The "China Threat" Issue: Major Arguments

Author(s): Denny Roy

Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 36, No. 8 (Aug., 1996), pp. 758-771
Published by: University of California Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2645437
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THE "CHINATHREAT"ISSUE
Major Arguments

Denny Roy

The futureof Chinais perhapsthemostpressingques-

tionin whatis becomingtheworld'smostimportant region.The possibility
of a "Chinathreat,"therefore,has becomea hotlydebatedtopic. This article
has twomainobjectives.First,it surveysthemajorarguments on bothsides
of the"Chinathreat" issue,makingan effort to achievea balancedrepresen-
tation. How one respondsto thesearguments obviouslydependsin large
measureuponone's politicalorientation, thatis, "pro-China" or "anti-China."
Less obvious,butperhapsequallyimportant, is the questionof theoretical
orientation.The article'ssecondpurposeis to showthata usefultheoretical
distinctioncan be made betweentwo classes of argument:arguments in
whichthe intentions of strategistsand policy makersmatterand those in
whichtheydo not. In additionto thesemainobjectives,thisarticlemakes
somegeneralpolicyrecommendations forpowerscontemplating howto best
respondto China's growingstrength.
Simplystated,the"Chinathreat"argument maintains thatan increasingly
powerfulChina is likelyto destabilizeregionalsecurityin the nearfuture.
This idea became highlytopical as China's economyposted exceptional
growthin theearly1990s. As manyanalystsnoted,a developedeconomy
could potentiallyturnChina's huge populationfroma weaknessinto a
strength,and giveChinathebasis forworld-class military and technological
capability.In short,
itcouldmakeChinaa superpower.The alarmist edgeof
muchof thiscommentary was based (sometimesexplicitly, sometimesnot)
on antipathy towardtheChineseCommunist Party(CCP) regimethathas
deep rootsbutit was re-ignited in 1989 by theTiananmenmassacre,which
dramaticallyendedtheSino-Western honeymoon of the 1980s duringwhich
Deng Xiaopingwas heldin highesteembecauseof his economicliberaliza-
tionprogram.

DennyRoy is ResearchFellow in theStrategicand DefenceStudies

Centre,Australian
NationalUniversity.
? 1996 by The Regentsof theUniversity
of California

758

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 DENNY ROY 759
As the"Chinathreat"argument tookshape,theChinesegovernment and
its apologists,includinga fair numberof Westernscholars,formulated
counter-arguments. The "Chinathreat issue,"as I use thetermhere,includes
bothsetsof arguments.The intensity of thedebatehas perhapsreachedits
apogee withthepublicationof AmericanjournalistCharlesKrauthammer's
essayand theChinesereply.Krauthammer characterized Chinaas a "bully"
to expanditsreach,"andproposed two-pronged
that"triesrelentlessly a strat-
egy. First,theUnitedStatesshould strive to "contain" China by cultivating
securityagreements withformer U.S. (and Chinese)enemies,Vietnamand
Russia,and by maintaining a strongalliancewithJapan,even if thismeans
overlookinga few inequitiesin the U.S.-Japantraderelationship.At the
sametime,Americashouldworkto undermine theCommunist Partyregime
and promotepoliticalliberalizationby supporting Chinesedissidents, pub-
China's humanrightsabuses,and opposingBeijing'sefforts
liclycriticizing
to accumulateinternationalprestige.' Krauthammer's extremeprescription
metan equallyextremeresponsetwo weekslaterin theChineseLiaowang
weekly. CallingKrauthammer a "Cold War knight," Liaowangdenounced
"preposterous,"
his "ravings"as "arrogant," and "an idiot'sgibberish."2

Arguments forViewing
Chinaas a Threat
Militarybuildup. Chinesedefensespendinghas risensignificantly in recent
years(a 21% increasewas budgetedfor1995),prompting manyanalyststo
ask whymilitary fundingis increasingwhenexternalthreatsto thePRC's
securityare at an all-timelow. Furthermore, China's military modernization
has includedacquisitionof weaponssystemsthatboostthePeople's Libera-
tionArmy's(PLA) capability toprojectpowerbeyondChina's shores-Rus-
sian Su-27s, RussianKilo class submarines, refuelingtechnology,
inflight
and a continuing interestin buyingor buildingone or moreaircraft carriers.
Since transparency is not the PLA's strongsuit and since China's armed
forcesget muchof theirfundingfromunofficial sources(e.g., armssales,
productionand marketing of civiliangoods), some of theestimatesof Chi-
nese armsspendingrunhigh. A Randstudy,forexample,used thepurchas-
ingpower-parity approachto arriveat thestunning figureof $140 billionfor
China's 1994 defenseexpenditures.
Manyobserversinferfromall thisthatChinaintendsto builditselfintoa
militarysuperpower by earlynextcentury, presumably to enforcea regional
hegemony.Masashi Nishiharaof Japan's NationalInstitutefor Defense

1. CharlesKrauthammer, "WhyWe MustContainChina,"Time,July31, 1995,p. 72.

SWB), FE/
2. Liaowang,August14, 1995, BBC, Summaryof WorldBroadcasts(hereafter
2382, August15, 1995,p. Gi1.

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 760 ASIANSURVEY,VOL. XXXVI,NO. 8, AUGUST1996
Studiesspeaksformanywhenhe accuses Chinaof "increasingits military
powerandtrying to establisha militarily
dominant positionin Asia bytaking
advantageofthecurrent whentheUnitedStatesandRussiahavecut
situation
back theirarmedforcesand defensebudgets."3Even Singapore,whichbe-
cameoutspokenly pro-Chinaafteritsnormalization of relationswithBeijing,
expressesconcern. "In Asia, China's risingpower and armsbuilduphas
stirred
anxiety,"PrimeMinisterGoh ChokTong said recently."It is impor-
tantto bringintotheopen thisunderlying senseof discomfort, even insecu-
rity,aboutthepoliticaland military ambitionsof China."4
ObservationsthatChina's armedforceswill notattainseriouspower-pro-
jectioncapabilityin thenearfuture5 do notnecessarily assuagethesefears.
The pointis notwhatChinacan deploynow,butin a decadeor two,witha
muchadvancedeconomicand technological base. In a recentPentagonwar
game thatenvisioneda Sino-U.S. naval war in theyear2010, theChinese
side reportedlyroutedtheAmericanforces. This resultstemmedfromas-
sumptionsthatChinese defensespendingand technologicalprogresswill
continueto grow,eventually enablingthePLA to "leapfrog"U.S. military
capabilities.6
CCP values. It is oftenclaimedthatnormssuchas politicalliberalization,
democratization,increasedhumanrights, thefreeflowof information,multi-
lateralism,thepeacefulresolution law,
of disputes,respectforinternational
and responsibleglobalcitizenshipareon theincreasewhileauthoritarianism,
state sovereignty, unilateralism,
nationalism, indifferenceto worldpublic
opinion,and theuse of forceto settledisputesor changethepoliticalstatus
quo are on thewane. If so, Chinaoftenappearsto be swimming againstthe
tide. Beijing has long generatedbad feelingamongmanyoutsidenations
withitspoorhumanrightsrecord,itsresistanceto multilateral discussionof
expansiveChineseclaimsin theSouthChinaSea, and itspersistent threats
to
use forceagainstTaiwan. Some of China's recentbehavior-theMischief
Reefincidentin theSouthChinaSea, themissiletestsoffthecoast of Tai-
wan,andcontinued missiletechnology
sales ofnuclear-capable toPakistan-
have hardenedtheseviews.

3. MasashiNishihara,"JapanHas Cause to WorryAboutChineseAmbition," International

Herald Tribune,July12, 1994,p. 3.
4. Quotedin MichaelRichardson, ChinaSetsOffAlarmsOver 'Containment',"
"A Resurgent
InternationalHerald Tribune,July7, 1995,p. 1.
5. KarlW. Eikenberry, "Does ChinaThreatenAsia-PacificRegionalStability?"Parameters,
25:1 (Spring1995),p. 28; RobertS. Ross,"An EnemyofConvenience," Trends,no. 51, Novem-
ber26-27, 1994,p. 1; KennethW. Allen,GlennKrumeland Jonathan D. Pollack,China's Air
Force Entersthe21st Century (Santa Monica,Calif.: RAND, 1995),p. 179.
6. BarbaraOpall,"ChinaSinksU.S. in SimulatedWar,"DefenseNews,January 30-February
5, 1995,p. 1.

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 DENNY ROY 761
AustralianscholarAnnKentnotesa "gap in valuesbetweenChineseand
Australians."Whatshe says aboutAustraliaappliesto theindustrialized de-
mocraciesin general:"Australialeads theworldin pushingfortradeliberal-
isation,whileChinesetradepracticeis riddledwithprotection and deception.
Australiais in theforefront of armscontrolefforts, whileChina is theonly
majorpower in the worldexpandingits militaryand the least inclinedto
multilateralism in securitypolicy." In a similarvein,GeraldSegal asserts:
"Today's Chinahas theleastcommitment to thestatusquo of anyimportant
power. It wishesto occupyTaiwanandtaketerritory frommostof itsneigh-
borsin East Asia. It wishestojoin theWorldTradeOrganization butwithout
beingboundby thedisputesettlement mechanism or otherrulesthatbindall
othermembers.It wishesto have access to our marketsbutnotto provide
access to itsown. It wishesto sell dangerousweaponsaroundtheworldand
dangeroustechnology to thelikesof Iran." A Far EasternEconomicReview
editorialcomplains: "Too oftenChina's actionsappearfoundedon the as-
sumptionthatits neighborsare, if not enemies,at least obstacles.. . . In
short,Chinaneedsto learnwhatitmeansto be a good neighbor."AndLarry
M. WortzelwritesthatBeijing"seemslockedinpre-coldwar,almostturn-of-
the-century modes of quasi-imperial competition forregionalhegemony."7
In sum,manycriticsaccuse theChinesegovernment towardthe
of hostility
modemvaluesthatarethought to promotepeace andprosperity. A powerful
Chinawiththesameanachronistic agendacouldonlyundermine thepillarsof
regionalstability.
Greatpowers behave like greatpowers. Froma simplegeopoliticalper-
spective,qualitativechangesin Chineseforeignpolicyshouldbe expectedif
Chinagrowsfroma medium-sized powerto a superpower.Paul Dibb argues
thatthemereemergenceof an economically muchstronger Chinawill upset
thecurrent equilibriumof powerin Asia and sparkrealignments by China's
neighbors.8At itspresentrateofeconomicgrowth, China'sproductive capa-
bilitiesand totalwealthwill soon outstripthoseof the otherAsia-Pacific
powers,and increasedrelativecapabilitiesmakeit feasiblefora risinggreat
power to exertmore controlover its surroundings. As a weakerpower,
China's dependenceon the favorof its neighborshas been comparatively

7. AnnKent,"China: On theRise or on theMarch?"CanberraTimes,July29, 1995,p. 17;

GeraldSegal, "We Can ShapeChinaas a CongenialSuperpower," Los AngelesTimes,August7,
1995, p. B5; "China Complex,"Far EasternEconomicReview(FEER), July20, 1995, p. 5;
LarryM. Wortzel,"ChinaPursuesTraditional Great-PowerStatus,"Orbis,38:2 (Spring1994),
p. 157.
8. Paul Dibb, "The Cold War May Be Over butFrictionRemainsin Asia," TheAustralian,
June6, 1995,p. 17. See also Dibb,"Towardsa New Balance of Powerin Asia," AdelphiPaper
of StrategicStudies(London),1995.
Institute
no. 295, International

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 762 ASIANSURVEY,VOL. XXXVI,NO. 8, AUGUST1996
high;as a greatpower,Chinawill behaveboldly,moreinclinedto forceits
will uponothersthanto consultwiththem.
If Chinafulfills
itsexpectedpotential,it will soon be a powerin theclass
of 19thcentury Britain,theSovietUnion,Nazi Germany, PacificWarJapan,
and 20thcentury America.Each ofthosecountries useditssuperior powerto
establishsomeformof hegemony to protectandpromoteitsinterests.There
is no convincingreasonto thinkChinaas a greatpowerwilldepartfromthis
pattern.If theopportunity arisesto establisha dominant role in theregion,
China can be expectedto seize it. This would notnecessarilyinvolvethe
physicalconquestand occupationof neighboring countriesbutwouldmean
theuse of varioustypesof coercionto maintain an environment favorableto
China's interests,
and notnecessarily to anyoneelse's.

Argument AgainstViewing
Chinaas a Threat
Constraints againstassertivebehavior. The anti-threat positionbeginswith
theargument thatChinamightnotbe able to developintoa "threat" evenifit
wantedto. Externally, theChineseare boundby interdependence withtheir
markets and suppliers.Havingtrieditbothways,theCCP is nowconvinced
thatstronglinkswiththeoutsideworldwillbestfacilitate theall-consuming
goal of economicdevelopment.This requiresthatChina have a peaceful
relationship withits neighbors, as seriousmisbehaviorwould destroythe
politicalenvironment andopportunities necessary foreconomicdevelopment.
GeneralSecretary JiangZemin,amongotherCCP officials, has insistedthat
an aggressiveor hegemonicChina is out of the questionbecause "China
needs a long-lastingpeacefulinternational environment for its develop-
ment."9
SeriousinternalproblemswilloccupyChina'sattention fortheforeseeable
future,makingforeignadventurism unfeasible. One such problemis rising
crime.GregAustinwritesthatwithDeng's economicreforms, publicorder
insideChinahas deteriorated to suchan extentthatthe"PLA willbe obliged
and resourceson internal,
to focusits attention notexternal,security."An-
otherkindof crisiswithpossibleforeignpolicyrepercussions is pollution.
JamesL. Richardsonsays China's massive environmental degradationis
likelyto precludeaggressiveexternal policiesin one of twoways: one,stop-
ping and reversing thecurrent arrayof damagingpracticeswouldconsume
vast resources,undercutting fundingfor an expansionof power beyond

9. JiangZeminspeechin Malaysia,"China'sPolicyTowardEast Asia,"November11, 1994,

textin Heping(Peace), no. 36-37 (March 1995),p. 4.

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 DENNY ROY 763
China's borders,or two, ignoringthe problemwill eventuallyjeopardize
China's economicbase.10
Benigntrackrecord. Pre-modern China was whatmoderntheorists might
terma regionalhegemon.If a society'shistorical and culturalpatternsinflu-
ence its presentand futurepolicy-making,theforeignrelationsof imperial
Chinamighttellus something aboutwhatto expectwhenmodernChinare-
turnsto thestatusof a top-rank
power.ButChenJianarguesthatunliketheir
Westerncounterparts, Chineserulerswerehistorically non-imperialistic,
de-
cliningto conquersurrounding "barbarian"
countries evenwhentheyhad the
meansto do so. The onlyreal instancesof territorial expansion,he argues,
occurredwhennon-Chinese Mongolsoccupiedthethrone.Explainingwhy
he did not considerChina a threat,MalaysianPrimeMinisterMahathir
Mohamedsaid: "If youlook at thehistory ofChinatheyhaveneverinvaded
neighboring countries."11
Yan Xuetongassertsthattraditional Chinesemorality guaranteesa strong
China will be a benignChina. "China's traditional cultureregardsit as a
shameto grabeconomicinterests by force,"he says. Chinesegongfu, which
"has a greatinfluenceuponChina'smilitary andpoliticalcircles,"includesa
code of honorteachingthatmartialartsshouldbe used "forimproving health
and self-defence,not forbullyingand humiliating the weak." Traditional
moralityteachesthatlike gongfu,war musthave a just purpose. Conse-
quently,whentoday'sChineseleaders"makea decisionon whether to use
force,theyare to a greatextentrestrained by . . . the normof righteous-
ness."12
ChineseForeignMinisterQian Qichenhas also reliedon Chinesetradition
usingtheConfucianadage,"do
forevidenceof Beijing'spacificintentions,
notdo untoothersthatyou do notlike othersto do untoyou" to strengthen
his claimthat"Chinawill neverthreatenor invadeotherscountries."13 Yan
suggestsa strongChina will be reminiscentof the 15thcenturyjourneysof
Ming DynastyofficialZheng He, who traveledthroughout the regionand
beyond,takingwithhima powerfulforcethatcould have easilysubjugated

10. GregAustin,"The StrategicImplications of China's PublicOrderCrisis,"Survival,37:2

(Summer1995), p. 7; JamesL. Richardson, "Asia-PacificSecurity:WhatAre theReal Dan-
gers?"in Coral Bell, ed.,Nation,Regionand Context:Studiesin Peace and Warin Honourof
ProfessorT. B. Millar (Canberra:Strategicand DefenceStudiesCentre,AustralianNational
University,1995).
11. Chen Jian,"Will China's DevelopmentThreatenAsia-PacificSecurity?"SecurityDia-
logue,24:2 (June1993), p. 194; GregSheridan,"MahathirBackflipon Our Asian Role," The
Australian,May 15, 1995,p. 1.
12. Yan Xuetong,"China's Post-ColdWar SecurityStrategy," Contemporary International
Relations,5:5 (May 1995),pp. 6-7.
13. "Give China 'Time and Space'," FEER, May 25, 1995,p. 30.

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 764 ASIANSURVEY,VOL. XXXVI,NO. 8, AUGUST1996
thepeoples he met. Instead,Zheng"triedhis best to disseminateChina's
and presentedthemwith appliances,
civilizationto the local inhabitants
seeds,books,utensils,silk,etc."
Militaryspendingnot excessive. While manyoutsidersare disturbedby
China's recentmilitary improvements, anti-threat
commentaries are quickto
noteseveralmitigating points. CCP leadersgave military modernizationa
relatively priorto the1990s,askingthePLA to be patient.As a
low priority
result,thebulkof China's current weaponsstockpileis outdated.Now that
theChineseeconomyis takingoff,and withthelessonsof theGulfWarstill
fresh,Beijingis movingto shoreup a neglectedarea. Moreover,in purchas-
ing modernweaponssystems, theChineseare merelyfollowingthepattern
set by theirneighbors throughout theregion.
school can manipulatestatisticsas deftlyas the China-
The anti-threat
threatschool. China's officialdefenseexpenditures are stillmodestrelative
to thoseoftheUnitedStatesorevenJapan,andmanyanti-threat analystsalso
liketo calculatemilitaryspending percapita,takingadvantageofthediluting
effectof China'shugepopulationwhenmakingcomparisons.Some Chinese
scholarsassertthatif inflationand thedepreciation of therenminbi against
thedollarare factored in,officialChinesedefensespendingshowsa decline
from1991 to 1995.14 Overall,China'sallegedmilitary "buildup"can be just
as plausiblyinterpretedas a routine,
moderate, and long-overdue moderniza-
tion.
Anti-Chinaprejudice. As partoftheircounterattack, criticshavequestioned
notonlythearguments butalso themotivesofthe"threat-mongers," whoare
oftenallegedto carrymean-spirited prejudicesor an ignoblehiddenagenda.
An obviouspossiblechargeagainstWesterners whocriticizeChinais racism.
More generally,thereis thefearof theOther.GaryKlintworth writes:"In
our mind'seye, we have thatNapoleonicimageof China as an awakening
Chinesedragon.... It is non-European, non-democratic and avowedly,the
last communist stronghold leftin the world." Anotherpossible sourceof
or professionalself-interest.
anti-Chinabias is institutional Austinasserts
thatexaggeratedclaimsaboutChina'sintentions andmilitary builduparepart
to propup continued
of "an effort levelsof defencespendingin theface of
severebudgetary pressures."ManyChinesescholarsmakethe same point.
ShenQurong,forexample,writesthatpeoplewhosee Chinaas a threat"are
lookingfarandwideforan enemyon purpose,fortheirold enemyhas disap-

p. 10.
14. Yan, "China'sPost-ColdWar Strategy,"

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 DENNY ROY 765
pearedwiththe end of theCold War and the disintegration of the former
SovietUnion. It seemsthatthesepeoplecannotgo withoutan enemy."15
Finally,and perhapsmostfrequently, is thechargethatmanyWesterners,
particularlyAmericans,areloatheto see Chinagrowfromthesemicolonized
"sickmanof Asia" intoa powerful politicalandeconomicrival. The United
States,accordingto thisview,wantsto keep Asia underitsdomination, and
thiscalls fora weak China. RallyingsupportamongChina's neighborsfor
an anti-Chinaallianceis anothertactic-along withhumanrightscriticism,
"peacefulevolution,"and thecampaignto preventBeijingfromwinningthe
rightto hostthe2000 OlympicGames-to "pin down thedevelopment of
China." Mockingdiscussionof a "Chinathreat"in theU.S. newsmedia,a
commentary bytheofficialXinhuanewsagencysaid,"it seemsthatonlythe
UnitedStateshas therightof development, whileChinadoes not. Chinahas
to remainpermanently poor and backwardand bow to thesubjugationand
exploitationof big Westernpowers."16
Securitybenefitsoutweighdangers. GaryKlintworth critiquesthe"China
threat"positionby arguingthatan economicallydevelopedChinaoffersthe
regiondefinitesecurity whilethepotential
benefits, dangersof a strongChina
areunlikely.An economicorpoliticalcollapsein Chinacouldupsetregional
by sendingout largenumbersof Chineserefugeesor by tempting
stability
otherpowersto invadeChina. A strong,unifiedChina on theotherhand,
wouldprecludethesedangers,whileprovidinga potentialcounterweight to
Japanor Russia. A unilateralChinesedriveforhegemonyis not a strong
becausea richerChinais morelikelyto democratize,
possibility withmoder-
atingeffectson Chineseforeignpolicy,and to becomemoreeconomically
interdependent withits neighbors.Given the two scenarios,a developed,
powerfulChinawouldserveregionalsecurity betterthana weak China.17

Responses to a GrowingChina
debateon howtherestof theAsia-
The Chinathreatissuehas also generated
Pacificregionshouldrespondto China's expectedemergenceas a great
power. Threegeneralpositionsare discernible:appeasement,
enmeshment,
and Krauthammer's favoredstrategyof containment.

15. GaryKlintworth, "GreaterChinaand RegionalSecurity," AustralianJournalofInterna-

tionalAffairs, 48:2 (November1994),p. 223; GregAustin,"A New Cold War in Asia?" ANU
Reporter(Canberra),June14, 1995, p. 4; Shen Qurong,"SecurityEnvironment in Northeast
Asia: ItsCharacteristicsandSensitivities,"
Contemporary Relations,2:12 (Decem-
International
ber 1992), p. 18.
16. The quotationis in Li Wenzheng,"Writing to Economist, ChineseAmbassadorto Britain
RefutedtheArgument of 'China's Threat',"People's Daily, August19, 1995, p. A3; Xinhua
quotedin International Herald Tribune,August24, 1995,p. 4.
17. Klintworth, "GreaterChina,"pp. 211-12, 219.

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 766 ASIANSURVEY,VOL.XXXVI,NO. 8, AUGUST1996
The appeasement position,prevalent in muchof SoutheastAsia, holdsthat
China's development cannotbe hindered or even significantly influenced by
outsidecountries.China's emergenceas a superpower shouldtherefore be
accepted,and thebestway theregioncan prepareforthiseventuality is to
avoid makingChina angry. Singapore'sSeniorMinisterLee Kuan Yew
warnedWesterncountries againstcurtailingtheirinvestment in China,saying
thiswould make the country"a xenophobic,chauvinistic force,bitterand
hostileto theWestbecauseittriedto slowdownor abortitsdevelopment."1
Like theenmeshment approach,appeasement advocatesChineseintegration
intointernationalpolitical,economic,and security organizations.Unlikeen-
meshment, however,theappeasement positionis pessimisticabouttheability
of outsidersto shape China, and places its faithin Chinese self-restraint
ratherthanoutsidepressureto ensuregood international behaviorbyBeijing.
"Ultimately, economicprogresscan producethe desiredchangesin China
betterthanthreatsand sanctions,"says SingaporeanPrimeMinisterGoh
ChokTong. "Risingaffluence, notgovernment decree,willbid up wages in
Chinaand improvetheworking conditionsof itslaborforce.A country that
has a stakein global tradeand economicgrowthwill have an interestin
upholdinginternational laws and standards.Over time,a successfulChina,
withits wealthof scientists is likelyto becomea fervent
and inventors, sup-
porterof intellectual
property rights."19
The enmeshment strategy seeks,in GeraldSegal's words,to "tie China
down." Also knownby themorevague term"engagement," whichis pre-
ferredby the U.S. government, enmeshment employseconomicincentives
and disincentivesto extractdesirablebehavior.Tougherthanappeasement,
enmeshment involveshardbargaining and low-levelcoercion. Segal's pre-
scriptionincludesstepssuchas requiring Chinato open itseconomyfurther
as a conditionforentryintothe World Trade Organization; demandingre-
of Chinesearmsand nucleartechnology
striction transfersas thepriceof
access to developed nations' technology;linking economic aid to Chinese
progressin humanrights;andproviding assistancein meetingspecificgoals
in whichtheChineseand theoutsideworldhave a commoninterest, suchas
reducingpiracyand environmental damage. Unlikeappeasement, enmesh-
mentpresumesoutsidepowerscan significantly moldChinaintoa shapethe
outsideworlddesires.20In thatsense,itrepresents thecontinuation of a cen-
tury-old(and largelyunsuccessful)Americanprojectto producethe ideal

18. Han Fook Kwang,"Asia Will Focus on DefenceIf US Withdraws," StraitsTimes,May

16, 1993,p. 1.
19. Quotedin FEER, "Give China 'Time and Space'," p. 30.
in U.S. government
appearsfrequently
20. This sentiment statements.Forexample,JosephS.
Nye,assistantsecretary security
ofdefenseforinternational affairs:"Pacificpowerand presence
stage and outcomescan still be influenced-thisis whywe choose to
is stillin a formative

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 DENNY ROY 767
China: prosperous, democratic,andresponsible(i.e.,pro-U.S.)in itsinterna-
tionalbehavior.
The enmeshment schoolbelievesit is premature to treatChina as an en-
emy;whether a strongChinawillbe a constructivepartner or a trouble-maker
is stilluncertain.Advocatesof containment, however,expecttheworstand
see no pointin delayingthecountermeasures whileChinacontinuesto grow
stronger.It is better,
in theirview,to getstartedwithCold War Two imme-
diately.The containment viewarguesthatChina'strading partners arestrate-
gically short-sighted, helpingto create what may well develop into a
superpowerthatcould ultimately threatentheirinterests.21Fears about
angeringor isolatingChina are misguided;China will behavebadlyin any
case, andifgranted anylatitude, theChinesewillonlytakeadvantageof itto
betterpositionthemselves formoreassertivemovesin thefuture.Insteadof
worrying aboutoffending China,therestof theworldshouldmaketheChi-
nese fear to rock the boat. The heartof the containment strategy,as
Krauthammer's articlemadeclear,is therecruitment of alliestojoin a coali-
tiontobalanceChinesepower.Manyhavespeculatedthatan assertiveChina
will rejuvenatethetroubledU.S.-Japanrelationship.An anti-Chinese con-
tainment strategy wouldalso providea newrationaleforthemaintenance of
U.S. forcesin East Asia.

theArguments:
Analyzing
The Questionof Intentions
ManyChina-watchers wouldagreewiththeassertion that"China'sintentions
are perhapseven moreimportant thanits capabilities."22This view,how-
ever,shouldnotbe accepteduncritically. Whetheror nottheintentions of
greatpowers(or buddinggreatpowers)matter, is, indeed,a keytheoretical
issue. The arguments advancedforor againsttheChinathreat can be divided
intotwo categories:"soft"arguments, whichconcerntheintentions of the
Chineseand of theiradversaries,
and "hard"arguments, whichdownplaythe
significance dealinginsteadwithcapabilitiesor anticipated
of intentions, but
unintended consequences.
In thecase of softarguments,theproblemwouldbe solvedif one of the
partiesimmediately involvedchangeditsattitude.Humanvolitionis pivotal.
The arguments aboutwhatkindof foreignpolicytheChineseleadershipin-

engageChina" (my emphasis). Quotedin MichaelRichardson, "A Resurgent China Sets Off
AlarmsOver 'Containment'," Herald Tribune,July7, 1995,p. 1.
International
21. DennyRoy,"ConsequencesofChina'sEconomicGrowthforAsia-PacificSecurity," Se-
curityDialogue, 24:2 (June1993),pp. 189-90. Roy latermoderatedhis positionsomewhat, as
in "Hegemonon theHorizon?"International Security,19:1 (Summer1994),pp. 166-67.
22. FrankChing,"China'sMilitarySpursConcern,"Far EasternEconomicReview,May 11,
1995,p. 40.

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 768 ASIANSURVEY,VOL.XXXVI,NO. 8, AUGUST1996
tendsto pursuewithits new military and economiccapabilityare soft;the
presenceor absenceof a Chinesethreat turnson whether theregime'sinten-
tionsare benignor malign.The arguments on bothsides aboutthemotiva-
tionsunderlying Chinesemilitary spendingand modernization also fallinto
thiscategory.So do thedebatesaboutthecharacter of Chineseforeignpol-
icy-"peaceful" and "neverseekinghegemony" versusforce-prone, irreden-
tist,domineering, and indifferenttowardinternational norms.The Chinese
counterattack againstWesterncriticism is a softargument as well,becauseit
alleges thata basic obstacleto good Sino-Western relationsis illegitimate
hostilitytowardChina.
Withthe hardarguments, by contrast,outcomesare not expectedto be
affected by variationsin humanattitudes butare logicallyextrapolated from
(allegedly)objectivecircumstances.The argumentthatan economically
powerful, unitedChinawillinevitably becomemoreunilaterally assertiveis a
hardargument becauseit presumesstructural politicalforceswill determine
thegeneraldirection of policy-making. The insistenceof current CCP lead-
ersthatthefuture China,evena strongChina,willnevertryto dominatethe
regionmeanslittleor nothing;even if thesestatements are sincere,over-
whelmingforceswill sweep suchsentiments away.
The hardcategoryalso includestwono-threat arguments. The firstis that
China is constrained frombeingassertivebecause of its internalproblems
andbecauseitis heldhostagebyitsparamount interestin economicdevelop-
ment.The secondis that,on balance,a developedChinaimprovesregional
securityby precluding morelikelydangerssuchas refugeeoutflowsand in-
vasionsby neighboring statesexploitinginternal Chinesedisorder.Bothof
thesearguments presumethathumanvolitionin general,andtheintentions of
policy-makers in particular,are neutraland constant;theymerelyride the
flowof externalevents.
The intentions questiontapsintoa largertheoretical issue dividingforeign
policyanalysts. Some assume thatforeign is
policy primarily drivenby na-
tionalleaders'assessment of system-levelconsiderations, andthatanystate's
primary foreignpolicyobjectiveis to maintainor enhancepowerrelativeto
otherstates,particularly the state'smostthreatening potentialadversaries.
Otheranalystsbelievethatunit-level considerations23 suchas domesticpoli-
tics,history,culture,and ideologydetermine foreignpolicy. The latterap-
proachis dominant amongSinologists.Some analystshavetriedto combine
bothapproaches, craftingexplanatory modelsthatsacrifice parsimony forso-
phistication.24The issueremainscontroversial, in largemeasurebecauseso

versusunit-level
23. For a discussionon system-level factors,see KennethN. Waltz,Theory
ofInternationalPolitics(New York: McGraw-Hill,1979), especiallychs. 4 and 5.
24. An exampleis Bruce Cumings,"The PoliticalEconomyof China's TurnOutward,"in
SamuelS. Kim,ed., Chinaand theWorld(Boulder,Colo.: WestviewPress,1989),esp. p. 206.

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 DENNY ROY 769
muchof thePRC's foreignpolicyappearsto be overdetermined-it makes
sensefrombothunit-level and system-level perspectives.Regainingcontrol
of Taiwan,forexample,wouldincreasetheBeijingregime'sterritory, popu-
lation,and wealthwhile at the same timeremovinga significant military
rival,butit wouldalso enhancethedomesticlegitimacy of theCCP faction
thataccomplishedit. Thus,eitherperspective could plausiblyexplainBei-
jing's strongreactionto Lee Teng-hui's1995 U.S. visit.
Froma systems-level perspective,the"soft"arguments are largelyirrele-
vant. All countrieshave basicallythe same intentions:to maintainor, if
possible,increasetheirsecurity andprosperity. Theirforeign policiesaim to
pursuetheseobjectivesbased on opportunities and dangersin the interna-
tionalenvironment. Variationsin foreign policiesamongcountries arebased
not on differing intentions but on differing relativecapabilities.All states
wish to controltheirenvironment but thisis feasibleonly forthe strong.
Increasedeconomicand military capabilitiesbroadenthe rangeof options
andlowerthecostsof usingforce.Therefore, in thecompetition amongcon-
flictingnationalinterests, strongcountriesare inevitablytemptedto force
theirwill upontheirweakerneighbors.Furthermore, since strongcountries
arepotentially dangerous to eachother,theirinterrelationsaregenerally tense
unlesstheyare allies againstanother,morethreatening power. Fromthis
standpoint, itis to be takenforgranted thatChinawilluse itsneweconomic,
technological, andmilitary strengthto dominateitsregioninsofaras possible,
and thattheUnitedStateswill seek to thwartthegrowthof thisnew rival.
Any two otherstatesin thepositionsof China and theU.S. wouldbehave
similarly becauseit is theinternational systemthatdrivesforeign policy,not
a particular state'sculture,ideology,or historical baggage.
If intentionsdon'tmatter, poor Sino-U.S.relationswouldseem likelyas
long as theU.S. remainsa greatpower,as long as China is perceivedas a
risinggreatpower,and no threatening thirdpartyemergesto drivethemto-
getherin a security alliance. Americanstrategists arecorrectto labelChinaa
"threat" in thesenseof a likelyaspirantto regionaldominance, and Chinese
strategistscorrectly fearU.S.-sponsored containment. For China's neighbors
and potentialadversaries, theworstis to be expected.The onlyquestionfor
them,assumingChinacontinuesto growrapidlyand to holdtogether politi-
cally,is how to prepareto meetChina's bid forhegemony.
On theotherhand,evenassumingthatthebasic goals of nationalgovern-
mentsare security and wealth,itis possibleto envisageforeign policyorien-
tationsin particular statesas rangingfromaggressiveto conciliatory.If so,
the"soft"arguments becomevitallyimportant. Undersomecircumstances, a
statemayjudge thatan assertiveforeign policywillbringthegreatestsecur-
ityand/orprosperity.In such a case, the state'sbehaviorwill growmore
assertiveas itsrelativecapabilitiesincrease.In othercases,however,a state

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 770 ASIANSURVEY,VOL.XXXVI,NO. 8, AUGUST1996
maydetermine thatitsinterests
are bestservedby a non-threatening posture
(e.g., postwarJapan). The keyissue,then,is whether thegovernment of a
strongstatebelievesa domineering, coerciveapproachwill fulfillits goals
betterthancooperation andcompromise.This maybe called "intention" but
it is reallya matter
ofperception.Factorsuniquetoparticular societies,such
as worldviewand historicalexperience, maystronglyinfluencethispercep-
tion. In someinstances, thestate'sforeign
policymightnotbe comprehensi-
ble withoutaccounting fortheseunit-levelfactors.

Conclusion:Respondingto
the Possible"Threat"
Understanding thetheoretical of intentions
significance exposessome of the
underpinnings of thearguments involvedin theChinathreatissue,and may
help studentsof Chinaand of international affairsdetermine forthemselves
thatsome of thesearguments are moresubstantial thanothers.The distinc-
tionbetween"soft"and "hard"arguments also carriesimportant ramifica-
tionsforpolicy.
The implication of thesoftor intention-intensive arguments is thata range
of possibilitiesremainsopen forfutureChineseforeignpolicy. The post-
Deng successioncrisismayindeed,as manyobservershave speculated,ex-
plain muchof China's recentprovocativebehavior.OfficialChinesestate-
mentsabouttheregime'sacceptanceof interdependence and lack of interest
in establishing
a post-ColdWar hegemony mightbe consideredovertures to
be builtupon insteadof propaganda.If intentions are malleable,the goal
shouldbe to createand maintain peaceful,cooperativeintentions. Apparent
CCP belligerence mightstemfroma fundamental senseof insecurity rather
thanfroma desireformaximumdominance.If so, concessionsaimed at
makingChinafeelmoresecuremightreciprocally spawna moreaccommo-
datingattitudein Beijing. ScaringChina, on the otherhand, would be
counterproductive.
Takingthesoftarguments seriouslyleads one to excludethetwoextreme
strategiesforresponding to a growingChina. It is possiblethatBeijing's
long-term intentions
strategic benign.Containment
arerelatively is therefore
unattractivebecause it forfeitsthepossibilityof a constructive relationship,
movingdirectlyto a worst-casescenariothatmightotherwisebe avoided.
Appeasement shouldalso be rejected;thereis no needto givethegameaway
whileBeijing's intentions remainuncertain.A mildformof enmeshment,
withemphasison rewardsrather thanpunishments, wouldseemthemost,and
reallytheonlysatisfactory option.The objectivewouldbe to convinceBei-
jing thatconciliationpays and heavy-handed unilateralism does not-to
bringChinaintothemuch-theorized "zoneofpeace" nowoccupiedbyNorth
America,WesternEurope,Japan,Australia,and New Zealand.

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 DENNY ROY 771
Based on thehardarguments, whichpresumethatpolicy-makers follow
geopoliticalimperatives, theChinesewill likelybehavemoreassertively as
theygrowstronger and will probablyconcludethattheyhave moreto gain
fromdomination thanfromcooperation.If sucha trenddevelopsunchecked,
it will eventually makethemitigating hardarguments (thata strongChina
represents moresecurity benefits
thandangersandthatChina'smilitary is not
presently capableof seriouspowerprojection)obsolete.
Fromthisstandpoint, therangeof appropriate policyoptionsis limitedto
outright containment at one end and a hard-nosed formof engagement at the
other.The latteris preferable becauseit wouldallowpoliticaltensionsto be
keptat a relatively low levelforthetimebeing,whileat thesametimelaying
thegroundwork forbuildingan anti-China security coalitionifthisprovesto
be necessary.A gatekeeping approachwouldbe ideal: generalsupportfor
Chinesedevelopment, withrewardsfordesirabletypesof Chinesebehavior
through increasedinternational assistanceandrecognition, butwithcriticism
andpunishment forundesirable behavior(e.g.,Japan'sreduction ofeconomic
aid aftertheChinesemissiletestsin theEast ChinaSea). A concurrent cam-
paignof peacefulevolution(i.e., subversion)wouldalso be consistent with
thisapproach.
Althoughthisarticlehas avoidedtakinga clearpositionon eitherside of
the China threatissue,it does yielda clear conclusionon the questionof
responsesto a growingChinaby theotherAsia-Pacificpowers: of thethree
possiblestrategies describedabove,Segal's enmeshment strategyis prefera-
ble to containment or appeasement.Withinthe generalframework of en-
meshment, thereremainssignificant leeway;negotiations withBeijingmight
be generousor demanding.It is significant thatbothhardandsoftarguments
lead to similarpolicyrecommendations. The enmeshment strategyis a sensi-
ble compromise in thefaceof uncertainty. It neithertrusts undulyin a rising
majorpower'sself-restraint, norincreasestensionshastilyandunnecessarily;
nordoes itprecludetougher actionin thefuture.Rather,it offersthechance
to "discipline"Chinesebehaviorthrough a structure of incentivesand disin-
centivesthatis a naturaloutgrowth of theinternational economicand polit-
ical tiestheChinesenow welcome. The desiredmessageshouldbe thatthe
worldwelcomesand will assistChina's development as long as China re-
mains peacefuland cooperative,but bullyingor defianceof international
normswillresultin decreasedgrowth opportunities and theemergenceof an
anti-China alliance.

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