Searches and Seizures

G.R. Nos.
100720-23 June 30, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROLANDO CODILLA, GERMAN LUCAÑAS and MARCELO PUTULIN, accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Erlich V. Barraquias for accused-appellants Lucañas and Putulin.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant R. Codilla.
REGALADO, J.:
Margarita Alpos, Helen Pepito and Letecia Pepito instituted four separate complaints with the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 12, Ormoc City, for rape against accused-appellants Rolando Codilla, German
Lucanas and Marcelo Putulin. Two separate complaints were filed by Helen Pepito and Margarita Alpos
against Rolando Codilla in Criminal Cases Nos. 3739-0 and 3740-0, respectively. German Lucañas was
charged with the same offense of rape by the same Margarita Alpos in Criminal Case No. 3742-0, while
Marcelo Putulin was also charged with the same crime of rape by Letecia Pepito, sister of Helen, in
criminal Case No. 3741-0.
These complaints1 were of the following tenor:
Criminal Case No. 3739-0
That on or about the 24th day of May, 1990, at around 3:00 o'clock in the morning, at Brgy. Concepcion,
Ormoc City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, ROLANDO
CODILLA y Dumalan, being then armed with a small pointed bolo, by means of violence and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the
complainant herein, HELEN PEPITO y Maglinte, against her will and in her own house.
All contrary to law and with the aggravating circumstance that the said offense was committed in the
dwelling of the offended party, the latter not having given provocation for the offense.
In violation of Article 335, Revised Penal Code.
Ormoc City. December 19, 1990.
(SGD.) HELEN M. PEPITO

Complainant
That on or about the 27th day of November, 1990, at around 3:00 o'clock in the morning at Brgy.
Concepcion, Ormoc City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- named accused,
ROLANDO CODILLA y Dumalan, being then armed with a handgun with unknown caliber, by means of
violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge
of the complainant herein, MARGARITA ALPOS, against her will and in her own house.
Ormoc City, December 21, 1990.
(SGD.) MARGARITA ALPOS

Complainant
That on or about the 24th day of May, 1990, at around 3:00 o'clock in the morning, at Brgy. Concepcion,
Ormoc City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, MARCELO
PUTULIN y Genoguin, being then armed with a small pointed bolo, by means of violence and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the
complainant LETECIA PEPITO y Maglinte, against her will and in her own house.
(SGD.) LETECIA PEPITO

Complainant
That on or about the 27th day of November, 1990, at around 3:00 o'clock in the morning, at Brgy.
Concepcion. Ormoc City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
GERMAN LUCAÑAS y dela Cruz, being then armed with a handgun with unknown caliber, by means of
violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge
of the complainant herein, MARGARITA ALPOS, against her will and in her own house.
(SGD.) MARGARITA ALPOS

Complainant
The factual milieu of these cases, as correctly and succinctly summarized by the Solicitor General with
page references to the transcripts of stenographic notes taken during the trial, is in concordance with the
findings of the trial court, and we adopt and reproduce the same hereunder:
In Criminal Case No. 3739-0, the private offended party, Helen Pepito, testified that she is thirteen (13)
years old, single and a student (tsn, Feb. 19, 1991, p. 13). At about 3:00 o'clock in the early morning of
May 24, 1990, at Barangay Concepcion, Ormoc City, she and her sister Letecia were awakened from their
sleep by a heavy rain (tsn, Feb. 19, 1991, p. 15). When she opened her eyes, she was surprised to see two
men wearing briefs and sleeveless shirts (tsn, Feb. 19, 1991, p.16). The men were carrying bolos and a
flashlight (tsn, Feb. 19, 1991, p.15).
One of the men asked her if they had money. When she replied that she had none, she was ordered to go
down to the kitchen with him. She obeyed the man out of overwhelming fear (tsn, Feb. 19, 1991, p. 18).
In the kitchen, one of the two men ordered her to remove her clothes. She initially refused, but when the
man pointed his bolo at her, she undressed herself. The men then held both her hands, inserted his penis
in her vagina and had sexual intercourse with her (tsn, Feb. 19, 1991, p. 19-20). When the carnal act was
consummated, she felt pain, in her private parts (tsn, Feb. 19, 1991, p. 20).
Helen Pepito identified the man who ravished her as Rolando Codilla (Ibid.).
Dr. Nelson Udtajan, Senior Resident Physician of the Ormoc District Hospital, testified that he examined
Helen Pepito on May 25, 1990. His findings, contained in Exhibit "A" of Criminal Case No. 3739-0,
show that Helen Pepito sustained lacerations in her hymen and indubitably indicated consummation of the
carnal act (tsn, Feb. 19, 1991, pp. 7-9).
In Criminal Case No. 3741-0, the private offended party, Letecia Pepito, testified that she is fifteen (15)
years old, single and a student (tsn, March. 4, 1991, p. 3). In the early morning of May 24, 1990, she was
awakened from her sleep by a light coming from a flashlight being focused on her face (tsn, Mar. 4, 1991,
p. 4). When she opened her eyes, she saw two men who pointed bolos at her and her sister, Helen Pepito.
One man ordered her sister to go down to the kitchen while the other brought her to the sala where he
ordered her to remove her panty (tsn, Mar. 1991, pp. 6-7). When she refused to comply, the man pushed
her to the ground, removed her panty himself and sexually abused her (tsn, Mar. 4, 1991, p. 8).
Letecia Pepito identified the man who raped her as Marcelo Putulin (tsn, Mar. 4, 1991, p. 10).
The defense admitted the authenticity of the medical certificate issued by Dr. Nelson Udtajan which
found that Letecia Pepito's hymen sustained lacerations that indubitably indicated the consummation of
the carnal act (tsn, Feb. 28, 1991, pp. 2-4).
Criminal Cases Nos. 3740-0 and 3742-0 involve the same private offended party, Margarita Alpos, and
the offenses were committed under the same circumstances and time.
Margarita Alpos testified that at about 3:00 o'clock in the early morning of November 27, 1990, she was
sleeping in her house at Barangay Concepcion, Ormoc City when she was awakened by the fall of her
gallon containing water (tsn, Feb. 28, 1991, p. 5). She stood up to go to the kitchen but was met by two
men on the stairs who pointed a flashlight on her face (tsn, Feb. 28, 1991, pp. 5-6). The two men asked
her to give some money, but since she had no money at that time, the two men brought her upstairs. Once
upstairs, the two men put out the light coming from an oil lamp. One of the men then put himself on top
of Margarita and succeeded in having sexual with her (tsn, Feb. 28, 1991, pp. 7-8). When he was through,
the other man took his turn in sexually abusing Margarita (tsn, Feb. 28, 1991, p. 8).
Margarita Alpos identified the two men who sexually abused her as Rolando Codilla and German
Lucañas (tsn, Feb. 28, 1991, p. 7).
Dr. Edilberto Calipayan, Medical Officer IV of the Ormoc City Health Office, testified that he examined
Margarita Alpos at about 3:00 o'clock p.m. on November 27, 1990 and he found that the victim had carnal
intercourse with at least two men about thirteen (13) hours prior to examination (tsn, Feb. 19, 1991, pp. 4-
7).
Sgt. Romeo Peñaranda, a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP) assigned to Ormoc City,
testified that at around 2:30 p.m. on November 27, 1990, he was at Brgy. Concepcion, Ormoc City,
responding to a rape case. Together with him were PFC Mamerto Sarcol, Jr., PFC Diosdado Tagalog, Pat.
Eduardo Bituin and CVO Manuel Pepito (tsn, Feb. 28, 1991, p. 32). They proceeded to the house of the
Barangay Captain who provided them with a guide to show them the place where the rape suspects were
hiding. The police were able to apprehend the suspects and brought them to the Ormoc City Police
Station. Margarita Alpos was able to identify two of the three suspects (Codilla and Lucañas) during the
custodial investigation of the case, as the persons who sexually assaulted her (tsn, Feb. 28, 1991, pp. 35-
36).
Helen and Letecia Pepito likewise identified the persons who raped them as Codilla and Putulin,
respectively, at the Police Station during the custodial investigation of the case (tsn, Feb. 19, 1991, pp.
30-31; 60).2
Accused-appellants, anchoring their defense on denial and alibi, present different versions which, as
culled from the joint decision of the court a quo, are respectively of the substantial import recounted in
the succeeding paragraphs.3
Appellant Rolando Codilla asserts that on the fateful day of May 24, 1990, at around 3:00 A.M., he was at
San Isidro, Leyte, working in the four-hectare cornland of Ernesto de la Cruz, having done so since the
middle part of March of the same year. He claims that he never left the place until August 6, 1990 when
he stopped working on the aforesaid land. This was corroborated by Ernesto de la Cruz who confirmed
having hired Codilla to harvest his corn from March, 1990 to August 6, 1990, and who supported
Codilla's claim that he never left San Isidro during this time.
Codilla also denies having had carnal knowledge of Margarita Alpos, claiming that on November 27,
1990, at about 3:00 A.M., when the alleged rape occurred, he was sleeping in their house at Sitio Tipik II,
Bgy. San Jose, Ormoc City.
Appellant German Lucañas, on his part, avers that having stayed in Manila for twelve (12) years, he came
home to Ormoc City on November 11, 1990 on board the M/V Cebuano Princess with appellant Marcelo
Putulin. On November 27, 1990, at about 3:00 A.M., he was at Sitio Tipik II, Bgy. San Jose, Ormoc City,
visiting his uncle, Gaudioso Potot.
Witness Gregoria Genoguin was presented by the defense to prove that she has known appellants Codilla
and Lucañas for fourteen years; that she was a resident of Sitio Tipik II, Bgy. San Jose, Ormoc City; and
that Codilla and Lucañas stayed in the barracks of Del Socorro at Brgy. Concepcion, Ormoc City.
As for appellant Marcelo Putulin, he alleges that she was in Manila on January 10, 1989 and he stayed
there until November 11, 1990 when he returned to Ormoc City with appellant Lucañas. While in Manila,
he sustained himself by selling hotcakes. Florentina Putulin, Marcelo's mother, was also called to the
witness stand to testify to the fact that her son was in Manila from January, 1990 to November, 1990 and
that he never left Manila during this period.
At the arraignment, appellants Codilla and Lucañas, assisted by Atty. Crisologo S. Bitas,4 and appellant
Putulin, assisted by Atty. Pablo Oliver, entered pleas of not guilty5 and, after a joint trial on the merits, the
court a quo rendered a joint decision, with the following decretal portion:
WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered:
1. In Crim. Case No. 3739-0, finding the accused ROLANDO CODILLA guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of RAPE defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. There being no
aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, the court imposes upon the same ROLANDO CODILLA the
sentence of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to indemnify HELEN PEPITO (in) the sum of P20,000.00;
2. In Crim. Case No. 3740-0, finding the accused ROLANDO CODILLA guilty beyond reasonable doubt
aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the court imposes upon the same ROLANDO CODILLA the
sentence of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to indemnify MARGARITA ALPOS (in) the sum of
P20,000.00;
3. In Crim. Case No. 3741-0, finding the accused MARCELO PUTULIN guilty beyond reasonable doubt
aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the court imposes upon the same MARCELO PUTULIN the
sentence of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to indemnify LETECIA ALPOS (in) the sum of P20,000.00;
4. In Crim. Case No. 3742-0, finding the accused GERMAN LUCAÑAS guilty beyond reasonable doubt
aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the court imposes upon the same GERMAN LUCAÑAS the
sentence of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to indemnify MARGARITA ALPOS (in) the sum of
P20,000.00;
As all three (3) accused are detention prisoners, the period of their detention shall be credited in full if
they conform in writing to the rules and conditions of convicted prisoners, otherwise only 4/5 thereof. In
the case of ROLANDO CODILLA, by reason of the two sentences of Reclusion Perpetua, the two
penalties shall be served successively in accordance with the provisions of Article 70 of the Revised Penal
Code.
SO ORDERED. 6
Appellants now invoke this Court's jurisdiction to review and reverse the decision of the court a quo,
contending that the latter supposedly erred: (1) in not considering the dubious circumstances surrounding
their arrest which is violative of their constitutional rights, and by indicating fabrication of charges against
them; (2) in not considering the conduct of the police investigators during the pre-trial identification of
appellants which was calculated to induce positive identification; (3) in giving credence to the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses despite their incredibility and unworthiness, and (4) in not considering
acceptable jurisprudence that identification arising from suggestive police behavior is unreliabe and
inadmissible for being violative of an accused's right against self-incrimination.7
During the pendency of this appeal, after it was proven that appellant Rolando Codilla escaped from the
Ormoc City Jail on July 27, 1991, the Court issued a resolution on April 6, 19928 dismissing his appeal
pursuant to Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court which provides, inter alia, that "(t)he court may
also, upon motion of the appellee or on its own motion, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from
prison or confinement or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal." It is a judicial
dictum that where the accused escapes from custody or jumps bail during the pendency of his appeal, the
appellate court has the discretion to either postpone the resolution of his case until his recapture or to
dismiss the appeal.9
Meanwhile, the Jail Warden of the Ormoc City Jail, Rodolfo D. Sonon, also manifested in a letter dated
August 11, 1992, that appellant German Lucañas was missing and the latter's whereabouts is unknown up
to the present. He expressed the belief that Lucañas was one of the victims of the flash flood which hit
Ormoc City last November 5, 1991. 10 In a resolution dated September 14, 1992, 11 the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) was ordered by this Court to investigate Lucañas' whereabouts. In response to NBI
queries, Jail Warden Sonon again manifested, in a letter dated September 22, 1992, 12 that Lucañas is still
missing.
After this investigation, the NBI submitted a report to this Court dated November 4, 1992, containing the
following excerpts:
03. . . . An interview was conducted at Ormoc City to determine the veracity of the report submitted by
the former City Jail Warden JUANITO CATIPAY. In an interview with JUANITO CATIPAY he averred
that because of the growing water occupying the ground floor at around 11:30 in the morning, he decided
to open the cell at the ground floor so that the prisoners could take refuge at the second floor or other
elevated portion of the jail. Minutes later, several people took shelter at the second floor making it
unmanageable coupled with the circumstance that everybody was in panic and concerned with his own
safety. . . .
04. . . . In view thereof, based on the interview and the spot inspection conducted by this Command
coupled with the fact that nobody was ever recovered after the calamity which was positively identified as
that of GERMAN LUCAÑAS, plus the fact that no witness could either confirm or deny the fact of death
of herein subject, nor could this command safely conclude the fact that he might still be alive, this
Command after a careful search for herein subject (in) in depth study of this matter respectively finds the
following:
1. That as to GERMAN LUCAÑAS being one of the victims of the flashflood which hit Ormoc City last
November 5, 1991, this Command based on the foregoing premises had found no basis to adopt such a
conclusion.
2. That as to his present whereabouts, the same remains unknown. 13
Atty. Erlich V. Barraquias, counsel of the record for appellant Lucañas, manifested that he does not have
sufficient knowledge to form a belief as to the whereabouts of his client, and that Juanito Lucañas, father
of said appellant, informed him that there has been no communication between him and his son since the
Ormoc City flash flood. 14
From the foregoing, it is not clear whether Lucañas died or merely escaped and is now hiding. At any
rate, in either case, his appeal will have to be dismissed and declared abandoned. If he has indeed
escaped, he is deemed to have abandoned his appeal in line with our pronouncement in People vs.
Quiritan, et al., 15 to the effect that if an accused-appellant escapes or refuses to surrender to the proper
authorities, he is deemed to have abandoned his appeal, and so his appeal should be dismissed. Moreover,
he is guilty of evasion of service of sentence under Article 158 of the Revised Penal Code. If, on the other
hand, he was indeed one of the victims of the Ormoc City tragedy, under Article 89 of the Revised Penal
Code his criminal liability, with respect to the personal penalties, is totally extinguished and as to the
pecuniary penalties, since his death occurred while this case is pending appeal, the civil indemnity to be
paid subsists and must be charged against his estate. 16
The conviction of both appellants Codilla and Lucañas must, therefore be affirmed, with the modification
that their respective civil liabilities should be increased to an indemnity of P30,000.00 for each offended
party, respectively raped by them. The circumstances of nighttime, dwelling and use of a deadly weapon
shall hereinafter be discussed as matters of law involved in these cases and our disposition thereof,
although the imposable penalty of reclusion perpetua has to be maintained.
As for appellant Putulin, his appeal from his conviction for the rape of Letecia Pepito stands and his
liability wherefore we shall now resolve, the discussion which follows being with reference to his
criminal liability alone.
This appellant starts his defense by challenging his warrantless arrest and detention for two days without
any charges being filed against him. 17 We have of necessity to reject this argument for the simple reason
that he is estopped from questioning the legality of his arrest. Any objection involving a warrant of arrest
or the procedure in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made
before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived.18 Besides, this issue is being raised
for the first time by appellant before this Court. He did not move for the quashal of the information before
the trial court on this ground. Hence, any irregularity attendant to his arrest, if any, was cured when he
voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of not guilty and
participating in the trial. 19
After considering the factual findings on which the impugned decision is based, we do not descry any
cogent reason to depart from the holding of the lower court. As has often been emphasized, on the matter
of credibility of witnesses the findings of the trial court are generally accorded great weight and respect, if
not conclusive effect, because it has the opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses while
testifying. Such findings may only be disturbed on appeal if there is any showing that the trial court
overlooked some material or substantial fact which if given consideration will alter the assailed
decision 20 and, as we have just stated, we do not find any such arbitrary oversight or omission by the
court below.
Letecia's account regarding the rape committed upon her was given full faith and credit by the trial
court. 21 We agree with the latter that Letecia is a credible witness, having testified in a categorical,
straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner, and having remained consistent on cross-
examination. 22 Her story finds ample support in the testimony of her sister, Helen, who was likewise
deflowered on that fateful day of May 24, 1990. The two sisters were able to identify their abusers
through the "lamparilla" which was then lighted inside their house. 23 Moreover, their claims that they
were raped that early morning have been corroborated by Anita Royeras, the wife of the barangay captain
of Barangay Catayum, Ormoc City, who had been conducting a surveillance in their community and had
observed that the three suspicious-looking appellants used to go home at around 3:00 o'clock in the
morning. 24
Although Letecia could recognize her abuser, as shown by the fact that she was able to describe the
latter's physical features at the police station a day after the incident, she did not know his name nor his
whereabouts. 25Nevertheless, on November 28, 1990, she was able to identify her defiler, who turned to
be appellant Putulin, when the latter was picked up and placed in a police line-up together with the other
two appellants herein. 26 This positive identification was reiterated in open court during the trial. 27
The scenario and details of the sexual abuse were fully established by the evidence for the prosecution.
After barging into Letecia's room, appellant Putulin threatened her with a knife and ordered her to go to
the sala. Along the way, appellant continuously pushed her, causing her to fall to the ground and sustain
bruises on her elbow. Upon reaching the sala, appellant Putulin commanded her to remove her underwear
and, when she refused, he remove it himself and then satisfied his bestial desire. Despite the struggle put
up by the overpowered victim, the sexual abuse was consummated. 28 Letecia was paralyzed with fear,
causing her to succumb to appellant's animal instinct.
Considering her tender age, the force and intimidation exerted upon her suffice to constitute that requisite
element of rape. It is well settled that the force or violence required in rape cases is relative; when
applied, it need not be overpowering or irresistible. 29 It need but be present, and so long as it brings about
the desired result, all considerations of whether it was more or less irresistible are beside the point.
So it must likewise be for intimidation, which is addressed to the mind of the victim and is, therefore,
subjective. Intimidation must be viewed in the light of the victim's perception and judgment at the time of
the commission of the crime and not by any hard and fast rule; it is therefore enough that it produces fear
— fear that if the victim does not yield to the lecherous demands of the accused, something would happen
to her at that moment or even thereafter, as when she is threatened with death if she reports the incident.
Intimidation includes the moral kind, as the fear caused by threatening the girl with a knife. When such
intimidation exists and the victim is cowed into submission as a result thereof, thereby rendering
resistance futile, it would be extremely unreasonable, to say the least, to expect the victim to act with
equanimity of disposition and with nerves of steel; or to act like an adult or a mature and experienced
woman who would know what to do under the circumstances, or to have the courage and intelligence to
disregard the threat. 30
For an innocent girl who was then only fifteen years old, we are satisfied that the threats made by
appellant against this complainant engendered in her a well-grounded fear that if she dared resist or
frustrate his lustful advances, she would be killed. 31
The defense attempts to discredit her testimony on the theory that she, together with her sister Helen, did
not immediately reveal the incident to their parents who were just sleeping in the room nearby and,
instead, just let the time pass crying and sobbing in one corner. 32 This specious contention cannot pass
judicial muster.
The fact that she and her sister did not immediately divulge their ravishment does not necessarily mean
that they were not sexually desecrated. Being then of very tender ages and utterly innocent of the ways of
the world, their temporary silence is easily understandable. They could have been terrified by the threats
of their ravishers and shocked into insensibility by the satyric acts they were subjected to. Young and
naive as they were, they ingenuously opted to momentarily suffer in silence if only to avoid humiliation
and embarrassment that may be brought about by the public disclosure of such dastardly acts. 33
It is likewise of no moment that the rape occurred with the complainant's parents, brothers and sisters just
sleeping in the nearby room. 34 It is not impossible nor incredible for her family members to be in deep
slumber and not be awakened while the sexual assault was being committed. As we have repeatedly
pointed out, rape can be committed even in places where people congregate: in parks, along the roadside,
within the school premises and even inside a house where there are other occupants. Lust is no respecter
of time or place. 35
We are convinced, in line with our previous rulings which we now repeat, that what motivated
complainant to come out in the open is her desire to obtain justice. It is unthinkable that a rural-bred and
minor victim like her would endure the embarrassment and humiliation of public disclosure that she had
been ravished, allow an examination of her private parts, and undergo the ordeal and expense of a court
proceeding if her story is a lie. 36 Considering the inbred modesty and antipathy of a Filipina to the airing
in public of things that affect her honor, it is hard to conceive that the complainant would assume and
admit the ignominy she had undergone if it were not true. 37 Besides, by testifying, she made public a
painful and humiliating secret which others would have simply kept to themselves forever, jeopardizing
her chances of marriage or foreclosing the possibility of a blissful married life as her husband may not
fully understand the excruciatingly painful experience which would always haunt her. 38
Appellant's alibi is too superficial and transparent to merit this Court's consideration, as he was even
caught fabricating stories to suit his defense. As correctly pointed out by the lower court, the fact that she
was in Manila since January 10, 1989 and returned to Ormoc City on November 11, 1990 does not
prevent him from being in Ormoc City on May 24, 1990 when the crime occurred. He was an unable to
present any witness who could prove to the satisfaction of this Court that on the precise date of May 24,
1990, at 3:00 o'clock in the morning, he was indeed in Manila.
On this point, we give credit to and quote with approval this observation of the court below:
On the claim of Marcelo Putulin that he was in Manila at the time Letecia and Helen Pepito were raped on
May 24, 1990, the accused's evidence does not inspire belief. The assertion by accused Marcelo Putulin
that he took a jeepney from Pier 17 to Makati and he found the place where his mother lives by just
asking people when he did not even have the address of (his) mother is too incredible to be true. The court
take judicial notice that there are no jeepneys in the pier area of Manila that have a direct route to Makati
and it is absolutely impossible to find the place in Makati where his mother lives if he did not even know
the address. Marcelo Putulin's claim that he came to know Rolando Codilla only in November 11, 1990,
through German Lucañas, is belied by the fact that the three of them were at one place at the barracks of
(D)el Socorro in Brgy. Concepcion, at the time of their arrest and their claim that they worked in the farm
of (D)el Socorro is too shallow. Marcelo Putulin and German Lucañas told the court that they had work in
Manila and came to Ormoc City in November 1990 to take a vacation. If true, why did they have to work
as farm laborers when their purpose in coming to Ormoc was to take a vacation? 39
Being aware of appellant's prevarications, the trial court had to advise the former's counsel not to ask
appellant any more re-direct questions, with the warning that he would "just be exposing this witness to
perjury." 40 Not even appellant's mother, Florentina, could sustain his fabricated defense, for when asked
how she was able to say that her son never left Manila for Ormoc City from January to November, 1990,
all she could say was: "Because every Sunday I have to visit him in his place because Sunday is my day-
off." 41 The rape occurred on May 24, 1990 which was a Thursday. It is, therefore, possible for appellant
to have arrived in Manila before Sunday, that is, before May 27, 1990, just in time for his mother's visit.
Besides, mother and son rendered conflicting testimonies on the witness stand, to which the former's
attention had to be called by the trial court:
Q Do you know if that was the first time that your son Marcelo Putulin arrived in Manila, that is January,
1990?
A Last January 15, 1990, it was the third time that Marcelo Putulin have gone (sic) to Manila, and the first
time he went to Manila he was yet single; the second time he was already married. 42
xxx xxx xxx
Q But you are not aware that your son testified that it was the first time, on January 10, 1990, that he left
for Manila, no other date and year when he has gone to Manila?
A Maybe he was just frightened because he is innocent and

illiterate. 43
xxx xxx xxx
Q When your son Marcelo Putulin arrived in Manila in January 1990, did he go direct(ly) to your house
or did you meet him at the pier?
A No. sir, because he went direct(ly) to my uncle and there he called by telephone.
COURT
Q Your son testified in court that he went direct(ly) to you, as a matter of fact the court was rather
surprised with the way he testified that he just took a jeepney from the pier to Makati and the court takes
judicial notice that there are no jeepneys to Makati. What can you say about this?
A. Maybe he was frightened because he was not used to testify before the court because he is illiterate. 44
The foregoing testimonial colloquy clearly does violence to what we have held in a number of cases that
evidence, to be worthy or credit, must not only proceed from a credible source but must, in addition, be
credible in itself. And by this is meant that it shall be natural, reasonable and probable as to make it easy
to believe. 45
Appellant also asserts that the police investigators induced positive identification by placing him and the
two other appellants in a police line-up by themselves only and by having them undress, thus violating
their right against self-incrimination. 46 We disagree.
The right against self-incrimination has been defined as a protection against testimonial compulsion. 47 It
prohibits the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused, not an
exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material. 48 Essentially, the right is meant to "avoid and
prohibit positively the repetition and recurrence of the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a
person, in a criminal or any other case, to furnish the missing evidence necessary for his conviction." 49
With the passage of time, this has been extended to any evidence "communicative in nature acquired
under circumstances of duress." An act, whether testimonial or passive, that would amount to disclosure
of incriminatory facts is covered by the inhibition of the Constitution. This should be distinguished,
parenthetically, from mechanical acts the accused is made to execute which are not meant to unearth
undisclosed facts but to ascertain physical attributes determinable by simple observation, like requiring
him to take part in a police line-up. 50 In fact, it has been held that to require a person to remove his
garments would not be violative of the right against self-incrimination. To require the accused to put on a
pair of pants and a hat to determine whether they fitted him for measuring or photographing of a party, or
the removal or replacement of garments or shoes, are not within the privilege against self-incrimination
too. 51
Contrary to appellant's asseverations, there was no undue influence exerted by the police upon the
complainant which induced the latter to positively identify him. As already noted, even right after the
incident, complainant was able to describe the features of her rapist at the police headquarters, and upon
being given the chance to identify the malefactor at the police line-up, she did so without faltering.
The cases to which appellant clings for his protection, far from favoring his cause, actually work against
him. First, in People vs. Cruz, 52 the lighting situation in the house was wholly uncertain and rendered
highly suspect and questionable, if not altogether infirm, the ability of the two girls to shape out a positive
identification of the appellant therein. Moreover, the identification at the police station was attended by a
great deal of whispered conversations, as well as by at least one unexplained conference elsewhere in the
municipal building, at which they were present immediately prior to their being confronted by the
accused. Furthermore, the witnesses there were unable to identify the accused at sight.
In the cases of People vs. Hassan 53 and People vs. Domingo, et al., 54 the eyewitnesses were not positive
enough as to the identity of the assailant. In fact, in the latter case, the witness even declared that he
would not be able to recognize the assailant, even if he were to see him again. In Chavez vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., 55 there was no issue as to proper identification, but only as to the accused being called by
the prosecution to the witness stand.
In the instant case, the environs were conducive enough for complainant to recognize her debaucher at the
time of the incident. As earlier stated, the "lamparilla" was still lighted when herein appellant barged into
her room. Moreover, upon seeing the suspect at the police line-up, she immediately identified him without
even the least prodding from the law enforcers.
As we have heretofore observed, a consideration of the modifying circumstances attendant to this case
would be virtually of academic value insofar as the aggravation of appellants' criminal liability and the
corresponding penalty therefor are concerned, 56 in view of the constitutional constraint thereon. It is felt,
however, that a disquisition is in order for future guidance as a sub silentio treatment may be
misconstrued as implying the non-applicability of said circumstances to these cases.
We rule that the court a quo erred in not appreciating the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and
dwelling. Nighttime, according to Viada, is that period of darkness beginning at the end of dusk and
ending at dawn. 57 Our Civil Code defines nights as from sunset to sunrise. 58 When the rapes were
committed at 3:00 A.M. on May 24, 1990, it was still "nighttime," and this aggravating circumstance can
be considered as long as it is proved, even if not alleged in the information. 59 It is obvious that appellant
Putulin and his two other co-appellants specially sought the cover of darkness to facilitate the commission
of the crimes without their being recognized, aside from ensuring their unmolested escape. They chose to
unleash their evil deeds at the unholy hour of 3:00 o'clock in the morning, taking advantage of the
stillness of a sleeping world. 60
The crime having been perpetrated in the house of the complainant, there can be no serious debate that the
aggravating circumstance of dwelling should properly be appreciated, considering the sanctity of privacy
which the law accords to a human abode.
The use of a deadly weapon which is considered as a qualifying circumstance in the crime of rape 61 is
likewise to be appreciated to constitute the offenses charged in these cases into what are jurisprudentially
referred as qualified rapes, such circumstance being alleged in each of the complaints in these cases and it
being uncontroverted that herein appellant was armed with a pointed bolo, appellant Codilla with a bolo
and a handgun, while appellant Lucañas used a handgun, to realize their criminal objectives.
Nevertheless, the penalty of reclusion perpetuaimposed by the trial court on appellants shall remain
because of the death penalty until the restoration thereof by congressional fiat.
WHEREFORE, with the MODIFICATIONS that the civil indemnity, which accused-appellants Rolando
Codilla, German Lucañas and Marcelo Putulin must pay to each of their victims for every crime of rape
committed by them against the latter, is hereby increased to P30,000.00; and that the aggravating
circumstances of nighttime and dwelling, together with the qualifying circumstance of use of a deadly
weapon, are duly taken account of in point of law as above explained and are hereby made of judicial
record in these cases, the assailed judgment of the court a quo is consequently AFFIRMED, with costs
against accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-10280 September 30, 1963
QUA CHEE GAN, JAMES UY, DANIEL DY alias DEE PAC, CHAN TIONG YU, CUA CHU
TIAN, CHUA LIM PAO alias JOSE CHUA and BASILIO KING, petitioners-appellants,
vs.THE DEPORTATION BOARD, respondent-appellee.
BARRERA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila (in Sp. Proc. No. 20037)
denying the petition for writs of habeas corpus and/or prohibition, certiorari, and mandamus filed by Qua
Chee Gan, James Uy, Daniel Dy alias Dee Pac, Chan Tiong Yu, Chua Chu Tian, Chua Lim
Pao alias Jose Chua, and Basilio King. The facts of the case, briefly stated, are as follows:.
On May 12, 1952, Special Prosecutor Emilio L. Galang charged the above-named petitioners before the
Deportation Board, with having purchased U.S. dollars in the total sum of $130,000.00, without the
necessary license from the Central Bank of the Philippines, and of having clandestinely remitted the same
to Hongkong and petitioners, Qua Chee Gan, Chua Lim Pao alias Jose Chua, and Basilio King, with
having attempted to bribe officers of the Philippine and United States Governments (Antonio Laforteza,
Chief of the Intelligence Division of the Central Bank, and Capt. A. P. Charak of the OSI, U.S. Air Force)
in order to evade prosecution for said unauthorized purchase of U.S. dollars.1
Following the filing of said deportation charges, a warrant for the arrest of said aliens was issued by the
presiding member of the Deportation Board. Upon their filing surety bond for P10,000.00 and cash bond
for P10,000.00, herein petitioners-appellants were provisionally set at liberty.
On September 22, 1952, petitioners-appellants filed a joint motion to dismiss the charges presented
against them in the Deportation Board for the reason, among others, that the same do not constitute legal
ground for deportation of aliens from this country, and that said Board has no jurisdiction to entertain
such charges. This motion to dismiss having been denied by order of the Board of February 9, 1953,
petitioners-appellants filed in this Court a petition for habeas corpus and/or prohibition, which petition
was given due course in our resolution of July 7, 1953, but made returnable to the Court of First Instance
of Manila (G.R. No. L-6783). The case was docketed in the lower court as Special Proceeding No. 20037.
At the instance of petitioners and upon their filing a bond for P5,000.00 each, a writ of preliminary
injunction was issued by the lower court, restraining the respondent Deportation Board from hearing
Deportation charges No. R-425 against petitioners, pending final termination of the habeas corpus and/or
prohibition proceedings.
On July 29, 1953, the respondent Board filed its answer to the original petition, maintaining among
others, that the Deportation Board, as an agent of the President, has jurisdiction over the charges filed
against petitioners and the authority to order their arrest; and that, while petitioner Qua Chee Gan was
acquitted of the offense of attempted bribery of a public official, he was found in the same decision of the
trial court that he did actually offer money to an officer of the United States Air Force in order that the
latter may abstain from assisting the Central Bank official in the investigation of the purchase of
$130,000.00 from the Clark Air Force Base, wherein said petitioner was involved.
After due trial, the court rendered a decision on January 18, 1956, upholding the validity of the delegation
by the president to the Deportation Board of his power to conduct investigations for the purpose of
determining whether the stay of an alien in this country would be injurious to the security, welfare and
interest of the State. The court, likewise, sustained the power of the deportation Board to issue warrant of
arrest and fix bonds for the alien's temporary release pending investigation of charges against him, on the
theory that the power to arrest and fix the amount of the bond of the arrested alien is essential to and
complement the power to deport aliens pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code.
Consequently, the petitioners instituted the present appeal. .
It may be pointed out at the outset that after they were provisionally released on bail, but before the
charges filed against them were actually investigated, petitioners-appellant raised the question of
jurisdiction of the Deportation Board, first before said body, then in the Court of First Instance, and now
before us. Petitioners-appellants contest the power of the President to deport aliens and, consequently, the
delegation to the Deportation Board of the ancillary power to investigate, on the ground that such power
is vested in the Legislature. In other words, it is claimed, for the power to deport to be exercised, there
must be a legislation authorizing the same.
Under Commonwealth Act No. 613 (Immigration Act of 1940), the Commissioner of Immigration was
empowered to effect the arrest and expulsion of an alien, after previous determination by the Board of
Commissioners of the existence of ground or grounds therefor (Sec- 37). With the enactment of this law,
however, the legislature did not intend to delimit or concentrate the exercise of the power to deport on the
Immigration Commissioner alone, because in its Section 52, it provides:.
SEC. 52. This Act is in substitution for and supersedes all previous laws relating to the entry of aliens into
the Philippines, and their exclusion, deportation, and repatriation therefrom, with the exception of section
sixty-nine of Act Numbered Twenty-seven hundred and eleven which shall continue in force and effect:
..." (Comm. Act No. 613).
Section 69 of Act No. 2711 (Revised Administrative Code) referred to above reads:.
SEC. 69 Deportation of subject to foreign power. — A subject of a foreign power residing in the
Philippines shall not be deported, expelled, or excluded from said Islands or repatriated to his own
country by the President of the Philippines except upon prior investigation, conducted by said Executive
or his authorized agent, of the ground upon which Such action is contemplated. In such case the person
concerned shall be informed of the charge or charges against him and he shall be allowed not less than
these days for the preparation of his defense. He shall also have the right to be heard by himself or
counsel, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to cross-examine the opposing witnesses."
While it may really be contended that the aforequoted provision did not expressly confer on the President
the authority to deport undesirable aliens, unlike the express grant to the Commissioner of Immigration
under Commonwealth Act No. 613, but merely lays down the procedure to be observed should there be
deportation proceedings, the fact that such a procedure was provided for before the President can deport
an alien-which provision was expressly declared exempted from the repealing effect of the Immigration
Act of 1940-is a clear indication of the recognition, and inferentially a ratification, by the legislature of
the existence of such power in the Executive. And the, exercise of this power by the chief Executive has
been sanctioned by this Court in several decisions.2
Under the present and existing laws, therefore, deportation of an undesirable alien may be effected in two
ways: by order of the President, after due investigation, pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code, and by the Commissioner of Immigration, upon recommendation by the Board of
Commissioners, under Section 37 of Commonwealth Act No. 613.
Petitioners contend, however, that even granting that the President is invested with power to deport, still
he may do so only upon the grounds enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, and on no
other, as it would be unreasonable and undemocratic to hold that an alien may be deported upon an
unstated or undefined ground depending merely on the unlimited discretion of the Chief Executive. This
contention is not without merit, considering that whenever the legislature believes a certain act or conduct
to be a just cause for deportation, it invariably enacts a law to that effect. Thus, in a number of
amendatory acts, grounds have been added to those originally contained in Section 37 of Commonwealth
Act No. 613, as justifying deportation of an alien, as well as other laws which provide deportation as part
of the penalty imposed on aliens committing violation thereof.
Be this as it may, the charges against the herein petitioners constitute in effect an act of profiteering,
hoarding or blackmarketing of U.S. dollars, in violation of the Central Bank regulations — an economic
sabotage — which is a ground for deportation under the provisions of Republic Act 503 amending
Section 37 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940. The President may therefore order the deportation
of these petitioners if after investigation they are shown to have committed the act charged.
There seems to be no doubt that the President's power of investigation may be delegated. This is clear
from a reading of Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides for a "prior
investigation, conducted by said Executive (the President) or his authorized agent." The first executive
order on the subject was that of Governor General Frank Murphy (No. 494, July 26, 1934), constituting a
board to take action on complaints against foreigners, to conduct investigations and thereafter make
recommendations. By virtue of Executive Order No. 33 dated May 29, 1936, President Quezon created
the Deportation Board primarily to receive complaints against aliens charged to be undesirable, to
conduct investigation pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code and the rules and
regulations therein provided, and make the corresponding recommendation. 3 Since then, the Deportation
Board has been conducting the investigation as the authorized agent of the President.
This gives rise to the question regarding the extent of the power of the President to conduct investigation,
i.e., whether such authority carries with it the power to order the arrest of the alien complained of, since
the Administrative Code is silent on the matter, and if it does, whether the same may be delegated to the
respondent Deportation Board.1awphîl.nèt
Let it be noted that Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, unlike Commonwealth Act No. 613
wherein the Commissioner of Immigration was specifically granted authority, among others, to make
arrests, fails to provide the President with like specific power to be exercised in connection with such
investigation. It must be for this reason that President Roxas for the first time, saw it necessary to issue
his Executive Order No. 69, dated July 29, 1947, providing —
For the purpose of insuring the appearance of aliens charged before the Deportation Board created under
Executive Order No. 37, dated January 4, 1947, and facilitating the execution of the order of deportation
whenever the President decides the case against the respondent. I, Manuel Roxas, President of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby order that all respondents in
deportation proceedings shall file a bond with the Commissioner of Immigration in such amount and
containing such conditions as he may prescribe. .
xxx xxx xxx
Note that the executive order only required the filing of a bond to secure appearance of the alien under
investigation. It did not authorize the arrest of the respondent.
It was only on January 5, 1951, when President Quirino reorganized the Deportation Board by virtue of
his Executive Order No. 398, that the Board was authorized motu proprio or upon the filing of formal
charges by the Special Prosecutor of the Board, to issue the warrant for the arrest of the alien complained
of and to hold him under detention during the investigation unless he files a bond for his provisional
release in such amount and under such conditions as may be prescribed by the Chairman of the Board.
As has been pointed out elsewhere, Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon whose authority
the President's power to deport is predicated, does not provide for the exercise of the power to arrest. But
the Solicitor General argues that the law could not have denied to the Chief Executive acts which are
absolutely necessary to carry into effect the power of deportation granted him, such as the authority to
order the arrest of the foreigner charged as undesirable.
In this connection, it must be remembered that the right of an individual to be secure in his person is
guaranteed by the Constitution in the following language:.
3. The right of the People to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized." (Sec 1, Art. III, Bill of Rights, Philippine Constitution).
As observed by the late Justice Laurel in his concurring opinion in the case of Rodriguez, et al. v.
Villamiel, et al. (65 Phil. 230, 239), this provision is not the same as that contained in the Jones Law
wherein this guarantee is placed among the rights of the accused. Under our Constitution, the same is
declared a popular right of the people and, of course, indisputably it equally applies to both citizens and
foreigners in this country. Furthermore, a notable innovation in this guarantee is found in our Constitution
in that it specifically provides that the probable cause upon which a warrant of arrest may be issued, must
be determined by the judge after examination under oath, etc., of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce. This requirement — "to be determined by the judge" — is not found in the Fourth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, in the Philippine Bill or in the Jones Act, all of which do not specify
who will determine the existence of a probable cause. Hence, under their provisions, any public officer
may be authorized by the Legislature to make such determination, and thereafter issue the warrant of
arrest. Under the express terms of our Constitution, it is, therefore, even doubtful whether the arrest of an
individual may be ordered by any authority other than the judge if the purpose is merely to determine the
existence of a probable cause, leading to an administrative investigation. The Constitution does not
distinguish between warrants in a criminal case and administrative warrants in administrative
proceedings. And, if one suspected of having committed a crime is entitled to a determination of the
probable cause against him, by a judge, why should one suspected of a violation of an administrative
nature deserve less guarantee? Of course it is different if the order of arrest is issued to carry out a final
finding of a violation, either by an executive or legislative officer or agency duly authorized for the
purpose, as then the warrant is not that mentioned in the Constitution which is issuable only on probable
cause. Such, for example, would be a warrant of arrest to carry out a final order of deportation, or to effect
compliance of an order of contempt. The contention of the Solicitor General that the arrest of a foreigner
is necessary to carry into effect the power of deportation is valid only when, as already stated, there is
already an order of deportation. To carry out the order of deportation, the President obviously has the
power to order the arrest of the deportee. But, certainly, during the investigation, it is not indispensable
that the alien be arrested. It is enough, as was true before the executive order of President Quirino, that a
bond be required to insure the appearance of the alien during the investigation, as was authorized in the
executive order of President Roxas. Be that as it may, it is not imperative for us to rule, in this proceeding
- and nothing herein said is intended to so decide — on whether or not the President himself can order the
arrest of a foreigner for purposes of investigation only, and before a definitive order of deportation has
been issued. We are merely called upon to resolve herein whether, conceding without deciding that the
President can personally order the arrest of the alien complained of, such power can be delegated by him
to the Deportation Board. Unquestionably, the exercise of the power to order the arrest of an individual
demands the exercise of discretion by the one issuing the same, to determine whether under specific
circumstances, the curtailment of the liberty of such person is warranted. The fact that the Constitution
itself, as well as the statute relied upon, prescribe the manner by which the warrant may be issued,
conveys the intent to make the issuance of such warrant dependent upon conditions the determination of
the existence of which requires the use of discretion by the person issuing the same. In other words, the
discretion of whether a warrant of arrest shall issue or not is personal to the one upon whom the authority
devolves. And authorities are to the effect that while ministerial duties may be delegated, official
functions requiring the exercise of discretion and judgment, may not be so delegated. Indeed, an implied
grant of power, considering that no express authority was granted by the law on the matter under
discussion, that would serve the curtailment or limitation on the fundamental right of a person, such as his
security to life and liberty, must be viewed with caution, if we are to give meaning to the guarantee
contained in the Constitution. If this is so, then guarantee a delegation of that implied power, nebulous as
it is, must be rejected as inimical to the liberty of the people. The guarantees of human rights and freedom
can not be made to rest precariously on such a shaky foundation.
We are not unaware of the statements made by this Court in the case of Tan Sin v. Deportation
Board (G.R. No. L-11511, Nov. 28,1958). It may be stated, however, that the power of arrest was not
squarely raised in that proceeding, but only as a consequence of therein petitioner's proposition that the
President had no inherent power to deport and that the charges filed against him did not constitute ground
for deportation. .
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Executive Order No. 398, series of 1951, insofar as it empowers the
Deportation Board to issue warrant of arrest upon the filing of formal charges against an alien or aliens
and to fix bond and prescribe the conditions for the temporary release of said aliens, is declared illegal. As
a consequence, the order of arrest issued by the respondent Deportation Board is declared null and void
and the bonds filed pursuant to such order of arrest, decreed cancelled. With the foregoing modification,
the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed. No costs. So ordered.
BACHE & CO. (PHIL.), INC. and FREDERICK E. SEGGERMAN, Petitioners, v. HON. JUDGE
VIVENCIO M. RUIZ, MISAEL P. VERA, in his capacity as Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
ARTURO LOGRONIO, RODOLFO DE LEON, GAVINO VELASQUEZ, MIMIR DELLOSA,
NICANOR ALCORDO, JOHN DOE, JOHN DOE, JOHN DOE, and JOHN DOE, Respondents.
San Juan, Africa, Gonzales & San Agustin, for Petitioners.
Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Crispin V . Bautista, Solicitor Pedro
A. Ramirez and Special Attorney Jaime M. Maza for Respondents.
DECISION
VILLAMOR, J.:
This is an original action of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for a writ of preliminary
mandatory and prohibitory injunction. In their petition Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc., a corporation duly
organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, and its President, Frederick E. Seggerman, pray
this Court to declare null and void Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 issued by respondent Judge on February
25, 1970; to order respondents to desist from enforcing the same and/or keeping the documents, papers
and effects seized by virtue thereof, as well as from enforcing the tax assessments on petitioner
corporation alleged by petitioners to have been made on the basis of the said documents, papers and
effects, and to order the return of the latter to petitioners. We gave due course to the petition but did not
issue the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for therein.
The pertinent facts of this case, as gathered from record, are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
On February 24, 1970, respondent Misael P. Vera, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter
addressed to respondent Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search warrant against
petitioners for violation of Section 46(a) of the National Internal Revenue Code, in relation to all other
pertinent provisions thereof, particularly Sections 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209, and authorizing Revenue
Examiner Rodolfo de Leon, one of herein respondents, to make and file the application for search warrant
which was attached to the letter.
In the afternoon of the following day, February 25, 1970, respondent De Leon and his witness, respondent
Arturo Logronio, went to the Court of First Instance of Rizal. They brought with them the following
papers: respondent Vera’s aforesaid letter-request; an application for search warrant already filled up but
still unsigned by respondent De Leon; an affidavit of respondent Logronio subscribed before respondent
De Leon; a deposition in printed form of respondent Logronio already accomplished and signed by him
but not yet subscribed; and a search warrant already accomplished but still unsigned by respondent Judge.
At that time respondent Judge was hearing a certain case; so, by means of a note, he instructed his Deputy
Clerk of Court to take the depositions of respondents De Leon and Logronio. After the session had
adjourned, respondent Judge was informed that the depositions had already been taken. The stenographer,
upon request of respondent Judge, read to him her stenographic notes; and thereafter, respondent Judge
asked respondent Logronio to take the oath and warned him that if his deposition was found to be false
and without legal basis, he could be charged for perjury. Respondent Judge signed respondent de Leon’s
application for search warrant and respondent Logronio’s deposition, Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 was
then sign by respondent Judge and accordingly issued.
Three days later, or on February 28, 1970, which was a Saturday, the BIR agents served the search
warrant petitioners at the offices of petitioner corporation on Ayala Avenue, Makati, Rizal. Petitioners’
lawyers protested the search on the ground that no formal complaint or transcript of testimony was
attached to the warrant. The agents nevertheless proceeded with their search which yielded six boxes of
documents.
On March 3, 1970, petitioners filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Rizal praying that the
search warrant be quashed, dissolved or recalled, that preliminary prohibitory and mandatory writs of
injunction be issued, that the search warrant be declared null and void, and that the respondents be
ordered to pay petitioners, jointly and severally, damages and attorney’s fees. On March 18, 1970, the
respondents, thru the Solicitor General, filed an answer to the petition. After hearing, the court, presided
over by respondent Judge, issued on July 29, 1970, an order dismissing the petition for dissolution of the
search warrant. In the meantime, or on April 16, 1970, the Bureau of Internal Revenue made tax
assessments on petitioner corporation in the total sum of P2,594,729.97, partly, if not entirely, based on
the documents thus seized. Petitioners came to this Court.
The petition should be granted for the following reasons:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Respondent Judge failed to personally examine the complainant and his witness.
The pertinent provisions of the Constitution of the Philippines and of the Revised Rules of Court
are:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(3) The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized." (Art. III, Sec. 1, Constitution.)
"SEC. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable
cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined by the judge or justice of the peace after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
"No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.
"SEC. 4. Examination of the applicant. — The judge or justice of the peace must, before issuing the
warrant, personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce
and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented
to him." (Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court.)
The examination of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, required by Art. III, Sec. 1, par. 3,
of the Constitution, and by Secs. 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, should be conducted by
the judge himself and not by others. The phrase "which shall be determined by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce," appearing
in the said constitutional provision, was introduced by Delegate Francisco as an amendment to the draft
submitted by the Sub-Committee of Seven. The following discussion in the Constitutional Convention
(Laurel, Proceedings of the Philippine Constitutional Convention, Vol. III, pp. 755-757) is
enlightening:jgc:
x x
"MR. LAUREL. . . . The reason why we are in favor of this amendment is because we are incorporating
in our constitution something of a fundamental character. Now, before a judge could issue a search
warrant, he must be under the obligation to examine personally under oath the complainant and if he has
any witness, the witnesses that he may produce . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
The implementing rule in the Revised Rules of Court, Sec. 4, Rule 126, is more emphatic and candid, for
it requires the judge, before issuing a search warrant, to "personally examine on oath or affirmation the
complainant and any witnesses he may produce . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
Personal examination by the judge of the complainant and his witnesses is necessary to enable him to
determine the existence or non-existence of a probable cause, pursuant to Art. III, Sec. 1, par. 3, of the
Constitution, and Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, both of which prohibit the issuance of
warrants except "upon probable cause." The determination of whether or not a probable cause exists calls
for the exercise of judgment after a judicial appraisal of facts and should not be allowed to be delegated in
the absence of any rule to the contrary.
In the case at bar, no personal examination at all was conducted by respondent Judge of the complainant
(respondent De Leon) and his witness (respondent Logronio). While it is true that the complainant’s
application for search warrant and the witness’ printed-form deposition were subscribed and sworn to
before respondent Judge, the latter did not ask either of the two any question the answer to which could
possibly be the basis for determining whether or not there was probable cause against herein petitioners.
Indeed, the participants seem to have attached so little significance to the matter that notes of the
proceedings before respondent Judge were not even taken. At this juncture it may be well to recall the
salient facts. The transcript of stenographic notes (pp. 61-76, April 1, 1970, Annex J-2 of the Petition)
taken at the hearing of this case in the court below shows that per instruction of respondent Judge, Mr.
Eleodoro V. Gonzales, Special Deputy Clerk of Court, took the depositions of the complainant and his
witness, and that stenographic notes thereof were taken by Mrs. Gaspar. At that time respondent Judge
was at the sala hearing a case. After respondent Judge was through with the hearing, Deputy Clerk
Gonzales, stenographer Gaspar, complainant De Leon and witness Logronio went to respondent Judge’s
chamber and informed the Judge that they had finished the depositions. Respondent Judge then requested
the stenographer to read to him her stenographic notes. Special Deputy Clerk Gonzales testified as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"A And after finishing reading the stenographic notes, the Honorable Judge requested or instructed them,
requested Mr. Logronio to raise his hand and warned him if his deposition will be found to be false and
without legal basis, he can be charged criminally for perjury. The Honorable Court told Mr. Logronio
whether he affirms the facts contained in his deposition and the affidavit executed before Mr. Rodolfo de
Leon.
"Q And thereafter?
"A And thereafter, he signed the deposition of Mr. Logronio.
"Q Who is this he?
"A The Honorable Judge.
"Q The deposition or the affidavit?
"A The affidavit, Your Honor."cralaw virtua1aw library
Thereafter, respondent Judge signed the search warrant.
The participation of respondent Judge in the proceedings which led to the issuance of Search Warrant No.
2-M-70 was thus limited to listening to the stenographer’s readings of her notes, to a few words of
warning against the commission of perjury, and to administering the oath to the complainant and his
witness. This cannot be consider a personal examination. If there was an examination at all of the
complainant and his witness, it was the one conducted by the Deputy Clerk of Court. But, as stated, the
Constitution and the rules require a personal examination by the judge. It was precisely on account of the
intention of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention to make it a duty of the issuing judge to
personally examine the complainant and his witnesses that the question of how much time would be
consumed by the judge in examining them came up before the Convention, as can be seen from the record
of the proceedings quoted above. The reading of the stenographic notes to respondent Judge did not
constitute sufficient compliance with the constitutional mandate and the rule; for by that manner
respondent Judge did not have the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the complainant and his
witness, and to propound initial and follow-up questions which the judicial mind, on account of its
training, was in the best position to conceive. These were important in arriving at a sound inference on the
all-important question of whether or not there was probable cause.
2. The search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense.
Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 was issued for" [v]iolation of Sec. 46(a) of the National Internal Revenue
Code in relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof particularly Secs. 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209." The
question is: Was the said search warrant issued "in connection with one specific offense," as required by
Sec. 3, Rule 126?
To arrive at the correct answer it is essential to examine closely the provisions of the Tax Code referred to
above. Thus we find the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Sec. 46(a) requires the filing of income tax returns by corporations.
Sec. 53 requires the withholding of income taxes at source.
Sec. 72 imposes surcharges for failure to render income tax returns and for rendering false and fraudulent
returns.
Sec. 73 provides the penalty for failure to pay the income tax, to make a return or to supply the
information required under the Tax Code.
Sec. 208 penalizes" [a]ny person who distills, rectifies, repacks, compounds, or manufactures any article
subject to a specific tax, without having paid the privilege tax therefore, or who aids or abets in the
conduct of illicit distilling, rectifying, compounding, or illicit manufacture of any article subject to
specific tax . . .," and provides that in the case of a corporation, partnership, or association, the official
and/or employee who caused the violation shall be responsible.
Sec. 209 penalizes the failure to make a return of receipts, sales, business, or gross value of output
removed, or to pay the tax due thereon.
The search warrant in question was issued for at least four distinct offenses under the Tax Code. The first
is the violation of Sec. 46(a), Sec. 72 and Sec. 73 (the filing of income tax returns), which are interrelated.
The second is the violation of Sec. 53 (withholding of income taxes at source). The third is the violation
of Sec. 208 (unlawful pursuit of business or occupation); and the fourth is the violation of Sec. 209
(failure to make a return of receipts, sales, business or gross value of output actually removed or to pay
the tax due thereon). Even in their classification the six above-mentioned provisions are embraced in two
different titles: Secs. 46(a), 53, 72 and 73 are under Title II (Income Tax); while Secs. 208 and 209 are
under Title V (Privilege Tax on Business and Occupation).
Respondents argue that Stonehill, Et. Al. v. Diokno, Et Al., L-19550, June 19, 1967 (20 SCRA 383), is
not applicable, because there the search warrants were issued for "violation of Central Bank Laws,
Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code;" whereas, here Search Warrant No 2-M-70 was issued
for violation of only one code, i.e., the National Internal Revenue Code. The distinction more apparent
than real, because it was precisely on account of the Stonehill incident, which occurred sometime before
the present Rules of Court took effect on January 1, 1964, that this Court amended the former rule by
inserting therein the phrase "in connection with one specific offense," and adding the sentence "No search
warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense," in what is now Sec. 3, Rule 126. Thus we said in
Stonehill:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search warrants,
that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court that ‘a search
warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense.’ Not satisfied
with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that ‘no search warrant shall issue
for more than one specific offense.’"
3. The search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be seized.
The documents, papers and effects sought to be seized are described in Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 in
this manner:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Unregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers, journals, columnars, receipts and disbursements
books, customers ledgers); receipts for payments received; certificates of stocks and securities; contracts,
promissory notes and deeds of sale; telex and coded messages; business communications, accounting and
business records; checks and check stubs; records of bank deposits and withdrawals; and records of
foreign remittances, covering the years 1966 to 1970."
The description does not meet the requirement in Art III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution, and of Sec. 3, Rule
126 of the Revised Rules of Court, that the warrant should particularly describe the things to be seized.
In Stonehill, this Court, speaking thru Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was
compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:
‘Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios,
credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or paper showing all business transactions including
disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss statements.’
"Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions
of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned
the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature,
thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights — that the things to be seized be
particularly described — as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general
warrants."cralaw virtua1aw library
While the term "all business transactions" does not appear in Search Warrant No. 2-M-70, the said
warrant nevertheless tends to defeat the major objective of the Bill of Rights, i.e., the elimination of
general warrants, for the language used therein is so all-embracing as to include all conceivable records of
petitioner corporation, which, if seized, could possibly render its business inoperative.
In Uy Kheytin, Et. Al. v. Villareal, etc., Et Al., 42 Phil. 886, 896, this Court had occasion to explain the
purpose of the requirement that the warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the
things to be seized, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . Both the Jones Law (sec. 3) and General Orders No. 58 (sec. 97) specifically require that a search
warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized. The evident
purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those, and only those,
particularly described in the search warrant — to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding
what articles they shall seize, to the end that ‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ may not be made, —
that abuses may not be committed. That this is the correct interpretation of this constitutional provision is
borne out by American authorities."cralaw virtua1aw library
The purpose as thus explained could, surely and effectively, be defeated under the search warrant issued
in this case.
A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the description therein
is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow (People v. Rubio; 57 Phil. 384); or when the
description expresses a conclusion of fact — not of law — by which the warrant officer may be guided in
making the search and seizure (idem., dissent of Abad Santos, J.,); or when the things described are
limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued (Sec. 2,
Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court). The herein search warrant does not conform to any of the foregoing
tests. If the articles desired to be seized have any direct relation to an offense committed, the applicant
must necessarily have some evidence, other than those articles, to prove the said offense; and the articles
subject of search and seizure should come in handy merely to strengthen such evidence. In this event, the
description contained in the herein disputed warrant should have mentioned, at least, the dates, amounts,
persons, and other pertinent data regarding the receipts of payments, certificates of stocks and securities,
contracts, promissory notes, deeds of sale, messages and communications, checks, bank deposits and
withdrawals, records of foreign remittances, among others, enumerated in the warrant.
Respondents contend that certiorari does not lie because petitioners failed to file a motion for
reconsideration of respondent Judge’s order of July 29, 1970. The contention is without merit. In the first
place, when the questions raised before this Court are the same as those which were squarely raised in and
passed upon by the court below, the filing of a motion for reconsideration in said court
before certiorari can be instituted in this Court is no longer a prerequisite. (Pajo, etc., Et. Al. v. Ago, Et
Al., 108 Phil., 905). In the second place, the rule requiring the filing of a motion for reconsideration
before an application for a writ of certiorari can be entertained was never intended to be applied without
considering the circumstances. (Matutina v. Buslon, Et Al., 109 Phil., 140.) In the case at bar time is of
the essence in view of the tax assessments sought to be enforced by respondent officers of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue against petitioner corporation, On account of which immediate and more direct action
becomes necessary. (Matute v. Court of Appeals, Et Al., 26 SCRA 768.) Lastly, the rule does not apply
where, as in this case, the deprivation of petitioners’ fundamental right to due process taints the
proceeding against them in the court below not only with irregularity but also with nullity. (Matute v.
Court of Appeals, Et Al., supra.)
It is next contended by respondents that a corporation is not entitled to protection against unreasonable
search and seizures. Again, we find no merit in the contention.
"Although, for the reasons above stated, we are of the opinion that an officer of a corporation which is
charged with a violation of a statute of the state of its creation, or of an act of Congress passed in the
exercise of its constitutional powers, cannot refuse to produce the books and papers of such corporation,
we do not wish to be understood as holding that a corporation is not entitled to immunity, under the 4th
Amendment, against unreasonable searches and seizures. A corporation is, after all, but an association of
individuals under an assumed name and with a distinct legal entity. In organizing itself as a collective
body it waives no constitutional immunities appropriate to such body. Its property cannot be taken
without compensation. It can only be proceeded against by due process of law, and is protected, under the
14th Amendment, against unlawful discrimination . . ." (Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 50 L. ed. 652.)
"In Linn v. United States, 163 C.C.A. 470, 251 Fed. 476, 480, it was thought that a different rule applied
to a corporation, the ground that it was not privileged from producing its books and papers. But the rights
of a corporation against unlawful search and seizure are to be protected even if the same result might have
been achieved in a lawful way." (Silverthorne Lumber Company, Et. Al. v. United States of America, 251
U.S. 385, 64 L. ed. 319.)
In Stonehill, Et. Al. v. Diokno, Et Al., supra, this Court impliedly recognized the right of a corporation to
object against unreasonable searches and seizures, thus:
"As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the legality of
the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said
corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein
petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or the interest of each of them in said corporations,
whatever, the offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can
be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an
unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. Consequently,
petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and
things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object
to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized
effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their
individual capacity . . .
In the Stonehill case only the officers of the various corporations in whose offices documents, papers and
effects were searched and seized were the petitioners. In the case at bar, the corporation to whom the
seized documents belong, and whose rights have thereby been impaired, is itself a petitioner. On that
score, petitioner corporation here stands on a different footing from the corporations in Stonehill.
The tax assessments referred to earlier in this opinion were, if not entirely — as claimed by petitioners —
at least partly — as in effect admitted by respondents — based on the documents seized by virtue of
Search Warrant No. 2-M-70. Furthermore, the fact that the assessments were made some one and one-half
months after the search and seizure on February 25, 1970, is a strong indication that the documents thus
seized served as basis for the assessments. Those assessments should therefore not be enforced.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is granted. Accordingly, Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 issued by
respondent Judge is declared null and void; respondents are permanently enjoined from enforcing the said
search warrant; the documents, papers and effects seized thereunder are ordered to be returned to
petitioners; and respondent officials the Bureau of Internal Revenue and their representatives are
permanently enjoined from enforcing the assessments mentioned in Annex "G" of the present petition, as
well as other assessments based on the documents, papers and effects seized under the search warrant
herein nullified, and from using the same against petitioners in any criminal or other proceeding. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT (PHILS.), INC. and IFPI (SOUTHEAST ASIA),
LTD., petitioners, vs. HON. JUDGE DOLORES L. ESPANOL OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 90, DASMARIAS, CAVITE, ELENA S. LIM, SUSAN L. TAN, DAVID S. LIM,
JAMES H. UY, WILSON ALEJANDRO, JR., JOSEPH DE LUNA, MARIA A. VELA CRUZ,
DAVID CHUNG, JAMES UY, JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, AND SOLID LAGUNA
CORPORATION, respondents.
GARCIA, J.:
Assailed and sought to be nullified in this petition for certiorari with application for injunctive relief are
the orders issued by the respondent judge on June 25, 2002[1] and January 6, 2003,[2] the first
quashing Search Warrant No. 219-00, and the second, denying reconsideration of the first.
From the petition, the comment thereon of private respondents, their respective annexes, and other
pleadings filed by the parties, the Court gathers the following relevant facts:
In a criminal complaint filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Videogram Regulatory Board
(VRB)[3] charged herein private respondents James Uy, David Chung, Elena Lim and another officer of
respondent Solid Laguna Corporation (SLC) with violation of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1987.[4] As
alleged in the complaint, docketed as I.S. No. 2000-1576, the four (4) were engaged in the replication,
reproduction and distribution of videograms without license and authority from VRB. On account of this
and petitioners own complaints for copyright infringement, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI),
through Agent Ferdinand M. Lavin, applied on September 18, 2000, with the Regional Trial Court at
Dasmarias, Cavite, Branch 80, presided by the respondent judge, for the issuance of search warrants
against private respondents David Chung, James Uy, John and Jane Does, doing business under the
name and style Media Group inside the factory and production facility of SLC at Solid corner Camado
Sts., Laguna International Industrial Park, Bian, Laguna.[5]
During the proceedings on the application, Agent Lavin presented, as witnesses, Rodolfo Pedralvez, a
deputized agent of VRB, and Rene C. Baltazar, an investigator retained by the law firm R.V. Domingo &
Associates, petitioners attorney-in-fact. In their sworn statements, the three stated that petitioners sought
their assistance, complaining about the manufacture, sale and distribution of various titles of compact
discs (CDs) in violation of petitioners right as copyright owners; that acting on the complaint, Agent
Lavin and the witnesses conducted an investigation, in the course of which unnamed persons informed
them that allegedly infringing or pirated discs were being manufactured somewhere in an industrial park
in Laguna; that in the process of their operation, they were able to enter, accompanied by another
unnamed source, the premises of SLC and to see various replicating equipment and stacks of CDs; and
that they were told by their anonymous source that the discs were being manufactured in the same
premises. They also testified that private respondents were (1) engaged in the reproduction or replication
of audio and video compacts discs without the requisite authorization from VRB, in violation of Section 6
of PD No. 1987, presenting a VRB certification to such effect; and (2) per petitioners certification and a
listing of Sony music titles, infringing on petitioners copyrights in violation of Section 208 of Republic
Act (RA) No. 8293, otherwise known as Intellectual Property Code.[6]
On the basis of the foregoing sworn statements, the respondent judge issued Search Warrant No. 219-
00[7] for violation of Section 208 of R.A. No. 8293 and Search Warrant No. 220-00[8] for violation of
Section 6 of PD No. 1987.
The following day, elements of the Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and Detection
Group, led by PO2 Reggie Comandante, enforced both warrants and brought the seized items to a private
warehouse of Carepak Moving and Storage at 1234 Villonco Road, Sucat, Paranaque City and their
custody turned over to VRB.[9] An inventory of seized items,[10] as well as a Return of Search Warrant
were later filed with the respondent court.
Meanwhile, the respondents in I.S. No. 2000-1576 belabored to prove before the DOJ Prosecutorial
Service that, since 1998 and up to the time of the search, they were licensed by VRB to operate as
replicator and duplicator of videograms.
On the stated finding that respondents can not . . . be considered an unauthorized reproducers of
videograms, being licensed to engage in reproduction in videograms under SLC in which they are the
officers and/or or officials, the DOJ, via a resolution dated January 15, 2001,[11] dismissed VRBs
complaint in I.S. No. 2000-1576.
On February 6, 2001, private respondents, armed with the DOJ resolution adverted to, moved to quash the
search warrants thus issued.[12] VRB interposed an opposition for the reason that the DOJ has yet to
resolve the motion for reconsideration it filed in I.S. No. 2000-1576.
Eventually, the DOJ denied VRBs motion for reconsideration, prompting private respondents to move
anew for the quashal of the search warrants. In its supplement to motion, private respondents attached
copies of SLCs license as videogram duplicator and replicator.
In an order dated October 30, 2001,[13] the respondent judge, citing the January 15, 2001 DOJ resolution
in I.S. No. 2000-1576, granted private respondents motion to quash, as supplemented, dispositively
stating:
Nonetheless, such being the case, the aforesaid Search Warrants are QUASHED
Petitioners forthwith sought clarification on whether or not the quashal order referred to both search
warrants or to Search Warrant No. 220-00 alone, since it was the latter that was based on the charge of
violation of PD No. 1987.[14] The respondent judge, in a modificatory order dated January 29,
2002,[15] clarified that her previous order quashed only Search Warrant No. 220-00.
Meanwhile, or on November 22, 2001, petitioners filed with the DOJ an affidavit-complaint, docketed
thereat as I.S. No. 2001-1158, charging individual private respondents with copyright infringement in
violation of Sections 172 and 208 in relation to other provisions of RA No. 8293.[16] Attached to the
affidavit-complaint were certain documents and records seized from SLCs premises, such as production
and delivery records.
Following their receipt of DOJ-issued subpoenas to file counter-affidavits, private respondents moved, in
the search warrant case, that they be allowed to examine the seized items to enable them to intelligently
prepare their defense.[17] On January 30, 2002, respondent judge issued an order allowing the desired
examination, provided it is made under the supervision of the courts sheriff and in the presence of the
applicant of Search Warrant No. 219-00.[18]
On February 8, 2002, the parties, represented by their counsels, repaired to the Carepak warehouse. An
NBI agent representing Agent Lavin appeared. The examination, however, did not push through on
account of petitioners counsel insistence on Agent Lavins physical presence.[19] Private respondents were
able to make an examination on the following scheduled setting, February 15, 2002, albeit it was limited,
as the minutes of the inspection discloses, to inspecting only one (1) box containing 35 assorted CDs,
testing stampers, diskettes, a calendar, organizers and some folders and documents. The minutes also
contained an entry stating - Other items/machines were not examined because they cannot be identified
as they are not properly segregated from other items/machines in the warehouse. The parties agreed to
schedule another examination on (to be agreed by the parties) after the items/machines subject of the
examination shall have been segregated from the other items/machines by Carepak Moving and Storage ,
Inc.[20]
During the preliminary investigation conducted on February 26, 2002 in I.S. No. 2001-1158, however,
petitioners counsel objected to any further examination, claiming that such exercise was a mere
subterfuge to delay proceedings.[21]
On April 11, 2002, individual private respondents, through counsel, filed a Motion To Quash Search
Warrant (And To Release Seized Properties) grounded on lack of probable cause to justify issuance of
search warrant, it being inter alia alleged that the applicant and his witnesses lacked the requisite personal
knowledge to justify the valid issuance of a search warrant; that the warrant did not sufficiently describe
the items to be seized; and that the warrant was improperly enforced.[22] To this motion to quash,
petitioners interposed an opposition dated May 7, 2002 predicated on four (4) grounds.[23] On June 26,
2002, respondent SLC filed a Manifestation joining its co-respondents in, and adopting, their motion to
quash.[24]
On June 25, 2002, the respondent judge issued the herein first assailed order quashing Search Warrant
No. 219-00 principally on the ground that the integrity of the seized items as evidence had been
compromised, commingled as they were with other articles. Wrote the respondent judge:
Based on the report submitted, it appears that on February 15, 2002, an examination was actually
conducted. Unfortunately, the alleged seized items were commingled with and not segregated from
thousands of other items stored in the warehouse. Only one box . . . were (sic) examined in the presence
of both parties with the sheriff, such that another date was set . . . . On February 22, 2002, during the
hearing before the Department of Justice (DOJ), [petitioners counsel] Atty. Arevalo manifested their
objection to the further examination on the alleged ground that all of the items subject of the DOJ
complaint have been examined.
Analyzing the report and the incidents relative thereto, it shows that the items subject of the questioned
Search Warrant were commingled with other items in the warehouse of Carepak resulting in the failure to
identify the machines and other items subject of this Search Warrant, while the other items enumerated in
the said Inventory of Seized Items and Certification of Legality, Orderliness and Regularity in the
Execution and enforcement of Search Warrants were not examined, hence, the charge imputed against the
respondents could not be established as the evidence to show such violation fails to determine the
culpability of said respondents, thus, violating their constitutional rights.[25]
Excepting, petitioners moved for reconsideration, arguing on the main that the quashal order was
erroneously based on a ground outside the purview of a motion to quash.[26] To this motion, private
respondents interposed an opposition, against which petitioners countered with a reply.
On January 6, 2003, respondent judge issued the second assailed order denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration on the strength of the following premises:
Careful scrutiny of the records of the case reveals that the application of the above-entitled case stemmed
from the application for Search Warrant alleging that the respondent was not licensed to duplicate or
replicate CDs and VCDs. The Court was misled when the applicants declared that Solid Laguna
Corporation (SLC) is not licensed to engage in replicating/duplicating CDs and VCDs, when in truth and
in fact, SLC was still a holder of a valid and existing VRB license. Considering the fact that respondent
was duly licensed which facts (sic) was not laid bare to this Court when the application for writ was filed
by the private complainant through the National Bureau of Investigation, this Court hereby recalls and
quashes the above writ.
Lastly, taking into account that respondents were licensed to engage in replicating/duplicating CDs and
VCDs, the issuance of search warrant was of no force and effect as there was absence of probable cause
to justify said issuance. xxx[27]
Hence, petitioners present recourse.
In a Resolution dated February 19, 2003,[28] the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
respondents from implementing and enforcing the respondent judges questioned orders.
Petitioners ascribe on the respondent judge the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the first assailed order in that:
1. It was based on a ground that is not a basis for quashal of a search warrant, i.e., private respondents
failure to examine the seized items, which ground is extraneous to the determination of the validity of the
issuance of the search warrant.
2. Public respondent, in effect, conducted a preliminary investigation that absolved the private
respondents from any liability for copyright infringement.
3. Public respondent recognized the motion to quash search warrant filed by persons who did not have
any standing to question the warrant.
Petitioners also deplore the issuance of the second assailed order which they tag as predicated on a ground
immaterial to Search Warrant No. 219-00.
Private respondents filed their Comment on May 13, 2003, essentially reiterating their arguments in
the Motion To Quash Search Warrant (And To Release Seized Properties). Apart therefrom, they aver
that petitioners violated the rule on hierarchy of courts by filing the petition directly with this Court. As to
be expected, petitioners reply to comment traversed private respondents position.
Owing to their inability to locate respondent David Chung, petitioners moved and the Court subsequently
approved the dropping, without prejudice, of said respondent from the case.[29]
On February 20, 2004, private respondents filed their Rejoinder, therein inviting attention to petitioner
IFPIs failure to execute the certification on non-forum shopping as required by Rule 7, Section 5 of the
Rules of Court and questioning the validity of the Special Powers of Attorney of petitioners attorney-in-
fact to file this case.
In Resolution of March 31, 2004, the Court gave due course to the petition and directed the submission of
memoranda which the parties, after each securing an extension, did submit.
The underlying issue before Us revolves on the propriety of the quashal of Search Warrant No. 219-
00 which, in turn, resolves itself into question of the propriety of the warrants issuance in the first place.
It has repeatedly been said that ones house, however, humble is his castle where his person, papers and
effects shall be secured and whence he shall enjoy undisturbed privacy except, to borrow from Villanueva
vs. Querubin,[30] in case of overriding social need and then only under the stringent procedural
safeguards. The protection against illegal searches and seizure has found its way into our 1935 and 1973
Constitutions and is now embodied in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, thus -
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized,
and in Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, viz -
Sec. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause . .
. to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to
be seized.
Complementing the aforequoted provisions is Section 5 of the same Rule, reading:
SEC. 5. Examination of the complainant; record. The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally
examine in form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and any
witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn
statements together with any affidavits submitted.
To prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation of the right to privacy, a liberal
construction in search and seizure cases is given in favor of the individual. Consistent with this postulate,
the presumption of regularity is unavailing in aid of the search process when an officer undertakes to
justify it.[31] For, the presumption juris tantum of regularity cannot, by itself, prevail against the
constitutionally protected rights of an individual because zeal in the pursuit of criminals cannot ennoble
the use of arbitrary methods that the Constitution itself detests.[32]
A core requisite before a warrant shall validly issue is the existence of a probable cause, meaning the
existence of such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are
in the place to be searched.[33] And when the law speaks of facts, the reference is to facts, data or
information personally known to the applicant and the witnesses he may present. Absent the element of
personal knowledge by the applicant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search
warrant may be justified, the warrant is deemed not based on probable cause and is a nullity, its issuance
being, in legal contemplation, arbitrary, as held by us in Columbia Pictures, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals.[34] Testimony based on what is supposedly told to a witness, being patent hearsay and, as rule, of
no evidentiary weight[35] or probative value, whether objected to or not,[36] would, alone, not suffice under
the law on the existence of probable cause.
In our view, the issuance of the search warrant in question did not meet the requirements of probable
cause. The respondent judge did not accordingly err in quashing the same, let alone gravely abuse her
discretion. Petitioners argue that the instant petition is on all fours with Columbia,[37] wherein the en
banc Court upheld the validity of search warrants based on the testimonies of the applicant and his
witnesses who conducted an investigation on the unlawful reproduction and distribution of video tapes of
copyrighted films.
We are not persuaded.
In Columbia, the issuing court probed the applicants and his witnesses personal knowledge of the fact of
infringement. It was, however, determined by this Court that during the application hearing, therein
petitioners attorney-in-fact, a witness of the applicant, stated in his affidavit and further expounded in his
deposition that he personally knew of the fact that private respondents had never been authorized by his
clients to reproduce, lease and possess for the purposes of selling any of the copyrighted
films.[38]Significantly, the Court, in upholding the validity of the writ issued upon complaint of Columbia
Pictures, Inc., et al., stated that there is no allegation of misrepresentation, much less finding thereof by
the lower court, on the part of petitioners witnesses.[39]
Therein lies the difference with the instant case. Here, applicant Agent Lavin and his witnesses, Pedralvez
and Baltazar, when queried during the application hearing how they knew that audio and video compact
discs were infringing or pirated, relied for the most part on what alleged unnamed sources told them
and/or on certifications or lists made by persons who were never presented as witnesses. In net effect,
they testified under oath as to the truth of facts they had no personal knowledge of. The following
excerpts of the depositions of applicant Lavin and his witnesses suggest as much:
A. Deposition of Agent Lavin
28. Question: What happened next?
Answer: We then went to the Laguna Industrial Park, your Honor . . . We then verified from an
informant that David Chung, James Uy . . . under the name and style Media Group were the ones
replicating the infringing CDs.
xxx xxx xxx

36. Question: How do you know that all of these VCDs and CDs you purchased or are indeed
infringing?
Answer: I have with me the VRB certification that the VCDs are unauthorized copies. I also have with
me the Complaint-Affidavit of Sony Music and IFPI that certified that these are infringing copies, as well
as the title list of Sony Music wherein some of the CDs purchased are indicated. (Annex 10, Comment,
Rollo, p. 841)
B. Deposition of Baltazar
18. Question: What did you see in that address?
Answer: We saw that they had in stock several infringing, pirated and unauthorized CDs. They also had
videograms without VRB labels, aside from artworks and labels. John Doe gave us a Wholesome CD
while Jane Doe gave us Kenny Rogers Videoke and Engelbert Humperdinck Videoke which the
informant told us were being reproduced in that facility. The informant further showed us the rooms
where the replicating and/or stamping machine was located.
19. Question: How did you determine that the CDs you purchased are counterfeit, pirated or
unauthorized?
Answer: The Attorney-in-fact of Sony Music and IFPI certified in his Complaint-Affidavit that they are
unauthorized copies. I also have with me a listing of Sony Music titles and some of the CDs I purchased
are in that list.[40]
C. Deposition of Pedralvez
27. Question: What proof do you have they are producing infringing materials?
Answer: We were given some samples by John Doe and Jane Doe. These are Kenny Rogers Videoke,
Engelbert Humperdinck Videoke, and Andrew E. Wholesome CD. The informant told us that the said
samples were being reproduced in the facility.
28. Question: How do you know that all of these VCDs you purchased or got are indeed unauthorized?
Answer: The VRB has certified that they are unauthorized copies. (Annex 12, Comment, Rollo, pp.
849-852).
Unlike their counterparts in Columbia who were found to be personally knowledgeable about their
facts, Agent Lavin and his witnesses, judging from their above quoted answers, had no personal
knowledge that the discs they saw, purchased or received were, in fact, pirated or infringing on petitioners
copyrights. To us, it is not enough that the applicant and his witnesses testify that they saw stacks of
several allegedly infringing, pirated and unauthorized discs in the subject facility. The more decisive
consideration determinative of whether or not a probable cause obtains to justify the issuance of a search
warrant is that they had personal knowledge that the discs were actually infringing, pirated or
unauthorized copies.[41]
Moreover, unlike in Columbia, misrepresentation on the part of the applicant and his witnesses had been
established in this case.
This is not to say that the master tapes should have been presented in evidence during the application
hearing, as private respondents, obviously having in mind the holding in 20th Century Fox Film Corp. vs.
Court of Appeals,[42] would have this Court believe. It is true that the Court, in 20th Century
Fox, underscored the necessity, in determining the existence of probable cause in copyright infringement
cases, of presenting the master tapes of the copyrighted work. But, as emphatically clarified
in Columbia such auxiliary procedure, however, does not rule out the use of testimonial or documentary
evidence, depositions, admissions or other classes of evidence xxx especially where the production in
court of object evidence would result in delay, inconvenience or expenses out of proportion to its
evidentiary value.[43] What this Court is saying is that any evidence presented in lieu of the master tapes,
if not readily available, in similar application proceedings must be reliable, and, if testimonial, it must, at
the very least, be based on the witness personal knowledge.
Petitioners argue, citing People v. Chua Uy,[44] that Agent Lavins informants testimonies are not
indispensable as they would only be corroborative.[45] Like Columbia,Chua Uy is not a winning card for
petitioners, for, in the latter case, there was a reliable testimony to corroborate what the applicant testified
to, i.e., the testimony of the police poseur-buyer in a buy-bust operation involving prohibited drugs. The
circumstances are different in this case wherein the applicant and his witnesses had no personal
knowledge that the discs they purchased were infringing or pirated copies. It cannot be overemphasized
that not one of them testified seeing the pirated discs being manufactured at SLCs premises. What they
stated instead was that they were given copies of Kenny Rogers Videoke, Engelbert Humperdinck
Videoke and Andrew E. Wholesome CD by two anonymous sources, while yet another informant told
them that the discs were manufactured at said premises.
Initial hearsay information or tips from confidential informants could very well serve as basis for the
issuance of a search warrant, if followed up personally by the recipient and validated,[46] as what
transpired in Columbia. Unfortunately, the records show that such is not the case before us.
On the issue that the public respondent gravely abused her discretion in conducting what petitioners
perceived amounted to a preliminary investigation, this Court has already ruled in Solid Triangle Sales
Corp. vs. Sheriff of RTC Quezon City, Branch 93,[47] that in the determination of probable cause, the court
must necessarily resolve whether or not an offense exists to justify the issuance or quashal of the
warrant. In the exercise of this mandate - which we can allow as being akin to conducting a preliminary
investigation - abuse of discretion cannot plausibly be laid at the doorstep of the issuing court on account
of its prima facie holding that no offense has been committed, even if consequent to such holding a
warrant is recalled and the private complainant is incidentally deprived of vital evidence to prove his
case. Solid Triangle succinctly explains why:
The proceedings for the issuance/quashal of a search warrant before a court on the one hand, and the
preliminary investigation before an authorized officer on the other, are proceedings entirely independent
of each other. One is not bound by the others finding as regards the existence of a crime. The first is to
determine whether a warrant should issue or be quashed, and the second, whether an information should
be filed in court.
When the court, in determining probable cause for issuing or quashing a search warrant, finds that no
offense has been committed, it does not interfere with or encroach upon the proceedings in the
preliminary investigation. The court does not oblige the investigating officer not to file the information
for the courts ruling that no crime exists is only of purposes of issuing or quashing the warrant. This does
not, as petitioners would like to believe, constitute a usurpation of the executive function. Indeed, to shirk
from this duty would amount to an abdication of a constitutional obligation.[48]
While the language of the first questioned Order may be viewed as encroaching on executive functions,
nonetheless, it remains that the order of quashal is entirely independent of the proceedings in I.S. No.
2001-1158. And needless to stress, the DOJ is by no means concluded by the respondent judges findings
as regards the existence, or the non-existence, of a crime.
We can, to a point, accord merit to petitioners lament that the basis of the first questioned order, i.e., the
mingling of the seized items with other items, is extraneous to the determination of the validity of the
issuance of the search warrant. It is to be pointed out, though, that public respondent corrected her error
when it was raised in petitioners motion for reconsideration. There can really be no serious objection to a
judge correcting or altogether altering his case disposition on a motion for reconsideration, it being the
purpose of such recourse to provide the court an opportunity to cleanse itself of an error unwittingly
committed, or, with like effect, to allow the aggrieved party the chance to convince the court that its
ruling is erroneous.[49] A motion for reconsideration before resort to certiorari is required precisely to
afford the public respondent an opportunity to correct any actual or fancied error attributed to it by way
of re-examination of the legal and factual aspects of the case.[50]
Similarly, as to the matter of the respondent judges recognizing the April 11, 2002 motion to quash search
warrant[51] filed by the individual private respondents, instead of by SLC, as presumptive owner of the
seized items, such error was properly addressed when respondent SLC, represented throughout the
proceedings below by the same counsel of its co-respondents, formally manifested that it was adopting
the same motion as its own.[52]
It is apropos to point out at this juncture that petitioners have imputed on individual private respondents
criminal liability, utilizing as tools of indictment the very articles and papers seized from the premises of
SLC. Be that as it may, petitioners should be deemed in estoppel to raise the personality of individual
private respondents to interpose a motion to quash. To be sure, it would be unsporting for petitioners to
prosecute individual private respondents on the basis of seized articles but on the same breath deny the
latter standing to question the legality of the seizure on the postulate that only the party whose rights have
been impaired thereby, meaning SLC, can raise that challenge. There can be no quibbling that individual
private respondents stand to be prejudiced or at least be inconvenient by any judgment in any case based
on the seized properties. In a very real sense, therefore, they are real parties in interest who ought not to
be prevented from assailing the validity of Search Warrant 219-00, albeit they cannot plausibly asked for
the release and appropriate as their own the seized articles.
Petitioners related argument that SLC could not have validly adopted individual private respondents
motion to quash due to laches is untenable.
The records show that the seizure in question was effected on September 19, 2000. The complaint in I.S.
No. 2000-1576 was filed against the officers of SLC, all of whom, except for one, are also private
respondents in the instant petition. I.S. No. 2000-1576 was only resolved on January 15, 2001 when the
DOJ dismissed the complaint on the ground that SLC was, in fact, duly licensed by the VRB. Shortly
thereafter, or on February 6, 2001, less than five (5) months after the seizure, private respondents moved
to quash both search warrants.[53] The motion clearly indicates private respondents desire for the return of
the seized items, and there is nothing in the records showing that petitioners objected to the motion on the
ground that the movants had no standing to question the warrants.
This bring Us to the second assailed order. As earlier stated, DOJ, in I.S. No. 2000-1576, found
respondent SLC to be licensed by VRB to engage in the business of replicating or duplicating
videograms. Petitioners would have the Court believe that the second questioned order was based on a
ground immaterial to the charge of infringement. A scrutiny of the text of the said order, however, shows
that the respondent judge denied petitioners motion for reconsideration because she was misled by the
applicants and his witnesses testimony. It may be that a VRB license is no defense to a charge of violating
Section 208 of R.A. No. 8293. It must be stressed in this regard, however, that the core issue here is the
validity of the warrant which applicant secured on the basis of, among others, his representation which
turned out to be false.
As above discussed, the answers of Agent Lavin and his witnesses to the public respondents searching
questions, particularly those relating to how they knew that the compact discs they purchased or received
were illegal, unauthorized or infringing, were based on certifications and not personal knowledge. The
subject warrant, as well as Search Warrant No. 220-00, was issued nonetheless. It may well have been
that the issuing judge was, in the end, convinced to issue the warrants by means of the erroneous VRB
certification presented during the joint application hearing, overriding whatever misgivings she may have
had with the applicants and his witnesses other answers. This Court, however, cannot engage in such
speculation and sees no need to.
Summing up, the issuance of Search Warrant No. 219-00 was, at bottom, predicated on the sworn
testimonies of persons without personal knowledge of facts they were testifying on and who relied on a
false certification issued by VRB. Based as it were on hearsay and false information, its issuance was
without probable cause and, therefore, invalid.
Given the foregoing perspective, the peripheral issues of (a) whether or not petitioner IFPI (South East
Asia), Ltd. failed to comply with the rules requiring the filing of a certification on non-forum shopping;
and (b) whether or not IFPIs board of directors ratified its conditional authorization for its attorney-in-fact
to represent IFPI in this petition, need not detain us long. In our review of the records, R.V. Domingo &
Associates, whose authority to represent the petitioners in this petition continues, had duly executed the
sworn certification on non- forum shopping.
In the same manner, this Court, having taken cognizance of this petition, need not belabor the issue of
whether or not petitioners have cavalierly breached the rule on hierarchy of courts. Suffice it to state that,
while the Court looks with disfavor on utter disregard of its rules,[54] it is within its power to suspend its
own rules or to except a particular case from its operation whenever the ends of justice so requires, as
here. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the temporary restraining order
issued on February 19, 2003 is consequently RECALLED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. TIU WON CHUA a.k.a. Timothy Tiu and QUI
YALING y CHUA a.k.a. Sun Tee Sy y Chua, accusedappellant.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 27, convicting
appellants Tiu Won Chua a.k.a. Timothy Tiu (Tiu Won) and Qui Yaling y Chua a.k.a. Sun Tee Sy y Chua
(Qui Yaling) for violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.
Appellants were charged with the crime of illegal possession of a regulated drug, i.e., methamphetamine
hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu, in an information which reads:
The undersigned accuses TIU WON CHUA aka Timothy Tiu and QUI YALING Y CHUA aka Sun Tee
Sy Y Chua of violation of Section 16, Article III in relation to Section 2 (e-2), Article I of Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 179 and as further amended by Republic Act No. 7659,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 3rd day of October 1998, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused without
being authorized by law to possess or use any regulated drug, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully,
knowingly and jointly have in their possession and under their custody and control the following, to wit:
A sealed plastic bag containing two three four point five (234.5) grams of white crystalline substance;
Four (4) separate sealed plastic bags containing six point two two four three (6.2243) grams of white
crystalline substance;
Sixteen (16) separate sealed plastic bags containing twenty point three six seven three (20.3673) grams of
white crystalline substance; or a total of 261.0916 grams, and;
An improvised tooter with traces of crystalline substance
known as SHABU containing methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without the

corresponding license or prescription thereof.
Contrary to law.[1]
During arraignment, a plea of not guilty was entered. Appellants, with the assistance of counsel, and the
prosecution stipulated on the following facts:
1. The authenticity of the following documents:
a. The letter of Police Senior Inspector Angelo Martin of WPD, District Intelligence Division, United
Nations Avenue, Ermita, Manila, dated October 12, 1998, to the Director of the NBI requesting the latter
to conduct a laboratory examination of the specimen mentioned therein;
b. The Certification issued by Forensic Chemist Loreto Bravo of the NBI, dated October 13, 1998, to the
effect that the specimen mentioned and enumerated therein gave positive results for methamphetamine
hydrochloride, Exhibit B; and
c. Dangerous Drug Report No. 98-1200 issued by Forensic Chemist Bravo, dated October 13, 1998, to the
effect that the specimen mentioned therein gave positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride;
2. The existence of one plastic bag containing 234.5 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, Exhibit
D; four (4) plastic sachets also containing methamphetamine hydrochloride with a total net weight of
6.2243 grams, Exhibits E, E-1, E-2 and E-3; additional 16 plastic sachets containing methamphetamine
hydrochloride with a total net weight of 20.3673 grams, Exhibits F, F-1 to F-15, and one improvised
tooter with a length of 8 inches more or less and with a red plastic band, Exhibit G;
3. Forensic Chemist Loreto Bravo has no personal knowledge as to the source of the regulated drug in
question; and
4. Tiu Won Chua and Qui Yaling y Chua as stated in the information are the true and correct names of the
two accused.[2]
The witnesses presented by the prosecution were SPO1 Anthony de Leon, PO2 Artemio Santillan and
PO3 Albert Amurao. Their testimonies show that the police authorities, acting on an information that
drug-related activities were going on at the HCL Building, 1025 Masangkay St., Binondo, Manila,
surveyed the place on October 2, 3, 4 and 5, 1998. At about 10 p.m. of October 6, they conducted a test-
buy operation, together with a Chinese-speaking asset. They were able to buy P2,000.00 worth of
substance from appellants, which, upon examination by the PNP crime laboratory, proved positive
for methamphetamine hydrochloride.[3] Nonetheless, they did not immediately arrest the suspects but
applied for a warrant to search Unit 4-B of HCL Building, 1025 Masangkay St., Binondo, Manila. Their
application to search the unit supposedly owned by Timothy Tiu was granted by Judge Ramon Makasiar
of Branch 35 of the RTC of Manila on October 9.[4] Armed with the warrant, they proceeded to the place
and learned that Tiu Won was not inside the building. They waited outside but Tiu Won did not come.
After several stakeouts, they were able to implement the warrant on October 12. Failing to get the
cooperation of the barangay officials, they requested the presence of the building coordinator, Noel
Olarte, and his wife, Joji, who acted as witnesses.
During the enforcement of the warrant, there were three (3) persons inside the apartment, namely,
appellants Tiu Won and Qui Yaling, and a housemaid. The search was conducted on the sala and in the
three (3) bedrooms of Unit 4-B. On top of a table inside the masters bedroom, one (1) big pack,
containing 234.5 grams of shabu, was found inside a black leather mans handbag supposedly owned by
Tiu Won, while sixteen (16) small packs of shabu weighing 20.3673 grams were found inside a ladys
handbag allegedly owned by Qui Yaling. Also contained in the inventory were the following items: an
improvised tooter, a weighing scale, an improvised burner and one rolled tissue paper.[5] The authorities
also searched a Honda Civic car bearing Plate No. WCP 157, parked along Masangkay Street, registered
in the name of the wife of Tiu Won and found four (4) plastic bags containing 6.2243 grams of shabu,
which were likewise confiscated. A gun in the possession of Tiu Won was also seized and made subject
of a separate criminal case.
The defense presented appellants Tiu Won and Qui Yaling. They denied that Timothy Tiu and Tiu Won
Chua are one and the same person. They presented papers and documents to prove that appellant is Tiu
Won Chua and not Timothy Tiu, as stated in the search warrant. Tiu Won also claimed that he does not
live in the apartment subject of the search warrant, alleging that he is married to a certain Emily Tan and
is a resident of No. 864 Alvarado St., Binondo, Manila. Nonetheless, he admitted that his co-appellant,
Qui Yaling, is his mistress with whom he has two children. Qui Yaling admitted being the occupant of the
apartment, but alleged that she only occupied one room, while two other persons, a certain Lim and a
certain Uy, occupied the other rooms. Both appellants denied that they were engaged in the sale or
possession of shabu. They asserted that they are in the jewelry business and that at the time the search and
arrest were made, the third person, whom the prosecution identified as a housemaid, was actually a
certain Chin, who was there to look at some of the pieces of jewelry sold by Tiu Won. They also denied
that a gun was found in the possession of Tiu Won.
Qui Yaling recalled that upon asking who was it knocking at the door of her apartment on October 12, the
police authorities represented that they were electric bill collectors. She let them in. She was surprised
when upon opening the door, around ten (10) policemen barged inside her unit. She, together with Tiu
Won and Chin, was asked to remain seated in the sofa while the men searched each room. Tiu Won
alleged that after a fruitless search, some of the policemen went out, but came back a few minutes later
with another person. Afterwards, he was made to sign a piece of paper. Appellants also claimed that the
policemen took their bags which contained money, the pieces of jewelry they were selling and even Qui
Yalings cell phone. They both denied that shabu was discovered in the apartment during the search.
Appellants were arrested and brought to the police station.
In a decision, dated August 15, 2001, the RTC found proof beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the
appellants and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine of P500,000.00
each.[6]
Thus, appellants interpose this appeal raising the following assignment of errors:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE LEGAL DEFECTS OF THE SEARCH
WARRANT USED BY THE POLICE OPERATIVES AGAINST BOTH ACCUSED.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION EVIDENCES (sic) WHICH
SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED AND DISREGARDED WHICH RESULTED IN THE
ERRONEOUS CONVICTION OF BOTH ACCUSED.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING BOTH ACCUSED DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF
PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE FACT THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS OF BOTH ACCUSED WERE SERIOUSLY VIOLATED BY THE POLICE OPERATIVES.[7]
These issues can be trimmed down to two i.e., the legality of the search warrant and the search and arrest
conducted pursuant thereto, and the correctness of the judgment of conviction imposed by the RTC.
As regards the propriety of the search warrant issued in the name of Timothy Tiu, which did not include
appellant Qui Yaling, appellants contend that because of this defect, the search conducted and
consequently, the arrest, are illegal. Being fruits of an illegal search, the evidence presented cannot serve
as basis for their conviction.
We beg to disagree. There are only four requisites for a valid warrant, i.e,: (1) it must be issued upon
probable cause; (2) probable cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3) such judge must
examine under oath or affirmation the complainant and the witnesses he may produce; and (4) the warrant
must particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.[8] As correctly
argued by the Solicitor General, a mistake in the name of the person to be searched does not invalidate the
warrant,[9] especially since in this case, the authorities had personal knowledge of the drug-related
activities of the accused. In fact, a John Doe warrant satisfies the requirements so long as it contains
a descriptio personae such as will enable the officer to identify the accused.[10] We have also held that a
mistake in the identification of the owner of the place does not invalidate the warrant provided the place
to be searched is properly described.[11]
Thus, even if the search warrant used by the police authorities did not contain the correct name of Tiu
Won or the name of Qui Yaling, that defect did not invalidate it because the place to be searched was
described properly. Besides, the authorities conducted surveillance and a test-buy operation before
obtaining the search warrant and subsequently implementing it. They can therefore be presumed to have
personal knowledge of the identity of the persons and the place to be searched although they may not
have specifically known the names of the accused. Armed with the warrant, a valid search of Unit 4-B
was conducted.
We affirm, however, the illegality of the search conducted on the car, on the ground that it was not part of
the description of the place to be searched mentioned in the warrant. It is mandatory that for the search to
be valid, it must be directed at the place particularly described in the warrant.[12] Moreover, the search of
the car was not incidental to a lawful arrest. To be valid, such warrantless search must be limited to that
point within the reach or control of the person arrested, or that which may furnish him with the means of
committing violence or of escaping.[13] In this case, appellants were arrested inside the apartment, whereas
the car was parked a few meters away from the building.
In a prosecution for illegal possession of a dangerous drug, it must be shown that (1) appellants were in
possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug, (2) such possession is
not authorized by law, and (3) the appellants were freely and consciously aware of being in possession of
the drug.[14] We also note that the crime under consideration is malum prohibitum, hence, lack of criminal
intent or good faith does not exempt appellants from criminal liability. Mere possession of a regulated
drug without legal authority is punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act.[15]
In the case at bar, the prosecution has sufficiently proved that the packs of shabu were found inside Unit
4-B, HCL Building, 1025 Masangkay St., Binondo, Manila. Surveillance was previously conducted.
Though no arrest was made after the successful test-buy operation, this does not destroy the fact that in a
subsequent search, appellants were found in possession of shabu. The testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses are consistent in that after the test-buy operation, they obtained a search warrant from Judge
Makasiar, pursuant to which, they were able to confiscate, among others, several packs of shabu from a
mans handbag and a ladies handbag inside a room in the unit subject of the warrant. Furthermore, the
seizure of the regulated drug from Unit 4-B is proven by the Receipt for Property Seized[16] signed by
SPO1 de Leon, the seizing officer, Noel, the building administrator, and Joji Olarte, his wife, who were
also present. De Leon attested to the truth and genuineness of the receipt which was not contradicted by
the defense.
Be that as it may, we cannot sustain the trial courts decision attributing to both appellants the illegal
possession of the same amount of shabu. We note that nowhere in the information is conspiracy alleged.
Neither had it been proven during the trial. As such, we need to look at the individual amounts possessed
by each appellant.
In his testimony, Tiu Won admitted ownership of the mans handbag where 234.5 grams of shabu were
found, viz:
Q: During those ten to 20 minutes, what were those policemen doing inside that unit?
A: They went inside the rooms and started ransacking the drawers and everything. As a matter of fact,
even handbags were searched by them.
Q: Whose handbags were searched?
A: My bag, the one I was carrying that day, with jewelry and checks and others were taken by
them.[17] (emphasis supplied)
Qui Yaling, in her appellants brief, denied owning the handbag where 20.3673 grams of shabu were
discovered. However, during her testimony, she admitted its ownership, viz:
Q: Now, the police testified before this court that you has (sic) a bag and when they searched this bag, it
yielded some sachets of shabu(.) (W)hat can you say about that?
A: That is an absolute lie, sir. What they saw in my bag were my cosmetics.[18] (emphasis supplied)
An admission is an act or declaration of a party as to the existence of a relevant fact which may be used in
evidence against him.[19] These admissions, provided they are voluntary, can be used against appellants
because it is fair to presume that they correspond with the truth, and it is their fault if they do not.[20]
Qui Yaling likewise argues that the lower court erred in attributing ownership of the handbag to her
considering that there was another girl present at the apartment during the search. She contends that since
the prosecution was not able to establish the ownership of the bag, then such could have also been owned
by Chin.
We do not subscribe to this argument. The defense failed to bring Chin to court, although during the
course of the presentation of their evidence, they manifested their intention to present her testimony.
Furthermore, a visitor does not normally leave her bag lying anywhere, much more in the masters
bedroom. Being the occupant of the apartment, it is more logical to presume that the handbag belongs to
Qui Yaling. The failure of the prosecution to present the bags and proofs that the bags belong to the
appellants is immaterial because the bags, the license of Tiu Won found inside the mans handbag and the
passport of Qui Yaling found inside the ladies handbag are not illegal. Having no relation to the use or
possession of shabu, the authorities could not confiscate them for they did not have the authority to do so
since the warrant authorized them to seize only articles in relation to the illegal possession of
shabu.[21] Not within their control, they could not have been presented in court.
We now come to the penalties of the appellants. R. A. No. 6425, as amended by R. A. No. 7659, applies.
Thus, since 234.5 grams of shabu were found inside the mans handbag, deemed to be owned by Tiu Won,
he is guilty of violating Section 16, Article III of R.A. No. 6425, while Qui Yaling, whose handbag
contained only 20.3673 grams of shabu is guilty of violating Section 20 thereof. Section 16, in connection
with Section 20 (1st paragraph), provides the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging
from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos where the amount of shabu involved is 200 grams
or more. Where the amount is less than 200 grams, Section 20 punishes the offender with the penalty
ranging from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of RTC Br. 27, Manila as to the penalty of appellant Tiu Won is
affirmed, while that of appellant Qui Yaling is modified. Tiu Won Chua is sentenced to a penalty
of reclusion perpetua, and a fine of five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) in accordance with
Section 16 and Section 20 (1st paragraph) of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by R.A. No. 7659. Qui Yaling y
Chua is sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of prision correccional as minimum to prision mayor as
maximum, there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances.
SO ORDERED.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SANTIAGO SY JUCO, defendant.
TEOPISTO B. REMO, petitioner-appellant.
Laurel, Del Rosario and Sabido for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General for appellee.
DIAZ, J.:
Upon petition of the agent and representatives of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, named Narciso
Mendiola, who alleged that, according to information given him by a person whom he considered
reliable, certain fraudulent bookletters and papers or records were being kept in the building marked
No. 482 on Juan Luna Street, Binondo, Manila, occupied by Santiago Sy Juco, a warrant to search the
building in question was issued against said person on March 7, 1933, by the Court of First Instance of
Manila, through Judge Mariano A. Albert. In said warrant, the peace officers to whom it was directed for
execution were required to seize the above-stated articles for the purpose of delivering them to the
court, for the proper action to be taken in due time. After making the required search the officers
concerned seized, among things, an art metal filing cabinet claimed by Attorney Teopisto B. Remo to be
his and to contain some letters, documents and papers belonging to his clients. Inasmuch as said officers
later refused to return the filing cabinet in question to him, he filed a petition in the Court of First
Instance of Manila, praying that the Collector of Internal Revenue and his agents be prohibited from
opening said art metal filing cabinet and that the sheriff of the City of Manila likewise be ordered to take
charge of said property in the meantime, on the ground that the warrant by virtue of which the search
was made is null and void, being illegal and against the Constitution. A similar petition was later filed in
the same case by the Salakan Lumber Co., Inc., the same agents of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
having also seized some books belonging to it by virtue of the above-mentioned search warrant.
After due hearing, the Court of First Instance through Judge Delfin Jaranilla, decided to overrule both
petitions, declaring that the art metal filing cabinet and the books and papers claimed by the Salakan
Lumber Co., Inc., would be returned to Attorney Teopisto B. Remo and to the company, respectively, as
soon as it be proven, by means of an examination thereof to be made in the presence of the interested
parties, that they contain nothing showing that they have been used to commit fraud against the
Government. Only Attorney Teopisto B. Remo appealed from the decision of the court and he now
contends that it committed the nine errors assigned by him as follows:
1. The lower court erred in not holding that the search warrant, Exhibit B, issued in the case at bar is
unconstitutional and void ab initio and hence can confer no legal right upon the Government to seize,
much less to retain or open the filing cabinet in question, Exhibit 3.
2. The lower court erred in not holding that the search warrant, which is void ab initio may not be
legalized by evidence secured subsequent to the issuance, or in consequence, of said illegal search
warrant.
3. The lower court erred in not holding that the doctrine of the case of People vs. Rubio (G. R. No. 35500,
57 Phil., 384), is not applicable to the case at bar.
4. The lower court erred in not holding that the search warrant, Exhibit B, was procured in order to
obtain evidence against the defendant Santiago Sy Juco.
5. The lower court erred in not holding that the search warrant, Exhibit B, was issued solely against the
premised occupied by the defendant Santiago Sy Juco, and hence cannot be used against the premises
occupied by a stranger, or the petitioner, Teopisto B. Remo.
6. The lower court erred in not holding that the filing cabinet, Exhibit 3, is the personal property of the
petitioner, Teopisto B. Remo, and not of the defendant Santiago Sy Juco.
7. The lower court erred in not upholding the inviolability of the contents of the filing cabinet, Exhibit 3,
the same being confidential documents entrusted to the herein petitioner, Attorney Teopisto B. Remo,
by his clients, in his professional capacity and in connection with cases pending before the courts of
justice and administrative tribunals.
8. The lower court erred in not holding that the Internal Revenue agents gave infringed the penal laws
not only by procuring the search warrant, Exhibit B, against the premises of the defendant, Santiago Sy
Juco, without just cause, but also by exceeding their authority in enforcing said search warrant against
the premises of the petitioner, Teopisto B. Remo, who is stranger to said search warrant, which acts also
constitute a violation of the domicile of said petitioner; and in not endorsing the matter to the city fiscal
for proper action.
9. The lower court erred in not ordering the return of the filing cabinet, Exhibit 3, intact and unopened,
to its lawful owner, the petitioner Teopisto B. Remo.
The pertinent part of the search warrant in question was couched in the following language:
Proof by affidavit having this day been made before me, Mariano Albert, Judge of the Court of First
Instance of the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, by the complainant on oath of Narciso Mendiola,
special investigator, Bureau of Internal Revenue, Manila, that the defendant, Santiago Sy Juco, of No.
482 Juan Luna, Manila, keeps illegally and feloniously fraudulent books, correspondence, and records
and that he verily believes upon probable cause that the said books, correspondence and records at No.
482 Juan Luna, Manila, and the said (personal) property is now being used in the commission of fraud of
the revenue of the Government.
You are therefore commanded to take with you the necessary and proper assistance and to enter, in the
daytime, into the said premises and there diligently search for fraudulent books, correspondence and
records and that you seize and bring them before the court to be disposed of according to law.
Given under my hands this 7th day of March, 1933, in the City of Manila.
[SEAL] (Sgd.) MARIANO A. ALBERT
Judge of Court of First instance of Manila
The affidavit or deposition referred to in the warrant above-quoted contained the following questions
and answers:
TESTIMONY TAKEN BEFORE HON. JUDGE MARIANO A. ALBERT, Narciso Mendiola, being duly sworn,
testifies as follows:
Q. What is your name, residence and occupation? — A. Narciso Mendiola, special investigator, Bureau of
Internal Revenue, Manila.
Q. Are you the applicant for this search warrant? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. do you know the premises situated at No. 482 Juan Luna, Manila? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know who occupy said premises? — A. According to the best of my information, the house is
occupied by Santiago Sy Juco.
Q. What are your reasons for applying for a search warrant? — A. It has been reported to us by person
whom I considered reliable that in said premises are fraudulent books, correspondence and records.
I. Narciso Mendiola, being duly sworn, depose and say that I have read the foregoing questions and
answers and that I found the same to be correct and true to the best of my knowledge and belief.
(Sgd.) NARCISCO MENDIOLA.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 7th day of March, 1933, in the City of Manila, P. I.
[SEAL] (Sgd.) MARIANO A. ALBERT

Judge, Court of First Instance, Manila
It appears clear to this court that the question that the appellant wishes to raise by means of the allege
errors attributed by him to the lower court, may be reduced to the following:
1. Is the search warrant in question valid or not, taking into consideration the provisions of the law and
of the Constitution relative thereto?
2. Does the art metal filing cabinet seized by the agents of the Bureau of Internal Revenue belong to
Santiago Sy Juco or to Teopisto B. Remo?
3. Could the search warrant in question affect Attorney Teopisto B. Remo, not being the person against
whom it was directed?
4. Had the court authority to order the opening of the cabinet in question for the purpose of
determining, by an examination of the books, documents and records contained therein, whether or not
same were used to commit fraud against the Government?
1. A question which is very similar to the first one herein raised by the appellant, has been decided by
this court in the negative in its judgment rendered in the case of Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance of
Tayabas and Anti Usury Board, p. 33, ante. According to our laws in force on the date in question, which
do not differ substantially from the provisions of the Constitution of the Commonwealth in matters
regarding search, in order that a search warrant may be valid, the following requisites, among others,
must be present: That the application upon which it is issued be supported by oath; That the search
warrant particularly describes not only place to be searched but also the person or thing to be seized
and that there be probable cause (sec. 97, General Orders, No. 58: sec. 3, Jones Law; Article III, sec. 1,
paragraph 3, Constitution of the Commonwealth).
In the above-cited case of Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas and Anti-Usury Board, supra, and
in that of United States vs. Addison (28 Phil., 566), this court held that the oath required must be such
that it constitutes a guaranty that the person taking it has personal knowledge of the facts of the case
and that it convince the committing magistrate, not the individual seeking the issuance of the warrant or
the person making the averment by hearsay, of the existence of the requisite of probable cause. It has
likewise been held by this court that by probable cause are meant such facts and circumstances
antecedent to the issuance thereof. It has furthermore been held that the true test of the sufficiency of
an affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a manner that
perjury could be charged thereon in case the allegations contained therein prove false (Sate vs.
Roosevelt, 244 Pac., 280), and that the provisions of the Constitution and the statutes relative to
searches and seizures must be construed liberally in favor of the individual who may be affected
thereby, and strictly against the State and against the person invoking them for the issuance of the
warrant ordering their execution (Elardo vs. State of Misissippi, 145 So., 615; Fowler vs. U. S., 62 Fed.
[2d], 656; Saforik vs. U. S. Feed. [2d], 892; Boyd vs. U. S., 116 U. S., 616; 29 Law. ed., 746), for the simple
reason that the proceedings of search and seizure are, by their very nature, summary and drastic ones
(Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas and Anti-Usury Board, supra, and the authorities cited
therein).
By reading the affidavit which gave rise to the issuance of the search warrant in question, it will be seen
that the latter does not fulfill the necessary conditions in support of its validity. In the first place, it is not
stated in said affidavit that the books, documents or records referred to therein are being used or are
intended to be used in the commission of fraud against the Government and, notwithstanding the lack
of such allegation, the warrant avers that they are actually being used for such purpose. In the second
place, it assumes that the entire building marked No. 482 on Juan Luna Street is occupied by Santiago Sy
Juco against whom the warrant was exclusively issued, when the only ground upon which such
assumption is based is Narciso Mendiola's statement which is mere hearsay and when in fact part
thereof was occupied by the appellant. In the third place, it was not asked that the things belonging to
the appellant and to others also be searched. In otherwords, the warrant in question has gone beyond
what had been applied for by Narciso Mendiola and the agent who executed it performed acts not
authorized by the warrant, and it is for this and the above-stated reason why it is unreasonable, it being
evidence that the purpose thereof was solely to fish for evidence or search for it by exploration, in case
some could be found. It is of common knowledge that search warrants have not been designed for such
purpose (Gouled vs. U. S., 255 U. S., 298, S. C. R., 65 Law. ed., 647; Uy Kheytin vs. Villareal, 42 Phil., 886)
much less in a case as the one under consideration where it has not even been alleged in the affidavit of
Narciso Mendiola what crime had been committed by Santiago Sy Juco or what crime he was about
commit. On this point said affidavit merely contained the following allegation: "It has been reported to
us by a person whom I considered reliable that in said premises are fraudulent books, correspondence
and records." Therefore, the first question raised should be decided in the negative.
2. The resolution of the second question depends entirely on the nature of the evidence presented and
the relative preponderance thereof. The only witness who testified that the art metal filing cabinet
belongs to the accused Santiago Sy Juco, is Macario Garcia. Against Garcia's testimony, we certainly
have that of the appellant himself and his witnesses Rufino C. Wenceslao, Vicente del Rosario, Jose
Jeuquenco and Feliciano Belmonte, besides Exhibits E, F, G, H and L, which conclusively proves that the
furniture in question was purchased by said appellant at the beginning of January, 1933, and that he had
it precisely in a room on one of the upper floors of building No. 482 on Juan Luna Street, which he was
then subleasing from Santiago Sy Juco, to keep his records and those of his clients. On the otherhand, it
is unimportant now to determine whether the furniture in question belongs to Santiago Sy Juco or to
the appellant Attorney Topisto B. Remo. It should have been alleged at the time he applied for the
issuance of the search warrant, to show with the other allegations, reason and evidence that the
issuance thereof was justified because of the existence of probable cause, the latter being a requisite
without which the issuance of the judicial warrant authorizing such search would be unwarranted. For
these reasons, this court concludes that the second question raised calls for an answer in the negative.
3. After the considerations just made, the third question cannot be resolved except in the negative. The
search warrant in question could not and should not in any way affect the appellant attorney on the
ground that he is not the person against whom it had been sought. It is Santiago Sy Juco alone against
whom the search warrant could be used, because it had been obtained precisely against him; so much
so that Narciso Mendiola, who applied for it, mentioned him expressly in his affidavit and again did so in
his report to his superior, that is, the Collector of Internal Revenue (Exhibit C); and at the trial of this
case, it was insisted that there was necessity of making the search in the premises occupied by Santiago
Sy Juco because an investigation was then pending against him, for having defrauded the Government in
its public revenue. The doctrine laid down in the case of People vs. Rubio (57 Phil., 384), invoked against
the appellant, is not applicable to the case at bar because, unlike in the above-cited case, neither books
nor record indicating fraud were found in his possession, and it is not he against whom the warrant was
issued.
4. It is clear that the court could not and can not order the opening of the art metal filing cabinet in
question because, it having been proven that it belongs to the appellant attorney and that in it he keeps
the records and documents of his clients, to do so would be in violation of his right as such attorney,
since it would be tantamount to compelling him to disclose or divulge facts or things belonging to his
clients, which should be kept secret, unless she is authorized by them to make such disclosure, it being a
duty imposed by law upon an attorney to strictly preserve the secrets or communications made to him.
Such an act would constitute a qualified violation of section 383, No. 4, and of section 31 of Act No. 190,
which read as follows:
An attorney can not, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication made by
the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of professional employment; nor can an
attorney's secretary stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the consent of client and his employer,
concerning any fact, the knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity. (Sec. 383, No. 4, Act
No. 190.)
A lawyer must strictly maintain inviolate the confidence and preserve the secrets of his client. He shall
not be permitted in any court without the consent of his client, given in open court, to testify to any
facts imparted to him by his client in professional consultation, or for the purpose of obtaining advice
upon legal matters. (Sec. 31, Act No. 190.)
For all the foregoing reasons, and finding that the errors assigned by the appellant are very well
founded, the appealed judgment is reversed, and it is ordered that the art metal filing cabinet, together
with the key thereof seized by the internal revenue agent by virtue of the judicial warrant in question,
which is hereby declared null and void, be immediately returned unopened to the appellant; and that a
copy of this decision be sent to the Solicitor-General for him to take action, if he deems it justified, upon
careful investigation of the facts, against the internal revenue agent or agents who obtained and
executed the warrant in question, in accordance with the provisions of article 129 of the Revised Penal
Code, without special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
ELIDAD KHO and VIOLETA KHO, Petitioners, v. HON. ENRICO LANZANAS, Presiding Judge
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila - Branch 7 and SUMMERVILLE GENERAL
MERCHANDISING, Respondents.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Culled from the records are the following antecedent facts:
Shun Yih Chemistry Factory (SYCF), a business existing and operating in Taiwan and engaged in the
manufacture and sale of Chin Chun Su Creams/Cosmetics, appointed Young Factor Enterprises in the
Philippines, owned and operated by Quintin Cheng also known as Kho Seng Hiok, as its distributor of
Chin Chun Su products in the Philippines for a term of two years beginning 1978.1 Quintin Cheng
registered with the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD) as distributor of Chin Chun Su products. Quintin
Cheng subsequently secured a supplemental registration for Chin Chun Su and device.2 This supplemental
registration was ordered cancelled by the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer 3 on the
ground of failure of the registrant to file the required affidavit of non-use as required by Section 12 of
Republic Act No. 166, as amended.4
Notwithstanding this cancellation, Quintin Cheng executed on 30 January 1990 an Assignment of a

Registered Trademark5 and a Supplementary Deed of Assignment6 dated 25 November 1991 wherein he
sold all his right, title, interest and goodwill in the trademark Chin Chun Su and device to petitioner
Elidad Kho.
In the meantime, animosity arose between SYCF and Quintin Cheng resulting in the termination of their
distributorship agreement on 30 October 1990.7
Consequently, on 30 November 1990, SYCF appointed respondent Summerville General Merchandising,

represented by Ang Tiam Chay and Victor Chua, as its exclusive importer, re-packer and distributor of
Chin Chun Su products in the Philippines8 for a period of five years or until May 2005.
SYCF further executed a Special Power of Attorney dated 11 September 1991 in favor of Summerville
General Merchandising granting it the authority to file complaints against usurpers of Chin Chun Su
trademarks/tradename.9
From the foregoing incidents arose several judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings.
1) Civil Case No. Q-91-10926 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 90
On 20 December 1991, Elidad Kho/KEC Laboratory filed a Complaint for Injunction and Damages
against Ang Tiam Chay and Summerville General Merchandising before the RTC of Quezon City,
Branch 90, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-91-10926. Plaintiff therein Elidad Kho/KEC Laboratory sought
to enjoin defendants Ang Tiam Chay and Summerville General Merchandising from using the name Chin
Chun Su in their cream products.
On 22 January 1993, a decision in Civil Case No. Q-91-10926 was rendered, the dispositive portion of
which provides:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Declaring that plaintiff is not legally authorized to use the trademark "CHIN CHUN SU" and
upholding the right of defendant Summerville General Merchandising & Co. to use said trademark as
authorized by Shun Yih Chemistry Factory of Taiwan;
2. Declaring plaintiff to have the right to use the copyright claim on "OVAL FACIAL CREAM
CONTAINER/CASE" by virtue of Certificate of Copyright Registration No. 3687 issued by the National
Library on May 23, 1991;
3. No award of damages;
4. Counsels for plaintiff and defendants are awarded P75,000.00 each as attorney's fees; andcralawlibrary
5. Both parties to pay proportionate fees.10
Both parties appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV NO. 48043
entitled, "Elidad C. Kho, doing business under the style of KEC Cosmetic Laboratory v. Summerville
General Merchandising and Co., et al." In a decision11 dated 22 November 1999, the appellate court
affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.12 Elidad Kho elevated the case to this Court, docketed as
G.R. No. 144100. In a resolution dated 28 August 2000, we denied the petition. We held that:
The issue is who, between petitioner Elidad C. Kho and respondent Summerville General Merchandising
and Company has the better right to use the trademark "Chin Chun Su" on their facial cream
product?cralawlibrary
We agree with both the Court of Appeals and the trial court that Summerville General Merchandising and
Company has the better right to use the trademark "Chin Chun Su" on its facial cream product by virtue
of the exclusive importation and distribution rights given to it by Shun Yih Chemistry Factory of Taiwan
on November 20, 1990 after the latter cancelled and terminated on October 30, 1990 its Sole
Distributorship Agreement with one Quintin Cheng, who assigned and transferred his rights under said
agreement to petitioner Elidad C. Kho on January 31, 1990.
As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, petitioner Kho is not the author of the trademark "Chin Chun
Su" and his only claim to the use of the trademark is based on the Deed of Agreement executed in his
favor by Quintin Cheng. By virtue thereof, he registered the trademark in his name. The registration was a
patent nullity because petitioner is not the creator of the trademark "Chin Chun Su" and, therefore, has no
right to register the same in his name. Furthermore, the authority of Quintin Cheng to be the sole
distributor of Chin Chun Su in the Philippines had already been terminated by Shun Yih Chemistry of
Taiwan. Withal, he had no right to assign or to transfer the same to petitioner Kho.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby denied due course.13
2) BFAD Cosmetic Case No. CM-040-91
At the other end of the spectrum, due to the proliferation of fake Chin Chun Su products, Summerville
General Merchandising filed a Complaint14 before the BFAD against KEC Cosmetic Laboratory owned
by Elidad Kho.
In a resolution of the BFAD dated 4 February 1992, it ruled that:

WHEREFORE, the brand name clearance of CCS in favor of KEC is recalled and cosmetic registration
number DR-X6113-78 dtd 11/17/78 is TEMPORARILY CANCELLED until KEC applies to change or
amend the brand name CCS it is now using. For this purpose, KEC is hereby ordered to retrieve all
locally produced Chin Chun Su Pearl Cream for relabelling as soon as the amendment of its brand name
has been approved by this Bureau with the corresponding amended Certificate of Registration.
Summerville's application to register (renew or reinstate) CCS Medicated Cream under DR-X6113-78 in
the name of Shun Yih Chemistry Factory is herewith approved for processing at BFAD-Product Services
Division.15
3) Criminal Case No. 00-183261 before the RTC of Manila, Branch 1
This is the case filed before the RTC of Manila, Branch 1, entitled, "People of the Philippines v. Elidad
and Violeta Kho and Roger Kho," pursuant to the DOJ Resolution in I.S. No. 00A-02396 and I.S. No.
00B-10973, ordering the filing of a criminal complaint against Elidad, Roger and Violeta Kho.16
Prior to the filing of Criminal Case No. 00-183261 before the RTC of Manila, Branch 1, on 18 January
2000, Victor Chua, representing Summerville General Merchandising, filed a Complaint for Unfair
Competition, docketed as I.S. No. 00A-02396 entitled, "Summerville General Merchandising, represented
by Victor Chua v. Elidad and Violeta Kho," before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila.
Elidad and Violeta Kho filed their counter-affidavit in the Complaint for Unfair Competition which
served as their countercharge against Ang Tiam Chay and Victor Chua, likewise for Unfair Competition,
docketed as I.S. No. OOB-10973.
On 29 March 2000, the Office of the City Prosecutor granted the consolidation of both I.S. No. 00A-
02396 and I.S. No. 00B-10973. On 25 April 2000, Assistant City Prosecutor Rector Macapagal rendered
a joint resolution dismissing both the Complaint and countercharge. This resolution of dismissal was
reversed by the review resolution17 dated 31 May 2000 issued by Assistant City Prosecutor Elmer Calledo
who directed the filing of an information against Elidad Kho, Roger Kho and Violeta Kho for violation of
Section 168.3(a) in relation to Sections 168 and 170, Republic Act No. 8293 (The Intellectual Property
Code).18On 17 August 2000, Department of Justice (DOJ) Undersecretary Regis Puno issued a
resolution19dismissing the Petition for Review filed by Elidad and Violeta Kho and upholding the ruling
of Assistant City Prosecutor Calledo, directing the filing of charges against the Khos. Elidad and Violeta
Kho filed a motion for reconsideration, and in a complete turnabout, on 28 September 2001, a
resolution20 was issued by then DOJ Secretary Hernando Perez again dismissing the Complaint and
countercharge in I.S. No. 00A-02396 and I.S. No. 00B-10973 for lack of merit. Summerville General
Merchandising accordingly filed a motion for reconsideration of this DOJ resolution dated 20 September
2001.
In view of the latest DOJ resolution ordering the dismissal of the complaint of Summerville General
Merchandising against the Khos, the RTC of Manila, Branch 1, issued an Order dated 24 October 2001
directing the dismissal of the Complaint in Criminal Case No. 00-183261.21 Summerville General
Merchandising filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 1, a motion for reconsideration of its Order of
dismissal of Criminal Case No. 00-183261. For their part, Elidad and Violeta Kho also filed with the
same court a supplemental motion insisting that the Order dismissing Criminal Case No. 00-183261
cannot be set aside because to do so would, in effect, reinstate the said criminal case and would already
constitute double jeopardy. Acting on these motions, the RTC of Manila, Branch 1, issued an Order dated
21 August 2002 resolving the motions in the following manner:
The foregoing duly established facts indubitably supports accused's contention that a re-filing [o]f the
Information would put them in double jeopardy. As ruled by the Supreme Court in Marcelo v. Court of
Appeals, 235 SCRA 39, upon withdrawal of the Information, which is the logical consequence of the
grant of the Motion to Withdraw, there no longer remained any case to dismiss.
Accordingly, finding merit in the Motion for Reconsideration, the same is hereby granted.
The information against accused is hereby dismissed.
The Clerk of Court is hereby directed to return to the accused the cash bonds posted by the latter for their
provisional liberty upon presentation of the requisite receipts.
The ruling renders the remaining incidents moot and academic.22
Thereafter, on 17 September 2002, the DOJ Secretary, Hernando B. Perez, granted the pending motion of
Summerville General Merchandising for reconsideration of the DOJ resolution23 dated 28 September
2001, which dismissed the Complaint of movant Summerville General Merchandising in I.S. No. 00A-
02396, and accordingly issued another resolution vacating the questioned 28 September 2001 resolution
and directing the City Prosecutor of Manila to continue with the criminal prosecution of the Khos for
Unfair Competition.
Elidad and Violeta Kho filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution dated 17 September 2002
before the DOJ. The DOJ,24 thru the new Secretary Simeon A. Datumanong denied that double jeopardy
lies, in a resolution dated 17 July 2003, declared that:
After an evaluation of the record, we resolve to deny the motion for reconsideration. For double jeopardy
to attach, the following requirements must be present: (1) upon a valid indictment; (2) before a competent
court; (3) after arraignment; (4) when a valid plea has been entered; and (5) when the defendant was
convicted, acquitted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the
accused. (People v. Court of Appeals, 308 SCRA 687). In the instant case, it appears that the case was
terminated with the express consent of the respondent, as the criminal case was dismissed upon the
express application of the accused. Her action in having the case dismissed constitutes a waiver of her
constitutional prerogative against double jeopardy as she thereby prevented the court from proceeding to
trial on the merits and rendering a judgment of conviction against her.25
At odds with the final DOJ resolution, the RTC of Manila, Branch 1, handling Criminal Case No. 00-
183261, held in its Order dated 2 April 2003 that:
Considering the tenors of the orders of dismissal, whatever maybe the merits of the Motion for
Reconsideration, revival of the case is now barred by the impregnable wall of double jeopardy.
ACCORDINGLY, the Motion for Reconsideration dated September 10, 2002 filed by the private
prosecutor and subject of the Motion to Resolve is hereby denied with finality.
The Clerk of Court is hereby directed to return to the accused the cash bond posted by them for their
provisional liberty upon presentation of the required receipts.26
Thus, Summerville General Merchandising raised its case to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 77180, assailing the Order dated 24 October 2001 of the RTC of Manila, Branch 1, dismissing
Criminal Case No. 00-183261, as well as the Orders dated 21 August 2002 and 2 April 2003 of the same
court affirming its previous order of dismissal.
In a decision of the Court of Appeals dated 26 May 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 77180,27 the Court denied
due course to the petition of Summerville General Merchandising and affirmed the ruling of the trial court
that, indeed, double jeopardy has set in.
The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77180 is now the subject of a Petition for
Review before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 163741 entitled, Summerville General Merchandising
and Co., Inc. v. Elidad Kho."28
4) Search Warrant No. 99-1520 before the RTC of Manila, Branch 7
Shortly before instituting Criminal Case No. 00-183261 against the Khos, or on 7 January 2000,
Summerville General Merchandising applied for the issuance of a search warrant against the Spouses
Elidad and Violeta Kho and Roger Kho, since they persisted in manufacturing and selling Chin Chun Su
products despite the BFAD order directing them to refrain from doing so. The application was docketed
as Search Warrant No. 99-1520 before the RTC of Manila, Branch 7, which was presided over by
respondent herein, Judge Enrico A. Lanzanas. A hearing on the application was held on 10 January
200029 and the search warrant was issued against Elidad, Violeta and Roger Kho on the same day.30 Its
enforcement led to the seizure of several Chin Chun Su
products.31 Ï‚Î·Î±Ã±rÎ¿blÎµÅ¡ Î½Î¹râ€ Ï…Î±l lÎ±Ï‰ lÎ¹brÎ±rÃ¿
On 17 January 2000, Elidad, Violeta and Roger Kho filed before the RTC of Manila, Branch 7, a motion
to quash the search warrant and for the return of the items unlawfully seized. The motion was opposed by
Summerville General Merchandising.
In an Order32 dated 3 April 2000, the RTC of Manila, Branch 7, denied Elidad and Violeta Kho's motion
to quash and to return the seized articles for lack of merit.33 Elidad and Violeta Kho filed a motion for
reconsideration and motion to transfer the proceedings in RTC of Manila, Branch 7, to RTC of Manila,
Branch 1, citing Supreme Court Administrative Order 113-9534 designating the RTC of Manila, Branch 1,
as an Intellectual Property Court. The RTC of Manila, Branch 7, denied these motions in an Order dated 5
June 2000,35 explaining that:
Anent the Motion to Compel this Branch to transfer the case to Branch 1 of this Court, suffice it to say
that the cases for violation of Arts. 188 and 189 of the Revised Penal Code (now under the Intellectual
Property Law) are those that are already filed in court after the proper preliminary investigation and not
cases for application for search warrant involving probable violation of said law. Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 113-95 itself designates the alluded court or branch thereof to try and decide
which clearly excludes cases/applications for search warrant which obviously does not involve trying and
deciding case for violation of the Intellectual Property law.
On respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, the Court finds their arguments therein a rehash of the
issues and arguments raised in their Motion to Quash.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, respondents' Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Transfer, are
hereby DENIED.36
Elidad and Violeta Kho filed a Petition for Certiorari and Preliminary Mandatory Injunction,37 docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 60084, before the Court of Appeals questioning the aforementioned Orders of the
RTC of Manila, Branch 7. A decision dated 6 August 200138 was rendered by the Court of Appeals
denying the petition. It upheld Search Warrant No. 99-1520 as having been validly issued and properly
executed and, thus, there is no basis for the return of the goods seized. A motion for reconsideration filed
by the Khos was denied by the Court of Appeals in an Order dated 16 November 2001.39
Elidad and Violeta Kho filed a supplement to their Motion for Reconsideration dated 20 November
200140before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60084, reiterating their prayer for the quashal of
Search Warrant No. 99-1520 and the return of the seized items. The Court of Appeals, in a resolution
dated 4 December 2001,41 merely noted the motion in view of its earlier resolution rendered on 16
November 2001 already denying Elidad and Violeta Kho's Motion for Reconsideration.
Pained by the decisions and orders of the trial court and appellate court, petitioners Elidad and Violeta
Kho filed the present petition praying that the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60084
dated 6 August 2001 be reversed and set aside, and a new decision be issued granting the quashal of
Search Warrant No. 99-1520 and ordering the return of the items unlawfully seized.42
In their Memorandum, petitioners raise the following issues for resolution:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE

WITHDRAWAL OF THE INFORMATION FOR UNFAIR COMPETITION AGAINST THE
PETITIONERS IN BRANCH 1 OF RTC-MANILA AS A RESULT OF THE RESOLUTION OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FINDING NO PROBABLE CAUSE.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT NO GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION WAS COMMITTED BY HONORABLE JUDGE ENRICO LANZANAS IN
FINDING THAT PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTED AGAINST THE PETITIONERS FOR THE
ISSUANCE OF SEARCH WARRANT NO. 99-1520.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT BRANCH 7 OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA HAD JURISDICTION TO ISSUE SEARCH WARRANT
NO. 99-1520.
OF DISCRETION WAS COMMITTED BY HONORABLE JUDGE ENRICO LANZANAS IN
RULING THAT SEARCH WARRANT NO. 99-1520 WAS LAWFULLY EXECUTED.
OF DISCRETION WAS COMMITTED BY HONORABLE JUDGE ENRICO LANZANAS IN NOT
ORDERING THE RETURN OF THE ITEMS SEIZED UNDER SEARCH WARRANT NO. 99-1520.43
The petition is devoid of merit.
As to the first issue, it must be noted that the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 00-183261 by the RTC of
Manila, Branch 1, was initially by virtue of the resolution of the DOJ dated 28 September 200144 ordering
the dismissal of the criminal case for unfair competition.
This order of dismissal, however, was again set aside by the DOJ in its resolution dated 17 September
200245 directing that appropriate information for Unfair Competition be filed against the Khos. The
motion for reconsideration of Elidad and Violeta Kho was denied by the DOJ in its resolution dated 17
July 2003.46 This is the latest existing resolution of the DOJ on the matter, dated 17 July 2003, which
affirmed the resolution of the then DOJ Secretary Hernando B. Perez directing the City Prosecutor of
Manila to file the appropriate information against Elidad and Violeta Kho for Unfair Competition as
defined and penalized under Section 168.3(a), in relation to Sections 168 and 170 of Rep. Act No. 8293 or
The Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines. Therefore, at the time of the dismissal of Criminal Case
No. 00-183261 by the RTC of Manila, Branch 1, on 24 October 2001, the DOJ resolution on I.S. No.
00A-02396 on which Criminal Case No. 00-183261 is based has not been written finis as yet.
Taking into consideration these circumstances, the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the Order of
the RTC of Manila, Branch 7, denying the motion to quash filed by the herein petitioners because,
subsequently, the DOJ still ordered the filing of charges against Elidad and Violeta Kho. As to whether
the RTC of Manila, Branch 1, properly dismissed the criminal case against the Khos despite the
resolution of the DOJ ordering their criminal prosecution, we cannot dwell more on the issue because it is
already the subject of G.R. No. 163741 before another division of this Court.
Issues two, three and four, on the other hand, boil down to the central issue of whether or not the Court of
Appeals erred in upholding the RTC of Manila, Branch 7, in its findings of probable cause to issue a
search warrant. Also resting on how we shall resolve the foregoing issue is the fifth and last issue in the
Petition at bar which questions the refusal by both the Court of Appeals and the RTC of Manila, Branch
7, to return the seized items.
The issuance of Search Warrants is governed by Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court reproduced
below:
SECTION 1. Search warrant defined. - A search warrant is an order in writing issued in the name of the
People of the Philippines, signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search
for personal property described therein and bring it before the court.
SEC. 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. - An application for search warrant
shall be filed with the following:
a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.
b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region where the crime
was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial
region where the warrant shall be enforced.
However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in the court
where the criminal action is pending.
SEC. 3. Personal property to be seized. - A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of
personal property:
(a) Subject of the offense;
(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; or
(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. - A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable
cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.
SEC.5. Examination of complainant; record. - The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally
examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn
statements together with the affidavits submitted.
SEC. 6. Issuance and form of search warrant. - If the judge is satisfied of the existence of facts upon
which the application is based or that there is probable cause to believe that they exist, he shall issue the
warrant, which must be substantially in the form prescribed by these Rules.
What constitutes "probable cause" is well settled. In Microsoft Corporation v. Maxicorp, Inc.,47 we
defined probable cause as follows:
Probable cause means "such reasons, supported by facts and circumstances as will warrant a cautious man
in the belief that his action and the means taken in prosecuting it are legally just and proper." Thus,
probable cause for a search warrant requires such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and the objects sought in connection with that
offense are in the place to be searched.
xxxx
The determination of probable cause does not call for the application of rules and standards of proof that a
judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits. As implied by the words themselves, "probable
cause" is concerned with probability, not absolute or even moral certainty. The prosecution need not
present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt. The standards of judgment are those of a reasonably
prudent man, not the exacting calibrations of a judge after a full-blown trial.
No law or rule states that probable cause requires a specific kind of evidence. No formula or fixed rule for
its determination exists. Probable cause is determined in the light of conditions obtaining in a given
situation. xxx
In Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,48 we explained further that:

Although the term "probable cause" has been said to have a well-defined meaning in the law, the term is
exceedingly difficult to define, in this case, with any degree of precision; indeed, no definition of it which
would justify the issuance of a search warrant can be formulated which would cover every state of facts
which might arise, and no formula or standard, or hard and fast rule, may be laid down which may be
applied to the facts of every situation. As to what acts constitute probable cause seem incapable of
definition. There is, of necessity, no exact test. At best, the term "probable cause" has been understood to
mean a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
warrant a cautious man in the belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged; or the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite an honest belief in a reasonable
mind acting on all the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the magistrate that the charge
made by the applicant for the warrant is true.
Probable cause does not mean actual and positive cause, nor does it import absolute certainty. The
determination of the existence of probable cause is not concerned with the question of whether the offense
charged has been or is being committed in fact, or whether the accused is guilty or innocent, but only
whether the affiant has reasonable grounds for his belief. The requirement is less than certainty or proof,
but more than suspicion or possibility.
In Philippine jurisprudence, probable cause has been uniformly defined as such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed,
and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. It being
the duty of the issuing officer to issue, or refuse to issue, the warrant as soon as practicable after the
application therefor is filed, the facts warranting the conclusion of probable cause must be assessed at the
time of such judicial determination by necessarily using legal standards then set forth in law and
jurisprudence, and not those that have yet to be crafted thereafter.
We also declared in People v. Chiu,49 citing Malaloan v. Court of Appeals,50 that a search warrant is
merely a judicial process designed by the Rules to respond only to an incident in the main case, if one has
already been instituted, or in anticipation thereof. It bears repeating that the proceedings before the RTC
of Manila, Branch 7, was solely for the issuance of Search Warrant No. 99-1520, while the main case
against Elidad and Violeta Kho for violation of The Intellectual Property Code was instituted only later on
as Criminal Case No. 00-183261 before the RTC of Manila, Branch 1. What is before us in the Petition at
bar is the validity of the search warrant issued in the proceedings in Search Warrant No. 99-1520.
A perspicacious examination of the records reveal that the RTC of Manila, Branch 7, followed the
prescribed procedure for the issuance of Search Warrant No. 99-1520, namely, (1) the examination under
oath or affirmation of the Complainant and his witnesses and, in this case, Judge Enrico A. Lanzanas
personally examined complainant-policewoman SPO4 Nedita Alvario Balagbis, and Mr. Victor Chua, the
representative/officer of Summerville General Merchandising, at the hearing on the application for Search
Warrant No. 99-1520 held on 10 January 2000; (2) an examination personally conducted by then
Presiding Judge Lanzanas, in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, of
the complainant and witnesses on facts personally known to them; and (3) the taking of sworn statements,
together with the affidavits submitted, which were duly attached to the records. In determining probable
cause in the issuance of a search warrant, the oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the
personal knowledge of the applicant or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the
committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of
the existence of probable cause.52
From the affidavit dated 7 January 2000 of SPO4 Nedita Balagbis, in support of the application for search
warrant, she stated that Summerville General Merchandising represented by Mr. Victor Chua sought the
assistance of their police station in connection with the proliferation of fake Chin Chun Su products. With
Victor Chua, they made a surveillance of two places, namely 2407 Topacio Street and 2412 Raymundo
Street both in San Andres, Manila. Through this, they were able to verify that plastic containers were
being labeled with Chin Chun Su stickers filled with cream at 2407 Topacio Street. On the other hand, in
the affidavit dated 7 January 2000 of Victor Chua, he stated that Summerville General Merchandising,
being the exclusive importer, distributor and dealer of Chin Chun Su products received reliable
information that persons going by the name of Elidad, Violeta and Roger Kho were engaged in the illegal
manufacture and sale of these products. From the surveillance conducted with the help of SPO4 Balagbis,
they saw a tricycle full of containers taken to a house at 2412 Raymundo Street, San Andres, Manila. It
was at this address that Chin Chun Su stickers were being affixed. The containers were thereafter taken to
2407 Topacio Street to be filled with the cream product.
Clearly, probable cause existed for the issuance of the warrant as shown by the affidavits of the above
affiants who had personal knowledge of facts indicating that an offense involving violation of intellectual
property rights was being committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the
place sought to be searched. The surveillance conducted by SPO4 Nedita Balagbis on the basis of reliable
information that Elidad, Violeta and Roger Kho were engaged in the illegal manufacture and sale of fake
Chin Chun Su products enabled her to gain personal knowledge of the illegal activities of the Khos.53 This
fact was sufficient justification for the examining judge, in this case Judge Lanzanas, to conclude that
there was probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant. At the hearing conducted by Judge
Lanzanas, SPO4 Nedita Balagbis and Victor Chua testified on the affidavits they separately executed, and
essentially stated therein upon inquiry by Judge Lanzanas that indeed several fake Chin Chun Su products
were loaded to a tricycle and brought to a warehouse in Topacio Street.
In People v. Tee,54 this Court held that:It is presumed that a judicial function has been regularly
performed, absent a showing to the contrary. A magistrate's determination of probable cause for the
issuance of a search warrant is paid great deference by a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial
basis for that determination. Substantial basis means that the questions of the examining judge brought
out such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed, and the objects in connection with the offense sought to be seized are in the
place sought to be searched.We cannot find any irregularity or abuse of discretion on the part of Judge
Lanzanas for issuing the assailed search warrant. On the contrary, we find that he had complied with the
procedural and substantive requirements for issuing a search warrant. We are, therefore, bound to respect
his finding of probable cause for issuing Search Warrant No. 99-1520.
After declaring that Search Warrant No. 99-1520 was validly issued by the RTC of Manila, Branch 7,
then there is no reason for us to order the return of the articles seized by virtue thereof.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 6 August 2001 and Resolution dated 16
November 2001, denying the quashal of Search Warrant No. 99-1520 and the return of the seized items,
are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.
JOSE BURGOS, SR., JOSE BURGOS, JR., BAYANI SORIANO and J. BURGOS MEDIA SERVICES,
INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY,
THE CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER, PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY COMMAND, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, ET
AL., respondents.
Lorenzo M. Tañada, Wigberto E. Tañada, Martiniano Vivo, Augusto Sanchez, Joker P. Arroyo, Jejomar
Binay and Rene Saguisag for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
ESCOLIN, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory and
prohibitory injunction is the validity of two [2] search warrants issued on December 7, 1982 by
respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano, Executive Judge of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal [Quezon
City], under which the premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D,
RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We
Forum" newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and printing machines, equipment,
paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the
said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to
be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum"
newspaper, were seized.
Petitioners further pray that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued for
the return of the seized articles, and that respondents, "particularly the Chief Legal Officer, Presidential
Security Command, the Judge Advocate General, AFP, the City Fiscal of Quezon City, their
representatives, assistants, subalterns, subordinates, substitute or successors" be enjoined from using
the articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and the other accused in Criminal
Case No. Q- 022782 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, entitled People v. Jose Burgos, Jr. et al. 1
In our Resolution dated June 21, 1983, respondents were required to answer the petition. The plea for
preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction was set for hearing on June 28, 1983, later reset to
July 7, 1983, on motion of the Solicitor General in behalf of respondents.
At the hearing on July 7, 1983, the Solicitor General, while opposing petitioners' prayer for a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction, manifested that respondents "will not use the aforementioned
articles as evidence in the aforementioned case until final resolution of the legality of the seizure of the
aforementioned articles. ..." 2 With this manifestation, the prayer for preliminary prohibitory injunction
was rendered moot and academic.
Respondents would have this Court dismiss the petition on the ground that petitioners had come to this
Court without having previously sought the quashal of the search warrants before respondent judge.
Indeed, petitioners, before impugning the validity of the warrants before this Court, should have filed a
motion to quash said warrants in the court that issued them. 3 But this procedural flaw notwithstanding,
we take cognizance of this petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of the constitutional issues
raised not to mention the public interest generated by the search of the "We Forum" offices, which was
televised in Channel 7 and widely publicized in all metropolitan dailies. The existence of this special
circumstance justifies this Court to exercise its inherent power to suspend its rules. In the words of the
revered Mr. Justice Abad Santos in the case of C. Vda. de Ordoveza v. Raymundo, 4 "it is always in the
power of the court [Supreme Court] to suspend its rules or to except a particular case from its
operation, whenever the purposes of justice require it...".
Respondents likewise urge dismissal of the petition on ground of laches. Considerable stress is laid on
the fact that while said search warrants were issued on December 7, 1982, the instant petition
impugning the same was filed only on June 16, 1983 or after the lapse of a period of more than six [6]
months.
Laches is failure or negligence for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it. 5
Petitioners, in their Consolidated Reply, explained the reason for the delay in the filing of the petition
thus:
Respondents should not find fault, as they now do [p. 1, Answer, p. 3, Manifestation] with the fact that
the Petition was filed on June 16, 1983, more than half a year after the petitioners' premises had been
raided.
The climate of the times has given petitioners no other choice. If they had waited this long to bring their
case to court, it was because they tried at first to exhaust other remedies. The events of the past eleven
fill years had taught them that everything in this country, from release of public funds to release of
detained persons from custody, has become a matter of executive benevolence or largesse
Hence, as soon as they could, petitioners, upon suggestion of persons close to the President, like Fiscal
Flaminiano, sent a letter to President Marcos, through counsel Antonio Coronet asking the return at
least of the printing equipment and vehicles. And after such a letter had been sent, through Col. Balbino
V. Diego, Chief Intelligence and Legal Officer of the Presidential Security Command, they were further
encouraged to hope that the latter would yield the desired results.
After waiting in vain for five [5] months, petitioners finally decided to come to Court. [pp. 123-124,
Rollo]
Although the reason given by petitioners may not be flattering to our judicial system, We find no ground
to punish or chastise them for an error in judgment. On the contrary, the extrajudicial efforts exerted by
petitioners quite evidently negate the presumption that they had abandoned their right to the
possession of the seized property, thereby refuting the charge of laches against them.
Respondents also submit the theory that since petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. had used and marked as
evidence some of the seized documents in Criminal Case No. Q- 022872, he is now estopped from
challenging the validity of the search warrants. We do not follow the logic of respondents. These
documents lawfully belong to petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and he can do whatever he pleases with them,
within legal bounds. The fact that he has used them as evidence does not and cannot in any way affect
the validity or invalidity of the search warrants assailed in this petition.
Several and diverse reasons have been advanced by petitioners to nullify the search warrants in
question.
1. Petitioners fault respondent judge for his alleged failure to conduct an examination under oath or
affirmation of the applicant and his witnesses, as mandated by the above-quoted constitutional
provision as wen as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court .6 This objection, however, may properly be
considered moot and academic, as petitioners themselves conceded during the hearing on August 9,
1983, that an examination had indeed been conducted by respondent judge of Col. Abadilla and his
witnesses.
2. Search Warrants No. 20-82[a] and No. 20- 82[b] were used to search two distinct places: No. 19, Road
3, Project 6, Quezon City and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, respectively.
Objection is interposed to the execution of Search Warrant No. 20-82[b] at the latter address on the
ground that the two search warrants pinpointed only one place where petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was
allegedly keeping and concealing the articles listed therein, i.e., No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City.
This assertion is based on that portion of Search Warrant No. 20- 82[b] which states:
Which have been used, and are being used as instruments and means of committing the crime of
subversion penalized under P.D. 885 as amended and he is keeping and concealing the same at 19 Road
3, Project 6, Quezon City.
The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error. Precisely, two search warrants were applied
for and issued because the purpose and intent were to search two distinct premises. It would be quite
absurd and illogical for respondent judge to have issued two warrants intended for one and the same
place. Besides, the addresses of the places sought to be searched were specifically set forth in the
application, and since it was Col. Abadilla himself who headed the team which executed the search
warrants, the ambiguity that might have arisen by reason of the typographical error is more apparent
than real. The fact is that the place for which Search Warrant No. 20- 82[b] was applied for was 728
Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, which address appeared in the opening
paragraph of the said warrant. 7 Obviously this is the same place that respondent judge had in mind
when he issued Warrant No. 20-82 [b].
In the determination of whether a search warrant describes the premises to be searched with sufficient
particularity, it has been held "that the executing officer's prior knowledge as to the place intended in
the warrant is relevant. This would seem to be especially true where the executing officer is the affiant
on whose affidavit the warrant had issued, and when he knows that the judge who issued the warrant
intended the building described in the affidavit, And it has also been said that the executing officer may
look to the affidavit in the official court file to resolve an ambiguity in the warrant as to the place to be
searched." 8
3. Another ground relied upon to annul the search warrants is the fact that although the warrants were
directed against Jose Burgos, Jr. alone, articles b belonging to his co-petitioners Jose Burgos, Sr., Bayani
Soriano and the J. Burgos Media Services, Inc. were seized.
Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, enumerates the personal properties that may be seized under
a search warrant, to wit:
Sec. 2. Personal Property to be seized. — A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of
the following personal property:
[a] Property subject of the offense;
[b] Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; and
[c] Property used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.
The above rule does not require that the property to be seized should be owned by the person against
whom the search warrant is directed. It may or may not be owned by him. In fact, under subsection [b]
of the above-quoted Section 2, one of the properties that may be seized is stolen property. Necessarily,
stolen property must be owned by one other than the person in whose possession it may be at the time
of the search and seizure. Ownership, therefore, is of no consequence, and it is sufficient that the
person against whom the warrant is directed has control or possession of the property sought to be
seized, as petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was alleged to have in relation to the articles and property seized
under the warrants.
4. Neither is there merit in petitioners' assertion that real properties were seized under the disputed
warrants. Under Article 415[5] of the Civil Code of the Philippines, "machinery, receptables, instruments
or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on
in a building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or
works" are considered immovable property. In Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo9 where this legal provision
was invoked, this Court ruled that machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when
placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant,
usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent
of the owner.
In the case at bar, petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the
machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the
ground remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.
5. The questioned search warrants were issued by respondent judge upon application of Col. Rolando N.
Abadilla Intelligence Officer of the P.C. Metrocom.10 The application was accompanied by the Joint
Affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, 11 members of the Metrocom Intelligence and
Security Group under Col. Abadilla which conducted a surveillance of the premises prior to the filing of
the application for the search warrants on December 7, 1982.
It is contended by petitioners, however, that the abovementioned documents could not have provided
sufficient basis for the finding of a probable cause upon which a warrant may validly issue in accordance
with Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution which provides:
SEC. 3. ... and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after
We find petitioners' thesis impressed with merit. Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to
be searched. And when the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or
editor in connection with the publication of subversive materials, as in the case at bar, the application
and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating with particularity the alleged
subversive material he has published or is intending to publish. Mere generalization will not suffice.
Thus, the broad statement in Col. Abadilla's application that petitioner "is in possession or has in his
control printing equipment and other paraphernalia, news publications and other documents which
were used and are all continuously being used as a means of committing the offense of subversion
punishable under Presidential Decree 885, as amended ..." 12 is a mere conclusion of law and does not
satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a finding of the
existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant
and it was a grave error for respondent judge to have done so.
Equally insufficient as basis for the determination of probable cause is the statement contained in the
joint affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, "that the evidence gathered and collated
by our unit clearly shows that the premises above- mentioned and the articles and things above-
described were used and are continuously being used for subversive activities in conspiracy with, and to
promote the objective of, illegal organizations such as the Light-a-Fire Movement, Movement for Free
Philippines, and April 6 Movement." 13
In mandating that "no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, ...
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce; 14 the Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge by the complainant or his
witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified. In Alvarez v. Court
of First Instance, 15 this Court ruled that "the oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within
the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince
the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the
warrant, of the existence of probable cause." As couched, the quoted averment in said joint affidavit
filed before respondent judge hardly meets the test of sufficiency established by this Court in Alvarez
case.
Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally objectionable is
that they are in the nature of general warrants. The search warrants describe the articles sought to be
seized in this wise:
1] All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo (equipment, typewriters, cabinets, tables,
communications/recording equipment, tape recorders, dictaphone and the like used and/or connected
in the printing of the "WE FORUM" newspaper and any and all documents communication, letters and
facsimile of prints related to the "WE FORUM" newspaper.
2] Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publication to promote the objectives
and piurposes of the subversive organization known as Movement for Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire
Movement and April 6 Movement; and,
3] Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the "WE FORUM" and other subversive
materials and propaganda, more particularly,
1] Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892;
2] DATSUN pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969
3] A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 524;
4] TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP 665; and,
5] TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 427 with marking "Bagong Silang."
In Stanford v. State of Texas 16 the search warrant which authorized the search for "books, records,
pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written instruments
concerning the Communist Party in Texas," was declared void by the U.S. Supreme Court for being too
general. In like manner, directions to "seize any evidence in connectionwith the violation of SDC 13-3703
or otherwise" have been held too general, and that portion of a search warrant which authorized the
seizure of any "paraphernalia which could be used to violate Sec. 54-197 of the Connecticut General
Statutes [the statute dealing with the crime of conspiracy]" was held to be a general warrant, and
therefore invalid. 17 The description of the articles sought to be seized under the search warrants in
question cannot be characterized differently.
In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme Courts calls to mind a notable chapter in English history: the era
of disaccord between the Tudor Government and the English Press, when "Officers of the Crown were
given roving commissions to search where they pleased in order to suppress and destroy the literature
of dissent both Catholic and Puritan Reference herein to such historical episode would not be relevant
for it is not the policy of our government to suppress any newspaper or publication that speaks with
"the voice of non-conformity" but poses no clear and imminent danger to state security.
As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the business and printing offices of the "Metropolitan
Mail" and the "We Forum newspapers. As a consequence of the search and seizure, these premises
were padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the printing and publication of said newspapers
were discontinued.
Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the press
guaranteed under the fundamental law, 18 and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners' freedom to
express themselves in print. This state of being is patently anathematic to a democratic framework
where a free, alert and even militant press is essential for the political enlightenment and growth of the
citizenry.
Respondents would justify the continued sealing of the printing machines on the ground that they have
been sequestered under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 885, as amended, which authorizes "the
sequestration of the property of any person, natural or artificial, engaged in subversive activities against
the government and its duly constituted authorities ... in accordance with implementing rules and
regulations as may be issued by the Secretary of National Defense." It is doubtful however, if
sequestration could validly be effected in view of the absence of any implementing rules and regulations
promulgated by the Minister of National Defense.
Besides, in the December 10, 1982 issue of the Daily Express, it was reported that no less than President
Marcos himself denied the request of the military authorities to sequester the property seized from
petitioners on December 7, 1982. Thus:
The President denied a request flied by government prosecutors for sequestration of the WE FORUM
newspaper and its printing presses, according to Information Minister Gregorio S. Cendana.
On the basis of court orders, government agents went to the We Forum offices in Quezon City and took
a detailed inventory of the equipment and all materials in the premises.
Cendaña said that because of the denial the newspaper and its equipment remain at the disposal of the
owners, subject to the discretion of the court. 19
That the property seized on December 7, 1982 had not been sequestered is further confirmed by the
reply of then Foreign Minister Carlos P. Romulo to the letter dated February 10, 1983 of U.S.
Congressman Tony P. Hall addressed to President Marcos, expressing alarm over the "WE FORUM "
case. 20 In this reply dated February 11, 1983, Minister Romulo stated:
2. Contrary to reports, President Marcos turned down the recommendation of our authorities to close
the paper's printing facilities and confiscate the equipment and materials it uses. 21
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Search Warrants Nos. 20-82[a] and 20-82[b] issued by respondent judge
on December 7, 1982 are hereby declared null and void and are accordingly set aside. The prayer for a
writ of mandatory injunction for the return of the seized articles is hereby granted and all articles seized
thereunder are hereby ordered released to petitioners. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De
la Fuente and Cuevas, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., took no part

G.R. No. 82585 November 14, 1988
MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, ANTONIO V. ROCES, FREDERICK K. AGCAOLI, and GODOFREDO L.

MANZANAS, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 35,
UNDERSECRETARY SILVESTRE BELLO III, of the Department of Justice, LUIS C. VICTOR, THE CITY FISCAL
OF MANILA and PRESIDENT CORAZON C. AQUINO, respondents.
G.R. No. 82827 November 14, 1988
LUIS D. BELTRAN, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of Branch 35 of the Regional Trial Court, at Manila,
THE HON. LUIS VICTOR, CITY FISCAL OF MANILA, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SUPERINTENDENT OF
THE WESTERN POLICE DISTRICT, and THE MEMBERS OF THE PROCESS SERVING UNIT AT THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, respondents.
G.R. No. 83979 November 14, 1988.
LUIS D. BELTRAN, petitioner,

vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY CATALINO MACARAIG, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE SEDFREY ORDOÑEZ,
UNDERSECRETARY OF JUSTICE SILVESTRE BELLO III, THE CITY FISCAL OF MANILA JESUS F. GUERRERO,
and JUDGE RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of Branch 35 of the Regional Trial Court, at
Manila, respondents.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz for petitioners in G.R. No. 82585.
Perfecto V. Fernandez, Jose P. Fernandez and Cristobal P. Fernandez for petitioner in G.R. Nos. 82827 and
83979.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were raised: (1) whether or not petitioners were
denied due process when informations for libel were filed against them although the finding of the
existence of a prima faciecase was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by
the President; (2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent
RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the
witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause; and (3) whether or not the President of the Philippines,
under the Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioners through the filing of a
complaint-affidavit.
Subsequent events have rendered the first issue moot and academic. On March 30, 1988, the Secretary
of Justice denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration and upheld the resolution of the
Undersecretary of Justice sustaining the City Fiscal's finding of a prima facie case against petitioners. A
second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by the Secretary of Justice on
April 7, 1988. On appeal, the President, through the Executive Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the
Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The motion for reconsideration was denied by the Executive
Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these developments, petitioners' contention that they have been
denied the administrative remedies available under the law has lost factual support.
It may also be added that with respect to petitioner Beltran, the allegation of denial of due process of
law in the preliminary investigation is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter-
affidavits, he filed a "Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving his right to refute the
complaint by filing counter-affidavits. Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a
criminal case actually file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed
completed. All that is required is that the respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-
affidavits if he is so minded.
The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the constitutional provision
on the issuance of warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads:
Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination nder oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant of
authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be authorized
by law," has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now requires the judge to
personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the
issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to
satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally
evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of
probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds
no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting
affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary
examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding
cases filed before their courts.
On June 30, 1987, the Supreme Court unanimously adopted Circular No. 12, setting down guidelines for
the issuance of warrants of arrest. The procedure therein provided is reiterated and clarified in this
resolution.
It has not been shown that respondent judge has deviated from the prescribed procedure. Thus, with
regard to the issuance of the warrants of arrest, a finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction cannot be sustained.
Anent the third issue, petitioner Beltran argues that "the reasons which necessitate presidential
immunity from suit impose a correlative disability to file suit." He contends that if criminal proceedings
ensue by virtue of the President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a
witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's jurisdiction. This, continues Beltran,
would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness
stand, she would be exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury.
The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the
exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that
being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office holder's
time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be
invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf. Thus, an
accused in a criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege
as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege.
Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the
court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President's
prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.
As regards the contention of petitioner Beltran that he could not be held liable for libel because of the
privileged character or the publication, the Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts and that such a
defense is best left to the trial court to appreciate after receiving the evidence of the parties.
As to petitioner Beltran's claim that to allow the libel case to proceed would produce a "chilling effect"
on press freedom, the Court finds no basis at this stage to rule on the point.
The petitions fail to establish that public respondents, through their separate acts, gravely abused their
discretion as to amount to lack of jurisdiction. Hence, the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for
cannot issue.
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part
of the public respondents, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petitions in G. R. Nos. 82585, 82827 and
83979. The Order to maintain the status quo contained in the Resolution of the Court en banc dated
April 7, 1988 and reiterated in the Resolution dated April 26, 1988 is LIFTED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento,
Cortes, Griño-Aquino Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
ALFREDO C. MENDOZA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND JUNO CARS, INC., Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
While the determination of probable cause to charge a person of a crime is the sole function of the.
prosecutor, the trial court may, in the protection of one's fundamental right to liberty, dismiss the case if,
upon a personal assessment of the evidence, it finds that the evidence does not establish probable cause.
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Court of Appeals' decision2 dated January 14,
2011, which reversed the Regional Trial Court's dismissal of the complaint against petitioner Alfredo C.
Mendoza for qualified theft and estafa.
This case stems from a complaint-affidavit filed by Juno Cars, Inc. through its representative, Raul C.
Evangelista, on January 8, 2008 for qualified theft and estafa against Alfredo.3
In the complaint-affidavit, Juno Cars alleged that on June 2, 2007, it hired Alfredo as Trade-In/Used Car
Supervisor. On November 19, 2007, its Dealer/Operator, Rolando Garcia, conducted a partial audit of the
used cars and discovered that five (5) cars had been sold and released by Alfredo without Rolando’s or
the finance manager’s permission.4
The partial audit showed that the buyers of the five cars made payments, but Alfredo failed to remit the
payments totalling ₱886,000.00. It was further alleged that while there were 20 cars under Alfredo’s
custody, only 18 were accounted for. Further investigation revealed that Alfredo failed to turn over the
files of a 2001 Hyundai Starex and a Honda City 1.5 LXI. Juno Cars alleged that taking into account the
unremitted amounts and the acquisition cost of the Honda City, Alfredo pilfered a total amount of
₱1,046,000.00 to its prejudice and damage.5
In his counter-affidavit, Alfredo raised, among others, Juno Cars’ supposed failure to prove ownership
over the five (5) cars or its right to possess them with the purported unremitted payments. Hence, it could
not have suffered damage.6
On March 4, 2008, Provincial Prosecutor Rey F. Delgado issued a Resolution7 finding probable cause and
recommending the filing of an information against Alfredo for qualified theft and estafa.
Alfredo moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied.8 He then filed a petition for review with
the Department of Justice on May 16, 2008.9
While Alfredo’s motion for reconsideration was still pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Mandaluyong, two informations for qualified theft10 and estafa11 were filed before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 212, Mandaluyong City. On March 31, 2008, Alfredo filed a motion for determination of
probable cause12 before the trial court. On April 28, 2008, he also filed a motion to defer arraignment.
Several clarificatory hearings were scheduled but were not conducted.13 On February 4, 2009, the parties
agreed to submit all pending incidents, including the clarificatory hearing, for resolution.14
On March 3, 2009, the trial court, through Presiding Judge Rizalina Capco-Umali, issued an
order15 dismissing the complaint, stating that:
After conducting an independent assessment of the evidence on record which includes the assailed
Resolution dated 04 March 2008, the court holds that the evidence adduced does not support a finding of
probable cause for the offenses of qualified theft and estafa. x x x.16
Juno Cars filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied on July 3, 2009.17
Juno Cars then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court acted
without or in excess of its jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the complaint.
It argued that "the determination of probable cause and the decision whether or not to file a criminal case
in court, rightfully belongs to the public prosecutor."18
On January 14, 2011, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision,19 reversed the trial court, and reinstated
the case. In its decision, the appellate court ruled that the trial court acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction "in supplanting the public prosecutor’s findings of probable cause with her own findings of
insufficiency of evidence and lack of probable cause."20
Aggrieved, Alfredo filed a petition for review under Rule 45 before this court. In essence, he argued that
the trial court was correct in finding that there was no probable cause as shown by the evidence on record.
He argued that "judicial determination of probable cause is broader than [the] executive determination of
probable cause"21 and that "[i]t is not correct to say that the determination of probable cause is exclusively
vested on the prosecutor x x x."22
In its comment,23 Juno Cars argued that Alfredo presented questions, issues, and arguments that were a
mere rehash of those already considered and passed upon by the appellate court.
The Office of the Solicitor General, arguing for public respondent, stated in its comment 24 that the
appellate court correctly sustained the public prosecutor in his findings of probable cause against Alfredo.
Since there was no showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of Prosecutor Rey F. Delgado, the
trial court should respect his determination of probable cause.
In his reply,25 Alfredo reiterated that "judicial determination of probable cause[,] while not a superior
faculty[,] covers a broader encompassing perspective in the disposition of the issue on the existence of
probable cause."26 He argued that the findings of the trial court should be accorded greater weight than the
appellate court’s. It merely reviewed the findings of the trial court.
The primordial issue is whether the trial court may dismiss an information filed by the prosecutor on the
basis of its own independent finding of lack of probable cause.
Time and again, this court has been confronted with the issue of the difference between the determination
of probable cause by the prosecutor on one hand and the determination of probable cause by the judge on
the other. We examine these two concepts again.
Juno Cars filed a complaint against Alfredo for qualified theft27 and estafa under Article 315, fourth
paragraph, no. 3(c)28 of the Revised Penal Code. Since qualified theft is punishable by reclusion perpetua,
a preliminary investigation must first be conducted "to determine whether there is sufficient ground to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty
thereof, and should be held for trial," in accordance with Rule 112, Section 1 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure.
At this stage, the conduct of the preliminary investigation and the subsequent determination of the
existence of probable cause lie solely within the discretion of the public prosecutor.29 If upon evaluation
of the evidence, the prosecutor finds sufficient basis to find probable cause, he or she shall then cause the
filing of the information with the court.
Once the information has been filed, the judge shall then "personally evaluate the resolution of the
prosecutor and its supporting evidence"30 to determine whether there is probable cause to issue a warrant
of arrest. At this stage, a judicial determination of probable cause exists.
In People v. Castillo and Mejia,31 this court has stated:
There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial. The executive
determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is a function that
properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable
cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and
thus should be held for trial. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine
whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court. Whether or not that function has been correctly
discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment of the
existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be
compelled to pass upon.
The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the judge to ascertain
whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that
based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not to
frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the
arrest warrant.32
The difference is clear: The executive determination of probable cause concerns itself with whether there
is enough evidence to support an Information being filed. The judicial determination of probable cause,
on the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued. In People v. Inting:33
x x x Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains
whether the offender should be held for trial or released. Even if the two inquiries are conducted in the
course of one and the same proceeding, there should be no confusion about the objectives. The
determination of probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The preliminary
investigation proper—whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the
offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and
embarrassment of trial—is the function of the Prosecutor.34 (Emphasis supplied)
While it is within the trial court’s discretion to make an independent assessment of the evidence on hand,
it is only for the purpose of determining whether a warrant of arrest should be issued. The judge does not
act as an appellate court of the prosecutor and has no capacity to review the prosecutor’s determination of
probable cause; rather, the judge makes a determination of probable cause independent of the prosecutor’s
finding.
People v. Court of Appeals and Jonathan Cerbo35 discussed the rationale. In that case, Jonathan Cerbo
allegedly shot Rosalinda Dy in the presence of his father, Billy Cerbo. An information for murder was
filed against Jonathan Cerbo. The daughter of Rosalinda Dy, as private complainant, executed a
complaint-affidavit charging Billy Cerbo with conspiracy. The prosecutor then filed a motion to amend
the information, which was granted by the court. The information was then amended to include Billy
Cerbo as one of the accused, and a warrant of arrest was issued against him.
Billy Cerbo filed a motion to quash the warrant arguing that it was issued without probable cause. The
trial court granted this motion, recalled the warrant, and dismissed the case against him. The Court of
Appeals affirmed this dismissal. This court, however, reversed the Court of Appeals and ordered the
reinstatement of the amended information against Billy Cerbo, stating that:
In granting this petition, we are not prejudging the criminal case or the guilt or innocence of Private
Respondent Billy Cerbo. We are simply saying that, as a general rule, if the information is valid on its
face and there is no showing of manifest error, grave abuse of discretion or prejudice on the part of the
public prosecutor, courts should not dismiss it for ‘want of evidence,’ because evidentiary matters should
be presented and heard during the trial. The functions and duties of both the trial court and the public
prosecutor in "the proper scheme of things" in our criminal justice system should be clearly understood.
The rights of the people from what could sometimes be an "oppressive" exercise of government
prosecutorial powers do need to be protected when circumstances so require. But just as we recognize this
need, we also acknowledge that the State must likewise be accorded due process. Thus, when there is no
showing of nefarious irregularity or manifest error in the performance of a public prosecutor’s duties,
courts ought to refrain from interfering with such lawfully and judicially mandated duties.
In any case, if there was palpable error or grave abuse of discretion in the public prosecutor’s finding of
probable cause, the accused can appeal such finding to the justice secretary and move for the deferment or
suspension of the proceedings until such appeal is resolved.36 (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the resolution dated March 4, 2008 of Prosecutor Rey F. Delgado found that the facts and
evidence were "sufficient to warrant the indictment of [petitioner] x x x."37 There was nothing in his
resolution which showed that he issued it beyond the discretion granted to him by law and jurisprudence.
While the information filed by Prosecutor Delgado was valid, Judge Capco-Umali still had the discretion
to make her own finding of whether probable cause existed to order the arrest of the accused and proceed
with trial.
Jurisdiction over an accused is acquired when the warrant of arrest is served. Absent this, the court cannot
hold the accused for arraignment and trial.
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
The Constitution prohibits the issuance of search warrants or warrants of arrest where the judge has not
personally determined the existence of probable cause. The phrase "upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce" allows a determination of probable cause by the judge ex parte.
For this reason, Section 6, paragraph (a) of Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure mandates the
judge to "immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record fails to establish probable cause."
Section 6, paragraph (a) of Rule 112 reads:
Section 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. — (a) By the Regional Trial Court. — Within ten (10) days
from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the
prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record
clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a
commitment order if the accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who
conducted the preliminary investigation or when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to
section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the
prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved
by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint of information.
In People v. Hon. Yadao:38
Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court gives the trial court three options upon the filing of the criminal
information: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish probable cause; (2)
issue a warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; and (3) order the prosecutor to present additional
evidence within five days from notice in case of doubt as to the existence of probable cause.
But the option to order the prosecutor to present additional evidence is not mandatory.1âwphi1 The
court’s first option under the above is for it to "immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record
clearly fails to establish probable cause." That is the situation here: the evidence on record clearly fails to
establish probable cause against the respondents.39 (Emphasis supplied)
It is also settled that "once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case,
whether as to its dismissal or the conviction or the acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound discretion of
the court."40
In this case, Judge Capco-Umali made an independent assessment of the evidence on record and
concluded that "the evidence adduced does not support a finding of probable cause for the offenses of
qualified theft and estafa."41Specifically, she found that Juno Cars "failed to prove by competent
evidence"42 that the vehicles alleged to have been pilfered by Alfredo were lawfully possessed or owned
by them, or that these vehicles were received by Alfredo, to be able to substantiate the charge of qualified
theft. She also found that the complaint "[did] not state with particularity the exact value of the alleged
office files or their valuation purportedly have been removed, concealed or destroyed by the
accused,"43 which she found crucial to the prosecution of the crime of estafa under Article 315, fourth
paragraph, no. 3(c) of the Revised Penal Code. She also noted that:
x x x As a matter of fact, this court had even ordered that this case be set for clarificatory hearing to clear
out essential matters pertinent to the offense charged and even directed the private complainant to bring
documents relative to the same/payment as well as affidavit of witnesses/buyers with the end view of
satisfying itself that indeed probable cause exists to commit the present case which private complainant
failed to do.44
Accordingly, with the present laws and jurisprudence on the matter, Judge Capco-Umali correctly
dismissed the case against Alfredo.
Although jurisprudence and procedural rules allow it, a judge must always proceed with caution in
dismissing cases due to lack of probable cause, considering the preliminary nature of the evidence before
it. It is only when he or she finds that the evidence on hand absolutely fails to support a finding of
probable cause that he or she can dismiss the case. On the other hand, if a judge finds probable cause, he
or she must not hesitate to proceed with arraignment and trial in order that justice may be served.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision dated January 14, 2011 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP. No. 110774 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Criminal Case Nos. MC08-11604-05
against Alfredo C. Mendoza are DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Rule 126, Section 4 to 6 of the Rules of Court
Section 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not issue except upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in
the Philippines. (3a)
Section 5. Examination of complainant; record. — The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally
examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn
statements, together with the affidavits submitted. (4a)
Section 6. Issuance and form of search warrant. — If the judge is satisfied of the existence of facts upon
which the application is based or that there is probable cause to believe that they exist, he shall issue the
warrant, which must be substantially in the form prescribed by these Rules. (5a)
ROMER SY TAN,Petitioner, vs. SY TIONG GUE, FELICIDAD CHAN SY, SY CHIM, SY TIONG SAN, SY YU
BUN, SY YU SHIONG, SY YU SAN, and BRYAN SY LIM, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
PERALTA, J.:
On February 17, 2010, this Court rendered a Decision[1] in G.R. No. 174570 entitled Romer Sy Tan v. Sy
Tiong Gue, et al., the decretal portion of which reads, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution dated
December 29, 2005 and August 18, 2006, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81389
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders of the RTC dated September 1, 2003 and October 28,
2003 are REINSTATED. The validity of Search Warrant Nos. 03-3611 and 03-3612 is SUSTAINED.
On March 22, 2010, respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration[2] wherein respondents informed
this Court, albeit belatedly, that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted their motion for the withdrawal
of the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 06-241375. As such, respondents prayed that the decision
be reconsidered and set aside and that the quashal of the subject search warrants be rendered moot
and academic on the basis of the dismissal of the criminal case.
In his Comment[3] dated July 7, 2010, petitioner maintains that the motion is a mere reiteration of what
respondents have previously alleged in their Comment and which have been passed upon by this Court
in the subject decision. Petitioner alleges that he also filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Manila a Complaint for Qualified Theft against the respondents based on the same incidents and that
should the Information for Qualified Theft be filed with the proper court, the items seized by virtue of
the subject search warrants will be used as evidence therein.
On August 6, 2010, respondents filed their Reply.
On September 8, 2010, this Court issued a Resolution[4] wherein respondents were required to submit a
certified true copy of the Order of the RTC dated November 14, 2008, which granted their motion to
withdraw the information.
On October 22, 2010, respondents complied with the Courts directive and submitted a certified true
copy of the Order.[5]
In granting the motion to withdraw the Information, the RTC took into consideration the Amended
Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 90368 dated August 29, 2006, which affirmed the
findings of the City Prosecutor of Manila and the Secretary of Justice that the elements of Robbery, i.e.,
unlawful taking with intent to gain, with force and intimidation, were absent. Thus, there was lack of
probable cause, warranting the withdrawal of the Information.[6] The RTC also considered that the said
pronouncements of the CA were affirmed by no less than this Court in G.R. No. 177829 in the
Resolution[7] dated November 12, 2007.
Accordingly, the RTC granted respondents motion to withdraw the information without prejudice, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the motion to withdraw information is hereby GRANTED and the case is DISMISSED
without prejudice.
SO ORDERED.
Consequently, in view of the withdrawal of the Information for Robbery, the quashal of the subject
search warrants and the determination of the issue of whether or not there was probable cause
warranting the issuance by the RTC of the said search warrants for respondents alleged acts of robbery
has been rendered moot and academic. Verily, there is no more reason to further delve into the
propriety of the quashal of the search warrants as it has no more practical legal effect.[8]
Furthermore, even if an Information for Qualified Theft be later filed on the basis of the same incident
subject matter of the dismissed case of robbery, petitioner cannot include the seized items as part of
the evidence therein. Contrary to petitioners contention, he cannot use the items seized as evidence in
any other offense except in that in which the subject search warrants were issued. Section 4, Rule 126 of
the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Section 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable
cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after
particularly describing the place to be searched and things to be seized which may be anywhere in the
Philippines.
Thus, a search warrant may be issued only if there is probable cause in connection with only one specific
offense alleged in an application on the basis of the applicants personal knowledge and his or her
witnesses. Petitioner cannot, therefore, utilize the evidence seized by virtue of the search warrants
issued in connection with the case of Robbery in a separate case of Qualified Theft, even if both cases
emanated from the same incident.
Moreover, considering that the withdrawal of the Information was based on the findings of the CA, as
affirmed by this Court, that there was no probable cause to indict respondents for the crime of Robbery
absent the essential element of unlawful taking, which is likewise an essential element for the crime of
Qualified Theft, all offenses which are necessarily included in the crime of Robbery can no longer be
filed, much more, prosper.
Based on the foregoing, the Court resolves to Grant the motion.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the respondents
is GRANTED. The Decision of this Court dated February 17, 2010 is RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. The
petition filed by Romer Sy Tan is DENIED for being MOOT and ACADEMIC.
SO ORDERED.
BENJAMIN V. KHO and ELIZABETH ALINDOGAN, petitioners, vs. HON. ROBERTO L. MAKALINTAL and
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, respondents.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari assailing the Order, dated July 26, 1990, of Branch LXXVII of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Paranaque, which denied petitioners Motion to Quash Search Warrants
emanating from the same Court. Petitioners sought to restrain the respondent National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) from using the objects seized by virtue of such warrants in any case or cases filed or
to be filed against them and to return immediately the said items, including the firearms, ammunition
and explosives, radio communication equipment, hand sets, transceivers, two units of vehicles
and motorcycle.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On May 15, 1990, NBI Agent Max B. Salvador applied for the issuance of search warrants by the
respondent Judge against Banjamin V. Kho, now petitioner, in his residence at No. 45 Bb. Ramona Tirona
St., BF Homes, Phase I, Paranaque. On the same day, Eduardo T. Arugay, another NBI agent, applied with
the same court for the issuance of search warrants against the said petitioner in his house at No. 326
McDivitt St., Bgy. Moonwalk, Paranaque. The search warrants were applied for after teams of NBI
agents had conducted a personal surveillance and investigation in the two houses referred to on the
basis of confidential information they received that the said places were being used as storage centers
for unlicensed firearms and chop-chop vehicles. Respondent NBI sought for the issuance of search
warrants in anticipation of criminal cases to be instituted against petitioner Kho.
On the same day, the respondent Judge conducted the necessary examination of the applicants and
their witnesses, after which he issued Search Warrant Nos. 90-11, 90-12, 90-13, 90-14, and 90-15.
On the following day, May 16, 1990, armed with Search Warrant Nos. 90-11 and 90-12, NBI agents
searched subject premises at BF Homes, Paranaque, and they recovered various high-powered firearms
and hundreds of rounds of ammunition. Meanwhile, another search was conducted at the house at No.
326 McDivitt St. Bgy. Moonwalk, Paranaque, by another team of NBI agents using Search Warrant Nos.
90-13, 90-14 and 90-15. The said second search yielded several high-powered firearms with explosives
and more than a thousand rounds of ammunition. The simultaneous searches also resulted in the
confiscation of various radio and telecommunication equipment,two units of motor vehicles (Lite-Ace
vans) and one motorcycle. Upon verification with the Firearms and Explosives Unit in Camp Crame, the
NBI agents found out that no license has ever been issued to any person or entity for the confiscated
firearms in question. Likewise, the radio agents found out that no license has ever been issued to any
person or entity for the confiscated firearms in question. Likewise, the radio tranceivers recovered and
motor vehicles seized turned out to be unlicensed and unregistered per records of the government
agencies concerned.
On May 22, 1990, the raiding teams submitted separate returns to the respondent Judge requesting that
the items seized be in the continued custody of the NBI (Annexes O, P, and Q, Petition).
On May 28, 1990, the petitioners presented a Motion to Quash the said Search Warrants, contending
that:
1. The subject search warrants were issued without probable cause;
2. The same search warrants are prohibited by the Constitution for being general warrants;
3. The said search warrants were issued in violation of the procedural requirements set forth by the
Constitution;
4. The search warrants aforesaid were served in violation of the Revised Rules of Court; and
5. The objects seized were all legally possessed and issued.
On July 26, 1990, respondent Judge issued the assailed Order denying the said Motion To Quash
interposed by petitioners.
Petitioners question the issuance of subject search warrants, theorizing upon the absence of any
probable cause therefor. They contend that the surveillance and investigation conducted by NBI agents
within the premises involved, prior to the application for the search warrants under controversy, were
not sufficient to vest in the applicants personal knowledge of facts and circumstances showing or
indicating the commission of a crime by them (petitioners).
Petitioners contention is untenable. Records show that the NBI agents who conducted the surveillance
and investigation testified unequivocably that they saw guns being carried to and unloaded at the two
houses searched, and motor vehicles and spare parts were stored therein. In fact, applicant Max B.
Salvador declared that he personally attended the surveillance together with his witnesses (TSN, May
15, 1990, pp. 2-3), and the said witnesses personally saw the weapons being unloaded from motor
vehicles and carried to the premises referred to. NBI Agent Ali Vargas testified that he actually saw the
firearms being unloaded from a Toyota Lite-Ace van and brought to the aformentioned house in BF
Homes, Paranaque because he was there inside the compound posing as an appliance agent (TSN, May
15, 1990, pp. 4-5). It is therefore decisively clear that the application for the questioned search warrants
was based on the personal knowledge of the applicants and their witnesses.
In the case of Central Bank v. Morfe (20 SCRA 507), this Court ruled that the question of whether or not
a probable cause exists is one which must be determined in light ofthe conditions obtaining in given
situations. In Luna v. Plaza (26 SCRA 310), it held that the existence of a probable cause depends to a
large extent upon the finding or opinion of the judge who conducted the required examination of the
applicants and the witnesses.
After a careful study, the Court discerns no basis for disturbing the findings and conclusions arrived at by
the respondent Judge after examining the applicants and witnesses. Respondent judge had the singular
opportunity to assess their testimonies and to find out their personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances enough to create a probable cause. The Judge was the one who personally examined the
applicants and witnesses and who asked searching questions vis-a-vis the applications for search
warrants. He was thus able to observe and determine whether subject applicants and their witnesses
gave accurate accounts of the surveillance and investigation they conducted at the premises to be
searched. In the absence of any showing that respondent judge was recreant of his duties in connection
with the personal examination he so conducted on the affiants before him, there is no basis for doubting
the reliability and correctness of his findings and impressions.
Petitioners brand as fatally defective and deficient the procedure followed in the issuance of subject
search warrants, reasoning out that the same did not comply with constitutional and statutory
requirements. They fault respondent Judge for allegedly failing to ask specific questions they deem
particularly important during the examination of the applicants and their witnesses. To buttress their
submission, petitioners invite attention to the following question, to wit:
How did you know that there are unlicensed firearms being kept by Benjamin Kho at No. 45 Bb. Ramona
Tirona St., Phase I, BF Homes, Paranaque, Metro Manila? (TSN, Ali Vargas, May 15, 1990, p. 4)
Petitioners argue that by propounding the aforequoted question, the respondent Judge assumed that
the firearms at the premises to be searched were unlicensed, instead of asking for a detailed account of
how the NBI agents came to know that the firearms being kept thereat were unlicensed.
This stance of petitioners is similarly devoid of any sustainable basis. Nothing improper is perceived in
the manner the respondent Judge conducted the examination of subject applicants for search warrants
and their witnesses. He personally examined them under oath, and asked them searching questions on
the facts and circumstances personally known to them, in compliance with prescribed procedure and
legal requirements. It can be gleaned that the sworn statements and affidavits submitted by the
witnesses were duly attached to the pertinent records of the proceedings. It was within the discretion of
the examining Judge to determine what questions to ask the witnesses so long as the questions asked
are germane to the pivot of inquiry - the existence or absence of a probable cause.
Petitioners claim that subject search warrants are general warrants proscribed by the
Constitution. According to them, the things to be seized were not described and detailed out, i.e. the
firearms listed were not classified as to size or make, etc.
Records on hand indicate that the search warrants under scrutiny specifically describe the items to be
seized thus:
Search Warrant No. 90-11
Unlicensed radio communications equipments such as transmitters, transceivers, handsets, scanners,

monitoring device and the like.
Search Warrant No. 90-13

Unlicensed radio communications equipments such as transmitters, transceivers, handsets, radio
communications equipments, scanners, monitoring devices and others.
The use of the phrase and the like is of no moment. The same did not make the search warrants in
question general warrants. In Oca v. Maiquez (14 SCRA 735), the Court upheld the warrant although it
described the things to be seized as books of accounts and allied papers.
Subject Search Warrant Nos. 90-12 and 90-15 refer to:
Unlicensed firearms of various calibers and ammunitions for the said firearms.
Search Warrant No. 90-14 states:
Chop-chop vehicles and other spare parts.
The Court believes, and so holds, that the said warrants comply with Constitutional and statutory
requirements. The law does not require that the things to be seized must be described in precise and
minute detail as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities. Otherwise, it would
be virtually impossible for the applicants to obtain a warrant as they would not know exactly what kind
of things they are looking for. Since the element of time is very crucial in criminal cases, the effort and
time spent in researching on the details to be embodied in the warrant would render the purpose of the
search nugatory.
In the case under consideration, the NBI agents could not have been in a position to know before hand
the exact caliber or make of the firearms to be seized. Although the surveillance they conducted did
disclose the presence of unlicensed firearms within the premises to be searched, they could not have
known the particular type of weapons involved before seeing such weapons at close range, which was of
course impossible at the time of the filing of the applications for subject search warrants.
Verily, the failure to specify detailed descriptions in the warrants did not render the same
general. Retired Justice Ricardo Franciscos book on Criminal Procedure has this useful insight:
A description of the property to be seized need not be technically accurate nor necessarily precise; and
its nature will necessarily vary according to whether the identity of the property, or its character, is the
matter of concern. Further, the description is required to be specific only so far as the circumstances will
ordinarily allow. x x x
In People v. Rubio (57 Phil 384), the Court held that, ... But where, by the nature of the goods to be
seized, their description must be rather general, it is not required that a technical description be given,
for this would mean that no warrant could issue.
It is indeed understandable that the agents of respondent Bureau have no way of knowing whether the
guns they intend to seize are a Smith and Wesson or a Beretta. The surveillance conducted could not
give the NBI agents a close view of the weapons being transported or brought to the premises to be
searched. Thus, they could not be expected to know the detailed particulars of the objects to be
seized. Consequently, the list submitted in the applications for subject search warrants should be
adjudged in substantial compliance with the requirements of law.
Petitioners contend that the searching agents grossly violated the procedure in enforcing the search
warrants in question. The petition avers supposedly reprehensible acts perpetrated by the NBI
agents. Among the irregularities alluded to, are:
1. The raiding team failed to perform the following before breaking into the premises:
a. Properly identify themselves and showing necessary credentials including presentation of the Search
Warrants;
b. Furnishing of Search Warrants and allowing the occupants of the place to scrutinize the same;
c. Giving ample time to the occupants to voluntarily allow the raiders entry into the place and to search
the premises.
2. The team entered the premises by climbing the fence and by forcing open the main door of the
house.
3. Once inside the house, the raiders herded the maids and the sixteen year-old son of defendant Kho
into the dining room where they were confined for the duration of the raid.In the case of the son, he
was gagged with a piece of cloth, his hands were tied behind his back and he was made to lie face down.
4. Defendant Khos hands were immediately tied behind his back (initially with a rag and later with the
electric cord of a rechargeable lamp) and was restrained in a kneeling position with guns pointed at him
throughout the duration of the search. It was only after the search was completed and the seized items
stuffed in carton boxes (and a T-bag) that his hands were untied so he can sign the search warrants
which he was forced to do.
5. All throughout the search, defendant Kho and his companions were kept in the dining room and
continuously intimidated of being shot while the raiders search all the rooms all by themselves and
without anybody seeing whatever they were doing.
The question of whether there was abuse in the enforcement of the challanged search warrants is not
within the scope of a Motion to Quash. In a Motion to Quash, what is assailed is the validity of the
issuance of the warrant. The manner of serving the warrant and of effecting the search are not an issue
to be resolved here. As aptly opined and ruled by the respondent Judge, petitioners have remedies
under pertinent penal, civil and administrative laws for their problem at hand, which cannot be solved
by their present motion to quash.
According to petitioner Kho, the premises searched and objects seized during the search sued upon
belong to the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) of which he is an agent and
therefore, the NBI agents involved had no authority to search the aforesaid premises and to confiscate
the objects seized.
Whether the places searched and objects seized are government properties are questions of fact
outside the scope of the petition under consideration. The Court does not see its way clear to rule on
such issues lest it preempts the disposition of the cases filed by the respondent NBI against the herein
petitioners.
Considering that cases for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Explosives and Violation of Section 3 in
relation to Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6539, otherwise known as the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972,
have been instituted against the petitioners, the petition for mandamus with preliminary and
mandatory injunction to return all objects seized and to restrain respondent NBI from using the said
objects as evidence, has become moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, for want of merit and on the ground that it has become moot and academic, the petition
at bar is hereby DISMISSED. No pronoucement as to costs.
SO ORDERED
ARIEL C. VALLEJO, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Former SPECIAL FIFTEENTH DIVISION, JUDGE ISAAC R. DE ALBAN,
Regional trial Court, Ilagan, Isabela, Branch 16, and FRANKLIN M. JAVIER, NBI Head Agent, Cagayan
Valley Regional Office II, Ilagan, Isabela, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO SR., J.:
This is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, to
review and reverse the Resolution1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 24265 dismissing the
petitioner's petition as well as its Resolution dated November 28, 2002 denying the motion to admit
petition for certiorari.
Factual Antecedents
The petitioner is a lawyer in the Register of Deeds of the province of Isabela. On February 16, 2000,
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Agent, Franklin M. Javier, filed a sworn application for search
warrant before the Regional Trial Court of Iligan, Isabela, Branch 16, worded as follows:
COMES NOW the undersigned HEAD AGENT of the National Bureau of Investigation, Cagayan Valley
Regional Office Ilagan, Isabela hereby requests that a Search Warrant be issued on the Office of the
Registry (sic) of Deeds, Provincial Capitol, Alibaga, Iligan for the purpose of seizing the following
documents, to wit:
01. Undetermined number of FAKE LAND TITLES, Official Receipts in the Cashier's Office, Judicial Form
No. 39 known as Our Primary Entry Book under no. 496 and other pertinent documents related
therewith;
02. Blank Forms of Land Titles kept inside the drawers of every table of employees of the Registry (sic)
of Deeds;
03. Undetermined number of Land Transfer transactions without the corresponding payment of
Documentary Stamps and Capital Gains Tax.
all of which documents are being used or intended to be used in the commission of a felony that is
FALSIFICATION OF LAND TITLES under Article 171, Revised Penal Code, Article 213, RPC and R.A. 3019
(Anti-Graft) and are hidden or being kept in the said office.
This application is founded on a confidential information received by the undersigned, a peace officer,
on information which I have personally investigated and founded as follows: The Office of the Registry
(sic) of Deeds of Isabela is keeping and hiding Fake Land Titles, and embezzling or stealing from the
government thru non-payment of Capital Gains Tax and Documentary Stamps.
That upon the facts above-stated, I have caused to believe and verily believe that the said Office of the
Registry (sic) of Deeds located at the Provincial Capital, Alibagu, Ilagan, Isabela and/or in the said Office
of the Registry (sic) of Deeds the above-described documents are hidden and kept.2
On the same date, Presiding Judge Isaac R. de Alban issued Search Warrant No. 2000-03 against the
petitioner, thusly worded:
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:
GREETINGS:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examining under oath NBI Head Agent Franklin
M. Javier and his witness that there are reasonable grounds to believe that Falsification of Land Titles
under Art. 171, Revised Penal Code, Article 213, RPC and R.A 3019 (Anti-Graft) has been committed or is
about to be committed and that there are good and sufficient reasons to believe that the Registry (sic)
of Deeds, Provincial Capitol, Alibagu, Ilagan, Isabela has in its possession and control the following:
1. Undetermined number of Fake Land Titles, Official Receipts in the Cashier's Office, Judicial Form
No. 39 known as Primary Entry Book under No. 496 and other pertinent documents related therewith;
2. Blank Forms of Land Titles kept inside the drawers of every table of employees of the Registry (sic)
of Deeds;
3. Undetermined number of land Transfer transactions without the corresponding payment of Capital
Gains Tax and payment of documentary Stamps.
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search anytime of the day or night of the premises
above-mentioned and forthwith seize and take possession of the above mentioned documents/subject
of the offense and bring to this court said documents and persons to be dealt with as the law may
direct. You are further directed to submit return within 10 days from today.3
On February 17, 2000, the petitioner filed a motion to quash the search warrant, which the trial court
denied in its Order dated February 29, 2000. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the said
order on the ground that the questioned search warrant was in the form of a general warrant for failure
to describe the persons or things to be seized and was violative of the Constitution; hence, null and void.
The motion was, likewise, denied for lack of merit.
On May 4, 2000, the petitioner filed a notice of appeal and prayed that the entire record of the case be
elevated to the Court of Appeals. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 24265.
In a Resolution dated September 6, 2000, the appellate court dismissed the petitioner's appeal as
follows:
The appealed order denying a motion to quash the search warrant is interlocutory and not appealable.
Accordingly, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED. (Rule 41, Sec. 1 (c); Rule 50, Sec. 1 (i) and Sec. 2, 2nd
paragraph, in relation to Rule 124, Sec. 18, Revised Rules of Court).
SO ORDERED.4
The petitioner filed a motion to admit petition for certiorari on August 29, 2000 before the Court of
Appeals.
Respondent Franklin M. Javier, for and in behalf of the NBI, filed his comment on the petition where he
alleged his version of the facts as follows:
4.1 On 08 December 1999, the undersigned received a "tip-off" (i.e. from the respondent himself, ATTY.
ARIEL VALLEJO) about the presence of "fixers" who were allegedly submitting to him fake titles;
4.2 The undersigned together with other operatives of the Cagayan Valley Regional Office (CAVRO) NBI,
Isabela, Ilagan, conducted surveillance and entrapment operations to confirm the veracity of reported,
(sic) As a result thereof, the "fixer" was later apprehended in "flagrante delicto" and was subjected to
investigation together with other employees of the Register of Deeds of Ilagan, Isabela;
4.3 Thereafter a certain, MS. REMEDIOS BIRI, a clerk assigned at the Register of Deeds of Isabela,
volunteered to provide CAVRO operatives vital information and later on turned witness considering her
knowledge of the "scheme" being used by corrupt employees assigned at the said office;
4.4. On 16 February 2000, after confirming information relayed to us by witness MS. REMEDIOS BIRI, the
undersigned applied for a search warrant against the Office of the Register of Deeds, Ilagan, Isabela for
Falsification of Public Document under Art. 171 of the Revised Penal Code. The respondent presiding
Judge HON. ISAAC DE ALBAN of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Isabela, Ilagan finding the existence
of "probable cause" issued Search Warrant No. 2000-03;
4.5 On 16 February 2000, operatives of CAVRO headed by the undersigned served aforecited search
warrant. Found and seized inside the premises of the Register of Deeds if Ilagan, Isabela were several
fake titles/documents; On 2 March 2000, a Return of the search warrant was made informing the
respondent presiding judge of its positive findings; …5
Respondent Javier asserted that contrary to the position of the petitioner, the things to be seized were
particularly described in the questioned warrant. Furthermore, considering the volume of the
documents to be seized, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to provide the court with the technical
descriptions of all the official receipts and the titles, including the reference number or mark of the
documents. To require such task is to render the application of the search warrant nil, as no such search
warrant could be granted. According to respondent Javier, there was no way that the court could
determine with precision the exact details of the things to be seized. The law does not require that the
things to be seized must be described in precise and minute details as to leave no room for doubt on the
part of the searching authorities.6 Respondent Javier also posited that the article "Judicial Form No. 39
known as the Primary Entry Book" could not or would not have been mistaken for any other documents;
similarly the "Blank Forms of Land Titles kept inside the drawer of every table of employees of the
Register of Deeds" clearly indicates the documents to be seized.7
The Court of Appeals denied the petitioner's motion in its Resolution dated November 28, 2002 on the
following grounds:
First. We earlier dismissed movant's appeal because it was a wrong choice of remedy to assail an order
denying a motion to quash the search warrant. Movant himself has conceded that:
"the relief that was resorted to by your appellant from the denial of his motion to quash search warrant
subject of the case was under the imports of an ordinary appeal and that it was not the proper remedy
under the premises."
Second. Movant's petition for certiorari under rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure purportedly
to cure the procedural defect he incurred cannot be countenanced. He admitted that his petition was
filed beyond the reglementary period. The correct dismissal of an appeal becomes a final judgment of
the appellate court after the lapse of 15 days from service of a copy thereof upon the accused or his
counsel.
Third. Movant cannot simultaneously or alternately resort to a petition for review under Rule 45
(ordinary appeal) and/or petition for certiorari under Rule 65 (special civil action). They are mutually
exclusive remedies having different legal grounds for their availment. Thus, the dismissed appeal cannot
be incorporated with movant's petition for certiorari which should have been first resorted to upon
denial of his motion to quash and docketed as a special civil action (SP).
ACCORDINGLY, the motion for reconsideration and the motion to admit petition for certiorari
are DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.8
Hence, the instant petition.
The Petitioner's Arguments
The petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in committing the following:
A. DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION ON THE RESOLUTION OF THE RESPONDENT

HON. COURT OF APPEALS DISMISSING PETITIONER'S APPEAL ON THE RESPONDENT'S REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT'S ORDER DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION TO QUASH SEARCH WARRANT;
B. DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION TO ADMIT PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 OF THE
REVISED RULES OF COURT, SEEKING TO CORRECT THE ERROR OF JURISDICTION COMMITTED BY THE
RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, AS THERE WAS GRAVE ABUSE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO EXCESS OR LACK OF JURISDICTION IN DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF THE SAID REGIONAL TRIAL COURT'S ORDER DENYING THE MOTION TO QUASH
SEARCH WARRANT;
C. FAILING TO APPRECIATE AND CONSIDER SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE ON PETITIONER'S APPEAL OR CASE,

AND BY REASON OF THIS FAILURE SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE IS SERIOUSLY INJURED AND MADE
SUBSERVIENT TO THE TECHNICALITY OF THE RULES;
D. FAILING TO ACT UPON PETITIONER'S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND MAKE A RULING ON THE
MATTER OF THE PATENT NULLITY OF THE SEARCH WARRANT ISSUED BY THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT THAT IN ITS EXECUTION EXTREME PREJUDICE RESULTED AND THAT BY REASON FOR
WHICH RELIEF IS EXTREMELY URGENT;9
According to the petitioner, by its failure to consider the petition on the merits, the Court of Appeals
allowed technicality rather than substantial justice to prevail, considering that the issue involved is a
constitutional right, no less than the right of one to be secure against unreasonable searches and
seizures.
The petitioner claims that in the implementation of the questioned search warrant, damages of far
reaching implications were sustained not only in the functional operations of the Office of the Register
of Deeds, but also in the business transactions involving lands in the province of Isabela. According to
the petitioner, millions of documents of various nature were seized and hauled out of the premises of
the office by the respondent Javier, which continue to be in the latter's custody.
The petitioner further asserts that the search warrant issued by the RTC is in the nature of a general
warrant. There was no particularity as to what documents were to be searched and seized. While the
warrant made mention of "fake land titles," there was no mention of which titles were spurious. The
petitioner points out that the Register of Deeds is the repository of all land titles within the territorial
jurisdiction of the province of Isabela, and millions of such titles are kept thereat. The phrase
"undetermined number of land transfer transactions without the corresponding payment of capital
gains tax and payment of documentary stamps" is, likewise, a dangerous supposition, as there are
millions of documents on various land transactions kept in the registry. Anent the phrase "blank forms
of land titles kept inside the drawers of every table of employees of the Register of Deeds," the
petitioner asserts that no conceivable wrong could have been committed therein, as it was the normal
practice for employees to have such blank forms in hand, in preparation for their issuance after
thorough examination of the propriety of documents submitted in support thereof. However, the
petitioner asserts that not every employee can take hold of such blank forms but only those designated
as examiners. There was no mention in the warrant of the names of the employees who purportedly
kept the blank forms.
According to the petitioner, the warrant was a wanton, sweeping authority for the NBI agents who
raided the Registry Offices and confiscated and seized every document in sight. It was a "fishing
expedition" for the raiding party to obtain any kind of conceivable evidence to support the offense for
which it was applied.
The petitioner also contends that the warrant is patently objectionable for having been issued despite
the fact that the application therefor contained more than one offense, in violation of Article III, Section
2, of the 1987 Constitution.
The petitioner concludes that the search warrant in question, being in the nature of a general warrant,
violated the constitutional as well as the statutory requirements for its issuance, and as such, is null and
void.
The Position of the Office of the Solicitor General 10
The Office of the Solicitor General, for its part, agrees with the petitioner and opines that the strict
application of the rules of procedure should be relaxed in this case.
The OSG also asserts that it cannot sustain the questioned CA Resolutions of September 6, 2000 and
November 28, 2002 for the reason that the subject search warrant is a patent nullity. It submitted the
following reasons for such conclusion:
First. The subject search warrant issued by the RTC was not just for one offense, but for at least three
offenses, namely: violation of a) Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code (Falsification by public officer,
employee or notary or ecclesiastical minister); b) Article 213 of the same Code (Frauds against the public
treasury and similar offenses); and, c) Rep. Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).
Second. The things to be seized were not particularly described in the search warrant, leaving the officer
of the law with limitless discretion in its implementation on what articles to seize.
Third. From the contents of the search warrant itself, the raiding team could not have distinguished
which of the land titles kept in the custody of the Register of Deeds in Iligan, Isabela were fake, and
which of them were genuine. The warrant did not define the parameters upon which the fake land titles
could be gauged with sufficient clarity and definiteness, such as distinguishing marks.
Fourth. The issue regarding the validity of a Torrens title is a judicial question.
Thus, the OSG prays that the instant petition be granted.
The Court's Ruling
The issues in this case are as follows: a) whether or not the technical rules of procedure may be relaxed
in the case at bar; and, if so b) whether or not the warrant issued by the RTC was valid.
A Relaxation of Technical Rules
Is Warranted in this Case

According to the OSG, the petitioner's motion to admit petition for certiorari was filed beyond the sixty-
day reglementary period. The petitioner received a copy of the trial court's Order dated February 29,
2000 denying the motion to quash search warrant on March 6, 2000. Thus, he had only until May 5,
2000 within which to file a petition for certiorari. Realizing that the appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court he earlier filed with the Court of Appeals was not the proper remedy, the petitioner filed his
motion to admit petition for certiorari only on August 29, 2000, way beyond the reglementary period.
However, considering that the petitioner has presented a good cause for the proper and just
determination of his case, the appellate court should have relaxed the stringent application of technical
rules of procedure and yielded to considerations of substantial justice.
We agree. The Court has allowed some meritorious cases to proceed despite inherent procedural
defects and lapses. This is in keeping with the principle that rules of procedure are mere tools designed
to facilitate the attainment of justice and that strict and rigid application of rules which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must always be avoided.11 It
is a far better and more prudent cause of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the
parties a review of the case to attain the ends of justice, rather than dispose of the case on technicality
and cause grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while
actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice.12
The issue involved in this case is no less than the legality of the issuance of a warrant of arrest.13 It
behooved the Court of Appeals to look past rules of technicality and to resolve the case on its merits,
considering that the petitioner therein was invoking a constitutional right. The appellate court should
have, thus, considered the petitioner's appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as a special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the said Rules. Thus, in dismissing the petitioner's appeal, and,
thereafter, the motion to admit petition for certiorari, the appellate court gravely abused its discretion.
Indeed, the court has discretion to dismiss or not to dismiss an appeal, but such discretion must be a
sound one, to be exercised in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, having in mind the
circumstances obtaining in each case.14
The consequence of our ruling would be for the Court to direct the Court of Appeals to resolve on its
merits CA-G.R. No. 24265 by delving into and resolving the issue raised therein on whether or not Judge
de Alban of the RTC of Isabela, Branch 16, committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing Search
Warrant No. 2000-03. However, such step would unduly prolong the resolution of the case. We shall act
on the petition, considering that the lone issue raised is one of law, and an invocation of a constitutional
right at that. It is an accepted rule that the Court may resolve the dispute and serve the ends of justice
instead of remanding the case to the lower court for further proceedings, if, based on the records,
pleadings, and other evidence, the matter can readily be ruled upon.15 We take cognizance of this
petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of the constitutional issues raised.16
The Search Warrant in Question

is Constitutionally Infirm; Void
for Lack of Particularity
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures.
Sec 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
such search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
Furthermore, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides the requisites for the
issuance of a search warrant, viz.:
Sec. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. – A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable
cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in
the Philippines.
Sec. 5. Examination of complainant; record. – The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally
examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their
sworn statements, together with the affidavits submitted.
Thus, in issuing a search warrant, the judge must strictly comply with the foregoing constitutional and
statutory requirements; failure to comply therewith constitutes grave abuse of discretion.17
The things to be seized must be described with particularity. Technical precision of description is not
required. It is only necessary that there be reasonable particularity and certainty as to the identity of the
property to be searched for and seized, so that the warrant shall not be a mere roving
commission.18 Indeed, the law does not require that the things to be seized must be described in precise
and minute detail as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities. If this were the
rule, it would be virtually impossible for the applicants to obtain a warrant as they would not know
exactly what kind of things to look for.19 Any description of the place or thing to be searched that will
enable the officer making the search with reasonable certainty to locate such place or thing is
sufficient.20
However, the requirement that search warrants shall particularly describe the things to be seized makes
general searches under them impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant
describing another. As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the
warrant.21 Thus, the specific property to be searched for should be so particularly described as to
preclude any possibility of seizing any other property.22
A perusal of the tenor of the search warrant in question readily shows that it failed to pass this test of
particularity. The questioned warrant directed the peace officers to search and seize the following in the
petitioner's office at the Register of Deeds of Isabela:
4. Undetermined number of Fake Land Titles, Official Receipts in the Cashier's Office, Judicial Form No.
39 known as Primary Entry Book under No. 496 and other pertinent documents related therewith;
5. Blank Forms of Land Titles kept inside the drawers of every table of employees of the Registry of
Deeds;
6. Undetermined number of land Transfer transactions without the corresponding payment of Capital
Gains Tax and payment of Documentary Stamps.23
As correctly pointed out by the petitioner and the OSG, the terms expressly used in the warrant were
too all-embracing, with the obvious intent of subjecting all the records pertaining to all the transactions
of the petitioner's office at the Register of Deeds to search and seizure. Such tenor of a seizure warrant
contravenes the explicit command of the Constitution that there be a particular description of the things
to be seized.24 The executing officer's sole function is to apply the description to its subject matter,
which function may frequently involve the exercise of limited discretion in identifying the property
described. A description of such generality, however, as to lodge in the executing officer virtually
unlimited discretion as to what property shall be seized, is repugnant to the Constitution.25 As we held in
the early case of People v. Veloso:26
A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the constitutional and statutory
provisions under which it was issued. Otherwise, it is void. The proceedings upon search warrants, it has
rightly been held, must be absolutely legal, for there is not a description of process known to law, the
execution of which is more distressing to the citizen. Perhaps there is none which excites such intense
feeling in consequence of its humiliating and degrading effect. The warrant will always be construed
strictly without, however, going into the full length of requiring technical accuracy. No presumptions of
regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify under it.27
The Search Warrant Must

Be Issued for One Specific
Offense
The questioned warrant in this case is a scatter-shot warrant28 for having been issued for more than one
offense - Falsification of Land Titles under Article 171 and Article 213 of the Revised Penal Code, and
violation of Rep. Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. A warrant
must be issued upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense.29 In fact, a careful perusal
of the application for the warrant shows that the applicant did not allege any specific act performed by
the petitioner constituting a violation of any of the aforementioned offenses..
Thus, the questioned warrant must be struck down for having been issued in contravention of the 1987
Constitution, the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and existing jurisprudence. As the Court, through Justice
Concepcion held in the landmark case of Stonehill v. Diokno:30
To uphold the validity of the warrant in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most
fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and
the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice, or passion of
peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision above-
quoted – to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what would happen, in
times of keen political strife, when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even
though by legal means. 31
WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated September 6, 2000 and November 28, 2002
are SET ASIDE AND REVERSED. The respondent National Bureau of Investigation is hereby ORDERED to
return to the petitioner all items seized from the subject premises.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANNABELLE FRANCISCO y DAVID, @
ANNABELLE TABLAN, accused-appel
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Federico Verona and his live-in girlfriend, accused-appellant Annabelle Francisco, were placed under
surveillance after the police confirmed, through a test-buy operation, that they were engaged in selling
shabu or methamphetamine hydrochloride. SPO2 Teneros and SPO4 Alberto San Juan of OADDI-
WPDC, U.N. Avenue, Manila applied for a search warrant before Branch 23 of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila to authorize them to search the premises at 122 M. Hizon St., Caloocan City.
Attached to the application was the After-Surveillance Report[1] of SPO2 Teneros. It stated that Dante
Baradilla, of 1726 Lallana St., corner Sta. Catalina St., Tondo, Manila, who claimed to be one of Federico
Veronas runners in the illegal drugs operations, allegedly sought the assistance of SPO2 Teneros for the
arrest of Verona.[2] The search warrant[3] was subsequently issued by Judge Bayhon authorizing the search
of shabu and paraphernalia at No. 122 M. Hizon Street, Caloocan City.
Accused-appellant Annabelle Francisco, who was then nine months pregnant, was resting inside the
second floor masters bedroom of their two- storey apartment at No. 120 M. Hizon Street, Caloocan City,
when she heard a loud bang downstairs as if somebody forcibly opened the front door. Eight policemen
suddenly entered her bedroom and conducted a search for about an hour. Accused-appellant inquired
about their identities but they refused to answer. It was only at the police station where she found out that
the team of searchers was led by SPO2 Teneros. The police team, along with Barangay Chairwoman
Miguelita Limpo and Kagawad Bernie de Jesus, both of Barangay 64, Zone-6, District 2, Caloocan City,
enforced the warrant and seized the following:[4]
1. One (1) Salad Set marked Pyrex wrapped in a plastic containing white crysthalline (sic) substance or
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu with markings by the undersigned inside the house of subjects
residence weighing (230) two hundred thirty (sic) grams of methampetamine hydrochloride or shabu by
Aida Abear-Pascual of NBI Forensic Chemist;
2. Several plastics in different sizes;
3. Two (2) roll of strip aluminum foil;
4. Five (5) tooter water pipe and improvised and two burner improvised;
5. Two (2) pantakal or measuring weight in shabu;
6. Two (2) cellular phone motorola with markings;
7. One (1) monitoring device with cord and with markings;
8. Several pcs. with strip aluminum foil;
9. Two (2) masking tip (sic) with markings;
10. Twentee (sic) two thousand nine hundred ninetee (sic) pesos.
The police team also allegedly seized the amount of P180,000.00, a Fiat car, jewelry, set of keys, an ATM
card, bank books and car documents.
Consequently, accused-appellant was charged with violation of Section 16, Article III, Republic Act No.
6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, in an information[5] which reads:
That about 10:30 oclock in the morning of 30 March 1996 at No. 122 SCL M. Hizon St., Kalookan City
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable court, the above-named accused grouping herself together
with some other persons whose liabilities are still being determined in a preliminary investigation,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in their possession, custody and/or control, methamphetamine hydrochloride popularly
known as shabu, a regulated drug, with a total weight of 230 grams, without the corresponding license
and/or prescription to possess, have custody and/or control over the aforesaid regulated drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Accused-appellant filed a motion to quash the search warrant[6] asserting that she and her live-in partner
Federico Verona had been leasing an apartment unit at No. 120 M. Hizon Street, District 2, Caloocan
City, Metro Manila, since 1995 up to the present as certified by the owner of the apartment unit.
On arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty,[7] after which, trial on the merits ensued.The trial
court denied the motion to quash and upheld the validity of the search warrant. It rendered a decision
finding accused-appellant guilty as charged, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE premises considered, and the prosecution having established beyond an iota of doubt the
guilt of the Accused for Violation of Sec. 16, Art. III, RA 6425 as amended by RA 7659 and considering
that the total net weight of subject drugs consists of 230 grams, this Court in the absence of any
modifying circumstance hereby imposes upon the Accused the penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine of
P1,000,000.00 pesos, and to pay the costs.
The period of Accuseds preventive imprisonment shall be credited in full in the service of her sentence
pursuant to Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
Subject drugs and paraphernalia are hereby declared confiscated and forfeited in favor of the government
to be dealt with in accordance with law.
The return to the Accused of the two (2) cellular phones, (Motorola Micro Fac) (sic) Nos. S-2968A and S-
3123A, which were turned over by the Acting Branch Clerk of Court of Manila RTC, Br. 3 to her
counterpart in this sala (Exh. 30) as well as the deposit of cash money in the amount of P22,990.00 with
the Manila RTC Clerk of Court JESUS MANINGAS as evidenced by acknowledgment receipt dated 21
May 1996, are hereby ordered.
SO ORDERED.[8]
On appeal, accused-appellant raised the following assignment of errors:[9]
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF THE CRIME OF ILLEGAL
POSSESSION OF SHABU;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE EVIDENCE AGAINST THE ACCUSED;
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE SEARCH CONDUCTED WAS
ILLEGAL AND VIOLATIVE OF ACCUSEDS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS;
IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED AFTER FINDING THAT
THE SEARCH WAS INDEED CONDUCTED AT A PLACE DIFFERENT FROM THAT DESCRIBED
IN THE SEARCH WARRANT.
The appeal is impressed with merit.
Plainly, the basic issue submitted for resolution is the reasonableness of the search conducted by the
police officers at accused-appellants residence.
The trial court, in upholding the validity of the search, stated that: [10]
Re 3rd argument - the fact that the search warrant in question was served at apartment No. 120 and not at
the specific address stated therein which is 122 M. Hizon St., Caloocan City will not by itself render as
illegal the search and seizure of subject stuff seized by the operatives pursuant thereto. While it is true
that the rationale behind the constitutional and procedural requirements that the search warrant must
particularly describe the place to be searched is to the end that no unreasonable search warrant and seizure
may not be made (sic) and abuses may not be committed, however, this requirement is not without
exception. It is the prevailing rule in our jurisdiction that even a description of the place to be searched is
sufficient if the officer with the warrant can with reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place
intended (People vs. Veloso, G.R. No. L-23051, Oct. 20, 1925).
Significantly in the case at bar the implementing officer SPO2 Teneros was principally the concerned
official who conducted an active surveillance on the Accused and subject house (Surveillance Report,
Exh. 9) and pursued this case by filing the corresponding application for the issuance of a search
warrant. Perforce, SPO2 TENEROS was thereby placed in a position enabling him to have prior and
personal knowledge of particular house intended in the warrant which definitely refer to no other than the
very place where the same was accordingly served.
Accused-appellant, on the other hand, maintains that the search was grossly infirm as the subject search
warrant authorized the police authorities to search only No. 122 M. Hizon St., Caloocan City. However,
the actual search was conducted at No. 120 M. Hizon St., Caloocan City.
The basic guarantee to the protection of the privacy and sanctity of a person, his home and his possessions
against unreasonable intrusions of the State is articulated in Section 2, Article III of the Constitution,
which reads:
THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO BE SECURE IN THEIR PERSONS, HOUSES, PAPERS, AND
EFFECTS AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES OF WHATEVER NATURE
AND FOR ANY PURPOSE SHALL BE INVIOLABLE, AND NO SEARCH WARRANT OR
WARRANT OF ARREST SHALL ISSUE EXCEPT UPON PROBABLE CAUSE TO BE
DETERMINED PERSONALLY BY THE JUDGE AFTER EXAMINATION UNDER OATH OR
AFFIRMATION OF THE COMPLAINANT AND THE WITNESSES HE MAY PRODUCE, AND
PARTICULARLY DESCRIBING THE PLACE TO BE SEARCHED AND THE PERSONS OR
THINGS TO BE SEIZED.
For the validity of a search warrant, the Constitution requires that there be a particular description of the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. The rule is that a description of a place to be
searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the
place intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. Any designation or description
known to the locality that leads the officer unerringly to it satisfies the constitutional requirement.[11]
Specifically, the requisites for the issuance of a valid search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2)
such presence is determined personally by the judge; (3) the complainant and the witnesses he or she may
produce are personally examined by the judge, in writing and under oath or affirmation; (4) the applicant
and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes
the place to be searched and the things to be seized.[12]
The absence of any of these requisites will cause the downright nullification of the search warrants. The
proceedings upon search warrants must be absolutely legal, for there is not a description of process
known to the law, the execution of which is more distressing to the citizen. Perhaps there is none which
excites such intense feeling in consequence of its humiliating and degrading effect. The warrants will
always be construed strictly without, however, going the full length of requiring technical accuracy. No
presumptions of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify
it.[13]
The application for search warrant filed by SPO2 Teneros requested for authority to search specifically
the premises of No. 122 M. Hizon St., Caloocan City. The application was accompanied by a sketch[14] of
the area which bears two parallel lines indicated as 10th Avenue drawn vertically on the left-hand side of
the paper. Intersecting these lines are two other parallel lines drawn horizontally and indicated as M.
Hizon. Above and on the left-hand side of the upper parallel line of the lines identified as M. Hizon, is a
square marked as Basketball Court. A similar drawing placed near the right-hand side of the upper
parallel line is another square marked as PNR Compound. Beneath the lower parallel line of the lines
marked as M. Hizon and right at the center is also a square enclosing an X sign marked as 122,
presumably No. 122 M. Hizon St., Caloocan City.
During the hearing for the application of the search warrant, police asset Dante Baradilla described the
house to be searched as:
Bale dalawang palapag po, semi concrete, color cream na ang mga bintana ay may rehas na bakal at
sliding at sa harap ay may terrace at may sasakyan sila na ginagamit sa pagdeliver ng shabu.[15]
The trial court then conducted an ocular inspection of the area. It turned out that No. 122 M. Hizon St.,
Caloocan City was a concrete two-storey residential building with steel-barred windows and a terrace. It
was owned by a certain Mr. Joseph Ching. The house, however, bore no house number. The house
marked No. 122 M. Hizon St., Caloocan City was actually two houses away from accused-appellants
house at No. 120 M. Hizon St. On the other hand, No. 120 Hizon St. was a compound consisting of three
apartments enclosed by only one gate marked on the outside as No. 120. The different units within No.
120 Hizon St. were not numbered separately. Accused-appellant rented the third unit from the entrance
which was supposedly the subject of the search. The entire compound had an area of approximately
ninety (90) square meters. The second unit was located at the back of the first unit and the third unit was
at the rear end of the compound. Hence, access to the third unit from M. Hizon Street was only through
the first two units and the common gate indicated as No. 120. The occupants of the premises stated that
they commonly use No. 120 to designate their residence.
In People v. Veloso, this Court declared that even a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if
the officer with the warrant can with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended.[16] The
description of the building in the application for a search warrant in Veloso as well as in the search
warrant itself refer to the building No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine Islands which was
considered sufficient designation of the premises to be searched.[17]
The prevailing circumstances in the case at bar are definitely different from those in Veloso. At first
glance, the description of the place to be searched in the warrant seems to be sufficient. However, from
the application for a search warrant as well as the search warrant itself, the police officer serving the
warrant cannot, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended precisely because it was
wrongly described as No. 122, although it may have been located on the same street as No. 120. Even the
description of the house by police asset Baradilla referred to that house located at No. 122 M. Hizon St.,
not at No. 120 M. Hizon St. The particularity of the place described is essential in the issuance of search
warrants to avoid the exercise by the enforcing officers of discretion. Hence, the trial court erred in
refusing to nullify the actions of the police officers who were perhaps swayed by their alleged knowledge
of the place. The controlling subject of search warrants is the place indicated in the warrant itself and not
the place identified by the police.[18]
It may well be that the police officer identified No. 120 M. Hizon St. as the subject of the actual
search. However, as indicated in the witness affidavit[19] in support of the application for a search
warrant,[20] No. 122 M. Hizon St. was unmistakably indicated. Inexplicably, a few days after the search
warrant was issued by the court and served at No. 120 M. Hizon St., SPO2 Teneros informed Judge
Bayhon in the return of search warrant[21] that the warrant was properly served at 122 M. Hizon St.,
Caloocan City, Metro Manila as indicated in the search warrant itself.
SPO2 Teneros attempted to explain the error by saying that he thought the house to be searched bore the
address 122 M. Hizon St., Caloocan City instead of No. 120 M. Hizon St.[22] But as this Court ruled
in Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines v. Asuncion,[23] thus:
The police had no authority to search the apartment behind the store, which was the place indicated in the
warrant, even if they really intended it to be the subject of their application. Indeed, the place to be
searched cannot be changed, enlarged or amplified by the police, viz.:
x x x. In the instant case, there is no ambiguity at all in the warrant. The ambiguity lies outside the
instrument, arising from the absence of a meeting of the minds as to the place to be searched between the
applicants for the warrant and the Judge issuing the same; and what was done was to substitute for the
place that the Judge had written down in the warrant, the premises that the executing officers had in their
mind. This should not have been done. It [was] neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to search a
place different from that stated in the warrant on the claim that the place actually searchedalthough not
that specified in the warrant[was] exactly what they had in view when they applied for the warrant and
had demarcated in their supporting evidence.What is material in determining the validity of a search is the
place stated in the warrant itself, not what the applicants had in their thoughts, or had represented in the
proofs they submitted to the court issuing the warrant. Indeed, following the officers theory, in the context
of the facts of the case, all four (4) apartment units at the rear of Abigails Variety Store would have been
fair game for a search.
The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by the officers own
personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced in support of their application for the
warrant. Such a change is proscribed by the Constitution which requires inter alia the search warrant to
particularly describe the place to be searched as well as the persons or things to be seized. It would
concede to police officers the power of choosing the place to be searched, even if it not be delineated in
the warrant. It would open wide the door to abuse of the search process, and grant to officers executing a
search warrant that discretion which the Constitution has precisely removed from them. The
particularization of the description of the place to be searched may properly be done only by the Judge,
and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers conducting the
search.
All told, the exclusionary rule necessarily comes into play, to wit:
Art. III, Sec. 3 (2), 1987 Constitution. -- ANY EVIDENCE OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF THIS OR
THE PRECEDING SECTION SHALL BE INADMISSIBLE FOR ANY PURPOSE IN ANY
PROCEEDING.
Consequently, all the items seized during the illegal search are prohibited from being used in
evidence. Absent these items presented by the prosecution, the conviction of accused-appellant for the
crime charged loses its basis. As the Court noted in an earlier case, the exclusion of unlawfully seized
evidence was the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Verily, they are the fruits of the poisonous tree. Without this exclusionary rule, the
constitutional right would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the
freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence.[24]
On another note, we find disturbing the variety of the items seized by the searching team in this case. In
the return of search warrant, they admitted the seizure of cellular phones, money and
television/monitoring device items that are not within the palest ambit of shabu paraphernalia, which were
the only items authorized to be seized. What is more disturbing is the suggestion that some items seized
were not reported in the return of search warrant, like the Fiat car, bankbooks, and money. In an attempt
to justify the presence of the car in the police station, SPO2 Teneros had to concoct a most incredible
story that the accused-appellant, whose pregnancy was already in the third trimester, drove her car to the
police station after the intrusion at her house even if the police officers had with them several cars.
A search warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a fishing
expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to a crime.It need not
be stressed anew that this Court is resolutely committed to the doctrine that this constitutional provision is
of a mandatory character and therefore must be strictly complied with. To quote from the landmark
American decision of Boyd v. United States: It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional
rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon. Their motto should be obsta
principiis.[26]
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the individual in
the name of order. Order is too high a price to pay for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes declared: I
think it is less evil that some criminals escape than that the government should play an ignoble part. It is
simply not allowed in free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is the
Constitution itself.[27]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 127,
Caloocan City, convicting accused-appellant of violation of Section 16, Article III, Republic Act No.
6425 and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P1,000,000.00 as
well as the costs, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to establish guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, accused-appellant Annabelle Francisco y David @ Annabelle Tablan is ACQUITTED
and is ordered immediately RELEASED from confinement, unless she is lawfully held in custody for
another cause. SO ORDERED.

Searches and Seizures

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G.R. Nos.

100720-23 June 30, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Erlich V. Barraquias for accused-appellants Lucañas and Putulin.

Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant R. Codilla.

These complaints1 were of the following tenor:

Criminal Case No. 3739-0

In violation of Article 335, Revised Penal Code.

Ormoc City. December 19, 1990.

(SGD.) HELEN M. PEPITO

Criminal Case No. 3740-0

In violation of Article 335, Revised Penal Code.

Ormoc City, December 21, 1990.

(SGD.) MARGARITA ALPOS

Criminal Case No. 3741-0

In violation of Article 335, Revised Penal Code.

Ormoc City, December 19, 1990.

(SGD.) LETECIA PEPITO

Criminal Case No. 3742-0

In violation of Article 335, Revised Penal Code.

Ormoc City, December 21, 1990.

(SGD.) MARGARITA ALPOS

WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered:

2. That as to his present whereabouts, the same remains unknown. 13

xxx xxx xxx

A Maybe he was just frightened because he is innocent and

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

San Juan, Africa, Gonzales & San Agustin, for Petitioners.

"Q And thereafter?

"A And thereafter, he signed the deposition of Mr. Logronio.

"Q Who is this he?

"A The Honorable Judge.

"Q The deposition or the affidavit?

"A The affidavit, Your Honor."cralaw virtua1aw library

Thereafter, respondent Judge signed the search warrant.

Sec. 46(a) requires the filing of income tax returns by corporations.

Sec. 53 requires the withholding of income taxes at source.

Hence, petitioners present recourse.

and in Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, viz -

Complementing the aforequoted provisions is Section 5 of the same Rule, reading:

We are not persuaded.

A. Deposition of Agent Lavin

28. Question: What happened next?

xxx xxx xxx

18. Question: What did you see in that address?

An improvised tooter with traces of crystalline substance

known as SHABU containing methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without the

1. The authenticity of the following documents:

Q: Whose handbags were searched?

Laurel, Del Rosario and Sabido for appellant.

(Sgd.) NARCISCO MENDIOLA.

[SEAL] (Sgd.) MARIANO A. ALBERT

Culled from the records are the following antecedent facts:

Notwithstanding this cancellation, Quintin Cheng executed on 30 January 1990 an Assignment of a

Consequently, on 30 November 1990, SYCF appointed respondent Summerville General Merchandising,

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered:

5. Both parties to pay proportionate fees.10

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby denied due course.13

2) BFAD Cosmetic Case No. CM-040-91

In a resolution of the BFAD dated 4 February 1992, it ruled that:

3) Criminal Case No. 00-183261 before the RTC of Manila, Branch 1