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Cases for Appellant

1. DR NoorjehanSafiaNiaz vs State of Maharashtra

By this PIL, filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners, who are
social activists, have alleged gender discrimination and arbitrary denial of access to women
in the sanctum sanctorum at the Haji Ali Dargah The petitioners state that they are the office
bearers of `Bharatiya Muslim MahilaAndolan' - a national secular autonomous mass
movement of Muslim Women with over 50,000 members in 15 StatesAccording to the
petitioners, since their childhood, they were visiting the Haji Ali Dargah, the Dargah of Pir
Haji Ali Shah Bukhari (R.A.), the patron SQPathan 3/56 pil.106.14.doc saint and during their
visits, were permitted to enter the sanctum sanctorum where the saint lied buried, through a
separate entry earmarked only for women to enable them to offer prayers. They have stated
that in March, 2011, when the petitioner No. 1 along with other activists, visited the Haji Ali
Dargah, they were permitted to enter the sanctum sanctorum to offer prayers. According to
the petitioners, in June, 2012 when the petitioner No. 1 revisited the Dargah to offer prayers,
she discovered a steel barricade put up at the entry of the sanctum sanctorum, thus preventing
the entry of women devotees in the sanctum sanctorum of the Haji Ali Dargah. According to
the petitioners, the said letter was clearly contrary to the issue raised and the actual realities
faced by the petitioners i.e. women were not being allowed in the sanctum sanctorum of the
Haji Ali Dargah. The petitioners thereafter, again requested the respondent No. 2 Trust to
discuss the issue and come to a consensus and also requested the then State Minister of
Women and Child and the State Minority Commission to facilitate a dialogue and to
amicably resolve the said issue. The petitioners surveyed several dargahs which allowed
entry of women in the sanctum sanctorum and have annexed to the petition, a list of the said
dargahs. The petitioners have stated that they had received a letter from the State Minority
Commission on 14th March, 2014 wherein, the Commission stated that the matter was
beyond its jurisdiction. The petitioners again visited the dargah on 5th April, 2014 and
noticed that nothing was done pursuant to the protest and representation and that the women
continued to be barred from entering the sanctum sanctorum of the Dargah. The petitioners
also filed a complaint in the office of the respondent No. 3, Charity Commissioner, against
the SQPathan 6/56pil.106.14.doc respondent No. 2 Trust stating, that the activities of the
Trust violated the Constitution of India. Aggrieved by the fact, that their representations were
not considered, the petitioners filed the aforesaid PIL seeking, amongst other reliefs, an
appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature of writ of mandamus and to declare that
female devotees have an equal right of entry and access to all parts including the sanctum
sanctorum (mazaar) of the Haji Ali Dargah on par with the male devotees. They have also
prayed for an order directing the respondent No. 2-Trust, to restore status quo ante, by
permitting female devotees to enter the sanctum sanctorum of the Haji Ali Dargah on par
with the male devotees. The other justification given by the respondent No. 2 Trust for
imposing the ban was the safety and security of the women, in particular, to prevent sexual
harassment of women at places of worship. It is stated that the said ban is in keeping with the
decision of the Apex Court, wherein stringent directions have been issued to ensure that there
is no sexual harassment to women at places of worship. We may note, that the said
submission is completely misplaced and misconceived and reliance placed on the judgment
of the Apex Court in the case of The Deputy General of Police &Anr. v. S.
Samuthiam(supra) (dated 30th November, 2012) is completely out of context, inasmuch as,
the directions were issued when the Protection of Women from Sexual Harassment at Work
Place Bill, 2010 was under consideration and as the provisions of that Bill were not sufficient
to curb eve-teasing. It is in these circumstances, certain directions were issued by the Apex
Court and directions were given to the State Governments to take effective and appropriate
measures to curb instances of eve-teasing. It is also pertinent to note, that at that time, there
were no suitable provisions SQPathan 54/56 pil.106.14.doc to curb eve-teasing. The said
judgment was also prior to the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013. Reliance placed on
this Judgment is clearly misconceived and cannot justify the ban imposed by the respondent
No. 2 Trust. The respondent No. 2, under the guise of providing security and ensuring safety
of women from sexual harassment, cannot justify the ban and prevent women from entering
the sanctum sanctorum of the Haji Ali Dargah. The respondent No. 2 Trust is always at
liberty to take steps to prevent sexual harassment of women, not by banning their entry in the
sanctum sanctorum, but by taking effective steps and making provisions for their safety and
security e.g. by having separate queues for men and women, as was done earlier. It is also the
duty of the State to ensure the safety and security of the women at such places. The State is
equally under an obligation to ensure that the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles
14, 15 and 25 of the Constitution are protected and that the right of access into the sanctum
sanctorum of the Haji Ali Dargah is not denied to women.

2. MohdHanif Qureshi v State of Bihar

ChiranjitlalChowdhuri v. The Union of India, ([1950] S.C.R. 869 at 891-892). The


impugned Acts put a total ban on the trade and business of the petitioners who kill only
cattle. Total prohibition of a trade which is not immoral or obnoxious can never be
reasonable restriction within the meaning of el. (6) of Art. 19.Chintaman Rao v. The State
of Madhya Pradesh, ([1950] S.C.R. 759 at 765); R.M. Sheshadri v. The District
Magistrate ( [1955] 1 S.C.R. 686 at 689, 690); Cooverjee B. Bharucha v. The Excise
Commis- sioner, ( [1954] S.C.R. 873); Rashid Ahmed. The Municipal Board, Kairana,
([1950] S.C.R. 566). Total ban on the slaughter of cattle is not in the interests of the
general public. Animal husbandry will suffer by a total ban. There is shortage of fodder
and pasture in the country and the useless and uneconomic cattle will deprive the useful
cattle of these things. Setting up of Gosadans for the uneconomic cattle will be a
tremendous waste of public money. [Counsel referred to various official reports in this
connection.] The impugned Acts create an odious discrimination between butchers and
persons dealing solely in cows, bulls, etc., and those dealing in sheep and goats, and
offend Art. 14.These Acts which single out the petitioners' community which kills only
cows, bulls, etc., are hostile and discriminatory legislation. Ye Cong Eng v. Trinidad, (70
L. Ed. 1059 at 1071); Fowler v. Rhode Island, (97 L. Ed. 828); Lane v. Wilson, (83 L.
Ed. 1281 at 1287); Ligget Co. v. Baldrige, (73 L. Ed. 204).The impugned Acts also
contravene Art. 25 as they prohibit the Mussalmans from performing the religious
practice of the community to sacrifice the cow on the occasion of Bakr Id.
RatilalPanachand Gandhi v. The State of Bombay,

3. ShayaraBano vs Union of India

The Supreme Court laid down this judgment on August 22, 2017 in 3:2 majority holding the
practice of Triple Talaaq unconstitutional. The majority judgment was written by Justice
Nariman for himself and on the behalf of Justice Lalit, while Justice Joseph concurred by the
majority opinion Chief Justice Kehar for himself and on behalf of Justice Nazeer wrote the
minority opinion. While the majority upon lengthy discussion came to the conclusion that Triple
Talaq is not an essential religious practice but minority bench found this practice to be an
essential religious practice.

Under Article 25 of the Constitution the state cannot take away the essential religious practice of
a person. Therefore, if a practice which is arbitrary and not an essential religious practice it will
be hit by the exception laid down u/a 25. Therefore, the whole issue was whether or not the
practice is an essential religious practice of Islam.

Therefore, as per majority it was held that the Triple Talaqor Talaq-e-biddatis not protected by
the exception laid down in Article 25 i.e. the court found the said practice not an essential
element of Islamic religion. The court justified its point of view in the sense that although it si
practiced by the Hanafi School but it is considered sinful in it. Triple Talaqis against the basic
tenets ofQuoran and whatever is against Quoranis contrary to Shariattherefore,what is bad in
theology cannot be good in law. The majority bench relied on its earlier
decision ShamimAra[1]which held that this practice of Triple Talaq is against both theology and
law and just because it is followed by a large number of people it cannot be validated. Therefore,
such practice is declared unconstitutional and set aside.

Article 25 in it carries the right of every person to freely practice and propagate any religion of
choice and such practice is only restricted in the context of the following exceptions:

1. Public Order
2. Health
3. Morality
4. Other Provisions of Part III of the Constitution

Although the said practice has no relevance to the first three exceptions but the said practice is
surely against other provisions of Part III namely Article 14. The said practice is in violation of
the Fundamental Right of equality since it is against the rights of women as they have no say in
the declaration of divorce unlike in other religions. Nariman& Lalit JJ. held that the impugned
practice is a tool by which marital tie can be broken on whims of Husband without any attempt
of reconciliation to save it. This form of Talaq therefore, is in violation of Article 14 and liable to
be struck down by the courts.

What is an essential religious practice? It depends on the background, history and tenets of the
religion. If some practice is not prohibited then it does not necessarily mean that such practice is
an essential religious practice. Essential religious practices are those on which the religion is
founded upon. Essential religious are those which are fundamental to the profession and
propagation of the religion. If taking away of a practice causes a substantial change in the
religion then such practice can be called as ‘an essential religious practice.’ Only such practices
are protected in Article 25(1). The usurpation of religious practices through state intervention
will result in violation in rights mentioned in Article 25(1) & not with the usurpation of
circumstantial and non-essential practices. The fact that majority of Islamic countries have done
away with the said practice also reflects that the said practice is not one which will be called as
an essential religious practice.

However, Justice Khehar, writing the minority opinion held that such practice is an essential
religious element of Islam. The Minority bench of the court justified this stance on the ground
that this practice is followed by a large population of people. Since this practice has the sanction
of religious denomination and followed by an overwhelming majority of Muslim population, the
said practice is declared to be constitutional and an essential religious practice.

Justice Kehar was, as far as the exceptions mentioned in Article 25(1) of the Constitution, of the
opinion that the impugned practice is not violative of any of these exceptions since Shariat or
Muslim Personal law is not based on any state legislative action.

Critical Analysis

The Triple Talaq judgment is widely appreciated throughout the jurisdictions as a protection
shield against the social evil such as this practice promoted. The majority bench on the face of it
criticized the government for not making relevant laws to prohibit such a regressive practice.
This act allowed the husband to end the marital tie on his whims and fancies, thereby making the
life of the women hell. The Muslim women have since many years demanding the protection
from such a regressive and bad practice and finally it was the apex court which gave them the
appropriate remedy Justice Nariman at the outset said that as soon as he would find any
violation of Fundamental Right, he will strike down the practice. There was no question that the
said practice was an essential religious practice or notsince majority of Islamic nations have
already banned the practice & in India only Hanafi School practices it. Therefore, it cannot be
said that the practice is one of religious importance. The majority finding the said practice in
violation of Article 14 as well as of the exceptions laid down in Article 25(1) struck down the
regressive act with 3:2 majority. The bench observed that merely because the practice is
widespread and continuing from time immemorial it cannot be held as an essential religious
practice. Hinduism also after finding Sati Pratharegressiveremovedit from the religion. Sati was
also practiced widespread and practiced since time immemorial. Therefore, the court arrived at a
very correct judgment.

The majority started its judgment by the phrase “what is bad in theology cannot be good in
law”. This statement makes it clear the stance of the majority bench on the impugned act. One
does not need to dwell down into the details and should understand that if Triple Talaqhad been
a essential religious practice of Islam then in that case it would not have been banned in almost
all Islamic nations. Further, the said practice is only practiced in Hanafi School who itself
considers it sinful. Therefore, the majority bench correctly held such practice as unconstitutional.

4. KS puttaswamy vs Union of India

The nine judges of the Court gave six separate opinions, producing what must be a contender for
the longest reasoned judgment ever produced by a court. These judgments defy short summary
and only a few key themes can be picked out.

The leading judgment is a tour de force, given on behalf of four judges by Dr D Y Chandrachud
J in 266 pages. It deals, in detail, with the Indian domestic case law on privacy and the nature of
constitutional rights. It also considers Comparative Law on Privacy (from England, the US,
South Africa, Canada, the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights). Various criticisms of the privacy doctrine – from Bork, Posner and feminist
critics – are addressed.

The problem for the Petitioners was that the Indian Constitution [pdf] does not contain an
explicit privacy right. Nevertheless, the Indian Constitution is a living instrument. The Courts
have sought to give effect to the “values” which the Constitution it contains by interpreting
express fundamental rights protections as containing a wide range of other rights. The crucial
provision for this purpose is Article 21 which provides that

“No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure
established by law”

Chandrachud J points out that this provision has been interpreted as containing, inter alia, the
rights to a speedy trial, legal aid, shelter, a healthy environment, frredom from torture, reputation
and to earn a livelihood (for a list see [150]). Privacy is an incident of fundamental freedom or
liberty.

In an important section of the joint judgment headed “Essential Nature of Privacy”, Chandrachud
J analyses the concept of privacy as being founded on autonomy and as an essential aspect of
dignity ([168] to [169]):

“Dignity cannot exist without privacy. Both reside within the inalienable values of life, liberty
and freedom which the Constitution has recognised. Privacy is the ultimate expression of the
sanctity of the individual. It is a constitutional value which straddles across the spectrum of
fundamental rights and protects for the individual a zone of choice and self-
determination” [169]

5. Durgah committee Ajmer vs Syed Hussain ALI


The Judjment of the Court was delivered by GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-In.the High
Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur a writ petition was filed under Art. 226 of
the Constitution by the nine respondents who are Khadims of the tomb of
KhwajaMoinud-din Chishti of Ajmer challenging the vires of the DurgahKhwajaSaheb
Act XXXVI of 1955 (hereafter called the Act). In this petition the respondents alleged
that the Act in general and the provisions specified in the petition in particular are ultra
vires and they claimed a direction or an appropriate writ or order restraining the
appellants the Durgah Com- mittee and the Nazim of the said Committee from enforcing
any of its provisions. The writ petition thus filed by the respondents substantially
succeeded and the High Court has made a declaration that the impugned provisions of the
Act are ultra vires and has issued an order restraining the appellants from enforcing them.
The appellants then applied for and obtained a certificate from the High Court and it is
with the said certificate that they have come to this Court by their present
appeal.According to the respondents the shrine of NazratKhwajaMoin-ud-din Chishti
which is generally known as the DurgahKhwajaSaheb situated at Ajmer is one of the
most important places of pilgrimage for the muslims of India. Since persons following
other religious also hold the saint in great veneration a large number of non-muslims visit
the tomb every year.KhwajaSaheb came to India sometime towards the end of the 12th
Century A. D. and settled down in Ajmer. His saintly character and his teachings
attracted a large number of devotees during his lifetime and these devotees honoured him
as a great spiritual leader. KhwajaSaheb belonged to the Chishti Order of Soofies. He
died at Ajmer in or about 1236 A. D., and naturally enough after his death-his tomb
became a place of pilgrimage.The respondents' case further is that after his death the
tomb under which the saint was interred was a kutcha structure and continued to be such
for nearly 300 years thereafter. The petition alleged that a pucca structure was built by the
Khilji Sultans of Mandu and over the said pucca structure a tomb was constructed.
Thereafter successive Muslim Rulers, particularly the Moghul Emperors, made
endowments and added to the wealth and splendour of the shrine.Khwaja Syed
Fukhuruddin and Sheikh Mohammad Yadgar, who originally accompanied the
KhwajaSaheb Syed to India, were his close and devoted followers. After the saint's death
both of them looked after the, grave and attended to the spiritual needs of the pilgrims.
The descendants of these two disciples gradually came to be known as Khadims. For
generations past their occupation has been that of religious service at the tomb of
KhwajaSaheb. The- respondents belong to this sect or section of Khadims. They claim
that they are members of a religious denomination or section known as ChishtiaSoofies.
Their petition further avers that throughout the centuries the Khadims had not only
looked after the premises of the tomb but also kept the keys of the tomb and attended to
the multitude of pilgrime who visited the shrine and acted as spiritual guides in the
performance of religious functions to, wit the Fateha (act of prayer) for which they
received Nazars (offerings).These Nazars were the main source of income for the
livelihood of the Khadims and have in fact always constituted their property.According to
the respondents the right of the Khadims to the offerings and Nazars made by pilgrims
before the tomb and at the Durgah had been the subject matter of several judicial
decisions and the same had been finally decided by the Privy Council in Syed Altaf
Hussain v. Dewan Syed Ali Rasul Ali Khan The petition is substantially based on what
the respondents regard to be the effect of the said decision in respect of their
rights.According to them the rights recognised by the said decision amount to their
fundamental rights to property and their fundamental right to manage the said property,
and that in substance is the basis of the petition.Thus the respondents challenged the vires
of the Act on the ground that its material provisions take (1) A.I.R. 1938 P.C. 71.away
and/or abridge their fundamental rights as a class and also the fundamental rights of the
muslims belonging to the SoofiChishtia Order guaranteed by Arts. 14, 19 (1) (f) and(g),
25, 26, 31(1) and (2) as well as 32. According to the case set out in the petition all Hanafi
muslims do not necessarily believe in Soofism and do not belong to the Chishtia Order of
Soofies, and it is to the latter sect that the shrine solely belongs; the maintenance of the
shrine has also been the sole concern of the said sect. It is this sect which has to maintain
the institution for religious purposes and manage its affairs according to custom and
usage. That is why the respondents alleged that the material provisions of the Act, were
violative of their fundamental rights. In regard to s. 5 of the Act under which the Durgah
Committee is constituted the respondents' objection is that it can consist of Hanafi
muslims who are not members of the Chishtia Order and that introduces an infirmity
which makes the said provision inconsistent with Art. 26 of the Constitution. On these,
allegations the respondents claimed a declaration that certain specified sections of the Act
Were void and ultra vires which made the whole of the Act void and ultra vires avid they
asked directions
6. Raja Kishore VS state of Orissa
The brief fact of the case is that the present petitioners were defendants in Title Suit No.
108 of 1991 in the Court of learned Sub-Judge, Puri. In the said suit the defendants
produced an unregistered Agreement for Sale, which was alleged by the plaintiff to be a
forged and fabricated document. The said suit was decided by the learned Sub-Judge,
Puri, Wdehis judgment dated 10.9.1993. After the disposal of the suit, the plaintiff filed a
petition on 11.10.1993 before the learned Sub-Judge, Puri, under Section 340 Cr.P.C. on
the allegations that the defendants (present petitioners) along with others made
conspiracy to forge a document to utilize the same in the aforesaid Title Suit No. 108 of
1991 (marked Ext.C in the suit) and intentionally gave false evidence in the suit.
3. The said petition of the plaintiff filed under Section 340 Cr.P.C. was registered as
Misc. Case No. 242 of 1993 and the learned Sub-Judge, Puri, without holding a
preliminary enquiry and only on consideration of the materials on record of the suit, vide
order dated 10.01.1994, came to hold that the present petitioners (opposite parties in
Misc. Case No. 242 of 1993) gave falsa evidence in a judicial proceeding and it appears
that they have committed offences punishable under Sections 193 and 467IPC.The
relevant portion of the order of the learned Sub-Judge, Puri, dated 10.01.1994, is
extracted below:In the instant case as I have already discussed, in view of the evidence of
D.W.4 on record in Title Suit No. 108/91 i.e. of the present O.P. No. 3, and in view of the
Judgment in Title Suit No. 108/91 I find no justification in issuing notice to the O.P. in
this case and in the interest of justice it is not expedient to conduct any preliminary
enquiry as sufficient materials are already before me to initiate action Under Section
340 of the Cr.P.C. Accordingly when the O.Ps.gave false evidence in a Judicial
proceeding regarding Ext.C it appears that the O.Ps. have committed an offence
punishable Under Sections 193and 467 of the I.P.C. Accordingly a complaint be lodged
before the S.D.J.M., Puri in the interest of justice and for prevention of perjury against
the O.Ps. for taking cognizance against the O.Ps. Under Sections 193 and 467 of the
I.P.C. Accordingly the misc. case is disposed of. Accordingly a written complaint was
lodged before the learned S.D.J.M., Puri, along with the copy of the order dated
10.01.1994 of the learned Sub-Judge, Puri, which was registered as 2(c) CC 17 of 1994.
The learned S.D.J.M., Puri, vide order dated 13.01.1994 took cognizance of the offences
under Sections 193/467/471/ IPC and directed issue of summons against the present
petitioners, which reads as under:A complaint petition along with the copy of order dated
10.1.94 in Misc. Case No. 242 of 1993 is received from the learned Sub-Judge, Puri. The
complaint is submitted under Section 340(1) Cr.P.C. and forwarded to this office vide
Sub-Judge Court's office letter No. 41 dated 13.1.94.
Perused the complaint. A prima facie under Sections 193/ 467/471 I.P.C. is well made out
against the accused persons and accordingly cognizance under Sections
193/467/471 I.P.C. is taken against the accused persons. Summon to them fixing 18.2.94
for appearance.Being aggrieved by the said order of the learned Sub-Judge, Puri, dated
10.01.1994 and the order of cognizance passed by the learned S.D.J.M., Puri, dated
13.01.1994 the present petitioner filed Crl. Appeal No. 8/66 of 2001/1994 before the
learned Adhoc Addl. District & Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No.II, Puri, assailing
the said orders. The learned Adhoc Addl. District & Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court
No. II, Puri, by order dated 20.10.2001 came to the conclusion that since there is no bar
under Section 195 Cr.P.C. for a Court to make a complaint in respect of offences covered
under Section 195 Cr.P.C, the learned Sub-Judge is competent to lodge the complaint.
Moreover even if the disputed document (Ext.C) is said to have been forged before
institution of the suit or before it was produced in the Court of learned Sub-Judge, the
cognizance taking Court an take cognizance of offence even on the complaint of the Sub-
Judge, unless it is shown under the law that a Court or a public servant cannot make a
complaint in respect of offences other than the offences under Section 195 Cr.P.C, the
impugned order of the S.D.J.M. taking cognizance cannot be disturbed..The moot
question which needs determination in this case is as to whether a prosecution can be
maintained on the complaint of a Court under Section 340(1) Cr.P.C. in respect of a
forged document produced in the said Court unless it is prima facie shown that such
offence has been committed with respect to a document after it has been produced or
given in evidence in a proceeding in any Court, i.e., during the time when the document
was in custody of the Court.
. Learned counsel for the petitioners refers to a judgment of the Full Bench of Punjab &
Haryana High Court in the case of Harbans Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab, (Full
Bench), wherein the Hon'ble Court considering the judgments and provisions of law
came to hold that Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Cr.P.C. is limited in its operation only to
the offences mentioned in that Section, if committed with regard to a document produced
or given in evidence in such proceedings, while the document is in custody of the Court.
It has no application to a case in which a document is fabricated prior to its production or
given in evidence. Section 195 Cr.P.C. deals with three distinct categories of offences
which have been described in Clauses (a) (b)(i) and (b)(ii) and they relate to (1) contempt
of lawful authority of public servants, (2) offences against public justice, and (3) offences
relating to documents given in evidence. Clause (a) deals with offences punishable
under Sections 172 to 188 IPC which occur in Chapter X of the IPC and the heading of
the Chapter is 'Of Contempts of The Lawful Authority of Public Servants.' These are
offences which directly affect the functioning of or discharge of lawful duties of a public
servant. Clause (b)(i) refers to offences in Chapter XI of IPC which is headed as - 'Of
False Evidence And Offences Against Public Justice'. The offences mentioned in this
clause clearly relate to giving or fabricating false evidence or making a false declaration
in any judicial proceeding or before a Court of justice or before a public servant who is
bound or authorized by law to receive such declaration, and also to some other offences
which have a direct correlation with the proceedings in a Court of justice (Sections
205 and 211, IPC).This being the scheme of two provisions or clauses of Section 195,
viz., that the offence should be such which has direct bearing or affects the functioning or
discharge of lawful duties of a public servant or has a direct correlation with the
proceedings in a Court of justice the expression "when such offence is alleged to have
been committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding
in a Court" occurring in Clause (b)(ii) should normally mean commission of such an
offence after the document has actually been produced or given in evidence in the Court.
The situation or contingency where an offence as enumerated in this clause has already
been committed earlier and later on the document is produced or is given in evidence in
Court, does not appear to be in tune with Clauses (a)(i) and (b)(i) and consequently with
the scheme of Section 195, Cr.P.C. This indicates that Clause (b) (ii) contemplates a
situation where the offences enumerated therein are committed with respect to a
document subsequent to its production or giving in evidence in a proceeding in any
Court. Section 195(1) mandates a complaint in writing of the Court for taking cognizance
of the offences enumerated in Clause (b)(i) and (b)(ii) thereof. Sections
340 and 341 Cr.P.C. which occur in Chapter XXVI prescribes the procedure for filing of
the complaint and other matters connected therewith. The heading of this Chapter is -
'Provisions As to Offences Affecting The Administration of Justice'. The fact that the
procedure for filing complaint by Court has been provided in Chapter XXVI dealing with
offences affecting administration of justice, is a clear pointer of the legislative intent that
the offence committed should be of such type which directly affects the
 ManimohanGhose v. Emperor
o The learned Judge in his charge to the jury explained the law with reference to
the charge under Section 364, and the learned advocate for the appellant has taken
no exception to this part of the charge. The learned Judge was careful to point out
that intent to murder was an essential ingredient of the offence, that the offence
might be committed without the murder actually taking place, but that the alleged
fact of murder was one of the circumstances on the basis of which it was sought to
be proved that the accused were actuated by the aforesaid criminal intent.
 Faddi v. State of M.P
o The report wasneither confession of the accused nor a statement made to apolice
officer during the course of investigation. Section 25 of the Evidence Act and s.
162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure do not bar its admissibility. The report
was anadmission by the accused of certain facts which had abearing on the
question to be determined by the Court viz.,how and by whom the murder was
committed or whether theaccused's statement in court denying the correctness
ofcertain statements of the prosecution witnesses was correct or not. Admissions
ire admissible in evidence under s. 21 of the Evidence admission of an accused
can beproved against him.
 State of Karanataka v. Papanaika
o Learned counsel for the appellant-State submitted that in view of the consistent
and reliable statement of the eye witnesses, the Division Bench of the High Court
has completely gone wrong in reversing the order of conviction into an acquittal
simply on the ground that the evidence of some of the witnesses were inconsistent
about the alleged occurrence and moreover large number of accused persons had
been acquitted by the learned trial court, therefore it is not safe to believe this
evidence to uphold the conviction for remaining accused. Learned counsel for the
appellant read out to us the statement of the eye witnesses and tried to persuade us
that small discrepancy in the version is just but natural and relationship between
the parties cannot be a ground to disbelieve all the eye witnesses. Learned counsel
for the appellant also invited our attention to some of the decisions of this Court
in his support which we will deal at appropriate stage.
 Darshan Singh v. State of Haryana
o While the initial presumption regarding the absence of circumstances bringing the
case within an exception may be met by showing the existence of appropriate
facts, the burden to establish a plea of private defence by a balance of
probabilities is a more difficult burden to discharge. The judgment points out that
despite this position there may be cases where, though the plea of private defence
is not established by an accused on a balance of probabilities, yet the totality of
facts and circumstances may still throw a reasonable doubt on the existence of
"mensrea", which normally is an essential ingredient of an offence. The present is
not a case of this latter kind. Indeed realising that a simple plea of private defence
may be insufficient to explain the nature of injuries caused to the deceased, Ram
Swarup suggested that the shot fired by him at the assailants of his father Ganga
Ram accidentally killed the deceased. We have no doubt that the act of Ram
Swarup was deliberate and not accidental. The respondents led no evidence to
prove their defence but that is not necessary because such proof can be offered
by relying on the evidence led by the prosecution, the material elicited by cross-
examining the prosecution witnesses and the totality of facts and circumstances
emerging out of the evidence in the case. In view of the considerations mentioned
earlier we find it impossible to hold that Ram Swarup fired the shot in
defence of his father Ganga Ram. The circumstances of the case negative the
existence of such a right.
 Queen Empress v. Abdullah
o When a witness is called who deposes to having put certain questions to a person,
the cause of whose death is the subject-matter of the trial, which questions have
been responded to by certain signs, can such questions and signs, taken together,
be properly regarded as "verbal statements" under Section 32 of the Evidence Act,
or are they admissible under any other sections of the same Act? I propose to deal
first with the other sections to which reference has been made. It is contended that
the questions which were put to the deceased, and the responses which she made
to those questions, are "facts" within the purview of Sections 3 and 9. I do not,
however, concur in this view. It appears to me that a fact must be proved to be
relevant before another fact can be proved to explain its meaning; and since,
without words being used, the signs could not be proved to be relevant, the words
themselves are also not relevant.
 State of A.P. v. Shrinivasala Reddy
o The prosecution examined as many as 25 witnesses and produced various
documents in support of its case.The appellants. However, did not lead any
evidence in support of his defence. The trial court after considering the oral and
documentary evidence on record found that the prosecution has filed to
establish any offence against the appellant and accordingly acquitted him of all
the charges. The High Court on appeal by the State of Andhra Pradesh allowed
the said appeal and remanded the matter back to the trial court for disposal in
accordance with law.The High Court in its judgment observed: “Thus, in my
opinion the trial Judge has failed to consider the relevant material for ascertaining
accused. The trial Judge should have tried to ascertain whether the accused.
 HarijanaNarayana v. State of A.P.
o Magistrates holding inquiries under s. 207A(3) Of the Codeof Criminal
Procedure must, however, be circumspect and seethat an accused person is not
handicapped in his defence byany omission on the part of the Police Officer
to furnishhim with necessary copies.Where such non-compliance is found to
cause any prejudice to the accused, the Court should in the interest of
justicereopen the proceedings and insist on a full compliance withthe provisions.
When it causes no prejudice, it is a mereirregularity curable under S. 537 Of the
Code.
 Ram Adhar v. Janki
o Section 50 runs thus:
"When the Court has to form an opinion as to the relationship of one person to
another, the opinion, expressed by conduct, as to the existence of such
relationship, of any person who, as a member of the family or otherwise, has
special means of knowledge on the subject, is a relevant fact".
There is a proviso also to this section, but that is not material for the purpose of
deciding the question at issue. This section enacts that when the Court has to
ascertain a question of relationship between two or more parties, the opinion of
any person having special means of knowledge, as expressed by conduct, is
admissible in evidence.
In order to admit evidence under this section three conditions must be, fulfilled:
(1) The person must be proved to have special means of knowledge; (2) (a) the
opinion alone is evidence; (b) the opinion as expressed by conduct only is
evidence; or in other words, (i) conduct only can be given in evidence; (ii) from
the conduct given in evidence, the Court is to see whether it is the result of any
opinion held by the person; and (3) the opinion which is relevant must be the one
as to the existence of the relationship. The opinion may be of a member of the
family, or an outsider: it is enough if he has special means of knowledge on the
subject.
But the opinion must be expressed by conduct, that is, external facts of events of
the nature indicated in the illustrations to the section, and not a mere statement of
an opinion held by the witness, or what another person may have said on the
question of relationship. This section makes relevant the evidence admissible in
English law as "family conduct", but evidence of general reputation, which is
admissible according to English law to prove relationship, is not admissible under
this section.
 Sandeep v. State of Haryana
o Submission of learned counsel for the appellants that the courts below erred in
relying upon the confessional statement made by Sandeep before PW9
LaxmiNarain requires to be accepted. There is no reason to disbelieve the say
of this witness that Sandeep made confessional statement. In view of the
aforesaid circumstantial evidence proved by the prosecution, even if we
discard the confessional statement made by accused Sandeep before PW9
LaxmiNarain, the High Court was right in convicting accused Sandeep (A1)
and Vikram Singh (A3). Further, the High Court held that against Mandeep
and Arun, except seeing them together while coming back by PW7, there is no
other evidence to connect them with the crime and that there was no discovery
of blood stained articles at their instance. Hence, they were acquitted. But that
would not in any way adversely affect the prosecution evidence qua A1 and
A3. It is also true that despite the detailed FIR, the IO has not taken immediate
steps for arresting the accused named in the FIR. But sluggishness in
investigation would not in any way adversely affect the evidence of
complainant-PW13, PW7 and PW11. In this view of the matter, the finding
recorded by the High Court convicting A1 and A3 and acquitting A2 and A4
does not call for any interference.
 Hubib Muhammad v. State of Hyderabad
o Though the prosecution is not bound to call all availablewitnesses
irrespective of considerations of number or reliability, witnesses essential to
the unfolding of thenarrative on which the prosecution is based must be
called by the prosecution, whether in the result the effect oftheir testimony
is for or against the case for theprosecution. Where the case against the
accused, a Subedar,was that he gave orders to the police to fire and the
DeputyCommissioner of Police who had accompanied the accused
andhad witnessed the occurrence was not examined by
theprosecution: Held, that the failure to examine him not onlyled to an adverse
inference against the prosecution case butalso cast serious reflection on the
fairness of the trial

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