Building the army of the sun: the growth of Japanese military might in late 19th century

In the late 19th century, the Meiji restoration in Japan had placed the country onto the

ideological path of nationalism. What immediately followed was one of the most rapid growth of

military strength in human history. The process and its achievement are rather impressive when

taking Japan’s condition into account. As Lory Hillis pointed out, Japan was able to turn a few

sailing boats and feudal armies into an effective fighting force (Lory 153). On the other hand,

Japan’s Asian counterpart – China started its military modernization around the same time after a

series of unequal treaties. However, by the time of the first Sino-Japanese war, there appears to

be a drastic comparison between the Chinese forces and the Imperial Japanese army. Where the

Japanese forces were well trained and well equipped, and the poorly organized Chinese forces

were still mainly equipped with melee weapons (Elleman 99). In this regard, such ambiguity led

to the question: What facilitated the rapid growth of Japanese military strength during the late

19th century?

Pioneers in this field have concluded serval plausible answers. Among them, many

believe that the rise of Japanese military majorly relied on foreign assistance from France and

Prussia. Notably, Meirion Harries and Susie Harries claims that the French military mission to

Japan helped the Imperial army to develop their air services, which greatly improved the combat

efficiency of the imperial military (Harries & Harries 363). In addition, foreign assistant from

Germany helped the Japanese imperial army to reconstruct its command structure following the

Prussian model (Nishitani et al. 28-29).

Hunt et al. assert that the use of superior military strength by Western powers to press

Japan for trade relations played a crucial role in encouraging the country’s rapid growth in

military strength. The Japanese realized that they were behind Western countries when American
Matthew c. Perry visited Japan in 1953 in large warships with technology and armament that far

outshined theirs. Commodore Perry’s intention was to conclude a treaty with Japan that would

open up Japan’s port for trade and the country’s military forces were incapable of defending

against such advances. The Japanese soon realized they had to take the initiative by opening its

doors to foreign technology as failure to do so would only lead to their domination by the

Western powers (Hunt et al. 712).

It is also possible to argue that the samurai tradition embodied in Japanese society has set

the base for the rise of militarism, in the sense that mobilization became much more convenient.

In addition, the majority of men in power during the Meiji era were ex-samurai or descendants of

sort (Cohen 153). Basically, some argue that the clever implementation of samurai tradition and

the bold appointment of many ex-samurais facilitated the rapid growth of Japanese military

strength.

While the answers presented above are plausible to a certain degree, they both consist of

major weaknesses. To counter the foreign assistance theory, Scholar Nishitani et al. pointed out

that the Imperial Japanese Army had to switch its command structure from French to German

due to German victory over France in 1878 (Nishitani et al. 28-29). In the light of this, various

types of foreign assistance actually caused entanglement in the process of military

modernization. On the other hand, the samurai tradition did not contribute as much as expected

either. In the sense that the imperial army was not initially centralized due to samurai tradition, in

which many samurais were more loyal to their own domain than to the emperor (Drea 10). The

samurais who were devoted to their traditional prerogatives opposed conscription which was

introduced in an attempt to strengthen the army by increasing the number of soldiers. The

samurai tradition would not have contributed so much to the modernization of the Japanese army
because apart from opposing conscription which would later become universal and obligatory,

their tradition meant that they would oppose the transfer of loyalties from the feudal lords to the

state.

Hunt et al.’s claim that the inability of Japan to defend itself against Western powers that

used their military might to press the country for trade relations is weak compared to other

reasons advanced by historians. Although the need for national security haunted Japan, new

leaders of the Meiji period wanted to invade Korea to stop a takeover by Europeans, Chinese or

Russia, and to give the samurai warriors a noble mission. The invasion of Korea was postponed

until Japan had a better military strategy and modern weaponry (Mayo 793).

Ultimately, this paper will uncover the true critical factor that contributed to the rapid

military growth of Japan in the late 19th century by focusing on the development of internal

policies and analyzing the role of these policies in the first Sino-Japanese war and the Russo-

Japanese war. Moreover, this paper will attempt to explain why even though many believe that

samurai tradition and foreign assistance enabled Japan to build up its military rapidly, what truly

facilitated such growth of Japanese military strength is still the series of successful military

reforms that took place in the late 19th century. In which, Japan was able to establish a

centralized army, introduced the conscription law, place their military under intensive

indoctrination and modernize their military equipment.

Before the establishment of a centralized army, the Japanese army fought under

improvised arrangements and lacked a reliable recruiting base as well as clear channels of

command and control. Despite fighting for the imperial cause, many units within the army were

not loyal to the imperial court but rather to their domains. The imperial government of Japan
created several administrative offices among them a military branch and later structured an

imperial bodyguard of 400 to 500, which was made up of Choshu and Satsuma troops supported

by veterans of the Toba-Fushimi encounter as well as masterless samurais from different

domains. The imperial court demanded the size of the local domains restricted and required them

to contribute to funding a national officers’ training school based in Kyoto. However, the

imperial bodyguard and the military branch were soon disbanded, the former due to lack of

weapons and equipment and the latter due to its ineffectiveness (Drea 34).

There appears to be an urge to centralize the imperial army after the unorganized imperial

forces suffered greatly in eastern Japan. As Drea stated, the reason behind such chaos is the lack

of centralized command (Drea 10). In this regard, key figures such as Omura Masijiro advocated

for the establishment of a centralized standing army (20). As a result, all private armies were

disbanded, and a strong centralized army was established. Nevertheless, the centralized army laid

the founding stone for the rapid growth of the Japanese military, allowing the state to manage its

forces much more efficiently and directly. For instance, the Meiji Japan better-led army defeated

Qing’s non-centralized army in the Sino-Japanese War in 1894-1895 (Elman 379).

However, a centralized military does not equal to unprecedented military might. To

further enhance the strength of the army, the Japanese had to further utilize its manpower in the

process of militarization. Japan then enforced the universal conscription law introduced by

Yamagate Aritomo (Norman 47). When conscription was enacted, it made universal military

service mandatory for all males in Japan. According to the law, individuals would have a total of

seven years of military service where three years would be spent in the regular army, to years in

the reserve and two more in the second reserve. Every non-disabled male aged between 17 and

40 years was considered a member of the national guard which would only serve the country in
case of a severe national crisis, for instance, an attack or an invasion of the country (Jaundrill

107).

The conscription law allowed the Imperial Japanese Army to educate its soldiers, which

became an attraction for the young ones to willingly join the military (Norman 64). As the

country became more urbanized, the government grew increasingly concerned about the

country’s population lack of education. The many illiterate and unknowing commoners were

given access to opportunities for education and career advancement as the government realized

that education made soldier better and productive members of society and made the state better.

In addition, the conscription law allowed commoners into the military to serve alongside the

samurais (47-64). For a long time in Japan, only samurais had the right to bear arms, a privilege

that was extended to every male in the country including the peasant class. The only groups of

people exempted from joining the army were those who were physically unfit or showed

hardship, criminals, heirs or head of households, teachers, students and bureaucrats. Under the

1873 ordinance, members of the Japanese army were mainly second and third sons of peasants

who manned the regional garrison while the imperial guard was controlled by the samurai.

The conscription law did not only enlarge the size of the Imperial Japanese army but also

enabled the commanders to explore the fighting potential of the peasants (Norman 47-64). In

1873 for instance, the Japanese army numbered about 17,900 from the country’s population of

about 35 million people at the time, a number that doubled to 33,000 by 1875 (Drea 29). This

shows how the crucial conscription program helped to build the numbers. Basically, through the

universal conscription law, the Japanese army reached an unprecedented size and established the

diversity of social classes in its military, which was translated into military strength.
 Furthermore, it is obvious the strength of the Imperial Japanese army majorly came from

its intensive indoctrination. In fact, the Imperial Japanese army is known as one of the most

indoctrinated military force in history. Military training in the country began at a very young age

where formal regimen and training would start at about the age of 8 years. Young boys

beginning their third year of primary school would receive semi-military training from their

teachers while the older ones in middle, higher school, college or university would receive

training from regular army officers. The indoctrination also had aspects of ancestor worship as

well as those of divine origin of the Emperor and the Japanese race. Starting from the restoration

of the Imperial rule in the 19th century, the government of Japan has stressed on the divine origin

its race and its leaders, and has reinforced this through teachings that portray the country’s war

efforts as “divine missions.” Popular examples of military feats and heroism are enthusiastically

praised on stage as well as in literature. In other words, the Japanese government has encouraged

hero worship (Jewell and Clancey 1).

According to Lory’s account, The Imperial Japanese soldiers regularly chanted mottos

such as “I willingly die for the emperor” (Lory 58). As a result, the Imperial Japanese army was

highly disciplined in terms of political loyalty and overcoming hardships. As Lory observed,

even under intense training for a prolonged period of time, there are absolutely no complaints

coming from any personnel (Lory 58-59). As a result, the strength of the Imperial army was

enhanced because the disciplined and indoctrinated soldiers were able to fight under great

hardship (Lory 62).

Japan’s modernization of military equipment played a vital role in the in the growth of

the country’s military strength. In 1870, the new Japanese government hatched an ambitious plan

to develop a navy with 200 ships. Although the plan was abandoned due to lack of resources
since Japan was not a wealthy state at the time, the Imperial Japanese Navy played a crucial role

in the country’s coastal defense and the Meiji government was unrelenting in its modernization.

In the same year, an imperial decree resolved that Britain’s Royal Navy would be the model for

the country’s Navy development instead of the Netherlands (Evans and Peattie 12). Germany

and France also helped the Japanese to modernize their army. For instance, the French mission

between 1872 and 1880 established the first school to train and educate officers, built an arsenal

for gun and munitions manufacture and a gunpowder factory. A British naval mission arrived in

Japan in 1873 and established British traditions such as the attitudes of officers as well as the

style of its uniforms. Additionally, ships such as the Kongo, Hiei and Fuso were built in British

shipyards although they were built specifically for the Imperial Japanese Navy (Evans and

Peattie 12). The Qing dynasty in China, on the other hand, bought advanced and expensive

western iron cruisers and was no match for the Japanese army.

By analyzing the strategy of Japanese militarization, my thesis is significant because it

illuminated the true factors that contributed to one of the most rapid growth of military strength

in history. More broadly, it exemplifies the rise of a militarism empire that brought great

suffering to the world – a crucial lesson for the peace-loving people who are devoted to

preventing this part of the history from repeating. Moreover, the paper explores some of the main

tactics used by militaries and could provide crucial lessons for nations seeking to fortify potential

targets adequately.
 Works Cited

Cohen, Mark. “The Political Process of the Revolutionary Samurai: a Comparative

Reconsideration of Japan’s Meiji Restoration.” Theory and Society, vol. 43, no. 2, 2014,

pp. 139–168., doi:10.1007/s11186-014-9215-6.

Drea, Edward J. Japans Imperial Army: Its Rise and Fall, 18531945. Univ Pr Of Kansas, 2016.

Elleman, Bruce A. Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989. Routledge, 2001.

Elman, Benjamin A. On their own terms. Harvard University Press, 2009.

Evans, David, and Mark Peattie. Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial

Japanese Navy, 1887-1941. Naval Institute Press, 2015.

Hunt, Lynn, Thomas R. Martin, Barbara H. Rosenwein, R. Po-chia Hsia et al. The Making of the

West, Peoples and Cultures. Vol. C. 3rd ed. Boston: Bedford/ St. Martin's, 2009. 712-13.

Jaundrill, D. Colin. Samurai to Soldier: Remaking Military Service in Nineteenth-Century Japan.

Cornell University Press, 2016.

Jewell, Larry and Clancey, Patrick. Handbook on Japanese Military Forces. War Department,

2009.

Lory, Hillis. Japans Military Masters. The Army in Japanese Life, Etc. New York, 1943.

Mayo, Marlene J. "The Korean crisis of 1873 and early Meiji foreign policy." The Journal of

Asian Studies 31.4 (1972): 793.

Nishitani, Yoko, et al. “Japanese and European Private International Law in Comparative

Perspective.” 2008, doi:10.1628/978-3-16-151295-7.

Norman, E. Herbert. “Soldier and Peasant in Japan: The Origins of Conscription.” Pacific

Affairs, vol. 16, no. 1, 1943, p. 47., doi:10.2307/2752051