Вы находитесь на странице: 1из 7

This page intentionally left blank.

businessops

when push
C
orporate pilots are strongly self- night to a remote airport in a nonradar In the world of on-demand
motivated to get the job done, environment in foul weather. operations, the pilot is likely to be deal-
and much more often than not Whatever the reason, the pilot must ing with unfamiliar passengers who may
they do the job safely. But there break the news to the passengers, who have an even greater sense of entitlement
are times in every pilot’s career when are anxiously waiting to board the air- in making decisions about the flight.
the risks are too great and only fools are craft, eager to get under way. They have In these situations, facing bad
flying. Killer thunderstorms that cannot been doing their own risk analysis, and weather might seem easier than coping
be circumvented. Widespread severe the consequences of not getting to that with mad passengers. They may plead
icing. Critical equipment problems. meeting at Point B on time are weigh- the importance of the trip and at least
A nonprecision circling approach at ing heavily on their minds. getting under way and taking a look at

26 | flight safety foundation | AeroSafetyWorld | April 2007


businessops

the situation in the air. They may subtly Advisory Committee, calls it airman- dealt with at the destination. The
or bluntly question the pilot’s judgment. ship. “Airmanship is a personal mind- captain refused, and the flight
Even worse, the lead passenger may be set, that indefinable something that was canceled.
the type who does not take no for an separates the superior pilot from the
answer. average pilot,” he said. • A business jet remained on the
Whether the pilot stands by the In a paper prepared for the Society ground for six hours while the
decision or caves in to pressure not only of Experimental Test Pilots, Gurney captain and maintenance person-
will affect safety but will reflect vividly wrote, “Pilots with good airmanship nel debated minimum equipment
on his or her professionalism. will politely but firmly decline and list (MEL) provisions applicable
“If you start making exceptions and resist the urge to press on when the to inoperative indicator lights
say, ‘Well, I can probably sneak by that weather, equipment, crew health, mis- for an unspecified switch on the
cell that’s two miles off the end of the sion demands, fuel supply and support first officer’s panel. The captain
runway,’ or, ‘I can’t get a clearance and services go sour. Even when every maintained that the aircraft could
I’m in mountainous terrain, but I’m marginal condition is within limits, be flown with one light inop-
going to take off in marginal weather pilots who exercise airmanship will erative, but not with both lights
and get a clearance while I’m airborne judge the cumulative effects, analyze inoperative. Maintenance argued
because the boss wants to go,’ … if you the big picture and refuse to be pres- that the aircraft could be flown
start doing things like that — making sured into a situation that reduces the by meeting MEL provisions for
exceptions that make you uncomfort- overall margins of safety.” the switch itself. Although he
able and go against what you’ve been Keep Sheehan’s and Gurney’s believed this was improper, the
taught and against your basic value sys- thoughts in mind while reading the captain complied under protest
tems for safety — you’re on a slippery following summaries of recent reports after disciplinary action was
slope,” said John Sheehan, president of to the U.S. National Aeronautics and threatened by the chief pilot and
Professional Aviation, a corporate avia- Space Administration’s Aviation Safety assistant director of operations.
tion consultancy. Reporting System:
Pilot-pushing is not a problem peculiar
That Indefinable Something • There were thunderstorms in to the United States, of course. The
A specialist in corporate flight opera- the vicinity when the captain following are summaries of reports sub-
tions safety, Sheehan believes that the of a regional airliner observed mitted recently to the U.K. Confidential

comes to shove
How to say no when the boss says go. BY MARK LACAGNINA

quality that makes true professionals failure indications for the radio Human Factors Incident Reporting
stand out among professional pilots is altimeter, ground-proximity Programme:
their personal commitment to a well- warning system and wind shear
defined set of standards. “They view warning system while holding • After conducting a walk-around
their standards as living standards,” he for departure. He radioed main- inspection of the airplane during a
said. “They do not make exceptions or tenance control and was told that turn-around, the captain returned
cut corners.” because the flight had left the to the flight deck to find the first of-
Dan Gurney, a member of the gate, it was considered to be en ficer, the pilot flying the next sector,
© iStockphoto

Flight Safety Foundation (FSF) CFIT/ route and that he should record “fiddling the figures” on the load
ALAR Action Group and European the malfunctions and have them sheet. Additional passengers had

www.flightsafety.org | AeroSafetyWorld | April 2007 | 27


businessops

been transferred to the flight, causing the senior aviation safety analyst in the U.S. Federal
maximum zero fuel weight to be exceeded Aviation Administration (FAA) Office of Ac-
by 1,400 kg (3,086 lb). Asked why he was cident Investigation, said, “Corporate operators
amending baggage weights, the first officer have become very safe as a class but still have
replied, “That’s what Operations want us to some issues remaining with crew performance,
do.” The captain then informed Operations decision making, flight procedures, possible
that he would not conduct the flight unless pressure on crews and the challenge of diverse
the excess payload was offloaded. “Once my destinations.”
position was expressed, there was no argu- Accident analyst Robert Breiling of Robert
ment,” he said. Breiling Associates, said, “I think that pressure
on pilots to fly is one of the most pressing issues
• The previous crew had pulled the circuit in our industry. It’s lessened over the years as
breaker for the inoperative cut-out button companies have learned about the dangers, but
for the landing gear warning horn and noted you know darn well that pilots are still being
on the technical log that the inoperative but- pushed, or are pushing themselves, to go. Very
ton was an acceptable deferred defect. The few accident reports point directly to it — it’s
incoming captain found no reference to the hard to prove — but if you read between the
button in the MEL and discussed the situa- lines in a lot of them, real or perceived pressure
tion with the chief pilot, who ultimately told is there.”
him to accept the aircraft or be relieved of
A charter customer One report that does point directly to pilot-
his command. “Cowed and angry, both with
pushed a G-III pushing came from the U.S. National Transpor-
him for applying such pressure and myself
captain to land at the tation Safety Board (NTSB) investigation of the
for failing to stand up and make my point
mountainous Aspen Gulfstream III accident in Aspen, Colorado,
for fear of my position/job, I went ahead and
airport. The airplane on March 29, 2001. The circumstances bear
flew the aircraft,” the captain said.
was seen emerging retelling.
from a snow shower The flight was chartered by a customer who
and banking steeply Hard to Prove needed transportation for himself and 14 other
left soon before it In a paper presented at the 2005 Corporate people from Los Angeles to a dinner party he
crashed. Aviation Safety Seminar, Robert Matthews, was hosting in Aspen. The schedule gave the
flight crew less than one hour after landing in
U.S. National Transportation Safety Board Aspen to deplane the passengers, refuel the air-
plane and depart before the airport’s nighttime
noise curfew began.
However, two passengers, including the
charter customer, had not arrived by the
scheduled departure time from Los Ange-
les. During a conversation with some of the
passengers who had arrived on time and had
boarded the airplane, one of the pilots — the
report does not say which — mentioned that
if the other passengers did not arrive soon,
they might not be able to land at Aspen be-
cause of the curfew.
“The charter customer, upon learning of this
conversation, instructed his business assistant
to call Avjet [the charter provider] and relay a
message to the pilot that he should ‘keep his

28 | flight safety foundation | AeroSafetyWorld | April 2007


businessops

comments to himself,’” the report said. other airplanes, a Cessna Citation and The tower controller saw the G-III
The business assistant said that his em- two Canadair Challengers, were ahead emerge from a snow shower and bank
ployer was irate about the possibility of of the G-III. The Citation crew gained steeply left about five seconds before
not landing in Aspen. “He was told to visual contact with the airport at 10,400 impact. The pilots, flight attendant and
call Avjet and tell the company that the ft and conducted a visual approach to passengers were killed by blunt force
airplane was not going to be redirect- Runway 15. trauma when the airplane struck slop-
ed,” the report said. “Specifically, he was ing terrain about 2,400 ft (732 m) from
told to say that his employer had flown Are We Clear? the runway.
into [Aspen] at night and was going to The G-III was being vectored to the
do it again.” final approach course for the VOR/ Aftermath
DME approach when a passenger came NTSB concluded that the probable
Behind Schedule forward and occupied the jump seat. cause of the G-III accident was “the
The G-III departed from Los Angeles Investigators were unable to deter- flight crew’s operation of the airplane
about 43 minutes later than sched- mine if this passenger was the charter below the [MDA] without an appropri-
uled. The forecast had called for visual customer, but the report said, “The ate visual reference for the runway.”
meteorological conditions (VMC) presence of a passenger on the jump Among the contributing factors was
at Aspen, and as the airplane neared seat, especially if it were the charter the charter customer’s pressure on the
the airport, the automatic terminal customer, most likely further height- captain to land.
information system reported VMC at ened the pressure on the flight crew to In a memorandum issued after
the airport. land at [Aspen].” the accident, Avjet’s director of opera-
The airport is at 7,815 ft and is sur- A pilot in the lead Challenger tions told company pilots and charter
rounded by mountainous terrain. There reported a missed approach. Data schedulers that diversions to suitable
was one instrument approach available, from the G-III’s cockpit voice recorder alternate airports must be made if
a VOR/DME (VHF omnidirectional (CVR) indicated that the captain said, landings cannot be conducted before
radio/distance measuring equipment) “The weather’s gone down. They’re not sunset at the Aspen airport or three
approach with circling minimums only. making it in.” The passenger said, “Oh, other mountain airports — Eagle and
Although the final approach course, really?” Soon thereafter, a pilot in the Telluride, both in Colorado, and Haily,
164 degrees, met alignment criteria for other Challenger reported a missed Idaho.
a straight-in approach to Runway 15, approach. “All passengers for these destina-
the required descent gradient exceeded “Are we clear?” the passenger asked. tions must be informed of this policy,”
the maximum authorized by the FAA. “Not yet,” the captain replied. “The the memo said. “Flight crewmembers
The minimum descent altitude (MDA) guy in front of us didn’t make it either.” must report any violation of this policy
was 10,200 ft, 2,385 ft above airport Again, the passenger said, “Oh, really?” or pressure from passengers to violate
elevation. The report said that CVR data in- this policy to the director of operations
The captain told the first officer that dicated that the pilots might have seen or chief pilot.”
they would conduct a visual approach if the runway briefly but that they did The company also revised its stan-
possible or the nonprecision approach not have the runway in sight when the dard operating procedures (SOPs)
if necessary. “We’re not going to have airplane descended below the MDA. to prohibit anyone other than an
a bunch of extra gas, so we only get They attempted to locate a highway assigned crewmember, check airman
to shoot it once and then we’re going to the right of the final approach or FAA observer from occupying a
to Rifle,” he said. The pilots did not course that leads to the airport. The jump seat.
brief the approach or missed approach first officer made none of the required
procedures. Rifle, Colorado, the crew’s callouts during the approach, and the On Borrowed Time
alternate airport, is about 54 nm (100 airplane was deviating right of the Company pressure to continue flights
km) from Aspen. final approach course and descending in marginal weather was cited by
Weather conditions deteriorated through 8,300 ft near the missed ap- NTSB as a factor in the crash of a
as the G-III neared the airport. Three proach point. Eurocopter AS 350BA in a mountain

www.flightsafety.org | AeroSafetyWorld | April 2007 | 29


businessops

pass near Juneau, Alaska, on June 9, Sheehan warns of what he calls the A Page of Protection
1999. “entrepreneurial boss” who has achieved Edward (Ted) Mendenhall, vice chair-
The pilot, who was not instrument- success in the business world by bend- man of the CAC and a member of
rated, became spatially disoriented ing and breaking the rules. “They the FSF aviation safety audits team,
and lost control of the helicopter after made their fortune doing that, and the said that auditors look for indications
encountering adverse weather condi- mindset is: Why shouldn’t I do that with of pilot-pushing during confidential
tions during an air tour flight. All seven my airplane? That’s the one you have to interviews of company pilots. “From
occupants were killed. watch out for.” That’s the one who will my perspective, there are some CEOs,
“The pilot had expressed to a launch you down the slippery slope if some personalities, who think their
previous employer and a previous you let your professionalism slip. decisions are irreversible,” he said.
instructor that he was uncomfortable “About 98 percent of the time, “Despite what a pilot will tell them
with company pressure to fly tours you and that entrepreneurial boss are about safety, they’ll say that they want
in bad weather,” the report said. The going to get along just fine with how to go.”
instructor told investigators that, a few you operate the airplane, where you go The best way to protect flight crews
days before the accident, the pilot had and when you go,” Sheehan said. “But from pressure exerted by these indi-
expressed the belief that he was “living maybe 2 percent of the time, you’re viduals is to have an introductory letter,
on borrowed time” and had inquired going to play what I call ‘you bet your signed by the CEO, in the aviation
about employment opportunities at the job.’ That’s when there’s a big squall department’s flight operations manual
instructor’s company. line to the west — and guess which (FOM), Mendenhall said.
way you want to go? — or the visibility Darol Holsman, manager of FSF
My Way or the Highway is down to 1,800 RVR [runway visual aviation safety audits, said, “The intro-
“There is no safety culture in some com- range] in blowing snow, and the boss ductory letter to the FOM specifically
panies,” said Roger Baker, president of wants to go.” mentions that undue pressure must not
the Safety Focus Group and a member of He related the following incident: be exerted on the pilot-in-command
the FSF Corporate Advisory Committee A blizzard was raging when the first and that his decision making is final
(CAC). “The mindset is: It’s my way or officer arrived at the airport and found with respect to cancellations, diver-
the highway.” In other words: Do what I it closed for snow removal. Unable to sions, etc.” Figure 1 shows the sample
tell you to do or find another job. contact the captain, who was stuck in letter recommended by the audits team.
“Unfortunately, I see more com- a traffic jam, he took it upon himself CEOs who sign such a letter typi-
panies that profess to have safety as to inform the lead passenger that the cally are adamant in enforcing it. “I
their core value but don’t operate that flight had to be canceled because of don’t think we hear about pilot-
way than companies that value safety the weather. The captain and the avia- pushing in more than one in maybe
as number one and operate that way,” tion department manager concurred as many as 10 audits that we do,” Hols-
Baker said. “They do things safely when with his decision, but the vice presi- man said. “In those cases, there’s usu-
it’s convenient, when it’s cheap, when dent to whom the manager reported ally someone in senior management
it’s easy or when they’re showing off for was furious. He told the captain, “I who is bringing pressure on pilots to
somebody. It’s just not the first thing make all decisions about what goes go. When the CEO is made aware of
they think about.” and what doesn’t.” The captain later it, either by the department manager
During his 20 years as an aviation learned that the vice president had or by us, that individual usually gets a
consultant, John Sheehan has seen arranged a charter flight from a nearby stern lecture.”
improvement in the quality of aviation airport to transport the company In at least one case, a pushy
department managers and SOPs. “We president and his party to the desti- passenger’s employment was terminat-
have become more professional, but are nation. The incident resulted in the ed. “The airplane was in flight when
pilots still being pressured to fly? Abso- dismissal of the first officer, an unpaid the pilot informed the passengers that
lutely,” he said. “We still have pilots do- two-week vacation for the captain and they would not be able to land at the
ing improbable things that they would early retirement of the department destination airport but that arrange-
not normally do.” manager. ments had been made to have a car

30 | flight safety foundation | AeroSafetyWorld | April 2007


businessops

waiting at the alternate airport to transport Sample Flight Operations Manual Introductory Letter
them to their meeting,” said Roger Baker. “One
passenger came forward and was irate in telling
the pilot that ground transportation would take
too long, etc. The pilot held his ground and
To all XY
said that there were safety reasons for not land- Z Corpo
ration p
ersonnel
:
ing at the destination. The man
agemen
t of XYZ
compan Corpora
y-owned
“Apparently, it was a very ugly exchange. decision
carries w
and/or m
anaged
tion has
authorize
aircraft fo d the op
is condu ith it the r use in eration o
obligatio f
But when that story got back to the executive of attainab
cted in a
le.
manner
consisten
n to assu
re that th
its busin
ess. This
t with th e flight o
p
the company, he terminated the senior man- This XYZ
e highes
t degree
eration
of safety
Corpora
tion Flig
ager for trying to unduly influence the pilot procedu
to follow
res estab
lished to
h t Operati
ons Man
ual conta
the polic achieve ins the p
against his better judgment. There could have comply
with all
ies, proce
applicab
dures an
this goal
d limitat
. All emp
loyees ar
olicies an
d
le Feder io ns in this e instruct
ed
been some extenuating circumstances, but that The Direc
tor of Op
al Aviation
R egulatio
manual
an d to
bility an erations/ ns.
was certainly the straw that broke the camel’s and pro
d autho
cedures.
rity to d
Chief Pilo
irect and
t has bee
n delegat
require co ed the re
back.” In decisio
mpliance
with thes
sponsi-
e policie
ns involv s
Baker noted that some companies have of that fli
the fligh
ght has
in g any giv
absolute
en flight,
the Cap
t. No em au th ority to ta in /Pilot-in
published the policy on their passenger-safety- bring an
y pressu
ployee o
f XYZ Co
operate,
rporatio delay, div
-Comman
ert or ca
d
pilot. re, direc n or pas ncel
t or imp
briefing cards. “It’s another way to remind em- lied, to in
fluence
senger w
the judg
ill attempt
to
ment of
ployees that the pilot-in-command always has Sincerely
,
the

the last say,” he said. “When it’s written down, John H.


Executive
Chairman
and CEO
it takes away a lot of those pressures.” XYZ Corp
oration

Standards to Live By
Pilots can protect themselves from pressure by
explaining the situation to the passengers, hav-
Source: Darol Holsman, manager of FSF aviation safety audits
ing written standards in the FOM to point to
and offering alternatives, if possible. Figure 1
“You can’t just go into the lounge with a
glum face and say, ‘We can’t go,’” said Sheehan. they conform with IS‑BAO standards, said
“You have to make sure they understand that the Darol Holsman. IS-BAO, the International
reason they’re not going is for their safety more Standard for Business Aviation Operations,
than anything else, and give them some alterna- was developed in 2002 and is described by the
tives — a limousine or a one- or two-hour delay International Business Aviation Council as
for the storm to pass.” a “code of best practices.” IS‑BAO includes a
Decisions are far more easy to communicate generic FOM.
and to defend when they are backed up by stan- Having written standards is effective in
dards published in the FOM. protecting pilots not only from passenger
“You have to make the boss and your pas- pressure but also from internal pressure.
sengers aware, and keep reminding them, that “Documentation takes away the ambigui-
you have these standards,” Sheehan said. “You ties,” Roger Baker said. “Written standards
have to create the expectation in their minds and guidelines leave less to the discretion of
that when we bump up against these standards, the PIC and less to be questioned by passen-
we don’t go.” gers. If the PIC has followed the standards and
Development and review of FOM stan- guidelines in the FOM, he can defend himself
dards should be a collaborative effort involv- when the Monday-morning quarterbacks come
ing everyone in the aviation department. The out and start asking why he did or didn’t do
FSF audits team strongly recommends that something.” ●

www.flightsafety.org | AeroSafetyWorld | April 2007 | 31

Вам также может понравиться