Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 120319 October 6, 1995

LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK, petitioner,

vs.
ASSOCIATION OF LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK EMPLOYEES and ATTY. ESTER S.
GARCIA in her capacity as VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:

From a submission agreement of the Luzon Development Bank (LDB) and the Association of
Luzon Development Bank Employees (ALDBE) arose an arbitration case to resolve the
following issue:

Whether or not the company has violated the Collective Bargaining Agreement
provision and the Memorandum of Agreement dated April 1994, on promotion.

At a conference, the parties agreed on the submission of their respective Position Papers on
December 1-15, 1994. Atty. Ester S. Garcia, in her capacity as Voluntary Arbitrator, received
ALDBE's Position Paper on January 18, 1995. LDB, on the other hand, failed to submit its
Position Paper despite a letter from the Voluntary Arbitrator reminding them to do so. As of May
23, 1995 no Position Paper had been filed by LDB.

On May 24, 1995, without LDB's Position Paper, the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a decision
disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding is hereby made that the Bank has not adhered to the
Collective Bargaining Agreement provision nor the Memorandum of Agreement
on promotion.

Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to set aside the decision of the
Voluntary Arbitrator and to prohibit her from enforcing the same.

In labor law context, arbitration is the reference of a labor dispute to an impartial third person for
determination on the basis of evidence and arguments presented by such parties who have
bound themselves to accept the decision of the arbitrator as final and binding.

Arbitration may be classified, on the basis of the obligation on which it is based, as either
compulsory or voluntary.

Compulsory arbitration is a system whereby the parties to a dispute are compelled by the
government to forego their right to strike and are compelled to accept the resolution of their
dispute through arbitration by a third party.1 The essence of arbitration remains since a
resolution of a dispute is arrived at by resort to a disinterested third party whose decision is final
and binding on the parties, but in compulsory arbitration, such a third party is normally
appointed by the government.

Under voluntary arbitration, on the other hand, referral of a dispute by the parties is made,
pursuant to a voluntary arbitration clause in their collective agreement, to an impartial third
person for a final and binding resolution.2 Ideally, arbitration awards are supposed to be
complied with by both parties without delay, such that once an award has been rendered by an

1
arbitrator, nothing is left to be done by both parties but to comply with the same. After all, they
are presumed to have freely chosen arbitration as the mode of settlement for that particular
dispute. Pursuant thereto, they have chosen a mutually acceptable arbitrator who shall hear and
decide their case. Above all, they have mutually agreed to de bound by said arbitrator's
decision.

In the Philippine context, the parties to a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) are required to
include therein provisions for a machinery for the resolution of grievances arising from the
interpretation or implementation of the CBA or company personnel policies.3 For this purpose,
parties to a CBA shall name and designate therein a voluntary arbitrator or a panel of
arbitrators, or include a procedure for their selection, preferably from those accredited by the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). Article 261 of the Labor Code accordingly
provides for exclusive original jurisdiction of such voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators over
(1) the interpretation or implementation of the CBA and (2) the interpretation or enforcement of
company personnel policies. Article 262 authorizes them, but only upon agreement of the
parties, to exercise jurisdiction over other labor disputes.

On the other hand, a labor arbiter under Article 217 of the Labor Code has jurisdiction over the
following enumerated cases:

. . . (a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code the Labor Arbiters shall
have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30)
calendar days after the submission of the case by the parties for decision without
extension, even in the absence of stenographic notes, the following cases
involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:

1. Unfair labor practice cases;

2. Termination disputes;

3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may
file involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions
of employment;

4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from
the employer-employee relations;

5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including
questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts;

6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and

maternity benefits, all other claims, arising from employer-employee relations,
including those of persons in domestic or household service, involving an amount
exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) regardless of whether accompanied
with a claim for reinstatement.

xxx xxx xxx

It will thus be noted that the jurisdiction conferred by law on a voluntary arbitrator or a panel of
such arbitrators is quite limited compared to the original jurisdiction of the labor arbiter and the
appellate jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for that matter.4 The
state of our present law relating to voluntary arbitration provides that "(t)he award or decision of
the Voluntary Arbitrator . . . shall be final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt
of the copy of the award or decision by the parties,"5 while the "(d)ecision, awards, or orders of
the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both
parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders." 6 Hence,
while there is an express mode of appeal from the decision of a labor arbiter, Republic Act No.
6715 is silent with respect to an appeal from the decision of a voluntary arbitrator.

Yet, past practice shows that a decision or award of a voluntary arbitrator is, more often than
not, elevated to the Supreme Court itself on a petition for certiorari,7 in effect equating the

2
voluntary arbitrator with the NLRC or the Court of Appeals. In the view of the Court, this is
illogical and imposes an unnecessary burden upon it.

In Volkschel Labor Union, et al. v. NLRC, et al.,8 on the settled premise that the judgments of
courts and awards of quasi-judicial agencies must become final at some definite time, this Court
ruled that the awards of voluntary arbitrators determine the rights of parties; hence, their
decisions have the same legal effect as judgments of a court. In Oceanic Bic Division (FFW), et
al. v. Romero, et al.,9 this Court ruled that "a voluntary arbitrator by the nature of her functions
acts in a quasi-judicial capacity." Under these rulings, it follows that the voluntary arbitrator,
whether acting solely or in a panel, enjoys in law the status of a quasi-judicial agency but
independent of, and apart from, the NLRC since his decisions are not appealable to the latter.10

Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902, provides that the Court of
Appeals shall exercise:

xxx xxx xxx

(B) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions,

resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial
agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil
Service Commission, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the
Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of
this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of
the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.

xxx xxx xxx

Assuming arguendo that the voluntary arbitrator or the panel of voluntary arbitrators may not
strictly be considered as a quasi-judicial agency, board or commission, still both he and the
panel are comprehended within the concept of a "quasi-judicial instrumentality." It may even be
stated that it was to meet the very situation presented by the quasi-judicial functions of the
voluntary arbitrators here, as well as the subsequent arbitrator/arbitral tribunal operating under
the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission,11 that the broader term "instrumentalities"
was purposely included in the above-quoted provision.

An "instrumentality" is anything used as a means or agency.12 Thus, the terms governmental

"agency" or "instrumentality" are synonymous in the sense that either of them is a means by
which a government acts, or by which a certain government act or function is performed. 13 The
word "instrumentality," with respect to a state, contemplates an authority to which the state
delegates governmental power for the performance of a state function.14 An individual person,
like an administrator or executor, is a judicial instrumentality in the settling of an estate, 15 in the
same manner that a sub-agent appointed by a bankruptcy court is an instrumentality of the
court,16and a trustee in bankruptcy of a defunct corporation is an instrumentality of the state. 17

The voluntary arbitrator no less performs a state function pursuant to a governmental power
delegated to him under the provisions therefor in the Labor Code and he falls, therefore, within
the contemplation of the term "instrumentality" in the aforequoted Sec. 9 of B.P. 129. The fact
that his functions and powers are provided for in the Labor Code does not place him within the
exceptions to said Sec. 9 since he is a quasi-judicial instrumentality as contemplated therein. It
will be noted that, although the Employees Compensation Commission is also provided for in
the Labor Code, Circular No. 1-91, which is the forerunner of the present Revised Administrative
Circular No. 1-95, laid down the procedure for the appealability of its decisions to the Court of
Appeals under the foregoing rationalization, and this was later adopted by Republic Act No.
7902 in amending Sec. 9 of B.P. 129.

A fortiori, the decision or award of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators should likewise
be appealable to the Court of Appeals, in line with the procedure outlined in Revised
Administrative Circular No. 1-95, just like those of the quasi-judicial agencies, boards and
commissions enumerated therein.

3
This would be in furtherance of, and consistent with, the original purpose of Circular No. 1-91 to
provide a uniform procedure for the appellate review of adjudications of all quasi-judicial
entities18 not expressly excepted from the coverage of Sec. 9 of B.P. 129 by either the
Constitution or another statute. Nor will it run counter to the legislative intendment that decisions
of the NLRC be reviewable directly by the Supreme Court since, precisely, the cases within the
adjudicative competence of the voluntary arbitrator are excluded from the jurisdiction of the
NLRC or the labor arbiter.

In the same vein, it is worth mentioning that under Section 22 of Republic Act No. 876, also
known as the Arbitration Law, arbitration is deemed a special proceeding of which the court
specified in the contract or submission, or if none be specified, the Regional Trial Court for the
province or city in which one of the parties resides or is doing business, or in which the
arbitration is held, shall have jurisdiction. A party to the controversy may, at any time within one
(1) month after an award is made, apply to the court having jurisdiction for an order confirming
the award and the court must grant such order unless the award is vacated, modified or
corrected.19

In effect, this equates the award or decision of the voluntary arbitrator with that of the regional
trial court. Consequently, in a petition for certiorari from that award or decision, the Court of
Appeals must be deemed to have concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme Court. As a matter of
policy, this Court shall henceforth remand to the Court of Appeals petitions of this nature for
proper disposition.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to REFER this case to the Court of Appeals.

SO ORDERED.

4
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 102976 October 25, 1995

IRON AND STEEL AUTHORITY, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA CRISTINA FERTILIZER
CORPORATION, respondents.

FELICIANO, J.:

Petitioner Iron and Steel Authority ("ISA") was created by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 272
dated 9 August 1973 in order, generally, to develop and promote the iron and steel industry in
the Philippines. The objectives of the ISA are spelled out in the following terms:

Sec. 2. Objectives — The Authority shall have the following objectives:

(a) to strengthen the iron and steel industry of the Philippines and to expand the
domestic and export markets for the products of the industry;

(b) to promote the consolidation, integration and rationalization of the industry in

order to increase industry capability and viability to service the domestic market
and to compete in international markets;

(c) to rationalize the marketing and distribution of steel products in order to

achieve a balance between demand and supply of iron and steel products for the
country and to ensure that industry prices and profits are at levels that provide a
fair balance between the interests of investors, consumers suppliers, and the
public at large;

(d) to promote full utilization of the existing capacity of the industry, to discourage
investment in excess capacity, and in coordination, with appropriate government
agencies to encourage capital investment in priority areas of the industry;

(e) to assist the industry in securing adequate and low-cost supplies of raw
materials and to reduce the excessive dependence of the country on imports of
iron and steel.

The list of powers and functions of the ISA included the following:

Sec. 4. Powers and Functions. — The authority shall have the following powers
and functions:

xxx xxx xxx

(j) to initiate expropriation of land required for basic iron and steel facilities for
subsequent resale and/or lease to the companies involved if it is shown that such
use of the State's power is necessary to implement the construction of capacity
which is needed for the attainment of the objectives of the Authority;

xxx xxx xxx

5
 (Emphasis supplied)

P.D. No. 272 initially created petitioner ISA for a term of five (5) years counting from 9 August
1973.1 When ISA's original term expired on 10 October 1978, its term was extended for another
ten (10) years by Executive Order No. 555 dated 31 August 1979.

The National Steel Corporation ("NSC") then a wholly owned subsidiary of the National
Development Corporation which is itself an entity wholly owned by the National Government,
embarked on an expansion program embracing, among other things, the construction of an
integrated steel mill in Iligan City. The construction of such a steel mill was considered a priority
and major industrial project of the Government. Pursuant to the expansion program of the NSC,
Proclamation No. 2239 was issued by the President of the Philippines on 16 November 1982
withdrawing from sale or settlement a large tract of public land (totalling about 30.25 hectares in
area) located in Iligan City, and reserving that land for the use and immediate occupancy of
NSC.

Since certain portions of the public land subject matter Proclamation No. 2239 were occupied by
a non-operational chemical fertilizer plant and related facilities owned by private respondent
Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation ("MCFC"), Letter of Instruction (LOI), No. 1277, also dated
16 November 1982, was issued directing the NSC to "negotiate with the owners of MCFC, for
and on behalf of the Government, for the compensation of MCFC's present occupancy rights on
the subject land." LOI No. 1277 also directed that should NSC and private respondent MCFC
fail to reach an agreement within a period of sixty (60) days from the date of LOI No. 1277,
petitioner ISA was to exercise its power of eminent domain under P.D. No. 272 and to initiate
expropriation proceedings in respect of occupancy rights of private respondent MCFC relating to
the subject public land as well as the plant itself and related facilities and to cede the same to
the NSC.2

Negotiations between NSC and private respondent MCFC did fail. Accordingly, on 18 August
1983, petitioner ISA commenced eminent domain proceedings against private respondent
MCFC in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, of Iligan City, praying that it (ISA) be places in
possession of the property involved upon depositing in court the amount of P1,760,789.69
representing ten percent (10%) of the declared market values of that property. The Philippine
National Bank, as mortgagee of the plant facilities and improvements involved in the
expropriation proceedings, was also impleaded as party-defendant.

On 17 September 1983, a writ of possession was issued by the trial court in favor of ISA. ISA in
turn placed NSC in possession and control of the land occupied by MCFC's fertilizer plant
installation.

The case proceeded to trial. While the trial was ongoing, however, the statutory existence of
petitioner ISA expired on 11 August 1988. MCFC then filed a motion to dismiss, contending that
no valid judgment could be rendered against ISA which had ceased to be a juridical person.
Petitioner ISA filed its opposition to this motion.

In an Order dated 9 November 1988, the trial court granted MCFC's motion to dismiss and did
dismiss the case. The dismissal was anchored on the provision of the Rules of Court stating that
"only natural or juridical persons or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil
case."3 The trial court also referred to non-compliance by petitioner ISA with the requirements of
Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.4

Petitioner ISA moved for reconsideration of the trial court's Order, contending that despite the
expiration of its term, its juridical existence continued until the winding up of its affairs could be
completed. In the alternative, petitioner ISA urged that the Republic of the Philippines, being the
real party-in-interest, should be allowed to be substituted for petitioner ISA. In this connection,
ISA referred to a letter from the Office of the President dated 28 September 1988 which
especially directed the Solicitor General to continue the expropriation case.

The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration, stating, among other things that:

6
 The property to be expropriated is not for public use or benefit [__] but for the use
and benefit [__] of NSC, a government controlled private corporation engaged in
private business and for profit, specially now that the government, according to
newspaper reports, is offering for sale to the public its [shares of stock] in the
National Steel Corporation in line with the pronounced policy of the present
administration to disengage the government from its private business
ventures.5 (Brackets supplied)

Petitioner went on appeal to the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 8 October 1991, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the order of dismissal of the trial court. The Court of Appeals held that
petitioner ISA, "a government regulatory agency exercising sovereign functions," did not have
the same rights as an ordinary corporation and that the ISA, unlike corporations organized
under the Corporation Code, was not entitled to a period for winding up its affairs after
expiration of its legally mandated term, with the result that upon expiration of its term on 11
August 1987, ISA was "abolished and [had] no more legal authority to perform governmental
functions." The Court of Appeals went on to say that the action for expropriation could not
prosper because the basis for the proceedings, the ISA's exercise of its delegated authority to
expropriate, had become ineffective as a result of the delegate's dissolution, and could not be
continued in the name of Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor General:

It is our considered opinion that under the law, the complaint cannot prosper, and
therefore, has to be dismissed without prejudice to the refiling of a new complaint
for expropriation if the Congress sees it fit." (Emphases supplied)

At the same time, however, the Court of Appeals held that it was premature for the trial
court to have ruled that the expropriation suit was not for a public purpose, considering
that the parties had not yet rested their respective cases.

In this Petition for Review, the Solicitor General argues that since ISA initiated and prosecuted
the action for expropriation in its capacity as agent of the Republic of the Philippines, the
Republic, as principal of ISA, is entitled to be substituted and to be made a party-plaintiff after
the agent ISA's term had expired.

Private respondent MCFC, upon the other hand, argues that the failure of Congress to enact a
law further extending the term of ISA after 11 August 1988 evinced a "clear legislative intent to
terminate the juridical existence of ISA," and that the authorization issued by the Office of the
President to the Solicitor General for continued prosecution of the expropriation suit could not
prevail over such negative intent. It is also contended that the exercise of the eminent domain
by ISA or the Republic is improper, since that power would be exercised "not on behalf of the
National Government but for the benefit of NSC."

The principal issue which we must address in this case is whether or not the Republic of the
Philippines is entitled to be substituted for ISA in view of the expiration of ISA's term. As will be
made clear below, this is really the only issue which we must resolve at this time.

Rule 3, Section 1 of the Rules of Court specifies who may be parties to a civil action:

Sec. 1. Who May Be Parties. — Only natural or juridical persons or entities

authorized by law may be parties in a civil action.

Under the above quoted provision, it will be seen that those who can be parties to a civil
action may be broadly categorized into two (2) groups:

(a) those who are recognized as persons under the law whether natural, i.e.,
biological persons, on the one hand, or juridical person such as corporations, on
the other hand; and

(b) entities authorized by law to institute actions.

7
Examination of the statute which created petitioner ISA shows that ISA falls under category (b)
above. P.D. No. 272, as already noted, contains express authorization to ISA to commence
expropriation proceedings like those here involved:

Sec. 4. Powers and Functions. — The Authority shall have the following powers
and functions:

xxx xxx xxx

(j) to initiate expropriation of land required for basic iron and steel facilities for
subsequent resale and/or lease to the companies involved if it is shown that such
use of the State's power is necessary to implement the construction of capacity
which is needed for the attainment of the objectives of the Authority;

xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis supplied)

It should also be noted that the enabling statute of ISA expressly authorized it to enter
into certain kinds of contracts "for and in behalf of the Government" in the following
terms:

xxx xxx xxx

(i) to negotiate, and when necessary, to enter into contracts for and in behalf of
the government, for the bulk purchase of materials, supplies or services for any
sectors in the industry, and to maintain inventories of such materials in order to
insure a continuous and adequate supply thereof and thereby reduce operating
costs of such sector;

xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, ISA was vested with some of the powers or attributes normally associated with juridical
personality. There is, however, no provision in P.D. No. 272 recognizing ISA as possessing
general or comprehensive juridical personality separate and distinct from that of the
Government. The ISA in fact appears to the Court to be a non-incorporated agency or
instrumentality of the Republic of the Philippines, or more precisely of the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines. It is common knowledge that other agencies or instrumentalities of
the Government of the Republic are cast in corporate form, that is to say, are incorporated
agencies or instrumentalities, sometimes with and at other times without capital stock, and
accordingly vested with a juridical personality distinct from the personality of the Republic.
Among such incorporated agencies or instrumentalities are: National Power
Corporation;6 Philippine Ports Authority;7 National Housing Authority;8 Philippine National Oil
Company;9 Philippine National Railways; 10 Public Estates Authority; 11 Philippine Virginia
Tobacco Administration,12 and so forth. It is worth noting that the term "Authority" has been used
to designate both incorporated and non-incorporated agencies or instrumentalities of the
Government.

We consider that the ISA is properly regarded as an agent or delegate of the Republic of the
Philippines. The Republic itself is a body corporate and juridical person vested with the full
panoply of powers and attributes which are compendiously described as "legal personality." The
relevant definitions are found in the Administrative Code of 1987:

Sec. 2. General Terms Defined. — Unless the specific words of the text, or the
context as a whole, or a particular statute, require a different meaning:

(1) Government of the Republic of the Philippines refers to the corporate

governmental entity through which the functions of government are exercised
throughout the Philippines, including, save as the contrary appears from the

8
 context, the various arms through which political authority is made effective in the
Philippines, whether pertaining to the autonomous regions, the provincial, city,
municipal or barangay subdivisions or other forms of local government.

xxx xxx xxx

(4) Agency of the Government refers to any of the various units of the
Government, including a department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or
government-owned or controlled corporation, or a local government or a distinct
unit therein.

xxx xxx xxx

(10) Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not

integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or
jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering
special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This
term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and government-owned
or controlled corporations.

xxx xxx xxx

(Emphases supplied)

When the statutory term of a non-incorporated agency expires, the powers, duties and functions
as well as the assets and liabilities of that agency revert back to, and are re-assumed by, the
Republic of the Philippines, in the absence of special provisions of law specifying some other
disposition thereof such as, e.g., devolution or transmission of such powers, duties, functions,
etc. to some other identified successor agency or instrumentality of the Republic of the
Philippines. When the expiring agency is an incorporated one, the consequences of such expiry
must be looked for, in the first instance, in the charter of that agency and, by way of
supplementation, in the provisions of the Corporation Code. Since, in the instant case, ISA is a
non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the Republic, its powers, duties, functions, assets
and liabilities are properly regarded as folded back into the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines and hence assumed once again by the Republic, no special statutory provision
having been shown to have mandated succession thereto by some other entity or agency of the
Republic.

The procedural implications of the relationship between an agent or delegate of the Republic of
the Philippines and the Republic itself are, at least in part, spelled out in the Rules of Court. The
general rule is, of course, that an action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the
real party in interest. (Rule 3, Section 2) Petitioner ISA was, at the commencement of the
expropriation proceedings, a real party in interest, having been explicitly authorized by its
enabling statute to institute expropriation proceedings. The Rules of Court at the same time
expressly recognize the role of representative parties:

Sec. 3. Representative Parties. — A trustee of an expressed trust, a guardian, an

executor or administrator, or a party authorized by statute may sue or be sued
without joining the party for whose benefit the action is presented or defended;
but the court may, at any stage of the proceedings, order such beneficiary to be
made a party. . . . . (Emphasis supplied)

In the instant case, ISA instituted the expropriation proceedings in its capacity as an agent or
delegate or representative of the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to its authority under P.D.
No. 272. The present expropriation suit was brought on behalf of and for the benefit of the
Republic as the principal of ISA. Paragraph 7 of the complaint stated:

7. The Government, thru the plaintiff ISA, urgently needs the subject parcels of
land for the construction and installation of iron and steel manufacturing facilities
that are indispensable to the integration of the iron and steel making industry
which is vital to the promotion of public interest and welfare. (Emphasis supplied)

9
 The principal or the real party in interest is thus the Republic of the Philippines and not
the National Steel Corporation, even though the latter may be an ultimate user of the
properties involved should the condemnation suit be eventually successful.

From the foregoing premises, it follows that the Republic of the Philippines is entitled to be
substituted in the expropriation proceedings as party-plaintiff in lieu of ISA, the statutory term of
ISA having expired. Put a little differently, the expiration of ISA's statutory term did not by itself
require or justify the dismissal of the eminent domain proceedings.

It is also relevant to note that the non-joinder of the Republic which occurred upon the expiration
of ISA's statutory term, was not a ground for dismissal of such proceedings since a party may
be dropped or added by order of the court, on motion of any party or on the court's own initiative
at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. 13 In the instant case, the Republic has
precisely moved to take over the proceedings as party-plaintiff.

In E.B. Marcha Transport Company, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 14 the Court
recognized that the Republic may initiate or participate in actions involving its agents. There the
Republic of the Philippines was held to be a proper party to sue for recovery of possession of
property although the "real" or registered owner of the property was the Philippine Ports
Authority, a government agency vested with a separate juridical personality. The Court said:

It can be said that in suing for the recovery of the rentals, the Republic of the
Philippines acted as principal of the Philippine Ports Authority, directly exercising
the commission it had earlier conferred on the latter as its agent. . . .15 (Emphasis
supplied)

In E.B. Marcha, the Court also stressed that to require the Republic to commence all
over again another proceeding, as the trial court and Court of Appeals had required, was
to generate unwarranted delay and create needless repetition of proceedings:

More importantly, as we see it, dismissing the complaint on the ground that the
Republic of the Philippines is not the proper party would result in needless delay
in the settlement of this matter and also in derogation of the policy against
multiplicity of suits. Such a decision would require the Philippine Ports Authority
to refile the very same complaint already proved by the Republic of the
Philippines and bring back as it were to square one.16 (Emphasis supplied)

As noted earlier, the Court of Appeals declined to permit the substitution of the Republic of the
Philippines for the ISA upon the ground that the action for expropriation could not prosper
because the basis for the proceedings, the ISA's exercise of its delegated authority to
expropriate, had become legally ineffective by reason of the expiration of the statutory term of
the agent or delegated i.e., ISA. Since, as we have held above, the powers and functions of ISA
have reverted to the Republic of the Philippines upon the termination of the statutory term of
ISA, the question should be addressed whether fresh legislative authority is necessary before
the Republic of the Philippines may continue the expropriation proceedings initiated by its own
delegate or agent.

While the power of eminent domain is, in principle, vested primarily in the legislative department
of the government, we believe and so hold that no new legislative act is necessary should the
Republic decide, upon being substituted for ISA, in fact to continue to prosecute the
expropriation proceedings. For the legislative authority, a long time ago, enacted a continuing or
standing delegation of authority to the President of the Philippines to exercise, or cause the
exercise of, the power of eminent domain on behalf of the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines. The 1917 Revised Administrative Code, which was in effect at the time of the
commencement of the present expropriation proceedings before the Iligan Regional Trial Court,
provided that:

Sec. 64. Particular powers and duties of the President of the Philippines. — In
addition to his general supervisory authority, the President of the Philippines shall
have such other specific powers and duties as are expressly conferred or

10
 imposed on him by law, and also, in particular, the powers and duties set forth in
this Chapter.

Among such special powers and duties shall be:

xxx xxx xxx

(h) To determine when it is necessary or advantageous to exercise the right of

eminent domain in behalf of the Government of the Philippines; and to direct the
Secretary of Justice, where such act is deemed advisable, to cause the
condemnation proceedings to be begun in the court having proper jurisdiction.
(Emphasis supplied)

The Revised Administrative Code of 1987 currently in force has substantially reproduced
the foregoing provision in the following terms:

Sec. 12. Power of eminent domain. — The President shall determine when it is
necessary or advantageous to exercise the power of eminent domain in behalf of
the National Government, and direct the Solicitor General, whenever he deems
the action advisable, to institute expopriation proceedings in the proper court.
(Emphasis supplied)

In the present case, the President, exercising the power duly delegated under both the
1917 and 1987 Revised Administrative Codes in effect made a determination that it was
necessary and advantageous to exercise the power of eminent domain in behalf of the
Government of the Republic and accordingly directed the Solicitor General to proceed
with the suit. 17

It is argued by private respondent MCFC that, because Congress after becoming once more the
depository of primary legislative power, had not enacted a statute extending the term of ISA,
such non-enactment must be deemed a manifestation of a legislative design to discontinue or
abort the present expropriation suit. We find this argument much too speculative; it rests too
much upon simple silence on the part of Congress and casually disregards the existence of
Section 12 of the 1987 Administrative Code already quoted above.

Other contentions are made by private respondent MCFC, such as, that the constitutional
requirement of "public use" or "public purpose" is not present in the instant case, and that the
indispensable element of just compensation is also absent. We agree with the Court of Appeals
in this connection that these contentions, which were adopted and set out by the Regional Trial
Court in its order of dismissal, are premature and are appropriately addressed in the
proceedings before the trial court. Those proceedings have yet to produce a decision on the
merits, since trial was still on going at the time the Regional Trial Court precipitously dismissed
the expropriation proceedings. Moreover, as a pragmatic matter, the Republic is, by such
substitution as party-plaintiff, accorded an opportunity to determine whether or not, or to what
extent, the proceedings should be continued in view of all the subsequent developments in the
iron and steel sector of the country including, though not limited to, the partial privatization of the
NSC.

WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 8 October 1991
to the extent that it affirmed the trial court's order dismissing the expropriation proceedings, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the case is REMANDED to the court a quo which shall
allow the substitution of the Republic of the Philippines for petitioner Iron and Steel Authority
and for further proceedings consistent with this Decision. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

11
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 90482 August 5, 1991

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, acting through the SUGAR REGULATORY

ADMINISTRATION, and REPUBLIC PLANTERS BANK, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, 15th Division, THE HONORABLE CORONA
IBAY-SOMERA, in her official capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Region, Branch 26, Manila, JORGE C. VICTORINO and JAIME K. DEL
ROSARIO, in their official capacities as RTC Deputy Sheriffs of Manila, ROGER Z. REYES,
ERNESTO L. TREYES, JR., and EUTIQUIO M. FUDOLIN, respondents.

Enrique V. Olmedo for Independent Sugar Farmers, Inc.

Reyes, Treyes & Fudolin Law Firm for respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, with prayer for a
temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, filed on 25 October 1989 by the
Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) in behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines "acting through the Sugar Regulatory Administration" (SRA) and the Republic
Planters Bank (RPB) seeking the review of the 13 October 1989 Decision of the Court of
Appeals (15th Division) in CAGR No. 17188.

The assailed decision1 dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by Petitioners against herein
public respondents Judge and deputy sheriffs and private respondents for the nullification of the
Orders of respondent Judge of 13 March 1989, 21 March 1989 and 27 March 1989 in Civil Case
No. 86-35880 of Branch 26 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila on the following grounds: (a)
the funds upon which the attorney's fees are sought to be executed now belong to the Republic
of the Philippines due to legal subrogation, (b) execution is not proper against the Republic
which is not a party to the case, (c) the issuance of a writ of execution would violate the
Constitution since according to it no money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance
to an appropriations made by law, and (d) execution for attomey's fees is unwarranted.

Respondent Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit principally because

(a) Under the compromise agreement petitioner (RPB) accepted the designation/appointment
as Trustee whose obligation is to pay; it received benefits by way of trustee's fees; it may not
question the right of private respondents to attorney's fees;

(b) Petitioner (SRA) may not lawfully bring an action on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines
since under Section 13 of Executive Order No. 18 dated 28 May 1986, which created it, it simply
was to take over the functions of the defunct PHILSUCOM; however, the latter was to remain a
judicial entity for three more years for the purpose of prosecuting and defending suits against it;
hence it is PHILSUCOM, being a party to the compromise agreement, which may properly
contest the right of private respondents to attomey's fees;

(c) The petition should have been filed through the Office of the Solicitor General OSG and not
through the (OGCC); neither the latter nor the (SRA) may lawfully represent the Government of
the Philippines in any suit or proceeding such as the present petition for administrative agencies
may only perform such powers and functions as may be authorized by the laws which created
or gave them existence; and

12
(d) The respondent judge did not commit any error of jurisdiction in issuing the questioned
orders; hence, the remedy should be appeal.

The facts which gave rise to said petition are summarized by the Court of Appeals as follows:

On May 16,1986, Republic Planters Bank (hereafter referred to as RPB), Zosimo

Maravilla, Rosendo de la Rama, Bibiano Sabino, Roberto Mascufiana and Ernesto
Kramer "for themselves and in representation of other sugar producers" filed a
Complaint with the respondent court, RTC Branch 26, docketed as C.C. 86-35880 "For
Sum of Money and/or Delivery of Personal Property with Restraining Order and/or
Preliminary Injunction" against the Philippine Sugar Commission (PHILSUCOM) and the
National Sugar Trading Corporation (NASUTRA) with the prayer:

WHEREFORE PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is respectfully prayed of this

Honorable Court that, after due hearing and trial, judgment be rendered in favor
of Plaintiffs and against Defendants ordering them to do the following:

1. To render a correct and faithful account of whatever amount of United States

dollar accounts/deposits in different banks, domestic and foreign, being held in
agents and/or representatives.

2. To render a correct and faithful inventory of all the physical sugar stocks for
crop year 1984-85 presently remaining in the warehouses of the different sugar
mills all over the country.

3. To deliver or remit to the Plaintiffs any and all United States dollar
accounts/deposits in various banks, domestic or foreign, held in the name of
Defendants, their subsidiaries, conducts (sic), agents and/or representatives.

4. To deliver the entire remaining physical sugar stocks corresponding to crop

year 1984-85 presently remaining in the warehouses of the different sugar mills
all over the country in favor of Plaintiffs who were unlawfully deprived of their
possession and control by Defendants, to be applied and deducted from
Defendant's liability to Plaintiffs for the unaccounted sugar for crop year 1984-85.

5. To jointly and severally pay Plaintiffs-Producers all interests and penalties

imposed by Assignee-banks/creditors for accounts covered by unpaid sugar
quedans for crop year 1984-85.

6. To jointly and severally pay Plaintiffs claims for moral, compensatory and
exemplary damages in such accounts to be determined in the course of the trial.

7. To jointly and severally pay for the attorney's fees of twenty percent (20%)
based on the total amount that may be recovered.

8. To jointly and severally pay for the costs and litigation expenses incurred by
the Plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs likewise pray that, in order to prevent grave and irreparable injury, this
Honorable Court shall issue a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining and/or prohibiting
the Defendants, their officers and/or agents from transferring, releasing or in any manner
disposing of all U.S. dollar deposits/accounts held in the name of Defendants, its
subsidiaries, conduits agents and/or representatives in the different banks, domestic and
foreign, including the physical sugar corresponding to crop year 1984-85 presently
remaining in the warehouses of the different sugar mills all over the country after
requiring the Plaintiffs to post a bond that may be determined by the Honorable Court to
answer for the damages in the event judgment will be rendered in Defendant's favor.
Furthermore, Plaintiffs pray that a Restraining Order be immediately issued for the
purpose of enjoining the Defendants from committing and/or proceeding with the
foregoing acts, pending hearing of the application for a writ of preliminary injunction.

13
 Plaintiffs further pray for such other reliefs and remedies, just and equitable under the
premises.

Before PHILSUCOM and NASUTRA could answer, a Compromise Agreement dated

May 23, 1986 was submitted by the parties which the lower court approved and based
on it, the Judgment dated June 2,1986 (Annex "B", Petition, Id., pp. 22-36) was issued.
A motion for the issuance of writ of execution was filed (Annex "C", Petition, Id., pp, 37-
50). PHILSUCOM and NASUTRA filed their "Comment and Opposition (To Motion for
Issuance of Writ of Execution)" (Annex D Petition, Id., pp. 51- 62). A Reply was filed by
the plaintiffs (Annex "E", Id., pp. 63- 72) and a Rejoinder was also filed by the
defendants (Annex "E", Petition, Id., pp. 73-78). The lower court issued the Order dated
March 13, 1989 which dismissed the separate petitions for relief from judgment filed by
Franklin Fuentebella, George Lacson, Fernando Ballesteros, and Antonio Lopez in one
petition; Romeo Guanzon as sugar producer and president of National Federation of
Sugar Cane Planters; PASSI (Iloilo) Sugar Central, Inc., represented by Romeo
Villavicencio; the Independent Sugar Planters represented by Corazon Sagimalet (In a
Motion for Intervention which substituted as a Petition for Relief from Judgment); and
Zosimo Maravilla, Rosendo dela Rama and Bibiano Sabino (Annex "G", Petition, Id., pp.
79-98). This Order dated March 13, 1989 (which as aforesaid, dismissed the petitions for
relief from judgment) is the first of the orders now being assailed.

On March 21, 1989, the lower court issued the second of the assailed orders which
granted a second motion to resolve a pending motion for issuance of a writ of execution
and allowed the issuance of an alias writ of execution in words, thus:

Let an alias writ of execution be issued for the final implementation of the
Judgment on Compromise Agreement, dated June 2, 1986, the only remaining
provision of said judgment is the 10% attorney's fees of counsels for the plaintiffs
(Paragraph 12 sub-section Annex "H", Petition, Id., pp. 99-100).

Correspondingly, on that same date March 21, 1989, RTC Mala Deputy Sheriff Jaime K.
del Rosario issued a "Notice of Delivery of Money" asking the RPB to "pay in cash the
10% of P45,293,552.60 to Attys. Roger Reyes, Ernesto Treyes, Jr. and Eutiquio Fudolin,
Jr. ... immediately upon receipt of this notice" (Annex "I", Petition, Id., p. 101).

And on March 27, 1989, the third of the questioned orders was issued by the lower
court, in response to the "Ex-Parte Motion to Require Officers of Trustee Republic
Planters Bank to Deliver Amount Subject of Alias Writ of Execution", requiring the
officers of the RPB named therein to "appear before the Court on March 29,1989 at
10:30 in the morning to explain why they should not be cited for contempt of court for
defying ... the alias writ of execution." (Annex "J", Petition, Id. pp. 102-103).

The instant petition was filed in this court on March 29, 1989, ...

Parenthetically, it may also be added that, as stated in paragraph 15 of the instant petition, the
producers and producer organizations who filed various petitions for relief from the judgment
based on the compromise agreement have appealed to the Court of Appeals the Order of 13
March 1989 denying their petitions.2

In the instant petition petitioners limit their grounds to only two errors allegedly committed by
respondent Court of Appeals, namely: (a) it erred in holding that neither the OGCC nor the SRA
can represent the Government of the Philippines in the action before it and (b) it deviated from
the decision of the Ninth Division of said court in CAGR SP No. 11046 (Kramer, et al. vs. Hon.
Doroteo, Cañeba, et al. promulgated on 16 March 1987), which declared that there was no valid
class suit and the controversial compromise agreement did not extend to the 40,000 unnamed
sugar producers.3

In the resolution of 26 October 1989 We required respondents to comment on the petition and
issued a temporary restraining order directing respondent Judge to desist and refrain from
further proceeding in Civil Case No. 86-35880, entitled Republic Planters Bank, et al. vs.
Philippine Sugar Commission, et al.4

14
On 23 November 1989 petitioners filed a manifestation informing this Court that at 9:30 a.m. on
26 October 1989, private respondents, accompanied by respondents sheriff and a squad of
police Special Action Force, swooped upon RPB's Bacolod Branch and divested a teller of
money from her booth allegedly because the branch manager had instructed the bank
personnel to close the bank vault while the enforcement of the court order was being verified -
with the head office in Manila; the amount taken was P179,955.31; these acts were allegedly
done by virtue of, among others, the orders dated October 24 and 25, 1989 of respondent judge
ordering the implementation of an alias Writ of Execution dated 21 March 1989 and the Writ of
Execution dated 21 March 1986; and claiming that what was enforced was an expired writ.5

In Our resolution of 5 December 1989 respondents were required to comment on this

manifestation.6

After motions for extension of time to file their Comments on the petition, separately filed by the
private respondents and the Solicitor General for the public respondents, were granted, the
former ultimately filed their Comment on 20 December 1989.7 The Solicitor General filed his
Comment on 4 January 1990.8

In his Comment the Solicitor General maintains that the SRA has no legal personality to file the
instant petition in the name of the Republic of the Philippines for under its charter, Executive
Order No. 18, the SRA is not vested with legal capacity to sue. He further argues that the SRA
was not a party to the court-approved compromise agreement in Civil Case No. 8635880 which
provided for the questioned 10% attorney's fees; PHILSUCOM and NASUTRA, which were
parties thereto, did not file any action to annul the compromise agreement; that while Executive
Order No. 18 abolished the PHILSUCOM, the latter's juridical personality was to continue for
three (3) years, during which period it may prosecute and defend suits against it; and that,
finally, even if SRA has the capacity to sue, it cannot still bring any action on behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines as this can be done only by the Office of the Solicitor General per
Section 1 of P.D. No. 478.

The Solicitor General likewise stresses that the interest of the national government in this case
is confined only to the amount remaining in RPB subject to legal subrogation; the judgment on
the compromise agreement had long become final and executory; and that no reversible error
was committed by respondent judge and respondent Court of Appeals.

Private respondents assert that the SRA and RPB do not have the legal authority to sue for and
in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. In respect to the former, their conclusion is
supported by almost the same arguments as that asserted by the Solicitor General. As regards
the RPB, they maintain that it "is a government-controlled corporation engaged in the banking
business with corporate powers vested in a Board of Directors," hence, it is "legally untenable
for such a banking institution, even assuming that it is government-controlled, to initiate suits for
and in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines." p.171, Rollo). They further argued that
petitioners have no legal personality to initiate the instant petition for (a) SRA is not a party in
the case before the trial court; the only reason why it became involved was because of the
contempt proceedings initiated by private respondents against SRA's Arsenio Yulo, Carlos
Ledesma and Bibiano Sabino for issuing Sugar Orders No. 9 and 14; and that neither can it be
presumed that SRA had substituted defendants PHILSUCOM and the NASUTRA in the case as
both continue to legally exist for the purpose of prosecuting and defending suits in liquidation of
its affairs; both did not file any petition for relief from judgment questioning the validity of the
judgment of the trial court approving the compromise agreement; and that, moreover, RPB was
a signatory to the Compromise Agreement as a Trustee and, as such, it regarded itself as only a
nominal party and in a series of pleadings it recognized the final and executory nature of the
decision approving the compromise agreement.

As to the second assigned error, private respondents pointed out that the Ninth Division of the
Court of Appeals did not rule in C.A.-G.R. No. 11046 that Civil Case No. 86-35880 before the
trial court was not a class suit, and whether or not it was a class suit was not an issue therein.

On 15 January 1990 petitioners filed a motion for leave to file consolidated reply, which We
granted in the resolution of 18 January 1990.9

15
On 18 January 1990 petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion10 "wherein they informed the
Court that despite the temporary restraining order issued on 26 October 1989, respondent
Judge, to whom the Order was addressed, continued to hear the case, particularly on the
whereabouts of 177,087.14 piculs of sugar for the crop year 1984-1985 allegedly stored in the
different warehouses throughout the country".

In the resolution of 30 January 199011 We required respondent judge to show cause why no
disciplinary action should be taken against her for failure to comply with the resolution of 26
October 1989 ordering her to refrain from further proceeding with Civil Case No. 86-35880 and
to answer why she should not be cited for contempt of court for such failure, within ten (10) days
from notice.

On 8 March 1990 petitioners filed their Consolidated Reply to the Comment with Motion to
Dismiss filed by private respondents and the Comment of the Solicitor General.12

On 5 April 1990 private respondents filed a Rejoinder to the Consolidated Reply.13

On 16 April 1990 respondent judge, through the OSG, filed her Compliance as required by the
Resolution of 30 January 1990.14 She claims that she did not defy the temporary restraining
order issued by this Court on 26 October 1989 because the petitioners sought for the issuance
of the temporary restraining order to stop the enforcement of the decision of the respondent
Court of Appeals in CA GR No. 17188 dated October 13, 1989; hence, the temporary
restraining order that this Court issued "actually orders herein respondent judge to desist from
enforcing the Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals in CAGR No. 17188 which is the
subject of the instant petition for review". Consequently, she stresses, her 15 December 1989
order was not issued in defiance of the restraining resolution; said order pertains exclusively to
the whereabouts of the 177,087.14 piculs of physical sugar for the crop year 1984-1985 and did
not in any way attempt to enforce the questioned decisions of the court a quo and the Court of
Appeals to the prejudice of petitioner's right to appeal.

In Our resolution of 15 May 199015 We resolved to consider the comments of respondents as

Answers to the petition, give due course to the petition, require the parties to submit their
respective memoranda within thirty days from notice, and to note the compliance of respondent
judge.

Petitioners filed their memorandum on 28 June 1990.16 Private respondents sent theirs by
registered mail on 22 August 1990 which this Court actually received on 8 September
1990.17 We shall now take up the assigned errors.

I.

The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that petitioner Sugar Regulatory Administration may not
lawfully bring an action on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines and that the Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel does not have the authority to represent said petitioner in this
case.

Executive Order No. 18, enacted on 28 May 1986 and which took effect immediately, abolished
the Philippine Sugar Commission (PHILSUCOM) and created the Sugar Regulatory
Administration (SRA) which shall be under the Office of the President. However, under the third
paragraph of Section 13 thereof, the PHILSUCOM was allowed to continue as a juridical entity
for three (3) years for the purpose of prosecuting and defending suits by or against it and
enabling it to settle and close its affairs, to dispose of and convey its property and to distribute
its assets, but not for the purpose of continuing the functions for which it was established, under
the supervision of the SRA.

Section 3 of said Executive Order enumerates the powers and functions of the SRA; but it does
not specifically include the power to represent the Republic of the Philippines in suits filed by or
against it, nor the power to sue and be sued although it has the power to "enter, make and
execute routinary contracts as may be necessary for or incidental to the attainment of its
purposes between any persons, firms, public or private, and the Government of the Philippines"
and "[t]o do all such other things, transact such other businesses and perform such functions

16
directly or indirectly incidental or conducive to the attainment of the purposes of the Sugar
Regulatory Administration."18

Section 4 thereof provides for the governing board of the Administration, known as the Sugar
Board, which shall exercise "[a]ll the corporate powers" of the SRA. Its specific functions are
enumerated in Section 6; however, the enumeration does not include the power to represent the
Republic of the Philippines, although among such functions is "[t]o enter into contracts,
transactions, or undertakings of whatever nature which are necessary or incidental to its
functions and objectives with any natural or juridical persons and with any foreign government
institutions, private corporations, partnership or private individuals.19

It is apparent that its charter does not grant the SRA the power to represent the Republic of the
Philippines in suits filed by or against the latter.

It is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly
granted to it by law and those that are necessarily implied in the exercise thereof. (Guerzon vs
Court of Appeals, et al., 77707, August 8, 1988, 164 SCRA 182,189, citing Makati Stock
Exchange, Inc. vs. SEC, 14 SCRA 620, and Sy vs. Central Bank, 70 SCRA 570.)20

The SRA no doubt, is an administrative agency or body. An administrative agency is defined as

"[a] government body charged with administering and implementing particular legislation.
Examples are workers' compensation commissions ... and the like. ... The term 'agency'
includes any department, independent establishment, commission, administration, authority
board or bureau ...21

The power to represent the Republic of the Philippines in any suit by or against it having been
withheld from SRA, it following that the latter cannot institute the instant petition and the petition
in C.A.-G.R. No. 17188 on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines.

This conclusion does not, however, mean that the SRA cannot sued and be sued. This power
can be implied from its powers to make and execute routinary contracts as may be necessary
for or incidental to the attainment of its purposes between any persons, firms public or private,
and the Government of the Philippines and to do all such other things, transact such other
businesses and perform such other functions directly or indirectly incidental or conducive to the
attainment of the purposes of the SRA and the powers of its governing board to enter into
contracts, transactions, or undertaking of whatever nature which are necessary or incidental to
its functions and objectives with any natural or juridical persons and with any foreign
government institutions, private corporations, partnership or private individuals.

The Court of Appeals also correctly ruled that the OGCC can represent neither the SRA nor the
Republic of the Philippines. We do not, however, share the view that only the Office of the
Solicitor General can represent the SRA.

The entry of appearance by the OGCC for the SRA was precipitated by the sudden turn-about
of the Office of the Solicitor General. Records show that the OSG eventually represented the
PHILSUCOM, NASUTRA and SRA in the trial court. However, on 29 January 1988 it filed a
Manifestation dated January 27, 1988 informing the court that its appearance in the case "is
limited to the issues relating only to the contempt proceedings against the public respondents
and is not concerned with the other issues raised by various parties in their petitions for
relief".22 By reason thereof, the Chairman/Administrator of SRA, Mr. Arsenio Yulo, Jr., sent a
letter23 dated 6 April 1988 to the Solicitor General, informing him that since the appearance of
the OSG is limited and that it has taken a different position, SRA's only alternative is to seek
another representative and that much to its regret, it is constrained to terminate OSG's services.
He further informed the Solicitor General that the case is being indorsed to the Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel for appropriate legal action pursuant to P.D. No. 478. There is,
however, no showing that the OSG withdrew its appearance for PHILSUCOM, NASUTRA or the
SRA in the trial court. On the contrary, per its Manifestation dated 8 February 1990, and filed
with this Court on 12 February 1990,24 it "has retained its appearance" "on behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines to recover whatever amount may be owing to the National Treasury
by virtue of legal subrogation."

17
Also on April 6,1988, SRA sent a letter25 to OGCC to engage its legal services to represent SRA
as successor agency of the PHILSUCOM in the case pending before the trial court.

The OGCC, availing of P.D. No. 1415, the law creating it, particularly Section 1 which, as
quoted by it on page 16 of the Petition,26 reads:

SECTION 1. The Office of the Government Corporate Counsel shall be the principal law
office of all government-owned and controlled corporations, including their
subsidiaries except as may otherwise be provided by their respective charters or
authorized by the President (Emphasis supplied).

sent a letter to the Office of the President, "in essence, requesting for authority for OGCC to
represent SRA in the case before the trial court," This was favorably acted by Executive
Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr.27

Indeed, under Section 35, Chapter 12, Title III of Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987
(Executive Order No. 292) the Solicitor General is the lawyer of the government, its agencies
and instrumentalities, and its officials or agents. Said Section reads as follows:

SECTION 35. Functions and Organization. — The Office of the Solicitor General shall
represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its
officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the
services of lawyers. When authorized by the President or head of the office concerned, it
shall also represent government-owned and controlled corporations. The Office of the
Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the Government and, as such, shall
discharge duties requiring the services of lawyers. ... .

This is similar to subsection (1) of Section 1 of P.D. No. 478.

In Republic, et al. vs. Partisala et al. (G.R. No. 61997, 15 November 1982, 118 SCRA 370,
373), We ruled that only the Solicitor General can bring or defend actions on behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines and that, henceforth, actions filed in the name of the Republic if not
initiated by the Solicitor General will be summarily dismissed.

However, in Secretary Oscar Orbos vs. Civil Service Commission, et al., G.R. No. 92561, 12
September 1990,28 We stated:

In the discharge of this task, the Solicitor General must see to it that the best interest of
the government is upheld within the limits set by law. When confronted with a situation
where one government office takes an adverse position against another government
agency, as in this case, the Solicitor General should not refrain from performing his duty
as the lawyer of the government. It is incumbent upon him to present to the court what
he considers should legally uphold the best interest of the government although it may
run counter to a client's position. In such an instance the government office adversely
affected by the position taken by the Solicitor General, if it still believes in the merit of its
case, may appear in its own behalf through its legal personnel or representative.

Consequently, the SRA need not be represented by the Office of the Solicitor General. It may
appear in its own behalf through its legal personnel or representative.

The question that logically crops up then is: May it be represented by the OGCC? Respondents
hold the negative view. Petitioners maintain otherwise, for the reason that pursuant to Section 1
of the charter of the OGCC (P.D. No. 1415), as they quoted, the Office of the President, through
the Executive Secretary, has authorized it to represent the SRA. The specific basis for such
authority is the alleged portion of the exceptionary clause therein, reading "... or authorized by
the President."

The words or authorized by the President are not found in the law. We are not aware of any law,
decree or executive order which amended Section 1 of P.D. No. 1415 by inserting therein said
words. Besides, even granting for the sake of argument that such words are written into the law,
such exception cannot confer upon the OGCC authority to represent the SRA. The exception

18
simply means that although the OGCC is the principal law office of all government-owned and
controlled corporations including their subsidiaries, the President may not allow it to act as
lawyer for a specified government-owned or controlled corporation or a subsidiary thereof. It will
be noted that under Section 1 of P.D. No. 478 the President may authorize the OSG to
represent government-owned or controlled corporations. In short, the exception limits, rather
than expands, the authority of the OGCC. Thus, the so-called approval by the Executive
Secretary of the request of OGCC to represent the SRA is based on an erroneous interpretation
of the law.

In any case, even if we grant that there was such an exception, as well construed in the manner
urged by petitioners, it must be deemed, nevertheless, to have been repealed by the
Administrative Code of 1987. Section 10, Chapter 3, Title III, Book IV thereof on the Office of the
Government Corporate counsel does not contain the purported exception. It reads:

SECTION 10. Office of the Government Corporate Counsel. —The Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) shall act as the principal law office of all
government-owned or controlled corporations, their subsidiaries, other corporate
offsprings and government acquired asset corporations and shall exercise control and
supervision over all legal departments or divisions maintained separately and such
powers and functions as are now or may hereafter be provided by law. In the exercise of
such control or suspension, the Government Corporate Counsel shall promulgate rules
and regulations to effectively implement the objectives of the Office. ...

Since the SRA is neither a government-owned or controlled corporation nor a subsidiary

thereof, OGCC does not have the authority to represent it. As to who may represent it,
the Orbos case29 provides the answer.

The case of the RPB is, however, different. It is admitted to be a government-owned

corporation. The OGCC can, therefore, legally represent RPB in actions filed by or against it.
Unfortunately, this issue was not categorically and expressly addressed by the Court of Appeals
and has not been raised in the petition. Anyway, even if We have to rule that OGCC's
appearance for the RPB in the petition before the Court of Appeals in CAGR No. 17188 was
proper, the result would be the same dismissal of the petition. As also correctly pointed out by
the Court of Appeals, having received benefits by way of trustee's fees, the RPB may not
question the right of private respondents to attorney's fees; its only obligation under the
judgment based on compromise was to pay the attorney's fees from out of the funds it held in
trust.

II.

The second assigned error is without merit. Petitioners have misread the decision of the Court
of Appeals in CAGR SP No. 11046 (Ernesto Kramer, et al. vs. Hon. Doroteo Caneba et al.
promulgated on 16 March 1987).30 The case was a petition for certiorari and mandamus with a
prayer for preliminary injunction wherein petitioners principally prayed the Court to declare null
and void the order of respondent judge of 16 December 1986 and to order him to issue the writ
of execution of the judgment of 2 June 1986, require respondent NASUTRA to account and turn
over to petitioners any and all sales proceeds of 1984-1985 sugar from 2 June 1986 up to the
present in favor of respondent Trustee Bank RPB for proper distribution to petitioners, issue an
order requiring respondent Trustee Bank to distribute without delay all the sales proceeds of the
1984-1985 sugar in its possession in accordance with the judgment of respondent court, and
issue a restraining order/preliminary injunction enjoining the SRA, its agents/representatives
from implementing Sugar Order No. 9 dated 25 September 1986. Although in the body of the
opinion a discussion was made on the matter of the sufficiency of representation to make Civil
Case No. 86-35880 a class suit, the resolution of the petition was not in any way based thereon
or influenced by it. As a matter of fact, the Court categorically stated that it was premature to
rule on that issue because of the pendency of the petition for relief from judgment and
interventions. The full disquisition of the Court of Appeals on this point reads:

xxx xxx xxx

19
At the outset, let it be stated that the incidents which arose from the class suit before the
respondent court are predominantly related to the ten percent (10%) attorney's fees
stipulated in the compromise agreement approved by the respondent court in its June 2,
1986 judgment in favor of petitioner's counsels Atty. Roger Z. Reyes, Ernesto L. Treyes,
Jr. and Eutiquio M. Fudolin, Jr.

In the said class suit, only the five original plaintiffs and producers Zosimo Maravilla, for
himself and in representation of Rosendo dela Rama, Roberto Mascurafia and Bibiano
Sabino per Special Power of Attorney, and Ernesto Kramer represented by Atty. Roger
Z. Reyes per Special Power of Attorney, have authorized said Attys. Reyes, Treyes, Jr.
and Fudolin, Jr. to represent them as counsel.

On page 18 of the instant petition, petitioners allege that there is no necessity to secure
Special Powers of Attorney from the unnamed parties in a class suit, and the failure of
petitioners' counsel to do so does not constitute fraud, the named parties having contest
over the class suit.' By such statement, petitioners and their counsels admit their lack of
authority from the rest of the alleged 40,000 sugar producers to file the class suit and
enter into the compromise agreement.

Section 12, Rule 3, Revised Rules of Court provides that in order that one or more may
sue for the benefit of others as a class suit, it is necessary that 'the court shall make sure
that the parties actually before it are sufficiently numerous and representative so that all
interests are fully protected. (Dimayuga, et al. vs. CIR, et al., G.R. No. L-1 0213, May 27,
1957).

For that matter, in the case below, therein plaintiffs Zosimo Maravilla, Rosendo dela
Rama and Bibiano Sabino filed with the respondent court a motion to partially annul
decision and/or petition for relief against the said ten (10%) percent attorney's fees on
the allegation that they were deceived into signing the compromise agreement believing,
as was agreed upon during the negotiations, that the ten (10%) percent of whatever
would be collected would go to a trust fund for the benefit of the sugar farmers and
producers and not as attorney's fees. Also, petition, for relief was filed by thirteen other
alleged sugar producers principally on the ground that the compromise agreement
entered into was without their express authority by way of Special Power of Attorney and
that the class suit was unnecessary. Some of these sugar producers are the Association
de Agricultores de la Region Oesta de Batangas, Inc. (AAROB) with 742 members; the
Samahang Mag-aasukal sa Kanluran Batangas (SABA) with 4,000 members and
Independent Sugar Farmers, Inc. with 200 members.

Here is a situation, as pointed out by respondent NASUTRA and SRA, where petitioners
in filing the class suit claim to represent 40,000 sugar producers all over the country and
yet when some of these producers filed petition for relief and interventions, petitioners
'disowned' them, stating that the other sugar producers have no personality to intervene,
not having been named parties to the class suit.

It should not be overlooked that the said sugar producers, although not named parties in
the class suit, are the very alleged persons represented in the class suit. They certainly
have interests in the subject matter of the controversy; in the contents of the
compromise agreement.

The filing of petitions for relief from judgment has not been prohibited by B.P. 129. The
remedy of petitions for relief from judgment is still available when a judgment is rendered
by an inferior court in a case, and a party thereto, by fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence, has been unjustly deprived of a hearing therein, or has been
prevented from taking an appeal. Section 9, paragraph 2 of BP 129 placing the original
exclusive jurisdiction on the Court of Appeals to annul judgments of Regional Trial
Courts has no relation to (sic) all to the petition for relief provided for in Rule 38 because
these two are completely different remedies.

The petitions for relief from judgment and interventions are still pending action by
respondent court.1âwphi1 In view thereof, it would be premature for this Court to resolve

20
 the issue of estoppel on the part of the said sugar producers to question the pertinent
portion of the judgment of compromise, and fraud on the part of the counsels for
petitioners therein. (Emphasis supplied).

IV.

Having disposed of the main issues, We shall now consider the motion of petitioners of 16
January 1990 to hold in contempt respondent Judge Corona Ibay-Somera for violating/defying
the Temporary Restraining Order issued by Us on 26 October 1989. They allegedly "continued
to hear the case particularly on the whereabouts of 177,087.14 piculs of sugar for the crop year
1984-1985 allegedly stored in different warehouses throughout the country," and that she even
further reset the hearing of the case on January 19, 1990 notwithstanding the cautionary
manifestation filed by petitioners during the 15 December 1989 hearing that said continued
hearing would be a violation of the TRO. In the resolution of 26 October 1989, this Court
specifically ordered respondent Judge to desist and refrain from further proceeding in Civil Case
No. 86-35880, entitled Republic Planters Bank, et al. vs. Philippine Sugar Commission, et al.

In her Compliance, respondent judge explained that the TRO in question actually ordered her to
desist from enforcing the Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals in CAGR No. 17188,
which is the subject of the instant petition, and that her "only honest motivation "in making the
inquiry is to see to it that while the instant petition is pending ... , whatever funds may be owing
to the Republic of the Philippines is duly preserved and protected."

We find the explanation to be satisfactory. No malice attended the commission of the

challenged act. We accord to respondent judge good faith in her claimed desire to preserve and
protect public funds. Moreover, petitioners failed to show that the act in question caused any
injury or damage to their rights or interest.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against
petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

21
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

First Division

MARIA ELENA MALAGA, doing business under the name B.E. CONSTRUCTION;
JOSIELEEN NAJARRO, doing business under the name BEST BUILT CONSTRUCTION;
JOSE N. OCCEÑA, doing business under the name THE FIRM OF JOSE N. OCCEÑA; and
the ILOILO BUILDERS CORPORATION, Petitioners, v. MANUEL R. PENACHOS, JR.,
ALFREDO MATANGGA, ENRICO TICAR AND TERESITA VILLANUEVA, in their respective
capacities as Chairman and Members of the Pre-qualification Bids and Awards
Committee (PBAC)-BENIGNO PANISTANTE, in his capacity as President of Iloilo State
College of Fisheries, as well as in their respective personal capacities; and HON.
LODRIGIO L. LEBAQUIN, Respondents.

Salas, Villareal & Velasco, for Petitioners.

Virgilio A. Sindico for Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; GOVERNMENT INSTRUMENTALITY, DEFINED. — The 1987

Administrative Code defines a government instrumentality as follows: Instrumentality refers to
any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department framework,
vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate
powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a
charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, and government-owned
or controlled corporations. (Sec. 2 (5) Introductory Provisions).

2. ID.; CHARTERED INSTITUTION; DEFINED; APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR. — The 1987

Administrative Code describes a chartered institution thus: Chartered institution — refers to any
agency organized or operating under a special charter, and vested by law with functions relating
to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This term includes the state universities and
colleges, and the monetary authority of the state. (Sec. 2 (12) Introductory Provisions). It is clear
from the above definitions that ISCOF is a chartered institution and is therefore covered by P.D.
1818. There are also indications in its charter that ISCOF is a government instrumentality. First,
it was created in pursuance of the integrated fisheries development policy of the State, a priority
program of the government to effect the socio-economic life of the nation. Second, the
Treasurer of the Republic of the Philippines shall also be the ex-officio Treasurer of the state
college with its accounts and expenses to be audited by the Commission on Audit or its duly
authorized representative. Third, heads of bureaus and offices of the National Government are
authorized to loan or transfer to it, upon request of the president of the state college, such
apparatus, equipment, or supplies and even the services of such employees as can be spared
without serious detriment to public service. Lastly, an additional amount of P1.5M had been
appropriated out of the funds of the National Treasury and it was also decreed in its charter that
the funds and maintenance of the state college would henceforth be included in the General
Appropriations Law. (Presidential Decree No. 1523)

3. ID.; PROHIBITION OF ANY COURT FROM ISSUING INJUNCTION IN CASES INVOLVING

INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS OF GOVERNMENT (P.D. 1818); POWER OF THE COURTS
TO RESTRAIN APPLICATION. — In the case of Datiles and Co. v. Sucaldito, (186 SCRA 704)
this Court interpreted a similar prohibition contained in P.D. 605, the law after which P.D. 1818
was patterned. It was there declared that the prohibition pertained to the issuance of injunctions
or restraining orders by courts against administrative acts in controversies involving facts or the
exercise of discretion in technical cases. The Court observed that to allow the courts to judge
these matters would disturb the smooth functioning of the administrative machinery. Justice
Teodoro Padilla made it clear, however, that on issues definitely outside of this dimension and
involving questions of law, courts could not be prevented by P.D. No. 605 from exercising their
power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts. We see no reason why the above ruling should

22
not apply to P.D. 1818. There are at least two irregularities committed by PBAC that justified
injunction of the bidding and the award of the project.

4. ID.; POLICIES AND GUIDELINES PRESCRIBED FOR GOVERNMENT INFRASTRUCTURE

(PD 1594); RULES IMPLEMENTING THEREOF, NOT SUFFICIENTLY COMPLIED WITH IN
CASE AT BAR. — Under the Rules Implementing P.D. 1594, prescribing policies and guidelines
for government infrastructure contracts, PBAC shall provide prospective bidders with the Notice
to Pre-qualification and other relevant information regarding the proposed work. Prospective
contractors shall be required to file their ARC-Contractors Confidential Application for
Registration & Classifications & the PRE-C2 Confidential Pre-qualification Statement for the
Project (prior to the amendment of the rules, this was referred to as Pre-C1) not later than the
deadline set in the published Invitation to Bid, after which date no PRE-C2 shall be submitted
and received. Invitations to Bid shall be advertised for at least three times within a reasonable
period but in no case less than two weeks in at least two newspapers of general circulations. (IB
13 1.2-19, Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. 1594 as amended) PBAC advertised
the pre-qualification deadline as December 2, 1988, without stating the hour thereof, and
announced that the opening of bids would be at 3 o’clock in the afternoon of December 12,
1988. This scheduled was changed and a notice of such change was merely posted at the
ISCOF bulletin board. The notice advanced the cut-off time for the submission of pre-
qualification documents to 10 o’clock in the morning of December 2, 1988, and the opening of
bids to 1 o’clock in the afternoon of December 12, 1988. The new schedule caused the pre-
disqualification of the petitioners as recorded in the minutes of the PBAC meeting held on
December 6, 1988. While it may be true that there were fourteen contractors who were pre-
qualified despite the change in schedule, this fact did not cure the defect of the irregular notice.
Notably, the petitioners were disqualified because they failed to meet the new deadline and not
because of their expired licenses. (B.E. & Best Built’s licenses were valid until June 30, 1989.
[Ex. P & O respectively: both were marked on December 28, 1988]) We have held that where
the law requires a previous advertisement before government contracts can be awarded, non-
compliance with the requirement will, as a general rule, render the same void and of no effect.
(Caltex Phil. v. Delgado Bros., 96 Phil. 368) The fact that an invitation for bids has been
communicated to a number of possible bidders is not necessarily sufficient to establish
compliance with the requirements of the law if it is shown that other possible bidders have not
been similarly notified.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; PURPOSE THEREOF; CASE AT BAR. — The purpose of the rules
implementing P.D. 1594 is to secure competitive bidding and to prevent favoritism, collusion and
fraud in the award of these contracts to the detriment of the public. This purpose was defeated
by the irregularities committed by PBAC. It has been held that the three principles in public
bidding are the offer to the public, an opportunity for competition and a basis for exact
comparison of bids. A regulation of the matter which excludes any of these factors destroys the
distinctive character of the system and thwarts the purpose of its adoption. (Hannan v. Board of
Education, 25 Okla. 372) In the case at bar, it was the lack of proper notice regarding the pre-
qualification requirement and the bidding that caused the elimination of petitioners B.E. and
Best Built. It was not because of their expired licenses, as private respondents now claim.
Moreover, the plans and specifications which are the contractors’ guide to an intelligent bid,
were not issued on time, thus defeating the guaranty that contractors be placed on equal footing
when they submit their bids. The purpose of competitive bidding is negated if some contractors
are informed ahead of their rivals of the plans and specifications that are to be the subject of
their bids.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF NON-COMPLIANCE THEREOF. — It has been held in a long line
of cases that a contract granted without the competitive bidding required by law is void, and the
party to whom it is awarded cannot benefit from it. It has not been shown that the irregularities
committed by PBAC were induced by or participated in by any of the contractors. Hence, liability
shall attach only to the private respondents for the prejudice sustained by the petitioners as a
result of the anomalies described above.

7. CIVIL LAW; NOMINAL DAMAGES; AWARD THEREOF, WHEN AVAILABLE. — As there is

no evidence of the actual loss suffered by the petitioners, compensatory damage may not be
awarded to them. Moral damages do not appear to be due either. Even so, the Court cannot
close its eyes to the evident bad faith that characterized the conduct of the private respondents,
including the irregularities in the announcement of the bidding and their efforts to persuade the

23
ISCOF president to award the project after two days from receipt of the restraining order and
before they moved to lift such order. For such questionable acts, they are liable in nominal
damages at least in accordance with Article 2221 of the Civil Code, which states: Art. 2221.
Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or
invaded by the defendant may be vindicated or, recognized, and not for the purpose of
indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. These damages are to be assessed
against the private respondents in the amount of P10,000.00 each, to be paid separately for
each of petitioners B.E. Construction and Best Built Construction.

DECISION

CRUZ, J.:

This controversy involves the extent and applicability of P.D. 1818, which prohibits any court
from issuing injunctions in cases involving infrastructure projects of the
government.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

The facts are not disputed.

The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (henceforth ISCOF) through its Pre-qualification, Bids and
Awards Committee (henceforth PBAC) caused the publication in the November 25, 26, 28, 1988
issues of the Western Visayas Daily an Invitation to Bid for the construction of the Micro
Laboratory Building at ISCOF. The notice announced that the last day for the submission of pre-
qualification requirements (PRE C-1) ** was December 2, 1988, and that the bids would be
received and opened on December 12, 1988, 3 o’clock in the afternoon. 1

Petitioners Maria Elena Malaga and Josieleen Najarro, respectively doing business under the
name of the B.E. Construction and Best Built Construction, submitted their pre-qualification
documents at two o’clock in the afternoon of December 2, 1988. Petitioner Jose Occeña
submitted his own PRE-C1 on December 5, 1988. All three of them were not allowed to
participate in the bidding because their documents were considered late, having been submitted
after the cut-off time of ten o’clock in the morning of December 2, 1988.

On December 12, 1988, the petitioners filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo
against the chairman and members of PBAC in their official and personal capacities. The
plaintiffs claimed that although they had submitted their PRE-C1 on time, the PBAC refused
without just cause to accept them. As a result, they were not included in the list of pre-qualified
bidders, could not secure the needed plans and other documents, and were unable to
participate in the scheduled bidding.

In their prayer, they sought the resetting of the December 12, 1988 bidding and the acceptance
of their PRE-C1 documents. They also asked that if the bidding had already been conducted,
the defendants be directed not to award the project pending resolution of their complaint.

On the same date, Judge Lodrigio L. Lebaquin issued a restraining order prohibiting PBAC from
conducting the bidding and awarding the project. 2

On December 16, 1988, the defendants filed a motion to lift the restraining order on the ground
that the Court was prohibited from issued restraining orders, preliminary injunctions and
preliminary mandatory injunctions by P.D. 1818.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The decree reads pertinently as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Section 1. No Court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order,
preliminary injunction, or preliminary infrastructure project, or a mining, fishery, forest or other
natural resource development project of the government, or any public utility operated by the
government, including among others public utilities for the transport of the goods and
commodities, stevedoring and arrastre contracts, to prohibit any person or persons, entity or
government official from proceeding with, or continuing the execution or implementation of any

24
such project, or the operation of such public utility, or pursuing any lawful activity necessary for
such execution, implementation or operation.

The movants also contended that the question of the propriety of a preliminary injunction had
become moot and academic because the restraining order was received late, at 2 o’clock in the
afternoon of December 12, 1988, after the bidding had been conducted and closed at eleven
thirty in the morning of that date.

In their opposition of the motion, the plaintiffs argued against the applicability of P.D. 1818,
pointing out that while ISCOF was a state college, it had its own charter and separate existence
and was not part of the national government or of any local political subdivision. Even if P.D.
1818 were applicable, the prohibition presumed a valid and legal government project, not one
tainted with anomalies like the project at bar.

They also cited Filipinas Marble Corp. v. IAC, 3 where the Court allowed the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction despite a similar prohibition found in P.D. 385. The Court therein stated
that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The government, however, is bound by basic principles of fairness and decency under the due
process clauses of the Bill of Rights. P.D. 385 was never meant to protect officials of
government-lending institutions who take over the management of a borrower corporation, lead
that corporation to bankruptcy through mismanagement or misappropriation of its funds, and
who, after ruining it, use the mandatory provisions of the decree to avoid the consequences of
their misleads (p. 188, Emphasis supplied).

On January 2, 1989, the trial court lifted the restraining order and denied the petition for
preliminary injunction. It declared that the building sought to be construed at the ISCOF was an
infrastructure project of the government falling within the coverage of P.D. 1818. Even if it were
not, the petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction would still fail because the
sheriff’s return showed that PBAC was served a copy of the restraining order after the bidding
sought to be restrained had already been held. Furthermore, the members of the PBAC could
not be restrained from awarding the project because the authority to do so was lodged in the
President of the ISCOF, who was not a party to the case. 4

In the petition now before us, it is reiterated that P.D. 1818 does not cover the ISCOF because
of its separate and distinct corporate personality. It is also stressed again that the prohibition
under P.D. 1818 could not apply to the present controversy because the project was vitiated
with irregularities, to wit:chanrobles.com : virtual law library

1. The invitation to bid as published fixed the deadline of submission of pre-qualification

document on December 2, 1988 without indicating any time, yet after 10:00 o’clock of the given
late, the PBAC already refused to accept petitioners’ documents.

2. The time and date of bidding was published as December 12, 1988 at 3:00 p.m. yet it was
held at 10:00 o’clock in the morning.

3. Private respondents, for the purpose of inviting bidders to participate, issued a

mimeographed "Invitation to Bid" form, which by law (P.D. 1594 and Implementing Rules, Exh.
B-1) is to contain the particulars of the project subject of bidding for the purpose of.

(i) enabling bidders to make an intelligent and accurate bids;

(ii) for PBAC to have a uniform basis for evaluating the bids;

(iii) to prevent collusion between a bidder and the PBAC, by opening to all the particulars of a
project.

Additionally, the Invitation to Bid prepared by the respondents and the Itemized Bill of Quantities
therein were left blank. 5 And although the project in question was a "Construction," the private
respondents used an Invitation to Bid form for "Materials." 6

The petitioners also point out that the validity of the writ of preliminary injunction had not yet

25
become moot and academic because even if the bids had been opened before the restraining
order was issued, the project itself had not yet been awarded. The ISCOF president was not an
indispensable party because the signing of the award was merely a ministerial function which he
could perform only upon the recommendation of the Award Committee. At any rate, the
complaint had already been duly amended to include him as a party defendant.

In their Comment, the private respondents maintain that since the members of the board of
trustees of the ISCOF are all government officials under Section 7 of P.D. 1523 and since the
operations and maintenance of the ISCOF are provided for in the General Appropriations Law, it
is should be considered a government institution whose infrastructure project is covered by P.D.
1818.

Regarding the schedule for pre-qualification, the private respondents insist that PBAC posted on
the ISCOF bulletin board an announcement that the deadline for the submission of pre-
qualifications documents was at 10 o’clock of December 2, 1988, and the opening of bids would
be held at 1 o’clock in the afternoon of December 12, 1988. As of ten o’clock in the morning of
December 2, 1988, B.E. construction and Best Built construction had filed only their letters of
intent. At two o’clock in the afternoon, B.E., and Best Built filed through their common
representative, Nenette Garuello, their pre-qualification documents which were admitted but
stamped "submitted late." The petitioners were informed of their disqualification on the same
date, and the disqualification became final on December 6, 1988. Having failed to take
immediate action to compel PBAC to pre-qualify them despite their notice of disqualification,
they cannot now come to this Court to question the binding proper in which they had not
participated.

In the petitioners’ Reply, they raise as an additional irregularity the violation of the rule that
where the estimate project cost is from P1M to P5M, the issuance of plans, specifications and
proposal book forms should made thirty days before the date of bidding. 7 They point out that
these forms were issued only on December 2, 1988, and not at the latest on November 12,
1988, the beginning of the 30-day period prior to the scheduled bidding.

In their Rejoinder, the private respondents aver that the documents of B.E. and Best Built were
received although filed late and were reviewed by the Award Committee, which discovered that
the contractors had expired licenses. B.E.’s temporary certificate of Renewal of Contractor’s
License was valid only until September 30, 1988, while Best Built’s license was valid only up to
June 30, 1988.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

The Court has considered the arguments of the parties in light of their testimonial and
documentary evidence and the applicable laws and jurisprudence. It finds for the petitioners.

The 1987 Administrative Code defines a government instrumentality as follows:chanrob1es

virtual 1aw library

Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the
department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some
if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy,
usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, and
government-owned or controlled corporations. (Sec. 2 (5) Introductory Provisions).

The same Code describes a chartered institution thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Chartered institution — refers to any agency organized or operating under a special charter, and
vested by law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This term
includes the state universities and colleges, and the monetary authority of the state. (Sec. 2 (12)
Introductory Provisions).

It is clear from the above definitions that ISCOF is a chartered institution and is therefore
covered by P.D. 1818.

There are also indications in its charter that ISCOF is a government instrumentality. First, it was
created in pursuance of the integrated fisheries development policy of the State, a priority
program of the government of effect the socio-economic life of the nation. Second, the

26
Treasurer of the Republic of the Philippines also be the ex-officio Treasurer of the state college
with its accounts and expenses to be audited by the Commission on Audit or its duly authorized
representative. Third, heads of bureaus and offices of the National Government are authorized
to loan or transfer to it, upon request of the president of the state college, such apparatus,
equipment, or supplies and even the services of such employees as can be spared without
serious detriment to public service. Lastly, an additional amount of P1.5M had been
appropriated out of the funds of the National Treasury and it was also decreed in its charter that
the funds and maintenance of the state college would henceforth be included in the General
Appropriations Law. 8

Nevertheless, it does not automatically follow that ISCOF is covered by the prohibition in the
said decree.

In the case of Datiles and Co. v. Sucaldito, 9 this Court interpreted a similar prohibition
contained in P.D. 605, the law after which P.D. 1818 was patterned. It was there declared that
the prohibition pertained to the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders by courts against
administrative acts in controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical
cases. The Court observed that to allow the courts to judge these matters would disturb the
smooth functioning of the administrative machinery. Justice Teodoro Padilla made it clear,
however, that on issues definitely outside of this dimension and involving questions of law,
courts could not be prevented by P.D. No. 605 from exercising their power to restrain or prohibit
administrative acts.

We see no reason why the above ruling should not apply to P.D. 1818.

There are at least two irregularities committed by PBAC that justified injunction of the bidding
and the award of the project.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

First, PBAC set deadlines for the filing of the PRE-C1 and the opening of bids and then changed
these deadlines without prior notice to prospective participants.

Under the Rules Implementing P.D. 1594, prescribing policies and guidelines for government
infrastructure contracts, PBAC shall provide prospective bidders with the Notice of Pre-
qualification and other relevant information regarding the proposed work. Prospective
contractors shall be required to file their ARC-Contractors Confidential Application for
Registration & Classifications & the PRE-C2 Confidential Pre-qualification Statement for the
Project (prior to the amendment of the rules, this was referred to as PRE-C1) not later than the
deadline set in the published Invitation to Bid, after which date no PRE-C2 shall be submitted
and received. Invitations to Bid shall be advertised for at least three times within a reasonable
period but in no case less than two weeks in at least two newspapers of general circulations. 10

PBAC advertised the pre-qualification deadline as December 2, 1988, without stating the hour
thereof, and announced that the opening of bids would be at 3 o’clock in the afternoon of
December 12, 1988. This schedule was changed and a notice of such change was merely
posted at the ISCOF bulletin board. The notice advanced the cut-off time for the submission of
pre-qualification documents to 10 o’clock in the morning of December 2, 1988, and the opening
of bids to 1 o’clock in the afternoon of December 12, 1988.

The new schedule caused the pre-disqualification of the petitioners as recorded in the minutes
of the PBAC meeting held on December 6, 1988. While it may be true that there were fourteen
contractors who were pre-qualified despite the change in schedule, this fact did not cure the
defect of the irregular notice. Notably, the petitioners were disqualified because they failed to
meet the new deadline and not because of their expired licenses. ***

We have held that where the law requires a previous advertisement before government
contracts can be awarded, non-compliance with the requirement will, as a general rule, render
the same void and of no effect 11 The facts that an invitation for bids has been communicated
to a number of possible bidders is not necessarily sufficient to establish compliance with the
requirements of the law if it is shown that other public bidders have not been similarly notified.
12

Second, PBAC was required to issue to pre-qualified applicants the plans, specifications and

27
proposal book forms for the project to be bid thirty days before the date of bidding if the estimate
project cost was between P1M and P5M. PBAC has not denied that these forms were issued
only on December 2, 1988, or only ten days before the bidding scheduled for December 12,
1988. At the very latest, PBAC should have issued them on November 12, 1988, or 30 days
before the scheduled bidding.

It is apparent that the present controversy did not arise from the discretionary acts of the
administrative body nor does it involve merely technical matters. What is involved here is non-
compliance with the procedural rules on bidding which required strict observance. The purpose
of the rules implementing P.D. 1594 is to secure competitive bidding and to prevent favoritism,
collusion and fraud in the award of these contracts to the detriment of the public. This purpose
was defeated by the irregularities committed by PBAC.chanrobles law library : red

It has been held that the three principles in public bidding are the offer to the public, an
opportunity for competition and a basis for exact comparison of bids. A regulation of the matter
which excludes any of these factors destroys the distinctive character of the system and thwarts
and purpose of its adoption. 13

In the case at bar, it was the lack of proper notice regarding the pre-qualification requirement
and the bidding that caused the elimination of petitioners B.E. and Best Built. It was not because
of their expired licenses, as private respondents now claim. Moreover, the plans and
specifications which are the contractors’ guide to an intelligent bid, were not issued on time,
thus defeating the guaranty that contractors be placed on equal footing when they submit their
bids. The purpose of competitive bidding is negated if some contractors are informed ahead of
their rivals of the plans and specifications that are to be the subject of their bids.

P.D. 1818 was not intended to shield from judicial scrutiny irregularities committed by
administrative agencies such as the anomalies above described. Hence, the challenged
restraining order was not improperly issued by the respondent judge and the writ of preliminary
injunction should not have been denied. We note from Annex Q of the private respondent’s
memorandum, however, that the subject project has already been "100% completed as to the
Engineering Standard." This fait accompli has made the petition for a writ of preliminary
injunction moot and academic.

We come now to the liabilities of the private respondents.

It has been held in a long line of cases that a contract granted without the competitive bidding
required by law is void, and the party to whom it is awarded cannot benefit from it. 14 It has not
been shown that the irregularities committed by PBAC were induced by or participated in by any
of the contractors. Hence, liability shall attach only to the private respondents for the prejudice
sustained by the petitioners as a result of the anomalies described above.

As there is no evidence of the actual loss suffered by the petitioners, compensatory damage
may not be awarded to them. Moral damages do not appear to be due either. Even so, the
Court cannot close its eyes to the evident bad faith that characterized the conduct of the private
respondents, including the irregularities in the announcement of the bidding and their efforts to
persuade the ISCOF president to award the project after two days from receipt of the restraining
order and before they moved to lift such order. For such questionable acts, they are liable in
nominal damages at least in accordance with Article 2221 of the Civil Code, which
states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Art. 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has
been violated or invaded by the defendant may be vindicated or, recognized, and not for the
purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.

These damages are to assessed against the private respondents in the amount of P10,000.00
each, to be paid separately for each of petitioners B.E. Construction and Best Built
Construction. The other petitioner, Occeña Builders, is not entitled to relief because it admittedly
submitted its pre-qualification documents on December 5, 1988, or three days after the
deadline.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: a) upholding the restraining order dated

28
December 12, 1988, as not covered by the prohibition in P.D. 1818; b) ordering the chairman
and the members of the PBAC board of trustees, namely Manuel R. Penachos, Jr., Alfredo
Matangga, Enrico Ticar, and Teresita Villanueva, to each pay separately to petitioners Maria
Elena Malaga and Josieleen Najarro nominal damages P10,000.00 each; and c) removing the
said chairman and members from the PBAC board of trustees, or whoever among them is still
incumbent therein, for their malfeasance in office. Costs against PBAC.

Let a copy of this decision be sent to the Office of the Ombudsman.

SO ORDERED.

29
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 115863 March 31, 1995

AIDA D. EUGENIO, petitioner,

vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. & HON. SALVADOR
ENRIQUEZ, JR., respondents.

PUNO, J.:

The power of the Civil Service Commission to abolish the Career Executive Service Board is
challenged in this petition for certiorari and prohibition.

First the facts. Petitioner is the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute. She
applied for a Career Executive Service (CES) Eligibility and a CESO rank on August 2, 1993,
she was given a CES eligibility. On September 15, 1993, she was recommended to the
President for a CESO rank by the Career Executive Service Board. 1

All was not to turn well for petitioner. On October 1, 1993, respondent Civil Service
Commission2 passed Resolution No. 93-4359, viz:

RESOLUTION NO. 93-4359

WHEREAS, Section 1(1) of Article IX-B provides that Civil Service shall be
administered by the Civil Service Commission, . . .;

WHEREAS, Section 3, Article IX-B of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides

that "The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the
government, is mandated to establish a career service and adopt measures to
promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progresiveness and
courtesy in the civil service, . . .";

WHEREAS, Section 12 (1), Title I, Subtitle A, Book V of the Administrative Code

of 1987 grants the Commission the power, among others, to administer and
enforce the constitutional and statutory provisions on the merit system for all
levels and ranks in the Civil Service;

WHEREAS, Section 7, Title I, Subtitle A, Book V of the Administrative Code of

1987 Provides, among others, that The Career Service shall be characterized by
(1) entrance based on merit and fitness to be determined as far as practicable by
competitive examination, or based highly technical qualifications; (2) opportunity
for advancement to higher career positions; and (3) security of tenure;

WHEREAS, Section 8 (c), Title I, Subtitle A, Book V of the administrative Code of

1987 provides that "The third level shall cover Positions in the Career Executive
Service";

WHEREAS, the Commission recognizes the imperative need to consolidate,

integrate and unify the administration of all levels of positions in the career
service.

30
 WHEREAS, the provisions of Section 17, Title I, Subtitle A. Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 confers on the Commission the power and authority
to effect changes in its organization as the need arises.

WHEREAS, Section 5, Article IX-A of the Constitution provides that the Civil
Service Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy and the necessary implications
thereof;

NOW THEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Civil Service

Commission hereby resolves to streamline reorganize and effect changes in its
organizational structure. Pursuant thereto, the Career Executive Service Board,
shall now be known as the Office for Career Executive Service of the Civil
Service Commission. Accordingly, the existing personnel, budget, properties and
equipment of the Career Executive Service Board shall now form part of the
Office for Career Executive Service.

The above resolution became an impediment. to the appointment of petitioner as Civil Service
Officer, Rank IV. In a letter to petitioner, dated June 7, 1994, the Honorable Antonio T. Carpio,
Chief Presidential legal Counsel, stated:

xxx xxx xxx

On 1 October 1993 the Civil Service Commission issued CSC Resolution No. 93-
4359 which abolished the Career Executive Service Board.

Several legal issues have arisen as a result of the issuance of CSC Resolution
No. 93-4359, including whether the Civil Service Commission has authority to
abolish the Career Executive Service Board. Because these issues remain
unresolved, the Office of the President has refrained from considering
appointments of career service eligibles to career executive ranks.

xxx xxx xxx

You may, however, bring a case before the appropriate court to settle the legal
issues arising from issuance by the Civil Service Commission of CSC Resolution
No. 93-4359, for guidance of all concerned.

Thank You.

Finding herself bereft of further administrative relief as the Career Executive Service Board
which recommended her CESO Rank IV has been abolished, petitioner filed the petition at
bench to annul, among others, resolution No. 93-4359. The petition is anchored on the following
arguments:

A.

IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, RESPONDENT COMMISSION

USURPED THE LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS OF CONGRESS WHEN IT
ABOLISHED THE CESB, AN OFFICE CREATED BY LAW, THROUGH THE
ISSUANCE OF CSC: RESOLUTION NO. 93-4359;

B.

ALSO IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, RESPONDENT CSC

USURPED THE LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS OF CONGRESS WHEN IT
ILLEGALLY AUTHORIZED THE TRANSFER OF PUBLIC MONEY, THROUGH
THE ISSUANCE OF CSC RESOLUTION NO. 93-4359.

Required to file its Comment, the Solicitor General agreed with the contentions of petitioner.
Respondent Commission, however, chose to defend its ground. It posited the following position:

31
 ARGUMENTS FOR PUBLIC RESPONDENT-CSC

I. THE INSTANT PETITION STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE

PUBLIC RESPONDENT-CSC.

II. THE RECOMMENDATION SUBMITTED TO THE PRESIDENT FOR

APPOINTMENT TO A CESO RANK OF PETITIONER EUGENIO WAS A VALID
ACT OF THE CAREER EXECUTIVE SERVICE BOARD OF THE CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION AND IT DOES NOT HAVE ANY DEFECT.

III. THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING

THE VALIDITY OF THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE CESB IN FAVOR OF
PETITIONER EUGENIO SINCE THE PRESIDENT HAS PREVIOUSLY
APPOINTED TO CESO RANK FOUR (4) OFFICIALS SIMILARLY SITUATED
AS SAID PETITIONER. FURTHERMORE, LACK OF MEMBERS TO
CONSTITUTE A QUORUM. ASSUMING THERE WAS NO QUORUM, IS NOT
THE FAULT OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION BUT
OF THE PRESIDENT WHO HAS THE POWER TO APPOINT THE OTHER
MEMBERS OF THE CESB.

IV. THE INTEGRATION OF THE CESB INTO THE COMMISSION IS

AUTHORIZED BY LAW (Sec. 12 (1), Title I, Subtitle A, Book V of the
Administrative Code of the 1987). THIS PARTICULAR ISSUE HAD ALREADY
BEEN SETTLED WHEN THE HONORABLE COURT DISMISSED THE
PETITION FILED BY THE HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, NAMELY: SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, FELICIANO R.
BELMONTE, JR., RENATO V. DIAZ, AND MANUEL M. GARCIA IN G.R. NO.
114380. THE AFOREMENTIONED PETITIONERS ALSO QUESTIONED THE
INTEGRATION OF THE CESB WITH THE COMMISSION.

We find merit in the petition.3

The controlling fact is that the Career Executive Service Board (CESB) was created in the
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1 on September 1, 19744 which adopted the Integrated Plan.
Article IV, Chapter I, Part of the III of the said Plan provides:

Article IV — Career Executive Service

1. A Career Executive Service is created to form a continuing pool of well-

selected and development oriented career administrators who shall provide
competent and faithful service.

2. A Career Executive Service hereinafter referred to in this Chapter as the

Board, is created to serve as the governing body of the Career Executive
Service. The Board shall consist of the Chairman of the Civil Service
Commission as presiding officer, the Executive Secretary and the Commissioner
of the Budget as ex-officio members and two other members from the private
sector and/or the academic community who are familiar with the principles and
methods of personnel administration.

xxx xxx xxx

5. The Board shall promulgate rules, standards and procedures on the selection,
classification, compensation and career development of members of the Career
Executive Service. The Board shall set up the organization and operation of the
service. (Emphasis supplied)

It cannot be disputed, therefore, that as the CESB was created by law, it can only be abolished
by the legislature. This follows an unbroken stream of rulings that the creation and abolition of
public offices is primarily a legislative function. As aptly summed up in AM JUR 2d on Public

32
Officers and
Employees, 5 viz:

Except for such offices as are created by the Constitution, the creation of public
offices is primarily a legislative function. In so far as the legislative power in this
respect is not restricted by constitutional provisions, it supreme, and the
legislature may decide for itself what offices are suitable, necessary, or
convenient. When in the exigencies of government it is necessary to create and
define duties, the legislative department has the discretion to determine whether
additional offices shall be created, or whether these duties shall be attached to
and become ex-officio duties of existing offices. An office created by the
legislature is wholly within the power of that body, and it may prescribe the mode
of filling the office and the powers and duties of the incumbent, and if it sees fit,
abolish the office.

In the petition at bench, the legislature has not enacted any law authorizing the abolition of the
CESB. On the contrary, in all the General Appropriations Acts from 1975 to 1993, the legislature
has set aside funds for the operation of CESB. Respondent Commission, however, invokes
Section 17, Chapter 3, Subtitle A. Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 as the
source of its power to abolish the CESB. Section 17 provides:

Sec. 17. Organizational Structure. — Each office of the Commission shall be

headed by a Director with at least one Assistant Director, and may have such
divisions as are necessary independent constitutional body, the Commission may
effect changes in the organization as the need arises.

But as well pointed out by petitioner and the Solicitor General, Section 17 must be read together
with Section 16 of the said Code which enumerates the offices under the respondent
Commission, viz:

Sec. 16. Offices in the Commission. — The Commission shall have the following
offices:

(1) The Office of the Executive Director headed by an Executive Director, with a
Deputy Executive Director shall implement policies, standards, rules and
regulations promulgated by the Commission; coordinate the programs of the
offices of the Commission and render periodic reports on their operations, and
perform such other functions as may be assigned by the Commission.

(2) The Merit System Protection Board composed of a Chairman and two (2)
members shall have the following functions:

xxx xxx xxx

(3) The Office of Legal Affairs shall provide the Chairman with legal advice and
assistance; render counselling services; undertake legal studies and researches;
prepare opinions and ruling in the interpretation and application of the Civil
Service law, rules and regulations; prosecute violations of such law, rules and
regulations; and represent the Commission before any court or tribunal.

(4) The Office of Planning and Management shall formulate development plans,
programs and projects; undertake research and studies on the different aspects
of public personnel management; administer management improvement
programs; and provide fiscal and budgetary services.

(5) The Central Administrative Office shall provide the Commission with
personnel, financial, logistics and other basic support services.

(6) The Office of Central Personnel Records shall formulate and implement
policies, standards, rules and regulations pertaining to personnel records

33
 maintenance, security, control and disposal; provide storage and extension
services; and provide and maintain library services.

(7) The Office of Position Classification and Compensation shall formulate and
implement policies, standards, rules and regulations relative to the administration
of position classification and compensation.

(8) The Office of Recruitment, Examination and Placement shall provide

leadership and assistance in developing and implementing the overall
Commission programs relating to recruitment, execution and placement, and
formulate policies, standards, rules and regulations for the proper implementation
of the Commission's examination and placement programs.

(9) The Office of Career Systems and Standards shall provide leadership and
assistance in the formulation and evaluation of personnel systems and standards
relative to performance appraisal, merit promotion, and employee incentive
benefit and awards.

(10) The Office of Human Resource Development shall provide leadership and
assistance in the development and retention of qualified and efficient work force
in the Civil Service; formulate standards for training and staff development;
administer service-wide scholarship programs; develop training literature and
materials; coordinate and integrate all training activities and evaluate training
programs.

(11) The Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit shall develop policies,
standards, rules and regulations for the effective conduct or inspection and audit
personnel and personnel management programs and the exercise of delegated
authority; provide technical and advisory services to Civil Service Regional
Offices and government agencies in the implementation of their personnel
programs and evaluation systems.

(12) The Office of Personnel Relations shall provide leadership and assistance in
the development and implementation of policies, standards, rules and regulations
in the accreditation of employee associations or organizations and in the
adjustment and settlement of employee grievances and management of
employee disputes.

(13) The Office of Corporate Affairs shall formulate and implement policies,
standards, rules and regulations governing corporate officials and employees in
the areas of recruitment, examination, placement, career development, merit and
awards systems, position classification and compensation, performing appraisal,
employee welfare and benefit, discipline and other aspects of personnel
management on the basis of comparable industry practices.

(14) The Office of Retirement Administration shall be responsible for the

enforcement of the constitutional and statutory provisions, relative to retirement
and the regulation for the effective implementation of the retirement of
government officials and employees.

(15) The Regional and Field Offices. — The Commission shall have not less than
thirteen (13) Regional offices each to be headed by a Director, and such field
offices as may be needed, each to be headed by an official with at least the rank
of an Assistant Director.

As read together, the inescapable conclusion is that respondent Commission's power to

reorganize is limited to offices under its control as enumerated in Section 16, supra.
From its inception, the CESB was intended to be an autonomous entity, albeit
administratively attached to respondent Commission. As conceptualized by the
Reorganization Committee "the CESB shall be autonomous. It is expected to view the
problem of building up executive manpower in the government with a broad and positive

34
 outlook." 6 The essential autonomous character of the CESB is not negated by its
attachment to respondent Commission. By said attachment, CESB was not made to fall
within the control of respondent Commission. Under the Administrative Code of 1987,
the purpose of attaching one functionally inter-related government agency to another is
to attain "policy and program coordination." This is clearly etched out in Section 38(3),
Chapter 7, Book IV of the aforecited Code, to wit:

(3) Attachment. — (a) This refers to the lateral relationship between the
department or its equivalent and attached agency or corporation for purposes of
policy and program coordination. The coordination may be accomplished by
having the department represented in the governing board of the attached
agency or corporation, either as chairman or as a member, with or without voting
rights, if this is permitted by the charter; having the attached corporation or
agency comply with a system of periodic reporting which shall reflect the
progress of programs and projects; and having the department or its equivalent
provide general policies through its representative in the board, which shall serve
as the framework for the internal policies of the attached corporation or agency.

Respondent Commission also relies on the case of Datumanong, et al., vs. Civil Service
Commission, G. R. No. 114380 where the petition assailing the abolition of the CESB was
dismissed for lack of cause of action. Suffice to state that the reliance is misplaced considering
that the cited case was dismissed for lack of standing of the petitioner, hence, the lack of cause
of action.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Resolution No. 93-4359 of the respondent
Commission is hereby annulled and set aside. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

35
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-57883 March 12, 1982

GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA Presiding Judge, Branch II of the City Court of Olongapo,

ESTANISLAO L. CESA, JR., FIDELA Y. VARGAS, BENJAMIN C. ESCOLANGO, JUANITO
C. ATIENZA, MANUEL REYES ROSAPAPAN, JR., VIRGILIO E. ACIERTO, and PORFIRIO
AGUILLON AGUILA, petitioners,
vs.
MANUEL ALBA, Minister of Budget, FRANCISCO TANTUICO, Chairman, Commission on
Audit, and RICARDO PUNO, Minister of Justice, Respondents.

FERNANDO, C.J.:

This Court, pursuant to its grave responsibility of passing upon the validity of any executive or
legislative act in an appropriate cases, has to resolve the crucial issue of the constitutionality of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled "An act reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds
Therefor and for Other Purposes." The task of judicial review, aptly characterized as exacting
and delicate, is never more so than when a conceded legislative power, that of judicial
reorganization, 1 may possibly collide with the time-honored principle of the independence of the
judiciary 2 as protected and safeguarded by this constitutional provision: "The Members of the
Supreme Court and judges of inferior courts shall hold office during good behavior until they
reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office.
The Supreme Court shall have the power to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of
at least eight Members, order their dismissal." 3 For the assailed legislation mandates that
Justices and judges of inferior courts from the Court of Appeals to municipal circuit courts,
except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals, unless appointed to
the inferior courts established by such Act, would be considered separated from the judiciary. It
is the termination of their incumbency that for petitioners justifies a suit of this character, it being
alleged that thereby the security of tenure provision of the Constitution has been ignored and
disregarded,

That is the fundamental issue raised in this proceeding, erroneously entitled Petition for
Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition 4 considered by this Court as an action for prohibited
petition, seeking to enjoin respondent Minister of the Budget, respondent Chairman of the
Commission on Audit, and respondent Minister of Justice from taking any action implementing
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. Petitioners 5 sought to bolster their claim by imputing lack of good
faith in its enactment and characterizing as an undue delegation of legislative power to the
President his authority to fix the compensation and allowances of the Justices and judges
thereafter appointed and the determination of the date when the reorganization shall be deemed
completed. In the very comprehensive and scholarly Answer of Solicitor General Estelito P.
Mendoza, 6 it was pointed out that there is no valid justification for the attack on the
constitutionality of this statute, it being a legitimate exercise of the power vested in the Batasang
Pambansa to reorganize the judiciary, the allegations of absence of good faith as well as the
attack on the independence of the judiciary being unwarranted and devoid of any support in law.
A Supplemental Answer was likewise filed on October 8, 1981, followed by a Reply of
petitioners on October 13. After the hearing in the morning and afternoon of October 15, in
which not only petitioners and respondents were heard through counsel but also the amici
curiae, 7 and thereafter submission of the minutes of the proceeding on the debate on Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, this petition was deemed submitted for decision.

The importance of the crucial question raised called for intensive and rigorous study of all the
legal aspects of the case. After such exhaustive deliberation in several sessions, the exchange
of views being supplemented by memoranda from the members of the Court, it is our opinion
and so hold that Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 is not unconstitutional.

36
1. The argument as to the lack of standing of petitioners is easily resolved. As far as Judge de la
Llana is concerned, he certainly falls within the principle set forth in Justice Laurel's opinion
in People v. Vera. 8 Thus: "The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of
a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained,
or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement." 9 The other petitioners as members of
the bar and officers of the court cannot be considered as devoid of "any personal and
substantial interest" on the matter. There is relevance to this excerpt from a separate opinion
in Aquino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections: 10 "Then there is the attack on the standing of
petitioners, as vindicating at most what they consider a public right and not protecting their
rights as individuals. This is to conjure the specter of the public right dogma as an inhibition to
parties intent on keeping public officials staying on the path of constitutionalism. As was so well
put by Jaffe: 'The protection of private rights is an essential constituent of public interest and,
conversely, without a well-ordered state there could be no enforcement of private rights. Private
and public interests are, both in substantive and procedural sense, aspects of the totality of the
legal order.' Moreover, petitioners have convincingly shown that in their capacity as taxpayers,
their standing to sue has been amply demonstrated. There would be a retreat from the liberal
approach followed in Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, foreshadowed by the very decision
of People v. Vera where the doctrine was first fully discussed, if we act differently now. I do not
think we are prepared to take that step. Respondents, however, would hark back to the
American Supreme Court doctrine in Mellon v. Frothingham with their claim that what petitioners
possess 'is an interest which is shared in common by other people and is comparatively so
minute and indeterminate as to afford any basis and assurance that the judicial process can act
on it.' That is to speak in the language of a bygone era even in the United States. For as Chief
Justice Warren clearly pointed out in the later case of Flast v. Cohen, the barrier thus set up if
not breached has definitely been lowered." 11

2. The imputation of arbitrariness to the legislative body in the enactment of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129 to demonstrate lack of good faith does manifest violence to the facts. Petitioners
should have exercised greater care in informing themselves as to its antecedents. They had laid
themselves open to the accusation of reckless disregard for the truth, On August 7, 1980, a
Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization was organized. 12 This Executive Order was
later amended by Executive Order No. 619-A., dated September 5 of that year. It clearly
specified the task assigned to it: "1. The Committee shall formulate plans on the reorganization
of the Judiciary which shall be submitted within seventy (70) days from August 7, 1980 to
provide the President sufficient options for the reorganization of the entire Judiciary which shall
embrace all lower courts, including the Court of Appeals, the Courts of First Instance, the City
and Municipal Courts, and all Special Courts, but excluding the Sandigan Bayan." 13 On October
17, 1980, a Report was submitted by such Committee on Judicial Reorganization. It began with
this paragraph: "The Committee on Judicial Reorganization has the honor to submit the
following Report. It expresses at the outset its appreciation for the opportunity accorded it to
study ways and means for what today is a basic and urgent need, nothing less than the
restructuring of the judicial system. There are problems, both grave and pressing, that call for
remedial measures. The felt necessities of the time, to borrow a phrase from Holmes, admit of
no delay, for if no step be taken and at the earliest opportunity, it is not too much to say that the
people's faith in the administration of justice could be shaken. It is imperative that there be a
greater efficiency in the disposition of cases and that litigants, especially those of modest means
— much more so, the poorest and the humblest — can vindicate their rights in an expeditious
and inexpensive manner. The rectitude and the fairness in the way the courts operate must be
manifest to all members of the community and particularly to those whose interests are affected
by the exercise of their functions. It is to that task that the Committee addresses itself and hopes
that the plans submitted could be a starting point for an institutional reform in the Philippine
judiciary. The experience of the Supreme Court, which since 1973 has been empowered to
supervise inferior courts, from the Court of Appeals to the municipal courts, has proven that
reliance on improved court management as well as training of judges for more efficient
administration does not suffice. I hence, to repeat, there is need for a major reform in the judicial
so stem it is worth noting that it will be the first of its kind since the Judiciary Act became
effective on June 16, 1901." 14 I t went to say: "I t does not admit of doubt that the last two
decades of this century are likely to be attended with problems of even greater complexity and
delicacy. New social interests are pressing for recognition in the courts. Groups long
inarticulate, primarily those economically underprivileged, have found legal spokesmen and are
asserting grievances previously ignored. Fortunately, the judicially has not proved inattentive. Its
task has thus become even more formidable. For so much grist is added to the mills of justice.

37
Moreover, they are likewise to be quite novel. The need for an innovative approach is thus
apparent. The national leadership, as is well-known, has been constantly on the search for
solutions that will prove to be both acceptable and satisfactory. Only thus may there be
continued national progress." 15 After which comes: "To be less abstract, the thrust is on
development. That has been repeatedly stressed — and rightly so. All efforts are geared to its
realization. Nor, unlike in the past, was it to b "considered as simply the movement towards
economic progress and growth measured in terms of sustained increases in per capita income
and Gross National Product (GNP). 16 For the New Society, its implication goes further than
economic advance, extending to "the sharing, or more appropriately, the democratization of
social and economic opportunities, the substantiation of the true meaning of social
justice." 17 This process of modernization and change compels the government to extend its
field of activity and its scope of operations. The efforts towards reducing the gap between the
wealthy and the poor elements in the nation call for more regulatory legislation. That way the
social justice and protection to labor mandates of the Constitution could be effectively
implemented." 18 There is likelihood then "that some measures deemed inimical by interests
adversely affected would be challenged in court on grounds of validity. Even if the question
does not go that far, suits may be filed concerning their interpretation and application. ... There
could be pleas for injunction or restraining orders. Lack of success of such moves would not,
even so, result in their prompt final disposition. Thus delay in the execution of the policies
embodied in law could thus be reasonably expected. That is not conducive to progress in
development." 19 For, as mentioned in such Report, equally of vital concern is the problem of
clogged dockets, which "as is well known, is one of the utmost gravity. Notwithstanding the most
determined efforts exerted by the Supreme Court, through the leadership of both retired Chief
Justice Querube Makalintal and the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, from the time
supervision of the courts was vested in it under the 1973 Constitution, the trend towards more
and more cases has continued." 20 It is understandable why. With the accelerated economic
development, the growth of population, the increasing urbanization, and other similar factors,
the judiciary is called upon much oftener to resolve controversies. Thus confronted with what
appears to be a crisis situation that calls for a remedy, the Batasang Pambansa had no choice.
It had to act, before the ailment became even worse. Time was of the essence, and yet it did not
hesitate to be duly mindful, as it ought to be, of the extent of its coverage before enacting Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129.

3. There is no denying, therefore, the need for "institutional reforms," characterized in the
Report as "both pressing and urgent." 21 It is worth noting, likewise, as therein pointed out, that a
major reorganization of such scope, if it were to take place, would be the most thorough after
four generations. 22 The reference was to the basic Judiciary Act generations . enacted in June
of 1901, 23 amended in a significant way, only twice previous to the Commonwealth. There was,
of course, the creation of the Court of Appeals in 1935, originally composed "of a Presiding
Judge and ten appellate Judges, who shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines,
with the consent of the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly, 24 It could "sit
en banc, but it may sit in two divisions, one of six and another of five Judges, to transact
business, and the two divisions may sit at the same time." 25 Two years after the establishment
of independence of the Republic of the Philippines, the Judiciary Act of 1948 26 was passed. It
continued the existing system of regular inferior courts, namely, the Court of Appeals, Courts of
First Instance, 27 the Municipal Courts, at present the City Courts, and the Justice of the Peace
Courts, now the Municipal Circuit Courts and Municipal Courts. The membership of the Court of
Appeals has been continuously increased. 28 Under a 1978 Presidential Decree, there would be
forty-five members, a Presiding Justice and forty-four Associate Justices, with fifteen
divisions. 29 Special courts were likewise created. The first was the Court of Tax Appeals in
1954, 30 next came the Court of Agrarian Relations in 1955, 31 and then in the same year a
Court of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations for Manila in 1955, 32 subsequently followed by
the creation of two other such courts for Iloilo and Quezon City in 1966. 33 In 1967, Circuit
Criminal Courts were established, with the Judges having the same qualifications, rank,
compensation, and privileges as judges of Courts of First Instance. 34

4. After the submission of such Report, Cabinet Bill No. 42, which later became the basis of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, was introduced. After setting forth the background as above
narrated, its Explanatory Note continues: "Pursuant to the President's instructions, this
proposed legislation has been drafted in accordance with the guidelines of that report with
particular attention to certain objectives of the reorganization, to wit, the attainment of more
efficiency in disposal of cases, a reallocation of jurisdiction, and a revision of procedures which

38
do not tend to the proper meeting out of justice. In consultation with, and upon a consensus of,
the governmental and parliamentary leadership, however, it was felt that some options set forth
in the Report be not availed of. Instead of the proposal to confine the jurisdiction of the
intermediate appellate court merely to appellate adjudication, the preference has been opted to
increase rather than diminish its jurisdiction in order to enable it to effectively assist the
Supreme Court. This preference has been translated into one of the innovations in the proposed
Bill." 35 In accordance with the parliamentary procedure, the Bill was sponsored by the Chairman
of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government to which it was referred.
Thereafter, Committee Report No. 225 was submitted by such Committee to the Batasang
Pambansa recommending the approval with some amendments. In the sponsorship speech of
Minister Ricardo C. Puno, there was reference to the Presidential Committee on Judicial
Reorganization. Thus: "On October 17, 1980, the Presidential Committee on Judicial
Reorganization submitted its report to the President which contained the 'Proposed Guidelines
for Judicial Reorganization.' Cabinet Bill No. 42 was drafted substantially in accordance with the
options presented by these guidelines. Some options set forth in the aforesaid report were not
availed of upon consultation with and upon consensus of the government and parliamentary
leadership. Moreover, some amendments to the bill were adopted by the Committee on Justice,
Human Rights and Good Government, to which The bill was referred, following the public
hearings on the bill held in December of 1980. The hearings consisted of dialogues with the
distinguished members of the bench and the bar who had submitted written proposals,
suggestions, and position papers on the bill upon the invitation of the Committee on Justice,
Human Rights and Good Government." 36 Stress was laid by the sponsor that the enactment of
such Cabinet Bill would, firstly, result in the attainment of more efficiency in the disposal of
cases. Secondly, the improvement in the quality of justice dispensed by the courts is expected
as a necessary consequence of the easing of the court's dockets. Thirdly, the structural
changes introduced in the bill, together with the reallocation of jurisdiction and the revision of the
rules of procedure, are designated to suit the court system to the exigencies of the present day
Philippine society, and hopefully, of the foreseeable future." 37 it may be observed that the
volume containing the minutes of the proceedings of the Batasang Pambansa show that 590
pages were devoted to its discussion. It is quite obvious that it took considerable time and effort
as well as exhaustive study before the act was signed by the President on August 14, 1981.
With such a background, it becomes quite manifest how lacking in factual basis is the allegation
that its enactment is tainted by the vice of arbitrariness. What appears undoubted and
undeniable is the good faith that characterized its enactment from its inception to the affixing of
the Presidential signature.

5. Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of an office within the competence of
a legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no infirmity. The ponencia of Justice J.B.L.
Reyes in Cruz v. Primicias, Jr. 38reiterated such a doctrine: "We find this point urged by
respondents, to be without merit. No removal or separation of petitioners from the service is
here involved, but the validity of the abolition of their offices. This is a legal issue that is for the
Courts to decide. It is well-known rule also that valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor
separation of the incumbents. ... And, of course, if the abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed
never to have ceased to hold office. The preliminary question laid at rest, we pass to the merits
of the case. As well-settled as the rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an
illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be
made in good faith." 39 The above excerpt was quoted with approval in Bendanillo, Sr. v.
Provincial Governor, 40 two earlier cases enunciating a similar doctrine having preceded it. 41 As
with the offices in the other branches of the government, so it is with the judiciary. The test
remains whether the abolition is in good faith. As that element is conspicuously present in the
enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, then the lack of merit of this petition becomes even
more apparent. The concurring opinion of Justice Laurel in Zandueta v. De la Costa 42 cannot
be any clearer. This is a quo warranto proceeding filed by petitioner, claiming that he, and not
respondent, was entitled to he office of judge of the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of
Manila. There was a Judicial Reorganization Act in 1936, 43 a year after the inauguration of the
Commonwealth, amending the Administrative Code to organize courts of original jurisdiction
known as the Courts of First Instance Prior to such statute, petitioner was the incumbent of such
branch. Thereafter, he received an ad interim appointment, this time to the Fourth Judicial
District, under the new legislation. Unfortunately for him, the Commission on Appointments of
then National Assembly disapproved the same, with respondent being appointed in his place.
He contested the validity of the Act insofar as it resulted in his being forced to vacate his
position This Court did not rule squarely on the matter. His petition was dismissed on the ground

39
of estoppel. Nonetheless, the separate concurrence of Justice Laurel in the result reached, to
repeat, reaffirms in no uncertain terms the standard of good faith to preclude any doubt as to the
abolition of an inferior court, with due recognition of the security of tenure guarantee. Thus: " I
am of the opinion that Commonwealth Act No. 145 in so far as it reorganizes, among other
judicial districts, the Ninth Judicial District, and establishes an entirely new district comprising
Manila and the provinces of Rizal and Palawan, is valid and constitutional. This conclusion flows
from the fundamental proposition that the legislature may abolish courts inferior to the Supreme
Court and therefore may reorganize them territorially or otherwise thereby necessitating new
appointments and commissions. Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution vests in the National
Assembly the power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts,
subject to certain limitations in the case of the Supreme Court. It is admitted that section 9 of the
same article of the Constitution provides for the security of tenure of all the judges. The
principles embodied in these two sections of the same article of the Constitution must be
coordinated and harmonized. A mere enunciation of a principle will not decide actual cases and
controversies of every sort. (Justice Holmes in Lochner vs. New York, 198 U.S., 45; 49 Law. ed;
937)" 44 justice Laurel continued: "I am not insensible to the argument that the National
Assembly may abuse its power and move deliberately to defeat the constitutional provision
guaranteeing security of tenure to all judges, But, is this the case? One need not share the view
of Story, Miller and Tucker on the one hand, or the opinion of Cooley, Watson and Baldwin on
the other, to realize that the application of a legal or constitutional principle is necessarily factual
and circumstantial and that fixity of principle is the rigidity of the dead and the unprogressive. I
do say, and emphatically, however, that cases may arise where the violation of the
constitutional provision regarding security of tenure is palpable and plain, and that legislative
power of reorganization may be sought to cloak an unconstitutional and evil purpose. When a
case of that kind arises, it will be the time to make the hammer fall and heavily. But not until
then. I am satisfied that, as to the particular point here discussed, the purpose was the
fulfillment of what was considered a great public need by the legislative department and that
Commonwealth Act No. 145 was not enacted purposely to affect adversely the tenure of judges
or of any particular judge. Under these circumstances, I am for sustaining the power of the
legislative department under the Constitution. To be sure, there was greater necessity for
reorganization consequent upon the establishment of the new government than at the time Acts
Nos. 2347 and 4007 were approved by the defunct Philippine Legislature, and although in the
case of these two Acts there was an express provision providing for the vacation by the judges
of their offices whereas in the case of Commonwealth Act No. 145 doubt is engendered by its
silence, this doubt should be resolved in favor of the valid exercise of the legislative power." 45

6. A few more words on the question of abolition. In the above-cited opinion of Justice Laurel in
Zandueta, reference was made to Act No. 2347 46 on the reorganization of the Courts of First
Instance and to Act No. 4007 47 on the reorganization of all branches of the government,
including the courts of first instance. In both of them, the then Courts of First Instance were
replaced by new courts with the same appellation. As Justice Laurel pointed out, there was no
question as to the fact of abolition. He was equally categorical as to Commonwealth Act No.
145, where also the system of the courts of first instance was provided for expressly. It was
pointed out by Justice Laurel that the mere creation of an entirely new district of the same court
is valid and constitutional. such conclusion flowing "from the fundamental proposition that the
legislature may abolish courts inferior to the Supreme Court and therefore may reorganize them
territorially or otherwise thereby necessitating new appointments and commissions." 48 The
challenged statute creates an intermediate appellate court, 49 regional trial
courts, 50 metropolitan trial courts of the national capital region, 51 and other metropolitan trial
courts, 52 municipal trial courts in cities, 53 as well as in municipalities, 54 and municipal circuit
trial courts. 55 There is even less reason then to doubt the fact that existing inferior courts were
abolished. For the Batasang Pambansa, the establishment of such new inferior courts was the
appropriate response to the grave and urgent problems that pressed for solution. Certainly,
there could be differences of opinion as to the appropriate remedy. The choice, however, was
for the Batasan to make, not for this Court, which deals only with the question of power. It bears
mentioning that in Brillo v. Eñage 56 this Court, in an unanimous opinion penned by the late
Justice Diokno, citing Zandueta v. De la Costa, ruled: "La segunda question que el recurrrido
plantea es que la Carta de Tacloban ha abolido el puesto. Si efectivamente ha sido abolido el
cargo, entonces ha quedado extinguido el derecho de recurente a ocuparlo y a cobrar el salario
correspodiente. Mc Culley vs. State, 46 LRA, 567. El derecho de un juez de desempenarlo
hasta los 70 años de edad o se incapacite no priva al Congreso de su facultad de abolir,
fusionar o reorganizar juzgados no constitucionales." 57 Nonetheless, such well-established

40
principle was not held applicable to the situation there obtaining, the Charter of Tacloban City
creating a city court in place of the former justice of the peace court. Thus: "Pero en el caso de
autos el Juzgado de Tacloban no ha sido abolido. Solo se le ha cambiado el nombre con el
cambio de forma del gobierno local." 58 The present case is anything but that. Petitioners did not
and could not prove that the challenged statute was not within the bounds of legislative
authority.

7. This opinion then could very well stop at this point. The implementation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, concededly a task incumbent on the Executive, may give rise, however, to questions
affecting a judiciary that should be kept independent. The all-embracing scope of the assailed
legislation as far as all inferior courts from the Courts of Appeals to municipal courts are
concerned, with the exception solely of the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax
Appeals 59 gave rise, and understandably so, to misgivings as to its effect on such cherished
Ideal. The first paragraph of the section on the transitory provision reads: "The provisions of this
Act shall be immediately carried out in accordance with an Executive Order to be issued by the
President. The Court of Appeals, the Courts of First Instance, the Circuit Criminal Courts, the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, the Courts of Agrarian Relations, the City Courts, the
Municipal Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Courts shall continue to function as presently
constituted and organized, until the completion of the reorganization provided in this Act as
declared by the President. Upon such declaration, the said courts shall be deemed
automatically abolished and the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold the office." 60 There is all
the more reason then why this Court has no choice but to inquire further into the allegation by
petitioners that the security of tenure provision, an assurance of a judiciary free from extraneous
influences, is thereby reduced to a barren form of words. The amended Constitution adheres
even more clearly to the long-established tradition of a strong executive that antedated the 1935
Charter. As noted in the work of former Vice-Governor Hayden, a noted political scientist,
President Claro M. Recto of the 1934 Convention, in his closing address, in stressing such a
concept, categorically spoke of providing "an executive power which, subject to the fiscalization
of the Assembly, and of public opinion, will not only know how to govern, but will actually
govern, with a firm and steady hand, unembarrassed by vexatious interferences by other
departments, or by unholy alliances with this and that social group." 61 The above excerpt was
cited with approval by Justice Laurel in Planas v. Gil. 62 Moreover, under the 1981 Amendments,
it may be affirmed that once again the principle of separation of powers, to quote from the same
jurist as ponente in Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 "obtains not through express provision
but by actual division." 64 The president, under Article VII, shall be the head of state and chief
executive of the Republic of the Philippines." 65Moreover, it is equally therein expressly provided
that all the powers he possessed under the 1935 Constitution are once again vested in him
unless the Batasang Pambansa provides otherwise." 66 Article VII of the 1935 Constitution
speaks categorically: "The Executive power shall be vested in a President of the
Philippines." 67 As originally framed, the 1973 Constitution created the position of President as
the "symbolic head of state." 68 In addition, there was a provision for a Prime Minister as the
head of government exercising the executive power with the assistance of the
Cabinet 69 Clearly, a modified parliamentary system was established. In the light of the 1981
amendments though, this Court in Free Telephone Workers Union v. Minister of Labor 70 could
state: "The adoption of certain aspects of a parliamentary system in the amended Constitution
does not alter its essentially presidential character." 71 The retention, however, of the position of
the Prime Minister with the Cabinet, a majority of the members of which shall come from the
regional representatives of the Batasang Pambansa and the creation of an Executive
Committee composed of the Prime Minister as Chairman and not more than fourteen other
members at least half of whom shall be members of the Batasang Pambansa, clearly indicate
the evolving nature of the system of government that is now operative. 72 What is equally
apparent is that the strongest ties bind the executive and legislative departments. It is likewise
undeniable that the Batasang Pambansa retains its full authority to enact whatever legislation
may be necessary to carry out national policy as usually formulated in a caucus of the majority
party. It is understandable then why in Fortun v. Labang 73 it was stressed that with the provision
transferring to the Supreme Court administrative supervision over the Judiciary, there is a
greater need "to preserve unimpaired the independence of the judiciary, especially so at
present, where to all intents and purposes, there is a fusion between the executive and the
legislative branches." 74

8. To be more specific, petitioners contend that the abolition of the existing inferior courts
collides with the security of tenure enjoyed by incumbent Justices and judges under Article X,

41
Section 7 of the Constitution. There was a similar provision in the 1935 Constitution. It did not,
however, go as far as conferring on this Tribunal the power to supervise administratively inferior
courts. 75 Moreover, this Court is em powered "to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a
vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal." 76 Thus it possesses the competence to
remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with such
power. 77 Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of
the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no
occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his
position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment
of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished,
the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the
abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the
judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance
with accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and
judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest
consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic
principle that this Court does not render advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If
such were the case, certainly this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either
of the two departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the
matter has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the
vacant positions created by the reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to
whom it properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of
judicial power, Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude
any plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing tulle
inferior courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored
or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even one
not readily discernidble except to those predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a
construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that in the choice of alternatives
between one which would save and another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be
preferred. 78 There is an obvious way to do so. The principle that the Constitution enters into and
forms part of every act to avoid any constitutional taint must be applied Nuñez v.
Sandiganbayan, 79 promulgated last January, has this relevant excerpt: "It is true that other
Sections of the Decree could have been so worded as to avoid any constitutional objection. As
of now, however, no ruling is called for. The view is given expression in the concurring and
dissenting opinion of Justice Makasiar that in such a case to save the Decree from the direct
fate of invalidity, they must be construed in such a way as to preclude any possible erosion on
the powers vested in this Court by the Constitution. That is a proposition too plain to be
committed. It commends itself for approval." 80Nor would such a step be unprecedented. The
Presidential Decree constituting Municipal Courts into Municipal Circuit Courts, specifically
provides: "The Supreme Court shall carry out the provisions of this Decree through
implementing orders, on a province-to-province basis." 81 It is true there is no such provision in
this Act, but the spirit that informs it should not be ignored in the Executive Order contemplated
under its Section 44. 82 Thus Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 could stand the most rigorous test of
constitutionality. 83

9. Nor is there anything novel in the concept that this Court is called upon to reconcile or
harmonize constitutional provisions. To be specific, the Batasang Pambansa is expressly vested
with the authority to reorganize inferior courts and in the process to abolish existing ones. As
noted in the preceding paragraph, the termination of office of their occupants, as a necessary
consequence of such abolition, is hardly distinguishable from the practical standpoint from
removal, a power that is now vested in this Tribunal. It is of the essence of constitutionalism to
assure that neither agency is precluded from acting within the boundaries of its conceded
competence. That is why it has long been well-settled under the constitutional system we have
adopted that this Court cannot, whenever appropriate, avoid the task of reconciliation. As
Justice Laurel put it so well in the previously cited Angara decision, while in the main, "the
Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the
executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government, the overlapping and
interlacing of functions and duties between the several departments, however, sometimes
makes it hard to say just where the one leaves off and the other begins." 84 It is well to recall
another classic utterance from the same jurist, even more emphatic in its affirmation of such a
view, moreover buttressed by one of those insights for which Holmes was so famous "The
classical separation of government powers, whether viewed in the light of the political

42
philosophy of Aristotle, Locke, or Motesquieu or of the postulations of Mabini, Madison, or
Jefferson, is a relative theory of government. There is more truism and actuality in
interdependence than in independence and separation of powers, for as observed by Justice
Holmes in a case of Philippine origin, we cannot lay down 'with mathematical precision and
divide the branches into water-tight compartments' not only because 'the great ordinances of the
Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white but also because 'even the
more specific of them are found to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme
to the other.'" 85 This too from Justice Tuazon, likewise expressing with force and clarity why the
need for reconciliation or balancing is well-nigh unavodiable under the fundamental principle of
separation of powers: "The constitutional structure is a complicated system, and overlappings of
governmental functions are recognized, unavoidable, and inherent necessities of governmental
coordination." 86 In the same way that the academe has noted the existence in constitutional
litigation of right versus right, there are instances, and this is one of them, where, without this
attempt at harmonizing the provisions in question, there could be a case of power against
power. That we should avoid.

10. There are other objections raised but they pose no difficulty. Petitioners would characterize
as an undue delegation of legislative power to the President the grant of authority to fix the
compensation and the allowances of the Justices and judges thereafter appointed. A more
careful reading of the challenged Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 ought to have cautioned them
against raising such an issue. The language of the statute is quite clear. The questioned
provisions reads as follows: "Intermediate Appellate Justices, Regional Trial Judges,
Metropolitan Trial Judges, municipal Trial Judges, and Municipal Circuit Trial Judges shall
receive such receive such compensation and allowances as may be authorized by the President
along the guidelines set forth in Letter of Implementation No. 93 pursuant to Presidential Decree
No. 985, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1597." 87 The existence of a standard is thus
clear. The basic postulate that underlies the doctrine of non-delegation is that it is the legislative
body which is entrusted with the competence to make laws and to alter and repeal them, the
test being the completeness of the statue in all its terms and provisions when enacted. As
pointed out in Edu v. Ericta: 88 "To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a
standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle
and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard
to repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and
specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative
command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out.
Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above
guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. The standard may be either express
or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does
not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act
considered as a whole." 89 The undeniably strong links that bind the executive and legislative
departments under the amended Constitution assure that the framing of policies as well as their
implementation can be accomplished with unity, promptitude, and efficiency. There is accuracy,
therefore, to this observation in the Free Telephone Workers Union decision: "There is
accordingly more receptivity to laws leaving to administrative and executive agencies the
adoption of such means as may be necessary to effectuate a valid legislative purpose. It is
worth noting that a highly-respected legal scholar, Professor Jaffe, as early as 1947, could
speak of delegation as the 'dynamo of modern government.'" 90 He warned against a "restrictive
approach" which could be "a deterrent factor to much-needed legislation." 91 Further on this
point from the same opinion" "The spectre of the non-delegation concept need not haunt,
therefore, party caucuses, cabinet sessions or legislative chambers." 92 Another objection based
on the absence in the statue of what petitioners refer to as a "definite time frame limitation" is
equally bereft of merit. They ignore the categorical language of this provision: "The Supreme
Court shall submit to the President, within thirty (30) days from the date of the effectivity of this
act, a staffing pattern for all courts constituted pursuant to this Act which shall be the basis of
the implementing order to be issued by the President in accordance with the immediately
succeeding section." 93 The first sentence of the next section is even more categorical: "The
provisions of this Act shall be immediately carried out in accordance with an Executive Order to
be issued by the President." 94 Certainly petitioners cannot be heard to argue that the President
is insensible to his constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. 95 In the
meanwhile, the existing inferior courts affected continue functioning as before, "until the
completion of the reorganization provided in this Act as declared by the President. Upon such
declaration, the said courts shall be deemed automatically abolished and the incumbents

43
thereof shall cease to hold office." 96 There is no ambiguity. The incumbents of the courts thus
automatically abolished "shall cease to hold office." No fear need be entertained by incumbents
whose length of service, quality of performance, and clean record justify their being named
anew, 97 in legal contemplation without any interruption in the continuity of their service. 98 It is
equally reasonable to assume that from the ranks of lawyers, either in the government service,
private practice, or law professors will come the new appointees. In the event that in certain
cases a little more time is necessary in the appraisal of whether or not certain incumbents
deserve reappointment, it is not from their standpoint undesirable. Rather, it would be a
reaffirmation of the good faith that will characterize its implementation by the Executive. There is
pertinence to this observation of Justice Holmes that even acceptance of the generalization that
courts ordinarily should not supply omissions in a law, a generalization qualified as earlier
shown by the principle that to save a statute that could be done, "there is no canon against
using common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean." 99 Where then is
the unconstitutional flaw

11. On the morning of the hearing of this petition on September 8, 1981, petitioners sought to
have the writer of this opinion and Justices Ramon C. Aquino and Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera
disqualified because the first-named was the chairman and the other two, members of the
Committee on Judicial Reorganization. At the hearing, the motion was denied. It was made
clear then and there that not one of the three members of the Court had any hand in the framing
or in the discussion of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. They were not consulted. They did not testify.
The challenged legislation is entirely the product of the efforts of the legislative body. 100 Their
work was limited, as set forth in the Executive Order, to submitting alternative plan for
reorganization. That is more in the nature of scholarly studies. That the undertook. There could
be no possible objection to such activity. Ever since 1973, this Tribunal has had administrative
supervision over interior courts. It has had the opportunity to inform itself as to the way judicial
business is conducted and how it may be improved. Even prior to the 1973 Constitution, it is the
recollection of the writer of this opinion that either the then Chairman or members of the
Committee on Justice of the then Senate of the Philippines 101 consulted members of the Court
in drafting proposed legislation affecting the judiciary. It is not inappropriate to cite this excerpt
from an article in the 1975 Supreme Court Review: "In the twentieth century the Chief Justice of
the United States has played a leading part in judicial reform. A variety of conditions have been
responsible for the development of this role, and foremost among them has been the creation of
explicit institutional structures designed to facilitate reform." 102 Also: "Thus the Chief Justice
cannot avoid exposure to and direct involvement in judicial reform at the federal level and, to the
extent issues of judicial federalism arise, at the state level as well." 103

12. It is a cardinal article of faith of our constitutional regime that it is the people who are
endowed with rights, to secure which a government is instituted. Acting as it does through public
officials, it has to grant them either expressly or impliedly certain powers. Those they exercise
not for their own benefit but for the body politic. The Constitution does not speak in the language
of ambiguity: "A public office is a public trust." 104 That is more than a moral adjuration It is a
legal imperative. The law may vest in a public official certain rights. It does so to enable them to
perform his functions and fulfill his responsibilities more efficiently. It is from that standpoint that
the security of tenure provision to assure judicial independence is to be viewed. It is an added
guarantee that justices and judges can administer justice undeterred by any fear of reprisal or
untoward consequence. Their judgments then are even more likely to be inspired solely by their
knowledge of the law and the dictates of their conscience, free from the corrupting influence of
base or unworthy motives. The independence of which they are assured is impressed with a
significance transcending that of a purely personal right. As thus viewed, it is not solely for their
welfare. The challenged legislation Thus subject d to the most rigorous scrutiny by this Tribunal,
lest by lack of due care and circumspection, it allow the erosion of that Ideal so firmly embedded
in the national consciousness There is this farther thought to consider. independence in thought
and action necessarily is rooted in one's mind and heart. As emphasized by former Chief
Justice Paras in Ocampo v. Secretary of Justice, 105 there is no surer guarantee of judicial
independence than the God-given character and fitness of those appointed to the Bench. The
judges may be guaranteed a fixed tenure of office during good behavior, but if they are of such
stuff as allows them to be subservient to one administration after another, or to cater to the
wishes of one litigant after another, the independence of the judiciary will be nothing more than
a myth or an empty Ideal. Our judges, we are confident, can be of the type of Lord Coke,
regardless or in spite of the power of Congress — we do not say unlimited but as herein
exercised — to reorganize inferior courts." 106 That is to recall one of the greatest Common Law

44
jurists, who at the cost of his office made clear that he would not just blindly obey the King's
order but "will do what becomes [him] as a judge." So it was pointed out in the first leading case
stressing the independence of the judiciary, Borromeo v. Mariano, 107 The ponencia of Justice
Malcolm Identified good judges with "men who have a mastery of the principles of law, who
discharge their duties in accordance with law, who are permitted to perform the duties of the
office undeterred by outside influence, and who are independent and self-respecting human
units in a judicial system equal and coordinate to the other two departments of
government." 108 There is no reason to assume that the failure of this suit to annul Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 would be attended with deleterious consequences to the administration of
justice. It does not follow that the abolition in good faith of the existing inferior courts except the
Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals and the creation of new ones will result in a
judiciary unable or unwilling to discharge with independence its solemn duty or one recreant to
the trust reposed in it. Nor should there be any fear that less than good faith will attend the
exercise be of the appointing power vested in the Executive. It cannot be denied that an
independent and efficient judiciary is something to the credit of any administration. Well and
truly has it been said that the fundamental principle of separation of powers assumes, and
justifiably so, that the three departments are as one in their determination to pursue the Ideals
and aspirations and to fulfilling the hopes of the sovereign people as expressed in the
Constitution. There is wisdom as well as validity to this pronouncement of Justice Malcolm
in Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation Company, 109 a decision promulgated almost half
a century ago: "Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not
sanction usurpations by any other department or the government, so should it as strictly confine
its own sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by the
Organic Act." 110 To that basic postulate underlying our constitutional system, this Court remains
committed.

WHEREFORE, the unconstitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 not having been shown, this
petition is dismissed. No costs.

Makasiar and Escolin, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, Jr., concur in the result.

Separate Opinions

BARREDO, J., concurring:

I join the majority of my brethren in voting that the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, is not unconstitutional as a whole nor in any of its parts.

The issue of unconstitutionality raised by petitioners relates particularly to Section 44 of the Act
which reads as follows:

SEC. 44. Transitory provisions. — The provisions of this Act shall be immediately
carried out in accordance with an Executive Order to be issued by the President.
The Court of Appeals, the Courts of First Instance, the Circuit Criminal Courts,
the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, the Courts of Agrarian Relations,
the City Courts, the Municipal Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Courts shall
continue to function as presently constituted and organized, until the completion
of the reorganization provided in this Act as declared by the President. Upon
such declaration, the said courts shall be deemed automatically abolished and
the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold office. The cases pending in the old
Courts shall e transferred to the appropriate Courts constituted pursuant to this
Act, together with the pertinent functions, records, equipment,. property and the
necessary personnel.

45
 The applicable appropriations shall likewise be transferred to the appropriate
courts constituted pursuant to this Act, to be augmented as may be necessary
from the funds for organizational changes as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg.
80. Said funding shall thereafter be included in the annual General
Appropriations Act.

It is contended by petitioners that the provision in the above section which mandates that "upon
the declaration upon the President that the reorganization contemplated in the Act has been
completed), the said courts (meaning the Court of Appeals and all other lower courts, except the
Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals) shall be deemed abolished and the incumbents
thereof shall cease to hold office" trenches on all the constitutional safeguards and guarantees
of the independence of the judiciary, such as the security of tenure of its members (Section 7,
Article X of the Philippine Constitution of 1973), the prerogatives of the Supreme Court to
administratively supervise all courts and the personnel thereof (Section 6, Id.) and principally,
the power of the Supreme Court "to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least
eight Members, order their dismissal. " (Section 7, Id.)

On the other hand, respondents maintain that thru the above-quoted Section 44. the Batasan
did nothing more than to exercise the authority conferred upon it be Section I of the same Article
of the Constitution which provides that The Judicial power shall be rested in one Supreme Court
and in such inferior courts as may be established by law." In other words, since all inferior courts
are, constitutionally speaking, mere creatures of the law (of the legislature it follows that it is
within the legislature's power to abolish or reorganize them even if in so doing, it might result in
the cessation from office of the incumbents thereof before the expiration of their respective
constitutionally fixed tenures. Respondents emphasize that the legislative power in this respect
is broad and indeed plenary.

Viewing the problem before Us from the above perspectives, it would appear that our task is
either (1) to reconcile, on the one hand, the parliament's power of abolition and reorganization
with, on the other, the security of tenure of members of the judiciary and the Supreme Court's
authority to discipline and remove judges or (2) to declare that either the power of the Supreme
Court or of the Batasan is more paramount than that of the other. I believe. however, that such a
manner of looking at the issue that confronts Us only confuses and compounds the task We are
called upon to perform. For how can there be a satisfactory and rational reconciliation of the
pretended right of a judge to continue as such, when the position occupied by him no longer
exists? To suggest, as some do, that the solution is for the court he is sitting in not to be
deemed abolished or that he should in some way be allowed to continue to function as judge
until his constitutional tenure expires is obviously impractical, if only because we would then
have the absurd spectacle of a judiciary with old and new courts functioning under distinct set-
ups, such as a district court continuing as such in a region where the other judges are regional
judges or of judges exercising powers not purely judicial which is offensive to the Constitution.
The other suggestion that the incumbent of the abolished court should be deemed appointed to
the corresponding new court is even worse, since it would deprive the appointing authority, the
president, of the power to make his own choices and would, furthermore, amount to an
appointment by legislation which is a Constitutional anachronism. more on this point later .

Inasmuch as pursuant to the analysis of the majority of the Members of this Court, in fact and in
law, the structure of judicial system created by Batas Pambansa 129 is substantially different
from that under the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, hence the courts now existing are
actually being abolished, why do We have to indulge in any reconciliation or feel bound to
determine whose power, that of the Batasang Pambansa or that of this Court, should be
considered more imperious? It being conceded that the power to create or establish carries with
it the power to abolish, and it is a legal axiom, or at least a pragmatic reality that the tenure of
the holder of an office must of necessity end when his office no longer exists, as I see it, be
have no alternative than to hold that petitioners' invocation of the independence of the judiciary
principle of the Constitution is unavailing ill the cases at bar. It is as simple as that. I might
hasten to add, in this connection, that to insist that what Batas Pambansa 129 is doing is just a
renaming and not a substantial and actual modification or alteration of the present judicial
structure or system assuming a close scrutiny might somehow support such a conclusion, is
pure wishful thinking, it being explicitly and unequivocally provided in the section in question that
said courts are deemed abolished" and further, as if to make it most unmistakably emphatic,
that "the incumbents thereat shall cease to hold office." Dura les, sed les. As a matter of fact, I

46
cannot conceive of a more emphatic way of manifesting and conveying the determined
legislative intent about it.

Now, why am I yielding to the above reasoning and conclusion? Why don't I insist on
championing the cause of the independence of the judiciary by maintaining that the
constitutional safeguards thereof I have already enumerated earlier must be respected in any
reorganization ordained by the parliament My answer is simple. Practically all the Members of
the Court concede that what is contemplated is not only general reorganization but abolition —
in other words, not only a rearrangement or remodelling of the old structure but a total
demolition thereof to be followed by the building of a new and different one. I am practically
alone in contemplating a different view. True, even if I should appear as shouting in the
wilderness, I would still make myself a hero in the eyes of man justices and judges, members of
the bar and concerned discerning citizens, all lovers of the judicial independence, but
understandably, I should not be, as I am not, disposed to play such a role virtually at the
expense not only of my distinguished colleagues but of the Batasang Pambansa that framed the
law and, most of all, the President who signed and, therefore, sanctioned the Act as it is, unless
I am absolutely sure that my position is formidable, unassailable and beyond all possible
contrary ratiocination, which I am not certain of, as I shall demonstrate anon.

To start with, the jurisprudence, here and abroad, touching on the question now before Us
cannot be said to be clear and consistent, much less unshakeable and indubitably definite either
way. None of the local cases 1 relied upon and discussed by the parties and by the Members of
the Court during the deliberations, such as Borromeo, 2 Ocampo, 3Zandueta, 4 Brillo, 5 etc. can,
to my mind, really serve as reliable pole stars that could lead me to certainty of correctness.

Of course, my instinct and passion for an independent judiciary are uncompromising and
beyond diminution. Indeed, my initial reactions, publicly known, about Batas Pambansa 129
explaining academically its apparent tendency to invade the areas of authority of the Supreme
Court, not to speak of its dangerously impairing the independence of the judiciary, must have, I
imagine, created the impression that I would vote to declare the law unconstitutional. But, during
the deliberations of the Court, the combined wisdom of my learned colleagues was something I
could not discount or just brush aside. Pondering and thinking deeper about all relevant factors,
I have come to the conviction that at least on this day and hour there are justifiable grounds to
uphold the Act, if only to try how it will operate so that thereby the people may see that We are
one with the President and the Batasan in taking what appear to be immediate steps needed to
relieve the people from a fast spreading cancer in the judiciary of our country.

Besides, the Philippines has somehow not yet returned to complete normalcy The improved
national discipline so evident during the earlier days of martial law, has declined at a quite
discernible degree. Different sectors of society are demanding urgent reforms in their respective
field And about the most vehement and persistent, loud and clear, among their gripes, which as
a matter of fact is common to all of them is that about the deterioration in the quality of
performance of the judges manning our courts and the slow and dragging pace of pending
judicial proceedings. Strictly speaking, this is, to be sure, something that may not necessarily be
related to lack of independence of the judiciary. It has more to do with the ineptness and/or
corruption among and corruptibility of the men sitting in the courts in some parts of the country
And what is worse, while in the communities concerned the malady is known to factually exist
and is actually graver and widespread, very few, if any individuals or even associations and
organized groups, truly incensed and anxious to be of help, have the courage and possess the
requisite legal evidence to come out and file the corresponding charges with the Supreme
Court, And I am not vet referring to similar situations that are not quite openly known but
nevertheless just as deleterious. On the other hand, if all these intolerable instances should
actually be formally brought to the Supreme Court, it would be humanly impossible for the Court
to dispose of them with desirable dispatch, what with the thousands of other cases it has to
attend to and the rather cumbersome strict requirements of procedural due process it has to
observe in each and every such administrative case all of which are time consulting. Verily,
under the foregoing circumstances, it may be said that there is justification for the patience of
the people about the possibility of early eradication of this disease or evil in our judiciary
pictured above to be nearing the breaking point.

Withal, we must bear in mind that judicial reorganization becomes urgent and inevitable not
alone because of structural inadequacies of the system or of the cumbersomeness and

47
technicality-peppered and dragging procedural rules in force, but also when it becomes evident
that a good number of those occupying positions in the judiciary, make a mockery of justice and
take advantage of their office for selfish personal ends and yet, as already explained, those in
authority cannot expeditiously cope with the situation under existing laws and rules. It is my
personal assessment of the present situation in our judiciary that its reorganization has to be of
necessity two-pronged, as I have just indicated, for the most Ideal judicial system with the most
perfect procedural rules cannot satisfy the people and the interests of justice unless the men
who hold positions therein possess the character, competence and sense of loyalty that can
guarantee their devotion to duty and absolute impartiality, nay, impregnability to an temptations
of graft and corruption, including the usual importunings and the fearsome albeit improper
pressures of the powers that be. I am certain that the Filipino people feel happy that Batas
Pambansa 129 encompasses both of these objectives, which indeed are aligned with the
foundation of the principle of independence of the judiciary.

The above premises considered, I have decided to tackle our problem from the viewpoint of the
unusual situation in which our judiciary is presently perilously situated. Needless to say, to all of
us, the Members of the Court, the constitutional guarantees of security of tenure and removal
only by the Supreme Court, among others, against impairment of the independence of the
judiciary, which is one of the bedrock's and, therefore, of the essence in any "democracy under
a regime of justice, peace, liberty and equality (Preamble of the 1973 Constitution), are
priceless and should be defended, most of all by the Supreme Court, with all the wisdom and
courage God has individually endowed to each of Us. Withal, we are all conscious of the fact
that those safeguards have never been intended to place the person of the judge in a singular
position of privilege and untouchability, but rather, that they are essentially part and parcel of
what is required of an independent judiciary where judges can decide cases and do justice to
everyone before them ruat caelum. However, We find Ourselves face to face with a situation, in
our judiciary which is of emergency proportions and to insist on rationalizing how those
guarantees should be enforced under such a circumstance seem to be difficult, aside from
being controversial. And so, in a real sense, We have to make a choice between adhering to the
strictly legalistic reasoning pursued by petitioners, on the one hand, and the broader and more
practical approach, which as I have said is within the spirit at least of the Constitution.

My concept of the Constitution is that it is not just a cluster of high sounding verbiages spelling
purely Idealism and nobility in the recognition of human dignity, protection of individual liberties
and providing security and promotion of the general welfare under a government of laws. With
all emphasis and vehemence, I say that the fundamental law of the land is a living instrument
which translates and adapts itself to the demands of obtaining circumstances. It is written for all
seasons, except for very unusual instances that human ratiocination cannot justify to be
contemplated by its language even if read in its broadest sense and in the most liberal way.
Verily, it is paramount and supreme in peace and in war, but even in peace grave critical
situations arise demanding recourse to extraordinary solutions. Paraphrasing the Spanish
adage, "Grandes males, grandes remedios ", such in ordinary problems justify exceptional
remedies. And so, history records that in the face of grave crises and emergencies, the most
constitutionally Idealistic countries have, at one time or another, under the pressure of
pragmatic considerations, adopted corresponding realistic measures, which perilously tether
along the periphery of their Charters, to the extent of creating impressions, of course erroneous,
that the same had been transgressed, although in truth their integrity and imperiousness
remained undiminished and unimpaired.

The Philippines has but recently had its own experience of such constitutional approach. When
martial law was proclaimed here in 1972, there were those who vociferously shouted not only
that the President had acted arbitrarily and without the - required factual bases contemplated in
the Commander-in-Chief clause of the 1935 Constitution, but more, that he had gone beyond
the traditional and universally recognized intent of said clause by utilizing his martial law powers
not only to maintain peace and tranquility and preserve and defend the integrity and security of
the state but to establish a New Society The critics contended that martial law is only for
national security, not for the imposition of national discipline under a New Society.

Due to its relevancy to Our present discussion, it is well for everyone to bear in mind that in this
jurisdiction, this concept of martial law has already been upheld several times by this Court. 1,
for one, accepted such a construction because I firmly believe that to impose martial law for the
sole end of suppressing an insurrection or rebellion without coincidentally taking corresponding

48
measures to eradicate the root causes of the uprising is utter folly, for the country would still
continue to lay open to its recurrence.

I have made the foregoing discourse, for it is fundamentally in the fight of this Court's doctrines
about the imposition of martial law as I have stated that I prefer to base this concurrence. To put
it differently, if indeed there could be some doubt as to the correctness of this Court's judgment
that Batas Pambansa 129 is not unconstitutional, particularly its Section 44, I am convinced that
the critical situation of our judiciary today calls for solutions that may not in the eyes of some
conform strictly with the letter of the Constitution but indubitably justified by its spirit and intent.
As 1 have earlier indicated, the Charter is not just a construction of words to whose literal iron-
clad meanings we must feel hidebound without regard to every Constitution's desirable inherent
nature of adjustability and adaptability to prevailing situations so that the spirit and fundamental
intent and objectives of the framers may remain alive. Batas Pambansa 129 is one such
adaptation that comes handy for the attainment of the transcendental objectives it seeks to
pursue While, to be sure, it has the effect of factually easing out some justices and judges
before the end of their respective constitutional tenure sans the usual administrative
investigation, the desirable end is achieved thru means that, in the light of the prevailing
conditions, is constitutionally permissible.

Before closing, it may not be amiss for me to point out that Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, aside
from what has been discussed about its effect on the guarantees of judicial independence, also
preempts, in some of its provisions, the primary rule-making power of the Supreme Court in
respect to procedure, practice and evidence. With the pardon of my colleagues, I would just like
to say that the Court should not decry this development too much. After all, the legislature is
expressly empowered by the Charter to do so, (Section 5(5), Article X of the Constitution of
1973) so much so, that I doubt if the Court has any authority to alter or modify any rule the
Batasang Pambansa enunciates. Truth to tell, as Chairman of the Committee on the Revision of
the Rules of Court, for one reason or another, principally the lack of a clear consensus as to
what some of my colleagues consider very radical proposals voiced by me or my committee,
We have regrettably procrastinated long enough in making our procedural rules more practical
and more conducive to speedier disposal and termination of controversies by dealing more with
substantial justice.

So also have We, it must be confessed, failed to come up to expectations of the framers of the
Constitution in our ways of disposing of administrative complaints against erring and
misconducting judges. Of course, We can excuse Ourselves with the explanation that not only
are We overloaded with work beyond human capability of its being performed expeditiously, but
that the strict requisites of due process which are time consuming have precluded Us from
being more expeditious and speedy.

I feel I must say all of these, because if the above-discussed circumstances have not combined
to create a very critical situation in our judiciary that is making the people lose its faith and
confidence in the administration of justice by the existing courts, perhaps the Court could look
with more sympathy at the stand of petitioners. I want all the sundry to know, however, that
notwithstanding this decision, the independence of the judiciary in the Philippines is far from
being insubstantial, much less meaningless and dead. Batas Pambansa 129 has precisely
opened our eyes to how, despite doubts and misgivings, the Constitution can be so construed
as to make it possible for those in authority to answer the clamor of the people for an upright
judiciary and overcome constitutional roadblocks more apparent than real.

To those justices, judges, members of the bar and concerned citizens whose eyes may be
dimming with tears of disappointment and disenchantment because of the stand I have chosen
to adopt in these cases, may I try to assuage them by joining their fervent prayers that some
other day, hopefully in the near future, Divine Providence may dictate to another constitutional
convention to write the guarantees of judicial independence with ink of deeper hue and words
that are definite, clear, unambiguous and unequivocal, in drawing the line of demarcation
between the Parliament and the Judiciary in the manner that in His Infinite wisdom would most
promote genuine and impartial justice for our people, free, not only from graft, corruption,
ineptness and incompetence but even from the tentacles of interference and insiduous influence
of the political powers that be. Presently, I am constrained from going along with any other view
than that the Constitution allows abolition of existing courts even if the effect has to be the

49
elimination of any incumbent judge and the consequent cutting of his constitutional tenure of
office.

I cannot close this concurrence without referring to the apprehensions in some quarters about
the choice that will ultimately be made of those who will be eased out of the judiciary in the
course of the implementation of Batas Pambansa 129. By this decision, the Court has in factual
effect albeit not in constitutional conception yielded generally to the Batasang Pambansa, and
more specifically to the President, its own constitutionally conferred power of removal of judges.
Section 44 of the Batasan's Act declares that all of them shall be deemed to have ceased to
hold office, leaving it to the President to appoint those whom he may see fit to occupy the new
courts. Thus, those who will not be appointed can be considered as "ceasing to hold their
respective offices", or, as others would say they would be in fact removed. How the President
will make his choices is beyond Our power to control. But even if some may be eased out even
without being duly informed of the reason therefor, much less being given the opportunity to be
heard the past actuations of the President on all matters of deep public interest shouted serve
as sufficient assurance that when lie ultimately acts, he will faithfully adhere to his solemn oath
"to do justice to every man hence, lie will equip himself first with the fullest reliable information
before acts. This is not only my individual faith founded on my personal acquaintance with the
character and sterling qualities of President Ferdinand E. Marcos. I dare say this is the faith of
the nation in a man who has led it successfully through crises and emergencies, with justice to
all, with malice towards none. I am certain, the President will deal with each and every individual
to be affected by this reorganization with the best light that God will give him every moment he
acts in each individual case as it comes for his decision

AQUINO, J., concurring:

I concur in the result. The petitioners filed this petition for declaratory relief and prohibition "to
declare the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (Batas Pambansa Blg. 129) unconstitutional".

The petition should have been dismissed outright because this Court has no jurisdiction to grant
declaratory relief and prohibition is not the proper remedy to test the constitutionality of the law.
the petition is premature. No jurisdictional question is involved.

There is no justiciable controversy wherein the constitutionality of the said law is in issue. It is
presumed to be constitutional. The lawmaking body before enacting it looked into the
constitutional angle.

Seven of the eight petitioners are practising lawyers. They have no personality to assail the
constitutionality of the said law even as taxpayers.

The eighth petitioner, Gualberto J. de la Llana, a city judge (who in 1977 filed a petition for
declaratory relief assailing Presidential Decree No. 1229, which called for a referendum. De la
Llana his Comelec, 80 SCRA 525), has no cause of action for prohibition. He is not being
removed from his position.

The Judiciary Reorganization Law was enacted in utmost good faith and not "to cloak an
unconstitutional and evil purpose As ably expounded by the Chief Justice, in enacting the said
law, the lawmaking body acted within the scope of its constitutional powers and prerogatives.

GUERRERO, J., concurring:

I concur with my distinguished and learned colleagues in upholding the constitutionality of the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. For the record, however, I would like to state my personal
convictions and observations on this case, a veritable landmark case, for whatever they may be
worth.

50
The legal basis of the Court's opinion rendered by our esteemed Chief Justice having been
exhaustively discussed and decisively justified by him, a highly-respected expert and authority
on constitutional law, it would be an exercise in duplication to reiterate the same cases and
precedents. I am then constrained to approach the problem quite differently, not through the
classic methods of philosophy, history and tradition, but following what the well-known jurist,
Dean Pound, said that "the most significant advance in the modern science of law is the change
from the analytical to the functional attitude." 1 And in pursuing this direct

ion, I must also reckon with and rely on the ruling that "another guide to the meaning of a statute
is found in the evil which it is designed to remedy, and for this the court properly looks at
contemporaneous events, the situation as it existed, and as it was pressed upon the attention of
the legislative body." 2

I have no doubt in my mind that the institutional reforms and changes envisioned by the law are
clearly conducive to the promotion of national interests. The objectives of the legislation namely:
(a) An institutional restructuring by the creation of an Intermediate Appellate Court, thirteen (I 3)
Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts: (b) A reappointment of jurisdiction geared towards greater efficiency: (c) A
simplification of procedures and (d) The abolition of the inferior courts created by the Judiciary
Act of 1948 and other statutes, as approved by the Congress of the Philippines 3 are
undoubtedly intended to improve the regime of justice and thereby enhance public good and
order. Indeed, the purpose of the Act as further stated in the Explanatory Note, which is "to
embody reforms in the structure, organization and composition of the Judiciary, with the aim of
improving the administration of justice, of decongesting judicial dockets, and coping with the
more complex problems on the present and forseeable future cannot but "promote the welfare
of society, since that is the final cause of law. 4

Hence, from the standpoint of The general utility and functional value of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act, there should be no difficulty, doubt or disbelief in its legality and
constitutionality. That there are ills and evils plaguing the judicial system is undeniable. The
notorious and scandalous congestion of court dockets as too well-known to be ignored as are
the causes which create and produce such anomaly. Evident is the need to look for devices and
measures that are more practical, workable and economical. 5

From the figures alone (301,497 pending cases in 1976; 351, 943 in 1977; 404, 686 in 1978;
426, 911 in 1979; 441, 332 in 1980; and 450, 063 as of February 3, 1982) 6 the congested
character of court dockets rising year after year is staggering and enormous, looming like a
legal monster.

But greater than the need to dispense justice speedily and promptly is the necessity to have
Justices and Judges who are fair and impartial, honest and incorruptible, competent and
efficient. The general clamor that the prestige of the Judiciary today has deteriorated and
degenerated to the lowest ebb in public estimation is not without factual basis. Records in the
Supreme Court attest to the unfitness and incompetence, corruption and immorality of many
dispensers of justice. According to the compiled data, the total number of Justices and Judges
against whom administrative charges have been filed for various offenses, misconduct,
venalities and other irregularities reaches 322. Of this total, 8 are Justices of the Court of
Appeals, 119 CFI Judges, 2 Criminal Circuit Judges, 8 CAR Judges, 1 Juvenile & Domestic
Relations Court Judge, 38 City Judges, and 146 Municipal Judges.

The Supreme Court has found 102 of them guilty and punished them with either suspension,
admonition, reprimand or fine. The number includes 1 CA Justice, 35 CFI Judges, 1 CCC
Judge, 3 CAR Judges, 1 JDRC Judge, 9 City Judges and 53 Municipal Judges.

Seventeen (17) Judges have been ordered dismissed and separated from the service. And
these are 3 CFI, 1 CAR, 1 City Judge and 12 Municipal Judges.

Going over these administrative proceedings, it took an average of two-year period from the
filing of the charge to the dismissal of the respondent. In one case, the proceedings were
terminated after seven years. How long the pending administrative cases will be disposed of,

51
only time will tell as an increasing number of administrative cases are being filed by victims of
judicial misconduct, abuse and arbitrariness.

Excepting those who have been punished and dismissed from the service, there are many who
have been castigated and censured in final judgments of the Supreme Court upon appeal or
review of the decisions, orders and other acts of the respondent courts, Justices and Judges. To
cite a few cases, Our decisions have categorically pronounced respondents' actuations, thus:
"deplorable, giving no credit to the Judiciary" 7; applicable rules. The whole proceedings looked
no more than a pre-arranged compromise between the accused and the Judge to flaunt the law
and every norm of propriety and procedure" 8; "there was a deliberate failure of respondent
Judge to respect what is so clearly provided in the Rules of Court" 9; "It is unfortunate that
respondent Judge failed to acquaint himself with, 01' misinterpreted, those controlling provisions
and doctrines" 10; "The failure of the respondent Municipal Judge to yield obedience to
authoritative decisions of the Supreme Court and of respondent Court of First Instance Judge
and his deplorable insistence on procedural technicalities was called down in L-49828, July 25,
1981. For peremptorily dismissing the third party complaint on the ground that the motion to
dismiss was 'well-taken' and respondent Judge did not elaborate, the Court remarked: "May his
tribe vanish." 11 In one case, We noted "There is here so something unusual, but far from
palliating the gravity of the error incurred, it merely exacerbated it. ... it did render the due
process requirement nugatory, for instead of a fair and impartial trial, there was an Idle form, a
useless ceremony." 12

It is dishonorable enough to be publicly and officially rebuked but to allow these Judges and
their ilk to remain and continue to preside in their courtrooms is a disgrace to the Judiciary. It is
to be deplored that the Supreme Court has not found time to exercise its power and authority in
the premises, for no charges or proceedings have been instituted against them. We have a list
of these crooked Judges whose actuations have been found to be patiently wrong and
manifestly in-defeasible. There ought to be no objection or compunction in weeding them out
from the service. If they are not booted out now, it will take from here to eternity to clean this
Augean stable.

Candidly, one reason for writing this concurring opinion is to call attention to these evils, abuses
and wrongs which are surreptitiously but surely destroying the trust and faith of the people in the
integrity of the entire Judiciary. Some members of the Court felt that these revelations would be
like washing dirty linen in public. But these facts are of public and official record nay court
cases, and sooner or later, Truth will come out.

In the light of these known evils and infirmities of the judiciary system, it would be absurd and
unreasonable to claim that the legislators did not act upon them in good faith and honesty of
purpose and with legitimate ends. It is presumed that official duty has been regularly
performed. 13 The presumption of regularity is not confined to the acts of the individual officers
but also applies to the acts of boards, such as administrative board or bodies, and to acts of
legislative bodies. 14 Good faith is always to be presumed in the absence of proof to the
contrary, of which there is none in the case at bar. It could not be otherwise if We are to accord
as We must, full faith and credit to the lawmakers' deep sense of public service and the
judicious exercise of their high office as the duly-elected representatives of the people.

It is conceded that the abolition of an office is legal if attendant with good faith. 15 The question
of good faith then is the crux of the conflict at bar. Good faith in the enactment of the law does
not refer to the wisdom of the measure, the propriety of the Act, or to its expediency. The
questions raised by petitioners and amicus curiae for their cause, viz: Why abolish all the courts
Why legislate out the judges Why not amend the Rules of Court only Is abolition of all courts the
proper remedy to weed out corrupt and misfits in our Judiciary? — may not be inquired into by
Us. "It is not the province of the courts to supervise legislation and keep it within the bounds of
propriety and common sense. That is primarily and exclusively a legislative concern." 16 The
Courts "are not supposed to override legitimate policy and ... never inquire into the wisdom of
the law." 17 Chief Justice Fernando who penned the Morfe decision, writes that while "(i)t is thus
settled, to paraphrase Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, that
only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the action taken, may be the basis
for declaring a statute invalid," 18 he adds that it is "useful to recall what was so clearly stated by
Laurel that 'the Judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the
wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive

52
and legislative departments of the government.'" 19In any case, petitioners have not shown an
iota of proof of bad faith. There is no factual foundation of bad faith on record. And I do not
consider the statement in the sponsorship speech for Cabinet Bill No. 42 of Minister of Justice
Ricardo J. Puno that the Bill would be a more efficient vehicle of "eliminating incompetent and
unfit Judges as indicative of impermissible legislative motive. 20

It may be true that while the remedy or solution formulated by the legislation will eradicate
hopefully or at least minimize the evils and ills that infect and pester the judicial body, it will
result in the actual removal of the Justices of the Court of Appeals and Judges of the lower
courts. It is also true that whether it is termed abolition of office or removal from office, the end-
result is the same — termination of the services of these incumbents. Indeed, the law may be
harsh, but that is the law. Dura lex sed lex.

The Justices and Judges directly affected by the law, being lawyers, should know or are
expected to know the nature and concept of a public office. It is created for the purpose of
effecting the ends for which government has been instituted, which are for the common good,
and not the profit, honor or private interest of any one man, family or class of men. In our form of
government, it is fundamental that public offices are public trust, and that the person to be
appointed should be selected solely with a view to the public welfare. 21 In the last analysis, a
public office is a privilege in the gift of the State. 22

There is no such thing as a vested interest or an estate in an office, or even an absolute right to
hold office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary
and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its salary. When an office
is created by the Constitution, it cannot be abolished by the legislature, but when created by the
State under the authority of the Constitution, it may be abolished by statute and the incumbent
deprived of his office. 23 Acceptance of a judicial appointment must be deemed as adherence to
the rule that "when the court is abolished, any unexpired term is abolished also. The Judge of
such a court takes office with that encumbrance and knowledge." 24 "The Judge's right to his full
term and his full salary are not dependent alone upon his good conduct, but also upon the
contingency that the legislature may for the public good, in ordaining and establishing the
courts, from time to time consider his office unnecessary and abolish it." 25

The removal from office of the incumbent then is merely incidental to the valid act of abolition of
the office as demanded by the superior and paramount interest of the people. The bad and the
crooked Judges must be removed. The good and the straight, sober Judges should be
reappointed but that is the sole power and prerogative of the President who, I am certain, will
act according to the best interest of the nation and in accordance with his solemn oath of office
"to preserve and defend its Constitution, execute its laws, do justice to everyone ... " There and
then the proper balance between the desire to preserve private interest and the desideratum of
promoting the public good shall have been struck. 26

The Supreme Court has been called the conscience of the Constitution. It may be the last
bulwark of constitutional government. 27 It Must, however, be remembered "that legislatures are
ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as
courts." 28 The responsibility of upholding the Constitution rests not on the courts alone but on
the legislatures as well. It adheres, therefore, to the well-settled principle that "all reasonable
doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute" for which reason it will not
set aside a law as violative of the Constitution "except in a clear case." 29

Finally, I view the controversy presented to Us as a conflict of opinions — on judicial

independence, whether impaired or strengthened by the law; on reorganization of the courts,
whether abolition of office or removal therefrom, and on delegation of legislative power, whether
authorized or unauthorized. Without detracting from the merits, the force and brilliance of their
advocacies based on logic, history and precedents, I choose to stand on the social justification
and the functional utility of the law to uphold its constitutionality. In the light of contemporaneous
events from which the New Republic emerged and evolved new Ideals of national growth and
development, particularly in law and government, a kind or form of judicial activism, perhaps
similar to it, is necessary to justify as the ratio decidendi of Our judgment.

53
This is the time and the moment to perform a constitutional duty to affix my imprimatur and
affirmance to the law, hopefully an act of proper judicial statesmanship.

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:

I agree with the learned Chief Justice of the Philippines that Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 is not
unconstitutional. Unlike Oscar Wilde, I choose not to yield to temptation by embellishing my
concurrence lest I be accrued of bringing coal to Newcastle. Accordingly, I will simply vote to
dismiss the petition

However, I cannot agree with the Chief Justice when he says:

... In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore it should be in

accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far as
incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that
its view be accorded the fullest consideration. There would be no plausibility then
to the allegation that there is an unconstitutional taint to the challenged Act.
Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle
that in the choice of alternatives between one which would save and another
which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred.

It has already been ruled that the statute does not suffer from any constitutional infirmity
because the abolition of certain judicial offices was done in good faith. This being the case, I
believe that the Executive is entitled to exercise its constitutional power to fill the newly created
judicial positions without any obligation to consult with this Court and to accord its views the
fullest consideration. To require consultation will constitute an invasion of executive territory
which can be resented and even repelled. The implicit suggestion that there could be an
unconstitutional implementation of the questioned legislation is not congruent with the basic
conclusion that it is not unconstitutional.

DE CASTRO, J., concurring:

I concur in the declaration that the law is not unconstitutional.

May I, however, submit this separate opinion more to avoid being misunderstood by my
brethren in the judiciary as not feeling for them as much concern as I should for their security of
tenure which is raised as the main argument against the constitutionality of the law, than by way
of giving added force or support to the main opinion so well-written by Our learned Chief Justice
in his usual scholarly fashion. I, therefore, limit myself to a discussion that the assailed statue is
not unconstitutional without having to suggest how it may be implemented in order that it could
stand the most rigid test of constitutionality, for in that area, what is involved is purely an
executive act of the President in whose wisdom, patriotism and sense of justice We should trust
in how he would fulfill his sworn duties to see that the laws are faithfully executed and to do
justice to every man.

Moreover, while I also concur in the dismissal of the petition, I do so on the additional ground
that petitioners have not fulfilled all the requisites for the exercise by this Court of its power of
judicial inquiry — the power to declare a law unconstitutional.

The creation and organization of courts inferior to the Supreme Court is a constitutional
prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative is plenary and necessarily implies the power to
reorganize said courts, and in the process, abolish them to give way to new or substantially
different ones. To contend otherwise would be to forget a basic doctrine of constitutional law
that no irrepealable laws shall be passed. 1

54
The power to create courts and organize them is necessarily the primary authority from which
would thereafter arise the security of tenure of those appointed to perform the functions of said
courts. in the natural order of things, therefore, since the occasion to speak of security of tenure
of judges arises only after the courts have first been brought into being, the right to security of
tenure takes a secondary position to the basic and primary power of creating the courts to
provide for a fair and strong judicial system. If the legislature, in the exercise of its authority,
deems it wise and urgent to provide for a new set of courts, and in doing so, it feels the abolition
of the old courts would conduce more to its objective of improving the judiciary and raising its
standard, the matter involved is one of policy and wisdom into which the courts, not even the
Supreme Court, cannot inquire, much less interfere with. By this secondary position it has to the
primary power of the legislature to create courts, the security of tenure given to the incumbents
should not be a legal impediment to the exercise of that basic power of creating the statutory
courts which, by necessary implication, includes the power to abolish them in order to create
new ones. This primary legislative power is a continuing one, and the resultant right of security
of tenure of those appointed to said courts could not bring about the exhaustion of that power.
Unquestionably, the legislature can repeal its own laws, and that power can never be exhausted
without, as a consequence, violating a fundamental precept of constitutional and representative
government that no irrepealable laws shall be passed.

If the creation of courts is a legislative prerogative their abolition is, therefore, a matter of
legislative intent. it involves the exercise of legislative power, an act of legislation which
generally concerns policy in the formation of which the courts have no say Initially, when the
legislature creates the courts, it suffers from no limitation arising from the necessity or
respecting the security of tenure of judges who are not yea there. This inherent character of
fullness and plenitude of the power to create and abolish courts does not change when that
same power is once more exercised thereafter, as the need therefor is felt. Which only goes to
show that when done in good faith and motivated solely by the good and the well-being of the
people, the exercise of the power is not meant to be restricted, curtailed, much less exhausted
by the so-called judicial security of tenure.

The passage of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 is no more than the exercise of the
power vested by the Constitution on the legislative body of the Republic as described above.
That power carries with it the duty and responsibility of providing the people with the most
effective and efficient system of administration of justice. This is by far of more imperative and
transcedental importance than the security of tenure of judges which, admittedly, is one of the
factors that would conduce to independence of the judiciary — but first of all, a good, efficient
and effective judiciary. A judiciary wanting in these basic qualities does not deserve the
independence that is meant only for a judiciary that can serve best the interest and welfare of
the people which is the most primordial and paramount consideration, not a judiciary in which
the people's faith has been eroded, a condition which the security of tenure, in some instances,
may even be contributory.

In enacting the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, the legislature is presumed to have been
motivated by no other objective than to provide the people the kind of judicial machinery that
would best serve their interest and welfare, in its belief that the present machinery is falling short
of that measure of public service. It should, likewise, be presumed that it has been led to this
low estimate of the utility and effectiveness of the present set-up of the judiciary after informing
itself, with the facilities at its command, such as the power of legislative investigation, of the
actual condition of the courts, particularly as to whether they continue to enjoy the trust, faith
and confidence of the public, and what the cause or causes are of their erosion, if not loss, as is
the keenly perceptible feeling of the people in general. Responsibility for this more or less
extensive slowdown of the delivery of judicial service can be laid on no other than either of the
two components of a court — the procedural laws or rules that govern the workings of the
courts, or the persons executing or applying them — or both.

When two interests conflict as what had given rise to the present controversy the duty of the
legislature to provide society with a fair, efficient and effective judicial system, on one hand, and
the right of judges to security of tenure, on the other, the latter must of necessity yield to the
former. One involves public welfare and interest more directly and on a greater magnitude than
the right of security of tenure of the judges which is, as is easily discernible, more of a personal
benefit to just a few, as indeed only the judge affected could seek judicial redress of what he
conceives to be its violation.

55
Herein lies the propriety of the exercise of "police power" of the State, if this concept which
underlies even the Constitution, has to be invoked as a constitutional justification of the passage
of the Act in question. That is, if a conflict between the primary power of the legislature to create
courts, and mere consequential benefit accorded to judges and justices after the creation of the
courts is indeed perceivable, which the writer fails to see, or, at least, would disappear upon a
reconciliation of the two apparently conflicting interests which, from the above disquisition is not
hard to find. It is, without doubt, in the essence of the exercise of police power that a right
assertable by individuals may be infringed in the greater interest of the public good and general
welfare. This is demonstrated in how the rights and freedoms enumerated in the Bill of Rights
enjoyable by The entire people, not just by a handful in comparison, are made subject to the
lawful exercise of the police power of the State.

Viewed, therefore, from the above-mentioned perspective, the general revamp of the judiciary
involving both its components — the court as an office or institution, and the judges and justices
that man them — should not find any legal obstacle in the security of tenure of judges. This
security, after all, is no more than as provided for all other officials and employees in the civil
service of the government in Section 3, Article XII-B of the Constitution which provides:

No officer or employees in the civil service shall be suspended or dismissed

except for cause as provided by law.

The provision of Article XVII, Section 10 of the Constitution gives to judicial officials no more
than a guarantee that their retirement age as fixed in the Constitution shall not be alterable at
mere legislative pleasure. The equivalent provision in the 1935 Constitution was inserted for the
first time because the retirement age before then was provided merely by statute not by the
Constitution. If it comes to their removal or suspension, what gives them constitutional
protection is the aforequoted provision which does not contemplate abolition of office when
done in good faith, for removal implies the existence of the office, not when it is abolished.
Admittedly, as has been held, abolition of office for no reason related to public welfare or for the
good of the service, let alone when done in bad faith, amounts to an unlawful removal. 2 The
abolition of the courts as declared in the Act as a result of a reorganization of the judiciary, as
the Title of the law curtly but announces, can by no means, from any viewpoint, be so branded.
And whether by said reorganization, the present would be deemed abolished, as the law
expresses such an unmistakable intent, the matter is one for the sole and exclusive
determination of the legislature. It rests entirely on its discretion whether by the nature and
extent of the changes it has introduced, it has done enough to consider them abolished. To give
the Supreme Court the power to determine the extent or nature of the changes as to their
structure, distribution and jurisdiction, before the clear intent to abolish them, or to declare them
so abolished, is given effect, would be to allow undue interference in the function of legislation.
This would be contrary to the primary duty of courts precisely to give effect to the legislative
intent as expressed in the law or as my be discovered therefrom.

From the above observation, it would be futile to insist that the present courts would not
effectively be abolished by the Act in question. it might be to arrogate power for Us to say that
the changes the law brings to the present judicial system, do not suffice for this Court to give
effect to the clear intent of the legislative body. Where would the agrarian courts, the circuit
criminal courts, the JDRC's be in the judicial structure as envisioned by the law? Are they not
abolished by merger with the regional trial courts, which by such merger, and by the other
changes introduced by the law, would make said courts different from the present Courts of First
Instance which, as a consequence, may then be considered abolished Integrated as the present
courts are supposed to be, changes somewhere in the judicial machinery would necessarily
affect the entire system.

The fact that the Supreme Court may specially assign courts to function as the special courts
just mentioned, does not mean that the changes wrought are only superficial or "cosmetic" as
this term has been used so often in the oral argument. Without the new law, these courts will
remain fixed and permanent where they are at present. Yet in the course of time, the need for
their independent existence may disappear, or that by changed conditions, where they are
needed at present at a certain place, the need for them may be somewhere else in later years, if
maximum benefit at the least expense is to be achieved, as always should be a most desirable
goal and objective of government.

56
Demonstrably then, the abolition of the courts is a matter of legislative intent into which no
judicial inquiry is proper, except perhaps if they intent is so palpably tainted with constitutional
repugnancy, which is not so in the instant case. We have, therefore, no occasion, as earlier
intimated, to speak of removal of judges when the reorganization of the judiciary would result in
the abolition of the courts other than the Supreme Court and the Court of Tax Appeals. Hence,
the provision of the Constitution giving to the Supreme Court power to dismiss a judge by a vote
of eight justices does not come into the vortex of the instant controversy. Its possible violation
by the assailed statute cannot happen, and may, therefore, not constitute an argument against
the constitutionality of the law.

Former Justice Barrera, in a speech before the Philippine Bar Association, 3 impliedly indorsed
the judicial revamp when he enumerated the qualities of a good judge that the appointing power
should consider in making new appointments to the judiciary upon its reorganization pursuant to
the questioned Act. The words of the eminent jurist may well reflect the favorable reaction of the
public in general to what the Act aim to achieve in the name of good and clean government. The
present judicial incumbents, who have not in any way, by their acts and behavior while in office,
tarnished the good image that the judiciary should have, therefore, have no cause for
apprehension that what they are entitled to under the Constitution by way of security of tenure
wig be denied them, considering the publicly known aim and purpose of the massive judicial
revamp, specially as cherished with deep concern by the President who initiated the move when
he created the Judiciary Reorganization Committee to recommend needed and appropriate
judicial reforms.

If the only obstacle to a verdict in favor of constitutionality of the law is its possible effect of
impairing the security of tenure of the incumbents, We may have the following facts to consider:

1. Under the 1973 Constitution all incumbent judges and justices may continue in office until
replaced or reappointed by the President. As to those judicial officials, no security of tenure, in
the traditional concept, attaches to their incumbency which is, in a real sense, only a holdover
tenure. How the President has exercised this immense power with admirable restraint should
serve as the strongest guarantee of how justice and fairness will be his sole guide in
implementing the law.

2. As to the rest of the incumbents, they are all appointees of Our present President, and he
should feel concerned more than anyone else to protect whatever rights they may rightfully
claim to maintain their official standing and integrity. They need have no fear of being ignored
for no reason at all, much less for mere spirit of vindictiveness or lack of nobility of heart.

From the foregoing, it would become apparent that only in the implementation of the law may
there possibly be a taint of constitutional repugnancy as when a judge of acknowledged
honesty, industry and competence is separated, because an act of arbitrariness would thereby
be committed, but the abolition of the courts as decreed by the law is not by itself or per se
unconstitutional.

Consequently, the law, the result of serious and concerned study by a highly competent
committee, deserves to be given a chance to prove its worth in the way of improving the
judiciary. If in its implementation, any one, if at all, feels aggrieved, he can always seek judicial
redress, if he can make out a case of violation of his right of security of tenure with
uncontrovertible clarity, as when the separation is very arbitrary in the peculiar circumstances of
his case, for an act of arbitrariness, under any constitution, is unpardonable.

This petition should also be dismissed for being premature, as is the stand of Justice Aquino.
The petition asks this Court to exercise its power of judicial inquiry, the power to declare a law
unconstitutional when it conflicts with the fundamental law (People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56). This
power has well-defined limits, for it can be exercised only when the following requisites are
present, to wit: (1) There must be an actual case or controversy; (2) The question of
constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) He should do so at the earliest
opportunity, and (4) The determination of the constitutionality of the statute must be necessary
to a final determination of the case.

57
I am of the opinion that the petition does not present an actual controversy nor was it filed by the
proper parties.

The main ground for which the constitutionality of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 is
assailed is that it is violative of the security of tenure of justices and judges. The only persons
who could raise the question of constitutionality of the law are, therefore, the actual incumbents
of the courts who would be separated from the service upon the abolition of the courts affected
by the law, on the theory as advanced by petitioners that their judicial security of tenure would
be violated. Olongapo City Judge de la Llana, the only judge among the petitioners, has not
been separated from the service. Nor is his separation already a certainty, for he may be
appointed to the court equivalent to his present court, or even promoted to a higher court. Only
when it has become certain that his tenure has been terminated will an actual controversy arise
on his allegation of a fact that has become actual, not merely probable or hypothetical.

The present petition may neither be allowed as a taxpayer suit. A taxpayer may bring an action
to raise the question of constitutionality of a statute only when no one else can more
appropriately bring the suit to defend a right exclusively belonging to him, and. therefore, would
localize the actual injury to his person, and to no other. For a "proper party" to invoke the power
of judicial inquiry, as one of the requisites in the exercise of such power, does not mean one
having no better right, one more personalized, than what he has as a member of the public in
general. With the incumbent judges undoubtedly being the ones under petitioners' theory, who
would suffer direct and actual injury, they should exclude mere taxpayers who cannot be said to
suffer as "direct" and "actual" an injury as the judges and justices by the enforcement of the
assailed statute, from the right to bring the suit.

The validity of the foregoing observation becomes more evident when We consider that only
after the fate of the present incumbents is known, whether they have been actually separated or
not, would the present courts be declared abolished. For the law clearly continues their
existence until all the new courts have been filled up with new appointments, or at least such
number as would be equal to the number of actual incumbents, and they are the very courts to
which they may lay claim to the right to continue therein, so that the status of each and
everyone of them has thereby been made certain. Only then, upon the actual abolition of the
courts, may there possibly be a violation of the security of tenure, as contented, that would give
rise to an "actual controversy" in which the 6 improper party" can be no other than the judges
who feel aggrieved by their non- appointment to the new courts.

It would, therefore, not be proper to declare the law void at this stage, before it has even been
given a chance to prove its worth, as the legislature itself and an those who helped by their
exhaustive and scholarly study, felt it to be an urgent necessity, and before any of the proper
parties who could assail its constitutionality would know for a fact, certain and actual, not merely
probable or hypothetical, that they have a right violated by what they could possibly contend to
be an unconstitutional enforcement of the law, not by a law that is unconstitutional unto itself.

I am, therefore, for giving the law a chance to be put into application so as not to douse great
popular expectations for the courts to regain their highest level of efficiency had reputation for
probity. Inevitably, this is to be so since only when the law is fully implemented will all the courts
affected be declared abolished, undoubtedly to avoid an interregnum when the country is
without any court, except the Supreme Court, the Court of Tax Appeals and the Sandigan. Only
then will it be known whether an actual controversy would arise because any of the incumbents
have been left out in the restructured judiciary.

There would then be also a proper party to assail the constitutionality of the law, conformably to
the conditions requisite for the exercise of the power of judicial inquiry which by their stringent
character, together with the constitutional prescription of a comparatively higher vote to declare
a law unconstitutional, reveal a salutary principle of government that a law should, by all
reasonable intendment and feasible means, be saved from the doom of unconstitutionality, the
rule corollary thereto being that if a law is susceptible to two interpretations, one of which would
make it constitutional, that interpretation should be adopted that will not kill the law.

It is to adhere to the above principles that the submission is made herein, that while in the
implementation of the law, constitutional repugnancy may not entirely be ruled out, a categorical

58
ruling hereon not being necessary or desirable at the moment, the law itself is definitely not
unconstitutional. 4 Any of the incumbent judges who feel injured after the law shall have been
implemented has adequate remedy in law, with full relief as would be proper. But surely, the
benefits envisioned by the law in the discharge of one of the basic duties of government to the
people — the administration of justice — should not be sacrificed, as it would be, if the law is, as
sought in the present petition, declared void right now, on the claim of a few of being allegedly
denied a right, at best of doubtful character, for the claim would seem to rest on an
unsupportable theory that they have a vested right to a public office.

Just one more point. The law in question is not self-executing in the sense that upon its
effectivity, certain judges and justices cease to be so by direct action of the law. This is what
distinguishes the Act in question from R.A. No. 1186 involved in the Ocampo case, 5 which by
its direct action, no act of implementation being necessary, all the judges whose positions were
abolished, automatically ceased as such. The Act in question, therefore, is not as exposed to
the same vulnerability to constitutional attack as R.A. No. 1186 was. Yet by the operation of the
Constitution with its wise provision on how a law may be declared unconstitutional, R.A. No.
1186 stood the test for it to be enforced to the fullness of its intent, which was, as in the law
under consideration, Identified with public interest and general welfare, through a more efficient
and effective judicial system as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 seeks to establish.

Hence, the constitutionality of the law should not be assailed, and the law itself, striken down,
on the ground that some judges or justices may be removed or separated in violation of their
security of tenure. The law does not directly operate with Chat effect. It is in how the law would
be implemented that this feared eventuality may or may not occur. We would then be killing the
law on a mere speculation if We do so at this stage. This would be an injudicious act done in
reckless disregard of the safeguards built around a law to defend it when its constitutionality is
attacked; first the presumption that a law is constitutional; second when a law is susceptible to
two interpretations one that would make it constitutional, the other, unconstitutional, the former
should be adopted; and third, the Constitution itself which ordains that a law may not be
declared unconstitutional except on the vote of at least ten (10) members of the Supreme Court,
more than what is required for an ordinary decision of the Court en banc. This is not to mention
the stringent requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial inquiry as already adverted to, all
designed to save the law from the dire fate of unconstitutionality.

To the writer, the question before this Court is a simple matter of choosing between protecting
some judges from possible separation, as the implementation of the law to achieve its primary
purpose of improving the judiciary may have to result in, or serving the interest of the entire
society through an honest, efficient and effective judiciary. For, it is unthinkable that what is for
the good of the people as a whole could have been meant by the Constitution to be sacrificed
for the sake of only the few. The greatest good for the greatest number is an unwritten rule,
more firm and enduring than any of the postulates spread in our written Constitution. This, I
might say, is the main theme of this separate opinion, otherwise expressed in the well-known
and time-honored maxim "Salus populi establish suprema lex."

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

There is unqualified adherence on my part to the dismissal of the Petition filed in this case. If I
am writing this separate concurrence, it is merely to state certain views I entertain in regards to
the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

The controversy in this case involves two constitutional provisions. Article X, Section 1, of the
Organic law provides that the legislative has the power to establish inferior Courts by law.
Section 7 of the same Article reads:

SEC, 7. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of inferior courts shall
hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or
become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court
shall have the power to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at
least eight Members order their dismissal.

59
There should be no conflict Between the two provisions. Both should be harmonized.

1. a) It is a fundamental proposition that the legislative power to create Courts ordinarily

includes the power to organize and to reorganize them, and that the power to abolish Courts is
generally coextensive with the power to create them. The power to abolish was not intended to
be qualified by the permanence of tenure (Opinion of Chief Justice Ricardo Paras in Ocampo
vs. Secretary of Justice, 51 O.G. 147 [1955], citing McCulley vs. State, 53 SW 134; Halsey vs.
Gaines 2 Lea 316). The right of Judges to hold office during good behavior until they reach the
age of 70 years, or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office, does not
deprive Congress of its power to abolish, organize or reorganize inferior Courts (Brillo vs.
Enage, 94 Phil. 732, 735, citing Zandueta vs. de la Costa, 66 Phil. 615; 42 Am. Jur., Pub.
Officer, 904-5). Judges of those Courts take office with that encumbrance and knowledge.

The legislative power to create a court carries with it the power to abolish it.
When the court is abolished any unexpired term is abolished also. The judge of
such court takes office with that encumbrance and knowledge. Perkins v. Corbin,
45 Ala 103, 6 Am. Rep. 698; State, ex rel. Thomas v. Gunter, 170 Ala. 165, 54
So 283, et al."

The importance and the imperative of maintaining the independence of the Judiciary is
undisputed. At the same time, the power of Congress under the Constitution cannot be
abridged. For, in the last analysis, it is not the security of tenure per se that is the only safeguard
to the independence of the Judiciary. It is the character and the mettle of the Judges who sit on
the Bench. Has not the impression been created in the public and that there are those who have
abused the prerogatives of their judicial position knowing that they are untouchables by virtue of
the permanence of their tenure

b) A distinction should be made between tenure of Judges and tenure of Courts. Section 1
heretofore mentioned refers to the "Judiciary" as a fundamental department of Government.
Section 7 quoted above refers to the tenure of office of "individual" Judges (inclusive of Justices
of inferior Courts that is to say, tenure of office is a matter concerning the individual Judge. This
"individuality" character of Section 7 is supported by the clause that the Supreme Court has the
power to discipline individual judges of inferior Courts.

A legislature is not bound to give security of tenure to Courts. Courts can be abolished. In fact,
the entire judicial system can be changed. If that system can no longer admit of change, woe to
the wheels of progress and the imperatives of growth in the development of the Judiciary. To
hold that tenure of Judges is superior to the legislative power to reorganize is to render impotent
the exercise of that power.

It may even be stated that, under Section 7, supra, Judges are entailed to their Courts, from
which they cannot be separated before retirement age except as a disciplinary action for bad
behavior. Under Section 1, Courts are not entailed to their Judges, because the power of the
legislative to establish inferior Courts presupposes the power to abolish those Courts. If an
inferior Court is abolished, the Judge presiding that Court will necessarily have to lose his
position because the abolished Court is not entailed to him.

c) The constitutional guarantee of tenure of Judges applies only as their Courts exist. As long as
those Courts exist, the Judges cannot be ousted without just cause; that is the extent of the
constitutional provision relative to security of tenure of Judges. Upon declaration of the
completion of the reorganization as provided for in the Reorganization Act, the affected Courts
"shall be deemed automatically abolished There being no Courts, there are no offices for which
tenure of Judges may be claimed. By the abolition of those offices, the rights to them are
necessarily extinguished (Manalang vs. Quitoriano, 94 Phil. 903 [1954]).

2. I am satisfied that the challenged law was enacted by the Batasang Pambansa in response to
an urgent and pressing public need and not for the purpose of affecting adversely the security of
tenure of all Judges or legislating them out to the detriment of judicial independence. It should
riot be said of the Batasang Pambansa that its power of abolition of Courts has been used to
disguise an unconstitutional and evil purpose to defeat the security of tenure of Judges. The
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981 sufficiently complies with the bona fide rule in the abolition

60
of public office, as clearly explained in the main opinion. Besides, every presumption of good
faith in its actuations must be accorded a coordinate and coequal branch of government,
supreme within the limits of its own sphere, until that presumption is clearly overcome. There is
no showing that the Reorganization Act was motivated for personal or political reasons as to
justify the interference by the Court (Garvey vs. Lowell, 199 Mass, 47, 85 N.E. 182, 127 A.S.R.
468; State vs. Eduards, 40 Mont. 287; 106 Pac. 695, 19 R.C.L. 236; Llanto vs. Dimaporo, 16
SCRA 599 [1966]). Public interest and public good, as the legislative body views it, must be
balanced with tenure of Judges, which is an individual right. Reverting to Section 1 and Section
7, supra, the former is the weightier, because the "Judiciary" is of more importance to the
welfare of the country than the tenure of office of an individual Judge. If a Judge is removed
without cause there can be damage to the public welfare to some extent, but maintenance of a
Court that does not meet the requirements of progressive Government, can cause incalculable
prejudice to the people.

3. Nor does a conflict exist with the power of discipline vested in the Supreme Court by the
present Constitution reading: the Supreme Court shall have the power "to discipline Judges of
inferior Courts, and, by a vote of at least 8 members, order their dismissal Absent the Court, it
would be futile to speak of the Supreme Court's power to discipline. Thus, where the legislature
has willed that the Courts be abolished, the power to discipline cannot pose an obstacle to the
abolition. The power to discipline can come into play only when there is removal from an
existing judicial office but not when that it office is abolished. The reorganization of the judicial
system with the abolition of certain Courts is not an exercise of the power to discipline the
Judges of the abolished Courts.

It is of significance to note that the power to dismissal vested in the Supreme Court by the 1973
Constitution is delimited by its power to discipline. Absent any need for discipline and the power
to dismiss does not exist. Being circumscribed in scope, it may well be asked: does the grant of
the power of discipline and dismissal in the Supreme Court deprive the executive of the power
of removal? Is it not more in keeping with the allocation of powers in our government to state
that the Supreme Court shares its power to dismiss with the executive power of removal? For is
not the power of removal basically executive in nature, as an incident to the power of
appointment, which is the prerogative of the Chief Executive alone As in the case of
appointments, Section 5 (6), Article X of the Constitution provides that the Supreme Court shall
appoint its officials and employees. However, is not this power shared with the power of
appointment of the executive who appoints some of the Court officials These questions could
lend themselves to an in-depth study in the proper case.

4. The abolition would be no deprivation either of due process of law. A public office cannot be
regarded as the "property " of the incumbent. A public office is not a contract (Segovia vs. Noel,
47 Phil. 543 [1925]). A public office is a public trust (Section 1, Article XIII. 1973 Constitution). It
is a privilege in the gift of the State (Brown vs. Russell, 166 Mass. 14, 43 NE 1005, 32 LRA, 253
cited also in Tañada & Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines, Vol. 2, p. 537). The officers are
the servants of the people and not their rulers (22 R.C.L. 378-379, cited in Martin, Administrative
Law, Law on Public Officers and Election Law, p. 112, 1970 ed.). Besides, it bears stressing that
there is no removal from office but abolition of the office itself.

5. The questioned statute is in keeping with major reforms in other departments of government.
"The thrust is on development." It is "the first major reorganization after four generations." It
does not provide for a piecemeal change, which could be ineffective. It goes to the roots and
does not just scratch the surface of our judicial system. Its main objectives are an improved
administration of justice, the "attainment of more efficiency in the disposal of cases, a
reallocation of jurisdiction, and a revision of procedures which do not tend to the proper meting
out of justice." These aims are policy matters of necessity in the pursuit of developmental goals
within the Judiciary.

6. The Reorganization Act reorganizing the entire judicial system excluding the Supreme Court,
which is the only constitutional Court, and the Sandiganbayan. It envisages institutional reforms
in the Philippine judiciary. It does not simply change the names of the Courts. The facts herein
are dissimilar from those in Brillo vs. Enage (94 Phil. 732 [1954]) where the position of Justice of
the Peace, although ostensibly abolished, was merely changed to Municipal Judge after the
municipality of Tacloban was converted into a city with its own charter.

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Significant among the institutional changes and procedural reforms are:

The Intermediate Appellate Court

This Court is now constituted into ten (10) divisions instead of fifteen (15), five members
composing each division, and a majority vote of three members being needed for a decision.
This obviates the cumbersome procedure, in case of dissent, of assigning two other members to
compose a "division of five". It also allows flexibility in that any three members of a division,
arriving at unanimity, can promulgate a decision. Now provided for is specialization into four (4)
Civil Cases Divisions, two (2) Criminal Cases Divisions and four (4) Special Cases Divisions.
The specialization is expected to contribute to the expeditious disposal of cases. The Court has
been given original jurisdiction to issue Writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas
corpus, quo warranto and auxiliary writs or processes whether or not in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction. This would undoubtedly ease the burden of the Supreme Court where numerous
such cases are filed daily.

It has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or
awards of quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, except those falling
within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the
Constitution.

The Intermediate Appellate Court would now have the power to try cases and conduct hearings,
receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in
cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and
conduct new trials or further proceedings (Sec. 9). This does away with the delays attendant to
the remand of cases to the lower trial Courts.

Regional Trial Courts

There are now thirteen (13) Judicial Regions, the same as the present administrative and
Batasang Pambansa Regions, instead of sixteen (16) Judicial Districts.

A Judge is appointed to a region, which is his official station. This ensures mobility since a
Judge may be assigned anywhere within the Region without applying the constitutional
limitation of six months. Additionally, -it can remedy temporary inequalities of caseloads in trial
Courts.

Specialized Courts are integrated into the Regional Trial Courts. Thus, Regional Trial Courts
would try all cases within its jurisdiction unless special cases are assigned to them, in which
case, they remain as Branches of Regional Trial Courts. Special procedures and technical rules
governing special Courts will continue to remain applicable in Branches assigned those special
cases.

Metropolitan Trial Courts

There is one Metropolitan Trial Court with several Branches for large urban areas. The
appointment of Judges would be to a Metropolitan Trial Court although a Judge may be
assigned by the Supreme Court to any Branch of the Metropolitan Trial Court as demanded by
the exigencies of the service.

The Supreme Court may designate certain Branches of said Courts to exercise special
jurisdiction over certain cases, unlike the present set-up where special jurisdiction applies only
to cases of traffic violations.

Municipal Trial Courts/Municipal Circuit Trial Courts

Municipal Trial Courts may now be designated by the Supreme Court to exercise special
jurisdiction over certain cases, thereby resulting in overall flexibility. They can also be circuitized
with those in cities not forming part of metropolitan areas.

62
One notable change between the old and the new set up is that Judges of these Courts will now
be Presidential appointees unlike presently where the incumbent Judges are merely designated
by the Supreme Court in an Administrative Order to sit in existing Municipal Courts and
Municipal Circuit Courts.

7. There are innovative features in the Act that commend themselves:

a) The confusing and illogical areas of concurrent jurisdiction between trial Courts have been
entirely eliminated.

b) Under Section 39, there is a uniform period for appeal of fifteen (15) days counted from the
notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from.

A record on appeal is no longer required to take an appeal. The entire original record is now to
be transmitted.

c) Under Section 40, in deciding appealed cases, adoption by reference of findings of fact and
conclusions of law as set forth in the decision, order, or resolution appealed from, is also
provided for. This will expedite the rendition of decisions in appealed cases.

d) Section 42 provides for "a monthly longevity pay equivalent to 5% of the monthly basic pay
for Justices and

Judges of the courts herein created for each five years of continuous, efficient, and meritorious
service rendered in the Judiciary, Provided that, in no case shall the total salary of each Justice
or Judge concerned, after this longevity pay is added, exceed the salary of the Justice or Judge
next in rank." Thus, Justices and Judges who may not reach the top, where unfortunately there
is not enough room for all, may have the satisfaction of at least approximating the salary scale
of those above him depending on his length of service,

8. But while the law itself as written is constitutional, the manner in which it will be administered
should not be tainted with unconstitutionality (Myles Salt Co. vs. Board of Commrs., 239 US
478, 60 L. Ed. 392, 36 Sct 204). To obviate the possibility of an unconstitutional exercise of
power the following safeguards are recommended and/or expected to be undertaken:

a) The President can be expected to indicate a reasonable time frame for the completion of the
reorganization provided for in the Act and the issuance of the corresponding implementing
Order.

b) Appointments and their effectivity should be simultaneous with, or as close as possible, to the
declaration by the President of the completion of the reorganization under Section 44 to avoid
any detriment to the smooth and continuous functioning of the judicial machinery.

c) The services of those not separated should be deemed uninterrupted, as recommended by

the Committee on Judicial Reorganization (Article XI of its Report).

9. For the speedy implementation of the law, the Supreme Court can be expected to submit to
the President within thirty (30) days from the date of finality of its Decision the staffing pattern for
all Courts required by Section 43.

I am constrained to disagree with the suggestion of one of the amici curiae that the staffing
pattern be made to include the names of Judges. The staffing pattern for Judges is already
clearly and explicitly provided in the law itself which enumerates the various Judges and
Justices in their hierarchical order. Furthermore, to include the superior positions of Judges
would depart from the traditional concept of a staffing pattern, which refers more to personnel
organization and corresponding salaries of inferior employees. It is also constitutionally
objectionable in that it would interfere with the prerogative of appointment intrinsically executive
in nature (Guevara vs. Inocentes, 16 SCRA 379 [1966]; Government of the Philippines vs.
Springer, 50 Phil. 259 [1927]). The President may not be deprived of, nor be limited in, the full
use of his discretion in the appointment of persons to any public office. Nothing should so trench
upon executive choice as to be, in effect, judicial designation.

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10. A word of explanation. If I had resolved not to inhibit myself in this case upon motion filed by
petitioners, it was because the Committee on Judicial Reorganization, of which I was privileged
to be a member, confined its work to the recommendation of options and guidelines in the task
of reorganization. The Committee had no part whatsoever in the drafting of the bill nor in the
public hearings conducted. In fact, some of its recommendations like the circuitization or
regionalization of the Intermediate Appellate Court, the appellation of members of the Judiciary,
the confinement of the jurisdiction of the Intermediate Appellate Court merely to appellate
jurisdiction, the adoption of the system found in the United Kingdom and in Commonwealth
countries of having a Court of general jurisdiction with trial and appellate divisions, were not
availed of in the final Act.

11. Lastly, but by no means the least, I entertain no doubt that reliance can be placed on the
good faith of the President that all the deserving, upon considerations of "efficiency, integrity,
length of service and other relevant factors shall be appointed to a strengthened and revitalized
judicial system in the interest of public service; that appointments will not be unduly delayed;
and that appointees will be evaluated thoroughly to ensure quality and impartiality in the men
and women who will keep vigil over our judicial ramparts.

ERICTA, J., concurring:

I concur in the view that the Judiciary reorganization law is not unconstitutional. It does not
violate the principle of security of tenure of judges.

The Constitution grants to the Batasang Pambansa the power to create courts inferior to the
Supreme Court (Article X, Section 1). All existing inferior courts were created by law. No law is
irrepealable. The power to create an office includes the power to abolish the same. (Urgelio vs.
Osmeña 9 SCRA 317; Maza vs. Ochave, 20 SCRA 142)

Security of tenure cannot be invoked when there is no removal of a public officer or employee
but an abolition of his office. (Manalang vs. Quitoriano, 94 Phil. 903; Cruz vs. Primicias, 23
SCRA 998; Baldoz vs. Office of the President, 78 SCRA 354, 362) A distinction should be made
between removal from office and abolition of an office. Removal implies that the office subsists
after ouster, while, in abolition, the office no longer exists thereby terminating the right of the
incumbent to exercise the rights and duties of the office. (Canonigo vs. Ramiro, 31 SCRA 278)

The power of the legislative branch of the government to abolish courts inferior to the Supreme
Court has long been established. (Ocampo vs. Secretary of Justice, 51 O.G. 147). What is only
needed is that the abolition passes the test of good faith. it need only be shown that said
abolition of the courts is merely incidental to a bona fide reorganization. (Urgelio vs.
Osmeña supra.)

It is unthinkable to impute bad faith to the Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization

composed of four (4) distinguished members of the Supreme Court, the Minister of Justice and
the Deputy Minister of Justice, and to the members of the Batasang Pambansa whose
combined efforts after a careful study and deliberation resulted to the enactment of a bill now
signed into law as Batasang Pambansa Blg. 129. In his sponsorship speech, Justice Ricardo C.
Puno declared the objectives of the Judiciary Reorganization Law to be the following: (1) the
attainment of more efficiency in the disposal of cases; (2) the improvement in the quality of
decisions by the courts that will result from the easing of court dockets; and (3) structural
changes to meet the exigencies of present day Philippine Society and of the foreseeable future.

Admittedly, in the implementation of the law, some Judges and Justices may be adversely
affected. But in a conflict between public interest and the individual interest of some Judges and
Justices, the public weal must prevail. The welfare of the people is the supreme law.

The implementation of the law will entail appointments to the new courts. The power of
appointment is the exclusive prerogative of the President. The implementation of the law should
be left exclusively to the wisdom, patriotism and statesmanship of the President.

64
PLANA, J., concurring:

As the lawmaking body has the power to create inferior courts and define, prescribe and
apportion their jurisdiction, so it has the power to abolish or replace them with other courts as
long as the act is done in good faith and not for the purpose of attaining an unconstitutional end.
Good faith has thus become the crucial issue in the case at bar.

Upon an examination of the legislative history of Batas Pambansa 129, as has been done in the
main opinion, it is manifest that actual, not merely presumed good faith attended its enactment.
On this basis, I concur in the opinion penned by the learned Chief Justice, qualified only by the
following observations:

1. Executive consultation with the Supreme Court. — I believe the President is under no
obligation to consult with the Supreme Court; and the Supreme Court as such is not called upon
to give legal advice to the President. Indeed, as the Supreme Court itself has said, it cannot give
advisory opinions (Bacolod Murcia Planters' Asso., Inc. vs. Bacolod — Murcia milling Co., 30
SCRA 67; NWSA vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 90 SCRA 629) even to the President.

In the drafting of the present Constitution, there was an attempt to vest the Supreme Court with
the function of giving advisory opinions. The framers of the Constitution, however, did not see fit
to adopt the proposal.

If the President should consult the Supreme Court on the implementation of Batas Pambansa
129 and the Supreme Court should give its advice (leaving aside the question of procedure), I
believe the President would be free to follow or disregard the advice; but, in either case, there
would be no guarantee that the implementing action would be upheld in one case or stricken
down in the other.

2. Undue delegation of legislative powers. —

The petitioners have also assailed the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa 129 on the ground
that a provision thereof (regarding fixing of compensation and allowances for members of the
Judiciary) constitutes an undue delegation unto the President of legislative power.

As pointed out in the main opinion, the legislature has provided ample standards or guidelines
for the implementation of the delegated power, which makes the delegation inoffensive. I would
like to add however some observations on the doctrine of undue delegation of legislative power.

Under the old Constitution, when the abiding rule was separation of legislative and executive
powers, there was good reason to maintain the doctrine of non-delegation of legislative power.
Otherwise, the principle of separation of governmental powers could be negated via
unbridled delegation of legislative power. The 1973 Constitution has however radically changed
the constitutional set-up. There is now a commingling or fusion of executive and legislative
powers in the hands of the same group of officials. Cabinet members play a leading role in the
legislative process, and members of the Batasan actively discharge executive functions. The
Prime Minister indeed must come from its ranks. Under the circumstances, there is really not
much sense in rigidly upholding the principle of non-delegation of legislative power, at least vis-
a-vis the Executive Department. In a very real sense, the present Constitution has significantly
eroded the hoary doctrine of non-delegation of legislative power, although it has retained some
provisions of the old Constitution which were predicated on the principle of non-delegation, this
time perhaps not so much to authorize shifting of power and thereby correspondingly reduce the
incidence of "undue" delegation of legislative power, as to avert the abdication thereof.

In times of war or other national emergency, the Batasang Pambansa may by

law authorize the President for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as
it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a
declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Batasang
Pambansa, such powers shall cease upon its next adjournment. (Art. VIII, Sec.
15.)

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 The Batasang Pambansa may by law authorize the President to fix within
specified this and subject to such stations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff
rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts. [Ibid, Sec. 17(2).]

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

Undoubtedly, no more crucial and transcendental issue of such magnitude has confronted the
Philippine judiciary than in the present case. The challenged Act, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 by
its title would reorganize all existing courts (except the nine-member Sandiganbayan 1 and the
three- member Court of Tax Appeals) and upon declaration by the President of the completion
of the reorganization would unprecedentedly deem all the said courts "automatically abolished
en masse and "the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold office." 2 The total abolition involves a
total of 1,663 judicial positions with 1,180 incumbent judges and 483 vacancies) as of January
26, 1982 and the Act would effect an increase of 230 judicial positions raising the total of judicial
positions to be filled by new appointments to 1,893. Notwithstanding the great deference due to
enactments of the Batasan, I regretably find myself unable to join the ranks of my esteemed
colleagues in the majority who uphold the constitutionality of the Act and have voted to dismiss
the petition, for the following main considerations and reasons:

1. I go by the ruling of the numerical majority of seven Justices (namely, Pablo, Cesar Bengzon,
Montemayor, Jugo, Bautista, Roberto Concepcion and J.B.L. Reyes, JJ.) in the leading 1955
case of Ocampo 3 who fell short by one vote to reach the constitutionally required 2/3 majority
(at the time 8 out of an 11-member Supreme Court) to declare unconstitutional and invalid
section 3 of Republic Act 1186 abolishing the positions of 18 judges-at-large and 15 cadastral
judges and removing or legislating out the incumbent judges from office as against the contrary
vote of a minority of 4 Justices (namely, then Chief Justice Paras and Padilla, Alex Reyes and
Labrador, JJ.) with the paradoxical situation that the last three named Justices voted for the
validity of the Act as a remedial measure that abolished said positions without permanent
station which subjected them to a rigodon de jueces without the consent of the Supreme Court,
which they considered as "repulsive to an independent judiciary" and violative of an express
prohibitory provision of the 1935 Constitution ê while Justice Alex Reyes conceded that
otherwise he would go with the majority that "Congress may not, as a general rule, abolish a
judicial post without allowing the incumbent to finish his term of office."

2. As then Associate, later Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon remarked in his separate opinion —
"(T)he [adverse] outcome of this litigation [sanctioning the ouster from office of the ten
petitioners who were presiding different Courts of First Instance, some as judges-at-large,
others as cadastral judges, upon the enactment on June 19, 1954 of R.A. 1186 abolishing the
positions of judges-at large and cadastral judges] is apt to revive the speculation whether
wittingly or unwittingly the Constitution has further weakened the usually weak judicial
department because of its 'innovative' requirement of a 2/3 majority vote of the Supreme Court
to declare a statute unconstitutional, and 'never in our history has such a number of judges of
first instance [totalling 33 positions] been ousted through judicial reorganization.

His rationale that the express constitutional guaranty of security of tenure of judges "during
good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge
the duties of their office" 4 must prevail over the implied constitutional authority to abolish courts
and to oust the judges despite their constitutionally-secured tenure bears repeating thus:

A careful analysis will perceive that whereas petitioners invoke

an express guaranty or positive definition of their term of office, the respondents
rely on implied authority to abolish courts and the positions of the respective
judges. Accurately stated, respondents' defense rests on a second inference
deduced from such implied power, because they reason out thusly: Congress
has express power to establish courts; therefore it has implicit power to abolish
courts and the positions of judges of such abolished courts (first inference); and
therefore (second inference) Congress likewise has power to eject the judges
holding such positions.

66
 Resulting juridical situation. The implied authority invoked by respondents
collides with the express guaranty of tenure protecting the petitioners. Which
shall prevail Obviously the express guaranty must override the implied authority.
"Implications can never be permitted to contradict the expressed intent or to
defeat its purpose."

xxx xxx xxx

But the collision may he should be avoided, and both sections given validity, if
one be considered a proviso or exception to the other. In other words, under the
Constitution the Congress may abolish existing courts, provided it does not
thereby remove the incumbent judges; such abolition to take effect upon
termination of their incumbent The fundamental provisions on the matter are
thereby coordinated and harmonized' as Justice Laurel suggested in his
concurring opinion in Zandueta v. De la Costa. To bring about reconciliations is
the great work of jurists. (Cardozo, Paradoxes of Legal Science, p. 6) 5

3. This reasoning that the express guaranty of tenure protecting incumbent judges during good
behavior unless removed from office after hearing and due process or upon reaching the
compulsory retirement age of seventy years must override the implied authority of removing by
legislation the judges has been further strengthened and placed beyond doubt by the new
provisions of the 1973 Constitution that transferred the administrative supervision over all courts
and their personnel from the Chief Executive through the then Secretary of Justice to the
Supreme Court 6 and vested in the Supreme Court exclusively "the power to discipline judges of
inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal," 7 Which power
was formerly lodged by the Judiciary Act in the Chief Executive.

As former Chief Justice Bengzon stressed in his opinion in Ocampo, the 1934 Constitutional
Convention "frowned on removal of judges of first instance through abolition of their offices or
reorganization," citing Professor Jose Aruego's observation that the security of judges' tenure
provision was intended to "help secure the independence of the judiciary" in that "during good
behavior, they may not be legislated out of office by the law-making body nor removed by the
Chief Executive for any reason and under the guise of any pretense whatsoever; they may stay
in office until they reach the age of seventy years, or become incapacitated to discharge the
duties of their office. (Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, Vol. 11, pp. 718-719)"
He further cited Aruego's report that a proposed amendment to the effect that the prohibition
against transfers of judges to another district without the approval of the Supreme
Court 8 "should not be applicable to a reorganization of tribunals of justice or of districts, but the
amendment was defeated easily without debate" 9 and logically concluded that "(N)ow, there .
before, having vetoed the transfer of judges thru a re-organization, the Convention evidently
could not have permitted the removal of judges thru re-organization.

Now, if the framers of the 1973 Constitution wished to dispel the strong doubts, to say the least
in the light of the 7 to 4 vote in the Ocampo case against removal of incumbent judges through
legislative action by abolition of their courts, then they would have so clearly provided for such
form of removal in the 1973 Constitution, but on the contrary as already stated they ruled out
such removal or ouster of judges by legislative action by vesting exclusively in the Supreme
Court the power of discipline and removal of judges of all inferior courts.

4. This being so, the fundamental point emphasized by former Chief Justice Bengzon that
abolition of the 33 judicial positions in the Ocampo case was "merely an indirect manner of
removing the petitioners-judges" while the "positions [that] were eliminated . . . were in fact
substituted or replaced by other positions of judges" applies with greater force in the case at bar
which involves an unprecedented total "abolition," thus: "(C)all it reorganization, or legislation or
removal or abolition, this law disregards the constitutional assurance that these judges, once
appointed, shall hold office during good behavior ... [unless incapacitated and until retirement].

The abolition of their offices was merely an indirect manner of removing these petitioners.
Remember that on June 19, 1954, there were 107 judges of first instance, district judges, judges
at-large and cadastral judges (Rep. Act 296). After the passage of Republic Act No. 1186 there
were 114 positions of judges of first instance. There was no reduction there was increase — in

67
the number of judges, nor in the number of courts. The positions of Judges-at-Large and
Cadastral Judges were eliminated; but they were in fact substituted or replaced by other
positions of judges; or if you please, there was a mere change of designation from 'Cadastral
Judge or Judge at large to district judge Hence it should be ruled that as their positions had not
been 'abolished' de facto, but actually retained with another name, these petitioners are entitled
to remain in the service. (Brillo v. Enage, G.R. No. L-7115, March 30, 1954.) For it is not
permissible to effect the removal of one judge thru the expediency of abolishing his office even
as the office with same power is created with another name. (Brillo v. Enage, Malone v.
Williams, 118 tenn. 391, Gibbe's Case 4 A.L.R. p. 211). In this view of the picture, we believe,
Congress could have, and should haveas suggested by Secretary Tuazon during the hearings
in Congress directed in said Republic Act No. 1186 that 'the present judges-at-large and
cadastral judges shall become district judges presiding such districts as may be fixed by the
President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments or by the Secretary of Justice,
as originally proposed by Senator Laurel in connection with the same bill. Something similar
was done before, and it would not be objectionable as an encroachment on the President's
prerogative of appointment, because such judges had already been appointed to the judiciary
before the passage of the act, and the provision may be construed in the light of mere change of
official designation plus increase in salary."

5. Concededly, the questioned Act effects certain changes and procedural reforms with more
specific delineation of jurisdiction as mentioned particularly in the majority opinion, but they do
not change the basic structure of the existing courts. The present Municipal Courts, Municipal
Circuit Courts and City Courts are restructured and redesignated as Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts and Metropolitan Trial Courts in the challenged Act. The Courts of
First Instance, Circuit Criminal Courts, Juvenile & Domestic Relations Courts and Courts of
Agrarian Relations are all restructured and redesignated to be known by the common name of
Regional Trial Courts with provision for certain branches thereof "to handle exclusively criminal
cases, juvenile and domestic relations cases, agrarian cases, urban land reform cases . . . .
and/or such other special cases as the Supreme Court may determine in the interest of a
speedy and efficient administration of justice" 10 and the Court of Appeals is restructured and
redesignated as the Intermediate Appellate Court with an increase in the number of Appellate
Justices from the present 45 to 50 but with a reduction of the number of divisions from 15
(composed of 3 Justices each) to 10 (composed of 5 members each) such that it is feared that
there is created a bottleneck at the appellate level in the important task discharged by such
appellate courts as reviewers of facts.

In my view, the "candid admission" by the Chief Justice in his opinion for the Court "that he
entertained doubts as to whether the intermediate court of appeals provided for is a new
tribunal" 10a is equally applicable to all the other above mentioned courts provided for in the
challenged Act as "new courts". And the best proof of this is the plain and simple transitory
provision in section 44 thereof that upon the President's declaration of completion of the
reorganization (whereby the "old courts" shall "be deemed automatically abolished and the
incumbents thereof shall cease to hold office "(T)he cases pending in the old Courts shall be
transferred to the appropriate Courts constituted pursuant to this Act, together with the pertinent
functions, records, equipment, property and the necessary personnel together with the
"applicable appropriations." This could not have been possible without a specification and
enumeration of what specific cases of the "old courts" would be transferred to the particular
"new courts," had these "new courts" not been manifestly and substantially the "old courts" with
a change of name — or as described by Justice Barredo to have been his first view, now
discarded, in his separate opinion: "just a renaming, and not a substantial and actual
modification or alteration of the present judicial structure or system" or "a rearrangement or
remodeling of the old structure." 11

6. I do not subscribe to the test of good faith or bad faith in the abolition of the courts and
consequent ouster of the incumbent judges from office as expounded by the late eminent
Justice Jose P. Laurel in his separate concurring opinion in the pre-war case
of Zandueta 12 wherein the Court dismissed the petition for quo warranto on the ground of
petitioner Zandueta's estoppel and abandonment of office. 13 Realistically viewed from the basis
of the established legal presumptions of validity and constitutionality of statutes (unless set
aside by a 2/3 majority of 10 members of the Supreme Court) and of good faith in their
enactment, one is hard put to conjure a case where the Court could speculate on the good or
bad motives behind the enactment of the Act without appearing to be imprudent and improper

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and declare that "the legislative power of reorganization (is) sought to cloak an unconstitutional
and evil purpose." The good faith in the enactment of the challenged Act must needs be
granted. What must be reconciled is the legislative power to abolish courts as implied from the
power to establish them with the express constitutional guaranty of tenure of the judges which is
essential for a free and independent judiciary. Adherents of the Rule of Law are agreed that
indispensable for the maintenance of the Rule of Law is a free and independent judiciary, sworn
to protect and enforce. it without fear or favor — "free, not only from graft, corruption, ineptness
and incompetence but even from the tentacles of interference and insiduous influence of the
political powers that be to quote again from Justice Barredo's separate concurring
opinion. 14 Hence, my adherence to the 7-member majority opinion of former Chief Justice
Bengzon in the Ocampo case, supra, as restated by the Philippine Association of Law
Professors headed by former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion that "any reorganization should
at least snow the incumbents of the existing courts to remain in office [the appropriate
counterpart 'new courts'] unless they are removed for cause."

7. The "judges' broader and stronger guarantees of tenure than ordinary civil servants" as
stressed by former Chief Justice Bengzon in Ms majority opinion in Ocampo is based on the
judiciary's status as a coequal and coordinate branch of government, whereas the long line of
Philippine cases upholding the legislative power to abolish offices refers to officers or
employees in the executive branch of government and "the underlying consideration must be
borne in mind that Manalang [the aggrieved petitioner] belonged to the Executive
Department and because the President approved the law no question or encroachment by one
branch on the other could be apprehended or alleged. 15 This is not a matter of personal
privilege for the incumbent judges but as aptly stated by former U.P. Law Dean Irene Cortez in
her memorandum as amicus curiae, "for the judiciary whose independence is not only eroded
but is in grave danger of being completely destroyed." Dean Cortez aptly stressed that "judicial
independence is not a guarantee intended for the Supreme Court alone, it extends to the entire
court system and is even more vital to the courts at the lowest levels because there are more of
them and they operate closest to the people," and "(P)articularly under the present form of
modified parliamentary government with legislative and executive functions overlapping and in
certain areas merging, the judiciary is left to perform the checking function in the performance of
which its independence assumes an even more vital importance. "

The extensive memoranda filed by Dean Cortez and other amici curiae such as former Senator
Jose W. Diokno who strongly urges the Court to strike down the Act "to prevent further
destruction of judicial independence," former Senator Lorenzo Sumulong, president of the
Philippine Constitution Association who advocates for the Court's adoption of the B Bengzon
majority opinion in the Ocampo case so as to abide by "the elementary rule in the interpretation
of constitutions that effect should be given to all parts of the Constitution" and that the judges'
security of tenure guaranty should not be rendered meaningless and inoperative" former
Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, president of the Philippine Lawyers' Association who submits
that the total abolition of all courts below the Supreme Court (except the Sandiganbayan and
the Court of Tax Appeals) and the removal of the incumbent Justices and Judges "violates the
independence of the judiciary, their security of tenure and right to due process guaranteed them
by the Constitution" and Atty. Raul M. Gonzales, president of the National Bar Association of the
Philippines who invokes the Declaration of Delhi at the ICJ Conference in 1959, that "The
principles of unremovability of the Judiciary and their Security of Tenure until death or until a
retiring age fixed by statute is reached, is an important safeguard of the Rule of Law" have
greatly helped in fortifying my views.

8. I had submitted in my memo of September 4, 1980 to the Presidential Committee on Judicial

Reorganization that "(W)hatever reorganization plans the committee may recommend to meet
the worldwide problem of congested court dockets, and to improve judicial services in the public
interest, it should be borne in mind that the members of the judiciary as the weakest branch of
government, yet called upon to safeguard the people's rights and protect them oppression,
official and otherwise, are entitled to security of tenure as guaranteed by the Constitution. Even
though the lower courts may be reshuffled or abolished in the process, the mandate and spirit of
the Constitution guaranteeing their security of tenure and maintaining the independence of the
judiciary should be respected, and they should be retained in the new courts."

In the same vein, Dean Cortez warned of the dire consequences of giving the questioned
provisions of the Act the "absolutist sense which they appear to have at first blush" thus: "(T)o

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accept legislative power to abolish courts asserted under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 which
sweeps through practically the entire judiciary would be to open the door to future court
abolitions in the guise of reorganization. At this stage of our political development, the process
of embarking upon a modified parliamentary system may well usher in a situation where despite
guarantees of judicial tenure, each ruling party in the legislature or any alliance that can
command a majority vote may periodically undertake complete reorganization and remove
judges, thus making of the judiciary a veritable straw in the political wind and "(F)urthermore,
what can result in the modified parliamentary system from the close working relationship
between executive and legislature is made manifest in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. If the
sweeping revamp provided were to be carried out the President would appoint all of the justices
and judges of the courts affected and the whole membership in the judiciary from the highest to
the lowest courts would be his appointees. It is relevant to point out that it is precisely a situation
like this that the Constitution seeks to avoid when it provides staggered terms for the chairman
and members of the constitutional commissions which like the judiciary are guaranteed
independence."

9. The judges' security of tenure was rendered nugatory by the Transitory Provisions of the
1973 Constitution which granted the incumbent President the unlimited power to remove and
replace all judges and officials 16 (as against the limited one-year period for the exercise of such
power granted President Quezon in the 1935 Constitution upon establishment of the Philippine
Commonwealth Upon the declaration of martial law in September, 1972, justices and judges of
all courts, except the Supreme Court, had been required to hand in their resignations. There is
listed a total of 53 judges who were replaced or whose resignations were accepted by the
President during the period from September, 1972 to April, 1976. The power to replace even the
judges appointed after the effectivity on January 17, 1973 of the 1973 Constitution is yet
invoked on behalf of the President in the pending case of Tapucar vs.
Famador 17 notwithstanding the generally held view that such post-1973 Constitution appointed
judges are not subject to the Replacement Clause of the cited Transitory Provision. (In this
case, petitioner judge appointed on January 30, 1976 as judge of the Court of First Instance of
Agusan del Norte and Butuan City, Branch 1, invoked his constitutional security of tenure and
questioned the appointment extended on February 26, 1980 to respondent to replace him,
although he had not been removed or otherwise dismissed from his position nor had be
resigned therefrom. The Court per its March 27, 1980 resolution ordered both to refrain from
discharging the functions of the questioned office And now comes this total abolition of 1,663
judicial positions (and thousands of personnel positions) unprecedented in its sweep and scope.
The urgent need is to strengthen the judiciary with the restoration of the security of tenure of
judges, which is essential for a free and independent judiciary as mandated by the Constitution,
not to make more enfeebled an already feeble judiciary, possessed neither of the power of the
sword nor the purse, as decried by former Chief Justice Bengzon in his Ocampo majority
opinion:

Shall we have judges of the type of Lord Coke Or judges, who, in his place,
would have answered 'I'll do what his majesty pleases,' judges who, afraid of
ouster thru a judiciary reshuffle, would rather serve the interests of the party in
power or of the political boss, than the interests of justice?

As it is, the Judicial Department is feeble enough. Shall we render it feebler with
judges precariously occupying their official seats Judges performing their duties
under the sword of Damocles of future judicial reorganizations

10. The Chief Justice, in his opinion for the Court, equally stressed that "what is equally
apparent is that the strongest ties bind the executive and legislative departments. It is likewise
undeniable that the Batasang Pambansa retains its full authority to enact whatever legislation
may be necessary to carry out national policy as usually formulated in a caucus of the majority
party. It is understandable then why in Fortun vs. Labang 18 it as stressed that with the provision
transferring to the Supreme Court administrative supervision over the Judiciary, there is a
greater need 'to preserve unimpaired the independence of the judiciary, especially so at
present, where to all intends and purposes, there is a fusion between the executive and the
legislative branches,'" 19 with the further observation that "many are the ways by which such
independence could be eroded." In the cited case of Judge Fortun (likewise penned by the
Chief Justice for the Court), the Court issued a writ of prohibition and certiorari ordering the
dismissal of the criminal complaint filed with respondent fiscal Labang by "disgruntled members

70
of the bar with a record of losing cases" in the judge's court and imposed the penalty of censure
on each and everyone of the private respondents-lawyers for the "unseemly haste" with which
they filed the criminal complaint, abetted by "the appearance of sheer vindictiveness or
oppressive exercise of state authority." The Court marked the "violation of the cardinal principles
of fairness and due process that underlie the Rule of Law. Petitioner-Judge was not heard; he
was denied the opportunity to defend himself against the accusation. There was, on the part of
private respondents then, a failure to abide by a Resolution of the Integrated Bar stressing that
precisely integration could shield 'the judiciary which traditionally cannot defend itself except
within its own forum, from the assaults that politics and self-interest may level at it, and assist it
to maintain its integrity, impartiality and independence,' " and that such subjection of a judge to
public "harassment and humiliation . . . can diminish public confidence in the courts."

11. This brings us to the allegedly underlying need for B.P. Blg. 129 discussed in the course of
committee hearings of Cabinet Bill No. 42 and the deliberation on second reading in the
Batasang Pambansa to rid the judiciary of incompetent and corrupt judges and to restore
confidence in the integrity of the courts. The purge has been the constant subject of headlines
and editorials, with the Ministry of Justice's Integrity Council reportedly screening and
conducting "integrity tests as to new applicants and the incumbent judges 20 and seeking
"confidential information on corrupt and incompetent judges to help the government purge the
judiciary." 21 Prime Minister Cesar Virata was quoted as saying that "there will be a purge of the
corrupt and the misfits' when the Judiciary Reorganization Act is signed into law by President
Marcos and implemented in coordination with the Supreme Court." 22 The public respondents'
answer sidesteps the issue of such purge contravening the rudiments of a fair hearing and due
process and submits that "no term of office is sacrosanct when demanded before the altar of the
public good." The metropolitan papers reported the "anxiety gripping the judiciary as the Ministry
of Justice has reportedly been asked to collate information 'on the performance of the judges
and on the qualifications of those slated to take over the positions of the incompetent, the
inefficient or those involved in irregularities. As stated in an editorial, 'Somehow, the uncertainty
that now hovers over the judiciary has unduly subjected the judges to mental torture since they
do not know when or whether the axe will fall on them. Worse, the sword of Damocles hanging
over their heads could provoke them into seeking the help of people claiming to have influence
with the powers that be." 23

But Dean Cortez in her memorandum states that "However, nowhere on public record is there
hard evidence on this. The only figures given in the course of the committee hearings were to
the effect that out of some 1,700 members of the judiciary, between 10 to 15 were of the
undesirable category, i.e. misfit, incompetent or corrupts. (Barredo, J., before the Committee on
Justice, human Rights and Good Government, December 4, 1980)," and that "(I)f this be the
case, the unprecedented, sweeping and wholesale abolition of judicial offices becomes an
arbitrary act, the effect of which is to assert the power to remove all the incumbents guilty or
innocent without due process of law." Now would it be of any avail to beg the question and
assert that due process is not available in mass abolitions of courts.

Justice Barredo, however, without citing any hard evidence, refers in his separate concurrence
to twin objectives of getting rid of " structural inadequacies of the system or of the
cumbersomeness and technicality-peppered and dragging procedural rules in force and of "a
good number of those occupying positions in the judiciary (who') make a mockery of justice and
take advantage of their office for personal ends He adds that "it is my personal assessment of
the present situation in our judiciary that its reorganization has to be of necessity two-pronged,
as I have just indicated, for the most Ideal judicial system with the most perfect procedural rules
cannot satisfy the people and the interests of justice unless the men who hold positions therein
possess the character, competence and sense of loyalty that can guarantee their devotion to
duty and absolute impartiality, nay, impregnability to all temptations of graft and corruption,
including the usual importunings and the fearsome albeit improper pressures of the powers that
be," 24 and invokes the adage of "grandes males, grandes remedios" to now uphold the validity
of the Act.

Former Senator Diokno in his memorandum anticipates the argument that "great ills demand
drastic cures" thus: "Drastic, yes — but not unfair nor unconstitutional. One does not improve
courts by abolishing them, any more than a doctor cures a patient by killing him. The ills the
judiciary suffers from were caused by impairing its independence; they will not be cured by

71
totally destroying that independence. To adopt such a course would only breed more perversity
in the administration of justice, just as the abuses of martial rule have bred more subversion."

12. Finally, as stated by the 19-i 5 integrated Bar of the Philippines 2nd House of Delegates, "It
would, indeed, be most ironical if Judges who are called upon to give due process cannot count
it on themselves. Observance of procedural due process in the separation of misfits from (he
Judiciary is the right way to attain a laudable objective. '

As stressed by the Chief Justice in the Fortun case, judges are entitled to the cardinal principles
of fairness and due process and the opportunity to be heard and defend themselves against the
accusations made against their and not to be subjected to harassment and humiliation, and the
Court will repudiate the "oppressive exercise of legal authority." More so, are judges entitled to
such due process when what is at stake is their constitutionally guaranteed security of tenure
and non-impairment of the independence of the judiciary and the proper exercise of the
constitutional power exclusively vested in the Supreme Court to discipline and remove judges
after fair hearing.

In sum, I see no reason to change the stand submitted by me to the Presidential Committee on
Judicial Reorganization that —

Judges of inferior courts should not be summarily removed and branded for life in such
reorganization on the basis of confidential adverse reports as to their performance, competence
or integrity, save those who may voluntarily resign from office upon being confronted with such
reports against them. The trouble with such ex-parte reports, without due process or hearing,
has been proven from our past experience where a number of honest and competent judges
were summarily removed while others who were generally believed to be basket cases have
remained in the service; and

The power of discipline and dismissal of judges of all inferior courts, from the Court of Appeals
down, has been vested by the 1973 Constitution in the Supreme Court, and if the judiciary is to
be strengthened, it should be left to clean its own house upon complaint and with the
cooperation of the as grieved parties and after due process and hearing.

The constitutional confrontation and conflict may wen be avoided by holding that since the
changes and provisions of the challenged Act do not substantially change the nature and
functions of the "new courts" therein provided as compared to the "abolished old courts" but
provide for procedural changes, fixed delineation of jurisdiction and increases in the number of
courts for a more effective and efficient disposition of court cases, -the incumbent judges
guaranteed security of tenure require that they be retained in the corresponding "new courts."

Fernandez, J., concur.

Separate Opinions

BARREDO, J., concurring:

I join the majority of my brethren in voting that the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, is not unconstitutional as a whole nor in any of its parts.

The issue of unconstitutionality raised by petitioners relates particularly to Section 44 of the Act
which reads as follows:

SEC. 44. Transitory provisions. — The provisions of this Act shall be immediately
carried out in accordance with an Executive Order to be issued by the President.
The Court of Appeals, the Courts of First Instance, the Circuit Criminal Courts,
the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, the Courts of Agrarian Relations,
the City Courts, the Municipal Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Courts shall

72
 continue to function as presently constituted and organized, until the completion
of the reorganization provided in this Act as declared by the President. Upon
such declaration, the said courts shall be deemed automatically abolished and
the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold office. The cases pending in the old
Courts shall e transferred to the appropriate Courts constituted pursuant to this
Act, together with the pertinent functions, records, equipment,. property and the
necessary personnel.

The applicable appropriations shall likewise be transferred to the appropriate

courts constituted pursuant to this Act, to be augmented as may be necessary
from the funds for organizational changes as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg.
80. Said funding shall thereafter be included in the annual General
Appropriations Act.

It is contended by petitioners that the provision in the above section which mandates that "upon
the declaration upon the President that the reorganization contemplated in the Act has been
completed), the said courts (meaning the Court of Appeals and all other lower courts, except the
Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals) shall be deemed abolished and the incumbents
thereof shall cease to hold office" trenches on all the constitutional safeguards and guarantees
of the independence of the judiciary, such as the security of tenure of its members (Section 7,
Article X of the Philippine Constitution of 1973), the prerogatives of the Supreme Court to
administratively supervise all courts and the personnel thereof (Section 6, Id.) and principally,
the power of the Supreme Court "to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least
eight Members, order their dismissal. " (Section 7, Id.)

On the other hand, respondents maintain that thru the above-quoted Section 44. the Batasan
did nothing more than to exercise the authority conferred upon it be Section I of the same Article
of the Constitution which provides that The Judicial power shall be rested in one Supreme Court
and in such inferior courts as may be established by law." In other words, since all inferior courts
are, constitutionally speaking, mere creatures of the law (of the legislature it follows that it is
within the legislature's power to abolish or reorganize them even if in so doing, it might result in
the cessation from office of the incumbents thereof before the expiration of their respective
constitutionally fixed tenures. Respondents emphasize that the legislative power in this respect
is broad and indeed plenary.

Viewing the problem before Us from the above perspectives, it would appear that our task is
either (1) to reconcile, on the one hand, the parliament's power of abolition and reorganization
with, on the other, the security of tenure of members of the judiciary and the Supreme Court's
authority to discipline and remove judges or (2) to declare that either the power of the Supreme
Court or of the Batasan is more paramount than that of the other. I believe. however, that such a
manner of looking at the issue that confronts Us only confuses and compounds the task We are
called upon to perform. For how can there be a satisfactory and rational reconciliation of the
pretended right of a judge to continue as such, when the position occupied by him no longer
exists? To suggest, as some do, that the solution is for the court he is sitting in not to be
deemed abolished or that he should in some way be allowed to continue to function as judge
until his constitutional tenure expires is obviously impractical, if only because we would then
have the absurd spectacle of a judiciary with old and new courts functioning under distinct set-
ups, such as a district court continuing as such in a region where the other judges are regional
judges or of judges exercising powers not purely judicial which is offensive to the Constitution.
The other suggestion that the incumbent of the abolished court should be deemed appointed to
the corresponding new court is even worse, since it would deprive the appointing authority, the
president, of the power to make his own choices and would, furthermore, amount to an
appointment by legislation which is a Constitutional anachronism. more on this point later .

Inasmuch as pursuant to the analysis of the majority of the Members of this Court, in fact and in
law, the structure of judicial system created by Batas Pambansa 129 is substantially different
from that under the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, hence the courts now existing are
actually being abolished, why do We have to indulge in any reconciliation or feel bound to
determine whose power, that of the Batasang Pambansa or that of this Court, should be
considered more imperious? It being conceded that the power to create or establish carries with
it the power to abolish, and it is a legal axiom, or at least a pragmatic reality that the tenure of
the holder of an office must of necessity end when his office no longer exists, as I see it, be

73
have no alternative than to hold that petitioners' invocation of the independence of the judiciary
principle of the Constitution is unavailing ill the cases at bar. It is as simple as that. I might
hasten to add, in this connection, that to insist that what Batas Pambansa 129 is doing is just a
renaming and not a substantial and actual modification or alteration of the present judicial
structure or system assuming a close scrutiny might somehow support such a conclusion, is
pure wishful thinking, it being explicitly and unequivocally provided in the section in question that
said courts are deemed abolished" and further, as if to make it most unmistakably emphatic,
that "the incumbents thereat shall cease to hold office." Dura les, sed les. As a matter of fact, I
cannot conceive of a more emphatic way of manifesting and conveying the determined
legislative intent about it.

Now, why am I yielding to the above reasoning and conclusion? Why don't I insist on
championing the cause of the independence of the judiciary by maintaining that the
constitutional safeguards thereof I have already enumerated earlier must be respected in any
reorganization ordained by the parliament My answer is simple. Practically all the Members of
the Court concede that what is contemplated is not only general reorganization but abolition —
in other words, not only a rearrangement or remodelling of the old structure but a total
demolition thereof to be followed by the building of a new and different one. I am practically
alone in contemplating a different view. True, even if I should appear as shouting in the
wilderness, I would still make myself a hero in the eyes of man justices and judges, members of
the bar and concerned discerning citizens, all lovers of the judicial independence, but
understandably, I should not be, as I am not, disposed to play such a role virtually at the
expense not only of my distinguished colleagues but of the Batasang Pambansa that framed the
law and, most of all, the President who signed and, therefore, sanctioned the Act as it is, unless
I am absolutely sure that my position is formidable, unassailable and beyond all possible
contrary ratiocination, which I am not certain of, as I shall demonstrate anon.

To start with, the jurisprudence, here and abroad, touching on the question now before Us
cannot be said to be clear and consistent, much less unshakeable and indubitably definite either
way. None of the local cases 1 relied upon and discussed by the parties and by the Members of
the Court during the deliberations, such as Borromeo, 2 Ocampo, 3Zandueta, 4 Brillo, 5 etc. can,
to my mind, really serve as reliable pole stars that could lead me to certainty of correctness.

Of course, my instinct and passion for an independent judiciary are uncompromising and
beyond diminution. Indeed, my initial reactions, publicly known, about Batas Pambansa 129
explaining academically its apparent tendency to invade the areas of authority of the Supreme
Court, not to speak of its dangerously impairing the independence of the judiciary, must have, I
imagine, created the impression that I would vote to declare the law unconstitutional. But, during
the deliberations of the Court, the combined wisdom of my learned colleagues was something I
could not discount or just brush aside. Pondering and thinking deeper about all relevant factors,
I have come to the conviction that at least on this day and hour there are justifiable grounds to
uphold the Act, if only to try how it will operate so that thereby the people may see that We are
one with the President and the Batasan in taking what appear to be immediate steps needed to
relieve the people from a fast spreading cancer in the judiciary of our country.

Besides, the Philippines has somehow not yet returned to complete normalcy The improved
national discipline so evident during the earlier days of martial law, has declined at a quite
discernible degree. Different sectors of society are demanding urgent reforms in their respective
field And about the most vehement and persistent, loud and clear, among their gripes, which as
a matter of fact is common to all of them is that about the deterioration in the quality of
performance of the judges manning our courts and the slow and dragging pace of pending
judicial proceedings. Strictly speaking, this is, to be sure, something that may not necessarily be
related to lack of independence of the judiciary. It has more to do with the ineptness and/or
corruption among and corruptibility of the men sitting in the courts in some parts of the country
And what is worse, while in the communities concerned the malady is known to factually exist
and is actually graver and widespread, very few, if any individuals or even associations and
organized groups, truly incensed and anxious to be of help, have the courage and possess the
requisite legal evidence to come out and file the corresponding charges with the Supreme
Court, And I am not vet referring to similar situations that are not quite openly known but
nevertheless just as deleterious. On the other hand, if all these intolerable instances should
actually be formally brought to the Supreme Court, it would be humanly impossible for the Court
to dispose of them with desirable dispatch, what with the thousands of other cases it has to

74
attend to and the rather cumbersome strict requirements of procedural due process it has to
observe in each and every such administrative case all of which are time consulting. Verily,
under the foregoing circumstances, it may be said that there is justification for the patience of
the people about the possibility of early eradication of this disease or evil in our judiciary
pictured above to be nearing the breaking point.

Withal, we must bear in mind that judicial reorganization becomes urgent and inevitable not
alone because of structural inadequacies of the system or of the cumbersomeness and
technicality-peppered and dragging procedural rules in force, but also when it becomes evident
that a good number of those occupying positions in the judiciary, make a mockery of justice and
take advantage of their office for selfish personal ends and yet, as already explained, those in
authority cannot expeditiously cope with the situation under existing laws and rules. It is my
personal assessment of the present situation in our judiciary that its reorganization has to be of
necessity two-pronged, as I have just indicated, for the most Ideal judicial system with the most
perfect procedural rules cannot satisfy the people and the interests of justice unless the men
who hold positions therein possess the character, competence and sense of loyalty that can
guarantee their devotion to duty and absolute impartiality, nay, impregnability to an temptations
of graft and corruption, including the usual importunings and the fearsome albeit improper
pressures of the powers that be. I am certain that the Filipino people feel happy that Batas
Pambansa 129 encompasses both of these objectives, which indeed are aligned with the
foundation of the principle of independence of the judiciary.

The above premises considered, I have decided to tackle our problem from the viewpoint of the
unusual situation in which our judiciary is presently perilously situated. Needless to say, to all of
us, the Members of the Court, the constitutional guarantees of security of tenure and removal
only by the Supreme Court, among others, against impairment of the independence of the
judiciary, which is one of the bedrock's and, therefore, of the essence in any "democracy under
a regime of justice, peace, liberty and equality (Preamble of the 1973 Constitution), are
priceless and should be defended, most of all by the Supreme Court, with all the wisdom and
courage God has individually endowed to each of Us. Withal, we are all conscious of the fact
that those safeguards have never been intended to place the person of the judge in a singular
position of privilege and untouchability, but rather, that they are essentially part and parcel of
what is required of an independent judiciary where judges can decide cases and do justice to
everyone before them ruat caelum. However, We find Ourselves face to face with a situation, in
our judiciary which is of emergency proportions and to insist on rationalizing how those
guarantees should be enforced under such a circumstance seem to be difficult, aside from
being controversial. And so, in a real sense, We have to make a choice between adhering to the
strictly legalistic reasoning pursued by petitioners, on the one hand, and the broader and more
practical approach, which as I have said is within the spirit at least of the Constitution.

My concept of the Constitution is that it is not just a cluster of high sounding verbiages spelling
purely Idealism and nobility in the recognition of human dignity, protection of individual liberties
and providing security and promotion of the general welfare under a government of laws. With
all emphasis and vehemence, I say that the fundamental law of the land is a living instrument
which translates and adapts itself to the demands of obtaining circumstances. It is written for all
seasons, except for very unusual instances that human ratiocination cannot justify to be
contemplated by its language even if read in its broadest sense and in the most liberal way.
Verily, it is paramount and supreme in peace and in war, but even in peace grave critical
situations arise demanding recourse to extraordinary solutions. Paraphrasing the Spanish
adage, "Grandes males, grandes remedios ", such in ordinary problems justify exceptional
remedies. And so, history records that in the face of grave crises and emergencies, the most
constitutionally Idealistic countries have, at one time or another, under the pressure of
pragmatic considerations, adopted corresponding realistic measures, which perilously tether
along the periphery of their Charters, to the extent of creating impressions, of course erroneous,
that the same had been transgressed, although in truth their integrity and imperiousness
remained undiminished and unimpaired.

The Philippines has but recently had its own experience of such constitutional approach. When
martial law was proclaimed here in 1972, there were those who vociferously shouted not only
that the President had acted arbitrarily and without the - required factual bases contemplated in
the Commander-in-Chief clause of the 1935 Constitution, but more, that he had gone beyond
the traditional and universally recognized intent of said clause by utilizing his martial law powers

75
not only to maintain peace and tranquility and preserve and defend the integrity and security of
the state but to establish a New Society The critics contended that martial law is only for
national security, not for the imposition of national discipline under a New Society.

Due to its relevancy to Our present discussion, it is well for everyone to bear in mind that in this
jurisdiction, this concept of martial law has already been upheld several times by this Court. 1,
for one, accepted such a construction because I firmly believe that to impose martial law for the
sole end of suppressing an insurrection or rebellion without coincidentally taking corresponding
measures to eradicate the root causes of the uprising is utter folly, for the country would still
continue to lay open to its recurrence.

I have made the foregoing discourse, for it is fundamentally in the fight of this Court's doctrines
about the imposition of martial law as I have stated that I prefer to base this concurrence. To put
it differently, if indeed there could be some doubt as to the correctness of this Court's judgment
that Batas Pambansa 129 is not unconstitutional, particularly its Section 44, I am convinced that
the critical situation of our judiciary today calls for solutions that may not in the eyes of some
conform strictly with the letter of the Constitution but indubitably justified by its spirit and intent.
As 1 have earlier indicated, the Charter is not just a construction of words to whose literal iron-
clad meanings we must feel hidebound without regard to every Constitution's desirable inherent
nature of adjustability and adaptability to prevailing situations so that the spirit and fundamental
intent and objectives of the framers may remain alive. Batas Pambansa 129 is one such
adaptation that comes handy for the attainment of the transcendental objectives it seeks to
pursue While, to be sure, it has the effect of factually easing out some justices and judges
before the end of their respective constitutional tenure sans the usual administrative
investigation, the desirable end is achieved thru means that, in the light of the prevailing
conditions, is constitutionally permissible.

Before closing, it may not be amiss for me to point out that Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, aside
from what has been discussed about its effect on the guarantees of judicial independence, also
preempts, in some of its provisions, the primary rule-making power of the Supreme Court in
respect to procedure, practice and evidence. With the pardon of my colleagues, I would just like
to say that the Court should not decry this development too much. After all, the legislature is
expressly empowered by the Charter to do so, (Section 5(5), Article X of the Constitution of
1973) so much so, that I doubt if the Court has any authority to alter or modify any rule the
Batasang Pambansa enunciates. Truth to tell, as Chairman of the Committee on the Revision of
the Rules of Court, for one reason or another, principally the lack of a clear consensus as to
what some of my colleagues consider very radical proposals voiced by me or my committee,
We have regrettably procrastinated long enough in making our procedural rules more practical
and more conducive to speedier disposal and termination of controversies by dealing more with
substantial justice.

So also have We, it must be confessed, failed to come up to expectations of the framers of the
Constitution in our ways of disposing of administrative complaints against erring and
misconducting judges. Of course, We can excuse Ourselves with the explanation that not only
are We overloaded with work beyond human capability of its being performed expeditiously, but
that the strict requisites of due process which are time consuming have precluded Us from
being more expeditious and speedy.

I feel I must say all of these, because if the above-discussed circumstances have not combined
to create a very critical situation in our judiciary that is making the people lose its faith and
confidence in the administration of justice by the existing courts, perhaps the Court could look
with more sympathy at the stand of petitioners. I want all the sundry to know, however, that
notwithstanding this decision, the independence of the judiciary in the Philippines is far from
being insubstantial, much less meaningless and dead. Batas Pambansa 129 has precisely
opened our eyes to how, despite doubts and misgivings, the Constitution can be so construed
as to make it possible for those in authority to answer the clamor of the people for an upright
judiciary and overcome constitutional roadblocks more apparent than real.

To those justices, judges, members of the bar and concerned citizens whose eyes may be
dimming with tears of disappointment and disenchantment because of the stand I have chosen
to adopt in these cases, may I try to assuage them by joining their fervent prayers that some

76
other day, hopefully in the near future, Divine Providence may dictate to another constitutional
convention to write the guarantees of judicial independence with ink of deeper hue and words
that are definite, clear, unambiguous and unequivocal, in drawing the line of demarcation
between the Parliament and the Judiciary in the manner that in His Infinite wisdom would most
promote genuine and impartial justice for our people, free, not only from graft, corruption,
ineptness and incompetence but even from the tentacles of interference and insiduous influence
of the political powers that be. Presently, I am constrained from going along with any other view
than that the Constitution allows abolition of existing courts even if the effect has to be the
elimination of any incumbent judge and the consequent cutting of his constitutional tenure of
office.

I cannot close this concurrence without referring to the apprehensions in some quarters about
the choice that will ultimately be made of those who will be eased out of the judiciary in the
course of the implementation of Batas Pambansa 129. By this decision, the Court has in factual
effect albeit not in constitutional conception yielded generally to the Batasang Pambansa, and
more specifically to the President, its own constitutionally conferred power of removal of judges.
Section 44 of the Batasan's Act declares that all of them shall be deemed to have ceased to
hold office, leaving it to the President to appoint those whom he may see fit to occupy the new
courts. Thus, those who will not be appointed can be considered as "ceasing to hold their
respective offices", or, as others would say they would be in fact removed. How the President
will make his choices is beyond Our power to control. But even if some may be eased out even
without being duly informed of the reason therefor, much less being given the opportunity to be
heard the past actuations of the President on all matters of deep public interest shouted serve
as sufficient assurance that when lie ultimately acts, he will faithfully adhere to his solemn oath
"to do justice to every man hence, lie will equip himself first with the fullest reliable information
before acts. This is not only my individual faith founded on my personal acquaintance with the
character and sterling qualities of President Ferdinand E. Marcos. I dare say this is the faith of
the nation in a man who has led it successfully through crises and emergencies, with justice to
all, with malice towards none. I am certain, the President will deal with each and every individual
to be affected by this reorganization with the best light that God will give him every moment he
acts in each individual case as it comes for his decision

AQUINO, J., concurring:

I concur in the result. The petitioners filed this petition for declaratory relief and prohibition "to
declare the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (Batas Pambansa Blg. 129) unconstitutional".

The petition should have been dismissed outright because this Court has no jurisdiction to grant
declaratory relief and prohibition is not the proper remedy to test the constitutionality of the law.
the petition is premature. No jurisdictional question is involved.

There is no justiciable controversy wherein the constitutionality of the said law is in issue. It is
presumed to be constitutional. The lawmaking body before enacting it looked into the
constitutional angle.

Seven of the eight petitioners are practising lawyers. They have no personality to assail the
constitutionality of the said law even as taxpayers.

The eighth petitioner, Gualberto J. de la Llana, a city judge (who in 1977 filed a petition for
declaratory relief assailing Presidential Decree No. 1229, which called for a referendum. De la
Llana his Comelec, 80 SCRA 525), has no cause of action for prohibition. He is not being
removed from his position.

The Judiciary Reorganization Law was enacted in utmost good faith and not "to cloak an
unconstitutional and evil purpose As ably expounded by the Chief Justice, in enacting the said
law, the lawmaking body acted within the scope of its constitutional powers and prerogatives.

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GUERRERO, J., concurring:

I concur with my distinguished and learned colleagues in upholding the constitutionality of the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. For the record, however, I would like to state my personal
convictions and observations on this case, a veritable landmark case, for whatever they may be
worth.

The legal basis of the Court's opinion rendered by our esteemed Chief Justice having been
exhaustively discussed and decisively justified by him, a highly-respected expert and authority
on constitutional law, it would be an exercise in duplication to reiterate the same cases and
precedents. I am then constrained to approach the problem quite differently, not through the
classic methods of philosophy, history and tradition, but following what the well-known jurist,
Dean Pound, said that "the most significant advance in the modern science of law is the change
from the analytical to the functional attitude." 1 And in pursuing this direct

ion, I must also reckon with and rely on the ruling that "another guide to the meaning of a statute
is found in the evil which it is designed to remedy, and for this the court properly looks at
contemporaneous events, the situation as it existed, and as it was pressed upon the attention of
the legislative body." 2

I have no doubt in my mind that the institutional reforms and changes envisioned by the law are
clearly conducive to the promotion of national interests. The objectives of the legislation namely:
(a) An institutional restructuring by the creation of an Intermediate Appellate Court, thirteen (I 3)
Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts: (b) A reappointment of jurisdiction geared towards greater efficiency: (c) A
simplification of procedures and (d) The abolition of the inferior courts created by the Judiciary
Act of 1948 and other statutes, as approved by the Congress of the Philippines 3 are
undoubtedly intended to improve the regime of justice and thereby enhance public good and
order. Indeed, the purpose of the Act as further stated in the Explanatory Note, which is "to
embody reforms in the structure, organization and composition of the Judiciary, with the aim of
improving the administration of justice, of decongesting judicial dockets, and coping with the
more complex problems on the present and forseeable future cannot but "promote the welfare
of society, since that is the final cause of law. 4

Hence, from the standpoint of The general utility and functional value of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act, there should be no difficulty, doubt or disbelief in its legality and
constitutionality. That there are ills and evils plaguing the judicial system is undeniable. The
notorious and scandalous congestion of court dockets as too well-known to be ignored as are
the causes which create and produce such anomaly. Evident is the need to look for devices and
measures that are more practical, workable and economical. 5

From the figures alone (301,497 pending cases in 1976; 351, 943 in 1977; 404, 686 in 1978;
426, 911 in 1979; 441, 332 in 1980; and 450, 063 as of February 3, 1982) 6 the congested
character of court dockets rising year after year is staggering and enormous, looming like a
legal monster.

But greater than the need to dispense justice speedily and promptly is the necessity to have
Justices and Judges who are fair and impartial, honest and incorruptible, competent and
efficient. The general clamor that the prestige of the Judiciary today has deteriorated and
degenerated to the lowest ebb in public estimation is not without factual basis. Records in the
Supreme Court attest to the unfitness and incompetence, corruption and immorality of many
dispensers of justice. According to the compiled data, the total number of Justices and Judges
against whom administrative charges have been filed for various offenses, misconduct,
venalities and other irregularities reaches 322. Of this total, 8 are Justices of the Court of
Appeals, 119 CFI Judges, 2 Criminal Circuit Judges, 8 CAR Judges, 1 Juvenile & Domestic
Relations Court Judge, 38 City Judges, and 146 Municipal Judges.

The Supreme Court has found 102 of them guilty and punished them with either suspension,
admonition, reprimand or fine. The number includes 1 CA Justice, 35 CFI Judges, 1 CCC
Judge, 3 CAR Judges, 1 JDRC Judge, 9 City Judges and 53 Municipal Judges.

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Seventeen (17) Judges have been ordered dismissed and separated from the service. And
these are 3 CFI, 1 CAR, 1 City Judge and 12 Municipal Judges.

Going over these administrative proceedings, it took an average of two-year period from the
filing of the charge to the dismissal of the respondent. In one case, the proceedings were
terminated after seven years. How long the pending administrative cases will be disposed of,
only time will tell as an increasing number of administrative cases are being filed by victims of
judicial misconduct, abuse and arbitrariness.

Excepting those who have been punished and dismissed from the service, there are many who
have been castigated and censured in final judgments of the Supreme Court upon appeal or
review of the decisions, orders and other acts of the respondent courts, Justices and Judges. To
cite a few cases, Our decisions have categorically pronounced respondents' actuations, thus:
"deplorable, giving no credit to the Judiciary" 7; applicable rules. The whole proceedings looked
no more than a pre-arranged compromise between the accused and the Judge to flaunt the law
and every norm of propriety and procedure" 8; "there was a deliberate failure of respondent
Judge to respect what is so clearly provided in the Rules of Court" 9; "It is unfortunate that
respondent Judge failed to acquaint himself with, 01' misinterpreted, those controlling provisions
and doctrines" 10; "The failure of the respondent Municipal Judge to yield obedience to
authoritative decisions of the Supreme Court and of respondent Court of First Instance Judge
and his deplorable insistence on procedural technicalities was called down in L-49828, July 25,
1981. For peremptorily dismissing the third party complaint on the ground that the motion to
dismiss was 'well-taken' and respondent Judge did not elaborate, the Court remarked: "May his
tribe vanish." 11 In one case, We noted "There is here so something unusual, but far from
palliating the gravity of the error incurred, it merely exacerbated it. ... it did render the due
process requirement nugatory, for instead of a fair and impartial trial, there was an Idle form, a
useless ceremony." 12

It is dishonorable enough to be publicly and officially rebuked but to allow these Judges and
their ilk to remain and continue to preside in their courtrooms is a disgrace to the Judiciary. It is
to be deplored that the Supreme Court has not found time to exercise its power and authority in
the premises, for no charges or proceedings have been instituted against them. We have a list
of these crooked Judges whose actuations have been found to be patiently wrong and
manifestly in-defeasible. There ought to be no objection or compunction in weeding them out
from the service. If they are not booted out now, it will take from here to eternity to clean this
Augean stable.

Candidly, one reason for writing this concurring opinion is to call attention to these evils, abuses
and wrongs which are surreptitiously but surely destroying the trust and faith of the people in the
integrity of the entire Judiciary. Some members of the Court felt that these revelations would be
like washing dirty linen in public. But these facts are of public and official record nay court
cases, and sooner or later, Truth will come out.

In the light of these known evils and infirmities of the judiciary system, it would be absurd and
unreasonable to claim that the legislators did not act upon them in good faith and honesty of
purpose and with legitimate ends. It is presumed that official duty has been regularly
performed. 13 The presumption of regularity is not confined to the acts of the individual officers
but also applies to the acts of boards, such as administrative board or bodies, and to acts of
legislative bodies. 14 Good faith is always to be presumed in the absence of proof to the
contrary, of which there is none in the case at bar. It could not be otherwise if We are to accord
as We must, full faith and credit to the lawmakers' deep sense of public service and the
judicious exercise of their high office as the duly-elected representatives of the people.

It is conceded that the abolition of an office is legal if attendant with good faith. 15 The question
of good faith then is the crux of the conflict at bar. Good faith in the enactment of the law does
not refer to the wisdom of the measure, the propriety of the Act, or to its expediency. The
questions raised by petitioners and amicus curiae for their cause, viz: Why abolish all the courts
Why legislate out the judges Why not amend the Rules of Court only Is abolition of all courts the
proper remedy to weed out corrupt and misfits in our Judiciary? — may not be inquired into by
Us. "It is not the province of the courts to supervise legislation and keep it within the bounds of
propriety and common sense. That is primarily and exclusively a legislative concern." 16 The

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Courts "are not supposed to override legitimate policy and ... never inquire into the wisdom of
the law." 17 Chief Justice Fernando who penned the Morfe decision, writes that while "(i)t is thus
settled, to paraphrase Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, that
only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the action taken, may be the basis
for declaring a statute invalid," 18 he adds that it is "useful to recall what was so clearly stated by
Laurel that 'the Judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the
wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive
and legislative departments of the government.'" 19In any case, petitioners have not shown an
iota of proof of bad faith. There is no factual foundation of bad faith on record. And I do not
consider the statement in the sponsorship speech for Cabinet Bill No. 42 of Minister of Justice
Ricardo J. Puno that the Bill would be a more efficient vehicle of "eliminating incompetent and
unfit Judges as indicative of impermissible legislative motive. 20

It may be true that while the remedy or solution formulated by the legislation will eradicate
hopefully or at least minimize the evils and ills that infect and pester the judicial body, it will
result in the actual removal of the Justices of the Court of Appeals and Judges of the lower
courts. It is also true that whether it is termed abolition of office or removal from office, the end-
result is the same — termination of the services of these incumbents. Indeed, the law may be
harsh, but that is the law. Dura lex sed lex.

The Justices and Judges directly affected by the law, being lawyers, should know or are
expected to know the nature and concept of a public office. It is created for the purpose of
effecting the ends for which government has been instituted, which are for the common good,
and not the profit, honor or private interest of any one man, family or class of men. In our form of
government, it is fundamental that public offices are public trust, and that the person to be
appointed should be selected solely with a view to the public welfare. 21 In the last analysis, a
public office is a privilege in the gift of the State. 22

There is no such thing as a vested interest or an estate in an office, or even an absolute right to
hold office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary
and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its salary. When an office
is created by the Constitution, it cannot be abolished by the legislature, but when created by the
State under the authority of the Constitution, it may be abolished by statute and the incumbent
deprived of his office. 23 Acceptance of a judicial appointment must be deemed as adherence to
the rule that "when the court is abolished, any unexpired term is abolished also. The Judge of
such a court takes office with that encumbrance and knowledge." 24 "The Judge's right to his full
term and his full salary are not dependent alone upon his good conduct, but also upon the
contingency that the legislature may for the public good, in ordaining and establishing the
courts, from time to time consider his office unnecessary and abolish it." 25

The removal from office of the incumbent then is merely incidental to the valid act of abolition of
the office as demanded by the superior and paramount interest of the people. The bad and the
crooked Judges must be removed. The good and the straight, sober Judges should be
reappointed but that is the sole power and prerogative of the President who, I am certain, will
act according to the best interest of the nation and in accordance with his solemn oath of office
"to preserve and defend its Constitution, execute its laws, do justice to everyone ... " There and
then the proper balance between the desire to preserve private interest and the desideratum of
promoting the public good shall have been struck. 26

The Supreme Court has been called the conscience of the Constitution. It may be the last
bulwark of constitutional government. 27 It Must, however, be remembered "that legislatures are
ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as
courts." 28 The responsibility of upholding the Constitution rests not on the courts alone but on
the legislatures as well. It adheres, therefore, to the well-settled principle that "all reasonable
doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute" for which reason it will not
set aside a law as violative of the Constitution "except in a clear case." 29

Finally, I view the controversy presented to Us as a conflict of opinions — on judicial

independence, whether impaired or strengthened by the law; on reorganization of the courts,
whether abolition of office or removal therefrom, and on delegation of legislative power, whether
authorized or unauthorized. Without detracting from the merits, the force and brilliance of their

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advocacies based on logic, history and precedents, I choose to stand on the social justification
and the functional utility of the law to uphold its constitutionality. In the light of contemporaneous
events from which the New Republic emerged and evolved new Ideals of national growth and
development, particularly in law and government, a kind or form of judicial activism, perhaps
similar to it, is necessary to justify as the ratio decidendi of Our judgment.

This is the time and the moment to perform a constitutional duty to affix my imprimatur and
affirmance to the law, hopefully an act of proper judicial statesmanship.

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:

I agree with the learned Chief Justice of the Philippines that Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 is not
unconstitutional. Unlike Oscar Wilde, I choose not to yield to temptation by embellishing my
concurrence lest I be accrued of bringing coal to Newcastle. Accordingly, I will simply vote to
dismiss the petition

However, I cannot agree with the Chief Justice when he says:

... In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore it should be in

accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far as
incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that
its view be accorded the fullest consideration. There would be no plausibility then
to the allegation that there is an unconstitutional taint to the challenged Act.
Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle
that in the choice of alternatives between one which would save and another
which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred.

It has already been ruled that the statute does not suffer from any constitutional infirmity
because the abolition of certain judicial offices was done in good faith. This being the case, I
believe that the Executive is entitled to exercise its constitutional power to fill the newly created
judicial positions without any obligation to consult with this Court and to accord its views the
fullest consideration. To require consultation will constitute an invasion of executive territory
which can be resented and even repelled. The implicit suggestion that there could be an
unconstitutional implementation of the questioned legislation is not congruent with the basic
conclusion that it is not unconstitutional.

DE CASTRO, J., concurring:

I concur in the declaration that the law is not unconstitutional.

May I, however, submit this separate opinion more to avoid being misunderstood by my
brethren in the judiciary as not feeling for them as much concern as I should for their security of
tenure which is raised as the main argument against the constitutionality of the law, than by way
of giving added force or support to the main opinion so well-written by Our learned Chief Justice
in his usual scholarly fashion. I, therefore, limit myself to a discussion that the assailed statue is
not unconstitutional without having to suggest how it may be implemented in order that it could
stand the most rigid test of constitutionality, for in that area, what is involved is purely an
executive act of the President in whose wisdom, patriotism and sense of justice We should trust
in how he would fulfill his sworn duties to see that the laws are faithfully executed and to do
justice to every man.

Moreover, while I also concur in the dismissal of the petition, I do so on the additional ground
that petitioners have not fulfilled all the requisites for the exercise by this Court of its power of
judicial inquiry — the power to declare a law unconstitutional.

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The creation and organization of courts inferior to the Supreme Court is a constitutional
prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative is plenary and necessarily implies the power to
reorganize said courts, and in the process, abolish them to give way to new or substantially
different ones. To contend otherwise would be to forget a basic doctrine of constitutional law
that no irrepealable laws shall be passed. 1

The power to create courts and organize them is necessarily the primary authority from which
would thereafter arise the security of tenure of those appointed to perform the functions of said
courts. in the natural order of things, therefore, since the occasion to speak of security of tenure
of judges arises only after the courts have first been brought into being, the right to security of
tenure takes a secondary position to the basic and primary power of creating the courts to
provide for a fair and strong judicial system. If the legislature, in the exercise of its authority,
deems it wise and urgent to provide for a new set of courts, and in doing so, it feels the abolition
of the old courts would conduce more to its objective of improving the judiciary and raising its
standard, the matter involved is one of policy and wisdom into which the courts, not even the
Supreme Court, cannot inquire, much less interfere with. By this secondary position it has to the
primary power of the legislature to create courts, the security of tenure given to the incumbents
should not be a legal impediment to the exercise of that basic power of creating the statutory
courts which, by necessary implication, includes the power to abolish them in order to create
new ones. This primary legislative power is a continuing one, and the resultant right of security
of tenure of those appointed to said courts could not bring about the exhaustion of that power.
Unquestionably, the legislature can repeal its own laws, and that power can never be exhausted
without, as a consequence, violating a fundamental precept of constitutional and representative
government that no irrepealable laws shall be passed.

If the creation of courts is a legislative prerogative their abolition is, therefore, a matter of
legislative intent. it involves the exercise of legislative power, an act of legislation which
generally concerns policy in the formation of which the courts have no say Initially, when the
legislature creates the courts, it suffers from no limitation arising from the necessity or
respecting the security of tenure of judges who are not yea there. This inherent character of
fullness and plenitude of the power to create and abolish courts does not change when that
same power is once more exercised thereafter, as the need therefor is felt. Which only goes to
show that when done in good faith and motivated solely by the good and the well-being of the
people, the exercise of the power is not meant to be restricted, curtailed, much less exhausted
by the so-called judicial security of tenure.

The passage of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 is no more than the exercise of the
power vested by the Constitution on the legislative body of the Republic as described above.
That power carries with it the duty and responsibility of providing the people with the most
effective and efficient system of administration of justice. This is by far of more imperative and
transcedental importance than the security of tenure of judges which, admittedly, is one of the
factors that would conduce to independence of the judiciary — but first of all, a good, efficient
and effective judiciary. A judiciary wanting in these basic qualities does not deserve the
independence that is meant only for a judiciary that can serve best the interest and welfare of
the people which is the most primordial and paramount consideration, not a judiciary in which
the people's faith has been eroded, a condition which the security of tenure, in some instances,
may even be contributory.

In enacting the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, the legislature is presumed to have been
motivated by no other objective than to provide the people the kind of judicial machinery that
would best serve their interest and welfare, in its belief that the present machinery is falling short
of that measure of public service. It should, likewise, be presumed that it has been led to this
low estimate of the utility and effectiveness of the present set-up of the judiciary after informing
itself, with the facilities at its command, such as the power of legislative investigation, of the
actual condition of the courts, particularly as to whether they continue to enjoy the trust, faith
and confidence of the public, and what the cause or causes are of their erosion, if not loss, as is
the keenly perceptible feeling of the people in general. Responsibility for this more or less
extensive slowdown of the delivery of judicial service can be laid on no other than either of the
two components of a court — the procedural laws or rules that govern the workings of the
courts, or the persons executing or applying them — or both.

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When two interests conflict as what had given rise to the present controversy the duty of the
legislature to provide society with a fair, efficient and effective judicial system, on one hand, and
the right of judges to security of tenure, on the other, the latter must of necessity yield to the
former. One involves public welfare and interest more directly and on a greater magnitude than
the right of security of tenure of the judges which is, as is easily discernible, more of a personal
benefit to just a few, as indeed only the judge affected could seek judicial redress of what he
conceives to be its violation.

Herein lies the propriety of the exercise of "police power" of the State, if this concept which
underlies even the Constitution, has to be invoked as a constitutional justification of the passage
of the Act in question. That is, if a conflict between the primary power of the legislature to create
courts, and mere consequential benefit accorded to judges and justices after the creation of the
courts is indeed perceivable, which the writer fails to see, or, at least, would disappear upon a
reconciliation of the two apparently conflicting interests which, from the above disquisition is not
hard to find. It is, without doubt, in the essence of the exercise of police power that a right
assertable by individuals may be infringed in the greater interest of the public good and general
welfare. This is demonstrated in how the rights and freedoms enumerated in the Bill of Rights
enjoyable by The entire people, not just by a handful in comparison, are made subject to the
lawful exercise of the police power of the State.

Viewed, therefore, from the above-mentioned perspective, the general revamp of the judiciary
involving both its components — the court as an office or institution, and the judges and justices
that man them — should not find any legal obstacle in the security of tenure of judges. This
security, after all, is no more than as provided for all other officials and employees in the civil
service of the government in Section 3, Article XII-B of the Constitution which provides:

No officer or employees in the civil service shall be suspended or dismissed

except for cause as provided by law.

The provision of Article XVII, Section 10 of the Constitution gives to judicial officials no more
than a guarantee that their retirement age as fixed in the Constitution shall not be alterable at
mere legislative pleasure. The equivalent provision in the 1935 Constitution was inserted for the
first time because the retirement age before then was provided merely by statute not by the
Constitution. If it comes to their removal or suspension, what gives them constitutional
protection is the aforequoted provision which does not contemplate abolition of office when
done in good faith, for removal implies the existence of the office, not when it is abolished.
Admittedly, as has been held, abolition of office for no reason related to public welfare or for the
good of the service, let alone when done in bad faith, amounts to an unlawful removal. 2 The
abolition of the courts as declared in the Act as a result of a reorganization of the judiciary, as
the Title of the law curtly but announces, can by no means, from any viewpoint, be so branded.
And whether by said reorganization, the present would be deemed abolished, as the law
expresses such an unmistakable intent, the matter is one for the sole and exclusive
determination of the legislature. It rests entirely on its discretion whether by the nature and
extent of the changes it has introduced, it has done enough to consider them abolished. To give
the Supreme Court the power to determine the extent or nature of the changes as to their
structure, distribution and jurisdiction, before the clear intent to abolish them, or to declare them
so abolished, is given effect, would be to allow undue interference in the function of legislation.
This would be contrary to the primary duty of courts precisely to give effect to the legislative
intent as expressed in the law or as my be discovered therefrom.

From the above observation, it would be futile to insist that the present courts would not
effectively be abolished by the Act in question. it might be to arrogate power for Us to say that
the changes the law brings to the present judicial system, do not suffice for this Court to give
effect to the clear intent of the legislative body. Where would the agrarian courts, the circuit
criminal courts, the JDRC's be in the judicial structure as envisioned by the law? Are they not
abolished by merger with the regional trial courts, which by such merger, and by the other
changes introduced by the law, would make said courts different from the present Courts of First
Instance which, as a consequence, may then be considered abolished Integrated as the present
courts are supposed to be, changes somewhere in the judicial machinery would necessarily
affect the entire system.

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The fact that the Supreme Court may specially assign courts to function as the special courts
just mentioned, does not mean that the changes wrought are only superficial or "cosmetic" as
this term has been used so often in the oral argument. Without the new law, these courts will
remain fixed and permanent where they are at present. Yet in the course of time, the need for
their independent existence may disappear, or that by changed conditions, where they are
needed at present at a certain place, the need for them may be somewhere else in later years, if
maximum benefit at the least expense is to be achieved, as always should be a most desirable
goal and objective of government.

Demonstrably then, the abolition of the courts is a matter of legislative intent into which no
judicial inquiry is proper, except perhaps if they intent is so palpably tainted with constitutional
repugnancy, which is not so in the instant case. We have, therefore, no occasion, as earlier
intimated, to speak of removal of judges when the reorganization of the judiciary would result in
the abolition of the courts other than the Supreme Court and the Court of Tax Appeals. Hence,
the provision of the Constitution giving to the Supreme Court power to dismiss a judge by a vote
of eight justices does not come into the vortex of the instant controversy. Its possible violation
by the assailed statute cannot happen, and may, therefore, not constitute an argument against
the constitutionality of the law.

Former Justice Barrera, in a speech before the Philippine Bar Association, 3 impliedly indorsed
the judicial revamp when he enumerated the qualities of a good judge that the appointing power
should consider in making new appointments to the judiciary upon its reorganization pursuant to
the questioned Act. The words of the eminent jurist may well reflect the favorable reaction of the
public in general to what the Act aim to achieve in the name of good and clean government. The
present judicial incumbents, who have not in any way, by their acts and behavior while in office,
tarnished the good image that the judiciary should have, therefore, have no cause for
apprehension that what they are entitled to under the Constitution by way of security of tenure
wig be denied them, considering the publicly known aim and purpose of the massive judicial
revamp, specially as cherished with deep concern by the President who initiated the move when
he created the Judiciary Reorganization Committee to recommend needed and appropriate
judicial reforms.

If the only obstacle to a verdict in favor of constitutionality of the law is its possible effect of
impairing the security of tenure of the incumbents, We may have the following facts to consider:

1. Under the 1973 Constitution all incumbent judges and justices may continue in office until
replaced or reappointed by the President. As to those judicial officials, no security of tenure, in
the traditional concept, attaches to their incumbency which is, in a real sense, only a holdover
tenure. How the President has exercised this immense power with admirable restraint should
serve as the strongest guarantee of how justice and fairness will be his sole guide in
implementing the law.

2. As to the rest of the incumbents, they are all appointees of Our present President, and he
should feel concerned more than anyone else to protect whatever rights they may rightfully
claim to maintain their official standing and integrity. They need have no fear of being ignored
for no reason at all, much less for mere spirit of vindictiveness or lack of nobility of heart.

From the foregoing, it would become apparent that only in the implementation of the law may
there possibly be a taint of constitutional repugnancy as when a judge of acknowledged
honesty, industry and competence is separated, because an act of arbitrariness would thereby
be committed, but the abolition of the courts as decreed by the law is not by itself or per se
unconstitutional.

Consequently, the law, the result of serious and concerned study by a highly competent
committee, deserves to be given a chance to prove its worth in the way of improving the
judiciary. If in its implementation, any one, if at all, feels aggrieved, he can always seek judicial
redress, if he can make out a case of violation of his right of security of tenure with
uncontrovertible clarity, as when the separation is very arbitrary in the peculiar circumstances of
his case, for an act of arbitrariness, under any constitution, is unpardonable.

84
This petition should also be dismissed for being premature, as is the stand of Justice Aquino.
The petition asks this Court to exercise its power of judicial inquiry, the power to declare a law
unconstitutional when it conflicts with the fundamental law (People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56). This
power has well-defined limits, for it can be exercised only when the following requisites are
present, to wit: (1) There must be an actual case or controversy; (2) The question of
constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) He should do so at the earliest
opportunity, and (4) The determination of the constitutionality of the statute must be necessary
to a final determination of the case.

I am of the opinion that the petition does not present an actual controversy nor was it filed by the
proper parties.

The main ground for which the constitutionality of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 is
assailed is that it is violative of the security of tenure of justices and judges. The only persons
who could raise the question of constitutionality of the law are, therefore, the actual incumbents
of the courts who would be separated from the service upon the abolition of the courts affected
by the law, on the theory as advanced by petitioners that their judicial security of tenure would
be violated. Olongapo City Judge de la Llana, the only judge among the petitioners, has not
been separated from the service. Nor is his separation already a certainty, for he may be
appointed to the court equivalent to his present court, or even promoted to a higher court. Only
when it has become certain that his tenure has been terminated will an actual controversy arise
on his allegation of a fact that has become actual, not merely probable or hypothetical.

The present petition may neither be allowed as a taxpayer suit. A taxpayer may bring an action
to raise the question of constitutionality of a statute only when no one else can more
appropriately bring the suit to defend a right exclusively belonging to him, and. therefore, would
localize the actual injury to his person, and to no other. For a "proper party" to invoke the power
of judicial inquiry, as one of the requisites in the exercise of such power, does not mean one
having no better right, one more personalized, than what he has as a member of the public in
general. With the incumbent judges undoubtedly being the ones under petitioners' theory, who
would suffer direct and actual injury, they should exclude mere taxpayers who cannot be said to
suffer as "direct" and "actual" an injury as the judges and justices by the enforcement of the
assailed statute, from the right to bring the suit.

The validity of the foregoing observation becomes more evident when We consider that only
after the fate of the present incumbents is known, whether they have been actually separated or
not, would the present courts be declared abolished. For the law clearly continues their
existence until all the new courts have been filled up with new appointments, or at least such
number as would be equal to the number of actual incumbents, and they are the very courts to
which they may lay claim to the right to continue therein, so that the status of each and
everyone of them has thereby been made certain. Only then, upon the actual abolition of the
courts, may there possibly be a violation of the security of tenure, as contented, that would give
rise to an "actual controversy" in which the 6 improper party" can be no other than the judges
who feel aggrieved by their non- appointment to the new courts.

It would, therefore, not be proper to declare the law void at this stage, before it has even been
given a chance to prove its worth, as the legislature itself and an those who helped by their
exhaustive and scholarly study, felt it to be an urgent necessity, and before any of the proper
parties who could assail its constitutionality would know for a fact, certain and actual, not merely
probable or hypothetical, that they have a right violated by what they could possibly contend to
be an unconstitutional enforcement of the law, not by a law that is unconstitutional unto itself.

I am, therefore, for giving the law a chance to be put into application so as not to douse great
popular expectations for the courts to regain their highest level of efficiency had reputation for
probity. Inevitably, this is to be so since only when the law is fully implemented will all the courts
affected be declared abolished, undoubtedly to avoid an interregnum when the country is
without any court, except the Supreme Court, the Court of Tax Appeals and the Sandigan. Only
then will it be known whether an actual controversy would arise because any of the incumbents
have been left out in the restructured judiciary.

85
There would then be also a proper party to assail the constitutionality of the law, conformably to
the conditions requisite for the exercise of the power of judicial inquiry which by their stringent
character, together with the constitutional prescription of a comparatively higher vote to declare
a law unconstitutional, reveal a salutary principle of government that a law should, by all
reasonable intendment and feasible means, be saved from the doom of unconstitutionality, the
rule corollary thereto being that if a law is susceptible to two interpretations, one of which would
make it constitutional, that interpretation should be adopted that will not kill the law.

It is to adhere to the above principles that the submission is made herein, that while in the
implementation of the law, constitutional repugnancy may not entirely be ruled out, a categorical
ruling hereon not being necessary or desirable at the moment, the law itself is definitely not
unconstitutional. 4 Any of the incumbent judges who feel injured after the law shall have been
implemented has adequate remedy in law, with full relief as would be proper. But surely, the
benefits envisioned by the law in the discharge of one of the basic duties of government to the
people — the administration of justice — should not be sacrificed, as it would be, if the law is, as
sought in the present petition, declared void right now, on the claim of a few of being allegedly
denied a right, at best of doubtful character, for the claim would seem to rest on an
unsupportable theory that they have a vested right to a public office.

Just one more point. The law in question is not self-executing in the sense that upon its
effectivity, certain judges and justices cease to be so by direct action of the law. This is what
distinguishes the Act in question from R.A. No. 1186 involved in the Ocampo case, 5 which by
its direct action, no act of implementation being necessary, all the judges whose positions were
abolished, automatically ceased as such. The Act in question, therefore, is not as exposed to
the same vulnerability to constitutional attack as R.A. No. 1186 was. Yet by the operation of the
Constitution with its wise provision on how a law may be declared unconstitutional, R.A. No.
1186 stood the test for it to be enforced to the fullness of its intent, which was, as in the law
under consideration, Identified with public interest and general welfare, through a more efficient
and effective judicial system as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 seeks to establish.

Hence, the constitutionality of the law should not be assailed, and the law itself, striken down,
on the ground that some judges or justices may be removed or separated in violation of their
security of tenure. The law does not directly operate with Chat effect. It is in how the law would
be implemented that this feared eventuality may or may not occur. We would then be killing the
law on a mere speculation if We do so at this stage. This would be an injudicious act done in
reckless disregard of the safeguards built around a law to defend it when its constitutionality is
attacked; first the presumption that a law is constitutional; second when a law is susceptible to
two interpretations one that would make it constitutional, the other, unconstitutional, the former
should be adopted; and third, the Constitution itself which ordains that a law may not be
declared unconstitutional except on the vote of at least ten (10) members of the Supreme Court,
more than what is required for an ordinary decision of the Court en banc. This is not to mention
the stringent requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial inquiry as already adverted to, all
designed to save the law from the dire fate of unconstitutionality.

To the writer, the question before this Court is a simple matter of choosing between protecting
some judges from possible separation, as the implementation of the law to achieve its primary
purpose of improving the judiciary may have to result in, or serving the interest of the entire
society through an honest, efficient and effective judiciary. For, it is unthinkable that what is for
the good of the people as a whole could have been meant by the Constitution to be sacrificed
for the sake of only the few. The greatest good for the greatest number is an unwritten rule,
more firm and enduring than any of the postulates spread in our written Constitution. This, I
might say, is the main theme of this separate opinion, otherwise expressed in the well-known
and time-honored maxim "Salus populi establish suprema lex."

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

There is unqualified adherence on my part to the dismissal of the Petition filed in this case. If I
am writing this separate concurrence, it is merely to state certain views I entertain in regards to
the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

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The controversy in this case involves two constitutional provisions. Article X, Section 1, of the
Organic law provides that the legislative has the power to establish inferior Courts by law.
Section 7 of the same Article reads:

SEC, 7. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of inferior courts shall
hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or
become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court
shall have the power to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at
least eight Members order their dismissal.

There should be no conflict Between the two provisions. Both should be harmonized.

1. a) It is a fundamental proposition that the legislative power to create Courts ordinarily

includes the power to organize and to reorganize them, and that the power to abolish Courts is
generally coextensive with the power to create them. The power to abolish was not intended to
be qualified by the permanence of tenure (Opinion of Chief Justice Ricardo Paras in Ocampo
vs. Secretary of Justice, 51 O.G. 147 [1955], citing McCulley vs. State, 53 SW 134; Halsey vs.
Gaines 2 Lea 316). The right of Judges to hold office during good behavior until they reach the
age of 70 years, or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office, does not
deprive Congress of its power to abolish, organize or reorganize inferior Courts (Brillo vs.
Enage, 94 Phil. 732, 735, citing Zandueta vs. de la Costa, 66 Phil. 615; 42 Am. Jur., Pub.
Officer, 904-5). Judges of those Courts take office with that encumbrance and knowledge.

The legislative power to create a court carries with it the power to abolish it.
When the court is abolished any unexpired term is abolished also. The judge of
such court takes office with that encumbrance and knowledge. Perkins v. Corbin,
45 Ala 103, 6 Am. Rep. 698; State, ex rel. Thomas v. Gunter, 170 Ala. 165, 54
So 283, et al."

The importance and the imperative of maintaining the independence of the Judiciary is
undisputed. At the same time, the power of Congress under the Constitution cannot be
abridged. For, in the last analysis, it is not the security of tenure per se that is the only safeguard
to the independence of the Judiciary. It is the character and the mettle of the Judges who sit on
the Bench. Has not the impression been created in the public and that there are those who have
abused the prerogatives of their judicial position knowing that they are untouchables by virtue of
the permanence of their tenure

b) A distinction should be made between tenure of Judges and tenure of Courts. Section 1
heretofore mentioned refers to the "Judiciary" as a fundamental department of Government.
Section 7 quoted above refers to the tenure of office of "individual" Judges (inclusive of Justices
of inferior Courts that is to say, tenure of office is a matter concerning the individual Judge. This
"individuality" character of Section 7 is supported by the clause that the Supreme Court has the
power to discipline individual judges of inferior Courts.

A legislature is not bound to give security of tenure to Courts. Courts can be abolished. In fact,
the entire judicial system can be changed. If that system can no longer admit of change, woe to
the wheels of progress and the imperatives of growth in the development of the Judiciary. To
hold that tenure of Judges is superior to the legislative power to reorganize is to render impotent
the exercise of that power.

It may even be stated that, under Section 7, supra, Judges are entailed to their Courts, from
which they cannot be separated before retirement age except as a disciplinary action for bad
behavior. Under Section 1, Courts are not entailed to their Judges, because the power of the
legislative to establish inferior Courts presupposes the power to abolish those Courts. If an
inferior Court is abolished, the Judge presiding that Court will necessarily have to lose his
position because the abolished Court is not entailed to him.

c) The constitutional guarantee of tenure of Judges applies only as their Courts exist. As long as
those Courts exist, the Judges cannot be ousted without just cause; that is the extent of the
constitutional provision relative to security of tenure of Judges. Upon declaration of the
completion of the reorganization as provided for in the Reorganization Act, the affected Courts

87
"shall be deemed automatically abolished There being no Courts, there are no offices for which
tenure of Judges may be claimed. By the abolition of those offices, the rights to them are
necessarily extinguished (Manalang vs. Quitoriano, 94 Phil. 903 [1954]).

2. I am satisfied that the challenged law was enacted by the Batasang Pambansa in response to
an urgent and pressing public need and not for the purpose of affecting adversely the security of
tenure of all Judges or legislating them out to the detriment of judicial independence. It should
riot be said of the Batasang Pambansa that its power of abolition of Courts has been used to
disguise an unconstitutional and evil purpose to defeat the security of tenure of Judges. The
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981 sufficiently complies with the bona fide rule in the abolition
of public office, as clearly explained in the main opinion. Besides, every presumption of good
faith in its actuations must be accorded a coordinate and coequal branch of government,
supreme within the limits of its own sphere, until that presumption is clearly overcome. There is
no showing that the Reorganization Act was motivated for personal or political reasons as to
justify the interference by the Court (Garvey vs. Lowell, 199 Mass, 47, 85 N.E. 182, 127 A.S.R.
468; State vs. Eduards, 40 Mont. 287; 106 Pac. 695, 19 R.C.L. 236; Llanto vs. Dimaporo, 16
SCRA 599 [1966]). Public interest and public good, as the legislative body views it, must be
balanced with tenure of Judges, which is an individual right. Reverting to Section 1 and Section
7, supra, the former is the weightier, because the "Judiciary" is of more importance to the
welfare of the country than the tenure of office of an individual Judge. If a Judge is removed
without cause there can be damage to the public welfare to some extent, but maintenance of a
Court that does not meet the requirements of progressive Government, can cause incalculable
prejudice to the people.

3. Nor does a conflict exist with the power of discipline vested in the Supreme Court by the
present Constitution reading: the Supreme Court shall have the power "to discipline Judges of
inferior Courts, and, by a vote of at least 8 members, order their dismissal Absent the Court, it
would be futile to speak of the Supreme Court's power to discipline. Thus, where the legislature
has willed that the Courts be abolished, the power to discipline cannot pose an obstacle to the
abolition. The power to discipline can come into play only when there is removal from an
existing judicial office but not when that it office is abolished. The reorganization of the judicial
system with the abolition of certain Courts is not an exercise of the power to discipline the
Judges of the abolished Courts.

It is of significance to note that the power to dismissal vested in the Supreme Court by the 1973
Constitution is delimited by its power to discipline. Absent any need for discipline and the power
to dismiss does not exist. Being circumscribed in scope, it may well be asked: does the grant of
the power of discipline and dismissal in the Supreme Court deprive the executive of the power
of removal? Is it not more in keeping with the allocation of powers in our government to state
that the Supreme Court shares its power to dismiss with the executive power of removal? For is
not the power of removal basically executive in nature, as an incident to the power of
appointment, which is the prerogative of the Chief Executive alone As in the case of
appointments, Section 5 (6), Article X of the Constitution provides that the Supreme Court shall
appoint its officials and employees. However, is not this power shared with the power of
appointment of the executive who appoints some of the Court officials These questions could
lend themselves to an in-depth study in the proper case.

4. The abolition would be no deprivation either of due process of law. A public office cannot be
regarded as the "property " of the incumbent. A public office is not a contract (Segovia vs. Noel,
47 Phil. 543 [1925]). A public office is a public trust (Section 1, Article XIII. 1973 Constitution). It
is a privilege in the gift of the State (Brown vs. Russell, 166 Mass. 14, 43 NE 1005, 32 LRA, 253
cited also in Tañada & Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines, Vol. 2, p. 537). The officers are
the servants of the people and not their rulers (22 R.C.L. 378-379, cited in Martin, Administrative
Law, Law on Public Officers and Election Law, p. 112, 1970 ed.). Besides, it bears stressing that
there is no removal from office but abolition of the office itself.

5. The questioned statute is in keeping with major reforms in other departments of government.
"The thrust is on development." It is "the first major reorganization after four generations." It
does not provide for a piecemeal change, which could be ineffective. It goes to the roots and
does not just scratch the surface of our judicial system. Its main objectives are an improved
administration of justice, the "attainment of more efficiency in the disposal of cases, a
reallocation of jurisdiction, and a revision of procedures which do not tend to the proper meting

88
out of justice." These aims are policy matters of necessity in the pursuit of developmental goals
within the Judiciary.

6. The Reorganization Act reorganizing the entire judicial system excluding the Supreme Court,
which is the only constitutional Court, and the Sandiganbayan. It envisages institutional reforms
in the Philippine judiciary. It does not simply change the names of the Courts. The facts herein
are dissimilar from those in Brillo vs. Enage (94 Phil. 732 [1954]) where the position of Justice of
the Peace, although ostensibly abolished, was merely changed to Municipal Judge after the
municipality of Tacloban was converted into a city with its own charter.

Significant among the institutional changes and procedural reforms are:

The Intermediate Appellate Court

This Court is now constituted into ten (10) divisions instead of fifteen (15), five members
composing each division, and a majority vote of three members being needed for a decision.
This obviates the cumbersome procedure, in case of dissent, of assigning two other members to
compose a "division of five". It also allows flexibility in that any three members of a division,
arriving at unanimity, can promulgate a decision. Now provided for is specialization into four (4)
Civil Cases Divisions, two (2) Criminal Cases Divisions and four (4) Special Cases Divisions.
The specialization is expected to contribute to the expeditious disposal of cases. The Court has
been given original jurisdiction to issue Writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas
corpus, quo warranto and auxiliary writs or processes whether or not in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction. This would undoubtedly ease the burden of the Supreme Court where numerous
such cases are filed daily.

It has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or
awards of quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, except those falling
within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the
Constitution.

The Intermediate Appellate Court would now have the power to try cases and conduct hearings,
receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in
cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and
conduct new trials or further proceedings (Sec. 9). This does away with the delays attendant to
the remand of cases to the lower trial Courts.

Regional Trial Courts

There are now thirteen (13) Judicial Regions, the same as the present administrative and
Batasang Pambansa Regions, instead of sixteen (16) Judicial Districts.

A Judge is appointed to a region, which is his official station. This ensures mobility since a
Judge may be assigned anywhere within the Region without applying the constitutional
limitation of six months. Additionally, -it can remedy temporary inequalities of caseloads in trial
Courts.

Specialized Courts are integrated into the Regional Trial Courts. Thus, Regional Trial Courts
would try all cases within its jurisdiction unless special cases are assigned to them, in which
case, they remain as Branches of Regional Trial Courts. Special procedures and technical rules
governing special Courts will continue to remain applicable in Branches assigned those special
cases.

Metropolitan Trial Courts

There is one Metropolitan Trial Court with several Branches for large urban areas. The
appointment of Judges would be to a Metropolitan Trial Court although a Judge may be
assigned by the Supreme Court to any Branch of the Metropolitan Trial Court as demanded by
the exigencies of the service.

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The Supreme Court may designate certain Branches of said Courts to exercise special
jurisdiction over certain cases, unlike the present set-up where special jurisdiction applies only
to cases of traffic violations.

Municipal Trial Courts/Municipal Circuit Trial Courts

Municipal Trial Courts may now be designated by the Supreme Court to exercise special
jurisdiction over certain cases, thereby resulting in overall flexibility. They can also be circuitized
with those in cities not forming part of metropolitan areas.

One notable change between the old and the new set up is that Judges of these Courts will now
be Presidential appointees unlike presently where the incumbent Judges are merely designated
by the Supreme Court in an Administrative Order to sit in existing Municipal Courts and
Municipal Circuit Courts.

7. There are innovative features in the Act that commend themselves:

a) The confusing and illogical areas of concurrent jurisdiction between trial Courts have been
entirely eliminated.

b) Under Section 39, there is a uniform period for appeal of fifteen (15) days counted from the
notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from.

A record on appeal is no longer required to take an appeal. The entire original record is now to
be transmitted.

c) Under Section 40, in deciding appealed cases, adoption by reference of findings of fact and
conclusions of law as set forth in the decision, order, or resolution appealed from, is also
provided for. This will expedite the rendition of decisions in appealed cases.

d) Section 42 provides for "a monthly longevity pay equivalent to 5% of the monthly basic pay
for Justices and

Judges of the courts herein created for each five years of continuous, efficient, and meritorious
service rendered in the Judiciary, Provided that, in no case shall the total salary of each Justice
or Judge concerned, after this longevity pay is added, exceed the salary of the Justice or Judge
next in rank." Thus, Justices and Judges who may not reach the top, where unfortunately there
is not enough room for all, may have the satisfaction of at least approximating the salary scale
of those above him depending on his length of service,

8. But while the law itself as written is constitutional, the manner in which it will be administered
should not be tainted with unconstitutionality (Myles Salt Co. vs. Board of Commrs., 239 US
478, 60 L. Ed. 392, 36 Sct 204). To obviate the possibility of an unconstitutional exercise of
power the following safeguards are recommended and/or expected to be undertaken:

a) The President can be expected to indicate a reasonable time frame for the completion of the
reorganization provided for in the Act and the issuance of the corresponding implementing
Order.

b) Appointments and their effectivity should be simultaneous with, or as close as possible, to the
declaration by the President of the completion of the reorganization under Section 44 to avoid
any detriment to the smooth and continuous functioning of the judicial machinery.

c) The services of those not separated should be deemed uninterrupted, as recommended by

the Committee on Judicial Reorganization (Article XI of its Report).

9. For the speedy implementation of the law, the Supreme Court can be expected to submit to
the President within thirty (30) days from the date of finality of its Decision the staffing pattern for
all Courts required by Section 43.

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I am constrained to disagree with the suggestion of one of the amici curiae that the staffing
pattern be made to include the names of Judges. The staffing pattern for Judges is already
clearly and explicitly provided in the law itself which enumerates the various Judges and
Justices in their hierarchical order. Furthermore, to include the superior positions of Judges
would depart from the traditional concept of a staffing pattern, which refers more to personnel
organization and corresponding salaries of inferior employees. It is also constitutionally
objectionable in that it would interfere with the prerogative of appointment intrinsically executive
in nature (Guevara vs. Inocentes, 16 SCRA 379 [1966]; Government of the Philippines vs.
Springer, 50 Phil. 259 [1927]). The President may not be deprived of, nor be limited in, the full
use of his discretion in the appointment of persons to any public office. Nothing should so trench
upon executive choice as to be, in effect, judicial designation.

10. A word of explanation. If I had resolved not to inhibit myself in this case upon motion filed by
petitioners, it was because the Committee on Judicial Reorganization, of which I was privileged
to be a member, confined its work to the recommendation of options and guidelines in the task
of reorganization. The Committee had no part whatsoever in the drafting of the bill nor in the
public hearings conducted. In fact, some of its recommendations like the circuitization or
regionalization of the Intermediate Appellate Court, the appellation of members of the Judiciary,
the confinement of the jurisdiction of the Intermediate Appellate Court merely to appellate
jurisdiction, the adoption of the system found in the United Kingdom and in Commonwealth
countries of having a Court of general jurisdiction with trial and appellate divisions, were not
availed of in the final Act.

11. Lastly, but by no means the least, I entertain no doubt that reliance can be placed on the
good faith of the President that all the deserving, upon considerations of "efficiency, integrity,
length of service and other relevant factors shall be appointed to a strengthened and revitalized
judicial system in the interest of public service; that appointments will not be unduly delayed;
and that appointees will be evaluated thoroughly to ensure quality and impartiality in the men
and women who will keep vigil over our judicial ramparts.

ERICTA, J., concurring:

I concur in the view that the Judiciary reorganization law is not unconstitutional. It does not
violate the principle of security of tenure of judges.

The Constitution grants to the Batasang Pambansa the power to create courts inferior to the
Supreme Court (Article X, Section 1). All existing inferior courts were created by law. No law is
irrepealable. The power to create an office includes the power to abolish the same. (Urgelio vs.
Osmeña 9 SCRA 317; Maza vs. Ochave, 20 SCRA 142)

Security of tenure cannot be invoked when there is no removal of a public officer or employee
but an abolition of his office. (Manalang vs. Quitoriano, 94 Phil. 903; Cruz vs. Primicias, 23
SCRA 998; Baldoz vs. Office of the President, 78 SCRA 354, 362) A distinction should be made
between removal from office and abolition of an office. Removal implies that the office subsists
after ouster, while, in abolition, the office no longer exists thereby terminating the right of the
incumbent to exercise the rights and duties of the office. (Canonigo vs. Ramiro, 31 SCRA 278)

The power of the legislative branch of the government to abolish courts inferior to the Supreme
Court has long been established. (Ocampo vs. Secretary of Justice, 51 O.G. 147). What is only
needed is that the abolition passes the test of good faith. it need only be shown that said
abolition of the courts is merely incidental to a bona fide reorganization. (Urgelio vs.
Osmeña supra.)

It is unthinkable to impute bad faith to the Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization

composed of four (4) distinguished members of the Supreme Court, the Minister of Justice and
the Deputy Minister of Justice, and to the members of the Batasang Pambansa whose
combined efforts after a careful study and deliberation resulted to the enactment of a bill now
signed into law as Batasang Pambansa Blg. 129. In his sponsorship speech, Justice Ricardo C.
Puno declared the objectives of the Judiciary Reorganization Law to be the following: (1) the

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attainment of more efficiency in the disposal of cases; (2) the improvement in the quality of
decisions by the courts that will result from the easing of court dockets; and (3) structural
changes to meet the exigencies of present day Philippine Society and of the foreseeable future.

Admittedly, in the implementation of the law, some Judges and Justices may be adversely
affected. But in a conflict between public interest and the individual interest of some Judges and
Justices, the public weal must prevail. The welfare of the people is the supreme law.

The implementation of the law will entail appointments to the new courts. The power of
appointment is the exclusive prerogative of the President. The implementation of the law should
be left exclusively to the wisdom, patriotism and statesmanship of the President.

PLANA, J., concurring:

As the lawmaking body has the power to create inferior courts and define, prescribe and
apportion their jurisdiction, so it has the power to abolish or replace them with other courts as
long as the act is done in good faith and not for the purpose of attaining an unconstitutional end.
Good faith has thus become the crucial issue in the case at bar.

Upon an examination of the legislative history of Batas Pambansa 129, as has been done in the
main opinion, it is manifest that actual, not merely presumed good faith attended its enactment.
On this basis, I concur in the opinion penned by the learned Chief Justice, qualified only by the
following observations:

1. Executive consultation with the Supreme Court. — I believe the President is under no
obligation to consult with the Supreme Court; and the Supreme Court as such is not called upon
to give legal advice to the President. Indeed, as the Supreme Court itself has said, it cannot give
advisory opinions (Bacolod Murcia Planters' Asso., Inc. vs. Bacolod — Murcia milling Co., 30
SCRA 67; NWSA vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 90 SCRA 629) even to the President.

In the drafting of the present Constitution, there was an attempt to vest the Supreme Court with
the function of giving advisory opinions. The framers of the Constitution, however, did not see fit
to adopt the proposal.

If the President should consult the Supreme Court on the implementation of Batas Pambansa
129 and the Supreme Court should give its advice (leaving aside the question of procedure), I
believe the President would be free to follow or disregard the advice; but, in either case, there
would be no guarantee that the implementing action would be upheld in one case or stricken
down in the other.

2. Undue delegation of legislative powers. —

The petitioners have also assailed the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa 129 on the ground
that a provision thereof (regarding fixing of compensation and allowances for members of the
Judiciary) constitutes an undue delegation unto the President of legislative power.

As pointed out in the main opinion, the legislature has provided ample standards or guidelines
for the implementation of the delegated power, which makes the delegation inoffensive. I would
like to add however some observations on the doctrine of undue delegation of legislative power.

Under the old Constitution, when the abiding rule was separation of legislative and executive
powers, there was good reason to maintain the doctrine of non-delegation of legislative power.
Otherwise, the principle of separation of governmental powers could be negated via
unbridled delegation of legislative power. The 1973 Constitution has however radically changed
the constitutional set-up. There is now a commingling or fusion of executive and legislative
powers in the hands of the same group of officials. Cabinet members play a leading role in the
legislative process, and members of the Batasan actively discharge executive functions. The
Prime Minister indeed must come from its ranks. Under the circumstances, there is really not
much sense in rigidly upholding the principle of non-delegation of legislative power, at least vis-

92
a-vis the Executive Department. In a very real sense, the present Constitution has significantly
eroded the hoary doctrine of non-delegation of legislative power, although it has retained some
provisions of the old Constitution which were predicated on the principle of non-delegation, this
time perhaps not so much to authorize shifting of power and thereby correspondingly reduce the
incidence of "undue" delegation of legislative power, as to avert the abdication thereof.

In times of war or other national emergency, the Batasang Pambansa may by

law authorize the President for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as
it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a
declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Batasang
Pambansa, such powers shall cease upon its next adjournment. (Art. VIII, Sec.
15.)

The Batasang Pambansa may by law authorize the President to fix within
specified this and subject to such stations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff
rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts. [Ibid, Sec. 17(2).]

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

Undoubtedly, no more crucial and transcendental issue of such magnitude has confronted the
Philippine judiciary than in the present case. The challenged Act, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 by
its title would reorganize all existing courts (except the nine-member Sandiganbayan 1 and the
three- member Court of Tax Appeals) and upon declaration by the President of the completion
of the reorganization would unprecedentedly deem all the said courts "automatically abolished
en masse and "the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold office." 2 The total abolition involves a
total of 1,663 judicial positions with 1,180 incumbent judges and 483 vacancies) as of January
26, 1982 and the Act would effect an increase of 230 judicial positions raising the total of judicial
positions to be filled by new appointments to 1,893. Notwithstanding the great deference due to
enactments of the Batasan, I regretably find myself unable to join the ranks of my esteemed
colleagues in the majority who uphold the constitutionality of the Act and have voted to dismiss
the petition, for the following main considerations and reasons:

1. I go by the ruling of the numerical majority of seven Justices (namely, Pablo, Cesar Bengzon,
Montemayor, Jugo, Bautista, Roberto Concepcion and J.B.L. Reyes, JJ.) in the leading 1955
case of Ocampo 3 who fell short by one vote to reach the constitutionally required 2/3 majority
(at the time 8 out of an 11-member Supreme Court) to declare unconstitutional and invalid
section 3 of Republic Act 1186 abolishing the positions of 18 judges-at-large and 15 cadastral
judges and removing or legislating out the incumbent judges from office as against the contrary
vote of a minority of 4 Justices (namely, then Chief Justice Paras and Padilla, Alex Reyes and
Labrador, JJ.) with the paradoxical situation that the last three named Justices voted for the
validity of the Act as a remedial measure that abolished said positions without permanent
station which subjected them to a rigodon de jueces without the consent of the Supreme Court,
which they considered as "repulsive to an independent judiciary" and violative of an express
prohibitory provision of the 1935 Constitution ê while Justice Alex Reyes conceded that
otherwise he would go with the majority that "Congress may not, as a general rule, abolish a
judicial post without allowing the incumbent to finish his term of office."

2. As then Associate, later Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon remarked in his separate opinion —
"(T)he [adverse] outcome of this litigation [sanctioning the ouster from office of the ten
petitioners who were presiding different Courts of First Instance, some as judges-at-large,
others as cadastral judges, upon the enactment on June 19, 1954 of R.A. 1186 abolishing the
positions of judges-at large and cadastral judges] is apt to revive the speculation whether
wittingly or unwittingly the Constitution has further weakened the usually weak judicial
department because of its 'innovative' requirement of a 2/3 majority vote of the Supreme Court
to declare a statute unconstitutional, and 'never in our history has such a number of judges of
first instance [totalling 33 positions] been ousted through judicial reorganization.

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His rationale that the express constitutional guaranty of security of tenure of judges "during
good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge
the duties of their office" 4 must prevail over the implied constitutional authority to abolish courts
and to oust the judges despite their constitutionally-secured tenure bears repeating thus:

A careful analysis will perceive that whereas petitioners invoke

an express guaranty or positive definition of their term of office, the respondents
rely on implied authority to abolish courts and the positions of the respective
judges. Accurately stated, respondents' defense rests on a second inference
deduced from such implied power, because they reason out thusly: Congress
has express power to establish courts; therefore it has implicit power to abolish
courts and the positions of judges of such abolished courts (first inference); and
therefore (second inference) Congress likewise has power to eject the judges
holding such positions.

Resulting juridical situation. The implied authority invoked by respondents

collides with the express guaranty of tenure protecting the petitioners. Which
shall prevail Obviously the express guaranty must override the implied authority.
"Implications can never be permitted to contradict the expressed intent or to
defeat its purpose."

xxx xxx xxx

But the collision may he should be avoided, and both sections given validity, if
one be considered a proviso or exception to the other. In other words, under the
Constitution the Congress may abolish existing courts, provided it does not
thereby remove the incumbent judges; such abolition to take effect upon
termination of their incumbent The fundamental provisions on the matter are
thereby coordinated and harmonized' as Justice Laurel suggested in his
concurring opinion in Zandueta v. De la Costa. To bring about reconciliations is
the great work of jurists. (Cardozo, Paradoxes of Legal Science, p. 6) 5

3. This reasoning that the express guaranty of tenure protecting incumbent judges during good
behavior unless removed from office after hearing and due process or upon reaching the
compulsory retirement age of seventy years must override the implied authority of removing by
legislation the judges has been further strengthened and placed beyond doubt by the new
provisions of the 1973 Constitution that transferred the administrative supervision over all courts
and their personnel from the Chief Executive through the then Secretary of Justice to the
Supreme Court 6 and vested in the Supreme Court exclusively "the power to discipline judges of
inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal," 7 Which power
was formerly lodged by the Judiciary Act in the Chief Executive.

As former Chief Justice Bengzon stressed in his opinion in Ocampo, the 1934 Constitutional
Convention "frowned on removal of judges of first instance through abolition of their offices or
reorganization," citing Professor Jose Aruego's observation that the security of judges' tenure
provision was intended to "help secure the independence of the judiciary" in that "during good
behavior, they may not be legislated out of office by the law-making body nor removed by the
Chief Executive for any reason and under the guise of any pretense whatsoever; they may stay
in office until they reach the age of seventy years, or become incapacitated to discharge the
duties of their office. (Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, Vol. 11, pp. 718-719)"
He further cited Aruego's report that a proposed amendment to the effect that the prohibition
against transfers of judges to another district without the approval of the Supreme
Court 8 "should not be applicable to a reorganization of tribunals of justice or of districts, but the
amendment was defeated easily without debate" 9 and logically concluded that "(N)ow, there .
before, having vetoed the transfer of judges thru a re-organization, the Convention evidently
could not have permitted the removal of judges thru re-organization.

Now, if the framers of the 1973 Constitution wished to dispel the strong doubts, to say the least
in the light of the 7 to 4 vote in the Ocampo case against removal of incumbent judges through
legislative action by abolition of their courts, then they would have so clearly provided for such
form of removal in the 1973 Constitution, but on the contrary as already stated they ruled out

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such removal or ouster of judges by legislative action by vesting exclusively in the Supreme
Court the power of discipline and removal of judges of all inferior courts.

4. This being so, the fundamental point emphasized by former Chief Justice Bengzon that
abolition of the 33 judicial positions in the Ocampo case was "merely an indirect manner of
removing the petitioners-judges" while the "positions [that] were eliminated . . . were in fact
substituted or replaced by other positions of judges" applies with greater force in the case at bar
which involves an unprecedented total "abolition," thus: "(C)all it reorganization, or legislation or
removal or abolition, this law disregards the constitutional assurance that these judges, once
appointed, shall hold office during good behavior ... [unless incapacitated and until retirement].

The abolition of their offices was merely an indirect manner of removing these petitioners.
Remember that on June 19, 1954, there were 107 judges of first instance, district judges, judges
at-large and cadastral judges (Rep. Act 296). After the passage of Republic Act No. 1186 there
were 114 positions of judges of first instance. There was no reduction there was increase — in
the number of judges, nor in the number of courts. The positions of Judges-at-Large and
Cadastral Judges were eliminated; but they were in fact substituted or replaced by other
positions of judges; or if you please, there was a mere change of designation from 'Cadastral
Judge or Judge at large to district judge Hence it should be ruled that as their positions had not
been 'abolished' de facto, but actually retained with another name, these petitioners are entitled
to remain in the service. (Brillo v. Enage, G.R. No. L-7115, March 30, 1954.) For it is not
permissible to effect the removal of one judge thru the expediency of abolishing his office even
as the office with same power is created with another name. (Brillo v. Enage, Malone v.
Williams, 118 tenn. 391, Gibbe's Case 4 A.L.R. p. 211). In this view of the picture, we believe,
Congress could have, and should haveas suggested by Secretary Tuazon during the hearings
in Congress directed in said Republic Act No. 1186 that 'the present judges-at-large and
cadastral judges shall become district judges presiding such districts as may be fixed by the
President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments or by the Secretary of Justice,
as originally proposed by Senator Laurel in connection with the same bill. Something similar
was done before, and it would not be objectionable as an encroachment on the President's
prerogative of appointment, because such judges had already been appointed to the judiciary
before the passage of the act, and the provision may be construed in the light of mere change of
official designation plus increase in salary."

5. Concededly, the questioned Act effects certain changes and procedural reforms with more
specific delineation of jurisdiction as mentioned particularly in the majority opinion, but they do
not change the basic structure of the existing courts. The present Municipal Courts, Municipal
Circuit Courts and City Courts are restructured and redesignated as Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts and Metropolitan Trial Courts in the challenged Act. The Courts of
First Instance, Circuit Criminal Courts, Juvenile & Domestic Relations Courts and Courts of
Agrarian Relations are all restructured and redesignated to be known by the common name of
Regional Trial Courts with provision for certain branches thereof "to handle exclusively criminal
cases, juvenile and domestic relations cases, agrarian cases, urban land reform cases . . . .
and/or such other special cases as the Supreme Court may determine in the interest of a
speedy and efficient administration of justice" 10 and the Court of Appeals is restructured and
redesignated as the Intermediate Appellate Court with an increase in the number of Appellate
Justices from the present 45 to 50 but with a reduction of the number of divisions from 15
(composed of 3 Justices each) to 10 (composed of 5 members each) such that it is feared that
there is created a bottleneck at the appellate level in the important task discharged by such
appellate courts as reviewers of facts.

In my view, the "candid admission" by the Chief Justice in his opinion for the Court "that he
entertained doubts as to whether the intermediate court of appeals provided for is a new
tribunal" 10a is equally applicable to all the other above mentioned courts provided for in the
challenged Act as "new courts". And the best proof of this is the plain and simple transitory
provision in section 44 thereof that upon the President's declaration of completion of the
reorganization (whereby the "old courts" shall "be deemed automatically abolished and the
incumbents thereof shall cease to hold office "(T)he cases pending in the old Courts shall be
transferred to the appropriate Courts constituted pursuant to this Act, together with the pertinent
functions, records, equipment, property and the necessary personnel together with the
"applicable appropriations." This could not have been possible without a specification and
enumeration of what specific cases of the "old courts" would be transferred to the particular

95
"new courts," had these "new courts" not been manifestly and substantially the "old courts" with
a change of name — or as described by Justice Barredo to have been his first view, now
discarded, in his separate opinion: "just a renaming, and not a substantial and actual
modification or alteration of the present judicial structure or system" or "a rearrangement or
remodeling of the old structure." 11

6. I do not subscribe to the test of good faith or bad faith in the abolition of the courts and
consequent ouster of the incumbent judges from office as expounded by the late eminent
Justice Jose P. Laurel in his separate concurring opinion in the pre-war case
of Zandueta 12 wherein the Court dismissed the petition for quo warranto on the ground of
petitioner Zandueta's estoppel and abandonment of office. 13 Realistically viewed from the basis
of the established legal presumptions of validity and constitutionality of statutes (unless set
aside by a 2/3 majority of 10 members of the Supreme Court) and of good faith in their
enactment, one is hard put to conjure a case where the Court could speculate on the good or
bad motives behind the enactment of the Act without appearing to be imprudent and improper
and declare that "the legislative power of reorganization (is) sought to cloak an unconstitutional
and evil purpose." The good faith in the enactment of the challenged Act must needs be
granted. What must be reconciled is the legislative power to abolish courts as implied from the
power to establish them with the express constitutional guaranty of tenure of the judges which is
essential for a free and independent judiciary. Adherents of the Rule of Law are agreed that
indispensable for the maintenance of the Rule of Law is a free and independent judiciary, sworn
to protect and enforce. it without fear or favor — "free, not only from graft, corruption, ineptness
and incompetence but even from the tentacles of interference and insiduous influence of the
political powers that be to quote again from Justice Barredo's separate concurring
opinion. 14 Hence, my adherence to the 7-member majority opinion of former Chief Justice
Bengzon in the Ocampo case, supra, as restated by the Philippine Association of Law
Professors headed by former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion that "any reorganization should
at least snow the incumbents of the existing courts to remain in office [the appropriate
counterpart 'new courts'] unless they are removed for cause."

7. The "judges' broader and stronger guarantees of tenure than ordinary civil servants" as
stressed by former Chief Justice Bengzon in Ms majority opinion in Ocampo is based on the
judiciary's status as a coequal and coordinate branch of government, whereas the long line of
Philippine cases upholding the legislative power to abolish offices refers to officers or
employees in the executive branch of government and "the underlying consideration must be
borne in mind that Manalang [the aggrieved petitioner] belonged to the Executive
Department and because the President approved the law no question or encroachment by one
branch on the other could be apprehended or alleged. 15 This is not a matter of personal
privilege for the incumbent judges but as aptly stated by former U.P. Law Dean Irene Cortez in
her memorandum as amicus curiae, "for the judiciary whose independence is not only eroded
but is in grave danger of being completely destroyed." Dean Cortez aptly stressed that "judicial
independence is not a guarantee intended for the Supreme Court alone, it extends to the entire
court system and is even more vital to the courts at the lowest levels because there are more of
them and they operate closest to the people," and "(P)articularly under the present form of
modified parliamentary government with legislative and executive functions overlapping and in
certain areas merging, the judiciary is left to perform the checking function in the performance of
which its independence assumes an even more vital importance. "

The extensive memoranda filed by Dean Cortez and other amici curiae such as former Senator
Jose W. Diokno who strongly urges the Court to strike down the Act "to prevent further
destruction of judicial independence," former Senator Lorenzo Sumulong, president of the
Philippine Constitution Association who advocates for the Court's adoption of the B Bengzon
majority opinion in the Ocampo case so as to abide by "the elementary rule in the interpretation
of constitutions that effect should be given to all parts of the Constitution" and that the judges'
security of tenure guaranty should not be rendered meaningless and inoperative" former
Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, president of the Philippine Lawyers' Association who submits
that the total abolition of all courts below the Supreme Court (except the Sandiganbayan and
the Court of Tax Appeals) and the removal of the incumbent Justices and Judges "violates the
independence of the judiciary, their security of tenure and right to due process guaranteed them
by the Constitution" and Atty. Raul M. Gonzales, president of the National Bar Association of the
Philippines who invokes the Declaration of Delhi at the ICJ Conference in 1959, that "The
principles of unremovability of the Judiciary and their Security of Tenure until death or until a

96
retiring age fixed by statute is reached, is an important safeguard of the Rule of Law" have
greatly helped in fortifying my views.

8. I had submitted in my memo of September 4, 1980 to the Presidential Committee on Judicial

Reorganization that "(W)hatever reorganization plans the committee may recommend to meet
the worldwide problem of congested court dockets, and to improve judicial services in the public
interest, it should be borne in mind that the members of the judiciary as the weakest branch of
government, yet called upon to safeguard the people's rights and protect them oppression,
official and otherwise, are entitled to security of tenure as guaranteed by the Constitution. Even
though the lower courts may be reshuffled or abolished in the process, the mandate and spirit of
the Constitution guaranteeing their security of tenure and maintaining the independence of the
judiciary should be respected, and they should be retained in the new courts."

In the same vein, Dean Cortez warned of the dire consequences of giving the questioned
provisions of the Act the "absolutist sense which they appear to have at first blush" thus: "(T)o
accept legislative power to abolish courts asserted under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 which
sweeps through practically the entire judiciary would be to open the door to future court
abolitions in the guise of reorganization. At this stage of our political development, the process
of embarking upon a modified parliamentary system may well usher in a situation where despite
guarantees of judicial tenure, each ruling party in the legislature or any alliance that can
command a majority vote may periodically undertake complete reorganization and remove
judges, thus making of the judiciary a veritable straw in the political wind and "(F)urthermore,
what can result in the modified parliamentary system from the close working relationship
between executive and legislature is made manifest in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. If the
sweeping revamp provided were to be carried out the President would appoint all of the justices
and judges of the courts affected and the whole membership in the judiciary from the highest to
the lowest courts would be his appointees. It is relevant to point out that it is precisely a situation
like this that the Constitution seeks to avoid when it provides staggered terms for the chairman
and members of the constitutional commissions which like the judiciary are guaranteed
independence."

9. The judges' security of tenure was rendered nugatory by the Transitory Provisions of the
1973 Constitution which granted the incumbent President the unlimited power to remove and
replace all judges and officials 16 (as against the limited one-year period for the exercise of such
power granted President Quezon in the 1935 Constitution upon establishment of the Philippine
Commonwealth Upon the declaration of martial law in September, 1972, justices and judges of
all courts, except the Supreme Court, had been required to hand in their resignations. There is
listed a total of 53 judges who were replaced or whose resignations were accepted by the
President during the period from September, 1972 to April, 1976. The power to replace even the
judges appointed after the effectivity on January 17, 1973 of the 1973 Constitution is yet
invoked on behalf of the President in the pending case of Tapucar vs.
Famador 17 notwithstanding the generally held view that such post-1973 Constitution appointed
judges are not subject to the Replacement Clause of the cited Transitory Provision. (In this
case, petitioner judge appointed on January 30, 1976 as judge of the Court of First Instance of
Agusan del Norte and Butuan City, Branch 1, invoked his constitutional security of tenure and
questioned the appointment extended on February 26, 1980 to respondent to replace him,
although he had not been removed or otherwise dismissed from his position nor had be
resigned therefrom. The Court per its March 27, 1980 resolution ordered both to refrain from
discharging the functions of the questioned office And now comes this total abolition of 1,663
judicial positions (and thousands of personnel positions) unprecedented in its sweep and scope.
The urgent need is to strengthen the judiciary with the restoration of the security of tenure of
judges, which is essential for a free and independent judiciary as mandated by the Constitution,
not to make more enfeebled an already feeble judiciary, possessed neither of the power of the
sword nor the purse, as decried by former Chief Justice Bengzon in his Ocampo majority
opinion:

Shall we have judges of the type of Lord Coke Or judges, who, in his place,
would have answered 'I'll do what his majesty pleases,' judges who, afraid of
ouster thru a judiciary reshuffle, would rather serve the interests of the party in
power or of the political boss, than the interests of justice?

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 As it is, the Judicial Department is feeble enough. Shall we render it feebler with
judges precariously occupying their official seats Judges performing their duties
under the sword of Damocles of future judicial reorganizations

10. The Chief Justice, in his opinion for the Court, equally stressed that "what is equally
apparent is that the strongest ties bind the executive and legislative departments. It is likewise
undeniable that the Batasang Pambansa retains its full authority to enact whatever legislation
may be necessary to carry out national policy as usually formulated in a caucus of the majority
party. It is understandable then why in Fortun vs. Labang 18 it as stressed that with the provision
transferring to the Supreme Court administrative supervision over the Judiciary, there is a
greater need 'to preserve unimpaired the independence of the judiciary, especially so at
present, where to all intends and purposes, there is a fusion between the executive and the
legislative branches,'" 19 with the further observation that "many are the ways by which such
independence could be eroded." In the cited case of Judge Fortun (likewise penned by the
Chief Justice for the Court), the Court issued a writ of prohibition and certiorari ordering the
dismissal of the criminal complaint filed with respondent fiscal Labang by "disgruntled members
of the bar with a record of losing cases" in the judge's court and imposed the penalty of censure
on each and everyone of the private respondents-lawyers for the "unseemly haste" with which
they filed the criminal complaint, abetted by "the appearance of sheer vindictiveness or
oppressive exercise of state authority." The Court marked the "violation of the cardinal principles
of fairness and due process that underlie the Rule of Law. Petitioner-Judge was not heard; he
was denied the opportunity to defend himself against the accusation. There was, on the part of
private respondents then, a failure to abide by a Resolution of the Integrated Bar stressing that
precisely integration could shield 'the judiciary which traditionally cannot defend itself except
within its own forum, from the assaults that politics and self-interest may level at it, and assist it
to maintain its integrity, impartiality and independence,' " and that such subjection of a judge to
public "harassment and humiliation . . . can diminish public confidence in the courts."

11. This brings us to the allegedly underlying need for B.P. Blg. 129 discussed in the course of
committee hearings of Cabinet Bill No. 42 and the deliberation on second reading in the
Batasang Pambansa to rid the judiciary of incompetent and corrupt judges and to restore
confidence in the integrity of the courts. The purge has been the constant subject of headlines
and editorials, with the Ministry of Justice's Integrity Council reportedly screening and
conducting "integrity tests as to new applicants and the incumbent judges 20 and seeking
"confidential information on corrupt and incompetent judges to help the government purge the
judiciary." 21 Prime Minister Cesar Virata was quoted as saying that "there will be a purge of the
corrupt and the misfits' when the Judiciary Reorganization Act is signed into law by President
Marcos and implemented in coordination with the Supreme Court." 22 The public respondents'
answer sidesteps the issue of such purge contravening the rudiments of a fair hearing and due
process and submits that "no term of office is sacrosanct when demanded before the altar of the
public good." The metropolitan papers reported the "anxiety gripping the judiciary as the Ministry
of Justice has reportedly been asked to collate information 'on the performance of the judges
and on the qualifications of those slated to take over the positions of the incompetent, the
inefficient or those involved in irregularities. As stated in an editorial, 'Somehow, the uncertainty
that now hovers over the judiciary has unduly subjected the judges to mental torture since they
do not know when or whether the axe will fall on them. Worse, the sword of Damocles hanging
over their heads could provoke them into seeking the help of people claiming to have influence
with the powers that be." 23

But Dean Cortez in her memorandum states that "However, nowhere on public record is there
hard evidence on this. The only figures given in the course of the committee hearings were to
the effect that out of some 1,700 members of the judiciary, between 10 to 15 were of the
undesirable category, i.e. misfit, incompetent or corrupts. (Barredo, J., before the Committee on
Justice, human Rights and Good Government, December 4, 1980)," and that "(I)f this be the
case, the unprecedented, sweeping and wholesale abolition of judicial offices becomes an
arbitrary act, the effect of which is to assert the power to remove all the incumbents guilty or
innocent without due process of law." Now would it be of any avail to beg the question and
assert that due process is not available in mass abolitions of courts.

Justice Barredo, however, without citing any hard evidence, refers in his separate concurrence
to twin objectives of getting rid of " structural inadequacies of the system or of the
cumbersomeness and technicality-peppered and dragging procedural rules in force and of "a

98
good number of those occupying positions in the judiciary (who') make a mockery of justice and
take advantage of their office for personal ends He adds that "it is my personal assessment of
the present situation in our judiciary that its reorganization has to be of necessity two-pronged,
as I have just indicated, for the most Ideal judicial system with the most perfect procedural rules
cannot satisfy the people and the interests of justice unless the men who hold positions therein
possess the character, competence and sense of loyalty that can guarantee their devotion to
duty and absolute impartiality, nay, impregnability to all temptations of graft and corruption,
including the usual importunings and the fearsome albeit improper pressures of the powers that
be," 24 and invokes the adage of "grandes males, grandes remedios" to now uphold the validity
of the Act.

Former Senator Diokno in his memorandum anticipates the argument that "great ills demand
drastic cures" thus: "Drastic, yes — but not unfair nor unconstitutional. One does not improve
courts by abolishing them, any more than a doctor cures a patient by killing him. The ills the
judiciary suffers from were caused by impairing its independence; they will not be cured by
totally destroying that independence. To adopt such a course would only breed more perversity
in the administration of justice, just as the abuses of martial rule have bred more subversion."

12. Finally, as stated by the 19-i 5 integrated Bar of the Philippines 2nd House of Delegates, "It
would, indeed, be most ironical if Judges who are called upon to give due process cannot count
it on themselves. Observance of procedural due process in the separation of misfits from (he
Judiciary is the right way to attain a laudable objective. '

As stressed by the Chief Justice in the Fortun case, judges are entitled to the cardinal principles
of fairness and due process and the opportunity to be heard and defend themselves against the
accusations made against their and not to be subjected to harassment and humiliation, and the
Court will repudiate the "oppressive exercise of legal authority." More so, are judges entitled to
such due process when what is at stake is their constitutionally guaranteed security of tenure
and non-impairment of the independence of the judiciary and the proper exercise of the
constitutional power exclusively vested in the Supreme Court to discipline and remove judges
after fair hearing.

In sum, I see no reason to change the stand submitted by me to the Presidential Committee on
Judicial Reorganization that —

Judges of inferior courts should not be summarily removed and branded for life in such
reorganization on the basis of confidential adverse reports as to their performance, competence
or integrity, save those who may voluntarily resign from office upon being confronted with such
reports against them. The trouble with such ex-parte reports, without due process or hearing,
has been proven from our past experience where a number of honest and competent judges
were summarily removed while others who were generally believed to be basket cases have
remained in the service; and

The power of discipline and dismissal of judges of all inferior courts, from the Court of Appeals
down, has been vested by the 1973 Constitution in the Supreme Court, and if the judiciary is to
be strengthened, it should be left to clean its own house upon complaint and with the
cooperation of the as grieved parties and after due process and hearing.

The constitutional confrontation and conflict may wen be avoided by holding that since the
changes and provisions of the challenged Act do not substantially change the nature and
functions of the "new courts" therein provided as compared to the "abolished old courts" but
provide for procedural changes, fixed delineation of jurisdiction and increases in the number of
courts for a more effective and efficient disposition of court cases, the incumbent judges
guaranteed security of tenure require that they be retained in the corresponding "new courts."

99
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-30637 July 16, 1987

LIANGA BAY LOGGING, CO., INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. MANUEL LOPEZ ENAGE, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch II of the
Court of First, Instance of Agusan, and AGO TIMBER CORPORATION, respondents.

TEEHANKEE, C.J.:

The Court grants the petition for certiorari and prohibition and holds that respondent judge,
absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion, has no competence nor authority to review
anew the decision in administrative proceedings of respondents public officials (director of
forestry, secretary of agriculture and natural resources and assistant executive secretaries of
the Office of the President) in determining the correct boundary line of the licensed timber areas
of the contending parties. The Court reaffirms the established principle that findings of fact by an
administrative board or agency or official, following a hearing, are binding upon the courts and
will not be disturbed except where the board, agency and/or official(s) have gone beyond their
statutory authority, exercised unconstitutional powers or clearly acted arbitrarily and without
regard to their duty or with grave abuse of discretion.

The parties herein are both forest concessionaries whose licensed areas are adjacent to each
other. The concession of petitioner Lianga Bay Logging Corporation Co., Inc. (hereinafter
referred to as petitioner Lianga) as described in its Timber License Agreement No. 49, is located
in the municipalities of Tago, Cagwait, Marihatag and Lianga, all in the Province of Surigao,
consisting of 110,406 hectares, more or less, while that of respondent Ago Timber Corporation
(hereinafter referred to as respondent Ago) granted under Ordinary Timber License No. 1323-60
[New] is located at Los Arcos and San Salvador, Province of Agusan, with an approximate area
of 4,000 hectares. It was a part of a forest area of 9,000 hectares originally licensed to one
Narciso Lansang under Ordinary Timber License No. 584-'52.

Since the concessions of petitioner and respondent are adjacent to each other, they have a
common boundary-the Agusan-Surigao Provincial boundary-whereby the eastern boundary of
respondent Ago's concession is petitioner Lianga's western boundary. The western boundary of
petitioner Lianga is described as "... Corner 5, a point in the intersection of the Agusan-Surigao
Provincial boundary and Los Arcos-Lianga Road; thence following Agusan-Surigao Provincial
boundary in a general northerly and northwesterly and northerly directions about 39,500 meters
to Corner 6, a point at the intersection of the Agusan-Surigao Provincial boundary and Nalagdao
Creek ..." The eastern boundary of respondent Ago's concession is described as "... point 4,
along the Agusan-Surigao boundary; thence following Agusan-Surigao boundary in a general
southeasterly and southerly directions about 12,000 meters to point 5, a point along Los Arcos-
Lianga Road; ..." 1

Because of reports of encroachment by both parties on each other's concession areas, the
Director of Forestry ordered a survey to establish on the ground the common boundary of their
respective concession areas. Forester Cipriano Melchor undertook the survey and fixed the
common boundary as "Corner 5 of Lianga Bay Logging Company at Km. 10.2 instead of Km.
9.7 on the Lianga-Arcos Road and lines N900E, 21,000 meters; N12 W, 21,150 meters; N40 W,
3,000 meters; N31 W, 2,800 meters; N50 W, 1,700 meters" which respondent Ago protested
claiming that "its eastern boundary should be the provincial boundary line of Agusan-Surigao as
described in Section 1 of Art. 1693 of the Philippine Commission as indicated in the green pencil
in the attached sketch" of the areas as prepared by the Bureau of Forestry. 2 The Director of
Forestry, after considering the evidence, found:

100
 That the claim of the Ago Timber Corporation portrays a line (green line) far different in
alignment with the line (red) as indicated in the original License Control Map of this
Office;

That the claim of the Ago Timber Corporation (green line does not conform to the
distance of 6,800 meters from point 3 to point 4 of the original description of the area of
Narciso Lansang but would project said line to a distance of approximately 13,800
meters;

That to follow the claim of the Ago Timber Corporation would increase the area of
Narciso Lansang from 9,000 to 12,360 hectares;

That to follow the claim of the Ago Timber Corporation would reduce the area of the
Lianga Bay Logging, Co., Inc. to 107,046 hectares instead of the area granted which is
110,406 hectares.

and ruled that "the claim of the Ago Timber Corporation runs counter to the intentions of this
Office is granting the license of Mr. Narciso Lansang; and further, that it also runs counter to the
intentions of this Office in granting the Timber License Agreement to the Lianga Bay Logging
Co., Inc. The intentions of this Office in granting the two licenses (Lansang and Lianga Bay
Logging Co., Inc.) are patently manifest in that distances and bearings are the controlling
factors. If mention was ever made of the Agusan-Surigao boundary, as the common boundary
line of both licensees, this Office could not have meant the Agusan-Surigao boundary as
described under Section 1 of Act 1693 of the Philippine Commission for were it so it could have
been so easy for this Office to mention the distance from point 3 to point 4 of Narciso Lansang
as approximately 13,800 meters. This cannot be considered a mistake considering that the
percentage of error which is more or less 103% is too high an error to be committed by an
Office manned by competent technical men. The Agusan-Surigao boundary as mentioned in the
technical descriptions of both licensees, is, therefore, patently an imaginary line based on B.F.
License Control Map. Such being the case, it is reiterated that distance and bearings control the
description where an imaginary line exists. 3The decision fixed the common boundary of the
licensed areas of the Ago Timber Corporation and Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. as that
indicated in red pencil of the sketch attached to the decision.

In an appeal interposed by respondent Ago, docketed in the Department of Agriculture and

Natural Resources as DANR Case No. 2268, the then Acting Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources Jose Y. Feliciano, in a decision dated August 9, 1965 set aside the appealed
decision of the Director of Forestry and ruled that "(T)he common boundary line of the licensed
areas of the Ago Timber Corporation and the Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc., should be that
indicated by the green line on the same sketch which had been made an integral part of the
appealed decision." 4

Petitioner elevated the case to the Office of the President, where in a decision dated June 16,
1966, signed by then Assistant Executive Secretary Jose J. Leido, Jr., the ruling of the then
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources was affirmed. 5 On motion for reconsideration,
the Office of the President issued another decision dated August 9, 1968 signed by then
Assistant Executive Secretary Gilberto Duavit reversing and overturning the decision of the then
Acting Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and affirming in toto and reinstating the
decision, dated March 20, 1961, of the Director of Forestry. 6

Respondent Ago filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision dated August 9, 1968 of the
Office of the President but after written opposition of petitioner Lianga, the same was denied in
an order dated October 2, 1968, signed by then Assistant Executive Secretary Jose J. Leido,
Jr. 7

On October 21, 1968, a new action was commenced by Ago Timber Corporation, as plaintiff, in
the Court of First Instance of Agusan, Branch II, docketed thereat as Civil Case No. 1253,
against Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc., Assistant Executive Secretaries Jose J. Leido, Jr. and
Gilberto M. Duavit and Director of Forestry, as defendants, for "Determination of Correct
Boundary Line of License Timber Areas and Damages with Preliminary Injunction" reiterating
once more the same question raised and passed upon in DANR Case No. 2268 and insisting

101
that "a judicial review of such divergent administrative decisions is necessary in order to
determine the correct boundary fine of the licensed areas in question." 8

As prayed for, respondent judge issued a temporary restraining order on October 28, 1968, on a
bond of P20,000, enjoining the defendants from carrying out the decision of the Office of the
President. The corresponding writ was issued the next day, or on October 29, 1968. 9

On November 10, 1968, defendant Lianga (herein petitioner) moved for dismissal of the
complaint and for dissolution of the temporary restraining order on grounds that the complaint
states no cause of action and that the court has no jurisdiction over the person of respondent
public officials and respondent corporation. It also submitted its opposition to plaintiff's (herein
respondent prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. 10 A supplemental motion
was filed on December 6, 1968. 11

On December 19, 1968, the lower court issued an order denying petitioner Lianga's motion to
dismiss and granting the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by respondent Ago. 12 Lianga's
Motion for Reconsideration of the Order was denied on May 9, 1969. 13 Hence, this petition
praying of the Court (a) to declare that the Director of Forestry has the exclusive jurisdiction to
determine the common boundary of the licensed areas of petitioners and respondents and that
the decision of the Office of the President dated August 9, 1968 is final and executory; (b) to
order the dismissal of Civil Case No. 1253 in the Court of First Instance of Agusan; (c) to
declare that respondent Judge acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction and with
grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in issuing the temporary restraining
order dated October 28, 1968 and granting the preliminary injunction per its Order dated
December 19, 1968; and (d) to annul the aforementioned orders.

After respondent's comments on the petition and petitioner's reply thereto, this Court on June
30, 1969 issued a restraining order enjoining in turn the enforcement of the preliminary
injunction and related orders issued by the respondent court in Civil Case No. 1253. 14

The Court finds merit in the petition.

Respondent Judge erred in taking cognizance of the complaint filed by respondent Ago, asking
for the determination anew of the correct boundary fine of its licensed timber area, for the same
issue had already been determined by the Director of Forestry, the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources and the Office of the President, administrative officials under whose
jurisdictions the matter properly belongs. Section 1816 of the Revised Administrative Code
vests in the Bureau of Forestry, the jurisdiction and authority over the demarcation, protection,
management, reproduction, reforestation, occupancy, and use of all public forests and forest
reserves and over the granting of licenses for game and fish, and for the taking of forest
products, including stone and earth therefrom. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, as department head, may repeal or in the decision of the Director of Forestry when
advisable in the public interests, 15 whose decision is in turn appealable to the Office of the
President. 16

In giving due course to the complaint below, the respondent court would necessarily have to
assess and evaluate anew all the evidence presented in the administrative
proceedings, 17 which is beyond its competence and jurisdiction. For the respondent court to
consider and weigh again the evidence already presented and passed upon by said officials
would be to allow it to substitute its judgment for that of said officials who are in a better position
to consider and weigh the same in the light of the authority specifically vested in them by law.
Such a posture cannot be entertained, for it is a well-settled doctrine that the courts of justice
will generally not interfere with purely administrative matters which are addressed to the sound
discretion of government agencies and their expertise unless there is a clear showing that the
latter acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion or when they have acted in a capricious
and whimsical manner such that their action may amount to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. 18

A doctrine long recognized is that where the law confines in an administrative office the power
to determine particular questions or matters, upon the facts to be presented, the jurisdiction of
such office shall prevail over the courts. 19

102
The general rule, under the principles of administrative law in force in this jurisdiction, is that
decisions of administrative officers shall not be disturbed by the courts, except when the former
have acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Findings
of administrative officials and agencies who have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is
confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but at times even finality of
such findings are supported by substantial evidence. 20 As recently stressed by the Court, "in
this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized administrative boards or commissions
with the special knowledge, experience and capability to hear and determine promptly disputes
on technical matters or essentially factual matters, subject to judicial review in case of grave
abuse of discretion, has become well nigh indispensable." 21

The facts and circumstances in the instant case are similar to the earlier case of Pajo, et al. v.
Ago, et al. 22 (where therein respondent Pastor Ago is the president of herein respondent Ago
Timber Corporation). In the said case, therein respondent Pastor Ago, after an adverse decision
of the Director of Forestry, Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and Executive
Secretary in connection with his application for renewal of his expired timber licenses, filed with
the Court of First instance of Agusan a petition for certiorari, prohibition and damages with
preliminary injunction alleging that the rejection of his application for renewal by the Director of
Forestry and Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and its affirmance by the
Executive Secretary constituted an abuse of discretion and was therefore illegal. The Court held
that "there can be no question that petitioner Director of Forestry has jurisdiction over the grant
or renewal of respondent Ago's timber license (Sec. 1816, Rev. Adm. Code); that petitioner
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources as department head, is empowered by law to
affirm, modify or reject said grant or renewal of respondent Ago's timber license by petitioner
Director of Forestry (Sec. 79[c], Rev. Adm. Code); and that petitioner Executive Secretary,
acting for and in behalf and by authority of the President has, likewise, jurisdiction to affirm,
modify or reverse the orders regarding the grant or renewal of said timber license by the two
aforementioned officials." The Court went on to say that, "(I)n the case of Espinosa, et al. v.
Makalintal, et al. (79 Phil. 134; 45 Off. Gaz. 712), we held that the powers granted to the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce (Natural Resources) by law regarding the disposition of
public lands such as granting of licenses, permits, leases, and contracts or approving, rejecting,
reinstating, or cancelling applications or deciding conflicting applications, are all executive and
administrative in nature. It is a well-recognized principle that purely administrative and
discretionary functions may not be interfered with by the courts. In general, courts have no
supervising power over the proceedings and actions of the administrative departments of the
government. This is generally true with respect to acts involving the exercise of judgment or
discretion, and findings of act. Findings of fact by an administrative board, agency or official,
following a hearing, are binding upon the courts and will not be disturbed except where the
board, agency or official has gone beyond his statutory authority, exercised unconstitutional
powers or clearly acted arbitrarily and without regard to his duty or with grave abuse of
discretion. And we have repeatedly held that there is grave abuse of discretion justifying the
issuance of the writ of certiorari only when there is capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. (Abad Santos v. Province of Tarlac, 67 Phil.
480; Tan vs. People, 88 Phil. 609)"

Respondent Ago contends that the motion filed by petitioner Lianga for reconsideration of the
decision of the Office of the President was denied in an alleged "decision" dated August 15,
1966, allegedly signed by then Assistant Executive Secretary Jose J. Leido, Jr. that, "however,
for some mysterious, unknown if not anomalous reasons and/or illegal considerations, the
"decision" allegedly dated August 15, 1966(Annex "D") was never released" and instead a
decision was released on August 9, 1968, signed by then Assistant Executive Secretary
Gilberto M. Duavit, which reversed the findings and conclusions of the Office of the President in
its first decision dated June 16, 1966 and signed by then Assistant Executive Secretary Leido.

It is elementary that a draft of a decision does not operate as judgment on a case until the same
is duly signed and delivered to the clerk for filing and promulgation. A decision cannot be
considered as binding on the parties until its promulgation. 23 Respondent should be aware of
this rule. In still another case of Ago v. Court of Appeals, 24 (where herein respondent Ago was
the petitioner) the Court held that, "While it is to be presumed that the judgment that was
dictated in open court will be the judgment of the court, the court may still modify said order as
the same is being put into writing. And even if the order or judgment has already been put into
writing and signed, while it has not yet been delivered to the clerk for filing, it is stin subject to

103
amendment or change by the judge. It is only when the judgment signed by the judge is actually
filed with the clerk of court that it becomes a valid and binding judgment. Prior thereto, it could
still be subject to amendment and change and may not, therefore, constitute the real judgment
of the court."

Respondent alleges "that in view of the hopelessly conflicting decisions of the administrative
bodies and/or offices of the Philippine government, and the important questions of law and fact
involved therein, as well as the well-grounded fear and suspicion that some anomalous, illicit
and unlawful considerations had intervened in the concealment of the decision of August 15,
1966 (Annex "D") of Assistant Executive Secretary Gilberto M. Duavit, a judicial review of such
divergent administrative decisions is necessary in order to determine the correct boundary line
of the licensed areas in question and restore the faith and confidence of the people in the
actuations of our public officials and in our system of administration of justice."

The mere suspicion of respondent that there were anomalies in the non-release of the Leido
"decision" allegedly denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration and the substitution thereof
by the Duavit decision granting reconsideration does not justify judicial review. Beliefs,
suspicions and conjectures cannot overcome the presumption of regularity and legality of official
actions. 25 It is presumed that an official of a department performs his official duties
regularly. 26 It should be noted, furthermore, that as hereinabove stated with regard to the case
history in the Office of the President, Ago's motion for reconsideration of the Duavit decision
dated August 9, 1968 was denied in the Order dated October 2, 1968 and signed by Assistant
Executive Secretary Leido himself (who thereby joined in the reversal of his own first decision
dated June 16, 1966 and signed by himself).

The Ordinary Timber License No. 1323-'60[New] which approved the transfer to respondent
Ago of the 4,000 hectares from the forest area originally licensed to Narciso Lansang, stipulates
certain conditions, terms and limitations, among which were: that the decision of the Director of
Forestry as to the exact location of its licensed areas is final; that the license is subject to
whatever decision that may be rendered on the boundary conflict between the Lianga Bay
Logging Co. and the Ago Timber Corporation; that the terms and conditions of the license are
subject to change at the discretion of the Director of Forestry and the license may be made to
expire at an earlier date. Under Section 1834 of the Revised Administrative Code, the Director
of Forestry, upon granting any license, may prescribe and insert therein such terms, conditions,
and limitations, not inconsistent with law, as may be deemed by him to be in the public interest.
The license operates as a contract between the government and respondent. Respondent,
therefore, is estopped from questioning the terms and stipulation thereof.

Clearly, the injunctive writ should not have been issued. The provisions of law explicitly provide
that Courts of First Instance shall have the power to issue writ of injunction, mandamus,
certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto and habeas corpus in their respective places, 27 if the
petition filed relates to the acts or omissions of an inferior court, or of a corporation, board,
officer or person, within their jurisdiction. 28

The jurisdiction or authority of the Court of First Instance to control or restrain acts by means of
the writ of injunction is limited only to acts which are being committed within the territorial
boundaries of their respective provinces or districts 29 except where the sole issue is the legality
of the decision of the administrative officials. 30

In the leading case of Palanan Lumber Plywood Co., Inc. v. Arranz 31 which involved a petition
for certiorari and prohibition filed in the Court of First Instance of Isabela against the same
respondent public officials as here and where the administrative proceedings taken were similar
to the case at bar, the Court laid down the rule that: "We agree with the petitioner that the
respondent Court acted without jurisdiction in issuing a preliminary injunction against the
petitioners Executive Secretary, Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Director of Forestry, who have their official residences in Manila and Quezon City, outside of the
territorial jurisdiction of the respondent Court of First Instance of Isabela. Both the statutory
provisions and the settled jurisdiction of this Court unanimously affirm that the extraordinary
writs issued by the Court of First Instance are limited to and operative only within their
respective provinces and districts."

104
A different rule applies only when the point in controversy relates solely to a determination of a
question of law whether the decision of the respondent administrative officials was legally
correct or not. 32 We thus declared in Director of Forestry v. Ruiz. 33 "In Palanan Lumber &
Plywood Co., Inc., supra, we reaffirmed the rule of non-jurisdiction of courts of first instance to
issue injunctive writs in order to control acts outside of their premises or districts. We went
further and said that when the petition filed with the courts of first instance not only questions
the legal correctness of the decision of administrative officials but also seeks to enjoin the
enforcement of the said decision, the court could not validly issue the writ of injunction when the
officials sought to be restrained from enforcing the decision are not stationed within its
territory.1avvphi1

"To recapitulate, insofar as injunctive or prohibitory writs are concerned, the rule still stands that
courts of first instance have the power to issue writs limited to and operative only within their
respective provinces or districts. "

The writ of preliminary injunction issued by respondent court is furthermore void, since it
appears that the forest area described in the injunctive writ includes areas not licensed to
respondent Ago. The forest area referred to and described therein comprises the whole area
originally licensed to Narciso Lansang under the earlier Ordinary Timber License No. 58452.
Only a portion of this area was in fact transferred to respondent Ago as described in its Ordinary
Timber License No. 1323-'60[New].

It is abundantly clear that respondent court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of Civil
Case No. 1253 of the Court of First Instance of Agusan nor has it jurisdiction to decide on the
common boundary of the licensed areas of petitioner Lianga and respondent Ago, as
determined by respondents public officials against whom no case of grave abuse of discretion
has been made. Absent a cause of action and jurisdiction, respondent Judge acted with grave
abuse of discretion and excess, if not lack, of jurisdiction in refusing to dismiss the case under
review and in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of the final
decision dated August 9, 1968 and the order affirming the same dated October 2, 1968 of the
Office of the President.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted. The restraining order
heretofore issued by the Court against enforcement of the preliminary injunction and related
orders issued by respondent judge is the case below is made permanent and the respondent
judge or whoever has taken his place is hereby ordered to dismiss Civil Case No. 1253.

SO ORDERED.

105
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 84811 August 29, 1989

SOLID HOMES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
TERESITA PAYAWAL and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

We are asked to reverse a decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining the jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City over a complaint filed by a buyer, the herein private
respondent, against the petitioner, for delivery of title to a subdivision lot. The position of the
petitioner, the defendant in that action, is that the decision of the trial court is null and void ab
initio because the case should have been heard and decided by what is now called the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board.

The complaint was filed on August 31, 1982, by Teresita Payawal against Solid Homes, Inc.
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and docketed as Civil Case No. Q-36119. The
plaintiff alleged that the defendant contracted to sell to her a subdivision lot in Marikina on June
9, 1975, for the agreed price of P 28,080.00, and that by September 10, 1981, she had already
paid the defendant the total amount of P 38,949.87 in monthly installments and interests. Solid
Homes subsequently executed a deed of sale over the land but failed to deliver the
corresponding certificate of title despite her repeated demands because, as it appeared later,
the defendant had mortgaged the property in bad faith to a financing company. The plaintiff
asked for delivery of the title to the lot or, alternatively, the return of all the amounts paid by her
plus interest. She also claimed moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and the costs of
the suit.

Solid Homes moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction,
this being vested in the National Housing Authority under PD No. 957. The motion was denied.
The defendant repleaded the objection in its answer, citing Section 3 of the said decree
providing that "the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the
real estate trade and business in accordance with the provisions of this Decree." After trial,
judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and the defendant was ordered to deliver to her
the title to the land or, failing this, to refund to her the sum of P 38,949.87 plus interest from
1975 and until the full amount was paid. She was also awarded P 5,000.00 moral damages, P
5,000.00 exemplary damages, P 10,000.00 attorney's fees, and the costs of the suit. 1

Solid Homes appealed but the decision was affirmed by the respondent court, 2 which also
berated the appellant for its obvious efforts to evade a legitimate obligation, including its dilatory
tactics during the trial. The petitioner was also reproved for its "gall" in collecting the further
amount of P 1,238.47 from the plaintiff purportedly for realty taxes and registration expenses
despite its inability to deliver the title to the land.

In holding that the trial court had jurisdiction, the respondent court referred to Section 41 of PD
No. 957 itself providing that:

SEC. 41. Other remedies.-The rights and remedies provided in this Decree shall
be in addition to any and all other rights and remedies that may be available
under existing laws.

and declared that "its clear and unambiguous tenor undermine(d) the (petitioner's) pretension
that the court a quowas bereft of jurisdiction." The decision also dismissed the contrary opinion
of the Secretary of Justice as impinging on the authority of the courts of justice. While we are

106
disturbed by the findings of fact of the trial court and the respondent court on the dubious
conduct of the petitioner, we nevertheless must sustain it on the jurisdictional issue.

The applicable law is PD No. 957, as amended by PD No. 1344, entitled "Empowering the
National Housing Authority to Issue Writs of Execution in the Enforcement of Its Decisions
Under Presidential Decree No. 957." Section 1 of the latter decree provides as follows:

SECTION 1. In the exercise of its function to regulate the real estate trade and
business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No.
957, the National Housing Authority shall haveexclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide cases of the following nature:

A. Unsound real estate business practices;

B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or
condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or
salesman; and

C. Cases involving specific performance of contractuala statutory obligations filed

by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer,
dealer, broker or salesman. (Emphasis supplied.)

The language of this section, especially the italicized portions, leaves no room for doubt that
"exclusive jurisdiction" over the case between the petitioner and the private respondent is
vested not in the Regional Trial Court but in the National Housing Authority. 3

The private respondent contends that the applicable law is BP No. 129, which confers on
regional trial courts jurisdiction to hear and decide cases mentioned in its Section 19, reading in
part as follows:

SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.-Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction:

(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of
pecuniary estimation;

(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or
any interest therein, except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of
lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;

xxx xxx xxx

(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest and cost or the
value of the property in controversy, amounts to more than twenty thousand
pesos (P 20,000.00).

It stresses, additionally, that BP No. 129 should control as the later enactment, having been
promulgated in 1981, after PD No. 957 was issued in 1975 and PD No. 1344 in 1978.

This construction must yield to the familiar canon that in case of conflict between a general law
and a special law, the latter must prevail regardless of the dates of their enactment. Thus, it has
been held that-

The fact that one law is special and the other general creates a presumption that
the special act is to be considered as remaining an exception of the general act,
one as a general law of the land and the other as the law of the particular case. 4

107
 xxx xxx xxx

The circumstance that the special law is passed before or after the general act
does not change the principle. Where the special law is later, it will be regarded
as an exception to, or a qualification of, the prior general act; and where the
general act is later, the special statute will be construed as remaining an
exception to its terms, unless repealed expressly or by necessary implication. 5

It is obvious that the general law in this case is BP No. 129 and PD No. 1344 the special law.

The argument that the trial court could also assume jurisdiction because of Section 41 of PD
No. 957, earlier quoted, is also unacceptable. We do not read that provision as vesting
concurrent jurisdiction on the Regional Trial Court and the Board over the complaint mentioned
in PD No. 1344 if only because grants of power are not to be lightly inferred or merely implied.
The only purpose of this section, as we see it, is to reserve. to the aggrieved party such other
remedies as may be provided by existing law, like a prosecution for the act complained of under
the Revised Penal Code. 6

On the competence of the Board to award damages, we find that this is part of the exclusive
power conferred upon it by PD No. 1344 to hear and decide "claims involving refund and any
other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyers against the project owner,
developer, dealer, broker or salesman." It was therefore erroneous for the respondent to brush
aside the well-taken opinion of the Secretary of Justice that-

Such claim for damages which the subdivision/condominium buyer may have
against the owner, developer, dealer or salesman, being a necessary
consequence of an adjudication of liability for non-performance of contractual or
statutory obligation, may be deemed necessarily included in the phrase "claims
involving refund and any other claims" used in the aforequoted subparagraph C
of Section 1 of PD No. 1344. The phrase "any other claims" is, we believe,
sufficiently broad to include any and all claims which are incidental to or a
necessary consequence of the claims/cases specifically included in the grant of
jurisdiction to the National Housing Authority under the subject provisions.

The same may be said with respect to claims for attorney's fees which are
recoverable either by agreement of the parties or pursuant to Art. 2208 of the
Civil Code (1) when exemplary damages are awarded and (2) where the
defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff 's
plainly valid, just and demandable claim.

xxx xxx xxx

Besides, a strict construction of the subject provisions of PD No. 1344 which

would deny the HSRC the authority to adjudicate claims for damages and for
damages and for attorney's fees would result in multiplicity of suits in that the
subdivision condominium buyer who wins a case in the HSRC and who is
thereby deemed entitled to claim damages and attorney's fees would be forced to
litigate in the regular courts for the purpose, a situation which is obviously not in
the contemplation of the law. (Emphasis supplied.)7

As a result of the growing complexity of the modern society, it has become necessary to create
more and more administrative bodies to help in the regulation of its ramified activities.
Specialized in the particular fields assigned to them, they can deal with the problems thereof
with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the legislature or the courts of
justice. This is the reason for the increasing vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial
powers in what is now not unreasonably called the fourth department of the government.

Statutes conferring powers on their administrative agencies must be liberally construed to

enable them to discharge their assigned duties in accordance with the legislative
purpose. 8 Following this policy in Antipolo Realty Corporation v. National Housing
Authority, 9 the Court sustained the competence of the respondent administrative body, in the

108
exercise of the exclusive jurisdiction vested in it by PD No. 957 and PD No. 1344, to determine
the rights of the parties under a contract to sell a subdivision lot.

It remains to state that, contrary to the contention of the petitioner, the case of Tropical Homes
v. National Housing Authority 10 is not in point. We upheld in that case the constitutionality of the
procedure for appeal provided for in PD No. 1344, but we did not rule there that the National
Housing Authority and not the Regional Trial Court had exclusive jurisdiction over the cases
enumerated in Section I of the said decree. That is what we are doing now.

It is settled that any decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck
down at any time, even on appeal before this Court. 11 The only exception is where the party
raising the issue is barred by estoppel, 12 which does not appear in the case before us. On the
contrary, the issue was raised as early as in the motion to dismiss filed in the trial court by the
petitioner, which continued to plead it in its answer and, later, on appeal to the respondent court.
We have no choice, therefore, notwithstanding the delay this decision will entail, to nullify the
proceedings in the trial court for lack of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the respondent court is REVERSED and the decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-36119 is SET ASIDE, without
prejudice to the filing of the appropriate complaint before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

109
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. L-45839 June 1, 1988

RUFINO MATIENZO, GODOFREDO ESPIRITU, DIOSCORRO FRANCO, AND LA SUERTE

TRANSPORTATION CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
HON. LEOPOLDO M. ABELLERA, ACTING CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD OF
TRANSPORTATION, HON. GODOFREDO Q. ASUNCION, MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF
TRANSPORTATION, ARTURO DELA CRUZ, MS TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., NEW
FAMILIA TRANSPORTATION CO., ROBERTO MOJARES, ET AL., respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition, with application for preliminary injunction, seeking
the annulment and inhibition of the grant or award of provisional permits or special authority by
the respondent Board of Transportation (BOT) to respondent taxicab operators, for the
operation and legalization of "excess taxicab units" under certain provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 101 "despite the lapse of the power to do so thereunder," and "in violation of other
provisions of the Decree, Letter of Instructions No. 379 and other relevant rules of the BOT."

The petitioners and private respondents are all authorized taxicab operators in Metro Manila.
The respondents, however, admittedly operate "colorum" or "kabit" taxicab units. On or about
the second week of February, 1977, private respondents filed their petitions with the respondent
Board for the legalization of their unauthorized "excess" taxicab units citing Presidential Decree
No. 101, promulgated on January 17, 1973, "to eradicate the harmful and unlawful trade of
clandestine operators, by replacing or allowing them to become legitimate and responsible
operators." Within a matter of days, the respondent Board promulgated its orders setting the
applications for hearing and granting applicants provisional authority to operate their "excess
taxicab units" for which legalization was sought. Thus, the present petition.

Opposing the applications and seeking to restrain the grant of provisional permits or authority,
as well as the annulment of permits already granted under PD 101, the petitioners allege that
the BOT acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the petitions for legalization and
awarding special permits to the private respondents.

Presidential Decree No. 101 vested in the Board of Transportation the power, among others "To
grant special permits of limited term for the operation of public utility motor vehicles as may, in
the judgment of the Board, be necessary to replace or convert clandestine operators into
legitimate and responsible operators." (Section 1, PD 101)

Citing, however, Section 4 of the Decree which provides:

SEC. 4. Transitory Provision. — Six months after the promulgation of this

Decree, the Board of Transportation, the Bureau of Transportation, The
Philippine Constabulary, the city and municipal forces, and the provincial and city
fiscals shall wage a concerted and relentless drive towards the total elimination
and punishment of all clandestine and unlawful operators of public utility motor
vehicles."

the petitioners argue that neither the Board of Transportation chairman nor any member thereof
had the power, at the time the petitions were filed (i.e. in 1977), to legitimize clandestine
operations under PD 101 as such power had been limited to a period of six (6) months from and
after the promulgation of the Decree on January 17, 1973. They state that, thereafter, the power
lapses and becomes functus officio.

110
To reinforce their stand, the petitioners refer to certain provisions of the Rules and Regulations
implementing PD 101 issued by respondent Board, Letter of Instructions No. 379, and BOT
Memorandum Circular No. 76-25 (a). In summary, these rules provide inter alia that (1) only
applications for special permits for "colorum" or "kabit" operators filed before July 17, 1973 shall
be accepted and processed (Secs. 3 and 16 (c), BOT-LTC-HPG Joint Regulations
Implementing PD 101, pp. 33 and 47, Rollo); (2) Every provisional authority given to any taxi
operator shall be cancelled immediately and no provisional authority shall thereafter be issued
(par. 6, Letter of Instructions No. 379, issued March 10, 1976, p. 58, Rollo); (3) Effective
immediately, no provisional authorities on applications for certificates of public convenience
shall be granted or existing provisional authorities on new applications extended to, among
others, taxi denominations in Metro Manila (BOT Memorandum Circular No. 75-25 (a), August
30, 1976, p. 64, Rollo); (4) All taxis authorized to operate within Metro Manila shall obtain new
special permits from the BOT, which permits shall be the only ones recognized within the area
(par. 8, LOI No. 379, supra); and (5) No bonafide applicant may apply for special permit to
operate, among others, new taxicab services, and, no application for such new service shall be
accepted for filing or processed by any LTC agency or granted under these regulations by any
LTC Regional Office until after it shall have announced its program of development for these
types of public motor vehicles (Sec. 16d, BOT-LTC-HPG Joint Regulations, p. 47, Rollo).

The petitioners raise the following issues:

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION HAS THE

POWER TO GRANT PROVISIONAL PERMITS TO OPERATE DESPITE THE
BAN THEREON UNDER LETTER OF INSTRUCTIONS NO. 379;

II. WHETHER OR NOT THE BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION HAS THE

POWER TO LEGALIZE, AT THIS TIME, CLANDESTINE AND UNLAWFUL
TAXICAB OPERATIONS UNDER SECTION 1, P.D. 101; AND

III. WHETHER OR NOT THE PROCEDURE BEING FOLLOWED BY THE

BOARD IN THE CASES IN QUESTION SATISFIES THE PROCEDURAL DUE
PROCESS REQUIREMENTS. (p. 119, Rollo)

We need not pass upon the first issue raised anent the grant of provisional authority to
respondents. Considering that the effectivity of the provisional permits issued to the
respondents was expressly limited to June 30, 1977, as evidenced by the BOT orders granting
the same (Annexes G, H, I and J among others) and Memorandum Circular No. 77-4 dated
January 20, 1977 (p. 151, Rollo), implementing paragraph 6 of LOI 379 (ordering immediate
cancellation of all provisional authorities issued to taxicab operators, supra), which provides:

5. After June 30, 1977, all provisional authorities are deemed cancelled, even if
hearings on the main application have not been terminated.

the issue is MOOT and ACADEMIC. Only the issue on legalization remains under consideration.

Justifying its action on private respondent's applications, the respondent Board emphasizes
public need as the overriding concern. It is argued that under PD 101, it is the fixed policy of the
State "to eradicate the harmful and unlawful trade of clandestine operators by replacing or
allowing them to become legitimate and responsible ones" (Whereas clause, PD 101). In view
thereof, it is maintained that respondent Board may continue to grant to "colorum" operators the
benefits of legalization under PD 101, despite the lapse of its power, after six (6) months, to do
so, without taking punitive measures against the said operators.

Indeed, a reading of Section 1, PD 101, shows a grant of powers to the respondent Board to
issue provisional permits as a step towards the legalization of colorum taxicab operations
without the alleged time limitation. There is nothing in Section 4, cited by the petitioners, to
suggest the expiration of such powers six (6) months after promulgation of the Decree. Rather,
it merely provides for the withdrawal of the State's waiver of its right to punish said colorum
operators for their illegal acts. In other words, the cited section declares when the period of
moratorium suspending the relentless drive to eliminate illegal operators shall end. Clearly,
there is no impediment to the Board's exercise of jurisdiction under its broad powers under the

111
Public Service Act to issue certificates of public convenience to achieve the avowed purpose of
PD 101 (Sec. 16a, Public Service Act, Nov. 7, 1936).

It is a settled principle of law that in determining whether a board or commission has a certain
power, the authority given should be liberally construed in the light of the purposes for which it
was created, and that which is incidentally necessary to a full implementation of the legislative
intent should be upheld as being germane to the law. Necessarily, too, where the end is
required, the appropriate means are deemed given (Martin, Administrative Law, 1979, p. 46).
Thus, as averred by the respondents:

... [A]ll things considered, the question is what is the best for the interest of the
public. Whether PD 101 has lost its effectiveness or not, will in no way prevent
this Board from resolving the question in the same candor and spirit that P.D.
101 and LOI 379 were issued to cope with the multifarious ills that plague our
transport system. ... (Emphasis supplied) (pp. 91-92, Rollo)

This, the private respondents appreciate, as they make reference to PD 101, merely to cite the
compassion with which colorum operators were dealt with under the law. They state that it is "in
the same vein and spirit that this Honorable Board has extended the Decree of legalization to
the operatives of the various PUJ and PUB services along legislative methods," that
respondents pray for authorization of their colorum units in actual operation in Metro Manila
(Petitions for Legalization, Annexes E & F, par. 7, pp. 65-79, Rollo).

Anent the petitioners' reliance on the BOT Rules and Regulations Implementing PD 101 as well
as its Memorandum Circular No. 76-25(a), the BOT itself has declared:

In line with its duty to rationalize the transport industry, the Board shall. from time
to time, re- study the public need for public utilities in any area in the Philippines
for the purpose of re- evaluating the policies. (p. 64, Rollo)

Thus, the respondents correctly argue that "as the need of the public changes and oscillates
with the trends of modern life, so must the Memo Orders issued by respondent jibe with the
dynamic and flexible standards of public needs. ... Respondent Board is not supposed to 'tie its
hands' on its issued Memo Orders should public interest demand otherwise" (Answer of private
respondents, p. 121, Rollo).

The fate of the private respondent's petitions is initially for the Board to determine. From the
records of the case, acceptance of the respondent's applications appears to be a question
correctly within the discretion of the respondent Board to decide. As a rule, where the
jurisdiction of the BOT to take cognizance of an application for legalization is settled, the Court
enjoins the exercise thereof only when there is fraud, abuse of discretion or error of law.
Furthermore, the court does not interfere, as a rule, with administrative action prior to its
completion or finality . It is only after judicial review is no longer premature that we ascertain in
proper cases whether the administrative findings are not in violation of law, whether they are
free from fraud or imposition and whether they find substantial support from the evidence.

Finally, with respect to the last issue raised by the petitioners alleging the denial of due process
by respondent Board in granting the provisional permits to the private respondents and in taking
cognizance of their applications for legalization without notice and hearing, suffice it to say that
PD 101 does not require such notice or hearing for the grant of temporary authority . The
provisional nature of the authority and the fact that the primary application shall be given a full
hearing are the safeguards against its abuse. As to the applications for legalization themselves,
the Public Service Act does enjoin the Board to give notice and hearing before exercising any of
its powers under Sec. 16 thereof. However, the allegations that due process has been denied
are negated by the hearings set by the Board on the applications as expressed in its orders
resolving the petitions for special permits (Annexes G, H, I, pp. 80-102, Rollo).

The Board stated:

The grounds involved in the petition are of first impression. It cannot resolve the
issue ex-parte. It needs to hear the views of other parties who may have an

112
 interest, or whose interest may be affected by any decision that this Board may
take.

The Board therefore, decides to set the petition for hearing.

xxx xxx xxx

As to the required notice, it is impossible for the respondent Board to give personal notice to all
parties who may be interested in the matter, which parties are unknown to it. Its aforementioned
order substantially complies with the requirement. The petitioners having been able to timely
oppose the petitions in question, any lack of notice is deemed cured.

WHEREFORE. the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The questioned orders of the
then Board of Transportation are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

113
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 71837 July 26, 1988

CHUNG KA BIO, WELLINGTON CHUNG, CHUNG SIONG PEK, VICTORIANO CHUNG, and
MANUEL CHUNG TONG OH, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (2nd Special Cases Division), SECURITIES and
EXCHANGE COMMISSION EN BANC, HON. ANTONIO R. MANABAT, HON. JAMES K.
ABUGAN, HON. ANTERO F.L. VILLAFLOR, JR., HON. SIXTO T.J. DE GUZMAN, JR.,
ALFREDO CHING, CHING TAN, CHIONG TIONG TAY, CHUNG KIAT HUA, CHENG LU KUN,
EMILIO TAÑEDO, ROBERTO G. CENON and PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS COMPANY,
INC., respondents.

Blanco Law Firm for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondent SEC.

Balgos & Perez Law Office for Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc.

Quiason, Ermitaño, Makalintal & Barot Law Offices for private respondents Ching Tan and
Chiong Tiong Tay.

Angara, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz Law Offices for private respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

The Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. was incorporated on January 19, 1952, for a term
of 25 years which expired on January 19,1977. 1 On May 14, 1977, the members of its board of
directors executed a deed of assignment of all of the accounts receivables, properties,
obligations and liabilities of the old PBM in favor of Chung Siong Pek in his capacity as treasurer
of the new PBM, then in the process of reincorporation. 2 On June 14, 1977, the new PMB was
issued a certificate of incorporation by the Securities and Exchange Commission. 3

On May 5, 1981, Chung Ka Bio and the other petitioners herein, all stockholders of the old PBM,
filed with the SEC a petition for liquidation (but not for dissolution) of both the old PBM and the
new PBM. The allegation was that the former had become legally non-existent for failure to
extend its corporate life and that the latter had likewise beenipso facto dissolved for non-use of
the charter and continuous failure to operate within 2 years from incorporation. 4

Dismissed for lack of a cause of action, the case, docketed as AC No. 055, was reinstated on
appeal to the SEC en banc and remanded to a new panel of hearing officers for further
proceedings, including the proper accounting of the assets and liabilities of the old PBM. This
order was appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court in a petition for partial review, docketed
as AC GR SP No. 00843, questioning the authority of the SEC in Case No. 055 to adjudicate a
matter not properly raised on appeal or resolved in the order appealed from.5

In a related development, Alfredo Ching, one of the members of the board of directors of the old
PBM who executed the deed of assignment, filed with the Intermediate Appellate Court a
separate petition for certiorari, docketed as AC GR No. 01099, in which he questioned the same
order and the decision of the SEC in AC Case No. 055. He alleged that the SEC had gravely
erred in not dismissing the petition for liquidation since the action amounted to a quo
warranto proceeding which only the state could institute through the Solicitor General. 6

114
Earlier, on April 1, 1982, the new PBM and Alfredo Ching had filed with the SEC a petition for
suspension of payment, which was opposed by Chung Ka Bio, et al., on the ground that the
SEC had no jurisdiction over a petition for suspension of payments initiated by a mere
individual. The opposition was rejected and the case was set for hearing. Chung Ka Bio
elevated the matter to the SEC en banc on certiorari with preliminary injunction and
receivership, docketed as SEC EB No. 018, praying for the annulment and setting aside of the
proceedings. On May 10, 1983, the case was remanded to the hearing officers for further
proceedings. 7

Chung Ka Bio came to this Court but we referred his case to the Intermediate Appellate Court
where it was docketed as GR SP No. 01007. The three cases, viz., PBM Co., Inc. v. SEC, AC
GR SP 00843; Chung Ka Bio, et al. v. SEC, AC GR SP No. 01007; and Alfredo Ching, et al. v.
SEC, AC GR SP No. 01099 were then consolidated in the respondent court which, on February
28, 1985, issued the decision now challenged on certiorari by the petitioners in the case at bar.
The decision affirmed the orders issued by the SEC in the said cases except the requirement for
the accounting of the assets of the old PBM, which was set aside.8

The petitioners now contend as follows:

1. The board of directors of an already dissolved corporation does not have the inherent power,
without the express consent of the stockholders, to convey all its assets to a new corporation.

2. The new corporation is accountable for the said assets to the stockholders of the dissolved
corporation who had not consented to the conveyance of the same to the new corporation.

3. The new corporation has not substantially complied with the two-year requirement of Section
22 of the new Corporation Code on non-user because its stockholders never adopted a set of
by-laws.

4. A quo warranto proceeding is no longer necessary to dissolve a corporation which is already

"deemed dissolved" under Section 22 of the new Corporation Code.

5. The Securities and Exchange Commission has no jurisdiction over a petition for suspension
of payments filed by an individual only.9

On the first contention, the petitioners insist that they have never given their consent to the
creation of the new corporation nor have they indicated their agreement to transfer their
respective stocks in the old PBM to the new PBM. The creation of the new corporation with the
transfer thereto of the assets of the old corporation was not within the powers of the board of
directors of the latter as it was authorized only to wind up the affairs of such company and not in
any case to continue its business. Moreover, no stockholders' meeting had been convened to
discuss the deed of assignment and the 2/3 vote required by the Corporation Law to authorize
such conveyance had not been obtained.10

The pertinent provisions of the Corporation Law, which was the law then in force, are the
following:

SEC. 77. Every corporation whose charter expired by its own limitation or is
annulled by forfeiture or otherwise, or whose corporate existence for other
purposes is terminated in any other manner, shall nevertheless be continued as
a body corporate for three years after the time when it would have been
dissolved, for the purpose of prosecuting and defending suits by or against it and
of enabling it gradually to settle and close its affairs, to dispose of and convey its
property and to divide its capital stock, but not for the purpose of continuing the
business for which it was established."

SEC. 28-1/2. A corporation may, by action taken at any meeting of its board of
directors, sell, lease, exchange, or otherwise dispose of all or substantially all of
its property and assets, including its goodwill, upon such terms and conditions
and for such considerations, which may be money, stocks bonds, or other
instruments for the payment of money or other property or other considerations,

115
 as its board of directors deem expedient, when and as authorized by the
affirmative vote of shareholders holding shares in the corporation entitling them
to exercise at least two-thirds of the voting power on such a proposal at a
shareholders' meeting called for that purpose. Notice of such meeting shall be
given to all of the shareholders of record of the corporation whether or not they
shall be entitled to vote thereat: Provided, however, That any stockholder who
did not vote to authorize the action of the board of directors, may, within forty
days after the date upon which such action was authorized, object thereto in
writing and demand payment for his shares. If, after such a demand by a
stockholder, the corporation and the stockholder can not agree upon the value of
his share or shares at the time such corporate action was authorized, such value
shall be ascertained by three disinterested persons, one of whom shall be named
by the stockholder, another by the corporation, and the third by the two thus
chosen. The finding of the appraisers shall be final and if their award is not paid
by the corporation within thirty days after it is made, it may be recovered in an
action by the stockholder against the corporation. Upon payment by the
corporation to the stockholder of the agreed or awarded price of his shares, the
stockholder shall forthwith transfer and assign the share or shares held by him as
directed by the corporation.

Unless and until such sale, lease, or exchange shall be abandoned, the
stockholder making such demand in writing ceases to be a stockholder and shall
have no rights with respect to such shares except the right to receive payment
therefor as aforesaid.

A stockholder shall not be entitled to payment for his shares under the provisions
of this section unless the value of the corporate assets which would remain after
such payment would be at least equal to the aggregate amount of its debts and
liabilities exclusive of capital stock.

Nothing in this section is intended to restrict the power of any corporation, without
the authorization thereof by the shareholders, to sell, lease, exchange, or
otherwise dispose of, any of its property if thereby the corporate business be not
substantially limited, or if the proceeds of such property be appropriated to the
conduct or development of its remaining business.

These are now Sections 122 and 40, respectively, with modifications, of the Corporation Code.

As the first contention is based on the negative averment that no stockholders' meeting was
held and the 2/3 consent vote was not obtained, there is no need for affirmative proof. Even so,
there is the presumption of regularity which must operate in favor of the private respondents,
who insist that the proper authorization as required by the Corporation Law was duly obtained at
a meeting called for the purpose. (That authorization was embodied in a unanimous resolution
dated March 19, 1977, which was reproduced verbatim in the deed of assignment.) 11Otherwise,
the new PBM would not have been issued a certificate of incorporation, which should also be
presumed to have been done regularly. It must also be noted that under Section 28-1/2, "any
stockholder who did not vote to authorize the action of the board of directors may, within forty
days after the date upon which such action was authorized, object thereto in writing and
demand payment for his shares." The record does not show, nor have the petitioners alleged or
proven, that they filed a written objection and demanded payment of their shares during the
reglementary forty-day period. This circumstance should bolster the private respondents' claim
that the authorization was unanimous.

While we agree that the board of directors is not normally permitted to undertake any activity
outside of the usual liquidation of the business of the dissolved corporation, there is nothing to
prevent the stockholders from conveying their respective shareholdings toward the creation of a
new corporation to continue the business of the old. Winding up is the sole activity of a
dissolved corporation that does not intend to incorporate anew. If it does, however, it is not
unlawful for the old board of directors to negotiate and transfer the assets of the dissolved
corporation to the new corporation intended to be created as long as the stockholders have

116
given their consent. This was not prohibited by the Corporation Act. In fact, it was expressly
allowed by Section 28-1/2.

What the Court finds especially intriguing in this case is the fact that although the deed of
assignment was executed in 1977, it was only in 1981 that it occurred to the petitioners to
question its validity. All of four years had elapsed before the petitioners filed their action for
liquidation of both the old and the new corporations, and during this period, the new PBM was in
full operation, openly and quite visibly conducting the same business undertaken earlier by the
old dissolved PBM. The petitioners and the private respondents are not strangers but relatives
and close business associates. 12 The PBM office is in the heart of Metro Manila. 13 The new
corporation, like the old, employs as many as 2,000 persons, the same personnel who worked
for the old PBM. 14 Additionally, one of the petitioners, Chung Siong Pek was one of the
directors who executed the deed of assignment in favor of the old PBM and it was he also who
received the deeded assets on behalf and as treasurer of the new PBM. 15 Surely, these
circumstances must operate to bar the petitioners now from questioning the deed of assignment
after this long period of inaction in the protection of the rights they are now belatedly asserting.
Laches has operated against them.

We have said in a number of cases that laches, in a general sense, means the failure or
neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier. 16 It is negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either
has abandoned or declined to assert it. 17 Public policy requires, for the peace of society, the
discouragement of claims grown stale for non-assertion. 18 Unlike the statute of limitations,
laches does not involve mere lapse or passage of time but is principally an impediment to the
assertion or enforcement of a right which has become under the circumstances inequitable or
unfair to permit. 19

The essential elements of laches are: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under
whom he claims, giving rise to the sitution complained of; (2) delay in asserting complainant's
right after he had knowledge of the defendant's conduct and after he has an opportunity to sue;
(3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert
the right on which he bases his suit; (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is
accorded to the complainant.20

All the requisites are present in the case at bar. To begin with, what gave rise to the situation
now complained of by the petitioners was the adoption of the deed of assignment by the
directors of the old PBM allegedly without the consent of its stockholders and the acceptance of
the deeded assets by the new PBM. Secondly, there was delay on the petitioners' part since it
took them nearly four years, i.e., from May 14, 1977 to May 5,1981, before they made their
move to assail the transfer despite complete knowledge of the transaction. It is also evident that
the new PBM could not have had the slightest suspicion that the petitioners would assert the
right on which they now base their suit, especially Chung Siong Pek, who in fact acted not only
as director of the old PBM but also as treasurer of the new PBM in the transaction. Finally, the
injury or prejudice in the event relief is granted is obvious as all the transactions of the new PBM
will have to be undone, including credits extended and commitments made to third parties in
good faith.

The second contention must also fall with the first, and for the same reasons.

The third contention is likewise rejected for, as already shown, it is undeniable that the new
PBM has in fact been operating all these years. The petitioners' argument that Alfredo Ching
was merely continuing the business of the old PBM is self-defeating for they themselves argue
that the old PBM had already been dissolved. As for the contention that the election of
Wellington Chung and J.R. Blanco as directors was subject to the outcome of the petition for
liquidation, this is clearly self-serving and completely without proof. Moreover, failure to file the
by-laws does not automatically operate to dissolve a corporation but is now considered only a
ground for such dissolution.

Section 19 of the Corporation Law, part of which is now Section 22 of the Corporation Code,
provided that the powers of the corporation would cease if it did not formally organize and

117
commence the transaction of its business or the continuation of its works within two years from
date of its incorporation. Section 20, which has been reproduced with some modifications in
Section 46 of the Corporation Code, expressly declared that "every corporation formed under
this Act, must within one month after the filing of the articles of incorporation with the Securities
and Exchange Commission, adopt a code of by-laws." Whether this provision should be given
mandatory or only directory effect remained a controversial question until it became academic
with the adoption of PD 902-A. Under this decree, it is now clear that the failure to file by-laws
within the required period is only a ground for suspension or revocation of the certificate of
registration of corporations.

Non-filing of the by-laws will not result in automatic dissolution of the corporation. Under Section
6(i) of PD 902-A, the SEC is empowered to "suspend or revoked, after proper notice and
hearing, the franchise or certificate of registration of a corporation" on the ground inter alia of
"failure to file by-laws within the required period." It is clear from this provision that there must
first of all be a hearing to determine the existence of the ground, and secondly, assuming such
finding, the penalty is not necessarily revocation but may be only suspension of the charter. In
fact, under the rules and regulations of the SEC, failure to file the by-laws on time may be
penalized merely with the imposition of an administrative fine without affecting the corporate
existence of the erring firm. 21

It should be stressed in this connection that substantial compliance with conditions subsequent
will suffice to perfect corporate personality. Organization and commencement of transaction of
corporate business are but conditions subsequent and not prerequisites for acquisition of
corporate personality. The adoption and filing of by-laws is also a condition subsequent. Under
Section 19 of the Corporation Code, a corporation commences its corporate existence and
juridical personality and is deemed incorporated from the date the Securities and Exchange
Commission issues certificate of incorporation under its official seal. This may be done even
before the filing of the by-laws, which under Section 46 of the Corporation Code, must be
adopted "within one month after receipt of official notice of the issuance of its certificate of
incorporation."

Distinguishing creation from defects in organization, Fletcher has the following to say:

Ordinarily, want of, or defects in, the organization of a corporation, as

distinguished from its creation, do not preclude the existence of a de
facto corporation; and requirements in special charters or general incorporation
laws relating to organization are often construed to be merely directory, or to
conditions subsequent rather than conditions precedent, so that compliance
therewith is not necessary to create even a dejure corporation. It has been held
that there may be a de facto corporation notwithstanding a failure to give the
notice required by the statute of the meeting for the of or organization; or though
there would failure to fix and limit the amount of the capital stock of the company
at the first meeting; or a failure to issue stock; or that there were informalities in
the proceedings of such meeting, or that no certificate of organization was
executed or filed. And the same has been held to be true though no board of
directors has been elected, and though there were irregularities with respect to
the number, term, place of residence and of meeting of the board of directors, or
some of the persons chosen as directors are not qualified, even though the
taking of these various steps is necessary to the proper use of the franchise. ....

In any case, the deficiency claimed by the petitioners was corrected when the new PBM
adopted and filed its by-laws on September 6, 1981,22 thus rendering the third issue also moot
and academic.

It is needless as well to dwell on the fourth contention, in view of the findings that the new PBM
has not been ipso facto dissolved.

On the fifth and final issue, the respondent court justifies assumption by the SEC of jurisdiction
over the petition for suspension of payment filed by the individual on the general principle
against multiplicity of suits.

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Under Section 5(d), PD 902-A, as amended by PD 1758, however, it is clearly provided that
such jurisdiction may be exercised only in:

d) Petitions of corporations, partnerships or associations to be declared in the

state of suspension of payments in cases where the corporation, partnership or
association possess sufficient property to cover all its debts but foresees the
impossibility of meeting them when they respectively fall due or in cases where
the corporation, partnership or association has no sufficient assets to cover its
liabilities but is under the management of a Rehabilitation Receiver or
Management Committee created pursuant to this Decree.

This section clearly does not allow a mere individual to file the petition which is limited to
"corporations, partnerships or associations." Administrative agencies like the SEC are tribunals
of limited jurisdiction and, as such, can exercise only those powers which are specifically
granted to them by their enabling statutes. 23 Consequently, where no authority is granted to
hear petitions of individuals for suspension of payments, such petitions are beyond the
competence of the SEC. The analogy offered by the respondent court is clearly inappropriate for
while it is true that the Sandiganbayan may assume jurisdiction over private individuals, it is
because its charter expressly allows this in specified cases. No similar permission is found in
PD 902-A.

The circumstance that Ching is a co-signer in the corporation's promissory notes, collateral or
guarantee or security agreements, does not make him a proper party. Jurisdiction over the
subject matter must exist as a matter of law and cannot be fixed by agreement of the parties,
acquired through, or waived, enlarged or diminished by, any act or omission; neither can it be
conferred by acquiescence of the tribunal. Hence, Alfredo Ching, as a mere individual, cannot
be allowed as a co-petitioner in SEC Case No. 2250.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED as above modified, with costs against the
petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

119
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 96938 October 15, 1991

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), petitioner,

vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, HEIRS OF ELIZAR NAMUCO, and HEIRS OF EUSEBIO
MANUEL, respondents.

Benigno M. Puno for private respondents.

Fetalino, Llamas-Villanueva and Noro for CSC.

NARVASA, J.:

In May, 1981, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) dismissed six (6) employees
as being "notoriously undersirable," they having allegedly been found to be connected with
irregularities in the canvass of supplies and materials. The dismissal was based on Article IX,
Presidential Decree No. 807 (Civil Service Law) 1 in relation to LOI 14-A and/or LOI No. 72. The
employees' Motion for Reconsideration was subsequently denied.

Five of these six dismissed employees appealed to the Merit Systems Board. The Board found
the dismissals to be illegal because effected without formal charges having been filed or an
opportunity given to the employees to answer, and ordered the remand of the cases to the GSIS
for appropriate disciplinary proceedings.

The GSIS appealed tothe Civil Service Commission. By Resolution dated October 21, 1987, the
Commission ruled that the dismissal of all five was indeed illegal and disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, it being obvious that respondents' separation from the service is illegal,
the GSIS is directed to reinstate them with payment of back salaries and benefits due
them not later than ten (10) days from receipt of a copy hereof, without prejudice to the
right of the GSIS to pursue proper disciplinary action against them. It is also directed that
the services of their replacement be terminated effective upon reinstatement of herein
respondents.

xxx xxx xxx

Still unconvinced, the GSIS appealed to the Supreme Court (G.R. Nos. 80321-22). Once more,
it was rebuffed. On July 4, 1988 this Court's Second Division promulgated a Resolution which:

a) denied its petition for failing to show any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Civl Service Commission, the dismissals of the employees having in truth been made
without formal charge and hearin, and

b) declared that reinstatement of said five employees was proper, "without prejudice to
the right of the GSIS to pursue proper disciplinary action against them;"

c) MODIFIED, however, the challenged CSC Resolution of October 21, 1987 "by
elminating the payment of back salaries to private respondents (employees) until the
outcome of the disciplinary proceedings is known, considering the gravity of the offenses
imputed to them ..., 2

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 d) ordered reinstateement only of three employees, namely: Domingo Canero, Renato Navarro and Belen Guerrero, "it appearing tht
respondents Elizar Namuco and Eusebio Manuel have since passed away." 3

On January 8, 1990, the aforesaid Resolution of July 4, 1988 having become final, the heirs of Namuco and Manuel filed a motion for execution of the
Civil Service Commission Resolution of October 21, 1987, supra. The GSIS opposed the motion. It argued that the CSC Resolution of October 21,
1987 — directing reinstatement of the employees and payment to them of back salaries and benefits — had been superseded by the Second Division's
Resolution of July 4, 1988 — precisely eliminating the payment of back salaries.

The Civil Service Commission granted the motion for execution in an Order dated June 20, 1990. It accordingly directed the GSIS "to pay the
compulsory heirs of deceased Elizar Namuco and Eusebio Manuel for the period from the date of their illegal separation up to the date of their
demise." The GSIS filed a motion for reconsideration. It was denied by Order of the CSC dated November 22, 1990.

Once again the GSIS has come to this Court, this time praying that certiorari issue to nullify the Orders of June 20, 1990 and November 22, 1990. Here
it contends that the Civil Service Commission has no pwer to execute its judgments and final orders or resolutions, and even conceding the contrary,
the writ of execution issued on June 20, 1990 is void because it varies this Court's Resolution of July 4, 1988.

The Civil Service Commission, like the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit, is a consitutional commission invested by the
Constitution and relevant laws not only with authority to administer the civil service, 4
but also with quasi-judicial powers. 5 It
has the authority to hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it or
brought to it on appeal. 6 The Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any
case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision it
within sixty days from the date of its submission for on certiorari by any aggrieved party within
thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. 7 It has the power, too, sitting en banc, to promulgate
its own rules concerning pleadings and practice before it or before any of its offices, which rules
should not however diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. 8

On October 9, 1989, the Civil Service Commission promulgated Resolution No. 89-779 adopting, approving and putting into effect simplified rules of
procedure on administrative disciplinary and protest cases, pursuant tothe authority granted by the constitutional and statutory provisions above cited,
as well as Republic Act No. 6713. 9
Those rules provide, among other things, 10 that decision in
"administrative disciplinary cases" shall be immediately executory unless a motion for
reconsideration is seasonably filed. If the decision of the Commission is brought to the Supreme
Court on certiorari, the same shall still be executory unless a restraining order or preliminary
injunction is issued by the High Court." 11 This is similar to a provision in the former Civil Service
Rules authorizing the Commissioner, "if public interest so warrants, ... (to) order his decision
executed pending appeal to the Civil Service Board of Appeals." 12 The provisions are
analogous and entirely consistent with the duty or responsibility reposed in the Chairman by PD
807, subject to policies and resolutions adopted by the Commission, "to enforce decision on
administrative discipline involving officials of the Commission," 13 as well as with Section 37 of
the same decree declaring that an appeal to the Commission 14 "shall not stop the decision from
being executory, and in case the penalty is suspension or removal, the respondent shall be
considered as having been under preventive suspension during the pendency of the appeal in
the event he wins an appeal."

In light of all the foregoing consitutional and statutory provisions, it would appear absurd to deny
to the Civil Service Commission the power or authority or order execution of its decisions,
resolutions or orders which, it should be stressed, it has been exercising through the years. It
would seem quite obvious that the authority to decide cases is inutile unless accompanied by
the authority to see taht what has been decided is carried out. Hence, the grant to a tribunal or
agency of adjudicatory power, or the authority to hear and adjudge cases, should normally and
logically be deemed to include the grant of authority to enforce or execute the judgments it thus
renders, unless the law otherwise provides.

In any event, the Commission's exercise of that power of execution has been sanctioned by this
Court in several cases.

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In Cucharo v. Subido, 15 for instance, this Court sustained the challenged directive of the Civil
Service Commissioner, that his decision "be executed immediately 'but not beyond ten days
from receipt thereof ...". The Court said:

As a major premise, it has been the repeated pronouncement of this Supreme Tribunal
that the Civil Service Commissioner has the discretion toorder the immediate execution
in the public interst of his decisionseparating petitioner-appellant from the service,
always sbuject however to the rule that, in the event the Civil Service Board of Appeals
or the proper court determines that his dismissal is illegal, he should be paid the salary
corresponding to the period of his separation from the service unitl his reinstatement.

Petitioner GSIS concedes that the heirs of Namuco and Manuel "are entitled tothe
retirement/death and other benefits due them as government employees" since, at the time of
their death, they "can be considered not to have been separated from the separated from the
service." 16

It contend, however, that since Namuco and Manuel had not been "completely exonerated of the administrative charge filed against them — as the
filing of the proper disciplinary action was yet to have been taken had death not claimed them" — no back salaries may be paid to them, although they
"may charge the period of (their) suspension against (their) leave credits, if any, and may commute such leave credits to money
value;" 17
this, on the authority of this Court's decision in Clemente v. Commission on Audit. 18 It is
in line with these considerations, it argues, that the final and executory Resolution of this Court's
Second Division of July 4, 1988 should be construed; 19 and since the Commission's Order of
July 20, 1990 maikes a contrary disposition, the latter order obviously cannot prevail and must
be deemed void and ineffectual.

This Court's Resolution of July 4, 1988, as already stated, modified the Civil Service
Commission's Resolution of October 21, 1987 — inter alia granting back salaries tothe five
dismissed employees, including Namuco and Manuel — and pertinently reads as follows:

We modify the said Order, however, by eliminating the payment of back salaries to
private respondents until the outcome of the disciplinary proceedings is known,
considering the gravity of the offense imputed to them in connection with the
irregularities in the canvass of supplies and materials at the GSIS.

The reinstatement order shall apply only to respondents Domingo Canero, Renato
Navarro and Belen Guerrero, it appearing that respondents Elizar Namuco and Eusebio
Manuel have since passed away. ....

On the other hand, as also already stated, the Commission's Order of June 20, 1990 directed
the GSIS "to pay the compulsory heirs of deceased Elizar Namuco and Eusebio Manuel for the
period from the date of their illegal separation up to the date of their demise."

The Commission asserted that in promulgating its disparate ruling, it was acting "in the interest
of justice and for other humanitarian reasons," since the question of whether or not Namuco and
Manuel should receive back salaries was "dependent on the result of the disciplinary
proceedings against their co-respondents in the administrative case before the GSIS," and
since at the tiem of their death, "no formal charge ... (had) as yet been made, nor any finding of
their personal culpability ... and ... they are no longer in a position to refute the charge."

The Court agrees that the challenged orders of the Civil Service Commission should be upheld,
and not merely upon compassionate grounds, but simply because there is no fair and feasible
alternative in the circumstances. To be sure, if the deceased employees were still alive, it would
at least be arguable, positing the primacy of this Court's final dispositions, that the issue of
payment of their back salaries should properly await the outcome of the disciplinary proceedings
referred to in the Second Division's Resolution of July 4, 1988.

Death, however, has already sealed that outcome, foreclosing the initiation of disciplinary
administrative proceedings, or the continuation of any then pending, against the deceased
employees. Whatever may be said of the binding force of the Resolution of July 4, 1988 so far
as, to all intents and pursposes, it makes exoneration in the adminstrative proceedings a
condition precedent to payment of back salaries, it cannot exact an impossible performance or

122
decree a useless exercise. Even in the case of crimes, the death of the offender exteinguishes
criminal liability, not only as to the personal, but also as to the pecuniary, penalties if it occurs
before final judgment.20 In this context, the subsequent disciplinary proceedings, even if not
assailable on grounds of due process, would be an inutile, empty procedure in so far as the
deceased employees are concerned; they could not possibly be bound by any substatiation in
said proceedings of the original charges: irrigularities in the canvass of supplies and materials.
The questioned order of the Civil Service Commission merely recognized the impossibility of
complying with the Resolution of July 4, 1988 and the legal futility of attempting a post-
mortem investigation of the character contemplated.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

123