CASE DIGESTS

CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 2
ROJO, JAIN MAE A.
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chavez v. Romulo -------------
Marcos v. Sandiganbayan -------------
Eastern Broadcasting v. Dans -------------
Ceniza v. COMELEC -------------
Mirasol v. DPWH -------------
Garcia v. Drilon -------------
Olivares v. Sandiganbayan -------------
Disini v. Sec. of Justice -------------
Manlavi v. Gacott -------------
People v. Cachola -------------
Salazar v. Achacoso -------------
Columbia Pictures v. Flores -------------
Nolasco v. Pano -------------
Tambasen v. People -------------
Pangandaman v. Casar -------------
People v. Rubio -------------
People v. Salanguit -------------
Umil v. Ramos -------------
People v. Bohol -------------
People v. Gatward -------------
Caballes v. CA -------------
Ramirez v. CA -------------
Zulueta v. CA -------------
Waterous Drug Corp v. NLRC -------------
Sanidad v. COMELEC -------------
Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC --------
Adiong v. COMELEC -------------
ABS-CBN v. COMELEC -------------
Bangalisan v. CA -------------
GSIS v. Kapisanan -------------
Aglipay v. Ruiz -------------
Garces v. Estenzo -------------
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
Austria v. NLRC -------------
Ebralinag v. Division
Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union ------
German v. Barangan -------------
Soriano v. Laguardia -------------
Imbong v. Ochoa -------------
Villavicencio v. Lukban -------------
Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro -------------
Philippine Association of Service Exporter v. Drilon ----
Chavez v. PEA – AMARI -------------
Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice -------------
Bantay v. COMELEC -------------
Bangalisan v. CA -------------
Occena v. COMELEC -------------
Phil. Rural Electric Corp. v. Secretary DILG -----
Ganzon v. Inserto -------------
Kabiling v. NHA -------------
Blaquena v. Alcala -------------
 FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner
vs.
HON. ALBERTO G. ROMULO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY; DIRECTOR GENERAL HERMOGENES E. EBDANE, JR.,
IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE CHIEF OF THE PNP, et al., respondents
G.R. No. 157036. June 9, 2004

Facts:
Petition for prohibition and injunction seeking to enjoin the
implementation of the “Guidelines in the Implementation of the Ban on
the Carrying of Firearms Outside of Residence” (Guidelines) issued by
respondent Hermogenes E. Ebdane, Jr., Chief of the Philippine
National Police (PNP).

Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, a licensed gun owner to whom a

PTCFOR has been issued, requested the DILG to reconsider the
implementation of the assailed Guidelines. However, his request was
denied. Thus, he filed the present petition impleading public
respondents Ebdane, as Chief of PNP; Alberto G. Romulo, as
Executive Secretary; and Gerry L. Barias, as Chief of the PNP-Firearms
and Explosives Division.

Issues:
1. whether respondent Ebdane is authorized to issue the assailed
Guidelines;
2. whether the issuance of the assailed Guidelines is a valid
exercise of police power?;
Ruling:
1. Authority of the PNP Chief
It is true that under our constitutional system, the powers of
government are distributed among three coordinate and
substantially independent departments: the legislative, the
executive and the judiciary. Each has exclusive cognizance of the
matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own
sphere.

The power to make laws – the legislative power – is vested in

Congress. Any attempt to abdicate the power is unconstitutional
and void, on the principle that “delegata potestas non potest
delegari” – “delegated power may not be delegated.”

The rule which forbids the delegation of legislative power,

however, is not absolute and inflexible. It admits of exceptions.
An exception sanctioned by immemorial practice permits the
legislative body to delegate its licensing power to certain persons,
municipal corporations, towns, boards, councils, commissions,
commissioners, auditors, bureaus and directors. Such licensing
power includes the power to promulgate necessary rules and
regulations.

Act No. 1780 delegated upon the Governor-General (now the

President) the authority (1) to approve or disapprove applications
of any person for a license to deal in firearms or to possess the
same for personal protection, hunting and other lawful purposes;
and (2) to revoke such license any time. Further, it authorized him
to issue regulations which he may deem necessary for the proper
enforcement of the Act.
By virtue of Republic Act No. 6975, the PNP absorbed the
Philippine Constabulary (PC). Consequently, the PNP Chief
succeeded the Chief of the Constabulary and, therefore, assumed
the latter’s licensing authority. Section 24 thereof specifies, as
one of PNP’s powers, the issuance of licenses for the possession
of firearms and explosives in accordance with law. This is in
conjunction with the PNP Chief’s “power to issue detailed
implementing policies and instructions” on such “matters as may
be necessary to effectively carry out the functions, powers and
duties” of the PNP.

2. Police Power

At any rate, assuming that petitioner’s PTCFOR constitutes a

property right protected by the Constitution, the same cannot be
considered as absolute as to be placed beyond the reach of the
State’s police power. All property in the state is held subject to its
general regulations, necessary to the common good and general
welfare.

The Court laid down the test to determine the validity of a police
measure, thus:
(1) The interests of the public generally, as distinguished from
those of a particular class, require the exercise of the police
power; and
(2) The means employed are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals.
It is apparent from the assailed Guidelines that the basis for its
issuance was the need for peace and order in the society. Owing
to the proliferation of crimes, particularly those committed by the
New People’s Army (NPA), which tends to disturb the peace of the
community, President Arroyo deemed it best to impose a
nationwide gun ban. Undeniably, the motivating factor in the
issuance of the assailed Guidelines is the interest of the public in
general.

The only question that can then arise is whether the means
employed are appropriate and reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and are not unduly oppressive. In
the instant case, the assailed Guidelines do not entirely prohibit
possession of firearms. What they proscribe is merely the
carrying of firearms outside of residence. However, those who
wish to carry their firearms outside of their residences may re-
apply for a new PTCFOR. This is a reasonable regulation. If the
carrying of firearms is regulated, necessarily, crime incidents will
be curtailed. Criminals carry their weapon to hunt for their
victims; they do not wait in the comfort of their homes. With the
revocation of all PTCFOR, it would be difficult for criminals to
roam around with their guns. On the other hand, it would be
easier for the PNP to apprehend them.

The petition is hereby DISMISSED.

 MARCOS V. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. NO. 126995
(Sec. 1, Art. 3, Due Process)

Imelda was charged together with Jose Dans for Graft & Corruption for
a dubious transaction done in 1984 while they were officers
transacting business with the Light Railway Transit. The case was
raffled to the 1st Division of the Sandiganbayan. The division was
headed by Justice Garchitorena with J Balajadia and J Atienza as
associate justices. No decision was reached by the division by reason
of Atienza’s dissent in favor of Imelda’s innocence. Garchitorena then
summoned a special division of the SB to include JJ Amores and
Cipriano as additional members. Amores then asked Garchitorena to
be given 15 days to send in his manifestation. On the date of Amores’
request, Garchitorena received manifestation from J Balajadia stating
that he agrees with J Rosario who further agrees with J Atienza.
Garchitorena then issued a special order to immediately dissolve the
special division and have the issue be raised to the SB en banc for it
would already be pointless to wait for Amores’ manifestation granted
that a majority has already decided on Imelda’s favor. The SB en banc
ruled against Imelda.

ISSUE: Whether or not due process has been observed.

HELD: The SC ruled that the ruling of the SB is bereft of merit as there
was no strong showing of Imelda’s guilt. The SC further emphasized
that Imelda was deprived of due process by reason of Garchitorena
not waiting for Amores’ manifestation. Such procedural flaws
committed by respondent Sandiganbayan are fatal to the validity of its
“•decision”• convicting petitioner. Garchitorena had already created
the Special Division of five (5) justices in view of the lack of unanimity
of the three (3) justices in the First Division. At that stage, petitioner
had a vested right to be heard by the five (5) justices, especially the
new justices in the persons of Justices Amores and del Rosario who
may have a different view of the cases against her. At that point,
Presiding Justice Garchitorena and Justice Balajadia may change their
mind and agree with the original opinion of Justice Atienza but the
turnaround cannot deprive petitioner of her vested right to the opinion
of Justices Amores and del Rosario. It may be true that Justice del
Rosario had already expressed his opinion during an informal,
unscheduled meeting in the unnamed restaurant but as aforestated,
that opinion is not the opinion contemplated by law. But what is more,
petitioner was denied the opinion of Justice Amores for before it could
be given, Presiding Justice Garchitorena dissolved the Special
Division.
 EASTERN BROADCASTING CORP (DYRE) V. DANS JR.
[137 SCRA 628; L-59329]
Facts: A petition was filed to reopen the Radio Station DYRE. DYRE
was “summarily closed” on grounds of national security. The radio
station was allegedly used to incite people to sedition. Petitioner,
DYRE contends that they were denied due process. There was no
hearing to establish factual evidence for the closure. Furthermore, the
closure of the radio station violates freedom of expression. Before the
court could even promulgate a decision upon the Issue raised,
Petitioner, through its president Mr. Rene Espina, filed a motion to
withdraw the petition. The rights of the station were sold to a new
owner, Manuel Pastrana; who is no longer interested in pursuing the
case. Despite the case becoming moot and academic, (because there
are no longer interested parties, thus the dismissal of the case) the
Supreme Court still finds that there is need to pass a “RESOLUTION”
for the guidance of inferior courts and administrative tribunals in
matters as this case.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not due process was exercised in the case of DYRE.
(2) Whether or not the closure of DYRE is a violation of the
Constitutional Right of Freedom of Expression.

Held: The court finds that the closure of the Radio Station in 1980 as
null and void. The absence of a hearing is a violation of Constitutional
Rights. The primary requirements in administrative proceedings are
laid down in the case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relation (69
Phil.635). The Ang Tibay Doctrine should be followed before any
broadcast station may be closed. The Ang Tibay Doctrine provides the
following requirements:
(1) The right to hearing, includes the right to present one’s case and
submit evidence presented.
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented
(3) The decision must have something to support itself.
(4) Evidence must be substantial (reasonable evidence that is
adequate to support conclusion)
(5) Decision must be based on the evidence presented at hearing
(6) The tribunal body must act on its own independent consideration
of law and facts and not simply accept subordinate’s views
(7) Court must render decision in such a manner that the proceeding
can know the various issued involved and reasons for decisions
rendered.

The court stresses that while there is no controlling and precise

definition of Due Process, it gives an unavoidable standard that
government actions must conform in order that deprivation of life,
liberty and property is valid.

The closure of the radio station is likewise a violation of the

constitutional right of freedom of speech and expression. The court
stresses that all forms of media, whether print or broadcast are
entitled to this constitutional right. Although the government still has
the right to be protected against broadcasts which incite the listeners
to violently overthrow it. The test for the limitation of freedom of
expression is the “clear and present danger” rule. If in the
circumstances that the media is used in such nature as to create this
danger that will bring in such evils, then the law has the right to
prevent it. However, Radio and television may not be used to organize
a rebellion or signal a start of widespread uprising. The freedom to
comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative
democracy. The people continues to have the right to be informed on
public affairs and broadcast media continues to have the pervasive
influence to the people being the most accessible form of media.
Therefore, broadcast stations deserve the the special protection given
to all forms of media by the due process and freedom of expression
clauses of the Constitution.
 CENIZA V. COMELEC
G.R. No. L-52304 – 95 SCRA 775
(Sec. 1, Art. 3, Equal Protection• **Gerrymandering)

**Gerrymandering is a “term employed to describe an

apportionment of representative districts so contrived as to give
an unfair advantage to the party in power.”**

Pursuant to Batas Blg 51 (enacted 22 Dec 1979), COMELEC

adopted Resolution No. 1421 which effectively bars voters in
chartered cities (unless otherwise provided by their charter),
highly urbanized (those earning above P40 M) cities, and
component cities (whose charters prohibit them) from voting in
provincial elections. The City of Mandaue, on the other hand, is a
component city NOT a chartered one or a highly urbanized one. So
when COMELEC added Mandaue to the list of 20 cities that cannot
vote in provincial elections, Ceniza, in behalf of the other
members of DOERS (Democracy or Extinction: Resolved to
Succeed) questioned the constitutionality of BB 51 and the
COMELEC resolution. They said that the regulation/restriction of
voting being imposed is a curtailment of the right to suffrage.
Further, petitioners claim that political and gerrymandering
motives were behind the passage of Batas Blg. 51 and Section 96
of the Charter of Mandaue City. They contend that the Province of
Cebu is politically and historically known as an opposition
bailiwick and of the total 952,716 registered voters in the province,
close to one-third (1/3) of the entire province of Cebu would be
barred from voting for the provincial officials of the province of
Cebu. Ceniza also said that the constituents of Mandaue never
ratified their charter. Ceniza likewise aver that Sec 3 of BB 885
insofar as it classifies cities including Cebu City as highly
urbanized as the only basis for not allowing its electorate to vote
for the provincial officials is inherently and palpably
unconstitutional in that such classification is not based on
substantial distinctions germane to the purpose of the law which
in effect provides for and regulates the exercise of the right of
suffrage, and therefore such unreasonable classification amounts
to a denial of equal protection.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of equal protection.

HELD: The thrust of the 1973 Constitution is towards the
fullest autonomy of local government units. In the Declaration
of Principles and State Policies, it is stated that “The State
shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local
government units to ensure their fullest development as self-
reliant communities.” The petitioners allegation of
gerrymandering is of no merit, it has no factual or legal basis.
The Constitutional requirement that the creation, division,
merger, abolition, or alteration of the boundary of a province,
city, municipality, or barrio should be subject to the approval
by the majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
governmental unit or units affected is a new requirement that
came into being only with the 1973 Constitution. It is
prospective in character and therefore cannot affect the
creation of the City of Mandaue which came into existence on
21 June 1969.

The classification of cities into highly urbanized cities and

component cities on the basis of their regular annual income
is based upon substantial distinction. The revenue of a city
would show whether or not it is capable of existence and
development as a relatively independent social, economic, and
political unit. It would also show whether the city has sufficient
economic or industrial activity as to warrant its independence
from the province where it is geographically situated. Cities
with smaller income need the continued support of the
provincial government thus justifying the continued
participation of the voters in the election of provincial officials
in some instances.

The petitioners also contend that the voters in Mandaue City

are denied equal protection of the law since the voters in other
component cities are allowed to vote for provincial officials.
The contention is without merit. The practice of allowing
voters in one component city to vote for provincial officials
and denying the same privilege to voters in another
component city is a matter of legislative discretion which
violates neither the Constitution nor the voter’s right of
suffrage.
 MIRASOL V. DPWH
G.R. No. 15879

Petitioners filed before the court a petition for declaratory judgment

with application for temporary restraining order and injunction. It
seeks the declaration of nullification of administrative issuances for
being inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Act 2000 (Limited
Access Highway Act) which was enacted in 1957.

Previously, pursuant to its mandate under RA 2000, DPWH issued

on June 25, 1998 Dept. Order no. 215 declaring the Manila Cavite
(Coastal Road) Toll Expressway as limited access facilities.

Petitioners filed an Amended Petition on February 8, 2001 wherein

petitioners sought the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid
administrative issuances.

The petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining

order to prevent the enforcement of the total ban on motorcycles
along NLEX, SLEX, Manila-Cavite (Coastal Road) toll Expressway
under DO 215.

RTC, after due hearing, granted the petitioner’s application for

preliminary injunction conditioned upon petitioner’s filing of cash
bond in the amount of P100, 000 which petitioners complied.

DPWH issued an order (DO 123) allowing motorcycles with engine

displacement of 400 cubic centimeters inside limited access
facilities (toll ways).

Upon assumption of Hon. Presiding Judge Cornejo, both the

petitioners and respondents were required to file their Memoranda.

The court issued an order dismissing the petition but declaring

invalid DO 123.

The petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied.

RTC ruled that DO 74 is valid but DO 123 is invalid being violative
of the equal protection clause of the Constitution
ISSUE:

Whether AO 1 is unconstitutional.

HELD:

NO. The Court emphasized that the secretary of the then

Department of Public Works and Communications had
issued AO 1 in February 1968, as authorized under
Section 3 of Republic Act 2000, prior to the splitting of the
department and the eventual devolution of its powers to
the DOTC.

Because administrative issuances had the force and

effect of law, AO 1 enjoyed the presumption of validity
and constitutionality. The burden to prove its
unconstitutionality rested on the party assailing it, more so
when police power was at issue and passed the test of
reasonableness. The Administrative Order was not
oppressive, as it did not impose unreasonable restrictions
or deprive petitioners of their right to use the facilities. It
merely set rules to ensure public safety and the
uninhibited flow of traffic within those limited-access
facilities.

The right to travel did not mean the right to choose any
vehicle in traversing a tollway. Petitioners were free to
access the tollway as much as the rest of the public.
However, the mode in which they wished to travel,
pertaining to their manner of using the tollway, was a
subject that could validly be limited by regulation. There
was no absolute right to drive; on the contrary, this
privilege was heavily regulated.

GARCIA v. DRILON
G.R. No. 179267
June 25, 2013
699 SCRA 352

FACTS: Petitioner Jesus Garcia (husband) admitted

having an affair with a bank manager. His infidelity
emotionally wounded private respondent which
spawned several quarrels that left respondent
wounded. Petitioner also unconscionably beat up
their daughter, Jo-ann.

The private respondent was determined to separate

from petitioner. But she was afraid he would take
away their children and deprive her of financial
support. He warned her that if she pursued legal
battle, she would not get a single centavo from him.
After she confronted him of his affair, he forbade her
to hold office. This deprived her of access to full
information about their businesses. Hence, no source
of income.

Thus, the RTC found reasonable ground to believe

there was imminent danger of violence against
respondent and her children and issued a series of
Temporary Protection Orders (TPO) pursuant to RA
9262.

Republic Act No. 9262 is a landmark legislation that

defines and criminalizes acts of violence against
women and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by
women's intimate partners.
Petitioner hence, challenged the constitutionality of
RA 9262 on making a gender-based classification.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9262 is

discriminatory, unjust, and violative of the equal
protection clause.

RULING: No. The equal protection clause in our

Constitution does not guarantee an absolute
prohibition against classification. The non-
identical treatment of women and men under RA
9262 is justified to put them on equal footing and
to give substance to the policy and aim of the
state to ensure the equality of women and men in
light of the biological, historical, social, and
culturally endowed differences between men and
women.

RA 9262, by affording special and exclusive

protection to women and children, who are
vulnerable victims of domestic violence,
undoubtedly serves the important governmental
objectives of protecting human rights, insuring
gender equality, and empowering women. The
gender-based classification and the special
remedies prescribed by said law in favor of
women and children are substantially related, in
fact essentially necessary, to achieve such
objectives. Hence, said Act survives the
intermediate review or middle-tier judicial
scrutiny. The gender-based classification therein
is therefore not violative of the equal protection
clause embodied in the 1987 Constitution.
 Olivarez v. Sandiganbayan
[GR 118533]

Facts: On 15 December 1992, Baclaran Credit Cooperative, Inc.

(BCCI), through its board member Roger de Leon, charged
Parañaque Mayor Dr. Pablo R. Olivarez with Violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for unreasonably refusing
to issue a mayor's permit despite request and follow-ups to
implement Parañaque Sangguniang Bayan Resolution 744,
(series of 1992) which Olivarez himself approved on 6 October
1992. Resolution 744 authorized BCCI to set up a night
manufacturer's fair during the Christmas fiesta celebration of
and at Baclaran for 60 days from 11 November 1992 to 15
February 1993 for which they will use a portion of the service
road of Roxas Boulevard. Allegedly, BCCI exerted all possible
efforts to secure the necessary permit but Olivarez simply
refused to issue the same unless BCCI gives money to the
latter. Attached to BCCI’s Reply-Affidavit was a copy of
Executive Order dated 23 November 1992 issued by Olivarez
granting a group of Baclaran-based
organizations/associations of vendors the holding of
"Christmas Agro-Industrial Fair Sa Baclaran" from 28
November 1992 to 28 February 1993 using certain portions of
the National and Local Government Roads/Streets in Baclaran
for fund raising. Graft Investigation Officer (GIO) III Ringpis
conducted a preliminary investigation and issued on 22
September 1993 a resolution recommending the prosecution
of Olivarez for violation of Section 3(f) of Republic Act (RA)
3019, as amended. On 16 February 1994, the information was
filed against Olivares (Criminal Case 20226). On 17 January
1994, Olivarez filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or
Reinvestigation allegedly to rectify error of law and on ground
of newly discovered evidence. The motion was granted on 24
January 1994. On 9 February 1993, Ombudsman disapproved
the recommendation to withdraw the information as Olivarez
does not refute the allegation and that bad faith is evident with
his persistent refusal to issue permit. On 18 February 1994,
Olivarez voluntarily surrendered and posted a cash bail bond
with the Sandiganbayan for his temporary release. On 21
February 1994, Olivarez filed an Omnibus Motion for a re-
examination and reassessment of the prosecution's report and
documentary evidence with a view to set aside the
determination of the existence of probable cause and
ultimately the dismissal of the case; which was denied by the
Sandiganbayan on 3 March 1994 in Open Court. In view of
Olivarez's refusal to enter any plea, the court ordered a plea of
"not guilty" entered into his record. On 8 March 1994, the
prosecution filed a Motion to suspend Accused Pendente Lite.
On March 9, 14 and 15, 1994, Olivarez filed a Motion to Set
Aside Plea and To Reduce Denial Order Into Writing (With
Entry of Appearance), Supplemental Motion to Set Aside Plea
and Opposition to Motion to Suspend Accused and
Supplemental Pleading with Additional Opposition to Motion to
Suspend Accused; which were denied by the Sandiganbayan
on 4 April 1994. The Sandiganbayan, however, set aside the
proceedings conducted on 3 March 1994 including Olivarez's
arraignment thus revoking the plea of "not guilty" entered in
his record in the interest of justice and to avoid further delay
in the prompt adjudication of the case due to technicalities. On
20 April 1994, Olivarez filed a motion for reconsideration which
was granted on 15 May 1994. Consequently, the case was
remanded to the Office of the Ombudsman for another
reinvestigation to be terminated within 30 days from notice.
The reinvestigation was reassigned to SPO III Angel C.
Mayoralgo who on 3 November 1994, recommended the
dismissal of the case. On 9 December 1994, DSP Jose de G.
Ferrer reversed the recommendation, finding Olivarez liable by
giving unwarranted benefit thru manifest partiality to another
group on the flimsy reason that complainant failed to apply for
a business permit. The Ombudsman approved the reversal and
on 27 December 1994 directed the prosecution to proceed
under the existing information. On 13 January 1995, Olivarez
filed a Motion for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum and Ad
Testificandum to DSP Jose de G. Ferrer, SPO III Roger
Berbano, Sr., and SPO III Angel Mayoralgo, Jr. and on 16
January 1995, Olivarez filed a Motion to Strike Out and/or
Review Result of Reinvestigation. The latter motion was
denied by Sandiganbayan. Olivarez filed the petition for
certiorari and prohibition.
Issue: Whether Olivarez exhibited partiality in the
denial of / inaction over BCCI’s application for
license.

Held: Olivarez's suspected partiality may be gleaned from

the fact that he issued a permit in favor of the unidentified
Baclaran-based vendors' associations by the mere
expedient of an executive order, whereas so many
requirements were imposed on BCCI before it could be
granted the same permit. Worse, Olivarez failed to show, in
apparent disregard of BCCI's right to equal protection, that
BCCI and the unidentified Baclaran-based vendors'
associations were not similarly situated as to give at least a
semblance of legality to the apparent haste with which said
executive order was issued. It would seem that if there was
any interest served by such executive order, it was that of
Olivarez. As the mayor of the municipality, the officials
referred to were definitely under his authority and he was
not without recourse to take appropriate action on the
letterapplication of BCCI although the same was not strictly
in accordance with normal procedure. There was nothing to
prevent him from referring said letter-application to the
licensing department, but which paradoxically he refused
to do. Whether Olivarez was impelled by any material
interest or ulterior motive may be beyond the Court for the
moment since this is a matter of evidence, but the
environmental facts and circumstances are sufficient to
create a belief in the mind of a reasonable man that this
would not be completely improbable, absent countervailing
clarification. Lastly, it may not be amiss to add that
Olivarez, as a municipal mayor, is expressly authorized and
has the power to issue permits and licenses for the holding
of activities for any charitable or welfare purpose, pursuant
to Section 444 (b) (3) (iv and v) of the Local Government
Code of 1991 (Republic Act 7160). Hence, he cannot really
feign total lack of authority to act on the letter-application
of BCCI.
 JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, JR., ET AL. v. THE
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL.,
[G.R. No. 203335]
Case Summary and Outcome
The Supreme Court of Philippines declared Sections
4(c)(3), 12, and 19 of the Cybercrime Prevention Act
of 2012 as unconstitutional. It held that Section
4(c)(3) violated the right to freedom of expression by
prohibiting the electronic transmission of unsolicited
commercial communications. It found Section 12 in
violation of the right to privacy because it lacked
sufficient specificity and definiteness in collecting
real-time computer data. It struck down Section 19 of
the Act for giving the government the authority to
restrict or block access to computer data without any
judicial warrant.
FACTS:
The case arises out of consolidated petitions to the
Supreme Court of the Philippines on the constitutionality of
several provisions of the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012,
Act No. 10175.

The Petitioners argued that even though the Act is the

government’s platform in combating illegal cyberspace
activities, 21 separate sections of the Act violate their
constitutional rights, particularly the right to freedom of
expression and access to inforamtion.

In February 2013, the Supreme Court extended the

duration of a temporary restraining order against the
government to halt enforcement of the Act until the
adjudication of the issues.

RULING:
Justice Abad delivered the Court’s opinion.
The government of Philippines adopted the Cybercrime
Prevention Act of 2012 for the purpose of regulating access to and
use of cyberspace. Several sections of the law define relevant
cyber crimes and enable the government to track down and
penalize violators.

Among 21 challenged sections, the Court declared Sections

4(c)(3), 12, and 19 of the Act as unconstitutional.

Section 4(c)(3) prohibits the transmission of unsolicited

commercial electronic communications, commonly known as
spams, that seek to advertise, sell, or offer for sale of products
and services unless the recipient affirmatively consents, or when
the purpose of the communication is for service or administrative
announcements from the sender to its existing users, or “when
the following conditions are present: (aa) The commercial
electronic communication contains a simple, valid, and reliable
way for the recipient to reject receipt of further commercial
electronic messages (opt-out) from the same source; (bb) The
commercial electronic communication does not purposely
disguise the source of the electronic message; and (cc) The
commercial electronic communication does not purposely include
misleading information in any part of the message in order to
induce the recipients to read the message.”

The government argued that unsolicited commercial

communications amount to both nuisance and trespass because
they tend to interfere with the enjoyment of using online services
and that they enter the recipient’s domain without prior
permission.

The Court first noted that spams are a category of commercial

speech, which does not receive the same level of protection as
other constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression ,”but is
nonetheless entitled to protection.” It ruled that the prohibition
on transmitting unsolicited communications “would deny a
person the right to read his emails, even unsolicited commercial
ads addressed to him.” Accordingly, the Court declared
Section4(c)(3) as unconstitutional.

Section 12 of the Act authorizes the law enforcement without a

court warrant “to collect or record traffic data in real-time
associated with specified communications transmitted by means
of a computer system.” Traffic data under this Section includes
the origin, destination, route, size, date, and duration of the
communication, but not its content nor the identity of users.

The Petitioners argued that such warrantless authority curtails

their civil liberties and set the stage for abuse of discretion by the
government. They also claimed that this provision violates the
right to privacy and protection from the government’s intrusion
into online communications.

According to the Court, since Section 12 may lead to disclosure of

private communications, it must survive the rational basis
standard of whether it is narrowly tailored towards serving a
government’s compelling interest. The Court found that the
government did have a compelling interest in preventing cyber
crimes by monitoring real-time traffic data.

As to whether Section 12 violated the right to privacy, the Court

first recognized that the right at stake concerned informational
privacy, defined as “the right not to have private information
disclosed, and the right to live freely without surveillance and
intrusion.” In determining whether a communication is entitled to
the right of privacy, the Court applied a two-part test: (1) Whether
the person claiming the right has a legitimate expectation of
privacy over the communication, and (2) whether his expectation
of privacy can be regarded as objectively reasonable in the
society.

The Court noted that internet users have subjective reasonable

expectation of privacy over their communications transmitted
online. However, it did not find the expectation as objectively
reasonable because traffic data sent through internet “does not
disclose the actual names and addresses (residential or office) of
the sender and the recipient, only their coded Internet Protocol
(IP) addresses.”

Even though the Court ruled that real-time traffic data under
Section 12 does not enjoy the objective reasonable expectation of
privacy, the existence of enough data may reveal the personal
information of its sender or recipient, against which the Section
fails to provide sufficient safeguard. The Court viewed the law as
“virtually limitless, enabling law enforcement authorities to
engage in “fishing expedition,” choosing whatever specified
communication they want.”

Accordingly, the Court struck down Section 12 for lack of

specificity and definiteness as to ensure respect for the right to
privacy.
Section 19 authorizes the Department of Justice to restrict or
block access to a computer data found to be in violation of the
Act. The Petitioners argued that this section also violated the
right to freedom of expression, as well as the constitutional
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.

The Court first recognized that computer data constitutes a

personal property, entitled to protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Also, the Philippines’ Constitution requires the
government to secure a valid judicial warrant when it seeks to seize a
personal property or to block a form of expression. Because Section
19 precluded any judicial intervention, the Court found it
unconstitutional.

GIL V. MANLAVI VS. JUDGE EUSTAQUIO Z. GACOTT, JR.,

Regional Trial Court, Branch 47, City of Puerto Princesa,
[A.M. No. RTJ-95-1293]

Facts:
On January 18, 1991 at Brgy. Mandaragat, Pureto Princesa
City, the accused dis then willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
possess illegally caught assorted fish with the use of explosives
weighing more or less eight thousand (8,000) kilos. The
complainant filed thereafter Criminal Cases No. 9210(Illegal
Possession of Explosives Intended for Fishing) and 9211 (Illegal
Possession of Illegally Caught Fish) against the accused. The
cases were consolidated for trial at the sala of the Honorable
respondent. The accused then moved to quash Criminal Case
No. 9210 on the ground that the evidence of the prosecution
was a product of a warrantless and illegal search and seizure
and also moved to quash Criminal Case Criminal case 9211 on
the ground that the information failed to charge the offense of
illegal possession of fish caught by explosives for its failure to
allege the element of profit.

The respondent granted both the motion to quash the criminal

cases filed. The prosecution moved for the reconsideration of
the order but was denied. The complainant then charged the
respondent with partiality, miscarriage of justice and knowingly
rendering an unjust decision in connection with the dismissal of
the Criminal Cases Nos. 9210 and 9211.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the judge erred in dismissing the case due to
warrantless arrest and search and seizure.

RULING:
The complaint is dismissed. As to the dismissal of Criminal Case
No. 9210, complainant himself admitted that the search and seizure
was conducted in the absence of a warrant and that the search
warrant was only produced by the complainant after the search and
seizure took place. The complainant invoked Circular No.
130(s.1967) of the Office of the President to justify the warrantless
search. The said circular pertains to the procedure in the
confiscation of fish caught by the use of explosives. Such
confiscation may be exercised only by the Commissioner of
Fisheries or his representatives who can only take a sample of the
fish caught (not to exceed one kilo) for testing if the fish were
indeed caught through the use of explosives. It is only upon the
determination that the fish were caught through the use of
explosives when the seizure of the entire catch may be authorized.
Thereafter, an appraisal of the value of the fish caught shall be
made, which shall be paid to the accused should he be
subsequently acquitted in the criminal case filed against him. The
arresting officer failed to show compliance with the procedure
prescribed by the very circular they invoked.

As to the dismissal of the Criminal Case 9211, though the

respondent erred in holding that the information was defective that
the information was defective in not alleging that the offense was
committed “knowingly” because the element of knowledge was
encompassed within the word “willfully”; however, the information
failed to allege the element of profit. Though it is true that the
prohibits Presidential Decree No. 704 prohibits the separate acts of
possessing, dealing in, selling or disposing of illegally caught fish
and aquatic products, but said acts must not only be done
“knowingly” but also “for profit”, as essential element of the offense.

PEOPLE V. CACHOLA
[GR NO. 148712-15]

FACTS:
The mother, elder brother, uncle and cousin of 12-year old
Jessie Barnachea (Jessie) were killed. There were 4
separate informations charging Dominador Cachola
(Cachola) and Ernestos Amay (Amay) with murder
At the trial before the RTC, the prosecution presented as
witnesses Jessie, his brother, neighbors and several police
officers. After the prosecution rested its case, the defense
counsels orally asked for leave of court to file a demurrer to
evidence. The trial court denied the motion outright and set
the schedule for the presentationof evidence for the defense.
However, instead of presenting evidence, the appellants filed
a Demurrer to Evidence even without leave of court. RTC
convicted Cachola and Amay sentencing them to suffer 4
counts of the supreme penalty of death. The case is on
automatic review before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in not allowing Cachola
and Amay to present evidence after filing their demurrer to
evidence without leave of court.

HELD:
NO. Section 15 (now Section 23), Rule 119 is clear on the
matter: SEC. 15. -Demurrer to evidence. - After the
prosecution has rested its case, the court may dismiss the
case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence: (1) on its
own initiative after giving the prosecution an opportunity to
be heard; or (2) on motion of the accused filed with prior
leave of court. If the court denies the motion for dismissal,
the accused may adduce evidence in his defense. When the
accused files such motion to dismiss without express leave
of court, he waives the right to present evidence and submits
the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the
prosecution. (Underscoring supplied). The filing by Cachola
and Amay of a demurrer to evidence in the absence of prior
leave of court was a clear waiver of their right to present
their own evidence. To sustain their claim that they had been
denied due process because the evidence they belatedly
sought to offer would have exculpated them would be to
allow them to “wager on the outcome of judicial proceedings
by espousing inconsistent viewpoints whenever dictated by
convenience.”
Furthermore, it cannot be said that the waiver was not clear.
The trial court postponed the hearings on the motion for
demurrer, even after leave of court had been denied, and
then granted extensions to Amay until he finally adopted the
position of his co-appellants. At no time other than in this
automatic review was there any attempt that is contrary to
the waiver of the presentation of evidence
 HORTENCIA SALAZAR
vs.
HON. TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, in his capacity as
Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, and FERDIE MARQUEZ
[G.R. No. 81510 March 14, 1990]

FACTS: This concerns the validity of the power of the

Secretary of Labor to issue warrants of arrest and
seizure under Article 38 of the Labor Code, prohibiting
illegal recruitment.

On October 21, 1987, Rosalie Tesoro filed with the POEA

a complaint against petitioner. Having ascertained that
the petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment
agency, public respondent Administrator Tomas D.
Achacoso issued his challenged CLOSURE AND
SEIZURE ORDER.

The POEA brought a team to the premises of Salazar to

implement the order. There it was found that petitioner
was operating Hannalie Dance Studio. Before entering
the place, the team served said Closure and Seizure
order on a certain Mrs. Flora Salazar who voluntarily
allowed them entry into the premises. Mrs. Flora Salazar
informed the team that Hannalie Dance Studio was
accredited with Moreman Development (Phil.). However,
when required to show credentials, she was unable to
produce any. Inside the studio, the team chanced upon
twelve talent performers — practicing a dance number
and saw about twenty more waiting outside, The team
confiscated assorted costumes which were duly
receipted for by Mrs. Asuncion Maguelan and witnessed
by Mrs. Flora Salazar.

A few days after, petitioner filed a letter with the POEA

demanding the return of the confiscated properties.
They alleged lack of hearing and due process, and that
since the house the POEA raided was a private
residence, it was robbery.

On February 2, 1988, the petitioner filed this suit for

prohibition. Although the acts sought to be barred are
already fait accompli, thereby making prohibition too
late, we consider the petition as one for certiorari in
view of the grave public interest involved.

ISSUE: May the Philippine Overseas Employment

Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) validly issue
warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article
38 of the Labor Code?

HELD: PETITION GRANTED. it is only a judge who may

issue warrants of search and arrest. Neither may it be
done by a mere prosecuting body.
We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a
judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants.
Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial
process. To that extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph
(c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force
and effect.

Moreover, the search and seizure order in question,

assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that it was validly
issued, is clearly in the nature of a general warrant. We
have held that a warrant must identify clearly the things
to be seized, otherwise, it is null and void

For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we reaffirm

the following principles:

Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987 Constitution, it is

only judges, and no other, who may issue warrants of
arrest and search:
The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and
undesirable aliens, whom the President or the
Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested,
following a final order of deportation, for the purpose of
deportation.
 COLUMBIA PICTURES V FLORES
[G.R. No. 78631]
FACTS:
Petitioners applied for a search warrant with the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig against private
respondents for violation of the Protection of Intellectual
Property law. Upon the offer of pieces of evidence, a
search warrant was issued.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not there are requirements to the issuance
of a valid search warrant.

HELD:
YES. In issuing a search warrant, the judge must strictly
comply with the constitutional and statutory
requirements. He must determine the existence of
probable cause by personally examining the applicant
and his witnesses in the form of searching questions.
The search warrant must contain a specific description
of the place to be searched and the articles sought to be
seized must be described with particularity.

Petition is DISMISSED and the assailed order is

AFFIRMED.
 NOLASCO V. PAÑO
[GR NO. L-69803]

FACTS:
The case at bar is for the motion for partial
reconsideration of both petitioners and respondents of
the SC’s decision that the questioned search warrant by
petitioners is null and void, that respondents are
enjoined from introducing evidence using such
search warrant, but such personalities obtained
would still be retained, without prejudice to
petitioner Aguilar-Roque. Respondents contend that
the search warrant is valid and that it should be
considered in the context of the crime of rebellion,
where the warrant was based. Petitioners on the other
hand, on the part of petitioner Aguilar-Roque, contend
that a lawful search would be justified only by a
lawful arrest. And since there was illegal arrest of
Aguilar-Roque, the search was unlawful and that the
personalities seized during the illegal search should
be returned to the petitioner. The respondents, in
defense, concede that the search warrants were null and
void but the arrests were not.
HELD:
"Any evidence obtained in violation of this . . . section
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding" (Sec. 4[2]). This constitutional mandate
expressly adopting the exclusionary rule has proved by
historical experience to be the only practical means
of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures by outlawing all
evidence illegally seized and thereby removing the
incentive on the part of state and police officers to
disregard such basic rights. What the plain language
of the Constitution mandates is beyond the power of the
courts to change or modify. All the articles thus
seized fall under the exclusionary rule totally and
unqualifiedly and cannot be used against any of the
three petitioners.
 TAMBASEN VS. PEOPLE
[246 SCRA 184; G.R. NO. 89103; 14 JUL 1995]
Facts: In August 1988, P/Sgt. Natuel applied for issuance of search
warrant alleging that he received information that Petitioner had in
his possession at his house “M-16 Armalite rifles, hand grenades,
.45 Cal. pistols, dynamite sticks and subversive documents”,
which were “used or intended to be used” for illegal purposes.
The application was granted.

In September, a police team, searched the house of petitioner and

seized “2 envelopes containing P14000, handset with antennae,
transceiver with antennae, regulator supply, academy notebook
and assorted papers and handset battery pack”. In October,
petitioner moved that the search and seizure be declared illegal
and that the seized articles be returned to him. In December,
MTCC, in its order, directed Lt. Col. Torres to return the money
seized to petitioner ruling that any seizure should be limited to the
specified items covered thereby. SolGen petitioned with the RTC
for the annulment of the order of MTCC citing that pending the
determination of legality of seizure of the articles, they should
remain in custogia legis. RTC granted the petition.
Issue: Whether or Not the seizure of the articles which were not
mentioned in the search warrant was legal.
Held: Section 2 Article III of the 1987 Constitution requires that a
search warrant should particularly describe the things to be
seized. The police acts beyond the parameters of their authority if
they seize articles not described in the search warrants. The
evident purpose and intent of the requirement is to limit the things
to be seized, to leave the officers of the law with no discretion;
that unreasonable search and seizure may not be made and that
abuses may not be committed.

Petition granted. People of the Philippines is ordered to return the

money seized.
PANGANDAMAN vs CASAR
[G.R. No. L-71782, April 14, 1988]

FACTS:
The shooting incident by armed men in Lanao led to the issuance
of a warrant of arrest. Petitioners assert that the respondent Judge
issued a warrant of arrest against fifty (50) “John Does”
transgressing the Constitutional provision requiring that such
warrants should particularly describe the persons or things to be
seized.

ISSUE: Whether said warrant is valid

HELD: NO
Insofar as said warrant is issued against fifty (50) “John Does!
not one of whom the witnesses to the complaint could or would
identify, it is of the nature of a general warrant, one of a class of
writs long proscribed as unconstitutional and once anathematized
as “totally subversive of the liberty of the subject.
Clearly violative of the constitutional injunction that warrants
of arrest should particularly describe the person or persons to be
seized, the warrant must, as regards it unidentified subjects, be
voided.
WHEREFORE, the warrant complained of is upheld and
declared valid insofar as it orders the arrest of the petitioners.
Said warrant is voided to the extent that it is issued against fifty
(5) “John Does.” The respondent Judge is directed to forward to
the Provincial Fiscal of Lanao del Sur the record of the preliminary
investigation of the complaint in Criminal Case NO. 1748 of his
Court for further appropriate action.
 PEOPLE V RUBIO
[ G.R. NO. L-35500 ]

FACTS:
Appellant’s house was searched on the strength of a
warrant issued to internal revenue agents and seized
from therein fraudulent books, invoices and records.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the search warrant was illegal and
void for failure to particularly describe the things to
be seized.

HELD:
NO. While the place to be searched and the property
to be seized under a search warrant must be
particularly described in the warrant, yet the
description is required to be specific only in so far as
the conditions will ordinarily allow. By the nature of
the goods to be seized, their description must be
rather general, it is not required that a technical
description be given, as this would mean that no
warrant could issue.
 UMIL V RAMOS
[ G.R. NO. 81567 ]

FACTS:
The Regional Intelligence Operations Unit of the Capital Command
(RIOU-CAPCOM) received confidential information about a
member of the NPA Sparrow Unit being treated for a gunshot
wound at a hospital. Upon verification, it was found that the
wounded person who was listed in the hospital records as Ronnie
Javelon is actually petitioner Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA
liquidation squad responsible for the killing of two CAPCOM
soldiers the day before. He was positively identified by
eyewitnesses as the gunman who went on top of the hood of the
CAPCOM mobile patrol car and fired at the two CAPCOM soldiers
seated inside.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not petitioner’s arrest was lawful.

HELD:
YES. Petitioner Dural was arrested for being a member of the New
Peoples Army (NPA), an outlawed subversive organization.
Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando
Dural without a warrant is justified as it can be said that he was
committing an offense when arrested. The crimes of rebellion,
subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and
crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in
connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the State
and are in the nature of continuing crime.

Petitions are DISMISSED.

 PEOPLE v. SALANGUIT

GR No. 13354

FACTS: Two criminal cases were filed against Salanguit, the first for
possession/use of shabu, and the second, for possession/use of
marijuana. Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied in the RTC of Cavite a warrant to
search the premises of Robert Salanguit for shabu and shabu
paraphernalias. He presented as a witness Edmund Badua, an undercover
officer, which transacted with Salanguit for the purchase of shabu.

The application was granted and the team of Aguilar proceeded to the
premises of Salanguit in QC to serve the warrant. The operatives
proceeded to knock on Salanguit’s door but the same was left unanswered.
The operatives heard people panicking inside the house and they began to
force their way inside the house. They indicated their authority to conduct
the search and began which yielded to the finding of clear plastic bags with
shabu and 2 bricks of dried marijuana leaves covered in newspaper.

Salanguit refused to sign the receipt for the confiscated drugs. During his
arraignment, he pleaded not guilty and in the trial court, he gave stated that
he never got the chance to review the purported warrant that Aguilar and
his team has. He further stated that the operatives ate their food and took
his cash and valuable, as well as canned goods.

The RTC found him guilty for possession/use of shabu and marijuana.
Salanguit appealed the said decision and argues that the shabu allegedly
recovered from his residence is inadmissible as evidence against him on
the ground that the warrant used to obtain it was invalid and that the
marijuana seized from him was also inadmissible as evidence against him
pursuant to the plain view doctrine, and that the operatives employed
unnecessary force in executing the warrant.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the warrant used to seize the shabu was valid and the said shabu
was inadmissible in evidence against him.
2. W/N the marijuana seized was admissible in evidence against Salanguit
pursuant to plain view doctrine.

HELD:

1. Yes, all the requisites for the issuance of a search warrant were satisfied.

2. No, the marijuana was not one of the drugs indicated in the warrant and it was
not in plain view when it was seized.

RATIO:

1. The warrant authorized the seizure of undetermined quantity of shabu and

drug paraphernalia. Salanguit contends that it should be void as it did not
indicate the existence of drug paraphernalias. The warrant was valid as to the
seizure of shabu and void as to the seizure of drug paraphernalia. It is to be
noted that no drug paraphernalia was seized. Salanguit further contends that the
warrant was issued for more than one specific offense because possession or
uses are punished under two different provisions in the Dangerous Drugs Act.
This Court has decided in the case of People v Dichoso that a warrant that does
not specify what provisions of the law were violated, is valid as to the authority
to search and seize marijuana, shabu and drug paraphernalias. Lastly, Salanguit
argues that the search warrant failed to indicate the place to be searched with
sufficient particularity. The rule is that a description of the place to be searched
is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain
and identify the place to be searched. The location of Salanguit’s house being
indicated by the evidence on record, there can be no doubt that the warrant
described the place to be searched with sufficient particularity.

2. Because the location of the shabu was indicated in the warrant and thus
known to the police operatives, it is reasonable to assume that the police found
the packets and shabu first. Once the valid portion of the search warrant has
been executed, the plain view doctrine can no longer provide basis for admitting
the other items subsequently found. The marijuana bricks were wrapped in
newsprint. There was no apparent illegality to justify their seizure. Not being in a
transparent container, the contents wrapped in newsprint could not have been
readily discernible as marijuana. That being said, we hold that the marijuana is
inadmissible in evidence against Salanguit.
 PEOPLE v. BOHOL

GR No. 171729

FACTS:
On March 7, 2003 the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
35, convicted appellant Ricardo Bohol of Violating sections 11
(3) and (5), Article II, respectively of Republic Act No. 9165 also
known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 200.
During the entrapment operation, PO2 Ferdinand Estrada, who
acted as poseur- buyer, was guided by their confidential
informant to the house of Bohol where the transaction for the
sale of shabu was to take place. After the transaction was
consummated, PO2 Estrada signaled his companions and
arrested Bohol. After frisking him, PO2 Gutierrez recovered
from him the buy-bust money and three plastic sachets
containing similar whit crystalline granules suspected to be
shabu. Bohol contends that the prosecution failed to establish
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He faults the trial for giving
full faith and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses. He asserts that the only reason why he was
arrested was because he was the overseer of a “Video-
Carrera”, The police officer filed the illegal drug trade and
possession against him because they failed to find any
evidence to have him tried for overseeing a “Video-Carrera”
place. Lastly, he laments the failure of the prosecution to
present the confidential informant as a witness during trial,
thereby preventing him from confronting said witness directly.

ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution was able to establish

guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling: The Supreme Court discerns no improper motive on
the part of the police officers that would impel them to
fabricate a story and falsely implicate Bohol in such serious
offense. In the absence of any evidence of the policemen’s
improper motive, their testimony is worthy of full faith and
credit. Also, courts generally give full faith and credit to
officers of the law, for they are presumed to have performed
their duties in a regular manner. According, in entrapment
cases, credence is given to the narration of an incident by
prosecution witnesses who are officers of the law and
presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner
in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary. As ruled by the appellate court, Bohol cannot insist
on the presentation of the informant. During trail, the
informant’s presence is not a requisite in the prosecution of
drug cases. The appellate court held that the police authorities
rarely, if ever, remove the cloak of confidentiality with which
they surround their poseur-buyers and informer’s since their
usefulness will be over the moment they are presented in
court. Further, what is material to prosecution for the illegal
sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or
sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court
of the corpus delicti. Both requirements were sufficiently
proven in this case. The police officers were able to testify
positively and categorically that the transaction or sale
actually took place. The prosecution when presented in the
court likewise positively identified the subject shabu. Hence,
we agree that the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt has
established Bohol’s guilt.
 G.R. No. 119772-73.
February 7, 1997

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs.
NIGEL RICHARD GATWARD

Facts:
The trial court handed down its verdict on March 3, 1995
finding both accused guilty as charged, thus:
In Criminal Case No. 94-6268, accused Nigel Richard Gatward
is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of transporting,
without legal authority therefor, 5,237.70 grams of heroin, a
prohibited drug, in violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No.
6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,
as amended by Republic Act No. 7659; and there being no
aggravating or mitigating circumstance shown to have
attended the commission of the crime, he is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment for thirty-five (35) years of
reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of Five Million Pesos
(P5,000,000.00).
In Criminal Case No. 94-6269, accused U Aung Win is found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of importing or bringing into
the Philippines 5,579.80 grams of heroin, a prohibited drug,
without being authorized by law to do so, contrary to Section 3
of Republic Act No. 6425, the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659; and in view of the
presence of one (1) mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea
of guilty, without any aggravating circumstance to offset it, he
is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for twenty-
five (25) years of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of One
Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00).

Issue:
Whether or not the decision and penalty imposed by the trial
court violated the accused constitutional or legal right?

RULING:
Finally, no constitutional or legal right of this accused is
violated by the imposition upon him of the corrected duration,
inherent in the essence and concept, of the penalty.
Otherwise, he would be serving a void sentence with an
illegitimate penalty born out of a figurative liaison between
judicial legislation and unequal protection of the law. He would
thus be the victim of an inadvertence which could result in the
nullification, not only of the judgment and the penalty meted
therein, but also of the sentence he may actually have served.
Far from violating any right of U Aung Win, therefore, the
remedial and corrective measures interposed by this opinion
protect him against the risk of another trial and review aimed
at determining the correct period of imprisonment.
The judgment of the court a quo, specifically with regard to the
penalty imposed on accused-appellant Nigel Richard Gatward
in Criminal Case No. 94-6268 and that of accused U Aung Win
in Criminal Case No. 94-6269, is MODIFIED in the sense that
both accused are sentenced to serve the penalty of reclusion
perpetua in its entire duration and full extent.
Privacy of Communication

SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ V. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

[G.R. No. 93833]
FACTS:

A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro Ramirez

in the Quezon City RTC alleging that the private respondent,
Ester Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter’s office, allegedly
vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a “hostile and furious
mood” and in a manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity and
personality,” contrary to morals, good customs and public
policy.”

In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim

transcript of the event and sought damages. The transcript on
which the civil case was based was culled from a tape
recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.

As a result of petitioner’s recording of the event and alleging

that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was
illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the
Pasay RTC for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled “An Act
to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related
violations of private communication, and other purposes.”

Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information, which the

RTC later on granted, on the ground that the facts charged do
not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200.
The CA declared the RTC’s decision null and void and denied
the petitioner’s MR, hence the instant petition.

ISSUE:

W/N the Anti-Wiretapping Act applies in recordings by one of

the parties in the conversation

HELD:

Yes. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, ” An Act to Prohibit and

Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of
Private Communication and Other Purposes,” provides:

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being

authorized by all the parties to any private communication or
spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other
device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or
record such communication or spoken word by using a device
commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however
otherwise described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it
illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any
private communication to secretly record such communication
by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as
to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute
ought to be a party other than or different from those involved
in the private communication. The statute’s intent to penalize
all persons unauthorized to make such recording is
underscored by the use of the qualifier “any”. Consequently,
as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, “even a
(person) privy to a communication who records his private
conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter
(will) qualify as a violator” under this provision of R.A. 4200.

A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover,

supports the respondent court’s conclusion that in enacting
R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal,
unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or
communications taken either by the parties themselves or by
third persons.

The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of

the statute. The substance of the same need not be
specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200
penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or
recording private communications by means of the devices
enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual
made a secret recording of a private communication by means
of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under
Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in
his COMMENT before the respondent court: “Nowhere (in the
said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a
violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its
communication to a third person should be professed.”

Petitioner’s contention that the phrase “private

communication” in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include
“private conversations” narrows the ordinary meaning of the
word “communication” to a point of absurdity. The word
communicate comes from the latin word communicare,
meaning “to share or to impart.” In its ordinary signification,
communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting
signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or
imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies the “process by
which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals
through a common system of symbols (as language signs or
gestures)”

These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-

verbal, written or expressive communications of “meanings or
thoughts” which are likely to include the emotionally-charged
exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and
private respondent, in the privacy of the latter’s office. Any
doubts about the legislative body’s meaning of the phrase
“private communication” are, furthermore, put to rest by the
fact that the terms “conversation” and “communication” were
interchangeably used by Senator Tañada in his Explanatory
Note to the Bill.
 ZULUETA VS. COURT OF APPEALS
[G.R. No. 107383, February 20, 1996]

FACTS:

This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of

Appeals, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to
return documents and papers taken by her from private
respondent's clinic without the latter's knowledge and
consent.

Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private

respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner
entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine,
and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private
respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and
cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157 documents
consisting of private correspondence between Dr.
Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards,
cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and
photographs. The documents and papers were seized
for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for
disqualification from the practice of medicine which
petitioner had filed against her husband.
ISSUE:

(1) Whether or not the documents and papers in

question are inadmissible in evidence;

HELD:

(1) No. Indeed the documents and papers in

question are inadmissible in evidence. The
constitutional injunction declaring "the
privacy of communication and
correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less
applicable simply because it is the wife (who
thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's
infidelity) who is the party against whom the
constitutional provision is to be enforced.
The only exception to the prohibition in the
Constitution is if there is a "lawful order
[from a] court or when public safety or order
requires otherwise, as prescribed by law."
Any violation of this provision renders the
evidence obtained inadmissible "for any
purpose in any proceeding."
(2)
The intimacies between husband and wife do not
justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and
cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for
any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person,
by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her
integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and
the constitutional protection is ever available to
him or to her.

The law insures absolute freedom of

communication between the spouses by making it
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for
or against the other without the consent of the
affected spouse while the marriage subsists.
Neither may be examined without the consent of
the other as to any communication received in
confidence by one from the other during the
marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one
thing is freedom of communication; quite another
is a compulsion for each one to share what one
knows with the other. And this has nothing to do
with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.

The review for petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

Waterhouse Drug Corp. v NLRC
[GR NO. 113271]

FACTS:

Antonia Melodia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist

by Waterous Drug Corp. Catolico sold to YSP Inc. 10
bottles of Voren Tablets at P384 per unit. However,
the normal selling price is P320 per unit. Catolico
overcharged by P64 per unit for a total of P640. YSP
sent a check payable to Catolico as a “refund” for the
jacked-up price. It was sent in an envelope addressed
to her. Saldana, the clerk of Waterous Drug Corp.
opened the envelope and saw that there was a check
for P640 for Catolico.

Waterous Drug Corp. ordered the termination of

Catolico for acts of dishonesty. NLRC: Dismissed the
Petition. Evidence of respondents (check from YSP)
being rendered inadmissible, by virtue of the
constitutional right invoked by complainants.

Petitioners: In the light of the decision in the People

v. Marti, the constitutional protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the
immunity of one’s person from interference by
government and cannot be extended to acts
committed by private individuals so as to bring it
within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the
government.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the check is admissible as
evidence.

HELD:
Yes. The Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from
unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by
private individuals. It is not true, as counsel for
Catolico claims, that the citizens have no recourse
against such assaults. On the contrary, and as said
counsel admits, such an invasion gives rise to both
criminal and civil liabilities. Despite this, the SC ruled
that there was insufficient evidence of cause for the
dismissal of Catolico from employment Suspicion is
not among the valid causes provided by the Labor
Code for the termination of Employment.
 SANIDAD VS. COMELEC
[G.R. NO. 90878]
Facts: In a petition dated November 20, 1989, herein petitioner
Pablito V. Sanidad, who claims to be a newspaper columnist of
the “OVERVIEW” for the BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, a
weekly newspaper circulated in the City of Baguio and the
Cordilleras, assailed the constitutionality of Section 19 of
Comelec Resolution No. 2167, which provides:

Section 19. Prohibition on columnists, commentators or

announcers. — During the plebiscite campaign period, on the
day before and on the plebiscite day, no mass media
columnist, commentator, announcer or personality shall use
his column or radio or television time to campaign for or
against the plebiscite issues.

It is alleged by petitioner that said provision is void and

unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional
guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press
enshrined in the Constitution.

Issue: Whether Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2167

inviolate the right to Freedom of Expression.

Held: Yes. While the limitation does not absolutely bar

petitioner’s freedom of expression, it is still a restriction on his
choice of the forum where he may express his view. No reason
was advanced by respondent to justify such abridgment. We
hold that this form of regulation is tantamount to a restriction
of petitioner’s freedom of expression for no justifiable reason.
 THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD VS COMELEC
[G.R No. 205728]
FACTS:

On February 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within

the compound of San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each
tarpaulin was approximately 6×10 in size. They were posted on
the front walls of the cathedral within public view.

The first tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA RH Law”

referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic
Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the
present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading “Conscience
Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH)/ Team Buhay”
or “(Pro-RH)/Team Patay”.

The electoral candidates were classified according to their

vote on the adoption of the RH Law. Those who voted for the
passing of the law were classified by petitioners as comprising
“Team Patay,” while those who voted against it form “Team
Buhay”. Respondent Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon, as Election
Officer of Bacolod City, issued a Notice to Remove Campaign
Materials addressed to petitioner Most Rev. Bishop Vicente M.
Navarra, otherwise, COMELEC will be constrained to file an
election offense against the petitioners.

ISSUE:
Whether the act of the COMELEC infringes the Freedom of
Religion and Freedom of Speech.
HELD:

On Freedom of Religion. As aptly argued by

COMELEC, the tarpaulin, on its face, “does not
convey any religious doctrine of the Catholic
church.” That the position of the Catholic church
appears to coincide with the message of the tarpaulin
regarding the RH Law does not, by itself, bring the
expression within the ambit of religious speech. On
the contrary, the tarpaulin clearly refers to candidates
classified under “Team Patay” and “Team Buhay”
according to their respective votes on the RH Law.

On Freedom of Speech. Embedded in the tarpaulin,

are opinions expressed by petitioners. It is a specie
of expression protected by our fundamental law.
There are several theories and schools of thought
that strengthen the need to protect the basic right to
freedom of expression.

First, this relates to the right of the people to

participate in public affairs, including the right to
criticize government actions. Speech that promotes
dialogue on public affairs, or airs out grievances and
political discontent, should thus be protected and
encouraged.
Second, free speech should be encouraged under the
concept of a market place of ideas.
Third, free speech involves self-expression that
enhances human dignity.
Fourth, expression is a marker for group identity.

Fifth, the Bill of Rights, free speech included, is

supposed to “protect individuals and minorities
against majoritarian abuses perpetrated through [the]
framework [of democratic governance]. ”
Lastly, free speech must be protected under the
safety valve theory. In order to avoid this situation
and prevent people from resorting to violence, there
is a need for peaceful methods in making passionate
dissent. Free speech must, thus, be protected as a
peaceful means of achieving one’s goal, considering
the possibility that repression of nonviolent dissent
may spill over to violent means just to drive a point.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free
expression and of assembly occupy a preferred
position as they are essential to the preservation and
vitality of our civil and political institutions; and such
priority “gives these liberties the sanctity and the
sanction not permitting dubious intrusions.”
 ADIONG v. COMELEC
[G.R. No. 103956]
March 31, 1992
FACTS:

Public respondent promulgated a resolution prohibiting the

posting of decals and stickers on “mobile” places, public or
private, and limit their location or publication to the authorized
posting areas that COMELEC fixes. Petitioner senatorial
candidate assails said resolution insofar as it prohibits the
posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and
other moving vehicles, wherein it is his last medium to inform
the electorate that he is a senatorial candidate, due to the ban
on radio, tv and print political advertisements.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) may

prohibit the posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places,
public or private, and limit their location or publication to the
authorized posting areas that it fixes.

RATIO:

No. The prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on

“mobile”places whether public or private except in the
authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes
censorship which cannot be justified by the Constitution:
. . . The concept of the Constitution as the fundamental law,
setting forth the criterion for the validity of any public act
whether proceeding from the highest official or the lowest
functionary, is a postulate of our system of government. That
is to manifest fealty to the rule of law, with priority accorded to
that which occupies the topmost rung in the legal hierarchy.
The three departments of government in the discharge of the
functions with which it is entrusted have no choice but to yield
obedience to its commands. Whatever limits it imposes must
be observed. Congress in the enactment of statutes must ever
be on guard lest the restrictions on its authority, either
substantive or formal, be transcended. The Presidency in the
execution of the laws cannot ignore or disregard what it
ordains. In its task of applying the law to the facts as found in
deciding cases, the judiciary is called upon to maintain
inviolate what is decreed by the fundamental law. Even its
power of judicial review to pass upon the validity of the acts of
the coordinate branches in the course of adjudication is a
logical. corollary of this basic principle that the Constitution is
paramount. It overrides any governmental measure that fails to
live up to its mandates. Thereby there is a recognition of its
being the supreme law. (Mutuc v. Commission on Elections,
supra)

The unusual circumstances of this year's national and local

elections call for a more liberal interpretation of the freedom to
speak and the right to know. It is not alone the widest possible
dissemination of information on platforms and programs
which concern us. Nor are we limiting ourselves to protecting
the unfettered interchange of ideas to bring about political
change. (Cf. New York Times v. Sullivan, supra) The big
number of candidates and elective positions involved has
resulted in the peculiar situation where almost all voters
cannot name half or even two-thirds of the candidates running
for Senator. The public does not know who are aspiring to be
elected to public office.
There are many candidates whose names alone evoke
qualifications, platforms, programs and ideologies which the
voter may accept or reject. When a person attaches a sticker
with such a candidate's name on his car bumper, he is
expressing more than the name; he is espousing ideas. Our
review of the validity of the challenged regulation includes its
effects in today's particular circumstances. We are
constrained to rule against the COMELEC prohibition.

There is no public interest substantial enough to warrant the

prohibition.

RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The

portion of Section 15 (a) of Resolution No. 2347 of the
Commission on Elections providing that "decals and stickers
may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas
provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof" is DECLARED
NULL and VOID.
 ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
[G.R. No. 133486 ; January 28, 2000]

FACTS:

COMELEC issued a Resolution restraining ABS-CBN or any

other groups from conducting exit survey during the
elections for national officials particularly for President and
Vice President. The electoral body believed that such
project might conflict with the official COMELEC count, as
well as the unofficial quick count of the National Movement
for Free Elections (NAMFREL).

ISSUE:

Whether the COMELEC Resolution restraining survey polls

infringes the Freedom of Speech and of the Press.

HELD:

The holding of exit polls and the dissemination of their

results through mass media constitute an essential part of
the freedoms of speech and of the press. Hence, the
COMELEC cannot ban them totally in the guise of
promoting clean, honest, orderly and credible elections.
Quite the contrary, exit polls — properly conducted and
publicized — can be vital tools in eliminating the evils of
election-fixing and fraud. Narrowly tailored
countermeasures may be prescribed by the COMELEC so
as to minimize or suppress the incidental problems in the
conduct of exit polls, without transgressing in any manner
the fundamental rights of our people.

The freedoms of speech and of the press should all the

more be upheld when what is sought to be curtailed is the
dissemination of information meant to add meaning to the
equally vital right of suffrage. The Court cannot support
any ruling or order “the effect of which would be to nullify
so vital a constitutional right as free speech.” When faced
with borderline situations in which the freedom of a
candidate or a party to speak or the freedom of the
electorate to know is invoked against actions allegedly
made to assure clean and free elections, this Court shall
lean in favor of freedom. For in the ultimate analysis, the
freedom of the citizen and the State’s power to regulate
should not be antagonistic. There can be no free and
honest elections if, in the efforts to maintain them, the
freedom to speak and the right to know are unduly
curtailed.
 BANGALISAN V CA
[G.R. No. 124678]
23 Jul 1997

FACTS:
The Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports (DECS) placed petitioners under preventive
suspension in connection with a mass action staged by a
number of public school teachers allegedly to dramatize
their grievances against public school authorities. Civil
Service Commission issued a resolution finding the
petitioners guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of the service and meted them a six-month suspension with
automatic reinstatement in service but without payment of
backwages.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not employees in the public service may
engage in strikes.

HELD:
NO. While the Constitution recognizes the right of
government employees to organize, they are prohibited
from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-
outs and other forms of mass action which will result in
temporary stoppage or disruption of public services. The
right of government employees to organize is limited only
to the formation of unions or associations, without
including the right to strike. It is an undisputed fact that
there was a work stoppage and that petitioners’ purpose
was to realize their demands by withholding their services.
The fact that the conventional term “strike” was not used
by the striking employees to describe their common course
of action is inconsequential, since the substance of the
situation, and not its appearance, will be deemed to be
controlling.

Petition is DENIED. Decision of Court of Appeals is

AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) and
WINSTON F. GARCIA, in his capacity as GSIS President &
General Manager
vs.
KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA GSIS
[GR NO. 170132]
FACTS: Forming a huge part of the October 4 to October 7,
2004 mass action participants were GSIS personnel, among
them members of the herein respondent Kapisanan Ng Mga
Manggagawa sa GSIS (“KMG” or the “Union”), a public
sector union of GSIS rank-and-file employees.

On or about October 10, 2004, the manager of the GSIS

Investigating Unit issued a memorandum directing 131
union and non-union members to show cause why they
should not be charged administratively for their
participation in said rally. In reaction, KMG’s counsel, Atty.
Manuel Molina, sought reconsideration of said directive on
the ground, among others, that the subject employees
resumed work on October 8, 2004 in obedience to the
return-to-work order thus issued. The plea for
reconsideration was, however, effectively denied by the
filing, on October 25, 2004, of administrative charges
against some 110 KMG members for grave misconduct and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

KMG filed a petition for prohibition with the CA against

these charges. The CA granted the petition and enjoined
the GSIS from implementing the issued formal charges and
from issuing other formal charges arising from the same
facts and events.

CA equated the right to form associations with the right to

engage in strike and similar activities available to workers
in the private sector. In the concrete, the appellate court
concluded that inasmuch as GSIS employees are not
barred from forming, joining or assisting employees’
organization, petitioner Garcia could not validly initiate
charges against GSIS employees waging or joining rallies
and demonstrations notwithstanding the service-disruptive
effect of such mass action.

ISSUE: WON the strike conducted by the GSIS employees

were valid.

HELD: NO

The 1987 Constitution expressly guaranteeing, for the

first time, the right of government personnel to self-
organization to complement the provision according
workers the right to engage in “peaceful concerted
activities, including the right to strike in accordance
with law.”. It was against the backdrop of the aforesaid
provisions of the 1987 Constitution that the Court
resolved Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals. In it, we held,
citing MPSTA v. Laguio, Jr., that employees in the public
service may not engage in strikes or in concerted and
unauthorized stoppage of work; that the right of
government employees to organize is limited to the
formation of unions or associations, without including
the right to strike.

Specifically, the right of civil servants to organize

themselves was positively recognized in Association of
Court of Appeals Employees vs. Ferrer-Caleja. But, as in
the exercise of the rights of free expression and of
assembly, there are standards for allowable limitations
such as the legitimacy of the purpose of the association,
[and] the overriding considerations of national security.

As regards the right to strike, the Constitution itself

qualifies its exercise with the provision “in accordance
with law.” This is a clear manifestation that the state
may, by law, regulate the use of this right, or even deny
certain sectors such right. Executive Order 180 which
provides guidelines for the exercise of the right of
government workers to organize, for instance, implicitly
endorsed an earlier CSC circular which “enjoins under
pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers
and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations,
mass leaves, walkouts and other forms of mass action
which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of
public service” by stating that the Civil Service law and
rules governing concerted activities and strikes in
government service shall be observed.

Public employees going on disruptive unauthorized

absences to join concerted mass actions may be held
liable for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service.

With the view we take of the events that transpired on

October 4-7, 2004, what respondent’s members
launched or participated in during that time partook of a
strike or, what contextually amounts to the same thing,
a prohibited concerted activity. The phrase “prohibited
concerted activity” refers to any collective activity
undertaken by government employees, by themselves
or through their employees’ organization, with the intent
of effecting work stoppage or service disruption in order
to realize their demands or force concessions,
economic or otherwise; it includes mass leaves,
walkouts, pickets and acts of similar nature. Indeed, for
four straight days, participating KMG members and
other GSIS employees staged a walk out and waged or
participated in a mass protest or demonstration right at
the very doorstep of the GSIS main office building. The
record of attendance for the period material shows that,
on the first day of the protest, 851 employees, or forty
eight per cent (48%) of the total number of employees in
the main office (1,756) took to the streets during office
hours, from 6 a.m. to 2 p.m.,leaving the other employees
to fend for themselves in an office where a host of
transactions take place every business day. On the
second day, 707 employees left their respective work
stations, while 538 participated in the mass action on
the third day. A smaller number, i.e., 306 employees, but
by no means an insignificant few, joined the fourth day
activity.

In whatever name respondent desires to call the four-

day mass action in October 2004, the stubborn fact
remains that the erring employees, instead of exploring
non-crippling activities during their free time, had taken
a disruptive approach to attain whatever it was they
were specifically after. As events evolved, they
assembled in front of the GSIS main office building
during office hours and staged rallies and protests, and
even tried to convince others to join their cause, thus
provoking work stoppage and service-delivery
disruption, the very evil sought to be forestalled by the
prohibition against strikes by government personnel.

To petitioner Garcia, as President and General Manager

of GSIS, rests the authority and responsibility, under
Section 45 of Republic Act No. 8291, the GSIS Act of
1997, to remove, suspend or otherwise discipline GSIS
personnel for cause. At bottom then, petitioner Garcia,
by filing or causing the filing of administrative charges
against the absenting participants of the October 4-7,
2004 mass action, merely performed a duty expected of
him and enjoined by law. Regardless of the mood
petitioner Garcia was in when he signed the charge
sheet, his act can easily be sustained as legally correct
and doubtless within his jurisdiction.
NON-ESTABLISHMENT

AGLIPAY VS RUIZ
[64 PHIL 201]

FACTS OF THE CASE:

The Director of Posts announced on May 1936 in Manila

newspapers that he would order the issuance of postage
stamps for the commemoration of the 33rd International
Eucharistic Congress celebration in the City of Manila. The
said event was organized by the Roman Catholic Church.
Monsignor Gregorio Aglipay, the petitioner, is the Supreme
Head of the Philippine Independent Church, requested
Vicente Sotto who is a member of the Philippine Bar to
raise the matter to the President. The said stamps in
consideration were actually issued already and sold though
the greater part thereof remained unsold. The further sale
of the stamps was sought to be prevented by the petitioner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent violated the Constitution in

issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the
Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress
HELD:

No, the respondent did not violate the Constitution by

issuing and selling the commemorative postage stamps.
Ruiz acted under the provision of Act No. 4052, which
contemplates no religious purpose in view, giving the
Director of Posts the discretion to determine when the
issuance of new postage stamps would be “advantageous
to the Government.” Of course, the phrase “advantageous
to the Government” does not authorize the violation of the
Constitution. In the case at bar, the issuance of the postage
stamps was not intended by Ruiz to favor a particular
church or denomination. The stamps did not benefit the
Roman Catholic Church, nor were money derived from the
sale of the stamps given to that church. The purpose of
issuing of the stamps was to actually take advantage of an
international event considered to be a great opportunity to
give publicity to the Philippines and as a result attract more
tourists to the country. In evaluating the design made for
the stamp, it showed the map of the Philippines instead of
showing a Catholic chalice. The focus was on the location
of the City of Manila, and it also bore the inscription that
reads “Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb.
3-7, 1937.” In considering these, it is evident that there is
no violation of the Constitution therefore the act of the
issuing of the stamps is constitutional.

The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of

prohibition, without pronouncement as to costs.
NON-ESTABLISHMENT

ANDRES GARCES vs. Hon. NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO

[G.R. No. L-53487]
May 25, 1981.

FACTS:

Pursuant to Resolution No. 5 of the Barangay Council of

Valencia, Ormoc City, a wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer

was acquired by the barangay council with funds raised by

means of solicitations and cash, duly ratified by the barangay

assembly in a plebiscite, reviving the traditional socio-religious

celebration of the feast day of the saint. As per Resolution No.

6, the image was brought to the Catholic parish church during

the saint's feast day which also designated the hermano mayor

as the custodian of the image. After the fiesta, however,

petitioner parish priest, Father Sergio Marilao Osmeña, refused

to return custody of the image to the council on the pretext that

it was the property of the church because church funds were

used for its acquisition until after the latter, by resolution, filed a

replevin case against the priest and posted the required bond.

Thereafter, the parish priest and his co-petitioners filed an

action for annulment of the council's resolutions relating to the

subject image contending that when they were adopted, the

barangay council was not duly constituted because the

chairman of the Kabataang Barangay was not allowed to

participate; and that they contravened the constitutional

provisions on separation of church and state, freedom of

religion and the use of public money to favor any sect or church.

ISSUE:

Whether the barangay council's resolution providing for

purchase of saint's image with private funds in connection with

barangay fiesta, constitutional.

HELD:

Yes. Resolution No. 5 of the barangay council of Valenzuela,

Ormoc City, "reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration"

every fifth day of April "of the feast day of Señor San Vicente

Ferrer, the patron saint of Valenzuela", and providing for: (I) the

acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer; and (2) the

construction of a waiting shed as the barangay's projects, funds

for which would be obtained through the "selling of tickets and

cash donations", does not directly or indirectly establish any

religion, nor abridge religious liberty, nor appropriate money for

the benefit of any sect, priest or clergyman. The image was

purchased with private funds, not with tax money. The

construction of the waiting shed is entirely a secular matter. The

wooden image was purchased in connection with the

celebration of the barrio fiesta honoring the patron saint, San

Vicente Ferrer, and not for the purpose of favoring any religion

or interfering with religious beliefs of the barrio residents. One of

the highlights of the fiesta was the mass. Consequently, the

image of the patron saint had to be placed in the church when

the mass was celebrated. If there is nothing unconstitutional or

illegal in holding a fiesta and having a patron saint for the barrio,

then any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron

saint (such as the acquisition and display of his image) cannot

be branded as illegal. As noted in the resolution, the barrio

fiesta is a socio-religious affair. Its celebration is an ingrained

tradition in rural communities. The fiesta relieves the monotony

and drudgery of the lives of the masses.

NON-ESTABLISHMENT
PASTOR DIONISIO V. AUSTRIA, petitioner, vs. HON.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
[G.R. No. 124382]

FACTS:

This is a case where the principle of separation of Church

and State is explained by the Supreme Court. The question
involved here is

The pastor in this case is Antonio (not his true name). He

started working for the Seventh Day Adventist as a
literature evangelist in 1963 and was registered by the
congregation as its employee with the SSS. He worked his
way up to the ladder and got promoted several times until
he was elevated to the position of pastor in nine years time.
Later on after 17 more years he even became a District
Pastor with 12 churches under his jurisdiction.

While serving as District Pastor, Antonio got into some

problems with is congregation and with some of his fellow
pastors. One of these problems was the accountability and
responsibility of the church tithes and offerings collected
by his wife. Another was in altercation with a co-pastor
regarding the collection of the latter's indebtedness. Said
altercation even led to heated exchanges and
temperamental outburst on the part of Antonio that caused
damage to the office equipment's in the pastor's office.
After a fact-finding committee was formed to investigate
the matter, Pastor Antonio received a notice from the
congregation terminating his services for misappropriation
of denominational funds, willful breach of trust, serious
misconduct, gross and habitual neglect of duties and
commission of an offense against his employer's
representative. Because Antonio thought that the grounds
for his termination, after serving for 28 years, were not true,
he sued the congregation before the Labor Arbiter. After
the hearing, the labor arbiter found his dismissal to be
illegal and he was ordered reinstated. The labor arbiter also
ordered the payment of his backwages and other
employee's benefits as well as moral and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees.

On appeal to the NLRC, the congregation raised for the first

time the lack of jurisdiction of the labor arbiter and the
NLRC. They claimed that the labor arbiter has no
jurisprudence over the complaint of Antonio due to the
constitutional provision on the separation of Church and
State since the case allegedly involved an ecclesiastical
affair to which the State cannot interfere.

ISSUE: Whether the State through the Labor Arbiter and the
NLRC can take cognizance of a dispute between a religious
congregation and one of its pastors that led to the
dismissal of the latter.
RULING: YES. The rationale of the principle of the separation of
Church and State is summed up in the familiar saying "Strong
fences make good neighbors." The idea advocated by this
principle is to delineate the boundaries between the two
institutions and thus avoid encroachments by one against the
other because of a misunderstanding of the limits of their
respective exclusive jurisdictions. The demarcation line calls on
the entities to "render therefore unto Caesar the things that are
Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's". While the State
is prohibited from interfering in purely ecclesiastical affairs, the
church is likewise barred from meddling in purely secular matters.

The case at bar does not concern an ecclesiastical or purely

religious affair as to bar the State from taking cognizance of the
case. An ecclesiastical affair involves the relationship between the
Church and its members and relate to matters of faith, religious
doctrines, worship and governance of the congregation. Examples
of this affairs to which the State cannot meddle are proceedings
for excommunication, ordinations of religious ministers,
administration of sacraments and other activities with attached
religious ministers, it does not ipso facto give the case a religious
significance. What is involved here is the relationship of the
Church as an employer and the minister as an employee. It is
purely secular and has no relation whatsoever with the practice of
faith, worship or doctrines of the Church. In this case Antonio was
not excommunicated from the membership of the congregation
but was terminated from employment. The grounds invoked for
his termination are all based on Art. 282 of the Labor Code. As
such the State, through the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC has the
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case and to determine
whether the congregation as employer, rightfully exercised its
management prerogative to dismiss an employee. And as found
by the Labor Arbiter, Antonio was terminated from the service
without just and lawful cause (Austria vs. NLRC et. al. G.R. No.
124382 Aug. 16, 1999).

NON-ESTABLISHMENT
IGLESIA NI CRISTO VS. COURT OF APPEALS
[259 SCRA 529; G.R. NO. 119673]

FACTS:
Petitioner has a television program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni
Cristo" aired on Channel 2 every Saturday and on Channel
13 every Sunday. The program presents and propagates
petitioner's religious beliefs, doctrines and practices often
times in comparative studies with other religions. Petitioner
submitted to the respondent Board of Review for Moving
Pictures and Television the VTR tapes of its TV program
Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. The Board classified the
series as "X" or not for public viewing on the ground that
they "offend and constitute an attack against other
religions which is expressly prohibited by law." On
November 28, 1992, it appealed to the Office of the
President the classification of its TV Series No. 128 which
allowed it through a letter of former Executive Secretary
Edelmiro A. Amante, Sr., addressed for Henrietta S. Mendez
reversing the decision of the respondent Board. According
to the letter the episode in is protected by the
constitutional guarantee of free speech and expression and
no indication that the episode poses any clear and present
danger. Petitioner also filed Civil Case. Petitioner alleged
that the respondent Board acted without jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion in requiring petitioner to
submit the VTR tapes of its TV program and in x-rating
them. It cited its TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and
128. In their Answer, respondent Board invoked its power
under PD No. 19861 in relation to Article 201 of the Revised
Penal Code. The Iglesia ni Cristo insists on the literal
translation of the bible and says that our (Catholic)
veneration of the Virgin Mary is not to be condoned
because nowhere it is found in the bible. The board
contended that it outrages Catholic and Protestant's
beliefs. RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. CA however
reversed it hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or Not the "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" program

is not constitutionally protected as a form of religious
exercise and expression.

HELD:
Yes. Any act that restrains speech is accompanied with
presumption of invalidity. It is the burden of the respondent
Board to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge
this burden, its act of censorship will be struck down. This
is true in this case. So-called "attacks" are mere criticisms
of some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of other
religions. RTC’s ruling clearly suppresses petitioner's
freedom of speech and interferes with its right to free
exercise of religion. “attack” is different from “offend” any
race or religion. The respondent Board may disagree with
the criticisms of other religions by petitioner but that gives
it no excuse to interdict such criticisms, however, unclean
they may be. Under our constitutional scheme, it is not the
task of the State to favor any religion by protecting it
against an attack by another religion. Religious dogmas
and beliefs are often at war and to preserve peace among
their followers, especially the fanatics, the establishment
clause of freedom of religion prohibits the State from
leaning towards any religion. Respondent board cannot
censor the speech of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply
because it attacks other religions, even if said religion
happens to be the most numerous church in our country.
The basis of freedom of religion is freedom of thought and
it is best served by encouraging the marketplace of dueling
ideas. It is only where it is unavoidably necessary to
prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and
welfare of the community that infringement of religious
freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest extent
necessary to avoid the danger. There is no showing
whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about
especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened
harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech,
cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the
showing of a substantive and imminent evil. It is
inappropriate to apply the clear and present danger test to
the case at bar because the issue involves the content of
speech and not the time, place or manner of speech.
Allegedly, unless the speech is first allowed, its impact
cannot be measured, and the causal connection between
the speech and the evil apprehended cannot be
established. The determination of the question as to
whether or not such vilification, exaggeration or fabrication
falls within or lies outside the boundaries of protected
speech or expression is a judicial function which cannot be
arrogated by an administrative body such as a Board of
Censors." A system of prior restraint may only be validly
administered by judges and not left to administrative
agencies.

FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE

EBRALINAG VS. DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOL

OF CEBU
[GR 95770, 29 December 1995]
FACTS:

Two special civil actions for certiorari, Mandamus and

Prohibition were filed and consolidated raising the same issue
whether school children who are members or a religious sect
known as Jehovah’s Witnesses may be expelled from school
(both public and private), for refusing, on account of their
religious beliefs, to take part in the flag ceremony which
includes playing (by a band) or singing the Philippine national
anthem, saluting the Philippine flag and reciting the patriotic
pledge.

All of the petitioners in both (consolidated) cases were expelled

from their classes by the public school authorities in Cebu for
refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite
the patriotic pledge as required by Republic Act No. 1265 (An
Act making flag ceremony compulsory in all educational
institutions) of July 11, 1955 , and by Department Order No. 8
(Rules and Regulations for Conducting the Flag Ceremony in All
Educational Institutions)dated July 21, 1955 of the Department
of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) making the flag
ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions.

Petitioners are Jehovah’s Witnesses believing that by doing

these is religious worship/devotion akin to idolatry against their
teachings. They contend that to compel transcends
constitutional limits and invades protection against official
control and religious freedom. The respondents relied on the
precedence of Gerona et al v. Secretary of Education where the
Court upheld the explulsions. Gerona doctrine provides that we
are a system of separation of the church and state and the flag
is devoid of religious significance and it doesn’t involve any
religious ceremony. The children of Jehovah’s Witnesses
cannot be exempted from participation in the flag ceremony.
They have no valid right to such exemption. Moreover,
exemption to the requirement will disrupt school discipline and
demoralize the rest of the school population which by far
constitutes the great majority. The freedom of religious belief
guaranteed by the Constitution does not and cannot mean
exemption from or non-compliance with reasonable and non-
discriminatory laws, rules and regulations promulgated by
competent authority.

ISSUE: Whether or not the expulsion of petitioners violated

their freedom of religion?
HELD:
YES. The Court held that the expulsion of the petitioners
from the school was not justified.

Religious freedom is a fundamental right of highest priority

and the amplest protection among human rights, for it
involves the relationship of man to his Creator. The right to
religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect,
vis., freedom to believe and freedom to act on one’s belief.
The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within
the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation
where the belief is translated into external acts that affect
the public welfare. The only limitation to religious freedom
is the existence of grave and present danger to public
safety, morals, health and interests where State has right to
prevent.

Petitioners stress that while they do not take part in the

compulsory flag ceremony, they do not engage in “external
acts” or behavior that would offend their countrymen who
believe in expressing their love of country through the
observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly stand at
attention during the flag ceremony to show their respect for
the right of those who choose to participate in the solemn
proceedings. Since they do not engage in disruptive
behavior, there is no warrant for their expulsion.
FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE

BENJAMIN VICTORIANO vs. ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS’

UNION

[GRN L-25246 September 12, 1974]

FACTS:
Benjamin Victoriano (Appellee), a member of the religious sect
known as the “Iglesia ni Cristo”, had been in the employ of the
Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. (Company) since 1958. He was a
member of the Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union (Union) which had
with the Company a CBA containing a closed shop provision which
reads as follows: “Membership in the Union shall be required as a
condition of employment for all permanent employees workers
covered by this Agreement.”

Under Sec 4(a), par 4, of RA 975, prior to its amendment by RA

3350, the employer was not precluded “from making an agreement
with a labor organization to require as a condition of employment
membership therein, if such labor organization is the representative
of the employees.” On June 18, 1961, however, RA 3350 was
enacted, introducing an amendment to par 4 subsection (a) of sec 4
of RA 875, as follows: “xxx but such agreement shall not cover
members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their
members in any such labor organization”.

Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits the affiliation of its

members with any labor organization, Appellee presented his
resignation to appellant Union. The Union wrote a formal letter to
the Company asking the latter to separate Appellee from the
service because he was resigning from the Union as a member.
The Company in turn notified Appellee and his counsel that unless
the Appellee could achieve a satisfactory arrangement with the
Union, the Company would be constrained to dismiss him from the
service.
Appellee filed an action for injunction to enjoin the Company and
the Union from dismissing Appellee. The Union invoked the “union
security clause” of the CBA and assailed the constitutionality of RA
3350 and contends it discriminatorily favors those religious sects
which ban their members from joining labor unions.

ISSUE:
Whether Appellee has the freedom of choice in joining the union or
not.

RULING:
YES. The Constitution and RA 875 recognize freedom of
association. Sec 1 (6) of Art III of the Constitution of 1935, as
well as Sec 7 of Art IV of the Constitution of 1973, provide that
the right to form associations or societies for purposes not
contrary to law shall not be abridged. Section 3 of RA 875
provides that employees shall have the right to self-
organization and to form, join of assist labor organizations of
their own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining
and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining and other mutual aid or protection. What
the Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act recognize and
guarantee is the “right” to form or join associations. A right
comprehends at least two broad notions, namely: first, liberty
or freedom, i.e., the absence of legal restraint, whereby an
employee may act for himself without being prevented by law;
and second, power, whereby an employee may, as he pleases,
join or refrain from joining an association. It is, therefore, the
employee who should decide for himself whether he should
join or not an association; and should he choose to join, he
himself makes up his mind as to which association he would
join; and even after he has joined, he still retains the liberty
and the power to leave and cancel his membership with said
organization at any time. The right to join a union includes the
right to abstain from joining any union. The law does not
enjoin an employee to sign up with any association.

The right to refrain from joining labor organizations

recognized by Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act is,
however, limited. The legal protection granted to such right to
refrain from joining is withdrawn by operation of law, where a
labor union and an employer have agreed on a closed shop, by
virtue of which the employer may employ only members of the
collective bargaining union, and the employees must continue
to be members of the union for the duration of the contract in
order to keep their jobs. By virtue of a closed shop agreement,
before the enactment of RA 3350, if any person, regardless of
his religious beliefs, wishes to be employed or to keep his
employment he must become a member of the collective
bargaining union. Hence, the right of said employee not to join
the labor union is curtailed and withdrawn.

To that all-embracing coverage of the closed shop

arrangement, RA No.3350 introduced an exception, when it
added to Section 4 (a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act the
following proviso: “but such agreement shall not cover
members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of
their members in any such labor organization”. Republic Act
No. 3350 merely excludes ipso jure from the application and
coverage of the closed shop agreement the employees
belonging to any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of
their members with any labor organization. What the exception
provides is that members of said religious sects cannot be
compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when said
unions have closed shop agreements with the employers; that
in spite of any closed shop agreement, members of said
religious sects cannot be refused employment or dismissed
from their jobs on the sole ground that they are not members
of the collective bargaining union. It does not prohibit the
members of said religious sects from affiliating with labor
unions. It still leaves to said members the liberty and the
power to affiliate, or not to affiliate, with labor unions. If,
notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the members of said
religious wets prefer to sign up with the labor union, they can
do so. If in deference and fealty to their religious faith, they
refuse to sign up, they can do so; the law does not coerce
them to join; neither does the law prohibit them from joining,
and neither may the employer or labor union compel them to
join.
The Company was partly absolved by law from the contractual
obligation it had with the Union of employing only Union
members in permanent positions. It cannot be denied,
therefore, that there was indeed an impairment of said union
security clause.

The prohibition to impair the obligation of contracts is not

absolute and unqualified. The prohibition is general. The
prohibition is not to be read with literal exactness, for it
prohibits unreasonable impairment only. In spite of the
constitutional prohibition, the State continues to possess
authority to safeguard the vital interests of its people.
Legislation appropriate to safeguarding said interests may
modify or abrogate contracts already in effect. For not only are
existing laws read into contracts in order to fix the obligations
as between the parties, but the reservation of essential
attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a
postulate of the legal order. The contract clause of the
Constitution. must be not only in harmony with, but also in
subordination to, in appropriate instances, the reserved power
of the state to safeguard the vital interests of the people. This
has special application to contracts regulating relations
between capital and labor which are not merely contractual,
and said labor contracts, for being impressed with public
interest, must yield to the common good.

The purpose to be achieved by RA 3350 is to insure freedom of

belief and religion, and to promote the general welfare by
preventing discrimination against those members of religious
sects which prohibit their members from joining labor unions,
confirming thereby their natural, statutory and constitutional
right to work, the fruits of which work are usually the only
means whereby they can maintain their own life and the life of
their dependents.

The individual employee, at various times in his working life, is

confronted by two aggregates of power collective labor,
directed by a union, and collective capital, directed by
management. The union, an institution developed to organize
labor into a collective force and thus protect the individual
employee from the power of collective capital, is,
paradoxically, both the champion of employee rights, and a
new source of their frustration. Moreover, when the Union
interacts with management, it produces yet a third aggregate
of group strength from which the individual also needs
protection – the collective bargaining relationship.

The free exercise of religious profession or belief is superior

to contract rights. In case of conflict, the latter must yield to
the former.

The purpose of RA 3350 is to serve the secular purpose of

advancing the constitutional right to the free exercise of
religion, by averting that certain persons be refused work, or
be dismissed from work, or be dispossessed of their right to
work and of being impeded to pursue a modest means of
livelihood, by reason of union security agreements. To help its
citizens to find gainful employment whereby they can make a
living to support themselves and their families is a valid
objective of the state. The Constitution even mandated that
“the State shall afford protection to labor, promote full
employment and equality in employment, ensure equal work
opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed and regulate the
relation between workers and employers.”

The primary effects of the exemption from closed shop

agreements in favor of members of religious sects that
prohibit their members from affiliating with a labor
organization, is the protection of said employees against the
aggregate force of the collective bargaining agreement, and
relieving certain citizens of a burden on their religious beliefs;
and by eliminating to a certain extent economic insecurity due
to unemployment, which is a serious menace to the health,
morals, and welfare of the people of the State, the Act also
promotes the well-being of society. It is our view that the
exemption from the effects of closed shop agreement does not
directly advance, or diminish, the interests of any particular
religion. Although the exemption may benefit those who are
members of religious sects that prohibit their members from
joining labor unions, the benefit upon the religious sects is
merely incidental and indirect.

The purpose of RA 3350 was not to grant rights to labor

unions. The rights of labor unions are amply provided for in
Republic Act No. 875 and the new Labor Code.

The Act does not require as a qualification, or condition, for

joining any lawful association membership in any particular
religion or in any religious sect; neither does the Act require
affiliation with a religious sect that prohibits its members from
joining a labor union as a condition or qualification for
withdrawing from a labor union. Joining or withdrawing from a
labor union requires a positive act Republic Act No. 3350 only
exempts members with such religious affiliation from the
coverage of closed shop agreements. So, under this Act, a
religious objector is not required to do a positive act-to
exercise the right to join or to resign from the union. He is
exempted ipso jure without need of any positive act on his
part.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is dismissed.

FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
GERMAN V. BARANGAN
[G.R. No. L-68828 March 27, 1985]

FACTS:

1. In the afternoon of October 2, 1984, petitioners,

composed of about 50 businessmen, students and office
employees converged at J.P. Laurel Street, Manila, for the
purpose of hearing Mass at the St. Jude Chapel which
adjoins the Malacañang grounds located in the same street.
Wearing yellow T-shirts, they started to march down with
raised clenched fists and shouts of anti-government
invectives. The marchers were barred by respondent Major
Lariosa, upon orders of his superiors and co-respondent
Gen. Santiago Barangan, from proceeding any further, on
the ground that St. Jude Chapel was located within the
Malacañang security area. Despite plea, they were not
allowed in the church.

2. Because of the alleged warning given them by

respondent Major Lariosa that any similar attempt by
petitioners to enter the church in the future would likewise
be prevented, petitioners took this present recourse.

3. Petitioners' alleged purpose in converging at J.P. Laurel

Street was to pray and hear mass at St. Jude church. At the
hearing of this petition, respondents assured petitioners
and the Court that they have never restricted, and will
never restrict, any person or persons from entering and
worshipping at said church. They maintain, however, that
petitioners' intention was not really to perform an act of
religious worship, but to conduct an anti-government
demonstration at a place close to the very residence and
offices of the President of the Republic.
4. Invoking their constitutional freedom to religious
worship and locomotion, petitioners seek the issuance of
[1] a writ of mandamus to compel respondents to allow
them to enter and pray inside St. Jude Chapel located at
J.P. Laurel Street, Manila; and [2] a writ of injunction to
enjoin respondents from preventing them from getting into
and praying in said church.

ISSUE: Whether or not the restriction to petitioners to

attend church is a violation of their freedom to religious
worship.

HELD:
The restriction imposed on the use of J.P. Laurel Street,
was established in the interest of national security.
Petitioners are not denied or restrained of their freedom of
belief or choice of their religion, but only in the manner by
which they had attempted to translate the same into action.
This curtailment is in accord with the pronouncement of
this Court in Gerona v. Secretary of Education.
FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
Soriano vs. La Guardia
[G.R. No. 164785 April 29, 2009]
Freedom of Speech
FACTS:
On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as
host of the program Ang Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37,
made obscene remarks against INC. Two days after, before
the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-
complaints were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven
other private respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni
Cristo (INC), against petitioner in connection with the
above broadcast. Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who
felt directly alluded to in petitioner’s remark, was then a
minister of INC and a regular host of the TV program Ang
Tamang Daan.

ISSUE:
Are Soriano’s statements during the televised “Ang Dating
Daan” part of the religious discourse and within the
protection of Section 5, Art.III?
RULING:
No. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case,
therefore, and considering the adverse effect of petitioner’s
utterances on the viewers’ fundamental rights as well as
petitioner’s clear violation of his duty as a public trustee,
the MTRCB properly suspended him from appearing in Ang
Dating Daan for three months.

Furthermore, it cannot be properly asserted that

petitioner’s suspension was an undue curtailment of his
right to free speech either as a prior restraint or as a
subsequent punishment. Aside from the reasons given
above (re the paramountcy of viewers rights, the public
trusteeship character of a broadcaster’s role and the power
of the State to regulate broadcast media), a requirement
that indecent language be avoided has its primary effect on
the form, rather than the content, of serious
communication. There are few, if any, thoughts that cannot
be expressed by the use of less offensive language.
FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
IMBONG V. OCHOA
(G.R. NO. 204819)
FACTS:
The increase of the country’s population at an
uncontrollable pace led to the executive and the
legislative’s decision that prior measures were still not
adequate. Thus, Congress enacted R.A. No. 10354,
otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), to provide
Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, access
and information to the full range of modern family planning
methods, and to ensure that its objective to provide for the
peoples’ right to reproductive health be achieved. Stated
differently, the RH Law is an enhancement measure to
fortify and make effective the current laws on
contraception, women’s health and population control.

Shortly after, challengers from various sectors of society

moved to assail the constitutionality of RH Law. Meanwhile,
the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed legislation
took effect. The Court then issued a Status Quo Ante Order
enjoining the effects and implementation of the assailed
legislation.

Petitioners question, among others, the constitutionality of

the RH Law, claiming that it violates Section 26(1), Article
VI of the Constitution, prescribing the one subject-one title
rule. According to them, being one for reproductive health
with responsible parenthood, the assailed legislation
violates the constitutional standards of due process by
concealing its true intent – to act as a population control
measure. On the other hand, respondents insist that the RH
Law is not a birth or population control measure, and that
the concepts of “responsible parenthood” and
“reproductive health” are both interrelated as they are
inseparable.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RH Law violated the one subject-one title

rule under the Constitution

Ruling: NO

Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health

law, the Court sees it as principally a population control
measure. The corpus of the RH Law is geared towards the
reduction of the country’s population. While it claims to
save lives and keep our women and children healthy, it also
promotes pregnancy-preventing products. As stated
earlier, the RH Law emphasizes the need to provide
Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, with
access to information on the full range of modem family
planning products and methods. These family planning
methods, natural or modern, however, are clearly geared
towards the prevention of pregnancy. For said reason, the
manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is to reduce
the number of births in the country. The Court, thus, agrees
with the petitioners’ contention that the whole idea of
contraception pervades the entire RH Law.

Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one

subject/one bill rule.

In Cawaling, Jr. v. COMELEC, it was written: It is well-

settled that the “one title-one subject” rule does not require
the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment
language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or
catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein.
The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is
comprehensive enough as to include the general object
which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the
persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and
consequences of the proposed law and its operation.
Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather
than technical construction of the rule “so as not to cripple
or impede legislation.”

In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of

the law shows that both “reproductive health” and
“responsible parenthood” are interrelated and germane to
the overriding objective to control the population growth.
As expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH
Law:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – The State recognizes and

guarantees the human rights of all persons including their
right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the
right to sustainable human development, the right to health
which includes reproductive health, the right to education
and information, and the right to choose and make
decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious
convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of
responsible parenthood.

The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that

the title of a law must not be “so uncertain that the average
person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of
the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which
is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one
subject where another or different one is really embraced in
the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the
real subject or scope of the act.”

Considering the close intimacy between “reproductive

health” and “responsible parenthood” which bears to the
attainment of the goal of achieving “sustainable human
development” as stated under its terms, the Court finds no
reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to
deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed
legislation.

The Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT

UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to certain
provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The
Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court is hereby
LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of R.A. No. 10354 which
have been herein declared as constitutional.
LIBERTY OF ABODE/TRAVEL
VILLAVICENCIO VS. LUKBAN
[ G.R. NO. L-14639 ]
FACTS:
Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with Anton
Hohmann, the city's Chief of Police, took custody of about 170
women at the night of October 25 beyond the latters consent
and knowledge and thereafter were shipped to Mindanao
specifically in Davao where they were signed as laborers. Said
women are inmates of the houses of prostitution situated in
Gardenia Street, in the district of Sampaloc.
That when the petitioner filed for habeas corpus, the
respondent moved to dismiss the case saying that those
women were already out of their jurisdiction and that , it
should be filed in the city of Davao instead.
The court ruled in favor of the petitioner with the
instructions;
For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order,
three optional courses were open: (1) They could have
produced the bodies of the persons according to the
command of the writ; or (2) they could have shown by affidavit
that on account of sickness or infirmity those persons could
not safely be brought before the court; or (3) they could have
presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or
their attorney waived the right to be present.
ISSUE:
The writ of Habeas Corpus was filed by the petitioner, with the
prayer that the respondent produce around 170 women whom
Justo Lukban et, al deported to Davao. Liberty of abode was
also raised versus the power of the executive of the
Municipality in deporting the women without their knowledge
in his capacity as Mayor.

Held:

The court concluded the case by granting the parties

aggrieved the sum of 400 pesos each, plus 100 pesos for
nominal damage due to contempt of court. Reasoning further
that if the chief executive of any municipality in the Philippines
could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and place him
beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then, when
called upon to defend his official action, could calmly fold his
hands and claim that the person was under no restraint and
that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other
municipality.

We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent

is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to
obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he
has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the
party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with
the custody of a person before the application for the writ is
no reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the
chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport
these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same
officials must necessarily have the same means to return them
from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of
process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of
her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow
the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has
lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The
great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded.
LIBERTY OF ABODE/TRAVEL
RUBI VS PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO
Constitutional Law : Article VI, Sec. 1(Legislative Power;
Non-Delegation)
[G.R. No. L-14078]

FACTS:
The case is an application for habeas corpus in favor of
Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro.
It is alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally
deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that
province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held
on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro,
against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held
under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison
at Calapan for having run away from the reservation.
The provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial
board thereof directed the Manguianes in question to
take up their habitation in Tigbao, a site on the shore of
Lake Naujan, selected by the provincial governor and
approved by the provincial board. The action was taken
in accordance with section 2145 of the Administrative
Code of 1917, and was duly approved by the Secretary
of the Interior as required by said action.
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads
as follows:

SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christian upon sites

selected by provincial governor. — With the prior
approval of the Department Head, the provincial
governor of any province in which non-Christian
inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course
is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to
direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on
sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him
an approved by the provincial board.

Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this

section of the Administrative Code.

ISSUE:
Does section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917
constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power by
the Philippine Legislature to a provincial official and a
department head, therefore making it unconstitutional?
HELD:
No. The Philippine Legislature has here conferred
authority upon the Province of Mindoro, to be exercised
by the provincial governor and the provincial board.
In determining whether the delegation of legislative
power is valid or not, the distinction is between the
delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily
involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and
conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution,
to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The
first cannot be done; to the later no valid objection can
be made. Discretion may be committed by the
Legislature to an executive department or official. The
Legislature may make decisions of executive
departments of subordinate official thereof, to whom it
has committed the execution of certain acts, final on
questions of fact. The growing tendency in the decision
is to give prominence to the "necessity" of the case.

In enacting the said provision of the Administrative

Code, the Legislature merely conferred upon the
provincial governor, with the approval of the provincial
board and the Department Head, discretionary authority
as to the execution of the law. This is necessary since
the provincial governor and the provincial board, as the
official representatives of the province, are better
qualified to judge “when such as course is deemed
necessary in the interest of law and order”. As officials
charged with the administration of the province and the
protection of its inhabitants, they are better fitted to
select sites which have the conditions most favorable
for improving the people who have the misfortune of
being in a backward state.

Hence, Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917

is not an unlawful delegation of legislative power by the
Philippine Legislature to provincial official and a
department head.
LIBERTY OF ABODE/TRAVEL

PASEI [PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS

INC] V. DRILON
[GR L-81958]
FACTS;
PASEI [Philippine Association of Service Exporters Inc] v. Drilon
[GR L-81958, 30 June 1988] En Banc, Sarmiento (J): 12 concur, 2
on leave Facts: The Philippine Association of Service Exporters,
Inc. (PASEI) is a firm "engaged principally in the recruitment of
Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas placement." It
challenged the Constitutional validity of DOLE’s Department
Order 1 (series of 1988), in the character of "Guidelines
Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino
Domestic and Household Workers," in a petition for certiorari
and prohibition. The measure is assailed (1) for "discrimination
against males or females;" that it "does not apply to all Filipino
workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar
skills;" (2) for being violative of the right to travel, and (3) for
being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power
being legislative, and not executive, in character. PASEI also
invoked Section 3 of Article XIII of the Constitution providing for
worker participation "in policy and decision-making processes
affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law as
Department Order No. 1, as contended, was passed in the
absence of prior consultations. It also claimed that it violated the
Charter's non-impairment clause, in addition to the "great and
irreparable injury" that PASEI members face should the Order be
further enforced. On 25 May 1988, the Solicitor General, on
behalf of the Secretary of Labor and Administrator of the POEA,
filed a Comment informing the Court that on 8 March 1988, the
Labor Secretary lifted the deployment ban in the states of Iraq,
Jordan, Qatar, Canada, Hongkong, United States, Italy, Norway,
Austria, and Switzerland. In submitting the validity of the
challenged "guidelines," the Solicitor General invokes the police
power of the Philippine State. Issue: Whether Department Order
1 unduly discriminates against women. Held: Department Order
1 applies only to "female contract workers," but it does not
thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes.
‘Equality before the law" under the Constitution does not import
a perfect identity of rights among all men and women. It admits
of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on
substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of
the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4)
they apply equally to all members of the same class. The
classification made — the preference for female workers — rests
on substantial distinctions. The sordid tales of maltreatment
suffered by migrant Filipina workers, even rape and various
forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of returning workers,
are compelling motives for urgent Government action. As
precisely the caretaker of Constitutional rights, the Court is
called upon to protect victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that
duty, the Court sustains the Government's efforts. There is no
evidence that, except perhaps for isolated instances, Filipino
men abroad have been afflicted with an identical predicament.
Discrimination in this case is justified. Further, the impugned
guidelines are applicable to all female domestic overseas
workers, not all Filipina workers. Had the ban been given
universal applicability, then it would have been unreasonable
and arbitrary, due to the fact that not all of them are similarly
circumstanced. What the Constitution prohibits is the singling
out of a select person or group of persons within an existing
class, to the prejudice of such a person or group or resulting in
an unfair advantage to another person or group of persons.
Where the classification is based on such distinctions that make
a real difference as infancy, sex, and stage of civilization of
minority groups, the better rule is to recognize its validity only if
the young, the women, and the cultural minorities are singled
out for favorable treatment.
ISSUE: Whether Department Order 1 unduly discriminates
against women.
HELD: Department Order 1 applies only to "female contract
workers," but it does not thereby make an undue
discrimination between the sexes. ‘Equality before the law"
under the Constitution does not import a perfect identity of
rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications,
provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial
distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they
apply equally to all members of the same class. The
classification made — the preference for female workers —
rests on substantial distinctions. The sordid tales of
maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina workers, even rape
and various forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of
returning workers, are compelling motives for urgent
Government action. As precisely the caretaker of
Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to protect
victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the Court
sustains the Government's efforts. There is no evidence that,
except perhaps for isolated instances, Filipino men abroad
have been afflicted with an identical predicament.
Discrimination in this case is justified. Further, the impugned
guidelines are applicable to all female domestic overseas
workers, not all Filipina workers. Had the ban been given
universal applicability, then it would have been unreasonable
and arbitrary, due to the fact that not all of them are similarly
circumstanced. What the Constitution prohibits is the singling
out of a select person or group of persons within an existing
class, to the prejudice of such a person or group or resulting
in an unfair advantage to another person or group of persons.
Where the classification is based on such distinctions that
make a real difference as infancy, sex, and stage of civilization
of minority groups, the better rule is to recognize its validity
only if the young, the women, and the cultural minorities are
singled out for favorable treatment.
RIGHT TO INFORMATION
CHAVEZ v. PEA and AMARI
[GR No. 133250]
FACTS: On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating PEA. PD
No. 1084 tasked PEA "to reclaim land, including foreshore and
submerged areas," and "to develop, improve, acquire, lease
and sell any and all kinds of lands." On the same date, then
President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1085
transferring to PEA the "lands reclaimed in the foreshore and
offshore of the Manila Bay" under the Manila-Cavite Coastal
Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).
On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino
issued Special Patent No. 3517, granting and transferring to
PEA "the parcels of land so reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite
Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) containing a
total area of one million nine hundred fifteen thousand eight
hundred ninety four (1,915,894) square meters." Subsequently,
on April 9, 1988, the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of
Parañaque issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 7309,
7311, and 7312, in the name of PEA, covering the three
reclaimed islands known as the "Freedom Islands" located at
the southern portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road,
Parañaque City.

PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation

without public bidding. On April 28, 1995, the Board of
Directors of PEA, in its Resolution No. 1245, confirmed the
JVA. On June 8, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos, through
then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, approved the JVA.
 The Senate Committees reported the results of their
investigation in Senate Committee Report No. 560 dated
September 16, 1997. Among the conclusions of their report
are: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI
under the JVA are lands of the public domain which the
government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore
PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2) the certificates of title
covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and (3) the JVA
itself is illegal.
On December 5, 1997, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued
Presidential Administrative Order No. 365 creating a Legal
Task Force to conduct a study on the legality of the JVA in
view of Senate Committee Report No. 560. The members of the
Legal Task Force were the Secretary of Justice, the Chief
Presidential Legal Counsel, and the Government Corporate
Counsel. The Legal Task Force upheld the legality of the JVA,
contrary to the conclusions reached by the Senate
Committees.

On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez ("Petitioner"

for brevity) as a taxpayer, filed the instant Petition for
Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order.
Petitioner contends the government stands to lose billions of
pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI.
Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any
renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section 28, Article II, and
Section 7, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution on the right of the
people to information on matters of public concern.

Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the Office of

the President, petitioner now prays that on "constitutional and
statutory grounds the renegotiated contract be declared null
and void."
ISSUE:

Whether the constitutional right to information includes

information on on-going neogtiations BEFORE a final
agreement;

HELD:
The State policy of full transparency in all transactions
involving public interest reinforces the people's right to
information on matters of public concern. This State
policy is expressed in Section 28, Article II of the
Constitution, thus: “Subject to reasonable conditions
prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a
policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions
involving public interest."

Contrary to AMARI's contention, the commissioners

of the 1986 Constitutional Commission understood that
the right to information "contemplates inclusion of
negotiations leading to the consummation of the
transaction." Certainly, a consummated contract is not a
requirement for the exercise of the right to information.
Otherwise, the people can never exercise the right if no
contract is consummated, and if one is consummated, it
may be too late for the public to expose its defects.

Requiring a consummated contract will keep the

public in the dark until the contract, which may be
grossly disadvantageous to the government or even
illegal, becomes a fait accompli.
 However, the right to information does not compel
PEA to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like
relating to the renegotiation of the JVA. 34 The right
only affords access to records, documents and papers,
which means the opportunity to inspect and copy them.
One who exercises the right must copy the records,
documents and papers at his expense. The exercise of
the right is also subject to reasonable regulations to
protect the integrity of the public records and to
minimize disruption to government operations, like rules
specifying when and how to conduct the inspection and
copying.
 ECHEGARAY V SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
[G.R. NO. 132601]
FACTS:
The SC affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo
Echegaray y Pilo for the crime of rape of the 10 year-old
daughter of his common-law spouse and the imposition
upon him of the death penalty for the said crime.
He filed an MFR and a supplemental MFR raising for the
first time the issue of the constitutionality of Republic
Act No. 7659 and the death penalty for rape. The Court
denied both motions.

In the meantime, Congress had seen it fit to change the

mode of execution of the death penalty from
electrocution to lethal injection, and passed Republic
Act No. 8177, AN ACT DESIGNATING DEATH BY
LETHAL INJECTION AS THE METHOD OF CARRYING
OUT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, AMENDING FOR THE
PURPOSE ARTICLE 81 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE,
AS AMENDED BY SECTION 24 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO.
7659.

The convict filed a Petition for prohibition from carrying

out the lethal injection against him under the grounds
that it constituted cruel, degrading, or unusual
punishment, being violative of due process, a violation
of the Philippines' obligations under international
covenants, an undue delegation of legislative power by
Congress, an unlawful exercise by respondent Secretary
of the power to legislate, and an unlawful delegation of
delegated powers by the Secretary of Justice to
respondent Director.

In his motion to amend, the petitioner added equal

protection as a ground.

The Office of the Solicitor General stated that this Court

has already upheld the constitutionality of the Death
Penalty Law, and has repeatedly declared that the death
penalty is not cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual
punishment; execution by lethal injection, as authorized
under R.A. No. 8177 and the questioned rules, is
constitutional, lethal injection being the most modern,
more humane, more economical, safer and easier to
apply (than electrocution or the gas chamber); the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does
not expressly or impliedly prohibit the imposition of the
death penalty; R.A. No. 8177 properly delegated
legislative power to respondent Director; and that R.A.
No. 8177 confers the power to promulgate the
implementing rules to the Secretary of Justice,
Secretary of Health and the Bureau of Corrections.

The Commission on Human Rights filed a Motion for

Leave of Court to Intervene and/or Appear as Amicus
Curiae with the attached Petition to Intervene and/or
Appear as Amicus Curiae. They alleged similarly with
Echegaray’s arguments.
The petitioner filed a reply similar to his first arguments.
The court gave due course to the petition.

Concisely put, petitioner argues that R.A. No. 8177 and

its implementing rules do not pass constitutional muster
for: (a) violation of the constitutional proscription
against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment, (b)
violation of our international treaty obligations, (c) being
an undue delegation of legislative power, and (d) being
discriminatory.

ISSUE:
1. Is it a violation of the constitutional proscription
against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment?
2. Is it an undue delegation of legislative power?
3. Whether or not the SC, after the decision in the case
becomes final and executory, still has jurisdiction over
the case.
RULING:
1. Petitioner contends that death by lethal
injection constitutes cruel, degrading and inhuman
punishment considering that (1) R.A. No. 8177 fails to
provide for the drugs to be used in carrying out lethal
injection, the dosage for each drug to be administered,
and the procedure in administering said drug/s into the
accused; (2) R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules
are uncertain as to the date of the execution, time of
notification, the court which will fix the date of
execution, which uncertainties cause the greatest pain
and suffering for the convict; and (3) the possibility of
"botched executions" or mistakes in administering the
drugs renders lethal injection inherently cruel.
Now it is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death
penalty per se is not a cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment.
Harden v. Director of Prisons- "punishments are cruel
when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the
punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of
that word as used in the constitution. It implies there
something inhuman and barbarous, something more
than the mere extinguishment of life." Would the lack in
particularity then as to the details involved in the
execution by lethal injection render said law "cruel,
degrading or inhuman"? The Court believes not. For
reasons discussed, the implementing details of R.A. No.
8177 are matters which are properly left to the
competence and expertise of administrative officials.
Petitioner contends that Sec. 16 of R.A. No. 8177 is
uncertain as to which "court" will fix the time and date
of execution, and the date of execution and time of
notification of the death convict. As petitioner already
knows, the "court" which designates the date of
execution is the trial court which convicted the accused.
The procedure is that the "judgment is entered fifteen
(15) days after its promulgation, and 10 days thereafter,
the records are remanded to the court below including a
certified copy of the judgment for execution. Neither is
there any uncertainty as to the date of execution nor the
time of notification. As to the date of execution, Section
15 of the implementing rules must be read in
conjunction with the last sentence of Section 1 of R.A.
No. 8177 which provides that the death sentence shall
be carried out "not earlier than one (1) year nor later
then eighteen (18) months from the time the judgment
imposing the death penalty became final and executory,
without prejudice to the exercise by the President of his
executive clemency powers at all times." Hence, the
death convict is in effect assured of eighteen (18)
months from the time the judgment imposing the death
penalty became final and executor wherein he can seek
executive clemency and attend to all his temporal and
spiritual affairs.
Petitioner further contends that the infliction of "wanton
pain" in case of possible complications in the
intravenous injection that respondent Director is an
untrained and untested person insofar as the choice and
administration of lethal injection is concerned, renders
lethal injection a cruel, degrading and inhuman
punishment. This is unsubstantiated.
First. Petitioner has neither alleged nor presented
evidence that lethal injection required the expertise only
of phlebotomists and not trained personnel and that the
drugs to be administered are unsafe or ineffective.
Petitioner simply cites situations in the United States
wherein execution by lethal injection allegedly resulted
in prolonged and agonizing death for the convict,
without any other evidence whatsoever.
Second. Petitioner overlooked Section 1, third
paragraph of R.A. No. 8177 which requires that all
personnel involved in the execution proceedings should
be trained prior to the performance of such task. We
must presume that the public officials entrusted with the
implementation of the death penalty will carefully avoid
inflicting cruel punishment.
Third. Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely
incidental in carrying out the execution of death penalty
and does not fall within the constitutional proscription
against cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. "In
a limited sense, anything is cruel which is calculated to
give pain or distress, and since punishment imports
pain or suffering to the convict, it may be said that all
punishments are cruel. But of course the Constitution
does not mean that crime, for this reason, is to go
unpunished." The cruelty against which the Constitution
protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the
method of punishment, not the necessary suffering
involved in any method employed to extinguish life
humanely.
What is cruel and unusual "is not fastened to the
obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion
becomes enlightened by a humane justice" and "must
draw its meaning from the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."

2. THERE IS NO UNDUE DELEGATION OF

LEGISLATIVE POWER IN R.A. NO. 8177 TO THE
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AND THE DIRECTOR OF
BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, BUT SECTION 19 OF THE
RULES AND REGULATIONS TO IMPLEMENT R.A. NO.
8177 IS INVALID.

The separation of power is a fundamental principle in

our system of government and each department has
exclusive cognizance of matters placed within its
jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. A
consequence of the doctrine of separation of powers is
the principle of non-delegation of powers. In Latin
maxim, the rule is : potestas delegata non delegari
potest.” (what has been delegated, cannot be
delegated). There are however exceptions to this rule
and one of the recognized exceptions is “ Delegation to
Administrative Bodies “

The Secretary of Justice in conjunction with the

Secretary of Health and the Director of the Bureau of
Corrections are empowered to promulgate rules and
regulations on the subject of lethal injection.

The reason for delegation of authority to administrative

agencies is the increasing complexity of the task of
government requiring expertise as well as the growing
inability of the legislature to cope directly with the
myriad problems demanding its attention.

Although Congress may delegate to another branch of

the Government the power to fill in the details in the
execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is
essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of
separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in
itself – it must set forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate –
and (b) fix a standard – the limits of which are
sufficiently determinate or determinable – to which the
delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions.

Considering the scope and the definiteness of RA 8177,

which changed the mode of carrying out the death
penalty, the Court finds that the law sufficiently
describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and
what is the scope of his authority.

RA 8177 likewise provides the standards which define

the legislative policy, mark its limits, map out its
boundaries, and specify the public agencies which will
apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the
legislative purpose may be carried out.

3. The finality of judgment does not mean that the

SC has lost all its powers or the case. By the finality of
the judgment, what the SC loses is its jurisdiction to
amend, modify or alter the same. Even after the
judgment has become final, the SC retains its
jurisdiction to execute and enforce it.
 The power to control the execution of the SC’s
decision is an essential aspect of its jurisdiction. It
cannot be the subject of substantial subtraction for the
Constitution vests the entirety of judicial power in one
SC and in such lower courts as may be established by
law. The important part of a litigation, whether civil or
criminal, is the process of execution of decisions where
supervening events may change the circumstance of the
parties and compel courts to intervene and adjust the
rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. It is because
of these unforeseen, supervening contingencies that
courts have been conceded the inherent and necessary
power of control of its processes and orders to make
them comform to law and justice.

The Court also rejected public respondent’s

contention that by granting the TRO, the Court has in
effect granted reprieve which is an executive function
under Sec. 19, Art. VII of the Constitution. In truth, an
accused who has been convicted by final judgment still
possesses collateral rights and these rights can be
claimed in the appropriate courts. For instance, a death
convict who becomes insane after his final conviction
cannot be executed while in a state of insanity. The
suspension of such a death sentence is indisputably an
exercise of judicial power. It is not a usurpation of the
presidential power of reprieve though its effects are the
same as the temporary suspension of the execution of
the death convict. In the same vein, it cannot be denied
that Congress can at any time amend the Death Penalty
Law by reducing the penalty of death to life
imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment is like
that of commutation of sentence. But the exercise of
Congress of its plenary power to amend laws cannot be
considered as a violation of the power of the President
to commute final sentences of conviction. The powers
of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to
save the life of a death convict do not exclude each
other for the simple reason that there is no higher right
than the right to life. To contend that only the Executive
can protect the right to life of an accused after his final
conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and
coordinate powers of the 3 branches of the government.
 BANTAY REPUBLIC ACT. VS. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 177271)

FACTS:
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for
certiorari and mandamus to nullify and set aside certain
issuances of the Commission on Elections (Comelec)
respecting party-list groups which have manifested their
intention to participate in the party-list elections on May
14, 2007.

A number of organized groups filed the necessary

manifestations and subsequently were accredited by the
Comelec to participate in the 2007 elections. Bantay
Republic Act (BA-RA 7941) and the Urban Poor for Legal
Reforms (UP-LR) filed with the Comelec an Urgent
Petition seeking to disqualify the nominees of certain
party-list organizations. Meanwhile petitioner Rosales,
in G.R. No. 177314, addressed 2 letters to the Director of
the Comelec’s Law Department requesting a list of that
groups’ nominees. Evidently unbeknownst then to Ms.
Rosales, et al., was the issuance of Comelec en banc
Resolution 07-0724 under date April 3, 2007 virtually
declaring the nominees’ names confidential and in net
effect denying petitioner Rosales’ basic disclosure
request. According to COMELEC, there is nothing in
R.A. 7941 that requires the Comelec to disclose the
names of nominees, and that party list elections must
not be personality oriented according to Chairman
Abalos.
 In the first petition (G.R. No. 177271), BA-RA 7941
and UP-LR assail the Comelec resolutions accrediting
private respondents Biyaheng Pinoy et al., to participate
in the forthcoming party-list elections without
simultaneously determining whether or not their
respective nominees possess the requisite
qualifications defined in R.A. No. 7941, or the "Party-List
System Act" and belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector each seeks to.

In the second petition (G.R. No. 177314), petitioners

Loreta Ann P. Rosales, Kilosbayan Foundation and
Bantay Katarungan Foundation impugn Comelec
Resolution dated April 3, 2007.

While both petitions commonly seek to compel the

Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the
nominees of the various party-list groups named in the
petitions, BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR have the additional
prayers that the 33 private respondents named therein
be "declare[d] as unqualified to participate in the party-
list elections and that the Comelec be enjoined from
allowing respondent groups from participating in the
elections.
ISSUE:
1. Can the Court cancel the accreditation accorded
by the Comelec to the respondent party-list groups
named in their petition on the ground that these groups
and their respective nominees do not appear to be
qualified.
2. Whether respondent Comelec, by refusing to
reveal the names of the nominees of the various party-
list groups, has violated the right to information and free
access to documents as guaranteed by the Constitution;
and
3. Whether respondent Comelec is mandated by the
Constitution to disclose to the public the names of said
nominees.
RULING:
1. The Court is unable to grant the desired plea of
petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR for cancellation of
accreditation on the grounds thus advanced in their
petition. The exercise would require the Court to make a
factual determination, a matter which is outside the
office of judicial review by way of special civil action for
certiorari. In certiorari proceedings, the Court is not
called upon to decide factual issues and the case must
be decided on the undisputed facts on record. The sole
function of a writ of certiorari is to address issues of
want of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion and
does not include a review of the tribunal’s evaluation of
the evidence. Also, the petitioner’s posture that the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it
granted the assailed accreditations without
simultaneously determining the qualifications of their
nominees is without basis, Nowhere in R .A. No. 7941 is
there a requirement that the qualification of a party-list
nominee be determined simultaneously with the
accreditation of an organization.

2. Section 7, Article III of the Constitution, viz:

Sec.7. The right of the people to information on

matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access
to official records, and to documents, and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as
well to government research data used as basis for
policy development, shall be afforded the citizen,
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

Section 28, Article II of the Constitution reading:

Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed

by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full
public disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest.

As may be noted, no national security or like

concerns is involved in the disclosure of the names of
the nominees of the partylist groups in question.
Doubtless, the Comelec committed grave abuse of
discretion in refusing the legitimate demands of the
petitioners for a list of the nominees of the party-list
groups subject of their respective petitions. Mandamus,
therefore, lies.
 The last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. 7941 reading:
"[T]he names of the party-list nominees shall not be
shown on the certified list" is certainly not a justifying
card for the Comelec to deny the requested disclosure.
To us, the prohibition imposed on the Comelec under
said Section 7 is limited in scope and duration, meaning,
that it extends only to the certified list which the same
provision requires to be posted in the polling places on
election day. To stretch the coverage of the prohibition
to the absolute is to read into the law something that is
not intended. As it were, there is absolutely nothing in
R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits the Comelec from
disclosing or even publishing through mediums other
than the "Certified List" the names of the party-list
nominees. The Comelec obviously misread the limited
nondisclosure aspect of the provision as an absolute
bar to public disclosure before the May 2007 elections.
The interpretation thus given by the Comelec virtually
tacks an unconstitutional dimension on the last
sentence of Section 7 of R.A. No. 7941.

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 177271 is

partly DENIED insofar as it seeks to nullify the
accreditation of the respondents named therein.
However, insofar as it seeks to compel the Comelec to
disclose or publish the names of the nominees of party-
list groups, sectors or organizations accredited to
participate in the May 14, 2007 elections, the same
petition and the petition in G.R. No. 177314 are
GRANTED.
RIGHT TO FORM ASSOCIATION

BANGALISAN V CA
[G.R. No. 124678]
FACTS:
The Secretary of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) placed
petitioners under preventive suspension in
connection with a mass action staged by a
number of public school teachers allegedly to
dramatize their grievances against public
school authorities. Civil Service Commission
issued a resolution finding the petitioners
guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service and meted them a six-
month suspension with automatic
reinstatement in service but without payment
of backwages.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not employees in the public
service may engage in strikes.
 HELD:
NO. While the Constitution recognizes the
right of government employees to organize,
they are prohibited from staging strikes,
demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and
other forms of mass action which will result in
temporary stoppage or disruption of public
services. The right of government employees
to organize is limited only to the formation of
unions or associations, without including the
right to strike. It is an undisputed fact that
there was a work stoppage and that
petitioners’ purpose was to realize their
demands by withholding their services. The
fact that the conventional term “strike” was
not used by the striking employees to describe
their common course of action is
inconsequential, since the substance of the
situation, and not its appearance, will be
deemed to be controlling.

Petition is DENIED. Decision of Court of

Appeals is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION.
 OCCENA VS. COMELEC
SAMUEL OCCENA VS. COMELEC
[G.R. NO. L-34150]

FACTS: Petitioner Samuel Occena and Ramon A.

Gozales instituted a prohibiting proceedings against the
validity of three batasang pambansa resolutions
(Resolution No. 1 proposing an amendment allowing a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines naturalized in a
foreign country to own a limited area of land for
residential purposes was approved by the vote of 122 to
5; Resolution No. 2 dealing with the Presidency, the
Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the National
Assembly by a vote of 147 to 5 with 1 abstention; and
Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to the Article on the
Commission on Elections by a vote of 148 to 2 with 1
abstention.) The petitioners contends that such
resolution is against the constitutions in proposing
amendments:

ISSUE: Whether the resolutions are

unconstitutional?
 HELD: In dismissing the petition for lack of merit,
the court ruled the following:

1. The power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to

propose its amendments and how it may be exercised
was validly obtained. The 1973 Constitution in its
Transitory Provisions vested the Interim National
Assembly with the power to propose amendments upon
special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of the
majority of its members to be ratified in accordance with
the Article on Amendments similar with the interim and
regular national assembly. 15 When, therefore, the
Interim Batasang Pambansa, upon the call of the
President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos, met
as a constituent body it acted by virtue of such
impotence.

2. Petitioners assailed that the resolutions where so

extensive in character as to amount to a revision rather
than amendments. To dispose this contention, the court
held that whether the Constitutional Convention will
only propose amendments to the Constitution or
entirely overhaul the present Constitution and propose
an entirely new Constitution based on an ideology
foreign to the democratic system, is of no moment,
because the same will be submitted to the people for
ratification. Once ratified by the sovereign people, there
can be no debate about the validity of the new
Constitution. The fact that the present Constitution may
be revised and replaced with a new one ... is no
argument against the validity of the law because
'amendment' includes the 'revision' or total overhaul of
the entire Constitution. At any rate, whether the
Constitution is merely amended in part or revised or
totally changed would become immaterial the moment
the same is ratified by the sovereign people."

3. That leaves only the questions of the vote

necessary to propose amendments as well as the
standard for proper submission. The language of the
Constitution supplies the answer to the above
questions. The Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a
constituent body, can propose amendments. In that
capacity, only a majority vote is needed. It would be an
indefensible proposition to assert that the three-fourth
votes required when it sits as a legislative body applies
as well when it has been convened as the agency
through which amendments could be proposed. That is
not a requirement as far as a constitutional convention
is concerned. Further, the period required by the
constitution was complied as follows: "Any amendment
to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when
ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
which shall be held not later than three months after the
approval of such amendment or revision." 21 The three
resolutions were approved by the Interim Batasang
Pambansa sitting as a constituent assembly on
February 5 and 27, 1981. In the Batasang Pambansa Blg.
22, the date of the plebiscite is set for April 7, 1981. It is
thus within the 90-day period provided by the
Constitution.
 PHILRECA vs. DILG
[G.R. No. 143076]

FACT: A class suit was filed by petitioners in their

own behalf and in behalf of other electric cooperatives
organized and existing under P.D. No. 269, as amended,
and registered with the National Electrification
Administration (NEA). Accordingly, petitioners enjoys
Assistance; Exemption from Taxes, Imposts, Duties,
Fees; Assistance from the National Power Corporation.
Petitioners contend that they are exempt from payment
of local taxes, including payment of real property tax.
With the passage of the Local Government Code,
however, they allege that their tax exemptions have
been invalidly withdrawn. In particular, petitioners assail
Sections 193 and 234 of the Local Government Code on
the ground that the said provisions discriminate against
them, in violation of the equal protection clause.
Further, they submit that the said provisions are
unconstitutional because they impair the obligation of
contracts between the Philippine Government and the
United States Government.

Issue: Whether the assailed provisions of the Local

Government Code violates the rights of the Petitioners
to the Equal Protection clause by unreasonable
classifying them and withdrawing their Tax exemption
 Held: There is No Violation of the Equal
Protection Clause. The equal protection clause
under the Constitution means that “no person or
class of persons shall be deprived of the same
protection of laws which is enjoyed by other
persons or other classes in the same place and in
like circumstances.” Thus, the guaranty of the
equal protection of the laws is not violated by a law
based on reasonable classification. The court hold
that there is reasonable classification under the
Local Government Code to justify the different tax
treatment between electric cooperatives covered
by P.D. No. 269, as amended, and electric
cooperatives under R.A. No. 6938.

First, substantial distinctions exist between

cooperatives under P.D. No. 269, as amended, and
cooperatives under R.A. No. 6938. These
distinctions are manifest in at least two material
respects which go into the nature of cooperatives
envisioned by R.A. No. 6938 and which
characteristics are not present in the type of
cooperative associations created under P.D. No.
269, as amended.
 Capital Contributions by Members
Extent of Government Control over
Cooperatives
Second, the classification of tax-exempt entities
in the Local Government Code is germane to the
purpose of the law. The Constitutional mandate
that every local government unit shall enjoy local
autonomy, does not mean that the exercise of
power by local governments is beyond regulation
by Congress. Thus, while each government unit is
granted the power to create its own sources of
revenue, Congress, in light of its broad power to
tax, has the discretion to determine the extent of
the taxing powers of local government units
consistent with the policy of local autonomy.
 GANZON V INSERTO
[G.R. No. L-56450]
FACTS:
Petitioner Rodolfo Ganzon executed a deed of absolute
sale of a parcel of land in favor of private respondents.
Several months later, a deed of real estate mortgage was
executed between the same parties to secure the payment
by the private respondents of a promissory not in favor of
petitioner. Private respondents filed a civil action against
petitioners after Ganzon initiated extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings in accordance with the terms and conditions
of the said mortgage. Respondent judge ordered the
substitution of the mortgage lien with a surety bond.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the order of respondent judge violates
the non-impairment clause of the Constitution.

HELD:
YES. Substitution of the mortgage with a surety bond
to ensure the payment of a loan would in effect change the
terms and conditions of the mortgage contract. Even
before trial on the very issues affecting the contract, the
respondent court has directed a deviation from its terms,
diminished its efficiency and dispensed with a primary
condition.

Instant petition si GRANTED. Orders of the trial court

are SET ASIDE.
 ROBIDANTE L. KABILING,
vs.
THE NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY AND THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
[G.R. No. L-57424 December 18, 1987]
FACTS:
Petitioners' are among the landowners whose title
to their respective lots have already been transferred
to respondent NHA pursuant to the provisions of P.D.
No. 1808. Wherein said petitioners assailed the
constitutionality of P.D . No. 1808. Alleging that said
P.D . No. 1808 deprives them of their property
without due process of law and without just
compensation and of their right to protection of the
laws. They further alleged that their properties are not
the proper subject of expropriation by the
government.

ISSUE/S:
1. Is P.D. No. 1808 unconstitutional due to the
deprivation of due process and just compensation?

RULING:
The petitioners' challenge to the constitutionality
of P.D. No. 1808 cannot be sustained. The objective
of the decree, namely, to resolve the land tenure
problem in the Agno-Leveriza area to allow the
implementation of the comprehensive development
plans for this depressed community, provides the
justification for the exercise of the police power of the
State. The police power of the State has been
described as "the most essential, insistent and
illimitable of powers. It is a power inherent in the
State, plenary, "suitably vague and far from precisely
defined, rooted in the conception that man in
organizing the state and imposing upon the
government limitations to safeguard constitutional
rights did not intend thereby to enable individual
citizens or group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably
the enactment of such salutary measure to ensure
communal peace, safety, good order and welfare.
Petitioners also cannot complain that they are
being deprived of their property without due process
of law and just compensation since Sec. 3 of P.D. No.
1808 provides for just compensation to lot owners
who have fully paid their obligations to the City of
Manila under their respective contracts before the
issuance of the decree, and while including
petitioners Robidante L. Kabiling, et al. to those have
not yet claimed the compensation for their respective
lots.
The motion for reconsideration was DENIED.
 BLAQUERA VS. ALCALA
[G.R. NO. 109406, SEPTEMBER 11, 1998]
FACTS:
On Feb. 21, 1992, then Pres. Aquino issued AO 268
which granted each official and employee of the
government the productivity incentive benefits in a
maximum amount equivalent to 30% of the
employee’s one month basic salary but which amount
not be less than P2, 000.00. Said AO provided that the
productivity incentive benefits shall be granted only
for the year 1991. Accordingly, all heads of agencies,
including government boards of government-owned
or controlled corporations and financial institutions,
are strictly prohibited from granting productivity
incentive benefits for the year 1992 and future years
pending the result of a comprehensive study being
undertaken by the Office of the Pres.

The petitioners, who are officials and employees of

several government departments and agencies, were
paid incentive benefits for the year 1992. Then, on
Jan. 19, 1993, then Pres. Ramos issued AO 29
authorizing the grant of productivity incentive
benefits for the year 1992 in the maximum amount of
P1,000.00 and reiterating the prohibition under Sec. 7
of AO 268, enjoining the grant of productivity
incentive benefits without prior approval of the
President. Sec. 4 of AO 29 directed all departments,
offices and agencies which authorized payment of
productivity incentive bonus for the year 1992 in
excess of P1, 000.00 to immediately cause the refund
of the excess. In compliance therewith, the heads of
the departments or agencies of the government
concerned caused the deduction from petitioners’
salaries or allowances of the amounts needed to
cover the alleged overpayments.

ISSUE: Whether or not AO 29 and AO 268 were issued

in the valid exercise of presidential control over the
executive departments

HELD: The Pres. is the head of the government.

Governmental power and authority are exercised and
implemented through him. His power includes the
control of executive departments as provided under
Sec. 17, Art. VII of the Constitution.

Control means the power of an officer to alter or

modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had
done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the
latter. The Pres. can, by virtue of his power of control,
review, modify, alter or nullify any action or decision
of his subordinate in the executive departments,
bureau or offices under him.

When the Pres. issued AO 29 limiting the amount of

incentive benefits, enjoining heads of government
agencies from granting incentive benefits without
approval from him and directing the refund of the
excess over the prescribed amount, the Pres. was
just exercising his power of control over executive
departments.

The Pres. issued subject AOs to regulate the grant of

productivity incentive benefits and to prevent
discontent, dissatisfaction and demoralization among
government personnel by committing limited
resources of government for the equal payment of
incentives and awards. The Pres. was only exercising
his power of control by modifying the acts of the
heads of the government agencies who granted
incentive benefits to their employees without
appropriate clearance from the Office of the Pres.,
thereby resulting in the uneven distribution of
government resources.

The President’s duty to execute the law is of

constitutional origin. So, too, is his control of
executive departments.
 CABALLES VS. CA
GR No. 136292
January. 15, 2002

FACTS:

On or about the 28th day of June, 1989, in the

Municipality of Pangasinan, and/or elsewhere
in the Province of Laguna, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honourable Court, the
above mentioned accused with intent to gain
and without the knowledge and consent of the
owner thereof, the National Power Corporation,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, steal and carry away about
630 kg of Aluminium cable conductors, valued
at Php 27, 450.00, belonging to and to the
damage and prejudice of said owner National
Power Corporation, in the aforesaid amount.

ISSUE:

WON the warrantless search without consent

is valid?
HELD:

In case of consented searches or waiver of the

constitutional guarantee against obtrusive
searches, it is fundamental that to constitute a
waiver, it must first appear that (1) the right
exists; (2) that person involved had
knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the
existence of such right, and (3) said person
had an actual intention to relinquish the right.

In the case at bar, the evidence is lacking that

the petitioner intentionally surrendered his
right against unreasonable searches.

WHEREFORE, the impugned decision is

reversed and set aside, and accused Rudy
Caballes is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime
charged.
 CABALLES VS. CA
GR No. 136292
January. 15, 2002

FACTS:

Sgt. Victorino Noceja and Pat. Alex de Castro,

while on a routine patrol in Barangay
Sampalucan, Pagsanjan, spotted a passenger
jeep unusually covered with “kakawati” leaves.

Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with

smuggled goods, the two police officers
flagged down the vehicle. The jeep was driven
by appellant. When asked what was loaded on
the jeep, he did not answer, and appeared
nervous.

With appellant’s consent, the police officers

checked the cargo and they discovered
bundles of 3.08 mm aluminum/galvanized
conductor wires exclusively owned by National
Power Corporation (NPC). When asked where
the wires came from, appellant answered that
they came from Cavinti, a town approximately
8 kilometers away from Sampalucan.

The court a quo rendered judgment finding the

accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Theft.
The CA affirmed the judgment of conviction.

Petitioner now comes to the Court contending

that the flagging down of his vehicle by police
officers who were on routine patrol, merely on
“suspicion” that “it might contain smuggled
goods,” does not constitute probable cause
that will justify a warrantless search and
seizure.

ISSUE:

Whether the evidence taken from the

warrantless search is admissible against the
appellant.

RULING:

It is not controverted that the search and

seizure conducted by the police officers in the
case at bar was not authorized by a search
warrant.

A warrantless search of a moving vehicle is

justified on the ground that it is not practicable
to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction
in which the warrant must be sought. Searches
without warrant of automobiles is also allowed
for the purpose of preventing violations of
smuggling or immigration laws, provided such
searches are made at borders or ‘constructive
borders’ like checkpoints near the boundary
lines of the State.

The mere mobility of these vehicles, however,

does not give the police officers unlimited
discretion to conduct indiscriminate searches
without warrants if made within the interior of
the territory and in the absence of probable
cause. Still and all, the important thing is that
there was probable cause to conduct the
warrantless search, which must still be present
in such a case.

Routine inspections are not regarded as

violative of an individual’s right against
unreasonable search. The search which is
normally permissible in this instance is limited
to the following instances:

(1) where the officer merely draws aside the

curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on
the public fair grounds; (2) simply looks into a
vehicle; (3) flashes a light therein without
opening the car’s doors; (4) where the
occupants are not subjected to a physical or
body search; (5) where the inspection of the
vehicles is limited to a visual search or visual
inspection; and (6) where the routine check is
conducted in a fixed area.

None of the foregoing circumstances is

obtaining in the case at bar. The police officers
did not merely conduct a visual search or
visual inspection of herein petitioner’s
vehicle.They had to reach inside the vehicle,
lift the kakawati leaves and look inside the
sacks before they were able to see the cable
wires. It cannot be considered a simple routine
check.

The vehicle of the petitioner was flagged down

because the police officers who were on
routine patrol became suspicious when they
saw that the back of the vehicle was covered
with kakawati leaves which, according to them,
was unusual and uncommon.

We hold that the fact that the vehicle looked

suspicious simply because it is not common
for such to be covered with kakawati leaves
does not constitute “probable cause” as would
justify the conduct of a search without a
warrant.
Neither can petitioner’s passive submission be
construed as an implied acquiescence to the
warrantless search.

Casting aside the cable wires as evidence, the

remaining evidence on record are insufficient
to sustain petitioner’s conviction. His guilt can
only be established without violating the
constitutional right of the accused against
unreasonable search and seizure.

The impugned decision was REVERSED and

SET ASIDE, and accused Rudy Caballes was
ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
MISAMIS UNIVERSITY