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Conflict Batch 3 I Atty.

Torregosa I EH 501
1. BOUDARD VS TAIT should be authenticated by the Consul or some consular agent of the United States in said
Facts: Emilie Boudard (appellant), widow of Marie Theodore Jerome Boudard and guardian of country.
her coappellants, her children born during her marriage with the deceased (Marie Theodore
Jerome Boudard), obtained a judgment in their favor from the Court of First Instance of Hanoi, The appellants argue that the papers are the original documents and that the Honorable
French Indo-China for the sum of 40,000 piastras, plus interest. The judgment was rendered French Consul in the Philippines has confirmed this fact. Such argument is not sufficient to
against Stewart Eddie Tait who had been declared in default for his failure to appear at the authorize a deviation from a rule established and sanctioned by law. To comply with the rule,
trial before said court. Marie Theodore Jerome Boudard, who was an employee of Stewart the best evidence of foreign judicial proceedings is a certified copy of the same with all the
Eddie Tait, was killed in Hanoi by other employees of said Tait, although "outside of the formalities required in said sections 304 and 305 for only thus can one be absolutely sure of
fulfillment of a duty". the authenticity of the record.

Emilie Boudard and children appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila On the other hand, said exhibits or documents, if admitted, would only corroborate and
dismissing the case instituted by them, thereby overruling their complaint, and sentencing strengthen the evidence of the appellee which in itself is convincing, and the conclusion of the
them to pay the costs. lower court that the appellee is not liable for the amount to which he was sentenced, as alleged
for he was not du]v tried or even summoned in conformity with the law.
The dismissal of appellants' complaint by the lower court was based principally on the lack of Moreover, the evidence of record shows that the appellee was not in Hanoi during the time
jurisdiction of the Court of Hanoi to render the judgment in question, for the execution of mentioned in the complaint of the appellants, nor were his employees or representatives. The
which this action was instituted in this jurisdiction. The lack of jurisdiction was discovered in rule in matters of this nature is that judicial proceedings in a foreign country, regarding
the decision itself of the Court of Hanoi which states that the appellee was not a resident of, payment of money, are only effective against a party if summons is duly served on him within
nor had a known domicile in, that country. such foreign country before the proceedings.

The evidence adduced at the trial conclusively proves that neither the appellee nor his agent 2. NORTHWEST ORIENT AIRLINES VS CA
or employees were ever in Hanoi, French Indo-China; and that the deceased Marie Theodore FACTS: Northwest Airlines is an airline company operating its business in Japan. It entered into
Jerome Boudard had never, at any time, been his employee. a contract with a Philippine corporation, CF Sharp, for the latter to sell airlines tickets. When
Sharp failed to remit the proceeds, the airline sued before Japanese Courts.
Issue: WON the service of summons is proper
The summons intended for the Philippine corporation was attempted to be served twice at its
Ruling: From notes: office in Japan but without success. The first attempt failed because the officer authorized to
Under existing jurisprudence and US authorities, the rule is uniform that in actions in personam, receive summons was not around. The second attempt also failed because while the officer
the defendant can only be served with summons and jurisdiction over him can only be acquired was already there, he claimed that he is no longer authorized or he is no longer connected with
if he is still within the territory where the court sits. In other words, summons should be served Sharp.
while defendant was still in Hanoi.
The summons not having been served, the Japanese court resorted to service of summons
Here, the defendant was already in the Philippines when the summons was served. Such through diplomatic channels. Under this mode, the Japanese court requested its Supreme
extraterritorial service does not vest jurisdiction in favor of the Hanoi court. Court to direct the service of the summons to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, and then
the Ministry coordinated with the Japanese consular office in the Philippines, and the foreign
From the full text: affairs coordinated with the Philippine court.
No.
It was really unnecessary for the lower court to admit Exhibits D, E, F and H to M-1, nor can The court now served summons on the defendant at its principal office in Manila. When the
these exhibits be admitted as evidence, for, as to the first point, the appellants failed to show Philippine corporation failed to participate in the proceedings, the Japanese court rendered
that the proceedings against the appellee in the Court of Hanoi were in accordance with the judgment in favor of the airline, and when the judgment cannot be satisfied in Japan, the airline
laws of France then in force. filed an action before the Philippine court for the enforcement of the foreign judgment.

Moreover, it appears that said documents are not of the nature mentioned in sections 304 and In its defense, Sharp argued that the decision rendered by the Japanese court is void because
305 of Act No. 190. They are not copies of the judicial record of the proceedings against the it is vitiated by lack of jurisdiction over his person. It claimed that the service of summons was
appellee in the Court of Hanoi, duly certified by the Proper authorities there, whose signatures not proper, relying on the case of Boudard v. Tait because like in that case, the summons was
served beyond the jurisdiction of the Japanese court.

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Conflict Batch 3 I Atty. Torregosa I EH 501
jurisdiction of the courts therein and may be deemed to have assented to the said courts'
Issue: WON Japanese court has jurisidction lawful methods of serving process.

Ruling: YES. Consequently, the party attacking (Sharp) a foreign judgment has the burden of Accordingly, the extraterritorial service of summons on it by the Japanese Court was valid not
overcoming the presumption of its validity. only under the processual presumption but also because of the presumption of regularity of
performance of official duty.
Accordingly, the presumption of validity and regularity of the service of summons and the
decision thereafter rendered by the Japanese court must stand. 3.Nagarmull vs Binalbagan Isabela
Principle : It is true that under the provisions of Section 50 of Rule 39, Rules of Court, a
Applying it, the Japanese law on the matter is presumed to be similar with the Philippine law judgment for a sum of money rendered by a foreign court "is presumptive evidence of a right
on service of summons on a private foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines. as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title", but when suit for
Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides that if the defendant is a foreign corporation its enforcement is brought in a Philippine court, said judgment "may be repelled by evidence of
doing business in the Philippines, service may be made: a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
(1) on its resident agent designated in accordance with law for that purpose, or, fact"
(2) If there is no such resident agent, on the government official designated by law to
that effect; or FACTS : Under Contract G/14370 dated May 6, 1949, plaintiff, a foreign corporation with
(3) on any of its officers or agents within the Philippines. offices at No. 8 Dalhousie Square (East) Calcutta, India, agreed to sell to defendant, a domestic
corporation with offices at the Chronicle Building, Aduana Street, Manila, 1,700,000 pieces of
If the foreign corporation has designated an agent to receive summons, the designation is Hessian bags at $26.20
exclusive, and service of summons is without force and gives the court no jurisdiction unless
made upon him. On September 8, 1949, plaintiff advised defendant that of the 850 bales scheduled for
shipment in July and August, the former was able to ship only 310 bales owing to the alleged
Where the corporation has no such agent, service shall be made on the government official failure of the Adamjee Jute Mills to supply the in September, 54 bales were likewise defaulted
designated by law, to wit: resulting in a total of 154 bales which is now the object of the controversy.
(a) the Insurance Commissioner in the case of a foreign insurance company
(b) the Superintendent of Banks, in the case of a foreign banking corporation Meanwhile, on October 1, 1949, the Government of India increased the export duty of jute
(c) the Securities and Exchange Commission, in the case of other foreign corporations bags from 80 to 350 rupees per ton, and on October 5, 1949, plaintiff requested defendant to
duly licensed to do business in the Philippines. Whenever service of process is so increase its letter of credit to cover the enhanced rate of export duty imposed
made, the government office or official served shall transmit by mail a copy of the
summons or other legal proccess to the corporation at its home or principal office. On November 17, 1949, plaintiff wrote defendant a letter reiterating its claim for
The sending of such copy is a necessary part of the service. corresponding to the increased export taxes on the 154 bales delivered to defendant from the
defaulted shipments for the months of July, August and September, 1949
The service on the proper government official under Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court,
in relation to Section 128 of the Corporation Code. Our laws and jurisprudence indicate a On February 6, 1951, defendant received notification from the Bengal Chamber of Commerce
purpose to assimilate foreign corporations, duly licensed to do business here, to the status of Tribunal of Arbitration in Calcutta, India, advising it that on December 28, 1950, Plaintiff
domestic corporations. applied to said Tribunal for arbitration regarding their claim. The Tribunal requested the
defendant to send them its version of the case. This, defendant did on March 1, 1951, thru the
We think it would be entirely out of line with this policy should we make a discrimination then Government Corporate Counsel, former Justice Pompeyo Diaz.
against a foreign corporation, like the petitioner, and subject its property to the harsh writ of
seizure by attachment when it has complied not only with every requirement of law made As presented to the Tribunal of Arbitration, the whole case revolved on the question of
specially of foreign corporations, but in addition with every requirement of law made of whether or not defendant is liable to the plaintiff for the payment of increased export taxes
domestic corporations. imposed by the Indian Government on the shipments of jute sacks. Defendant contended that
if the jute sacks in question were delivered by plaintiff in the months of July, August, and
In as much as SHARP was admittedly doing business in Japan through its four duly registered September, 1949, pursuant to the terms of the contract, then there would have been no
branches at the time the collection suit against it was filed, then in the light of the processual increased export taxes to pay because said increased taxes became effective only on October
presumption, SHARP may be deemed a resident of Japan, and, as such, was amenable to the 1, 1949, while on the other hand, plaintiff argued that the contract between the parties and

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Conflict Batch 3 I Atty. Torregosa I EH 501
all papers and documents made parts thereto should prevail, including defendant's letter of tax due on the shortage — which, because of appellee's fault, had to be delivered after the
September 29, 1949; effectivity of the increased export tax.
To the extent, therefore, that the decisions of the Tribunal of Arbitration of the Bengal
The Bengal Chamber of Commerce, Tribunal of Arbitration, refused to sustain defendant's Chamber of Commerce and of the High Court of Judicature of Calcutta fail to apply to the facts
contention and decided in favor of the plaintiff. of this case fundamental principles of contract, the same may be impeached, as they have
For about two years, the plaintiff attempted to enforce the said award through the Philippine been sufficiently impeached by appellant, on the ground of "clear mistake of law". We can not
Charge de'Affaires in Calcutta but constantly failed sanction a clear mistake of law that would work an obvious injustice upon appellant.

Rtc and CA ruled in favor of plaintiff 4. TESTATE ESTATE OF IDONAH SLADE PERKINS, RENATO D. TAYAG, vs. BENGUET
CONSOLIDATED, INC
Issue : The main issue to be resolved is whether or not the decision of the Tribunal of Corporation, stock certificate, court decree, jurisdiction
Arbitration of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce, as affirmed by the High Court of Judicature
of Calcutta, is enforceable in the Philippines. Facts: Idonah Slade Perkins, who died on March 27, 1960 in New York City, left among others,
two stock certificates covering 33,002 shares of appellant, the certificates being in the
Ruling: We are constrained to reverse the appealed decision upon the ground that it is based possession of the County Trust Company of New York, which as noted, is the domiciliary
upon a clear mistake of law and its enforcement will give rise to a patent injustice. administrator of the estate of the deceased. Then came this portion of the appellant's brief:
"On August 12, 1960, Prospero Sanidad instituted ancillary administration proceedings in the
It is true that under the provisions of Section 50 of Rule 39, Rules of Court, a judgment for a Court of First Instance of Manila; Lazaro A. Marquez was appointed ancillary administrator,
sum of money rendered by a foreign court "is presumptive evidence of a right as between the and on January 22, 1963, he was substituted by the appellee Renato D. Tayag. A dispute arose
parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title", but when suit for its between the domiciary administrator in New York and the ancillary administrator in the
enforcement is brought in a Philippine court, said judgment "may be repelled by evidence of a Philippines as to which of them was entitled to the possession of the stock certificates in
want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or question. On January 27, 1964, the Court of First Instance of Manila ordered the domiciliary
fact" (Emphasis supplied.) administrator, County Trust Company, to "produce and deposit" them with the ancillary
Upon the facts of record, We are constrained to hold that the decision sought to be enforced administrator or with the Clerk of Court. The domiciliary administrator did not comply with the
was rendered upon a "clear mistake of law" and because of that it makes appellant — an order, and on February 11, 1964, the ancillary administrator petitioned the court to "issue an
innocent party — suffer the consequences of the default or breach of contract committed by order declaring the certificate or certificates of stocks covering the 33,002 shares issued in the
appellee. name of Idonah Slade Perkins by Benguet Consolidated, Inc., be declared [or] considered as
There is no question at all that appellee was guilty of a breach of contract when it failed to lost."3
deliver one-hundred fifty-four Hessian bales which, according to the contract entered into with It is to be noted further that appellant Benguet Consolidated, Inc. admits that "it is immaterial"
appellant, should have been delivered to the latter in the months of July, August and as far as it is concerned as to "who is entitled to the possession of the stock certificates in
September, all of the year 1949. It is equally clear beyond doubt that had these one-hundred question; appellant opposed the petition of the ancillary administrator because the said stock
fifty-four bales been delivered in accordance with the contract aforesaid, the increase in the certificates are in existence, they are today in the possession of the domiciliary administrator,
export tax due upon them would not have been imposed because said increased export tax the County Trust Company, in New York, U.S.A...."
became effective only on October 1, 1949. It is its view, therefore, that under the circumstances, the stock certificates cannot be declared
or considered as lost. Moreover, it would allege that there was a failure to observe certain
To avoid its liability for the aforesaid increase in the export tax, appellee claims that appellant requirements of its by-laws before new stock certificates could be issued. Hence, its appeal.
should be held liable therefor on the strength of its letter of September 29, 1949 asking
appellee to ship the shortage. This argument is unavailing because it is not only illogical but ISSUE: Whether the court in the Philippines can declare the stock certificates as lost
contrary to known principles of fairness and justice. When appellant demanded that appellee
deliver the shortage of 154 bales it did nothing more than to demand that to which it was RULING: As was made clear at the outset of this opinion, the appeal lacks merit. The challenged
entitled as a matter of right. The breach of contract committed by appellee gave appellant, order constitutes an emphatic affirmation of judicial authority sought to be emasculated by
under the law and even under general principles of fairness, the right to rescind the contract the wilful conduct of the domiciliary administrator in refusing to accord obedience to a court
or to ask for its specific performance, in either case with right to demand damages. Part of the decree. How, then, can this order be stigmatized as illegal?
damages appellant was clearly entitled to recover from appellee growing out of the latter's As is true of many problems confronting the judiciary, such a response was called for by the
breach of the contract consists precisely of the amount of the increase decreed in the export realities of the situation. What cannot be ignored is that conduct bordering on wilful defiance,
if it had not actually reached it, cannot without undue loss of judicial prestige, be condoned or

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Conflict Batch 3 I Atty. Torregosa I EH 501
tolerated. For the law is not so lacking in flexibility and resourcefulness as to preclude such a We start with the undeniable premise that, "a corporation is an artificial being created by
solution, the more so as deeper reflection would make clear its being buttressed by operation of law...."16 It owes its life to the state, its birth being purely dependent on its will.
indisputable principles and supported by the strongest policy considerations. As Berle so aptly stated: "Classically, a corporation was conceived as an artificial person, owing
It can truly be said then that the result arrived at upheld and vindicated the honor of the its existence through creation by a sovereign power."17 As a matter of fact, the statutory
judiciary no less than that of the country. Through this challenged order, there is thus dispelled language employed owes much to Chief Justice Marshall, who in the Dartmouth College
the atmosphere of contingent frustration brought about by the persistence of the domiciliary decision defined a corporation precisely as "an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing
administrator to hold on to the stock certificates after it had, as admitted, voluntarily only in contemplation of law."18
submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the lower court by entering its appearance through There is thus a rejection of Gierke's genossenchaft theory, the basic theme of which to quote
counsel on June 27, 1963, and filing a petition for relief from a previous order of March 15, from Friedmann, "is the reality of the group as a social and legal entity, independent of state
1963. recognition and concession."21 A corporation as known to Philippine jurisprudence is a
Thus did the lower court, in the order now on appeal, impart vitality and effectiveness to what creature without any existence until it has received the imprimatur of the state according to
was decreed. For without it, what it had been decided would be set at naught and nullified. law. It is logically inconceivable therefore that it will have rights and privileges of a higher
Unless such a blatant disregard by the domiciliary administrator, with residence abroad, of priority than that of its creator. More than that, it cannot legitimately refuse to yield obedience
what was previously ordained by a court order could be thus remedied, it would have entailed, to acts of its state organs, certainly not excluding the judiciary, whenever called upon to do so.
insofar as this matter was concerned, not a partial but a well-nigh complete paralysis of judicial As a matter of fact, a corporation once it comes into being, following American law still of
authority. persuasive authority in our jurisdiction, comes more often within the ken of the judiciary than
1. Appellant Benguet Consolidated, Inc. did not dispute the power of the appellee ancillary the other two coordinate branches. It institutes the appropriate court action to enforce its
administrator to gain control and possession of all assets of the decedent within the right. Correlatively, it is not immune from judicial control in those instances, where a duty
jurisdiction of the Philippines. Nor could it. Such a power is inherent in his duty to settle her under the law as ascertained in an appropriate legal proceeding is cast upon it.
estate and satisfy the claims of local creditors.5 To assert that it can choose which court order to follow and which to disregard is to confer
It would follow then that the authority of the probate court to require that ancillary upon it not autonomy which may be conceded but license which cannot be tolerated. It is to
administrator's right to "the stock certificates covering the 33,002 shares ... standing in her argue that it may, when so minded, overrule the state, the source of its very existence; it is to
name in the books of [appellant] Benguet Consolidated, Inc...." be respected is equally beyond contend that what any of its governmental organs may lawfully require could be ignored at
question. For appellant is a Philippine corporation owing full allegiance and subject to the will. So extravagant a claim cannot possibly merit approval.
unrestricted jurisdiction of local courts. Its shares of stock cannot therefore be considered in 5. One last point. In Viloria v. Administrator of Veterans Affairs,22 it was shown that in a
any wise as immune from lawful court orders. guardianship proceedings then pending in a lower court, the United States Veterans
Our holding in Wells Fargo Bank and Union v. Collector of Internal Revenue8 finds application. Administration filed a motion for the refund of a certain sum of money paid to the minor under
"In the instant case, the actual situs of the shares of stock is in the Philippines, the corporation guardianship, alleging that the lower court had previously granted its petition to consider the
being domiciled [here]." To the force of the above undeniable proposition, not even appellant deceased father as not entitled to guerilla benefits according to a determination arrived at by
is insensible. It does not dispute it. Nor could it successfully do so even if it were so minded. its main office in the United States. The motion was denied. In seeking a reconsideration of
2. Appellant Benguet Consolidated, Inc. would seek to bolster the above contention by its such order, the Administrator relied on an American federal statute making his decisions "final
invoking one of the provisions of its by-laws which would set forth the procedure to be and conclusive on all questions of law or fact" precluding any other American official to
followed in case of a lost, stolen or destroyed stock certificate; it would stress that in the event examine the matter anew, "except a judge or judges of the United States court."23
of a contest or the pendency of an action regarding ownership of such certificate or certificates Reconsideration was denied, and the Administrator appealed.
of stock allegedly lost, stolen or destroyed, the issuance of a new certificate or certificates It is bad enough as the Viloria decision made patent for our judiciary to accept as final and
would await the "final decision by [a] court regarding the ownership [thereof]."15 conclusive, determinations made by foreign governmental agencies. It is infinitely worse if
Such reliance is misplaced. In the first place, there is no such occasion to apply such by-law. It through the absence of any coercive power by our courts over juridical persons within our
is admitted that the foreign domiciliary administrator did not appeal from the order now in jurisdiction, the force and effectivity of their orders could be made to depend on the whim or
question. Moreover, there is likewise the express admission of appellant that as far as it is caprice of alien entities. It is difficult to imagine of a situation more offensive to the dignity of
concerned, "it is immaterial ... who is entitled to the possession of the stock certificates ..." the bench or the honor of the country.
Even if such were not the case, it would be a legal absurdity to impart to such a provision Yet that would be the effect, even if unintended, of the proposition to which appellant Benguet
conclusiveness and finality. Assuming that a contrariety exists between the above by-law and Consolidated seems to be firmly committed as shown by its failure to accept the validity of the
the command of a court decree, the latter is to be followed. order complained of; it seeks its reversal. Certainly we must at all pains see to it that it does
4. What is more the view adopted by appellant Benguet Consolidated, Inc. is fraught with not succeed. The deplorable consequences attendant on appellant prevailing attest to the
implications at war with the basic postulates of corporate theory. necessity of negative response from us. That is what appellant will get.
That is all then that this case presents. It is obvious why the appeal cannot succeed.

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Conflict Batch 3 I Atty. Torregosa I EH 501
WHEREFORE, the appealed order of the Honorable Arsenio Santos, the Judge of the Court of Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in denying recognition and enforcement to the Malaysian
First Instance, dated May 18, 1964, is affirmed. With costs against oppositor-appelant Benguet Court judgment.
Consolidated, Inc.
Ruling: Yes. Generally, in the absence of a special compact, no sovereign is bound to give effect
5. Asiawest Merchant Bankers vs CA within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country; however, the
Gist of the facts: Malasian Court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner (Malaysian Corp) rules of comity, utility and convenience of nations have established a usage among civilized
for the recovery of performance bond it had put up in facvor of respondent (Phil Corp). Failed states by which final judgments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally
to enforce it in Malaysia, petitioner filed a case in Philippine Court for enforcement. respected and rendered efficacious under certain conditions that may vary in different
countries.
Facts: Petitioner Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad is a corporation organized under the
laws of Malaysia while private respondent Philippine National Construction Corporation is a In this jurisdiction, a valid judgment rendered by a foreign tribunal may be recognized insofar
corporation duly incorporated and existing under Philippine laws. as the immediate parties and the underlying cause of action are concerned so long as it is
convincingly shown that there has been an opportunity for a full and fair hearing before a court
Petitioner initiated a suit for collection against private respondent, then known as Construction of competent jurisdiction; that the trial upon regular proceedings has been conducted,
and Development Corporation of the Philippines, before the High Court of Malaya in Kuala following due citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant and under a system of
Lumpur entitled “Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad v. Asiavest CDCP Sdn. Bhd. and jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of justice; and that there is nothing
Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines.” to indicate either a prejudice in court and in the system of laws under which it is sitting or fraud
in procuring the judgment.
Petitioner sought to recover the indemnity of the performance bond it had put up in favor of
private respondent to guarantee the completion of the Felda Project and the nonpayment of A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes,
the loan it extended to Asiavest-CDCP Sdn. Bhd. for the completion of Paloh Hanai and Kuantan until a contrary showing, on the basis of a presumption of regularity of proceedings and the
By Pass; Project. giving of due notice in the foreign forum Under Section 50(b), Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of
Court, which was the governing law at the time the instant case was decided by the trial court
The High Court of Malaya (Commercial Division) rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner and respondent appellate court, a judgment, against a person, of a tribunal of a foreign country
and against the private respondent. Following unsuccessful attempts to secure payment from having jurisdiction to pronounce the same is presumptive evidence of a right as between the
private respondent under the judgment, petitioner initiated the complaint before RTC of Pasig, parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title. The judgment may, however, be
Metro Manila, to enforce the judgment of the High Court of Malaya. assailed by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact. In addition, under Section 3(n), Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of
Private respondent sought the dismissal of the case via a Motion to Dismiss, contending that Court, a court, whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, enjoys the presumption that it was
the alleged judgment of the High Court of Malaya should be denied recognition or acting in the lawful exercise of its jurisdiction. Hence, once the authenticity of the foreign
enforcement since on in face, it is tainted with want of jurisdiction, want of notice to private judgment is proved, the party attacking a foreign judgment, is tasked with the burden of
respondent, collusion and/or fraud, and there is a clear mistake of law or fact. Dismissal was, overcoming its presumptive validity.
however, denied by the trial court considering that the grounds relied upon are not the proper
grounds in a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Revised Rules of Court. In the instant case, petitioner sufficiently established the existence of the money judgment of
the High Court of Malaya by the evidence it offered. Petitioner’s sole witness, testified to the
Subsequently, private respondent filed its Answer with Compulsory Counter claim’s and effect that he is in active practice of the law profession in Malaysia; that he was connected
therein raised the grounds it brought up in its motion to dismiss. In its Reply filed, the petitioner with Skrine and Company as Legal Assistant up to 1981; that private respondent, then known
contended that the High Court of Malaya acquired jurisdiction over the person of private as Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines, was sued by his client,
respondent by its voluntary submission the court’s jurisdiction through its appointed counsel. Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad, in Kuala Lumpur; that the writ of summons were
Furthermore, private respondent’s counsel waived any and all objections to the High Court’s served on March 17, 1983 at the registered office of private respondent and on March 21, 1983
jurisdiction in a pleading filed before the court. on Cora S. Deala, a financial planning officer of private respondent for Southeast Asia
operations; that upon the filing of the case, Messrs. Allen and Gledhill, Advocates and
In due time, the trial court rendered its decision dismissing petitioner’s complaint. Petitioner Solicitors, with address at 24th Floor, UMBC Building, Jalan Sulaiman, Kuala Lumpur, entered
interposed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, but the appellate court dismissed the same their conditional appearance for private respondent questioning the regularity of the service
and affirmed the decision of the trial court. of the writ of summons but subsequently withdrew the same when it realized that the writ
was properly served; that because private respondent failed to file a statement of defense

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Conflict Batch 3 I Atty. Torregosa I EH 501
within two (2) weeks, petitioner filed an application for summary judgment and submitted However, private respondent failed to sufficiently discharge the burden that fell upon it – to
affidavits and documentary evidence in support of its claim; that the matter was then heard prove by clear and convincing evidence the grounds which it relied upon to prevent
before the High Court of Kuala Lumpur in a series of dates where private respondent was enforcement of the Malaysian High Court judgment.
represented by counsel; and that the end result of all these proceedings is the judgment sought
to be enforced. Private respondent failed to sufficiently discharge the burden that fell upon it to prove by clear
and convincing evidence the grounds which it relied upon to prevent enforcement of the
In addition to the said testimonial evidence, petitioner also offered the documentary evidence Malaysian High Court judgment, namely, (a) that jurisdiction was not acquired by the
to support their claim: Malaysian Court over the person of private respondent due to alleged improper service of
(a) A certified and authenticated copy of the Judgment promulgated by the Malaysian High summons upon private respondent and the alleged lack of authority of its counsel to appear
Court dated September 13, 1985 directing private respondent to pay petitioner the sum of and represent private respondent in the suit; (b) the foreign judgment is allegedly tainted by
$5,108,290.23 Malaysian Ringgit plus interests from March 1983 until fully paid; evident collusion, fraud and clear mistake of fact or law; and (c) not only were the requisites
for enforcement or recognition allegedly not complied with but also that the Malaysian
(b) A certified and authenticated copy of the Order dated September 13, 1985 issued by the judgment is allegedly contrary to the Constitutional prescription that the every decision must
Malaysian High Court in Civil Suit No. C638 of 1983; state the facts and law on which it is based.

(c) Computation of principal and interest due as of January 31, 1990 on the amount adjudged Private respondent relied solely on the testimony of its two (2) witnesses, namely, Mr. Alfredo
payable to petitioner by private respondent; N. Calupitan, an accountant of private respondent, and Virginia Abelardo, Executive Secretary
and a member of the staff of the Corporate Secretariat Section of the Corporate Legal Division,
(d) Letter and Statement of Account of petitioners counsel in Malaysia indicating the costs for of private respondent, both of whom failed to shed light and amplify its defense or claim for
prosecuting and implementing the Malaysian High Courts Judgment; non-enforcement of the foreign judgment against it.

(e) Letters between petitioners Malaysian counsel, Skrine and Co., and its local counsel, Sycip Mr. Calupitans testimony centered on the following: that from January to December 1982 he
Salazar Law Offices, relative to institution of the action in the Philippines; was assigned in Malaysia as Project Comptroller of the Pahang Project Package A and B for
road construction under the joint venture of private respondent and Asiavest Holdings;[37]
(f) Billing Memorandum of Sycip Salazar Law Offices dated January 2, 1990 showing attorneys that under the joint venture, Asiavest Holdings would handle the financial aspect of the
fees paid by and due from petitioner; project, which is fifty-one percent (51%) while private respondent would handle the technical
aspect of the project, or forty-nine percent (49%);[38] and, that Cora Deala was not authorized
(g) Statement of Claim, Writ of Summons and Affidavit of Service of such writ in petitioners to receive summons for and in behalf of the private respondent.[39] Ms. Abelardos testimony,
suit against private respondent before the Malaysian High Court; on the other hand, focused on the following: that there was no board resolution authorizing
Allen and Gledhill to admit all the claims of petitioner in the suit brought before the High Court
(h) Memorandum of Conditional Appearance dated March 28, 1983 filed by counsel for private of Malaya,[40] though on cross-examination she admitted that Allen and Gledhill were the
respondent with the Malaysian High Court; retained lawyers of private respondent in Malaysia.

(i) Summons in Chambers and Affidavit of Khaw Chay Tee, counsel for private respondent, The foregoing reasons or grounds relied upon by private respondent in preventing
submitted during the proceedings before the Malaysian High Court; enforcement and recognition of the Malaysian judgment primarily refer to matters of remedy
and procedure taken by the Malaysian High Court relative to the suit for collection initiated by
(j) Record of the Courts Proceedings in Civil Case No. C638 of 1983; petitioner. Needless to stress, the recognition to be accorded a foreign judgment is not
necessarily affected by the fact that the procedure in the courts of the country in which such
(k) Petitioners verified Application for Summary Judgment dated August 14, 1984; and judgment was rendered differs from that of the courts of the country in which the judgment is
relied on.[42] Ultimately, matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the
(l) Letter dated November 6, 1985 from petitioners Malaysian counsel to private respondents service of summons or court process upon the defendant, the authority of counsel to appear
counsel in Malaysia. and represent a defendant and the formal requirements in a decision are governed by the lex
fori or the internal law of the forum,[43] i.e., the law of Malaysia in this case.
Having thus proven, through the foregoing evidence, the existence and authenticity of the
foreign judgment, said foreign judgment enjoys presumptive validity and the burden then fell In this case, it is the procedural law of Malaysia where the judgment was rendered that
upon the party who disputes its validity, herein private respondent, to prove otherwise. determines the validity of the service of court process on private respondent as well as other

6
Conflict Batch 3 I Atty. Torregosa I EH 501
matters raised by it. As to what the Malaysian procedural law is, remains a question of fact, Lastly, there is no merit to the argument that the foreign judgment is not enforceable in view
not of law. It may not be taken judicial notice of and must be pleaded and proved like any other of the absence of any statement of facts and law upon which the award in favor of the
fact. Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court provide that it may be petitioner was based. As aforestated, the lex fori or the internal law of the forum governs
evidenced by an official publication or by a duly attested or authenticated copy thereof. It was matters of remedy and procedure.[53] Considering that under the procedural rules of the High
then incumbent upon private respondent to present evidence as to what that Malaysian Court of Malaya, a valid judgment may be rendered even without stating in the judgment every
procedural law is and to show that under it, the assailed service of summons upon a financial fact and law upon which the judgment is based, then the same must be accorded respect and
officer of a corporation, as alleged by it, is invalid. It did not. Accordingly, the presumption of the courts in this jurisdiction cannot invalidate the judgment of the foreign court simply
validity and regularity of service of summons and the decision thereafter rendered by the High because our rules provide otherwise.
Court of Malaya must stand.
All in all, private respondent had the ultimate duty to demonstrate the alleged invalidity of
On the matter of alleged lack of authority of the law firm of Allen and Gledhill to represent such foreign judgment, being the party challenging the judgment rendered by the High Court
private respondent, not only did the private respondents witnesses admit that the said law of Malaya. But instead of doing so, private respondent merely argued, to which the trial court
firm of Allen and Gledhill were its counsels in its transactions in Malaysia,[45] but of greater agreed, that the burden lay upon petitioner to prove the validity of the money judgment. Such
significance is the fact that petitioner offered in evidence relevant Malaysian jurisprudence[46] is clearly erroneous and would render meaningless the presumption of validity accorded a
to the effect that (a) it is not necessary under Malaysian law for counsel appearing before the foreign judgment were the party seeking to enforce it be required to first establish its
Malaysian High Court to submit a special power of attorney authorizing him to represent a validity.[54]
client before said court, (b) that counsel appearing before the Malaysian High Court has full
authority to compromise the suit, and (c) that counsel appearing before the Malaysian High 6. Saudia Arabia Airlines vs. CA (supra)
Court need not comply with certain pre-requisites as required under Philippine law to appear Facts: Morada was a flight attendant of SAUDIA (the airline). During a lay-over in Jakarta, she
and compromise judgments on behalf of their clients before said court. went to a disco dance with fellow crew members Thamer Al-Gazzawi and Allah Al-Gazzawi,
both Saudi nationals. Because it was almost morning when they returned to their hotels, they
Furthermore, there is no basis for or truth to the appellate courts conclusion that the agreed to have breakfast together at the room of Thamer. When they were in the room, Allah
conditional appearance of private respondents counsel who was allegedly not authorized to left on some pretext. Shortly after he did, Thamer attempted to rape plaintiff. Fortunately, a
appear and represent, cannot be considered as voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the roomboy and several security personnel heard her cries for help and rescued her. Later, the
High Court of Malaya, inasmuch as said conditional appearance was not premised on the Indonesian police came and arrested Thamer and Allah Al-Gazzawi, the latter as an accomplice.
alleged lack of authority of said counsel but the conditional appearance was entered to
question the regularity of the service of the writ of summons. Such conditional appearance When plaintiff returned to Jeddah a few days later, several SAUDIA officials interrogated her
was in fact subsequently withdrawn when counsel realized that the writ was properly about the Jakarta incident. They then requested her to go back to Jakarta to help arrange the
served.[48] release of Thamer and Allah. In Jakarta, SAUDIA Legal Officer Sirah Akkad and base manager
Baharini negotiated with the police for the immediate release of the detained crew members
On the ground that collusion, fraud and clear mistake of fact and law tainted the judgment of but did not succeed because plaintiff refused to cooperate. She was afraid that she might be
the High Court of Malaya, no clear evidence of the same was adduced or shown. The facts tricked into something she did not want because of her inability to understand the local dialect.
which the trial court found intriguing amounted to mere conjectures and specious She also declined to sign a blank paper and a document written in the local dialect. Eventually,
observations. The trial courts finding on the absence of judgment against Asiavest-CDCP Sdn. SAUDIA allowed plaintiff to return to Jeddah but barred her from the Jakarta flights.
Bhd. is contradicted by evidence on record that recovery was also sought against Asiavest-
CDCP Sdn. Bhd. but the same was found insolvent.[49] Furthermore, even when the foreign Plaintiff learned that, through the intercession of the Saudi Arabian government, the
judgment is based on the drafts prepared by counsel for the successful party, such is not per Indonesian authorities agreed to deport Thamer and Allah after two weeks of detention.
se indicative of collusion or fraud. Fraud to hinder the enforcement within the jurisdiction of a Eventually, they were again put in service by defendant SAUDIA. In September 1990, defendant
foreign judgment must be extrinsic, i.e., fraud based on facts not controverted or resolved in SAUDIA transferred plaintiff to Manila.
the case where judgment is rendered,[50] or that which would go to the jurisdiction of the On January 14, 1992, just when plaintiff thought that the Jakarta incident was already behind
court or would deprive the party against whom judgment is rendered a chance to defend the her, her superiors requested her to see Mr. Ali Meniewy, Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA, in
action to which he has a meritorious defense.[51] Intrinsic fraud is one which goes to the very Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. When she saw him, he brought her to the police station where the police
existence of the cause of action is deemed already adjudged, and it, therefore, cannot militate took her passport and questioned her about the Jakarta incident. Miniewy simply stood by as
against the recognition or enforcement of the foreign judgment.[52] Evidence is wanting on the police put pressure on her to make a statement dropping the case against Thamer and
the alleged extrinsic fraud. Hence, such unsubstantiated allegation cannot give rise to liability Allah. Not until she agreed to do so did the police return her passport and allowed her to catch
therein. the afternoon flight out of Jeddah.

7
Conflict Batch 3 I Atty. Torregosa I EH 501
“state of the most significant relationship rule” to arrive at the conclusion that in this case,
One year and a half later or on lune 16, 1993, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, a few minutes before such a state was the Philippines, thus Philippine Law on torts was applied.
the departure of her flight to Manila, plaintiff was not allowed to board the plane and instead
ordered to take a later flight to Jeddah to see Mr. Miniewy, the Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA. Before a choice can be made, it is necessary for us to determine under what category a certain
When she did, a certain Khalid of the SAUDIA office brought her to a Saudi court where she set of facts or rules fall. This process is known as "characterization", or the "doctrine of
was asked to sign a document written in Arabic. They told her that this was necessary to close qualification". It is the "process of deciding whether or not the facts relate to the kind of
the case against Thamer and Allah. As it turned out, plaintiff signed a notice to her to appear question specified in a conflicts rule." The purpose of "characterization" is to enable the forum
before the court on June 27, 1993. Plaintiff then returned to Manila. to select the proper law.

Shortly afterwards, defendant SAUDIA summoned plaintiff to report to Jeddah once again and Our starting point of analysis here is not a legal relation, but a factual situation, event, or
see Miniewy on June 27, 1993 for further investigation. Plaintiff did so after receiving operative fact. An essential element of conflict rules is the indication of a "test" or "connecting
assurance from SAUDIA's Manila manager, Aslam Saleemi, that the investigation was routinary factor" or "point of contact".
and that it posed no danger to her.
Choice-of-law rules invariably consist of a factual relationship (such as property right, contract
In Jeddah, a SAUDIA legal officer brought plaintiff to the same Saudi court on June 27, 1993. claim) and a connecting factor or point of contact, such as the situs of the res, the place of
Nothing happened then but on June 28, 1993, a Saudi judge interrogated plaintiff through an celebration, the place of performance, or the place of wrongdoing.
interpreter about the Jakarta incident. After one hour of interrogation, they let her go. At the
airport, however, just as her plane was about to take off, a SAUDIA officer told her that the Note that one or more circumstances may be present to serve as the possible test for the
airline had forbidden her to take flight. At the Inflight Service Office where she was told to go, determination of the applicable law. These "test factors" or "points of contact" or "connecting
the secretary of Mr. Yahya Saddick took away her passport and told her to remain in Jeddah, factors" could be any of the following:
at the crew quarters, until further orders. (1) The nationality of a person, his domicile, his residence, his place of sojourn, or his
On July 3, 1993 a SAUDIA legal officer again escorted plaintiff to the same court where the origin;
judge, to her astonishment and shock, rendered a decision, translated to her in English, (2) the seat of a legal or juridical person, such as a corporation;
sentencing her to five months imprisonment and to 286 lashes. Only then did she realize that (3) the situs of a thing, that is, the place where a thing is, or is deemed to be situated. In
the Saudi court had tried her, together with Thamer and Allah, for what happened in Jakarta. particular, the lex situs is decisive when real rights are involved;
The court found plaintiff guilty of (1) adultery; (2) going to a disco, dancing and listening to the (4) the place where an act has been done, the locus actus, such as the place where a
music in violation of Islamic laws; and (3) socializing with the male crew, in contravention of contract has been made, a marriage celebrated, a will signed or a tort committed.
Islamic tradition. The lex loci actus is particularly important in contracts and torts;
(5) the place where an act is intended to come into effect, e.g., the place of performance
Facing conviction, private respondent sought the help of her employer, petitioner SAUDIA. of contractual duties, or the place where a power of attorney is to be exercised;
Unfortunately, she was denied any assistance. She then asked the Philippine Embassy in (6) the intention of the contracting parties as to the law that should govern their
Jeddah to help her while her case is on appeal. Meanwhile, to pay for her upkeep, she worked agreement, the lex loci intentionis;
on the domestic flight of SAUDIA, while Thamer and Allah continued to serve in the (7) the place where judicial or administrative proceedings are instituted or done. The lex
international flights. fori — the law of the forum — is particularly important because, as we have seen
earlier, matters of "procedure" not going to the substance of the claim involved are
Because she was wrongfully convicted, the Prince of Makkah dismissed the case against her governed by it; and because the lex fori applies whenever the content of the
and allowed her to leave Saudi Arabia. Shortly before her return she was terminated from the otherwise applicable foreign law is excluded from application in a given case for the
service by SAUDIA, without her being informed of the cause. reason that it falls under one of the exceptions to the applications of foreign law;
and
On November 23, 1993, Morada filed a Complaint for damages against SAUDIA, and Khaled Al- (8) the flag of a ship, which in many cases is decisive of practically all legal relationships
Balawi ("Al-Balawi"), its country manager. of the ship and of its master or owner as such. It also covers contractual relationships
particularly contracts of affreightment.
Issues: WON Philippine Courts have jurisdiction over the case
After a careful study of the pleadings on record, including allegations in the Amended
Ruling: Yes. The Court characterized the factual problem as a tort; Conflict rule on tort is “lex Complaint deemed admitted for purposes of the motion to dismiss, we are convinced that
loci actus”, but since several incidents happened in different states, the Court also applied the there is reasonable basis for private respondent's assertion that although she was already

8
Conflict Batch 3 I Atty. Torregosa I EH 501
working in Manila, petitioner brought her to Jeddah on the pretense that she would merely The demurrer alleged lack of jurisdiction on the part of the lower court, which so held and
testify in an investigation of the charges she made against the two SAUDIA crew members for dismissed the case.
the attack on her person while they were in Jakarta. As it turned out, she was the one made to The question that presents itself for our consideration is whether such ruling is erroneous
face trial for very serious charges, including adultery and violation of Islamic laws and tradition. or not; and it will or will not be erroneous according to said court has or has no jurisdiction
over said offense.
Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one involving torts, the "connecting factor" The point at issue is whether the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over a crime, like
or "point of contact" could be the place or places where the tortious conduct or lex loci actus the one herein involved, committed aboard merchant vessels anchored in our jurisdictional
occurred. And applying the torts principle in a conflicts case, we find that the Philippines could waters.
be said as a situs of the tort (the place where the alleged tortious conduct took place). This is There are two fundamental rules on this particular matter in connection with International
because it is in the Philippines where petitioner allegedly deceived private respondent, a Law; to wit, the French rule, according to which crimes committed aboard a foreign
Filipina residing and working here. According to her, she had honestly believed that petitioner merchant vessel should not be prosecuted in the courts of the country within whose
would, in the exercise of its rights and in the performance of its duties, "act with justice, give territorial jurisdiction they were committed, unless their commission affects the peace and
her due and observe honesty and good faith." Instead, petitioner failed to protect her, she security of the territory; and the English rule, based on the territorial principle and followed
claimed. That certain acts or parts of the injury allegedly occurred in another country is of no in the United States, according to which, crimes perpetrated under such circumstances are
moment. For in our view what is important here is the place where the over-all harm or the in general triable in the courts of the country within whose territory they were committed.
totality of the alleged injury to the person, reputation, social standing and human rights of Of this two rules, it is the last one that obtains in this jurisdiction, because at present the
complainant, had lodged, according to the plaintiff below (herein private respondent). All told, theories and jurisprudence prevailing in the United States on this matter are authority in the
it is not without basis to identify the Philippines as the situs of the alleged tort. Philippines which is now a territory of the United States.
In the case of The Schooner Exchange vs. M'Faddon and Others (7 Cranch [U. S.]. 116), Chief
Moreover, with the widespread criticism of the traditional rule of lex loci delicti commissi, Justice Marshall said:
modern theories and rules on tort liability have been advanced to offer fresh judicial ". . . When merchant vessels enter for the purposes of trade, it would be obviously
approaches to arrive at just results. In keeping abreast with the modern theories on tort inconvenient and dangerous to society, and would subject the law to continual
liability, we find here an occasion to apply the "State of the most significant relationship" rule, infraction, and the government to degradation, if such individual or merchants did
which in our view should be appropriate to apply now, given the factual context of this case. not owe temporary and local allegiance, and were not amenable to the jurisdiction
of the country. . . ."
In applying said principle to determine the State which has the most significant relationship, In United States vs. Bull (15 Phil., 7), this court held:
the following contacts are to be taken into account and evaluated according to their relative ". . . No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offense or crime
importance with respect to the particular issue: (a) the place where the injury occurred; (b) the committed on the high seas or within the territorial waters of any other country, but
place where the conduct causing the injury occurred; (c) the domicile, residence, nationality, when she came within tree miles of a line drawn from the headlands which embrace
place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and (d) the place where the the entrance to Manila Bay, she was within territorial waters, and a new set of
relationship, if any, between the parties is centered. principles became applicable. (Wheaton, International Law [Dana ed.], p. 255, note
105; Bonfils, Le Droit Int., secs. 490 et seq.; Latour, La Mer Ter., ch. 1.) The ship and
Prescinding from this premise that the Philippines is the situs of the tort complained of and the her crew were then subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign subject to
place "having the most interest in the problem", we find, by way of recapitulation, that the such limitations as have been conceded by that sovereignty through the proper
Philippine law on tort liability should have paramount application to and control in the political agency. . . ."
resolution of the legal issues arising out of this case. Further, we hold that the respondent It is true that in certain cases the comity of nations is observed, as in Mali and Wildenhus vs.
Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the complaint; Keeper of the Common Jail (120 U. S., 1), wherein it was said that:
the appropriate venue is in Quezon City, which could properly apply Philippine law. ". . . The principle which governs the whole matter is this: Disorders which disturb
only the peace of the ship or those on board are to be dealt with exclusively by the
7. PEOPLE v. WONG CHENG (WONG CHUN) sovereignty of the home of the ship, but those which disturb the public peace may
In this appeal the Attorney-General urges the revocation of the order of the Court of First be suppressed, and, if need be, the offenders punished by the proper authorities of
Instance of Manila, sustaining the demurrer presented by the defendant to the information the local jurisdiction. It may not be easy at all times to determine to which of the two
that initiated this case and in which the appellee is accused of having illegally smoked opium jurisdictions a particular act of disorder belongs. Much will undoubtedly depend on
aboard the merchant vessel Changsa of English nationality while said vessel was anchored the attending circumstances of the particular case, but all must concede that
in Manila Bay two and a half miles from the shores of the city. felonious homicide is a subject for the local jurisdiction, and that if the proper

9
Conflict Batch 3 I Atty. Torregosa I EH 501
authorities are proceeding with the case in the regular way the consul has no right 8. US v BULL
to interfere to prevent it." (1910 case about cattles and carabaos onboard a ship)
Hence in United States vs. Look Chaw (18 Phil., 573), this court held that:
"Although the mere possession of an article of prohibited use in the Philippine FACTS:The appellant was convicted in the Court of First Instance of a violation of section 1
Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit, in any local port, does not, as a general of Act No. 55, The information alleges:
rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts of the Islands, such vessel being "That on and for many months prior to the 2nd day of December, 1908, the said H.
considered as an extension of its own nationality, the same rule does not apply when N. Bull was then and there master of a steam sailing vessel known as the
the article, the use of which is prohibited in the Islands, is landed from the vessel steamship Standard, which vessel was then and there engaged in carrying and
upon Philippine soil; in such a case an open violation of the laws of the land is transporting cattle, carabaos, and other animals from a foreign port, to wit, the port
committed with respect to which, as it is a violation of the penal law in force at the of Ampieng, Formosa, to the port and city of Manila, Philippine Islands; that the said
place of the commission of the crime, no court other than that established in the said accused H. N. Bull, while master of said vessel, as aforesaid, on or about the 2d day
place has jurisdiction of the offense, in the absence of an agreement under an of December, 1908, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and wrongfully carry,
international treaty." transport, and bring into the port and city of Manila, aboard said vessel, from the
As to whether the United States has ever consented by treaty or otherwise to renouncing port of Ampieng, Formosa, six hundred and seventy-seven (677) head of cattle and
such jurisdiction or a part thereof, we find nothing to this effect so far as England is carabaos, without providing suitable means for securing said animals while in transit,
concerned, to which nation the ship where the crime in question was committed belongs. so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the said animals, in this, to wit,
Besides, in his work "Treaties, Conventions, etc.," volume 1, page 625, Malloy says the that the said H. N. Bull, master, as aforesaid, did then and there fail to provide stalls
following: for said animals so in transit and suitable means for tying and securing said animals
"There shall be between the territories of the United States of America, and all the in a proper manner, and did then and there cause some of said animals to be tied by
territories of His Britanic Majesty in Europe, a reciprocal liberty of commerce. The means of rings passed through their noses, and allow and permit others to be
inhabitants of the two countries, respectively, shall have liberty freely and securely transported loose in the hold and on the deck of said vessel without being tied or
to come with their ships and cargoes to all such places, ports and rivers, in the secured in stalls, and all without bedding; that by reason of the aforesaid neglect and
territories aforesaid, to which other foreigners are permitted to come, to enter into failure of the accused to provide suitable means for securing said animals while so in
the same, and to remain and reside in any parts of the said territories, respectively; transit, the noses of some of said animals were cruelly torn, and many of said animals
also to hire and occupy houses and warehouses for the purposes of their commerce; were tossed about upon the decks and hold of said vessel, and cruelly wounded,
and, generally, the merchants and traders of each nation respectively shall enjoy the bruised, and killed.
most complete protection and security for their commerce, but subject always to the "All contrary to the provisions of Acts No. 55 and No. 275 of the Philippine
laws and statutes of the two countries, respectively." (Art. 1, Commerce and Commission."
Navigation Convention.) Section 1 of Act No. 55, which went into effect January 1, 1901, provides that
We have seen that the mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit was held —
by this court not triable by our courts, because it being the primary object of our Opium Law "The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels, carrying or transporting
to protect the inhabitants of the Philippines against the disastrous effects entailed by the cattle, sheep, swine, or other animals, from one port in the Philippine Islands to
use of this drug, its mere possession in such a ship, without being used in our territory, does another, or from any foreign port to any port within the Philippine Islands, shall carry
not bring about in the said territory those effects that our statute contemplates avoiding. with them, upon the vessels carrying such animals, sufficient forage and fresh water
Hence such a mere possession is not considered a disturbance of the public order. to provide for the suitable sustenance of such animals during the ordinary period
But to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign merchant occupied by the vessel in passage from the port of shipment to the port of
ship, is certainly a breach of the public order here established, because it causes such drug debarkation, and shall cause such animals to be provided with adequate forage and
to produce its pernicious effects within our territory. It seriously contravenes the purpose fresh water at least once in every twenty-four hours from the time that the animals
that our Legislature has in mind in enacting the aforesaid repressive statute. Moreover, as are embarked to the time of their final debarkation."
the Attorney-General aptly observes:
". . . The idea of a person smoking opium securely on board a foreign vessel ISSUES: Whether the Philippine court has jurisdiction.
at anchor in the port of Manila in open defiance of the local authorities, who are
impotent to lay hands on him, is simply subversive of public order. It requires no RULING: YES. It is contended that the information is insufficient because it does not state
unusual stretch of the imagination to conceive that a foreign ship may come into the that the court was sitting at a port where the cattle were disembarked, or that the offense
port of Manila and allow or solicit Chinese residents to smoke opium on board." was committed on board a vessel registered and licensed under the laws of the Philippine
Islands.

10
Conflict Batch 3 I Atty. Torregosa I EH 501
Act No. 55 confers jurisdiction over the offense created thereby on Courts of First Instance There are two well-defined theories as to the extent of the immunities
or any provost court organized in the province or port in which such animals are ordinarily granted to them. According to the French theory and practice, matters
disembarked. happening on board a merchant ship which do not concern the tranquillity of the port or
This jurisdiction may be exercised by the Court of First Instance in any province into which persons foreign to the crew, are justiciable only by the courts of the country to which the
such ship or water craft upon which the offense or crime was committed shall come after vessel belongs. The French courts therefore claim exclusive jurisdiction over crimes
the commission thereof. Had this offense been committed upon a ship carrying a Philippine committed on board French merchant vessels in foreign ports by one member of the crew
registry, there could have been no doubt of the jurisdiction of the court, because it is against another. Such jurisdiction has never been admitted or claimed by Great Britain as
expressly conferred, and the Act is in accordance with well recognized and established public a right, although she has frequently conceded it by treaties. Writers who consider
law. But the Standard was a Norwegian vessel, and it is conceded that it was not registered exterritoriality as a fact instead of a theory have sought to restrict local jurisdiction, but
or licensed in the Philippine Islands under the laws thereof. Hall, who is doubtless the leading English authority, says that —
We have then the question whether the court had jurisdiction over an offense of this "It is admitted by the most thoroughgoing asserters of the territoriality
character, committed on board a foreign ship by the master thereof, when the neglect and of merchant vessels that so soon as the latter enter the ports of a foreign state
omission which constitutes the offense continued during the time the ship was within the they become subject to the local jurisdiction on all points in which the interests of
territorial waters of the United States. No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction the country are touched."
over an offense or crime committed on the high seas or within the territorial waters of any The United States has adhered consistently to the view that when a merchant
other country, but when she came within 3 miles of a line drawn from the headlands which vessel enters a foreign port it is subject to the jurisdiction of the local authorities, unless the
embrace the entrance to Manila Bay, she was within territorial waters, and a new set of local sovereignty has by act of acquiescence or through treaty arrangements consented to
principles became applicable. The ship and her crew were then subject to the jurisdiction of waive a portion of such jurisdiction.
the territorial sovereign subject to such limitations as have been conceded by that The Supreme Court of the United States has recently said that the merchant
sovereignty through the proper political agency. This offense was committed within vessels of one country visiting the ports of another for the purpose of trade, subject
territorial waters. From the line which determines these waters the Standard must have themselves to the laws which govern the ports they visit, so long as they remain; and this as
traveled at least 25 miles before she came to anchor. During that part of her voyage the well in war as in peace, unless otherwise provided by treaty.
violation of the statute continued, and as far as the jurisdiction of the court is concerned, it Certain limitations upon the jurisdiction of the local courts are imposed by article
is immaterial that the same conditions may have existed while the vessel was on the high 13 of the treaty of commerce and navigation between Sweden and Norway and the United
seas. The offense, assuming that it originated at the port of departure in Formosa, was a States, of July 4, 1827, which concedes to the consuls, vice-consuls, or consular agents of
continuing one, and every element necessary to constitute it existed during the voyage each country "the right to sit as judges and arbitrators in such differences as may arise
across the territorial waters. The completed forbidden act was done within American between the captains and crews of the vessels belonging to the nation whose interests are
waters, and the court therefore had jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the offense and committed to their charge, without the interference of the local authorities, unless the
the person of the offender. conduct of the crews or of the captains should disturb the order or tranquillity of the
The offense then was thus committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, but country." This exception applies to controversies between the members of the ship's
the objection to the jurisdiction raises the further question whether that jurisdiction is company, and particularly to disputes regarding wages. The order and tranquillity of the
restricted by the fact of the nationality of the ship. Every state has complete control and country are affected by many events which do not amount to a riot or general public
jurisdiction over its territorial waters. According to strict legal right, even public vessels may disturbance. Thus an assault by one member of the crew upon another, committed upon
not enter the ports of a friendly power without permission, but it is now conceded that in the ship, of which the public may have no knowledge whatever, is not by this treaty
the absence of a prohibition such ports are considered as open to the public ships of all withdrawn from the cognizance of the local authorities.
friendly powers. The exemption of such vessels from local jurisdiction while within such The treaty does not therefore deprive the local courts of jurisdiction over offenses
waters was not established until within comparatively recent times. committed on board a merchant vessel by one member of the crew against another which
Local officials exercise but little control over their actions, and offenses amount to a disturbance of the order or tranquillity of the country, and a fair and reasonable
committed by their crews are justiciable by their own officers acting under the laws to construction of the language requires us to hold that any violation of criminal laws disturbs
which they primarily owe allegiance. This limitation upon the general principle of the order or tranquillity of the country. The offense with which the appellant is charged had
territorial sovereignty is based entirely upon comity and convenience, and finds its nothing to do with any difference between the captain and the crew. It was a violation by
justification in the fact that experience shows that such vessels are generally careful to the master of the criminal law of the country into who port he came. We thus find that
respect local laws and regulations which are essential to the health, order, and well-being neither by reason of the nationality of the vessel, the place of the commission of the
of the port. But comity and convenience does not require the extension of the same offense, or the prohibitions of any treaty or general principle of public law, are the courts
degree of exemption to merchant vessels. of the Philippine Islands deprived of jurisdiction over the offense charged in the
information in this case.

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Conflict Batch 3 I Atty. Torregosa I EH 501
It is further contended that the complaint is defective because it does not allege Tulin, Infante, Loyola, Changco, and a certain Hiong were arrested. The state Prosecutor filed
that the animals were disembarked at the port of Manila, an allegation which it is claimed is a case for qualified piracy against the accused.
essential to the jurisdiction of the court sitting at that port. To hold with the appellant upon (Si Cheong Hiong ra atong storyaan diri kay related sa iyang defense ang topic sa Conflict)
this issue would be to construe the language of the complaint very strictly against the Accused-appellant Cheong San Hiong adduced evidence that he was employed at Navi Marine
Government. The disembarkation of the animals is not necessary in order to constitute the Services, Pte., Ltd. as Port Captain. The company was engaged in the business of trading
completed offense, and a reasonable construction of the language of the statute confers petroleum and owned 4 vessels, one of which was "Navi Pride."
jurisdiction upon the court sitting at the port into which the animals are brought. They are The company was then dealing for the first time with Paul Gan, a Singaporean broker, who
then within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, and the mere fact of their disembarkation offered to sell to the former bunker oil for the amount of $300k. Hiong, was assigned to
is immaterial so far as jurisdiction is concerned. This might be different if the disembarkation supervise a ship-to-ship transfer of diesel oil off the port of Singapore. Hiong was told that
of the animals constituted a constitutional element in the offense, but it does not. "M/T Galilee" would be making the transfer. The transfer was then made and completed.
Whether a certain method of handling cattle is suitable within the meaning of the After the above transaction, Hiong went to the Philippines to discuss a new transaction with
Act can not be left to the judgment of the master of the ship. It is a question which must be Emilio Changco, who laid out the details of the new transfer. However, while sojourning, he
determined by the court from the evidence. On December 2, 1908, the was arrested by the NBI.
defendant Bull brought into and disembarked in the port and city of Manila certain cattle, The RTC convicted the accused hence the case at bar.
which came from the port of Ampieng, Formosa, without providing suitable means for Hiong argued, among others, that the trial court erred in convicting and punishing him as an
securing said animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to accomplice when the acts allegedly committed by him were done or executed outside of
said animals, contrary to the provisions of section 1 of Act No. 55, as amended by section 1 Philippine waters and territory, stripping the Philippine courts of jurisdiction to hold him for
of Act No. 275. The trial court found the following facts, all of which are fully sustained by trial, to convict, and sentence.
the evidence. As legal basis for his appeal, he explains that he was charged under the information with
The defendant was found guilty, and sentenced to pay a fine of two hundred and qualified piracy as principal under Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 532 which refers to
fifty pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The Philippine waters. In the case at bar, he argues that he was convicted for acts done outside
sentence and judgment is affirmed. So ordered. Philippine waters or territory. For the State to have criminal jurisdiction, the act must have
been committed within its territory.
9. People vs Tulin ISSUE: WON accused-appellant Cheong Hiong can be convicted as accomplice when he was
FACTS: Sometime in March 1991, M/T Tabangao, a cargo vessel owned by PNOC not charged as such and when the acts allegedly committed by him were done or executed
Shipping, loaded with thousands of barrels of gasoline and oil, was sailing off the coast of outside Philippine waters and territory - YES
Mindoro near Silonay Island. RULING: Suffice it to state that unquestionably, the attack on and seizure of "M/T Tabangao"
The vessel, manned by 21 crew members, was suddenly boarded, with the use of an aluminum (renamed "M/T Galilee" by the pirates) and its cargo were committed in Philippine waters,
ladder, by 7 fully armed pirates led by Emilio Changco. They detained the crew and took although the captive vessel was later brought by the pirates to Singapore where its cargo was
complete control of the vessel. off-loaded, transferred, and sold. And such transfer was done under accused-appellant
The vessel was then painted with the name "Galilee," (the name M/T Tabango was painted Hiong's direct supervision. Although PD 532 requires that the attack and seizure of the vessel
over) with registry at San Lorenzo, Honduras. The crew was forced to sail to Singapore, all the and its cargo be committed in Philippine waters, the disposition by the pirates of the vessel
while sending misleading radio messages to PNOC that the ship was undergoing repairs. and its cargo is still deemed part of the act of piracy, hence, the same need not be committed
PNOC, after losing radio contact with the vessel, reported the disappearance of the vessel to in Philippine waters.
the Coast Guard and secured the assistance of the Air Force and Navy. However, search and Moreover, piracy falls under Title 1 of Book 2 of the Revised Penal Code. As such, it is an
rescue operations yielded negative results. exception to the rule on territoriality in criminal law. The same principle applies even if Hiong,
The "M/T Tabangao" sailed to and anchored about 18 nautical miles from Singapore's shoreline in the instant case, were charged, not with a violation of qualified piracy under the penal code
where another vessel called "Navi Pride" anchored beside it. Emilio Changco ordered the crew but under a special law, PD 532 which penalizes piracy in Philippine waters. Verily, PD 532
of "M/T Tabangao" to transfer the vessel's cargo to the hold of "Navi Pride". After the transfer should be applied with more force here since its purpose is precisely to discourage and prevent
was completed, the vessel went back to the Philippines. piracy in Philippine waters. It is likewise well-settled that regardless of the law penalizing the
The crew members were then released in 3 batches with the stern warning not to report the same, piracy is a reprehensible crime against the whole world.
incident to government authorities for a period of two days otherwise they would be killed. AS REGARDS HIS CONVICTION AS AN ACCOMPLICE: The ruling of the trial court is within well-
Later, the members of the crew called the PNOC office to report the incident. The crew settle jurisprudence that if there is lack of complete evidence of conspiracy, the liability is
members were brought to the Coast Guard Office for investigation. The incident was also that of an accomplice and not as principal. Any doubt as to the participation of an individual
reported to the NBI where the officers and members of the crew executed sworn statements in the commission of the crime is always resolved in favor of lesser responsibility.
regarding the incident. A series of arrests was thereafter effected.

12
Conflict Batch 3 I Atty. Torregosa I EH 501
Emphasis must also be placed on Sec. 4 of PD 532 which presumes that any person who does Fourth, under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent, assuming
any of the acts provided in said section has performed them knowingly, unless the contrary is petitioner is such, enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state except in
proven. In the case at bar, accused-appellant Hiong had failed to overcome the legal the case of an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the
presumption that he knowingly abetted or aided in the commission of piracy, received diplomatic agent in the receiving state outside his official functions. As already mentioned
property taken by such pirates and derived benefit therefrom. Hence, Hiong is guilty. above, the commission of a crime is not part of official duty.
Finally, on the contention that there was no preliminary investigation conducted, suffice it to
10. Liang vs PP say that preliminary investigation is not a matter of right in cases cognizable by the MeTC such
Doctrine: The DFAs determination that a certain person is covered by immunity is only as the one at bar.[6] Being purely a statutory right, preliminary investigation may be invoked
preliminary which has no binding effect in courts; mere invocation of the immunity clause does only when specifically granted by law.[7] The rule on criminal procedure is clear that no
not ipso facto result in the dropping of the charges. preliminary investigation is required in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the MeTC.
-A diplomatic agent, assuming petitioner is such, enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction of
the receiving state except in the case of an action relating to any professional or commercial 11. US vs FOWLER, et. al.
activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving state outside his official functions. Facts: The two defendants have been accused for theft for the 16 bottles of champagne as
Facts: The accused is an employee of ADB who was charged with grave oral defamation for while on board the vessel Lawton with US flag then navigating at the high seas, as cargo owned
uttering defamatory words against a fellow employee. Liang was arrested and was able to post by a certain Lindsay. Counsel for defendants presented a demurrer that the CFI had no
bail. The MeTC released him under the custody of the ADB Security. The next day the MeTC jurisdiction to try the crime charged inasmuch that as per the information filed, the crime was
received an “office of protocol” from the DFA stating that Liang is covered by immunity from committed at the high seas, which is outside the territorial jurisdiction of Manila. The
legal processes under Sec. 45 of the Agreement with ADB. The MeTC dismissed the case prosecution opposed it contending that by virtue of the orders of the Military Governor(MG)
without notice to the prosecution. The MR was also denied, a petition for certiorari before the and the Civil Commission(CC), admiralty jurisdiction over all crimes committed on board vessel
RTC which set aside the MeTC ruling. Hence this petition. flying the flag of US has been vested with the CFI of Manila. Further, he argued that the
Liang argues that he is covered under the Agreement and no preliminary investigation was president of US has the authority to authorize the MG and CC to establish a judicial system
done to him. with authority to take cognizance of maritime and admiralty causes, citing a US SC decision,
which according to him is applicable in the archipelago and in the present case. Judge ruled in
Issue: WON Liang is immune from criminal prosecution? favor of the defendants.

Held: No.First, courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the communication from the Issue: WON the CFI of Manila has jurisdiction to try the crime charged, which was committed
DFA that petitioner is covered by any immunity. The DFAs determination that a certain person at high seas on board vessel of US.
is covered by immunity is only preliminary which has no binding effect in courts. In receiving
ex-parte the DFAs advice and in motuproprio dismissing the two criminal cases without notice Ruling: No. This case deals with a theft committed on board a transport while navigating the
to the prosecution, the latters right to due process was violated. It should be noted that due high seas. Act No. 136 of the organic law, as well as Act No. 186 passed by the Civil Commission,
process is a right of the accused as much as it is of the prosecution. The needed inquiry in what and which repealed the former law, Act No. 76, do not expressly confer jurisdiction or authority
capacity petitioner was acting at the time of the alleged utterances requires for its resolution upon this court to take cognizance of all crimes committed on board vessels on the high seas.
evidentiary basis that has yet to be presented at the proper time. At any rate, it has been ruled While the provisions of the law are clear and precise with respect to civil admiralty or maritime
that the mere invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the dropping of cases, this is not true with respect to criminal cases. If any doubt could arise concerning the
the charges. true meaning of the law applicable to the case, Act No. 400 effectively dissipates such doubts.
Second, under Sec. 45 of the Agreement, the immunity mentioned therein is not absolute, but This law, which is an addition to Act No. 136, by which the courts of justice of the Philippine
subject to the exception that the act was done in "official capacity." It is therefore necessary Islands were organized, in article 1 adds to article 56, consisting of seven paragraphs, another
to determine if petitioners case falls within the ambit of Section 45(a). Thus, the prosecution paragraph numbered 8, which reads as follows: "Of all crimes and offenses committed on the
should have been given the chance to rebut the DFA protocol and it must be accorded the high seas or beyond the jurisdiction of any country, or within any of the navigable waters of
opportunity to present its controverting evidence, should it so desire. the Philippine Archipelago, on board a ship or water craft of any kind registered or licensed in
Third, slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because the Philippine Islands in accordance with the laws thereof." The purpose of this law was to
our laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official define the jurisdiction of the courts of First Instance in criminal cases for crimes committed on
duty. The imputation of theft is ultra vires and cannot be part of official functions. It is well- board vessels registered or licensed in the Philippine Islands. The transport Lawton not being
settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for a vessel of this class, our courts are without jurisdiction to take cognizance of a crime
whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice or in bad faith or beyond committed on board the same.
the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.

13
Conflict Batch 3 I Atty. Torregosa I EH 501
12. MINORU FUJIKI v MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY (2) W/N a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign
Doctrine: For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to on the ground of bigamy.(YES)
prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. Petitioner may prove the (3) W/N the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for
Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a Court.(YES)
foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office. HELD:
I.For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage
FACTS: Fujiki is a Japanese national who married Marinay in the Philippineson 2004. The where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove
marriage did not sit well with Fujiki’s parents. He could not bring his wife to Japan where he the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the
resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other. foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections
24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court. Petitioner may prove the
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara. Without the first marriage being Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy
dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married in 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a
brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or
She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki. consular officer of the Philippine Foreign Service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of
office.
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment
Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the would mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions, including the form
marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.Fujikithen filed a and contents of the petition, the service of summons, the investigation of the public
petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute prosecutor, the setting of pre-trial, the trial and the judgment of the trial court. This is absurd
Nullity of Marriage)." Heprayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; because it will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign
(2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void under the judgments, which is "to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues." The interpretation of
Family Code of the Philippines; and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v. Rañada, this Court
City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between explained that "if every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff
Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and would be forced back on his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously
Civil Registrar General in the NSO. concluded litigation."
Philippine courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve
RTC immediately dismissed the petition.It based its dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02- into the merits of a foreign judgment.
11-10-SC. Apparently, the RTC took the view that only "the husband or the wife," in this case
either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki. III.To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot
substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. However, this does not apply in a petition for
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry based on the recognition of a foreign
contemplated ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage. Thus, judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. There is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under
Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTC’s "pronouncement that foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to
the petitioner failed to comply with A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC be set aside" and that the case be recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was already
reinstated in the trial court for further proceedings. The Solicitor General argued that Fujiki, as tried and decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in
the spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare the bigamous a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor General cited Juliano-Llave v. parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
Republic which held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in cases of Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are empowered
bigamy. to correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage while the foreign
spouse is free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine
ISSUES: (1) W/N A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is applicable.(NO) courts already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to

14
Conflict Batch 3 I Atty. Torregosa I EH 501
the extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. A critical RULING:
difference between the case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a I. This is a case capable of pecuniary estimation.
bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent The rules of comity, utility and convenience of nations have established a usage among civilized
with Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of states by which final judgments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally
the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to undergo full trial by filing a respected and rendered efficacious under certain conditions that may vary in different
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the countries.
only remedy available to him or her. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign There is an evident distinction between a foreign judgment in an action in rem and one in
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for personam. For an action in rem, the foreign judgment is deemed conclusive upon the title to
bigamy. the thing, while in an action in personam, the foreign judgment is presumptive, and not
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is conclusive, of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent
inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging title.[21] However, in both cases, the foreign judgment is susceptible to impeachment in our
party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of local courtson the grounds of want of jurisdiction or notice to the party,[22] collusion,
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there fraud,[23] or clear mistake of law or fact.[24] Thus, the party aggrieved by the foreign
is neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine judgment is entitled to defend against the enforcement of such decision in the local forum.
courts should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations. The There are distinctions, nuanced but discernible, between the cause of action arising from the
recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that enforcement of a foreign judgment, and that arising from the facts or allegations that
establishes a new status, right and fact that needs to be reflected in the civil registry. occasioned the foreign judgment. They may pertain to the same set of facts, but there is an
Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency between the recognition of the effectivity of the essential difference in the right-duty correlatives that are sought to be vindicated. For
foreign judgment and the public records in the Philippines. GRANTED. example, in a complaint for damages against a tortfeasor, the cause of action emanates from
the violation of the right of the complainant through the act or omission of the respondent.
13. MIJARES VS. HONORABLE RANADA On the other hand, in a complaint for the enforcement of a foreign judgment awarding
KEYWORDS: 1 Billion for Marcos victims damages from the same tortfeasor, for the violation of the same right through the same
FACTS: The essential facts bear little elaboration. A complaint via class suit was filed against manner of action, the cause of action derives not from the tortious act but from the foreign
the Marcos Estate by ten Filipinos representing 10,000 Filipinos whose heirs were tortured, judgment itself.
detained, raped or summarily executed during the Martial Law era before the US District Court The rules are silent as to what initiatory procedure must be undertaken in order to enforce a
in Hawaii. Plaintiffs invoked the US Alien Tort Act. The District Court awarded $ foreign judgment in the Philippines. But there is no question that the filing of a civil complaint
1,964,005,859.90 and such was affirmed by the US Court of Appeals. The Marcos Estate did is an appropriate measure for such purpose.
not appeal hence the judgment became final. It is self-evident that while the subject matter of the action is undoubtedly the enforcement of
The plaintiffs now filed a civil case before the RTC Makati for the enforcement of judgment. a foreign judgment, the effect of a providential award would be the adjudication of a sum of
The plaintiffs paid only P410 as docket fees, basing the rates on Special Proceedings cases. money. Perhaps in theory, such an action is primarily for the enforcement of the foreign
Marcos estate filed a motion to dismiss for failure to pay the correct amount of docket fees in judgment, but there is a certain obtuseness to that sort of argument since there is no denying
accordance with the SC circular since such was arguably pecuniary in nature and considering that the enforcement of the foreign judgment will necessarily result in the award of a definite
the fact that the damages amounts to almost P2 billion. Plaintiffs argued that such was sum of money.
incapable of pecuniary estimation since the action was merely for enforcement of foreign II. RTC has jurisdiction
judgment. Petitioner also invokes the Bill of Rights which state that free access to the courts Petitioners argue that if indeed an action for enforcement of foreign judgment may be capable
should not be denied by reason of poverty. CHR intervened in this case. RTC ruled that the of pecuniary estimation, itmight lead to an instance wherein a first level court such as the
filing fees should be P472,000,000.00. Municipal Trial Court would have jurisdiction to enforce a foreign judgment. But under the
RTC based its decision on the graduated rates on Section 7(a) Rule 141. Check lang nya the statute defining the jurisdiction of first level courts, B.P. 129, suchMTCC courts are not vested
provision at the bottom of the digest.These are the only facts. The rest of this lengthy case is with jurisdiction over actions for the enforcement of foreign judgments.
about the ruling. The SC said that: it is still under RTC jurisdiction since the same BP 129 states that RTC has
jurisdiction over “cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or
ISSUES: body exercising jurisdiction or any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-
1. WON the case is incapable of pecuniary estimation judicial functions.”
2. WON the proper filing fees was paid III. The proper filing fees were paid
3. WON the RTC has jurisdiction The SC said while it is capable of pecuniary estimation, it is still an action against an estate
based on a judgment.

15
Conflict Batch 3 I Atty. Torregosa I EH 501
We are comfortable in asserting the obvious, that the complaint to enforce the US District As stated in Section 48, Rule 39, the actionable issues are generally restricted to a review of
Court judgment is one capable of pecuniary estimation. But at the same time, it is also an jurisdiction of the foreign court, the service of personal notice, collusion, fraud, or mistake of
action based on judgment against an estate, thus placing it beyond the ambit ofSection 7(a) fact or law. The limitations on review is in consonance with a strong and pervasive policy in all
of Rule 141. What provision then governs the proper computation of the filing fees over the legal systems to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues.[32] Otherwise known as the
instant complaint? For this case and other similarly situated instances, we find that it is covered policy of preclusion, it seeks to protect party expectations resulting from previous litigation, to
by Section 7(b)(3), involving as it does, other actions not involving property. safeguard against the harassment of defendants, to insure that the task of courts not be
Notably, the amount paid as docket fees by the petitioners on the premise that it was an action increased by never-ending litigation of the same disputes, and in a larger sense to promote
incapable of pecuniary estimation corresponds to the same amount required for other actions what Lord Coke in the Ferrers Case of 1599 stated to be the goal of all law: rest and
not involving property. The petitioners thus paid the correct amount of filing fees, and it was quietness.[33] If every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff
a grave abuse of discretion for respondent judge to have applied instead a clearly inapplicable would be forced back on his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously
rule and dismissed the complaint. concluded litigation.
RELEVANT RULES OF COURT PROVISION
SEC. 7. Clerk of Regional Trial Court.-
(a) For filing an action or a permissive counterclaim or money claim against an estate NOT 14. TUNA PROCESSING, INC vs. PHILIPPINE KINGFORD, INC.
based on judgment, or for filing with leave of court a third-party, fourth-party, etc., complaint, Arbitration, General law v Special law
or a complaint in intervention, and for all clerical services in the same time, if the total sum
claimed, exclusive of interest, or the started value of the property in litigation, is: FACTS: Kanemitsu Yamaoka (hereinafter referred to as the "licensor"), co-patentee of U.S.
1. Less than P 100,00.00 P 500.00 Patent Philippine Letters Patent and Indonesian Patent (collectively referred to as the
2. P 100,000.00 or more - P 800.00but less than P 150,000.00 "Yamaoka Patent"), and five Philippine tuna processors, namely, Angel Seafood Corporation,
3. P 150,000.00 or more but - P 1,000.00less than P 200,000.00 (and so on and so forth) East Asia Fish Co., Inc., Mommy Gina Tuna Resources, Santa Cruz Seafoods, Inc., and
XXXXXXXXX respondent Kingford (collectively referred to as the "sponsors"/"licensees") entered into a
(b) For filing Memorandum of Agreement.
1. Actions where the valueof the subject mattercannot be estimated --- P 600.00
2. Special civil actions exceptjudicial foreclosure whichshall be governed byparagraph (a) above Purpose of the MOA is for Yamaoka to enter into alliance with Kingford for so that
--- P 600.00 he may enforce his patents, and for the latter to be licensed under the same patents, to enforce
3. All other actions notinvolving property --- P 600.00 (SC used this as basis for this decision) them and collect royalties in conjunction with the former.
In a real action, the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated value,
thereof shall be alleged by the claimant and shall be the basis in computing the fees. Subsequently, petitioner Tuna Processors, Inc (TPI) was established in the State of
BONUS: California. Stipulated was an arbitration clause whereby for any disputes arising from the
BASIS FOR ENFORCING FOREIGN JUDGMENT MOA, it should be submitted before the International Dispute Resolution in the State of
While the definite conceptual parameters of the recognition and enforcement of foreign California.
judgments have not been authoritatively established, the Court can assert with certainty that
such an undertaking is among those generally accepted principles of international law.[68] As Later, for unknown reasons, Kingford withdrew from TPI and reneged on its
earlier demonstrated, there is a (1) widespread practice among states accepting in principle obligations. So, TPI submitted the case for arbitration. Then, Kingford was ordered to pay TPI
the need for such recognition and enforcement, albeit subject to limitations of varying degrees. for breach of the MOA.
The fact that there is no binding universal treaty governing the practice is not indicative of a
widespread rejection of the principle, but only a disagreement as to the imposable specific To enforce award, TPI filed a Petition for Confirmation, Recognition, and
rules governing the procedure for recognition and enforcement. Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award before the RTC of Makati City. Then, a motion to
Aside from the widespread practice, (2) it is indubitable that the procedure for recognition dismiss was filed by Kingford. But the first judge, prior inhibition, denied it. Kingford sought for
and enforcement is embodied in the rules of law, whether statutory or jurisprudential, the judge’s inhibition, which the judge heeded even amidst unfounded allegations for
adopted in various foreign jurisdictions. Certainly, the Philippine legal system has long ago inhibition. The second judge, then granted the motion to dismiss and dismissed the petition
accepted into its jurisprudence and procedural rules the viability of an action for enforcement on the ground that TPI lacked legal capacity to sue in the Philippines.
of foreign judgment, as well as the requisites for such valid enforcement, as derived from
internationally accepted doctrines. Hence, this direct petition to SC under Rule 45, Review on Certiorari.
LIMITATION BY OUR COURTS ON REVIEWING FOREIGN JUDGMENT
ISSUE: WON TPI has the legal capacity to sue in the Philippines.

16
Conflict Batch 3 I Atty. Torregosa I EH 501

RULING: YES, IT HAS CAPACITY TO SUE

DECISION OF RTC

TPI is a foreign Corp organized under laws of California. So applicable law is Sec. 133
or now, 150 of the Revised Corp Code. In a nutshell, it states that:

NO foreign corp transacting business in the Philippines without license, or its


successors or assigns shall maintain or intervene in any action before Phil Courts or Admin
agencies, but, it can be sued.

This was the basis of the RTC in saying that TPI has no legal capacity because it
ADMITTED that it has no license to operate in the country.

ARGUMENT OF PETITIONER:

Under RA 9285 (Alternative Dispute Resolution of 2004), New York Convention, and
UNCITRAL Model Law, legal capacity is not required for a party to seek enforcement of
foreign arbitration judgment.

DILLEMA NOW:

How to RECONCILE Sec. 133 / 150 of the Revised Corp Code on one hand, and RA
9285, New York Convention, and UNCITRAL Model law on the other.

SC RESOLUTION:

1) ADR of 2004 being the Municipal law, is applicable.

2) Corp code is a GENERAL LAW (applies to all corporations) while ADR of 2004 is a SPECIAL
LAW (specific goal is to promote party autonomy in resolving their disputes). – as between a
general and special law, the latter shall prevail

3) ADR of 2004 provides exclusive grounds for the opposing party in an application for
recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award. NONE of the grounds touched on the
capacity to sue of the party seeking the recognition and enforcement of the award.

4) When a party enters into a contract containing a foreign arbitration clause and, as in this
case, in fact submits itself to arbitration, it becomes bound by the contract, by the arbitration
and by the result of arbitration.

TPI CAN FILE FOR RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE ARBITRAL AWARD.

CASE REMANDED.

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