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CAMPOREDONDO VS. NLRC the Labor Code, and the authority of the NLRC to exercise jurisdiction over disputes involving
terms and conditions of employment in government owned or controlled corporations had
FACTS: been recognized.
Petitioner Baltazar Camporedondo was employed by the Philippine National Red Cross sine
1980 until his early retirement on 15 Dec 1995. On 21 Nov 1995, PNRC Secretary General 1973 Constitution vs. 1987 Constitution Civil Service coverage
Celso Samson required petitioner to restitute the total sum of P135,927.78 representing cash
shortages, technical shortage and unremitted collection. On 28 May 1996, petitioner filed with 2. The 1973 Constitution, in which the Juco case is based, and 1987 Constitution starkly
the NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal, damages and underpayment of wages against the varies as regards the coverage of the civil service of government-owned or controlled
PNRC and its key officials. corporations.
The 1973 Constitution provides that “ [t]he civil service embraces every branch, agency,
ISSUE: Whether or not the PNRC is a government-owned and controlled corporation. subdivision, and instrumentality of the Government, including every government-owned or
controlled corporation …”
RULING:
YES. The PNRC is a government-owned and controlled corporation with an original charter The 1987 Constitution provides that “ [t]he civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
under R.A. No. 95, as amended. Those with special charters are government corporations instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled
subject to its provisions and its employees are under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service corporations with original charter.”
Commission, and are compulsory members of the Government Service Insurance System. The 3. Under the 1987 Constitutional provision which embraces GOCCs with original charter,
PNRC was not impliedly converted to a private sector corporation simply because its character the Civil Service doesnot include government-owned or controlled corporations which are
was amended to vest in it the authority to secure loans, be exempted from payment of all duties, organized as subsidiaries of government-owned or controlled corporations under the
taxes, fees, and other charges of all kinds on all importations and purchases for its exclusive general corporation law. (i.e., GOCCs incorporated under the Corporation Code)
use, on donations for its disaster relief work and other services and in its benefits and fund
raising drives, among others. 4. The proceedings in the 1986 Constitutional Commission also shed light on the
Constitutional intent and meaning in the use of the phrase "with original charter." It defined
NATIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION (NASECO) V. NLRC (1988) corporations with ‘original charters’ as those corporations created by law, by an act of
Congress, or by special law, and not under the general corporation law.
FACTS:
Eugenia C. Credo was an employee of the National Service Corporation (NASECO), a
domestic corporation, which provided security guards as well as other similar manpower NASECO is a GOCC without original charter
services to the Philippine National Bank. During her employment, she was administratively 5. On the premise that it is the 1987 Constitution that governs the instant case because it is
charged for non-compliance with entry procedures in the company billing statements. She the Constitution in place at the time of decision thereof, the NLRC has jurisdiction to accord
was placed on forced leave and eventually terminated. Credo then filed a complaint for illegal relief to the parties. As an admitted subsidiary of the NIDC, in turn a subsidiary of the PNB,
dismissal. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of NASECO, but the NLRC reversed the decision the NASECO is a government-owned or controlled corporation without original charter.
and ordered the reinstatement of Credo. NASECO argued that NLRC had no jurisdiction to
issue said order because NASECO is a government corporation by virtue of its being a REYNALDO D. LOPEZ, VS CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and ROMEO V. LUZ, JR.
subsidiary of the National Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC), a subsidiary
wholly owned by the Philippine National Bank (PNB), which in turn is a government owned FACTS:
corporation. Hence, the terms and conditions of employment of its employees are governed Petitioner Lopez, along with private respondent Romeo V. Luz, Jr. and Roberto Abellana, was
by the Civil Service Law, as stated in the case of National Housing Corporation vs. Juco. appointed as Assistant Harbor Master at Manila International Container Terminal, Manila South
Harbor and Manila North Harbor, respectively. A law was passed wherein the DOTC was
HELD: reorganized, and the number of Assistant Harbor Master in the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA)
was reduced from (3) three to (2) two. After a careful evaluation of a placement committee of
NLRC Jurisdiction the PPA, Luz was rated third. Luz protested/appealed the appointment of Lopez, but the PPA
1. The NLRC has jurisdiction. In the interest of justice, the holding in the Juco case should not General Manager said Luz was not qualified for the two slots. Luz then appealed to the CSC.
be given retroactive effect, that is, to cases that arose before its promulgation on 17 January The CSC ordered for a re-assessment which the PPA complied. Still, the CSC found that the
1985. To do otherwise would be oppressive to Credo and other employees similarly situated, re-assessment was not in order. It ruled that the immediate supervisor of respondent Luz was
because under the 1973 Constitution, but prior to the Juco ruling (1985), the applicability of in the best position to assess the competence of the respondent and not a psychiatric-

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consultant who was merely a contractual employee and susceptible to partiality. It directed the Subsequently, Deputy Executive Secretary Mariano Sarmiento sent a letter to the respondent
appointment of Luz as the Harbor Master instead of the petitioner Hence, the petition. dated November 7, 1990, requesting that based on the present certified function and actual
duties of the petitioner, the position be restored to the career service and that said petitioner
ISSUE: Whether or not the CSC erred in nullifying Lopez’ appointment and instead substituting be granted the civil service eligibility under R.A. No. 6850. Respondent commission denied the
its decision for that of the PPA. request stating the position was declared “confidential in nature” by the Office of the President.
The respondent however restored the position of Clerk II to career service but still denied the
RULING: petition for reconsideration of the petitioner.
The role of the Civil Service Commission in establishing a career service and in promoting the
morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, and courtesy among civil servants is not disputed ISSUE: Whether or not the writ of mandamus may be issued by the Court to compel the
by petitioner Lopez. On the other hand, the discretionary power of appointment delegated to respondent Commission to grant the petitioner the privilege of securing an appropriate civil
the heads of departments or agencies of the government is not controverted by the service eligibility under Republic Act No. 6850.
respondents. In the appointment, placement and promotion of civil service employees
according to merit and fitness, it is the appointing power, especially where it is assisted by a RULING:
screening committee composed of persons who are in the best position to screen the The court cannot compel the commission to grant the privilege of civil service eligibility under
qualifications of the nominees, who should decide on the integrity, performance and capabilities RA 6850. The simple reason being that under the law granting the privilege to government
of the future appointees. The law limits the Commission's authority only to whether or not the employees, there is a wide latitude of discretion given to the Commission which determines in
appointees possess the legal qualifications and the appropriate civil service eligibility, nothing Section 1 thereof, "who are qualified to avail themselves of the privilege granted under this
else. To go beyond this would be to set at naught the discretionary power of the appointing Act." With such discretion, Section 2 of the same law requires the Civil Service Commission to
authority and to give to the Commission a task which the law (Sec. 6, Rep. Act No. 6656) does promulgate the rules and regulations to implement this Act using certain standards. Besides
not confer. This does not mean that the Commission's act of approving or disapproving what the law granted is a privilege and not a right, therefore the discretion lies with the
becomes ministerial. The Court has defined the parameters within which the power of approval commission itself. As provided by Sec 1 of RA 6850
of appointments shall be exercised by the respondent Commission. In the case of Luego v. ; "The Civil Service Commission shall formulate performance evaluation standards in order to
Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327 [1986], the Court ruled that all the Commission is determine those temporary employees who are qualified to avail themselves of the privilege g
actually authorized to do is to check if the appointee possesses the qualifications and ranted under this Act.
appropriate eligibility: "If he does, his appointment is approved; if not it is disapproved." We
further ruled that the Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment simply because it "The civil service eligibility herein granted may apply to such other positions as the Civil Servi
believed that the private respondent was better qualified for that would have constituted an ce Commission maydeem appropriate.
encroachment of the discretion vested solely in the appointing authority. The Commission
cannot exceed its power by substituting its will for that of the appointing authority. Petition is Petition was hereby dismissed due to lack of merit.
GRANTED.
MANUEL LEYSON VS. OMBUDSMAN
RODELA D. TORREGOZA, PETITIONER, VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,
RESPONDENT
FACTS:
The Coconut Industry Investment Fund (CIIF) companies failed to comply with its contract
FACTS:
agreement with the International Towage and Transport Corporation (ITTC) for the transport
The petitioner has been working as Staff Aide position in the Legal Office, Office of the of coconut oil in bulk. ITTC Executive Vice President Manuel Leyson, Jr. filed a complaint
President, Malacanang, Manila, since January 18, 1978, to the present. His original with the Office of the Ombudsman for breach of contract, among others. The complaint was
appointment was for only six months. On June 5, 1978, less than five months after the first
dismissed.
appointment, petitioner was given another appointment to the same position effective "as of
June 18, 1978" and with a notation that "This appointment is declared confidential." Then on
March 5, 1990, respondent Commission issued the "Rules Implementing Republic Act No. ISSUE: Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to further act on the
6850, enabling the petitioner to file her application for the appropriate eligibility to the position complaint.
she has been occupying for the last thirteen (13) years and having accordingly rendered
efficient service. The petitioner’s request returned unacted for the reason that the position held RULING:
was declared confidential. After the Salary Standardization Law (Republic Act No. 6758) was NO. All three corporations comprising the CIIF companies were organized as stock
passed, the same position was reclassified as Clerk II in July 1989. corporations. The UCPB-CIIF owns 44.10% of the shares of Legaspi Oil, 91.24% of the

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shares of GranExport, and 92.85% of the shares of United Coconut. Obviously, the below Sec. 28. The Commission shall have original disciplinary jurisdiction over all its officials and
51% shares of stock in Legaspi Oil removes it from the definition of a government-owned or employees and over all cases involving civil service examination anomalies or irregularities."
controlled corporation. There is no showing that GranExport and United Coconut was vested
with functions relating to publi cneeds whether governmental or proprietary in nature. Thus, Petitioners' contention that they were denied due process of law by the fact that the CSC acted
the CIIF companies are private corporations not within the scope of the Ombudsman’s as investigator, complainant, prosecutor and judge, all at the same time against the petitioners
jurisdiction. is untenable. The CA correctly explained that the CSC is mandated to hear and decide
administrative case instituted by it or instituted before it directly or on appeal including actions
of its officers and the agencies attached to it pursuant to Book V, Title 1, Subtitle A, Chapter 3,
GILDA CRUZ VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION Section 12, paragraph 11 of the Administrative Code of 1987.
FACTS:
MANUEL L. ONTIVEROS vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, and
CSC received a letter from Carmelita B. Esteban, claiming that, during the examinations for the DEPARTMENT OF TOURISM
non-professional in the career civil service, Zenaida C. Paitim, the Municipal Treasurer of
Norzagaray, Bulacan, falsely pretending to be the examinee, Gilda Cruz, a co-employee in the FACTS:
said office, took the examinations for the latter. Carmelita Esteban requested the CSC to Petitioner was Security Officer I in the Investigation and Security Division of the Ministry of
investigate the matter. tourism, he was dismissed from the service for inefficiency, incompetence, and unauthorized
absences. Petitioner appealed to the CSC, invoking his status as a civil service eligible and a
The CSC issued Resolution No. 981695 finding the petitioners guilty of the charges and
permanent employee. CSC Director IV Angelito G. Grande informed petitioner that jurisdiction
ordered their dismissal from the government service. Petitioners then went up to the Court of
over his appeal was vested in the Review Committee created under Executive Order No. 17 of
Appeals assailing the resolution of the CSC. The CA dismissed the petition before it. The
then President Corazon C. Aquino and for that reason his (petitioner's) appeal could not be
motion for reconsideration was, likewise, denied. Hence, this petition. given due course by the CSC.
Petitioners maintain that the CSC did not have original jurisdiction to hear and decide the
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the CSC. Petitioner
administrative case. Allegedly, in accordance with Section 47(1), Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title 1,
filed a petition for review to the Court of Appeals. But his petition, as well as his motion for
Book V, Administrative Code of 1987, the CSC is vested with appellate jurisdiction only in all
reconsideration, was denied. The Court of Appeals ruled that the CSC had no jurisdiction over
administrative cases where the penalty imposed is removal or dismissal from the office and petitioner's appeal, the proper appellate body being the Review Committee established under
where the complaint was filed by a private citizen against the government employee. E.O. No.17. In addition, the appeals court held that review of petitioner's dismissal was barred
by laches. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not CSC did not have original jurisdiction to hear and decide the
administrative case.
Petitioner argues that his case does not fall under the Review Committee's jurisdiction because
his separation from the service was not in consequence of the reorganization of the
RULING:
government, as provided in the Provisional Constitution (also known as the Freedom
Petitioners' invocation of the law is misplaced. The provision is applicable to instances where Constitution), but was for cause; hence, appeal lies with the CSC.
administrative cases are filed against erring employees in connection with their duties and
functions of the office. This is, however, not the scenario contemplated in the case at bar. It ISSUE: Whether the case fall under the Review Committee's jurisdiction or with the CSC.
must be noted that the acts complained of arose from a cheating caused by the petitioners in
the Civil Service (Subprofessional) examination. The examinations were under the direct RULING:
control and supervision of the Civil Service Commission. The culprits are government
employees over whom the Civil Service Commission undeniably has jurisdiction. Thus, after Art. III, §2 of the Provisional Constitution provided that "All elective and appointive officials
the petitioners were duly investigated and ascertained whether they were indeed guilty of
and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by
dishonesty , the penalty meted was dismissal from the office.
proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of
their successors, if such is made within a period of one year from February 25, 1986" (emphasis
Section 28, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations explicitly provides
added). To be sure, petitioner was not dismissed by virtue of a proclamation or executive order
that the CSC can rightfully take cognizance over any irregularities or anomalies connected to of the President of the Philippines nor by reason of the designation or appointment and
the examinations, as it reads: qualification of his successor. It must also be noted that E.O. No.120, which reorganized the

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then Ministry of Tourism, was issued by then President Corazon C. Aquino only on January 20, Director III. Hence, in the execution of the decision of the Supreme Court, respondent was
1987, whereas petitioner was dismissed on May 26, 1986. reinstated to the position: Department Legal Counsel and/or Director III.

However, the memorandum of then Tourism Minister Jose Antonio U. Gonzales, dismissing Then Secretary Rafael Alunan III, issued Department Order No. 94-370 on July 26, 1994. This
petitioner from the service, clearly stated that it was being issued pursuant to Art. III, §2 of order relieved private respondent of his current duties and responsibilities and reassigned him
the Provisional Constitution. And indeed, just two days after petitioner had been dismissed, as Director III or Assistant Regional Director of Region XI.
E.O. No.17 was issued on May 28, 1986.
Private respondent, however, did not report to his new assigned position. Instead, he filed a
In Radia v. Review Committee under Executive Order No. 17,[9] the retroactive application of 90-day sick leave, and upon the expiration thereof, he submitted a memorandum for then acting
E.O. No.17 to past dismissals was affirmed. Secretary Alexander Aguirre, signifying his intention to re-assume his position as Department
Legal Counsel/Chief, Legal Services.
In this case, it is clear that petitioner's dismissal came within the coverage of E.O. No.17,
§3(3) and (5). Pursuant to §2 of the order, the memorandum of dismissal of Minister Accordingly, private respondent was advised to report to Region XI immediately. Private
Gonzales is considered the act of the then President. respondent wrote a memorandum requesting for reconsideration of the department order, but
to no avail.
Nor can it be argued that this case is not covered by Art. III, §2 of the Provisional Constitution
since the grounds for petitioner's dismissal are grounds under civil service laws and regulations. On appeal to the CSC by private respondent, the former issued a resolution which sustained
E.O. No.17 provided the grounds for the separation of employees from the service not to bring the latter’s reassignment. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied
their cases under ordinary civil service laws and regulations but to provide limits on what by the CSC.
otherwise would be absolute discretion and thus prevent an abuse of power. But certainly, it
was not the intention to make such cases subject to processing by regular procedures that The DILG directed private respondent to report to his new assigned post in Region XI, stressing
could defeat the summary nature required by government reorganization following the that his continued non-compliance with the department order is prejudicial to the interest of
establishment of a revolutionary government. public service. Private respondent was also warned that upon his failure to comply, the DILG
shall be constrained to consider him on absence without leave and as a consequence, drop
HON. ALMA DE LEON v. CA him from the rolls of public service. Instead of complying therewith, private respondent filed
with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
FACTS: restraining order and/or preliminary injunction but the issuance of the same was denied by the
court.
Private respondent Atty. Jacob Montesa was appointed as Ministry Legal Counsel CESO IV in
the Ministry of Local Government, now (DILG) by then Minister Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. Inspite of Upon the recommendation of the DILG, President Fidel Ramos, issued Administrative Order
not being a Career Executive Service Officer (CESO) or a member of the Career Executive No. 235, dropping private respondent from the roster of public servants for serious neglect of
Service (CES), private respondent's appointment was approved as permanent by the Civil duty and absences without leave.
Service Commission.
Later, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision on the petition in favor of private respondent
Subsequently, then President Corazon Aquino promulgated Executive Order No. 262, and rendered as null and void Department Order No. 94370. The Court of Appeals ordered that
reorganizing the DILG. Then Secretary Luis Santos designated Nicanor Patricio as Chief of private respondent be retained in his position as Chief, Legal Service or Department Legal
Legal Service in place of private respondent who, in turn, was directed to report to the office of Counsel in the DILG, without loss of seniority, rank, emolument and privileges.
the Secretary to perform special assignments. This prompted private respondent to file before
the Supreme Court a petition for quo warranto against Secretary Luis Santos and Nicanor The DILG Secretary was ordered to release to petitioner his withheld salaries and his back
Patricio. On September 26, 1990, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of private respondent and salaries, if also withheld.
ordered his reinstatement to his former position.
Both petitioners and private respondent moved for reconsideration. In his Motion for
Meanwhile,the Salary Standardization Law took effect on July 1, 1989. Pursuant thereto, the Clarification and/or Partial Motion for Reconsideration, private respondent prayed for
position of Department Service Chiefs, which include the Department Legal Counsel, was backwages and his salary that was illegally withheld from the time the resolution of the CSC
reclassified and ranked with Assistant Bureau Directors under the generic position title of was issued up to his actual reinstatement to office.

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Petitioners, on the other hand, posited that the decision of the Court of Appeals is not confluent A person who does not have the requisite qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to
with Administrative Order No. 235 issued by President Ramos which dropped petitioner from it in the first place or, only as an exception to the rule, may be appointed to it merely in an acting
the roster of public servants. They further argued that until and unless the said order is declared capacity in the absence of appropriate eligible. The appointment extended to him cannot be
invalid, the presumption is in favor of its validity and it is incumbent upon private respondent to regarded as permanent even if it may be so designated.
comply therewith so as not to prejudice the public service.
In the present case, private respondent does not have the required Career Executive Service
The Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration filed by public respondents for lack eligibility as evidenced by his admission in his Comment that he is not a Career Executive
of merit and granted petitioner's Motion for Clarification and/or Partial Motion for Service Officer or a member of the Career Executive Service. Hence, private respondent's
Reconsideration. It modified its earlier decision by ordering the DILG Secretary to release to appointment did not attain permanency.
petitioner his withheld salaries and backwages, including allowances or RATA and other
benefits, to which petitioner would have been entitled had he not been illegally removed. Not having taken the necessary Career Executive Service examination to obtain requisite
eligibility, he did not at the time of his appointment and up to the present, possess the needed
Dissatisfied, petitioners filed the present petition. eligibility for a position in the Career Executive Service. Consequently, his appointment as
Ministry Legal Counsel – CESO IV/ Department Legal Counsel and/or Director III, was merely
ISSUE: Whether or not an individual who lacks the necessary qualifications for a public position temporary.
can be appointed to it in a permanent capacity.
The cases on unconsented transfer invoked by private respondent find no application in the
RULING: No. The position of Ministry Legal Counsel – CESO IV is embraced in the Career present case. As his appointment was merely temporary, he could be transferred or reassigned
Executive Service. without violating the constitutionally guaranteed right to security of tenure.

Under the Integrated Reorganization Plan, appointment thereto shall be made by the President Private respondent’s contention, that the mobility and flexibility concepts in the assignment of
from a list of career executive eligible recommended by the Board. Such appointments shall be personnel under the Career Executive Service do not apply to him because he is not a Career
made on the basis of rank; provided that appointments to the higher ranks which qualify the Executive Service Officer, is without merit. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General,
incumbents to assignments as undersecretary and heads of bureaus and offices and equivalent non-eligible holding permanent appointments to CES positions were never meant to remain
positions shall be with the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. immobile in their status. Otherwise, their lack of eligibility would be a premium vesting them
with permanency in the CES positions, a privilege even their eligible counterparts do not enjoy.
The President may, however, in exceptional cases, appoint any person who is not a CES Hence, the assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals were reversed and set
eligible; provided that such appointee shall subsequently take the required CES examination aside and the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission were reinstated.
and that he shall not be promoted to a higher class until qualifies in such examination. PAGCOR VS. RILLORAZA

Passing the CES examination entitles the examinee to a conferment of a CES eligibility and FACTS:
the inclusion of his name in the roster of CES eligible. Conferment of CES eligibility is done by Administrative charges for dishonesty, grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best
the Board through a formal Board Resolution after an evaluation of the examinee's performance interest of the service, and loss of confidence were brought against Carlos Rilloraza, a casino
in the four stages of the CES eligibility examinations. operations manager of petitioner PAGCOR. On 02 Dec 1997, the PAGCOR Board issued a
resolution dismissing respondent.
In the case of Achacoso v. Macaraig, et al., the Court held that: a permanent appointment can
be issued only to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being Petitioner submits that since respondents are confidential employees, pursuant to Section 16
appointed, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed. If not, the appointment could be of Presidential Decree No. 1869 (the PAGCOR Charter), they did not have fixed term of office;
regarded only as temporary. And being so, it could be withdrawn at will by the appointing their tenure of employment was dependent on the continued confidence of their superiors; such
authority and at a moment's notice. confidence was lost because it was proven that they committed dishonest acts in the
The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service does not automatically confer performance of their duties.
security or tenure on its occupant even if he does not possess the required qualifications. Such
right will have to depend on the nature of his appointment, which in turn depends on his ISSUE: Whether or not all PAGCOR employees are confidential employees.
eligibility or lack of it.
RULING:
NO. The classification of a particular position as primarily confidential, policy-determining or

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highly technical amounts to no more than an executive or legislative declaration that is not “Two years after retirement, petitioner was hired by the SBMA on a contractual basis. He was
conclusive upon the courts, the true test being the nature of the position. The exemption issued by SBMA a permanent employment as Department Manager III, Labor and Employment
provided in the charter pertains to exemption from competitive examination to Center. However, when said appointment was submitted to CSC Regional Office No. III, it was
determine merit and fitness to enter the civil service. Such employees are still protected by the disapproved on the ground that petitioner’s eligibility was not appropriate. Petitioner was
mantle of security of tenure. advised by SBMA of the disapproval of his appointment. In view thereof, petitioner was issued
a temporary appointment.
It is thus clearly deducible, if not altogether apparent, that the primary purpose of the framers
of the 1987 Constitution in providing for the declaration of a position as policy-determining, The CSC affirmed the disapproval of his permanent appointment. The CA shunned the issue
primarily confidential or highly technical is to exempt these categories from competitive of constitutionality of the Memo Circular. It ruled that petitioner has no standing as only the
examination as a means for determining merit and fitness. It must be stressed further that appointing officer may request reconsideration of the action taken by the CSC. Also, petitioner
these positions are covered by security of tenure, although they are considered non- was not the real party in interest as his appointment was dependent on the CSC’s approval.
competitive only in the sense that appointees thereto do not have to undergo
competitive examinations for purposes of determining merit and fitness. 1st ISSUE: Who may file reconsideration or appeal

In fact, the CSC itself ascribes to this view as may be gleaned from its questioned resolution RULING:
wherein it stated that "the declaration of a position as primarily confidential if at all, merely A permanent appointment in the career service is issued to a person who has met the
exempts the position from the civil service eligibility requirement." Accordingly, the Piñero requirements of the position to which the appointment is made in accordance with the
doctrine continues to be applicable up to the present and is hereby maintained. Such being the provisions of law, the rules and the standards promulgated pursuant thereto. It implies the civil
case, the submission that PAGCOR employees have been declared confidential service eligibility of the appointee. The law requires the appointment to be submitted to the
appointees by operation of law under the bare authority of CSC Resolution No. 91-830 CSC which will ascertain, in the main, whether the proposed appointee is qualified to hold the
must be rejected. position and whether the rules pertinent to the process of appointment were observed.

Petitioner, therefore, cannot justify respondents' dismissal on loss of trust and confidence since The appointing officer and the CSC acting together, though not concurrently but consecutively,
the latter are not confidential employees. Being regular employees that enjoy security of tenure, make an appointment complete. In acting on the appointment, the CSC determines whether
respondents can only be dismissed for just cause and with due process, notice and hearing. the appointee possesses the appropriate civil service eligibility or the required qualifications. If
Petitioner cannot, in the alternative, allege that respondents are being dismissed for dishonesty the appointee does, the appointment must be approved; if not, it should be disapproved.
since petitioner's thesis, in its motion for reconsideration in the CSC and petition before the CA,
has always been that respondents, as confidential employees, can be dismissed for loss of According to the CA, only the appointing authority had the right to challenge the CSC’s
trust and confidence. Besides, dishonesty is not the reason for which they were dismissed per disapproval. It relied on Section 2 of Rule VI of CSC Memorandum Circular 40, s. 1998, which
the letter of dismissal of July 23, 1997, but for loss of trust and confidence. provides: “Section 2. Request for Reconsideration of, or appeal from, the disapproval of an
appointment may be made by the appointing authority and submitted to the Commission within
fifteen (15) calendar days from receipt of the disapproved appointment.”
ABELLA JR VS CSC
Appointing Authority’s Right to Challenge CSC Disapproval
FACTS:
Petitioner, a lawyer, retired from the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA), as Department The power of appointment necessarily entails the exercise of judgment and discretion.
Manager of the Legal Services Department. He held a civil service eligibility for the position of Significantly, “the selection of the appointee -- taking into account the totality of his
Department Manager, having completed the training program for Executive Leadership and qualifications, including those abstract qualities that define his personality -- is the prerogative
Management in 1982 under the Civil Service Academy, pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 850, of the appointing authority.” No tribunal, not even this Court, may compel the exercise of an
which was then the required eligibility for said position. appointment for a favored person.

The CSC issued issued Memorandum Circular No. 21, series of 1994 (Pertinent provision: The CSC’s disapproval of an appointment is a challenge to the exercise of the appointing
Positions covered by the CES: (a) the position is a career position, (b) above division chief level authority’s discretion. The appointing authority must have the right to contest the
(c) duties and responsibilities require performance of executive or managerial functions. Upon disapproval. Thus, Section 2 of Rule VI of CSC Memorandum Circular 40, s. 1998 is justified
promotion or transfer to other Career Executive Service (CES) positions, these incumbents insofar as it allows the appointing authority to request reconsideration or appeal.
shall be under temporary status in said other CES positions until they qualify.’)

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Appointee’s Legal Standing to Challenge the CSC Disapproval Resolutions then were already final and could no longer be elevated to the CA. Mathay’s
Petition for Certiorari filed with the CA was improper, because there was an available remedy
While there is justification to allow the appointing authority to challenge the CSC disapproval, of appeal. And the CSC could not have acted without jurisdiction, considering that it was
there is none to preclude the appointee from taking the same course of action. Aggrieved empowered to recall an appointment initially approved.
parties, including the CSC, should be given the right to file MRs or to appeal.
The right of the appointee to seek MR or appeal was not the issue in Mathay. At any rate, the
Although commonly directed towards ensuring that only certain parties can maintain an action, present case is being decided en banc, and the ruling may reverse previous doctrines laid down
“legal standing” and “real party in interest” are different concepts. “The question in standing is by this Court.
whether such parties have ‘alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the 2nd ISSUE: WON Section 4 of the CSC Memo Circular is unconstitutional
court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. On the other hand,
the question as to ‘real party-in-interest’ is whether he is ‘the party who would be [benefited] or RULING:
injured by the judgment, or the ‘party entitled to the avails of the suit.’” In the exercise of its authority, the CSC deemed it appropriate to clearly define and identify
positions covered by the Career Executive Service. Logically, the CSC had to issue guidelines
If legal standing is granted to challenge the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental to meet this objective, specifically through the issuance of the challenged Circular.
act despite the lack of personal injury on the challenger’s part, then more so should petitioner
be allowed to contest the CSC Order disapproving his appointment. Clearly, he was prejudiced Career Service Classified by Levels
by the disapproval, since he could not continue his office. Although petitioner had no vested
right to the position, it was his eligibility that was being questioned. Corollary to this point, he Positions in the career service, for which appointments require examinations, are grouped into
should be granted the opportunity to prove his eligibility. He had a personal stake in the three major levels:
outcome of the case, which justifies his challenge to the CSC act that denied his permanent “(a) The first level shall include clerical, trades, crafts, and custodial service positions which
appointment. involve non-professional or sub[-]professional work in a non-supervisory or supervisory
capacity requiring less than four years of collegiate studies;
The Appointee a Real Party in Interest “(b) The second level shall include professional, technical, and scientific positions which involve
professional, technical, or scientific work in a non-supervisory or supervisory capacity requiring
The rule refers to a real or present substantial interest as distinguished from a mere at least four years of college work up to Division Chief level; and
expectancy; or from a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest. The appointee “(c) The third level shall cover positions in the Career Executive Service.”
is rightly a real party in interest too. He is also injured by the CSC disapproval, because he is Entrance to the different levels requires the corresponding civil service eligibility. Those in the
prevented from assuming the office in a permanent capacity. Moreover, he would necessarily third level (CES positions) require Career Service Executive Eligibility (CSEE) as a requirement
benefit if a favorable judgment is obtained, as an approved appointment would confer on him for permanent appointment.
all the rights and privileges of a permanent appointee.
The challenged Circular did not revoke petitioner’s ELM eligibility. He was appointed to a CES
Appointee Allowed Procedural Relief position; however, his eligibility was inadequate. Eligibility must necessarily conform to the
requirements of the position, which in petitioner’s case was a CSEE.
The view that only the appointing authority may request reconsideration or appeal is too
narrow. The appointee should have the same right. , CSC Resolution 99-1936 recognizes the Rights Protected
right of the adversely affected party to appeal to the CSC Regional Offices prior to elevating a
matter to the CSC Central Office. The adversely affected party necessarily includes the The challenged Circular protects the rights of incumbents as long as they remain in the
appointee. This judicial pronouncement does not override Mathay v. CSC, which the CA relied positions to which they were previously appointed. They are allowed to retain their positions in
on. The Court merely noted in passing -- by way of obiter -- that based on a similar provision, a permanent capacity, notwithstanding the lack of CSEE. Clearly, the Circular recognizes the
only the appointing officer could request reconsideration of actions taken by the CSC on rule of prospectivity of regulations; hence, there is no basis to argue that it is an ex post facto
appointments. law or a bill of attainder. These terms, which have settled meanings in criminal jurisprudence,
are clearly inapplicable here.
In that case, QC Mayor Mathay Jr. sought the nullification of CSC Resolutions that recalled his
appointment. He filed a Petition assailing the CA Decision, which had previously denied his The government service of petitioner ended when he retired in 1996; thus, his right to remain
Petition for Certiorari for being the wrong remedy and for being filed out of time. The CSC in a CES position, notwithstanding his lack of eligibility, also ceased. Upon his reemployment

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ADMIN LAW CASE DIGEST PART 1
years later as department manager III at SBMA in 2001, it was necessary for him to comply U.P. VS. REGINO
with the eligibility prescribed at the time for that position.
FACTS:
Security of Tenure Not Impaired Angel Pamplina, a mimeograph operator at the University of the Philippines School of
Economics, was dismissed on June 22, 1982, after he was found guilty of dishonesty and grave
First, security of tenure in the Career Executive Service -- except in the case of first and second misconduct for causing the leakage of final examination questions in Economics 106 under
level employees in the civil service -- pertains only to rank, not to the position to which the Prof. Solita Monsod. He sought relief from Merit Systems Board after his appeal was denied
employee may be appointed Second, petitioner had neither rank nor position prior to his by UP Board of Regents. MSB exonerated Pamplina and ordered his reinstatement with back
reemployment. One cannot claim security of tenure if one held no tenure prior to appointment. wages. CSC sustained MSB’s decision. Pamplina’s motion for execution was granted by QC
RTC. When it remained unheeded, writ of mandamus was issued in favor of Pamplina. UP then
Due Process Not Violated filed a petition for certiorari to seek the annulment of the decision of the trial court and the
orders of the Commission directing the reinstatement of Pamplina. Under its charter, to wit, Act
The classification of positions in career service was a quasi-legislative, not a quasi-judicial, 1870, it enjoys not only academic freedom but also institutional autonomy.
issuance. This distinction determines whether prior notice and hearing are necessary.
Section 6(e) grants the UP Board of Regents the power "to appoint, on recommendation of
In exercising its quasi-judicial function, an administrative body adjudicates the rights of persons the president of the university, professors, instructors, lecturers, and other employees of
before it, in accordance with the standards laid down by the law. The determination of facts and the university, to fix their compensation and to remove them for cause after an investigation
the applicable law, as basis for official action and the exercise of judicial discretion, are and hearing shall have been had." Pamplina was dismissed by virtue of this provision.
essential for the performance of this function. On these considerations, it is elementary that due
process requirements, as enumerated in Ang Tibay, must be observed. These requirements ISSUE: Whether or not CSC has jurisdiction over the university which was vested under its
include prior notice and hearing. charter, Act No. 1870, with academic freedom and institutional autonomy.

On the other hand, quasi-legislative power is exercised by administrative agencies through the RULING:
promulgation of rules and regulations within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine
of non-delegation of certain powers flowing from the separation of the great branches of the YES. Under the 1972 Constitution, all government-owned or controlled corporations,
government. Prior notice to and hearing of every affected party, as elements of due process, regardless of the manner of their creation, were considered part of the Civil Service. As a mere
are not required since there is no determination of past events or facts that have to be government-owned or controlled corporation, UP was clearly a part of the Civil Service under
established or ascertained. As a general rule, prior notice and hearing are not essential to the the 1973 Constitution and now continues to be so because it was created by a special law and
validity of rules or regulations promulgated to govern future conduct. has an original charter. As a component of the Civil Service, UP is therefore governed by PD
607 and administrative cases involving the discipline of its employees come under the appellate
Significantly, the challenged Circular was an internal matter addressed to heads of jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.
departments, bureaus and agencies. It needed no prior publication, since it had been issued
as an incident of the administrative body’s power to issue guidelines for government officials to SAMSON VS. COURT OF APPEALS
follow in performing their duties.
FACTS:
Disapproval of Appointment Feliciano Talens was Assistant Secretary to the Mayor of Caloocan. The newly-elected mayor,
Marcial Samson, released an Administrative Order qualifying the services of Talens as non-
Since petitioner had no CES eligibility, the CSC correctly denied his permanent competitive and terminating his employment on the ground of “lack and loss of confidence”.
appointment. The appointee need not have been previously heard, because the nature of the
action did not involve the imposition of an administrative disciplinary measure. The CSC, in He appointed Liwas as replacement. Petitioner justifies that as Assistant Secretary, like the
approving or disapproving an appointment, merely examines the conformity of the appointment Secretary, renders non-competitive service which is primarily confidential and highly technical
with the law and the appointee’s possession of all the minimum qualifications and none of the in nature where termination may be made due to lack and loss of confidence. However,
disqualification. respondent contends that he is competitive employee and thus, can only be removed for cause
and after due process has been observed. Thus, he filed with the Court of First Instance of
Caloocan to annul the disputed administrative order. The CFI, as well as the CA, ruled in favor
of Talens.

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ADMIN LAW CASE DIGEST PART 1
use of the term "and/or" means that the word "and" and the word "or" are to be used
Petitioner contends that the position of Assistant Secretary to the Mayor should be considered interchangeably. The word "or" is a disjunctive term signifying dissociation and independence
as in the non-competitive service and that the tenure of assistant secretary lasts only as long of one thing from another. Thus, the use of the disjunctive term "or" in this controversy connotes
as the Mayor’s confidence in him remains. Petitioners’ submission is that the assistant that either the standard in the first clause or that in the second clause may be applied in
secretary is no less a secretary to the mayor. determining whether a prospective applicant for the position under question may qualify.

ISSUE: Whether or not the position of Assistant Secretary to the mayor is a non-competitive Respondent would indeed lack the required years of work experience to qualify for the
service. contested position if the managerial standards in the first clause above were to be strictly
followed. At the time of his permanent appointment on November 28, 1994 as Chief Aviation
RULING: Safety Regulation Officer, respondent had a little over one year of managerial experience from
No. The Court affirmed the lower court’s decision. The position of Assistant Secretary to the his designation as Acting Chief of the Aviation Safety Division during the latter part of 1993.
Mayor is deemed to belong to the competitive service. Only secretaries to governors and However, the work already rendered by respondent in the ATO at the time of his appointment
mayors are expressly enumerated as non-competitive. The position of Secretary to the Mayor was well within the supervisory standard in the second clause. Planning, organizing, directing,
and that of Assistant Secretary to the Mayor are two separate and distinct positions. coordinating and supervising the enforcement of air safety laws, rules and regulations
pertaining to licensing, rating and checking of all airmen and mechanics and regulation of the
CSC VS. DELA CRUZ activities of flying schools were part of the work performed by respondent for more than 13
years prior to his appointment.
FACTS:
Saturnino dela Cruz is an employee of DOTC, Air TransportationOffice, he was a Check Pilot Before respondent was appointed to the contested position, he had held several other
positions in the ATO, namely:
II. He was promoted to the position: Chief Aviation Safety Regulation Officer of the Aviation
Safety Division. His promotion was assailed by Calamba, saying he did not meet the 4 yr
March 6, 1981 to July 15, 1981
managerial & supervisory qualification for the position. CSC-NCR upheld the protest and July 16, 1981 to February 5, 1983
recalled the approval of the appointment of Dela Cruz. Upon appeal of the ATO Director Gilo,
CSC reversed itself and approved the appointment. (Decision of the CSC kept changing)CA Supply Checker
approved the appointment. He has the required qualifications “planning, organizing, directing, Junior Aeronautical Engineer
coordinating and supervising the enforcement of air safety laws, rules and regulations February 6, 1983 to February 29, 1984
pertaining to licensing, rating and checking of all airmen and mechanics and regulation of the
activities of flying schools. Air Carrier Safety Inspector
March 1, 1984 to February 28, 1987
March 1, 1987 to November 27, 1994
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent has sufficiently complied with the required experience
standards. November 28, 1994 to date
Check Pilot I
RULING: Check Pilot II

As noted by the CSC-NCR, the contested position required four years of work experience in Chief Aviation Safety Regulation Officer
managerial position(s) per the Qualification Standards Manual prescribed by MC No. 46, s.
1993 and/or four years of experience in planning, organizing, directing, coordinating and These positions, spanning more than 13 years, in four of the five sections of the Aviation
supervising the enforcement of air safety laws, rules and regulations pertaining to licensing, Safety Division of the ATO definitely met the minimum supervisory experience required of
rating and checking of all airmen and mechanics and regulation of the activities of flying schools respondent for the position.
per the above-stated ATO-DOTC Qualification Standards.

Petitioner's insistence that respondent failed to meet the four-year managerial and supervisory
experience requirement is misplaced. It is a well-settled rule in statutory construction that the

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