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2. CSC VS.

SALAS Hearing for presentation of the evidence commences and the ERB outlined the procedure to
be observed in the reception of evidence—That the oppositors and the board must have all the
FACTS: evidence-in-chief to be places on record first then the cross-examination will come later.
On 07 Oct 1989, respondent Salas was appointed by the PAGCOR chairman as internal
security staff member and assigned to the casino at the Manila Pavilion Hotel. His Maceda claims that this order of relaxed procedure for presentation of proof resulted in a denial
employment was terminated by the Board of Directors of PAGCOR on 03 Dec 1991, allegedly of due process because it deprived him of finishing his cross-examination of the witnesses.
for loss of confidence.
ISSUE:
ISSUE: W/N Maceda, through this relaxed procedure of presentation of evidence was deprived of due
Whether or not Salas is a confidential employee. process

RULING: RULING:
NO. It is the nature of the position which finally determines whether a position is primarily NO. The Solicitor General has pointed out that administrative bodies may relax the procedures
confidential, policy-determining or highly technical. The occupant of a particular position could in the introduction of evidence in trials. It is not improper. The ERB, as an administrative body
be considered a confidential employee if the predominant reason why he was chosen by the is not bound by the strict or technical rules of evidence governing court proceedings. In fact,
appointing authority was the latter’s belief that he can share a close relationship with the Section 2, Rule I of the Rules of Procedure Governing Hearings Before the ERB provides that—
occupant. Where the position occupied is remote from that of the appointing authority, the These rules shall govern pleadings, practice and procedure before the ERB in all matters of
element of trust between them is no longer predominant. inquiry, study, hearing, investigation and/or any other proceeding within the jurisdiction of the
Board. However, in the broader interest of justice, the Board may, in any particular matter,
3. MACEDA VS. ERB except itself from these rules and apply such suitable procedure as shall promote the objectives
of the Order.
DOCTRINE: The ERB, as an administrative body is not bound by the strict or technical rules
of evidence governing court proceedings 4. GARCIA VS. MOJICA

FACTS: FACTS:
Because of the outbreak of the conflict on the Persian Gulf, private respondents oil companies On May 7, 1998, petitioner, in his capacity as Cebu City mayor, signed a contract with F.E.
filed with the ERB their applications on oil price increases. The ERB granted provisional Zuellig for the supply of asphalt to the city. The contract covers the period 1998-2001, which
increase (P1.42 per liter) period was to commence on September 1998 when the first delivery should have been made
by F.E. Zuellig. Sometime in March 1999, news reports came out regarding the alleged
Petitioner Maceda filed a petition for Prohibition seeking to nullify this provisional increase he anomalous purchase of asphalt by Cebu City, through the contract signed by petitioner. This
claims that the increase in prices has to undergo the requirements of notice and hearing, prompted the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) to conduct an inquiry into the matter.
however in this case the requirements were not complied with, and therefore Maceda claims
he was deprived of due process. Respondent Jesus Rodrigo T. Tagaan, special prosecution officer of the Office of the
Ombudsman, was assigned to conduct the inquiry, docketed as INQ-VIS-99-0132. After his
In reaffirming the increase, the lower court ruled that Executive Order 172 does not preclude investigation, he recommended that the said inquiry be upgraded to criminal and administrative
the board from ordering ex-parte, a provisional increase. These provisional increases, however, cases against petitioner and the other city officials involved. Respondent Arturo C. Mojica,
will be subject to final disposition of whether or not it should be made permanent, to reduce or Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, approved this recommendation.
increase it, or to deny the application.
ISSUES:
In fact, in the same order which authorized the provision increase, the ERB set the applications
for hearing with due notice to all interested parties. Petitioners Maceda failed to appear at said 1. WON Garcia may be held administratively liable.
hearing and at the second hearing. The notice of hearing was also published in newspapers of
general circulation. NO. In a number of cases, we have repeatedly held that a re-elected local official may not be
held administratively accountable for misconduct committed during his prior term of office. The
rationale for this holding is that when the electorate put him back into office, it is presumed that
it did so with full knowledge of his life and character, including his past misconduct. If, armed
with such knowledge, it still re-elects him, then such re-election is considered a condonation of
his past misdeeds. However, in the present case, respondents point out that the contract 5. GLORIA VS. CA
entered into by petitioner with F.E. Zuellig was signed just four days before the date of the
elections. It was not made an issue during the election, and so the electorate could not be said FACTS:
to have voted for petitioner with knowledge of this particular aspect of his life and character. Abad, Bandigas, Somebang and Margallo, private respondents, are public school teachers.
Some time in September and October 1990, during the teacher’s strikes, they did not report for
For his part, petitioner contends that the only conclusive determining factor as regards the
work. For this reason they were administratively charged with 1) grave misconduct; 2) gross
peoples thinking on the matter is an election. On this point, we agree with petitioner. That the
violation of Civil Service Rules; 3) gross neglect of duty; 4) refusal to perform official duty; 5)
people voted for an official with knowledge of his character is presumed, precisely to eliminate
the need to determine, in factual terms, the extent of this knowledge. Such an undertaking will gross insubordination; 6) conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service and; 7) AWOL. They
obviously be impossible. Our rulings on the matter do not distinguish the precise timing or were placed under preventive suspension. Investigation ended before the lapse of the 90 day
period when the misconduct was committed, reckoned from the date of the officials reelection, period. Margallo was dismissed from the service. The three others were suspended for 6
except that it must be prior to said date. months. On appeal to the CA, the court mitigated the punishment to reprimand only. Hence
their reinstatement. Now the reinstated teachers are asking for back wages during the period
The above ruling in Salalima applies to this case. Petitioner cannot anymore be held of their suspension and pending appeal (before the CA exonerated them).
administratively liable for an act done during his previous term, that is, his signing of the contract
with F.E. Zuellig. The agreement between petitioner (representing Cebu City) and F.E. Zuellig ISSUE:
was perfected on the date the contract was signed, during petitioners prior term. At that Whether the teachers are entitled to backwages for the period pending their appeal if they are
moment, petitioner already acceded to the terms of the contract, including stipulations now subsequently exonerated.
alleged to be prejudicial to the city government. Thus, any culpability petitioner may have in
signing the contract already became extant on the day the contract was signed. It hardly
RULING:
matters that the deliveries under the contract are supposed to have been made months later.
YES, they are entitled to full pay pending their appeal. To justify the award of back wages, the
While petitioner can no longer be held administratively liable for signing the contract with F. E. respondent must be exonerated from the charges and his suspension be unjust. Preventive
Zuellig, however, this should not prejudice the filing of any case other than administrative suspension pending appeal is actually punitive, and it is actually considered illegal if the
against petitioner. Our ruling in this case, may not be taken to mean the total exoneration of respondent is exonerated and the administrative decision finding him guilty is reversed. Hence
petitioner for whatever wrongdoing, if any, might have been committed in signing the subject he should be reinstated with full pay for the period of the suspension. Section 47 (4) of the Civil
contract. The ruling now is limited to the question of whether or not he may be held Service Decree states that the respondent “shall be considered as under preventive
administratively liable therefor, and it is our considered view that he may not. suspension during the pendency of the appeal in the event he wins.” On the other hand if his
conviction is affirmed the period of his suspension becomes part of the final penalty of
2. WON the Ombudsman was stripped of its powers by virtue of the LGC. suspension or dismissal. In the case at bar the respondents won in their appeal, therefore the
period of suspension pending their appeal would be considered as part of the preventive
No. Indeed, there is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate that it has repealed, suspension, entitling them to full pay because they were eventually exonerated and their
whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The two
suspension was unjustified. They are still entitled to back salaries even if they were still
statutes on the specific matter in question are not so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as
reprimanded.
to compel us to only uphold one and strike down the other. The decision of the Ombudsman (6
month suspension) will prevail over the LGC (60day suspension) if the evidence of guilt is
strong. * The power to preventively suspend is available not only to the Ombudsman but also 6. BEJA SR VS. CA
to the Deputy Ombudsman.
FACTS:
SEC. 24. Preventive Suspension. The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend Fidencio Beja Sr. an employee of Philippine ports authority, hired as Arrastre supervisor in
any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the 1975. and later on appointed as terminal supervisor in 1988. On October 21, 1988, the General
evidence of guilt is strong. Manager, Rogelio A. Dayan filed administrative case against Beja Sr. and Villaluz for grave
dishonesty. Grave misconduct willful violation of reasonable office rules and regulations and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Consequently they were preventively suspended for the charges. After preliminary reorganizing the Ministry of Transportation and Communication was issued, the PPA retained
investigation conducted by the district attorney for region X, administrative case no. 11-04-88 its attached status.
was considered closed for lack of merit. On December 13, 1988 another administrative case
was filed against Beja by the PPA manager also for dishonesty grave misconduct violation of Administrative Code of 1987 classiffied PPA as an attached agency to the DOTC. Book IV of
office rules and regulations, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and for being the Administrative Code of 1987, the other two being supervision and control and administrative
notoriously undesirable. Beja was also placed under preventive suspension pursuant to sec. supervision, “Attachment” is defined as the “lateral relationship between the department or its
412 of PD No. 807. equivalent and the attached agency or corporation for purposes of policy and program
coordination”.
The case was redocketed as administrative case no. PPA-AAB-1-049-89 and thereafter, the
PPA indorsed it to the AAB for appropriate action. The AAB proceeded to hear the case and An attached agency has a larger measure of independence from the Department to which it is
gave Beja an opportunity to present evidence. However, on February 20, 1989, Beja filed attached than one which is under departmental supervision and control or administrative
petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Misamis supervision. This is borne out by the “lateral relationship” between the Department and the
Oriental. attached agency. The attachment is merely for policy and program coordination.”

Two days later, he filed with the ABB a manifestation and motion to suspend the hearing of With respect to administrative matters, the independence of an attached agency from the
administrative case no. PPA-AAB-1-049-89 on account of the pendency of the certiorari department control and supervision is furthermore reinforced by the fact that even an agency
proceeding before the court. AAB denied the motion and continued with the hearing of the under a Department’s administrative supervision is free from Departmental interference with
administrative case. Thereafter, Beja moved for the dismissal of the certiorari case and respect to appointments and other personnel actions “ in accordance with the decentralization
proceeded to file before the Court for a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and/or of personnel functions” under the administrative Code of 1987.
temporary restraining order.
The Law impliedly grants the general Manager with the approval of the PPA board of Directors
ISSUE: Wether or not the Administrative Action Board of DOTC has jurisdiction over the power to investigate its personnel below the rank of Assistant Manager who may be
administrative cases involving personnel below the rank of Assistant General Manager of the charged with an administrative offense. During such investigation, the PPA General Manager,
Philippine Ports Authority, an attached agency of DOTC. may subject the employee concerned to preventive suspension. The investigation should be
conducted in accordance with the procedure set out in Sec. 38 of PD no. 807.
RULING:
The PPA General Manager is the disciplining authority who may, by himself and without the The Decision of the Court of Appeal is AFFIRMED as so far as it upholds the power of the PPA
approval of the PPA Board of Directors, subject a respondent in an administrative case to General Manager to to subject petitioner to preventive suspension and REVERSED insofar as
preventive suspension. His disciplining powers are sanctioned not only by Sec.8 of PD no. 857 it validates the jurisdiction of the DOTC and/or the AAB to act on administrative case no. PPA
but also by Sec. 37 of PD no. 807 granting the heads of agencies the “Jurisdiction to investigate –AAB-1-049-89. The AAB decision in said cased is hereby declared NULL and VOID and the
and decide matters involving disciplinary actions against officers and employees in the PPA. case is REMANDED to the PPA whose General Manager shall conduct with dispatch its
reinvestigation.
With respect to the issue, the Court qualifiedly rules in favor of the petitioner.
8. HON. ALMA DE LEON v. CA
The PPA was created through PD no. 505 dated July 1974. Under the Law, the corporate
powers of the PPA were vested in a governing Board of Directors known as the Philippine Ports FACTS:
Authority Council. Sec. 5(i) of the same decree gave the council the power “to appoint,
discipline and remove, and determine the composition of the technical staff of the authority and Private respondent Atty. Jacob Montesa was appointed as Ministry Legal Counsel CESO IV in
other personnel”. the Ministry of Local Government, now (DILG) by then Minister Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. Inspite of
not being a Career Executive Service Officer (CESO) or a member of the Career Executive
Service (CES), private respondent's appointment was approved as permanent by the Civil
On December 23, 1975, PD no. 505 was substituted by PD no. 857 sec. 4(a) thereof created
Service Commission.
the Philippine Ports Authority which would be attached to the then Department of Public Works,
Transportation and Communication. When Executive order no. 125 dated January 30, 1987
Subsequently, then President Corazon Aquino promulgated Executive Order No. 262, private respondent be retained in his position as Chief, Legal Service or Department Legal
reorganizing the DILG. Then Secretary Luis Santos designated Nicanor Patricio as Chief of Counsel in the DILG, without loss of seniority, rank, emolument and privileges.
Legal Service in place of private respondent who, in turn, was directed to report to the office of
the Secretary to perform special assignments. This prompted private respondent to file before The DILG Secretary was ordered to release to petitioner his withheld salaries and his back
the Supreme Court a petition for quo warranto against Secretary Luis Santos and Nicanor salaries, if also withheld.
Patricio. On September 26, 1990, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of private respondent and
ordered his reinstatement to his former position. Both petitioners and private respondent moved for reconsideration. In his Motion for
Clarification and/or Partial Motion for Reconsideration, private respondent prayed for
Meanwhile,the Salary Standardization Law took effect on July 1, 1989. Pursuant thereto, the backwages and his salary that was illegally withheld from the time the resolution of the CSC
position of Department Service Chiefs, which include the Department Legal Counsel, was was issued up to his actual reinstatement to office.
reclassified and ranked with Assistant Bureau Directors under the generic position title of
Director III. Hence, in the execution of the decision of the Supreme Court, respondent was Petitioners, on the other hand, posited that the decision of the Court of Appeals is not confluent
reinstated to the position: Department Legal Counsel and/or Director III. with Administrative Order No. 235 issued by President Ramos which dropped petitioner from
the roster of public servants. They further argued that until and unless the said order is declared
Then Secretary Rafael Alunan III, issued Department Order No. 94-370 on July 26, 1994. This invalid, the presumption is in favor of its validity and it is incumbent upon private respondent to
order relieved private respondent of his current duties and responsibilities and reassigned him comply therewith so as not to prejudice the public service.
as Director III or Assistant Regional Director of Region XI.
The Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration filed by public respondents for lack
Private respondent, however, did not report to his new assigned position. Instead, he filed a of merit and granted petitioner's Motion for Clarification and/or Partial Motion for
90-day sick leave, and upon the expiration thereof, he submitted a memorandum for then acting Reconsideration. It modified its earlier decision by ordering the DILG Secretary to release to
Secretary Alexander Aguirre, signifying his intention to re-assume his position as Department petitioner his withheld salaries and backwages, including allowances or RATA and other
Legal Counsel/Chief, Legal Services. benefits, to which petitioner would have been entitled had he not been illegally removed.

Accordingly, private respondent was advised to report to Region XI immediately. Private Dissatisfied, petitioners filed the present petition.
respondent wrote a memorandum requesting for reconsideration of the department order, but
to no avail. ISSUE: Whether or not an individual who lacks the necessary qualifications for a public position
can be appointed to it in a permanent capacity.
On appeal to the CSC by private respondent, the former issued a resolution which sustained
the latter’s reassignment. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied RULING:
by the CSC. No. The position of Ministry Legal Counsel – CESO IV is embraced in the Career Executive
Service.
The DILG directed private respondent to report to his new assigned post in Region XI, stressing
that his continued non-compliance with the department order is prejudicial to the interest of Under the Integrated Reorganization Plan, appointment thereto shall be made by the President
public service. Private respondent was also warned that upon his failure to comply, the DILG from a list of career executive eligible recommended by the Board. Such appointments shall be
shall be constrained to consider him on absence without leave and as a consequence, drop made on the basis of rank; provided that appointments to the higher ranks which qualify the
him from the rolls of public service. Instead of complying therewith, private respondent filed incumbents to assignments as undersecretary and heads of bureaus and offices and equivalent
with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review with prayer for the issuance of a temporary positions shall be with the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.
restraining order and/or preliminary injunction but the issuance of the same was denied by the
court. The President may, however, in exceptional cases, appoint any person who is not a CES
eligible; provided that such appointee shall subsequently take the required CES examination
Upon the recommendation of the DILG, President Fidel Ramos, issued Administrative Order and that he shall not be promoted to a higher class until qualifies in such examination.
No. 235, dropping private respondent from the roster of public servants for serious neglect of
duty and absences without leave. Passing the CES examination entitles the examinee to a conferment of a CES eligibility and
the inclusion of his name in the roster of CES eligible. Conferment of CES eligibility is done by
Later, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision on the petition in favor of private respondent the Board through a formal Board Resolution after an evaluation of the examinee's performance
and rendered as null and void Department Order No. 94370. The Court of Appeals ordered that in the four stages of the CES eligibility examinations.
In the case of Achacoso v. Macaraig, et al., the Court held that: a permanent appointment can
be issued only to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being
appointed, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed. If not, the appointment could be
regarded only as temporary. And being so, it could be withdrawn at will by the appointing
authority and at a moment's notice.
The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service does not automatically confer
security or tenure on its occupant even if he does not possess the required qualifications. Such
right will have to depend on the nature of his appointment, which in turn depends on his
eligibility or lack of it.

A person who does not have the requisite qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to
it in the first place or, only as an exception to the rule, may be appointed to it merely in an acting
capacity in the absence of appropriate eligible. The appointment extended to him cannot be
regarded as permanent even if it may be so designated.

In the present case, private respondent does not have the required Career Executive Service
eligibility as evidenced by his admission in his Comment that he is not a Career Executive
Service Officer or a member of the Career Executive Service. Hence, private respondent's
appointment did not attain permanency.

Not having taken the necessary Career Executive Service examination to obtain requisite
eligibility, he did not at the time of his appointment and up to the present, possess the needed
eligibility for a position in the Career Executive Service. Consequently, his appointment as
Ministry Legal Counsel – CESO IV/ Department Legal Counsel and/or Director III, was merely
temporary.

The cases on unconsented transfer invoked by private respondent find no application in the
present case. As his appointment was merely temporary, he could be transferred or reassigned
without violating the constitutionally guaranteed right to security of tenure.

Private respondent’s contention, that the mobility and flexibility concepts in the assignment of
personnel under the Career Executive Service do not apply to him because he is not a Career
Executive Service Officer, is without merit. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General,
non-eligible holding permanent appointments to CES positions were never meant to remain
immobile in their status. Otherwise, their lack of eligibility would be a premium vesting them
with permanency in the CES positions, a privilege even their eligible counterparts do not enjoy.
Hence, the assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals were reversed and set
aside and the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission were reinstated.