CYNTHIA BOLOS vs. DANILO BOLOS
THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE HONORABLE COURT IN
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking a review of
RTC, declaring its decision pronouncing the nullity of marriage
between petitioner and respondent final and executory.
Cynthia filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her
marriage to respondent Danilo under Article 36 of the FC.
After trial on the merits, the RTC granted the petition for
annulment in a Decision, dated August 2, 2006.
A copy of said decision was received by Danilo and he timely
filed the Notice of Appeal on September 11, 2006.
Subsequently the RTC denied due course to the appeal for
Danilo’s failure to file the required motion for reconsideration
or new trial, in violation of Section 20 of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages. MAIN ISSUE
On November 23, 2006, a motion to reconsider the denial of
Danilo’s appeal was likewise denied.
On January 16, 2007, the RTC issued the order declaring its
August 2, 2006 decision final and executory and granting the
Motion for Entry of Judgment filed by Cynthia.
Not in conformity, Danilo filed with the CA a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to annul the orders of the
RTC as they were rendered with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction, to wit: 1) the
September 19, 2006 Order which denied due course to
Danilo’s appeal; 2) the November 23, 2006 Order which
denied the motion to reconsider the September 19, 2006
Order; and 3) the January 16, 2007 Order which declared the
August 2, 2006 decision as final and executory. Danilo also
prayed that he be declared psychologically capacitated to
render the essential marital obligations to Cynthia, who
should be declared guilty of abandoning him, the family home
and their children.
As earlier stated, the CA granted the petition and reversed
and set aside the assailed orders of the RTC.
The appellate court stated that the requirement of a motion
for reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal under A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC did not apply in this case as the marriage
between Cynthia and Danilo was solemnized on February 14,
1980 before the Family Code took effect. Based on Enrico v.
Sps. Medinaceli.
ISSUES:
I He further stresses the meritorious nature of his appeal from
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ISSUING THE
QUESTIONED DECISION DATED DECEMBER 10, 2008
CONSIDERING THAT:
A.
ENRICO V. SPS. MEDINACELI IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE
INSTANT CASE CONSIDERING THAT THE FACTS AND THE
ISSUE THEREIN ARE NOT SIMILAR TO THE INSTANT CASE.
B. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF
THE HONORABLE COURT IS APLLICABLE TO THE INSTANT
CASE, ITS RULING IN ENRICO V. SPS. MEDINACELI IS
PATENTLY ERRONEOUS BECAUSE THE PHRASE "UNDER THE
FAMILY CODE" IN A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC PERTAINS TO THE
WORD "PETITIONS" RATHER THAN TO THE WORD
"MARRIAGES."
C. FROM THE FOREGOING, A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC ENTITLED
"RULE ON DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF VOID
MARRIAGES AND ANNULMENT OF VOIDABLE MARRIAGES"
IS APPLICABLE TO MARRIAGES SOLEMNIZED BEFORE THE
EFFECTIVITY OF THE FAMILY CODE. HENCE, A MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION IS A PRECONDITION FOR AN APPEAL BY
HEREIN RESPONDENT.
D. CONSIDERING THAT HEREIN RESPONDENT REFUSED TO
COMPLY WITH A PRECONDITION FOR APPEAL, A
RELAXATION OF THE RULES ON APPEAL IS NOT PROPER IN
HIS CASE.
MAIN ISSUE FOR STAT CON:
From the arguments advanced by Cynthia, the principal
question to be resolved is whether or not A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC entitled "Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages," is
applicable to the case at bench.
Petitioner argues that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is also applicable
to marriages solemnized before the effectivity of the Family
Code. According to Cynthia, the CA erroneously anchored its
decision to an obiter dictum in the aforecited Enrico case,
which did not even involve a marriage solemnized before the
effectivity of the Family Code.
She added that, even assuming arguendo that the
pronouncement in the said case constituted a decision on its
merits, still the same cannot be applied because of the
substantial disparity in the factual milieu of the Enrico case
from this case. In the said case, both the marriages sought to
be declared null were solemnized, and the action for
declaration of nullity was filed, after the effectivity of both
the Family Code in 1988 and of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC in 2003.
In this case, the marriage was solemnized before the
effectivity of the Family Code and A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC while
the action was filed and decided after the effectivity of both.
Danilo, in his Comment, counters that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
is not applicable because his marriage with Cynthia was
solemnized on February 14, 1980, years before its effectivity.
the decision of the RTC declaring their marriage as null and
void due to his purported psychological incapacity and citing
the mere "failure" of the parties who were supposedly
"remiss," but not "incapacitated," to render marital
obligations as required under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The Court finds the petition devoid of merit.
Petitioner insists that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs this case.
Her stance is unavailing. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the
Court promulgated on March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope.
Section 1 of the Rule, in fact, reads:
Section 1. Scope – This Rule shall govern petitions for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and
annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of
the Philippines.
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no
room for doubt. The coverage extends only to those
marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family
Code which took effect on August 3, 1988. The rule sets a
demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family
Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code.
The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to petitioner’s
interpretation that the phrase "under the Family Code" in
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word "petitions" rather
than to the word "marriages."
A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law
is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no
room for construction or interpretation. There is only room
for application. As the statute is clear, plain, and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation. This is what is known as
the plain-meaning rule or verba legis.
The appellate court was correct in denying petitioner’s
motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration considering that the reglementary period for
filing the said motion for reconsideration is non-extendible.
The rule is and has been that the period for filing a motion for
reconsideration is non-extendible. The Court has made this
clear as early as 1986 in Habaluyas Enterprises vs. Japzon.
Given the above, we rule without hesitation that the
appellate court’s denial of petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration is justified, precisely because petitioner’s
earlier motion for extension of time did not suspend/toll the
running of the 15-day reglementary period for filing a motion
for reconsideration. Under the circumstances, the CA decision
has already attained finality when petitioner filed its motion
for reconsideration. It follows that the same decision was
already beyond the review jurisdiction of this Court.
In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in setting aside
the RTC decision which denied due course to respondent’s
appeal and denying petitioner’s motion for extension of time
to file a motion for reconsideration.
While the right to appeal is a statutory, not a natural right,
nonetheless it is an essential part of our judicial system and
courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a
party of the right to appeal, but rather, ensure that every
party-litigant has the amplest opportunity for the proper and
just disposition of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities.
In the case at bench, the respondent should be given the
fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his appeal
considering that what is at stake is the sacrosanct institution
of marriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
UNITED CHRISTIAN MISSIONARY SOCIETY v. SOCIAL
SECURITY COMMISSION and SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM
In this appeal from an order of the Social Security
Commission, we uphold the Commission's Order dismissing
the petition before it, on the ground that in the absence of an
express provision in the Social Security Act vesting in the
Commission the power to condone penalties, it has no legal
authority to condone, waive or relinquish the penalty for late
premium remittances mandatorily imposed under the Social
Security Act.
The five petitioners originally filed on November 20, 1964
separate petitions with respondent Commission, contesting
the social security coverage of American missionaries who
perform religious missionary work in the Philippines under
specific employment contracts with petitioners. After several
hearings, however, petitioners commendably desisted from
further contesting said coverage, manifesting that they had
adopted a policy of cooperation with the Philippine
authorities in its program of social amelioration, with which
they are in complete accord.
They instead filed their consolidated amended petition dated
May 7, 1966, praying for condonation of assessed penalties
against them for delayed social security premium remittances
in the aggregate amount of P69,446.42 for the period from
September, 1958 to September, 1963.
In support of their request for condonation, petitioners
alleged that they had labored under the impression that as
international organizations, they were not subject to
coverage under the Philippine Social Security System, but
upon advice by certain Social Security System officials, they
paid to the System in October, 1963, the total amount of
P81,341.80, representing their back premiums for the period
from September, 1958 to September, 1963. They further
claimed that the penalties assessed against them appear to
be inequitable, citing several resolutions of respondent
Commission which in the past allegedly permitted
condonation of such penalties.
On May 25, 1966, respondent System filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground that "the Social Security Commission
has no power or authority to condone penalties for late
premium remittance, to which petitioners filed their
opposition of June 15, 1966, and in turn, respondent filed its
reply thereto of June 22, 1966.
Respondent Commission set the Motion to Dismiss for
hearing and oral argument on July 20, 1966. At the hearing,
petitioners' counsel made no appearance but submitted their
Memorandum in lieu of oral argument. Upon petition of the
System's Counsel, the Commission gave the parties a further
period of fifteen days to submit their Memorandum
consolidating their arguments, after which the motion would
be deemed submitted for decision. Petitioners stood on their
original memorandum, and respondent System filed its
memorandum on August 4, 1966.
On September 22, 1966, respondent Commission issued its
Order dismissing the petition. The petition is hereby
dismissed and petitioners are directed to pay the respondent
System, within 30 days from receipt of this Order, the amount
of P69,446.42 representing the penalties payable by them.
This Court is thus confronted on appeal with this question of
first impression as to whether or not respondent Commission
erred in ruling that it has no authority under the Social
Security Act to condone the penalty prescribed by law for
late premium remittances.
We find no error in the Commission's action.
1. The plain text and intent of the pertinent provisions of the
Social Security Act clearly rule out petitioners' posture that
the respondent Commission should assume, as against the
mandatory imposition of the 3% penalty per month for late
payment of premium remittances, the discretionary authority
of condoning, waiving or relinquishing such penalty.
The pertinent portion of Section 22 (a) of the Social Security
Act peremptorily provides that:
SEC 22. Remittance of premiums. — (a) The contributions
imposed in the preceding sections shall be remitted to the
System within the first seven days of each calendar month
following the month for which they are applicable or within
such time as the Commission may prescribe. "Every employer
required to deduct and to remit such contribution shall be
liable for their payment and if any contribution is not paid to
the system, as herein prescribed, he shall pay besides the
contribution a penalty thereon of three per centum per
month from the date the contribution falls due until paid . . .
No discretion or alternative is granted respondent
Commission in the enforcement of the law's mandate that
the employer who fails to comply with his legal obligation to
remit the premiums to the System within the prescribed
period shall pay a penalty of three 3% per month. The
prescribed penalty is evidently of a punitive character,
provided by the legislature to assure that employers do not
take lightly the State's exercise of the police power in the
implementation of the Republic's declared policy "to develop,
establish gradually and perfect a social security system which
shall be suitable to the needs of the people throughout the
Philippines and (to) provide protection to employers against
the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death."
2. Petitioners contend that in the exercise of the respondent
Commission's power of direction and control over the system,
as provided in Section 3 of the Act, it does have the authority
to condone the penalty for late payment under Section 4 (1),
whereby it is empowered to "perform such other acts as it
may deem appropriate for the proper enforcement of this
Act." The law does not bear out this contention. Section 4 of
the Social Security Act precisely enumerates the powers of
the Commission. Nowhere from said powers of the
Commission may it be shown that the Commission is granted
expressly or by implication the authority to condone penalties
imposed by the Act.
3. Moreover, the funds contributed to the System by
compulsion of law have already been held by us to be "funds
belonging to the members which are merely held in trust by
the Government." Being a mere trustee of the funds of the
System which actually belong to the members, respondent
Commission cannot legally perform any acts affecting the
same, including condonation of penalties, that would
diminish the property rights of the owners and beneficiaries
of such funds without an express or specific authority
therefor.
4. Where the language of the law is clear and the intent of the
legislature is equally plain, there is no room for interpretation
and construction of the statute. The Court is therefore bound
to uphold respondent Commission's refusal to arrogate unto
itself the authority to condone penalties for late payment of
social security premiums, for otherwise we would be
sanctioning the Commission's reading into the law
discretionary powers that are not actually provided therein,
and hindering and defeating the plain purpose and intent of
the legislature.
5. Petitioners cite fourteen instances in the past wherein
respondent Commission had granted condonation of
penalties on delayed premium payments. They charge the
Commission with grave abuse of discretion in not having
uniformly applied to their cases its former policy of granting
condonation of penalties. They invoke more compelling
considerations of equity in their cases, in that they are non-
profit religious organizations who minister to the spiritual
needs of the Filipino people, and that their delay in the
payment of their premiums was not of a contumacious or
deliberate defiance of the law but was prompted by a well-
founded belief that the Social Security Act did not apply to
their missionaries.
The past instances of alleged condonation granted by the
Commission are not, however, before the Court, and the
unilateral conclusion asserted by petitioners that the
Commission had granted such condonations would be of no
avail, without a review of the pertinent records of said cases.
Nevertheless, assuming such conclusion to be correct, the
Commission, in its appealed Order of September 22, 1966
makes of record that since its Resolution No. 536, series of
1964, which it reiterated in another resolution dated August
18, 1966, it had definitely taken the legal stand, pursuant to
the recommendation of its Committee on Legal Matters and
Legislation, that in the absence of an express provision in the
Social Security Act vesting in the Commission the power to
condone penalties, it "has no power to condone, waive or
relinquish the penalties for late premium remittances which
may be imposed under the Social Security Act."
6. The Commission cannot be faulted for this correct legal
position. Granting that it had erred in the past in granting
condonation of penalties without legal authority, the Court
has held time and again that "it is a well-known rule that
erroneous application and enforcement of the law by public
officers do not block subsequent correct application of the
statute and that the Government is never estopped by
mistake or error on the part of its agents."5 Petitioners' lack
of intent to deliberately violate the law may be conceded,
and was borne out by their later withdrawal in May, 1966 of
their original petitions in November, 1964 contesting their
social security coverage. The point, however, is that they
followed the wrong procedure in questioning the applicability
of the Social Security Act to them, in that they failed for five
years to pay the premiums prescribed by law and thus
incurred the 3% penalty thereon per month mandatorily
imposed by law for late payment. The proper procedure
would have been to pay the premiums and then contest their
liability therefor, thereby preventing the penalty from
attaching. This would have been the prudent course,
considering that the Act provides in Section 22 (b) thereof
that the premiums which the employer refuses or neglects to
pay may be collected by the System in the same manner as
taxes under the National Internal Revenue Code, and that at
the time they instituted their petitions in 1964 contesting
their coverage, the Court had already ruled in effect against
their contest three years earlier, when it held in Roman
Catholic Archbishop vs. Social Security Commission that the
legislature had clearly intended to include charitable and
religious institutions and other non-profit institutions, such as
petitioners, within the scope and coverage of the Social
Security Act.
7. No grave abuse of discretion was committed, therefore, by
the Commission in issuing its Order dismissing the petition for
condonation of penalties for late payment of premiums, as
claimed by petitioners in their second and last error assigned.
Petitioners were duly heard by the Commission and were
given due opportunity to adduce all their arguments, as in
fact they filed their Memorandum in lieu of oral argument
and waived the presentation of an additional memorandum.
The mere fact that there was a pending appeal in the Court of
Appeals from an identical ruling of the Commission in an
earlier case as to its lack of authority to condone penalties
does not mean, as petitioners contend, that the Commission
was thereby shorn of its authority and discretion to dismiss
their petition on the same legal ground. The Commission's
action has thus paved the way for a final ruling of the Court
on the matter.
ACCORDINGLY, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed,
without pronouncement as to costs.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and
EPIFANIO DE LA CRUZ
The notices of sale under Section 3 of Act No. 3135, as
amended by Act No. 4118, on extra-judicial foreclosure of
real estate mortgage are required to be posted for not less
than twenty days in at least 3 public places of the
municipality or city where the property is situated, and if such
property is worth more than P400, such notices shall also be
published once a week for at least 3 consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the municipality or city.
Respondent court, through Justice Filemon Mendoza with
whom Justices Campos, Jr. and Aldecoa, Jr. concurred,
construed the publication of the notices on March 28, April
11 and 12, 1969 as a fatal announcement and reversed the
judgment appealed from by declaring void, inter alia, the
auction sale of the foreclosed pieces of realty, the final deed
of sale, and the consolidation of ownership.
Hence, the petition at bar, premised on the following
backdrop lifted from the text of the challenged decision:
The facts of the case as related by the trial court are, as
follows:
This is a verified complaint brought by the plaintiff for the
reconveyance to him (and resultant damages) of 2 parcels of
land mortgaged by him to the defendant PNB, which the
defendant allegedly unlawfully foreclosed. The defendant
then consolidated ownership unto itself, and subsequently
sold the parcels to third parties. The amended Answer of the
defendant states on the other hand that the extrajudicial
foreclosure, consolidation of ownership, and subsequent sale
to the third parties were all valid, the bank therefore
counterclaims for damages and other equitable remedies.
The Court is of the opinion that the following facts have been
proved: Two lots, located at Bulacan (the first covered by
Torrens Certificate No. 16743 and possessed of an area of
approximately 3,109 square meters: the second covered by
Torrens Certificate No. 5787, possessed of an area of around
610 square meters, and upon which stood a residential-
commercial building were mortgaged to the defendant
Philippine National Bank. The lots were under the common
names of the plaintiff (Epifanio dela Cruz), his brother (Delfin)
and his sister (Maria). The mortgage was made possible
because of the grant by the latter two to the former of a
special power of attorney to mortgage the lots to the
defendant. The lots were mortgaged to guarantee several
promissory notes.
On September 6, 1961, Atty. Ramon de los Reyes of the bank
(PNB) presented under Act No. 3135 a foreclosure petition of
the two mortgaged lots before the Sheriff's Office at Malolos,
Bulacan; accordingly, the two lots were sold or auctioned off
on October 20, 1961 with the defendant PNB as the highest
bidder for P28,908.46. On March 7, 1963, Sheriff Leopoldo
Palad executed a Final Deed of Sale, in response to a letter-
request by the Manager of the PNB (Malolos Branch). On
January 15, 1963 a Certificate of Sale in favor of the
defendant was executed by Sheriff Palad. The PNB sold on
June 4, 1970 the same to spouses Conrado de Vera and
Marina de Vera in a "Deed of Conditional Sale".
After due consideration of the evidence, the CFI on January
22, 1978 rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
The instant complaint against the defendant Philippine
National Bank is hereby ordered DISMISSED, with costs
against the plaintiff. The Counterclaim against the plaintiff is
likewise DISMISSED, for the Court does not believe that the
complaint had been made in bad faith.
Not satisfied with the judgment, plaintiff interposed the
present appeal assigning as errors the following:
I.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING IN FOOTNOTE I OF ITS
DECISION THAT IT IS THEREFORE INCLINED TO BELIEVE THAT
THE DATE "JUNE 30, 1962" WAS A MERE CLERICAL ERROR
AND THAT THE TRUE AND CORRECT DATE IS JUNE 30, 1958. IT
ALSO ERRED IN HOLDING IN THE SAME FOOTNOTE I THAT
"HOWEVER, EVEN ASSUMING THAT THE TRUE AND CORRECT
DATE IS JUNE 30, 1961, THE FACT STILL REMAINS THAT THE
FIRST TWO PROMISSORY NOTES HAD BEEN GUARANTEED BY
THE MORTGAGE OF THE TWO LOTS, AND THEREFORE, IT WAS
LEGAL AND PROPER TO FORECLOSE ON THE LOTS FOR
FAILURE TO PAY SAID TWO PROMISSORY NOTES". (page 115,
Amended Record on Appeal)
II.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE
PETITION FOR EXTRAJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE WAS
PREMATURELY FILED AND IS A MERE SCRAP OF PAPER
BECAUSE IT MERELY FORECLOSED THE ORIGINAL AND NOT
THE AMENDED MORTGAGE.
III.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT "IT IS CLEAR
THAT THE AUCTION SALE WAS NOT PREMATURE".
IV.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT "SUFFICE IT TO
STATE THAT ACTUALLY THE POWER OF ATTORNEY GIVEN TO
THE PNB WAS EMBODIED IN THE REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE
(EXB. 10) WHICH WAS REGISTERED IN THE REGISTRY OF
PROPERTY OF BULACAN AND WAS ANNOTATED ON THE TWO
TORRENS CERTIFICATES INVOLVED"
V.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT "THE NOTICES
REQUIRED UNDER SEC. 3 OF ACT NO. 3135 WERE ALL
COMPLIED WITH" AND "THAT THE DAILY RECORD . . . IS A
NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL CIRCULATION.
VI.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THE
CERTIFICATE OF SALE, FINAL DEED OF SALE AND AFFIDAVIT
OF CONSOLIDATION, NULL AND VOID.
VII.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ORDERING DEFENDANT TO
RECONVEY TO PLAINTIFF THE PARCELS OF LAND COVERED BY
T.C.T. NOS. 40712 AND 40713 OF BULACAN
VIII.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ORDERING DEFENDANT TO
PAY TO PLAINTIFF REASONABLE AMOUNTS OF MORAL AND
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES
IX.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE INSTANT
COMPLAINT AGAINST THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK WITH
COSTS AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF. (page 118, Amended Record
on Appeal)."
With reference to the pertinent issue at hand, respondent
court opined:
The Notices of Sale of appellant's foreclosed properties were
published on March 228, April 11 and April 12, 1969 issues of
the newspaper "Daily Record" (Amended Record on Appeal,
p. 108). The date March 28, 1969 falls on a Friday while the
dates April 11 and 12, 1969 are on a Friday and Saturday,
respectively. Section 3 of Act No. 3135 requires that the
notice of auction sale shall be "published once a week for at
least three consecutive weeks". Evidently, defendant-
appellee bank failed to comply with this legal requirement.
The Supreme Court has held that:
The rule is that statutory provisions governing publication of
notice of mortgage foreclosure sales must be strictly
complied with, and that even slight deviations therefrom will
invalidate the notice and render the sale at least voidable.
Interpreting Sec. 457 of the Code of Civil Procedure in
Campomanes vs. Bartolome and German & Co., this Court
held that if a sheriff sells without notice prescribed by the
Code of Civil Procedure induced thereto by the judgment
creditor, and the purchaser at the sale is the judgment
creditor, the sale is absolutely void and no title passes. This is
regarded as the settled doctrine in this jurisdiction whatever
the rule may be elsewhere (Boria vs. Addison).

. . . It has been held that failure to advertise a mortgage
foreclosure sale in compliance with statutory requirements
constitutes a jurisdictional defect invalidating the sale and
that a substantial error or omission in a notice of sale will
render the notice insufficient and vitiate the sale.
Although respondent court acknowledged that there was an
ambiguity on the date of execution of the third promissory
note (June 30, 1961) and the date of maturity thereof
(October 28, 1958), it was nonetheless established that the
bank introduced sufficient proof to show that the discrepancy
was a mere clerical error pursuant to Section 7, Rule l30 of
the Rules of Court. Anent the second disputation aired by
private respondent, the appellate court observed that
inasmuch as the original as well as the subsequent mortgage
were foreclosed only after private respondent's default, the
procedure pursued by herein petitioner in foreclosing the
collaterals was thus appropriate albeit the petition therefor
contained only a copy of the original mortgage.
It was only on the aspect of publication of the notices of sale
under Act No. 3135, as amended, and attorney's fees where
herein private respondent scored points which eliminated in
the reversal of the trial court's decision. Respondent court
was of the impression that herein petitioner failed to comply
with the legal requirement and the sale effected thereafter
must be adjudged invalid following the ruling of this Court in
Tambunting vs. Court of Appeals.
Now, in support of the theory on adherence to the conditions
spelled in the preliminary portion of this discourse, the
pronouncement of this Court in Bonnevie vs. Court of Appeals
is sought to be utilized to press the point that the notice need
not be published for three full weeks. According to petitioner,
there is no breach of the proviso since after the first
publication on March 28, 1969, the second notice was
published on April 11, 1969 (the last day of the second week),
while the third publication on April 12, 1969 was announced
on the first day of the third week. Petitioner thus concludes
that there was no violation from the mere happenstance that
the third publication was made only a day after the second
publication since it is enough that the second publication be
made on any day within the second week and the third
publication, on any day within the third week. Moreover, in
its bid to rectify its admission in judicio, petitioner
asseverates that said admission alluded to refers only to the
dates of publications, not that there was non-compliance
with the publication requirement.
Private respondent, on the other hand, views the legal
question from a different perspective. He believes that the
period between each publication must never be less than
seven consecutive days.
We are not convinced by petitioner's submissions because
the disquisition in support thereof rests on the erroneous
impression that the day on which the first publication was
made, or on March 28, 1969, should be excluded pursuant to
the third paragraph of Article 17 of the New Civil Code.
The publication effected on April 11, 1969 cannot be
construed as sufficient advertisement for the second week
because the period for the first week should be reckoned
from March 28, 1969 until April 3, 1969 while the second
week should be counted from April 4, 1969 until April 10,
1969. It is clear that the announcement on April 11, 1969 was
both theoretically and physically accomplished during the
first day of the third week and cannot thus be equated with
compliance in law. Indeed, where the word is used simply as
a measure of duration of time and without reference to the
calendar, it means a period of seven consecutive days
without regard to the day of the week on which it begins.
Certainly, it would have been absurd to exclude March 28,
1969 as reckoning point in line with the third paragraph of
Article 13 of the New Civil Code, for the purpose of counting
the first week of publication as to the last day thereof fall on
April 4, 1969 because this will have the effect of extending
the first week by another day. This incongruous repercussion
could not have been the unwritten intention of the
lawmakers when Act No. 3135 was enacted. Verily, inclusion
of the first day of publication is in keeping with the
computation in Bonnevie vs. Court of Appeals where this
Court had occasion to pronounce, through Justice Guerrero,
that the publication of notice on June 30, July 7 and July 14,
1968 satisfied the publication requirement under Act No.
3135. Respondent court cannot, therefore, be faulted for
holding that there was no compliance with the strict
requirements of publication independently of the so- called
admission in judicio.
WHEREFORE, the petitions for certiorari and intervention are
hereby dismissed and the decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby affirmed in toto.
What is the underlying assumption in statutory construction?
-That there is an ambiguity
-What are the aids in statutory construction?
-What is the first principle that u have to bear in mind in stat
con?
The first thing that you have to apply is verbal egis.
Farias v. Executive Secretary
-Fair Election Act
-If the law says effective immediately, according to the Court
Article 2 of the CC, shall be followed.
-The default will apply.
Paras v. Comelec
-What do you mean by regular comelec elections? Is SK
considered as a regular comelec election?
1st principle: You should interpret it that it would render it
unconstitutional
2nd principle: You have to interpret the law to make it
effective, you have to give life.

Speech is the index of intention.

Contemporaneous interpretation- by the DOJ, SEC

The court is not bound by contemporaneous interpretation,

or interpretations by administrative bodies