RALLA v.

RALLA
G.R. No. 78646
July 23, 1991
Facts:
Rosendo Ralla had two sons, Pablo,
whom he loved and Pedro, who was not in
good terms with him. Pablo and his family
lived with Rosendo, who took care of all
household expenses and administered part
of the family properties and received a
monthly salary of P250.00 plus part of the
produce of the land.
Paz Escarella died in 1957 and the
two brothers partitioned 63 parcels of land
she left as her paraphernalia property. On
December 22, 1958, Rosendo executed a
will disinheriting Pedro and leaving
everything he owned to Pablo, to whom he
said earlier sold a part of his property for
P10,000.00. Rosendo filed for the probate
of the will but pendente lite died on October
1, 1960
On November 3, 1966, the probate
judge converted SP 564 into an intestate
proceeding. On February 28, 1978, a
creditor of the deceased filed a petition for
the probate for Rosendo’s will in SP 1106,
which was heard jointly with SP 564. The
order of November 3, 1966 was set aside.
The last will and testament of
Rosendo was allowed on June 7, 1982 but
on October 20, 1982 the disinheritance of
Pedro was disapproved. This order was
elevated to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals reversed the
trial court and reinstated the disinheritance
clause after finding that the requisites of a
valid disinheritance had been complied with
in the will. The court also noted that Pedro
had threatened to kill his father, who was
afraid of him and had earlier sued him for
slander and grave oral defamation.
 DELA PENA v. CA and TAN
G.R. No. L-81827
March 28, 1994
Facts:
Ciriaco Reducto was occupying a
24-hectare parcel of land for which he filed
Homestead with the Bureau of Lands. A
certain Potenciano Nazaret likewise filed an
application for the same lot. As a result, a
case arose wherein Nazaret’s application
and that of Reducto were “conflicted.” Prior
thereto however, by means of a “Deed of
Relinquishment,” Reducto transferred his
possessory rights over 8 hectares of the lot
to petitioner Dela Pena who thereafter
entered his appearance in the
administrative case when the portion
transferred to him remained included in the
homestead applications of Reducto and
Nazaret. After it was ascertained in a field
verification that petitioner had a better right
to acquire the portion claimed, the Director
of Lands directed petitioner to apply for the
portion himself. However, no such
application was filed.
Meanwhile, Reducto transferred his
rights over another 1 ½-hectare portion of
the lot to Michael Doble who in turn sold his
rights to Ricardo Tan.
Upon a survey by the Bureau of
Lands, they found out that Tan’s lot was
smaller than what he had brought. Tan then
built a fence on his reclined potion but Dela
Pena kept on destroying it. Ricardo Tan
then transferred the lot to Herotido Tan.
Dela Pena later filed a complaint for forcible
entry against Ricardo Tan and was later on
amended to Herotido in the MTC.
MTC ruled in favor of Dela Pena. It
concluded that petitioner had prior
possession of the disputed ¾-heactare
portion and that he was prevented by
entering the same by the fence constructed
by private respondent. This was affirmed by
the RTC.
Dela Pena instituted another action
for reconveyance with damages with the
RTC during the pendency of the forcible
entry case. He alleged that private
respondent fraudulently registered that ¾-
hectare portion actually cultivated by him
when the former stated in his free patent
application that "the land applied for is not
claimed or occupied by any other person.
He also denied that a survey was
conducted; if at all, it was merely a "table
survey." It was discovered in the survey that
the area of petitioner's actual occupation
exceeded that which he bought from
Reducto.
The court rejected petitioner's denial
of the Survey on the ground that he was
already estopped from contesting it when he
offered Subdivision Plan CSD-11-001883-D
in evidence. Therefore, since the disputed
¾-hectare portion was not part of the area
bought and paid for by petitioner, the latter
was not entitled to reconveyance.
RTC rejected such action and
counterclaim was granted and Dela Peña
was ordered to pay P6,000 attorney's fees
and expenses of litigation, P15,000 for
moral damages and the costs of the
proceedings. Petitioner sought recourse to
the Court of Appeals reiterating his
allegations of fraud and misrepresentation
and, at the same time, contending that the
judgment in the forcible entry case
constituted res judicata on the action for
reconveyance. This was again denied.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not a favorable
judgement in the forcible entry case
constituted res judicata for reconveyance.
Held:
No. The fact that petitioner obtained
a favorable judgment in the forcible entry
case was not conclusive and did not ipso
facto entitle him to a similar favorable
judgment in the reconveyance case for the
reason that while prior physical possession
was the sole issue in the forcible entry case,
that of lawful ownership or possession de
jure was the issue disputed in the
reconveyance case.
It is well-settled that reconveyance is
a remedy granted only to the owner of the
property alleged to be erroneously titled in
another's name. 15 In the case at bench,
petitioner does not claim to be the owner of
the disputed portion. Admittedly, what he
has is only a "preferential right" to acquire
ownership thereof by virtue of his actual
occupation since January 1947.
Persons who have not obtained title
to public lands could not question the titles
legally issued by the State.
WHO IS THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST
In such cases, the real party in
interest is the Republic of the Philippines to
whom the property would revert if it is ever
established, after appropriate proceedings,
that the free patent issued to the grantee is
indeed vulnerable to annulment on the
ground that the grantee failed to comply
with the conditions imposed by the law. 18
Not being an applicant, much less a
grantee, petitioner cannot ask for
reconveyance.
U.P. v. LIGOT-TELAN
G.R. No. 110280
October 12, 1993
Facts:
UP administration conceptualized
and implemented the socialized scheme of
tuition fee payments through the Socialized
Tuition Fee and Assistance Program
(STFAP or popularly known as “Iskolar ng
Bayan” program) to expand the coverage of
government educational subsidies so as to
include the deserving in the lower rungs of
the socio-economic ladder. All students are
entitled to apply for STFAP benefits which
include reduction in fees, living and book
subsidies and student assistantships which
give undergraduate students the opportunity
to earn P12 per hour by working for the
University. However, applicants are required
to state the amount and source of the
annual income of the family, their real and
personal properties and special
circumstances from which the University
may evaluate their financial status and need
on the basis of which they are categorized
into brackets. Failure to disclose such
information is punishable under Section 2 of
the Rules and Regulations on Student
Conduct and Discipline of the University.
On March 14, 1991, a team
conducted a home investigation against
Ramon P. Nadal, a student enrolled in the
College of Law and found out that Nadal
failed to disclose that the family owned a
1977 Corolla car and that his mother
worked in the US. UP charged Nadal before
the Student Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT) of
dishonesty in violation of Section 2 of the
Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct
and Discipline. After hearing, the SDT
rendered a decision exculpating Nadal of
withholding the information about the car
but finding him guilty of withholding
information about the income of his mother.
SDT imposed the penalty of expulsion and
required him to reimburse all STFAP
benefits. The SDT decision was
automatically elevated to the Executive
Committee of UP Diliman for review which
affirmed the decision of SDT. Nadal
appealed to the Board of Regents which
affirmed the decision of SDT but because of
the Board was willing to grant a degree of
compassion to the appellant in view of the
alleged status and predicament of the
mother as an immigrant ‘TNT’ in the US, the
penalty was modified from expulsion to one-
year suspension plus reimbursement of all
benefits received from the STFAP, with
legal interest.
Nadal filed a motion for
reconsideration. On March 28, 1993, a vote
was held by secret ballot on whether
Ramon P. Nadal was guilty or not which
results in 4 votes guilty; 3 votes not guilty;
and 3 conditional votes, pending verification
with ADMU of Nadal’s statement that he
was granted scholarship by ADMU while in
high school. Should Ateneo confirm that
Nadal had not received financial assistance,
then the conditional votes would be
considered guilty and if otherwise, not guilty.
On March 29, 1993, ADMU confirms
the scholarship grant but the BOR found
Nadal guilty and imposed the penalty of one
year suspension, non-issuance of any
certificate of good moral character during
the suspension and reimburse the STFAP
benefits.
Nadal filed with the RTC of Quezon
a petition for mandamus with preliminary
injunction and prayer for a temporary
restraining order against President Abueva,
the BOR, Oscar Alfonso, Cesar
Buenaventure, Armand Fabella, and Olivia
Caoilli.
The RTC granted the petition.
The petitioners, President Abueva,
the BOR, Oscar Alfonso, Cesar
Buenaventure, Armand Fabella, and Olivia
Caoilli, filed a petition for certiorari. Nadal
raised an issue that Dr Caoilli and Dr
Abueva are not real parties in interest who
should file the petition.
Issues:
1. Whether Dr Caoilli and Dr Abueva
are real parties in interest.
2. Whether Nadal was denied due
process in administrative disciplinary
proceedings.
3. Whether respondent judge gravely
abused her discretion in issuing the
writ of preliminary injunction thereby
preventing the BOR from
implementing the suspension
penalty imposed on Nadal.
Held:
1. Yes. A real party in interest is one
“who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit.
‘Interest’ within the meaning of the
rule means material interest, an
interest in issue and to be affected
by the decree, as distinguished from
mere interest in the question
involved, or a mere incidental
interest.” Undoubtedly, the UP Board
of Regents has an interest to protect
its power to impose disciplinary
actions against student who violated
its rules and regulations. Having
specifically named Drs. Abueva and
Caoili as respondents in the petition
for mandamus that he filed below,
Nadal is now stopped from
questioning their personality to file
the instant petition. It is not
mandatory that each and every
member of the BOR be named
petitioners. As the Court has time
and again held, an action may be
entertained, notwithstanding the
failure to include an indispensable
party where it appears that the
naming of the party would be but a
formality.
2. As to due process, Nadal contended
that he was deprived due process
 when he was not given notice of the
March 29 meeting and that the
ground upon which Nadal was
convicted was not the same as the
original charge referring to the
conditional votes on March 28. The
court ruled that it is gross error to
equate due process with the sending
of notice. University rules do not
require the attendance in BOR
meetings of individuals whose cases
are included as items on the agenda
of the Board. And that the charge
was exactly the same charge as the
original which was the withholding of
information on the income of Nadal’s
mother. In administrative or quasi-
judicial proceedings, only substantial
evidence is required and it is
sufficient admission that Nadal
withheld information when he
admitted that his mother was a
“TNT” in the US.

3. The court also gravely abused its

discretion when it based its ruling
that the implementation of
disciplinary sanction on Nadal
“would work injustice to Nadal”,
completely disregarding the right of
UP to academic freedom which
provides more than ample
justification for the imposition of a
disciplinary sanction upon erring
student of an institution of higher
learning.