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Bob Jessop*
This article explores the roles of markets, states, Even now its social scientific usages are often
and partnerships in economic co-ordination and ‘pre-theoretical’ and eclectic; and lay usages are
considers their respective tendencies to failure. just as diverse and contrary. Nonetheless, in
The first section addresses the growing interest general terms, two closely related, but nested,
in governance and seeks explanations in recent meanings can be identified. First, governance
theoretical developments. The second section can refer to any mode of co-ordination of inter-
then asks whether the rise of the governance dependent activities. Among these modes, three
paradigm might also reflect fundamental shifts are relevant here: the anarchy of exchange,
in economic, political and social life, such that organizational hierarchy, and self-organizing
governance will remain a key issue for a long ‘heterarchy’. The second, more restricted mean-
time, or is a response to ing, is heterarchy (or self-
more cyclical shifts in Bob Jessop is Professor of Sociology at organization) and is the
modes of co-ordination. The Lancaster University, United Kingdom. focus of this article. Its
third section considers the His address is: Department of Sociology, forms include self-organiz-
logic of ‘heterarchic gover- Cartmel College, Lancaster University, ing interpersonal networks,
nance’ in contrast to Bailrigg, Lancaster LA1 4YL, UK, email: negotiated inter-organiza-
r.jessop얀lancaster.ac.uk His current
anarchic, ex post co-ordi- research interests include state theory,
tional co-ordination, and de-
nation through market institutional economics, contemporary centred, context-mediated
exchange and imperative ex British politics, economic development inter-systemic steering. The
ante co-ordination through strategies. He has recently completed a latter two cases involve self-
hierarchical forms of research project on economic and social organized steering of mul-
restructuring and local governance in two
organization. It also offers English regions.
tiple agencies, institutions,
some preliminary reflec- and systems which are oper-
tions on the nature, forms, ationally autonomous from
and logic of ‘governance one another yet structurally
failure’. The final section coupled due to their mutual
addresses the state’s increasing role in ‘meta- interdependence. These two features are
governance’, that is, in managing the respective especially significant in encouraging reliance on
roles of these different modes of co-ordination. heterarchy. For, whilst their respective oper-
ational autonomies exclude primary reliance on
a single hierarchy as a mode of co-ordination,
The rise of the ‘governance’ their interdependence makes them ill-suited to
paradigm simple, blind co-evolution based on the ‘invis-
ible hand’ of mutual, ex post adaptation. Such
Governance has only recently entered the stan- incrementalism is sub-optimal because it is
dard anglophone social science lexicon and based on short-run, localized, ad hoc responses
become a ‘buzzword’ in various lay circles. and thus takes inadequate account of the com-
ISSJ 155/1998 UNESCO 1998. Published by Blackwell Publishers, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
30 Bob Jessop
plex and continuing interdependence among tutions or organizations with multiple stake-
these autonomous agencies, institutions, and holders,1 the role of public–private partnerships,
systems. and other kinds of strategic alliances among
The ‘self-organization of inter-organiza- autonomous but interdependent organizations.
tional relations’ is a familiar form of govern- However, insofar as the relevant agencies,
ance in many different contexts. ‘De-centred, stakeholders, or organizations are based in dif-
context-mediated inter-systemic steering’ is less ferent institutional orders or functional systems,
familiar, however, at least outside the German- problems relating to inter-systemic steering will
speaking world (where it is known as ‘dezen- also affect the ‘self-organization of inter-organi-
trierte Kontextsteuerung’ (Glagow and Willke, zational relations’ even if they are not explicitly
1987) ). Thus an initial account should be use- posed in this context.
ful. This form of governance involves the co-
ordination of differentiated institutional orders Etymology, genealogy, and
or functional systems (such as the economic, discourse
political, legal, scientific, or educational
systems), each of which has its own complex The anglophone term ‘governance’ can be
operational logic such that it is impossible to traced to the classical Latin and ancient Greek
exercise effective overall control of its develop- words for the ‘steering’ of boats. It originally
ment from outside that system. The political referred mainly to the action or manner of gov-
and legal systems, for example, cannot control erning, guiding, or steering conduct and over-
the overall development of the economy through lapped with ‘government’. For a long time,
coercion, taxation, legislation, judicial decisions, usage was mainly limited to constitutional and
and so forth. This does not exclude specific legal issues concerning the conduct of ‘affairs
external interventions to produce a particular of state’ and/or to the direction of specific insti-
result; it does exclude control over that result’s tutions or professions with multiple stake-
repercussions on the wider and longer-term holders. It has enjoyed a remarkable revival
development of the whole system. This indi- over the last fifteen years or so in many
cates that there may be better prospects of contexts, however, becoming a ubiquitous
‘steering’ systems’ overall development by tak- ‘buzzword’ which can mean anything or
ing serious account of their own internal codes nothing. The key factor in its revival has prob-
and logics and modifying the structural and stra- ably been the need to distinguish between
tegic contexts in which these continue to oper- ‘governance’ and ‘government’. Thus govern-
ate; and by co-ordinating these contexts across ance would refer to the modes and manner of
different systems in the light of their substan- governing, government to the institutions and
tive, social, and spatio-temporal interdepen- agents charged with governing, and governing
dencies. Such steering is mediated not only to the act of governing itself. The analogous
through symbolic media of communication such German concept of Steuerung (steering,
as money, law, or knowledge but also through guidance) proved popular in the 1970s and
direct communication oriented to inter-systemic 1980s and for much the same reasons. But it
‘noise reduction’, negotiation, negative co-ordi- also has a fourth connotation in German through
nation, and co-operation in shared projects its links to systems theories. Mayntz notes, for
(these terms are defined below). Inter-systemic example, that, in systems-theoretical terms, gov-
co-ordination is typically de-centred and plural- erning refers to the deliberate action of bringing
istic and depends on specific forms of govern- an autonomous system as an object of govern-
ance (Glagow and Willke, 1987). ance from one state into another: whether to
Although governance in the sense of heter- stabilize it, redirect it, or transform it (1993b,
archy is found on three different levels pp. 11–12).
(interpersonal, inter-organizational, and inter- This general etymological account does not
systemic), the term itself is often limited to explain why a relatively dormant concept with
practices on the second level. This is consistent limited scope and restricted usage came to be
with recent lay usage, in which ‘governance’ revitalized at a particular moment and has been
refers to the mode of conduct of specific insti- applied by so many individuals, agencies, and
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32 Bob Jessop
by a loose coupling of agents, complex forms of problems have emerged which cannot be man-
reciprocal interdependence, and complex spatio- aged or resolved readily, if at all, through top-
temporal horizons. In addition, different state down state planning or market-mediated anar-
traditions have given more or less scope for chy. This secular shift reflects the dramatic
market forces and/or self-regulation to operate intensification of societal complexity which
in their economies and civil societies. Here one flows from growing functional differentiation
can contrast, for example, the Anglo-American of institutional orders in an increasingly global
tradition with the differing traditions in France society – which leads in turn to greater systemic
or Germany (Dyson, 1980). There are also nor- interdependencies across various social, spatial,
mative preferences for self-organization in cer- and temporal horizons of action. As Scharpf
tain contexts. This socially necessary minimum notes:
of heterarchic practices makes it all the more
curious that they have only recently attracted . . . the advantages of hierarchical co-ordination are lost
in a world that is characterized by increasingly dense,
focused scientific interest. This is almost cer- extended, and rapidly changing patterns of reciprocal
tainly related to the blindspots associated with interdependence, and by increasingly frequent, but
particular disciplinary paradigms or prevailing ephemeral, interactions across all types of pre-established
forms of ‘common sense’. Thus, during the boundaries, intra- and interorganizational, intra- and
intersectoral, intra- and international. (Scharpf, 1994,
postwar period of growth based on a virtuous p. 37)
circle of mass production and mass consumption
in North America and Western Europe In this sense, the recent expansion of networks
(hereafter referred to as ‘Atlantic Fordism’), at the expense of markets and hierarchies and
when the ‘mixed economy’ was a dominant of governance at the expense of government is
paradigm, institutions and practices intermediate not just a pendular swing in some regular suc-
between market and state were often neglected. cession of dominant modes of policy-making.
They had not actually disappeared; they were It reflects a shift in the fundamental structures
simply marginalized theoretically and politi- of the real world and a corresponding shift
cally. Subsequent disenchantment with the state in the centre of gravity around which policy
in the 1970s, and with markets in the 1990s, cycles move.
has renewed interest in something that never
really disappeared.
A third contributing factor to the rise of The rise of governance
governance is the cycle of modes of co-ordi- practices
nation. All modes are prone to dilemmas, con-
tradictions, paradoxes, and failures but the prob- The rise of governance is partly due to secular
lems differ with the mode in question. Markets, shifts in political economy which have made
states, and governance fail in different ways. heterarchy more significant than markets or
One practical response to this situation is to hierarchies for economic, political, and social
combine modes of policy-making and vary their co-ordination. I now consider the reasons for
weight over time – thereby shifting the forms this by undertaking three tasks: first, identifying
in which tendencies to ‘failure’ are manifested, the logic of governance as a distinctive co-
and creating room for manoeuvre (Offe, 1975). ordination mechanism in contradistinction to
The rediscovery of governance could mark a markets and imperative co-ordination; second,
fresh revolution in this process – a simple cycli- distinguishing three main types of heterarchic
cal response to past state failures (especially governance in terms of the sites on which they
those linked to attempts to manage the emerging operate; and, third, considering more fully what
crisis of Atlantic Fordism from the mid-1970s) societal (or macro-social) changes might have
and, more recently, market failure (and its asso- made heterarchy more appropriate as an econ-
ciated crisis in corporate governance). omic co-ordination mechanism.
The fourth possibility is that a fundamental First, the most general case for the rise of
secular shift in state–market–society relations heterarchic governance can be made in terms of
has occurred. This implies that important new the evolutionary advantage (in terms of relative
economic and social conditions and attendant capacities to innovate and learn in a changing
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34 Bob Jessop
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The rise of governance and the risks of failure: the case of economic development 35
interdependencies bearing on competition – talist economies. And this latter shift poses
whether at the level of the firm, the sector or further co-ordination problems concerning the
branch, or specific economic spaces. Such management of the inter-scalar as well as inter-
changes have major implications both for the systemic dependencies (see below).
internal and external relations of the organiza-
tional units of competition (firms, etc.). These
have been well expressed in the following Governance success and
terms: governance failure
The traditional models of the large, vertically integrated These changes may make anarchic and hier-
firm of the 1960s, and of the small autonomous, single-
phase firm of the 1970s and part of the 1980s, are archic modes of co-ordination more problem-
replaced by a new type of large networked firm, with atic. But it does not follow that the structural
strongly centralized strategic functions extending in sev- and strategic conditions for effective heterarchy
eral directions, and by a new type of small enterprise, will always and everywhere be sufficiently
integrated into a multi-company local network. Across
the network, a system of constantly evolving power developed to ensure that it will outperform con-
relationships governs both the dynamics of innovation tinued reliance on market forces or top-down
and the appropriability of returns to the partners control. Large literatures already exist on mar-
involved. The network firm is attracted towards diversi- ket and state failure. It is equally important to
fied mass production and the competitive factor of the
single firm is the control of complementary assets in the examine the governance failure and consider
hands of its potential partners. (Capello, 1996, p. 490) what affects its likelihood and the capacities for
recuperating or responding to such failure. Not-
These changes also make public–private part- ing the problems and risks of governance will
nerships and other forms of heterarchy more help us see through the current rhetoric sur-
relevant than conventional legislative, bureau- rounding ‘public–private partnership’ and the
cratic, and administrative techniques. This is associated tendency to highlight successes and
seen in a turn from the ‘Keynesian welfare downplay failures (cf. Capello, 1996).
national state’ to a more complex, negotiated The capitalist market has a procedural
system oriented to international competitiveness, rationality. This is formal in nature, prioritizing
innovation, flexibility, and ‘enterprise culture’. an endless ‘economizing’ pursuit of profit maxi-
The primary co-ordination instruments in the mization. By contrast, government has a sub-
Keynesian welfare system were the market and stantive rationality. It is goal-oriented, prioritiz-
the state. They were articulated in a ‘mixed ing ‘effective’ pursuit of successive policy
economy’ in which big business, big labour, goals. Market co-ordination and hierarchy are
and the big state often engaged in tripartite prey to the problems of bounded rationality,
concertation at the national or regional level. In opportunism, and asset specificity4 (Coulson,
the emerging Schumpeterian workfare regime 1997). Heterarchic governance is based on a
(Jessop, 1993) the market, the national state, third type of rationality: reflexive rationality.
and the mixed economy have lost significance The key to its success is continued commitment
to inter-firm networks, public–private partner- to dialogue to generate and exchange more
ships, and a multilateral and heterarchic ‘nego- information (thereby reducing, without ever eli-
tiated economy’ (Nielsen and Pedersen, 1993). minating, the problem of bounded rationality);
Moreover, in contrast to the primarily national reducing opportunism through locking govern-
focus of the mixed economy, these new forms ance partners into a range of interdependent
of negotiated economy also involve ‘key’ econ- decisions over a mixture of short-, medium-,
omic players from local and regional as well and long-term time horizons; and building on
as national and, increasingly, international econ- the interdependencies and risks associated with
omic spaces. This is linked to the partial ‘hol- ‘asset specificity’ by encouraging solidarity
lowing out’ of national states through the among those involved. It thereby supplements
expansion of supranational government, local market exchange and government hierarchy
governance regimes, and transnationalized local with institutionalized negotiations to mobilize
policy networks in an attempt to enhance the consensus and build mutual understanding. Indi-
‘de-centred context-mediated steering’ of capi- vidual economic partners give up part of their
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36 Bob Jessop
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The rise of governance and the risks of failure: the case of economic development 37
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38 Bob Jessop
succeed where conditions are sufficiently stable state failure alike would surely be a recipe for
and the options sufficiently restricted that reflex- pessimism (Malpas and Wickham, 1995, p. 39).
ive monitoring, interactive learning, and For those who recognize at least the formal
incremental change can occur.6 Relatively stable, procedural rationality of markets, it might still
non-turbulent environments facilitate the selection be possible to adjudge market outcomes as fail-
of responses that prove successful and thereby ures in terms of substantive (political) criteria,
enable governance mechanisms to stabilize them. such as an unjust distribution of lifechances.
Conversely, turbulence means that any lessons Likewise, even if one accepts that state elites
from previous successes or failures may be inap- are motivated by the public interest, political
plicable in rapidly changing circumstances. This outcomes might still be seen as failures in terms
argument also applies, of course, to the use of of formal (economic) criteria, such as the over-
imperative co-ordination. Those who see markets supply of poor quality, high priced public goods
as discovery mechanisms also presuppose some (cf. Mitchell and Simmons, 1994).
measure of stability in the environment. The criterion for governance failure is not
immediately obvious. For there is no pre-given
formal maximand or reference point to judge
Governance failure
governance success, as there is in the economy
with its emphasis on monetized profits and/or
The growing fascination with governance mech- the (imaginary) perfect market outcome. Nor
anisms as a solution to market and/or state fail- is there a pre-given substantive criterion – the
ure should not lead us to overlook the risks realization of specific political objectives – as
involved in attempts to substitute governance there is with imperative co-ordination. For the
for markets and/or hierarchies and the resulting point of governance is that goals are modified
likelihood of governance failure. However, in and through negotiation and reflection. In
whilst there are already extensive literatures on this sense governance failure would presumably
market failure and state failure, there is far consist in the failure to redefine objectives in
less direct, explicit, and focused concern with the face of continuing disagreement about
governance failure. Yet, if both market and state whether they are still valid for the various part-
failure are recognized in social sciences, we ners involved.
should also thematize governance failure. But one can also apply procedural and sub-
Market failure is usually seen as the failure stantive criteria to heterarchy and assess
of markets to provide economically efficient whether it produces more efficient long-term
allocations in and through pursuit of monetized outcomes than the market and more effective
private interests (as would, presumably, occur long-term outcomes than top-down co-ordi-
if the market functioned according to the stan- nation. This involves shifting perspective some-
dards of an imaginary perfect market). State what and implies a comparative evaluation of
failure is a failure to achieve substantive polit- all three modes of co-ordination in terms of
ical objectives defined as in the public interest all three rationalities. This can be seen in the
and enforced as necessary against particular increasing interest in heterarchy as a mechanism
interests. Those who believe in the beneficence to reduce transaction costs in the economy in
of market forces, regard state failure as normal cases of bounded rationality, complex inter-
and market failure as exceptional; they generally dependence, and asset specificity. It is also
respond to market failure by calling for more reflected in the increasing interest on the part
market, not less! Conversely, those who believe of the state apparatus in heterarchy as a mech-
in the rationality of the state and its embodiment anism to enhance the state’s capacity to achieve
of the public interest, typically consider market political objectives by sharing power with forces
failure as inevitable and state failure as some- beyond the state and/or delegating responsi-
thing which, if not exceptional, is at least con- bilities for specific objectives to partnerships (or
junctural. They therefore conclude that it can other heterarchic arrangements) acting in the
be solved through improved institutional design, shadow of hierarchy. In the same way, of
knowledge, or political practice. To recognize course, partnerships (or other heterarchic
the inevitability and centrality of market and arrangements) may simplify the pursuit of their
UNESCO 1998.
The rise of governance and the risks of failure: the case of economic development 39
own goals by relying on the market or the state the self-organizing dynamic and inter-systemic
to fulfil certain aspects of their jointly-agreed dominance of capitalism.
projects. There is an interesting research agenda The second set of constraints concerns the
implied in these reflections but, rather than pur- insertion of heterarchy into the broader political
sue it further in the present article, I want to system. This particularly concerns the relative
consider the limits to heterarchic governance as primacy of different modes of co-ordination and
a mechanism for pursuing economic develop- their differential access to the institutional sup-
ment. In this sense I will be applying procedural port and the material resources necessary to
and substantive criteria to heterarchy and thus pursue reflexively-agreed objectives. Among
judging its performance in more instrumental crucial issues here are the flanking and support-
terms. ing measures which are taken by the state; the
There are three main sets of factors which provision of material and symbolic support; and
limit the success of governance in guiding econ- the extent of any duplication or counteraction
omic development. The first is inscribed in the by other co-ordination mechanisms. We can dis-
very dynamic of capitalism itself and affects tinguish three aspects of this second set of con-
all forms of economic and social co-ordination, straints. First, as both governance and govern-
including the market mechanism itself. For capi- ment mechanisms exist on different scales
talist growth depends on the market-mediated (indeed one of their functions is to bridge
exploitation of wage-labour – not the inherent scales), success at one scale may well depend
efficiency of unfettered markets. Markets on what occurs on other scales. Second, co-
mediate the search for added value but cannot ordination mechanisms may also have different
produce it. And commodification generates con- temporal horizons. One function of governance
tradictions which cannot be resolved by the (as quangos and corporatist arrangements
market mechanism. This is evident in contradic- beforehand) is to enable decisions with long-
tions inscribed in most basic forms of capitalist term implications to be divorced from short-
market society. Thus the commodity is both an term political (notably electoral) calculations.
exchange-value and a use-value; the wage is But there may still be disjunctions between the
both a cost of production and a source of temporalities of different governance and
demand; money is both national money and government mechanisms which go beyond
international currency; productive capital is both issues of sequencing to affect the very viability
abstract value in motion and a concrete stock of heterarchy in the shadow of hierarchy. Third,
of time- and place-specific assets in the course although governance mechanisms may acquire
of being valorized; and so on. In this sense specific techno-economic, political, and/or ideo-
much of what passes as market failure is actu- logical functions, the state typically monitors
ally an expression of the underlying contradic- their effects on its own capacity to secure social
tions of capitalism. cohesion in divided societies. The state reserves
This suggests that substituting the state or to itself the right to open, close, juggle, and
heterarchy for the market will not eliminate re-articulate governance not only in terms of
the underlying obstacles to smooth economic particular functions but also from the viewpoint
performance. For heterarchy does not substitute of partisan and global political advantage.
non-capitalist principles for those of the market A complicating factor reinforcing the first
or introduce a neutral third term between market and second sets of problems is the ‘relativiz-
and state (let alone between capital and labour). ation of scale’ (cf. Collinge, 1996). This is a
It adds yet another area where the dilemmas, new development and so cannot have the same
contradictions, and antagonisms of capitalism status as the first two sets. But it is nonetheless
are expressed – including those often discussed important today. Whereas the national scale of
in terms of the conflict between capital accumu- economic and political organization was domi-
lation and political legitimacy. This is especially nant during the postwar economic expansion,
important to grasp because much literature on the current period sees a crisis of the taken-for-
economic governance focuses on the modalities grantedness of national economic and political
rather than objects of governance and thereby space. This crisis has not led to the emergence
ignores the distinctive constraints imposed by of another spatial scale as the predominant
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40 Bob Jessop
economic level (whether global or local, supra- are bound to fail because of the incompleteness
national or regional) around which the remain- of the definition of objects of governance and
ing scale levels (however many and however failure to close them off from competing
identified) can be organized in order to produce attempts at governance (Malpas and Wickham,
a degree of structured coherence. Instead we 1996), one can still usefully distinguish between
witness a proliferation of scales, related in degrees of success and failure. In this context,
tangled hierarchies rather than simply nested, governance attempts may fail because of over-
with different temporalities as well as spatial- simplification of the conditions of action and/or
ities. This increases the extent of ‘unstructured deficient knowledge about the causal relation-
complexity’ to which heterarchy is a response; ships which affect the object of governance.
but it also makes it harder for it to succeed, as This can be especially problematic when the
markets and states also face increasing prob- object of governance is an inherently unstruc-
lems. The rediscovery of the local is one mani- tured but complex system such as the global
festation of this but local problems cannot be economy. Second, there may be co-ordination
solved entirely at this level; nor is there some problems on one or more of the interpersonal,
other spatial scale at which meta-governance inter-organizational, and inter-systemic levels.
can be secured so that the local becomes man- These levels are often related: thus inter-organi-
ageable. zational negotiation often depends on interper-
The third set is inscribed in the very nature sonal trust; and de-centred inter-systemic steer-
of governance as a process of self-organization. ing involves the representation of system logics
The conditions bearing on governance success through inter-organizational and/or interpersonal
also tell us something about those for failure. communication. Linked to this is the problem-
First, accepting that all efforts at governance atic relationship between those engaged in com-
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The rise of governance and the risks of failure: the case of economic development 41
munication (networking, negotiation, etc.) and both in relation to any given partnership and,
those whose interests and identities are being even more acutely, in relation to the opport-
represented. Gaps can open between these unities that may exist for juggling multiple part-
groups leading to representational and legit- nerships to secure partisan advantage.
imacy crises and/or to problems in securing
compliance. Third, there is the ‘governability’ Openness vs closure. Heterarchies operate in
problem, i.e., the question of whether the object complex, often turbulent, environments. They
of governance could ever be manageable, even face problems in remaining open to the environ-
with adequate knowledge (Mayntz, 1993b; ment at the same time as securing the closure
Malpas and Wickham, 1996). Fourth, there is needed for effective co-ordination among a lim-
a problem of governance without government – ited number of partners. One horn of the
the inability to manage the repercussions of resulting dilemma is that closure may lock in
many devolved decisions. I address this problem members whose exit would be beneficial (e.g.,
in a later section on meta-governance. inefficient firms, underemployed workers, sunset
sectors) or block recruitment of new social part-
Dilemmas of governance ners (e.g., new firms, marginalized workers,
sunrise sectors). The other horn is that openness
In addition to these general constraints affecting may discourage partners from entering into
governance and meta-governance, there are spe- long-term commitments and sharing long-term
cific dilemmas within individual mechanisms. time horizons. This may prompt opportunism in
Here I will discuss four such dilemmas. (the potentially self-fulfilling) case that partner-
ships dissolve or involve high turnover. It is
Co-operation vs competition. Capitalist econom- reflected in the choice of maximizing the range
ies operate through an unstable mix of co-oper- of possible actions by expanding relevant bases
ation and competition. One horn of the resulting of membership or favouring the ‘small is beauti-
dilemma is how to maintain interpersonal trust, ful’ principle for the purpose of focused and
secure generalized compliance with negotiated timely action; and the choice of variable geo-
understandings, reduce noise through open com- metries of action versus fixed spatial boundaries
munication, and engage in negative co-ordi- for membership of a governance arrangement.
nation in the face of the many and varied An interesting variant of this latter version of
opportunities that exist for short-term self-inter- the dilemma is whether to permit transnational
ested competitive behaviour – behaviour which partnerships or to insist on sovereignty.
could soon destroy the basis for continuing part-
nership. The other horn is that an excessive Governability vs flexibility. Heterarchy is said
commitment to co-operation and consensus to permit longer-term strategic guidance
could block the emergence of creative tensions, (lacking in markets) whilst retaining flexibility
conflicts, or efforts at crisis-resolution which (lacking in hierarchies with their rule-governed
could promote learning and/or learning procedures). But this is also the site of a
capacities and thereby enhance adaptability. dilemma: that between governability (the
This horn is especially acute when the environ- capacity for guidance) and flexibility (the
ment is turbulent, speedy action is required, capacity to adapt to changed circumstances).
incrementalism is inappropriate, and it would This assumes several forms. Reducing com-
take time to build consensus. Such dilemmas plexity through operational rules as a precon-
have been widely discussed in recent analyses dition for governing a complex world needs to
of flexible industrial districts, learning regions, be balanced against the recognition of com-
innovative milieux, etc. They also occur politi- plexity to mobilize the ‘requisite variety’ of
cally in the trade-off between partnership and actors and resources. Avoiding duplication to
partisanship. For partnerships are typically limit resource costs needs to be balanced against
linked to differential advantages for political maintaining an adequate repertoire of actions
parties, tiers of government, and departmental and strategic capacities. A third variant is posed
interests as well as to differential economic in the choice between exploiting past organiza-
interests of various kinds. This poses dilemmas tional and inter-organizational learning to stan-
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42 Bob Jessop
dardize around ‘best practice’ and maintaining to deal with different temporal horizons. Thus
adaptability in the face of a turbulent environ- one partnership may have an open structure and
ment by avoiding ‘lock-in’ to outmoded rou- long-term horizon, another may be relatively
tines. This last problem is particularly associa- closed and pursue specific tasks or development
ted with efforts to impose ‘best practice’ from activities with short-term time horizons.
above rather than encourage diversity and allow
for horizontal communication and learning
among partnerships. From governance failure to
meta-governance
Accountability vs efficiency. Some public–priv-
ate partnerships are expected to serve the public In discussing ways of handling these dilemmas
interest as well as to deliver private benefits. I have already broached the issue of meta-
But this blurs the public–private distinction and governance: the ‘organization of self-organiza-
poses a familiar dilemma in terms of account- tion’. This idea should not be confused with a
ability versus efficiency. On the one hand, there super-ordinate level of government to which all
are problems about attributing responsibility for governance arrangements are subordinated. It
decisions and non-decisions (acts of commission involves instead the design of institutions and
or omission) in interdependent networks. These generation of visions which can facilitate not
problems are especially acute when partnerships only self-organization in different fields but also
are inter-organizational rather than interper- the relative coherence of the diverse objectives,
sonal. On the other hand, attempts to establish spatial and temporal horizons, actions, and out-
clear lines of accountability can interfere with comes of various self-organizing arrangements.
the efficient, co-operative pursuit of joint goals. Meta-governance has institutional and strategic
A related dilemma is that public–private dimensions. Institutionally, it provides mech-
arrangements run the risk of allowing the anisms for collective learning about the func-
exploitative capture of public resources for priv- tional linkages and the material interdepen-
ate purposes and/or extending the state’s reach dencies among different sites and spheres of
into the market economy and civil society to action. Strategically, it promotes the develop-
serve the interests of the state or governing ment of shared visions which might encourage
party. A third version of this dilemma concerns new institutional arrangements and/or new
the relative primacy of economic performance activities to be pursued to supplement and/or
and social inclusion – how far the maximand complement existing patterns of governance. In
in public–private partnerships is marketized both respects it involves the shaping of the
economic performance as opposed to addressing context within which heterarchies can be forged
problems of social cohesion. rather than developing specific strategies and
These dilemmas can be managed collec- initiatives for them. States have a major role
tively in several ways. Among these are the here as the primary organizer of the dialogue
development of different institutions, appar- among policy communities, as an institutional
atuses, or agencies specializing primarily in one ensemble charged with ensuring some coher-
or other horn of a dilemma and changing the ence among all subsystems, as the source of a
balance between them through differential allo- regulatory order in and through which they can
cation of resources, continuing competition for pursue their aims, and as the sovereign power
legitimacy in changing circumstances, etc. Like- responsible ‘in the last resort’ for compensatory
wise, different horns can be handled at different action where other subsystems fail (e.g., where
scales. Thus in neo-liberal economies compe- markets, unions, or the science policy com-
tition is often pursued more vigorously at the munity have failed). This involves almost per-
national level (privatization, liberalization, manent institutional and organizational inno-
deregulation, etc.) whilst co-operation is pur- vation in order to maintain the very possibility
sued more vigorously at the local or regional (however remote) of sustained economic
level (through public–private partnerships) (cf. growth.
Gough and Eisenschitz, 1996). Different Meta-governance does not amount to the
governance arrangements may also be instituted installation of a monolithic mode of governance.
UNESCO 1998.
The rise of governance and the risks of failure: the case of economic development 43
UNESCO 1998.
44 Bob Jessop
hood of failure and to alter their balance in the this context is that the need for irony holds not
face of failure; and a self-reflexive ‘irony’ in only for individual governance mechanisms but
the sense that participants must recognize the also for the commitment to meta-governance
likelihood of failure but proceed as if success itself.
were possible. Perhaps the supreme irony in
Notes
* This paper was initially delivered to governance as defined in specific 5. In this way they may generate
to the Colloquium on ‘Enjeux des governance projects. policy synergy, i.e., ‘a process by
debats sur la gouvernance’, 29–30 which new insights or solutions are
November, 1996, at the University 3. This typology is influenced by produced out of the differences
of Lausanne. It derives from work the Luhmannian distinction between between partners’ (Hastings, 1996,
for an Economic and Social three levels of social structure p. 259).
Research Council research project (interaction, organization, and
on local governance (Grant functional system or institutional
L311253032); it was written while order); and by a correlative 6. This does not mean, for inter-
I was Hallsworth Research Fellow distinction between different forms systemic steering, that systems must
at Manchester University. of social embeddedness – the social abandon their own distinctive codes
embeddedness of interpersonal or undergo de-differentiation. But
1. For example, the corporate relations, the institutional the individual programmes that they
governance of firms, schools, embeddedness of inter- use to specify these codes’
hospitals, etc. organizational relations, and the operational implications must be
societal embeddedness of inter- modified at the margins to facilitate
2. This is not to deny the claim systemic relations. the continued negative and/or
that modes of governance in part positive co-ordination of their
constitute their own objects of 4. Asset specificity exists to the respective operations across the
governance. Not all constituted extent that assets have limited uses different systems involved.
objects of governance are amenable and are immobile.
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