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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS Review – First Exam Coverage| 1st Semester S.Y.

2018-2019
From the Lectures of Atty. Lydia Galas 1
4-Manresa | Ateneo de Davao University College of Law

June 22, 2018 Article 3. Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance
Amparo | Estillore therewith. (2)

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 386


“Ignorantia Legis Neminem Excusat”
An Act to Ordain and Institute the Civil Code of the Philippines
PRELIMINARY TITLE  This refers only to our own laws. For as long as they have been
CHAPTER 1 published, then we are presumed to know all the laws, even if
Effect and Application of Laws we still have to read it. So, there can be no escape from liability
by the simple expedient of being ignorant of the law.
Article 1. This Act shall be known as the "Civil Code of the Philippines."
Article 3; When Not Applicable
(n)
 “Ignorance of the law” is not applicable to foreign laws,
judgments, decrees, conventions, agreements, because these are
Article 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the factual in nature.
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such Orion Savings Bank v. Suzuki
publication. (1a) 740 S 345

“unless it is otherwise provided” - refers to the effectivity of the law In order for foreign laws to be given due recognition by our courts, they
which might be lengthen or shorten depending on the law. must be alleged and proved. Otherwise, in the absence of proof as to the
existence of a foreign law, or there is failure to prove the same, then we
The application of Article 2 will only be true if the law itself does not apply the “Doctrine of Processual Presumption” or the “Presumed
provide for its own effectivity. Identity Approach.

LAWS
Article 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is
 If the law is silent, then it becomes effective after 15 days provided. (3)
following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette.
Q: How do laws operate?
 If the law provides that it is immediately effective, the
Supreme Court said that it is effective immediately as soon as it
GENERAL RULE: Laws operate prospectively. It does not look
has been published. Because publication is an indispensable
backward, it looks forward.
requirement regardless of the type of law enacted by the
Congress and even if it will merely benefit a particular person.
Some Reasons of Prospective Application of Laws:
This is the holding of the SC in the case of Tañ ada vs. Tuvera.
 It might prejudice vested rights if they are given retroactive
application.
TAÑ ADA VS. TUVERA  It might attach disabilities to transactions already passed.
146 SCRA 448
EXCEPTIONS:
Because it is a law, then it has to be published. The purpose of the
(1) If it is PENAL in nature if the following two (2) requisites are
publication is to comply with the due process clause guaranteed by the
Constitution. If there is non-publication, the due process clause is present:
violated, and thus, the law does not find any effectivity. a. If it is favorable to the accused; and
b. The accused is NOT a habitual delinquent as defined
EO No. 200 likewise has already amended Article 2. It now allows the by Article 62 of the Revised Penal Code.
publication of laws in a newspaper of general circulation due to erratic
(2) REMEDIAL LAWS–
releases of the Official Gazette and of its limited readership.

CHENG VS. SY
All laws must be published. But there is no publication requirement for
592 SCRA 155 | July 7, 2009
Supreme Court decisions. They are not laws, thus, there is no need for
publishing SC decisions before they become effective. This is in relation
to Article 8. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants’
rights does not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions.
It is axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws does
Article 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines. (n) affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that, as a
general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural
DE ROY VS. CA laws.
157 SCRA 757
ATIENZA VS. BRILLANTES, JR.
HELD: “There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court 243 SCRA 32
decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a
condition to their becoming effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel Brillantes’ prior marriage was celebrated in 1965 (Under the Civil Code)
as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the without the requisite license. Under the Civil Code, there was no
Supreme Court”. requirement for a void marriage to be declared void by the courts. But, it
should be noted that the subsequent marriage was celebrated under the
LOCAL ORDINANCES Family Code. He married de Castro in Los Angeles, California in 1991.
 Likewise, the provisions of Article 2 do NOT govern local Thus, there is now that requirement to obtain a decree of nullity of the
ordinances. The Local Government Code governs them. previous void marriage.

CIRCULARS, ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS, IMPLEMENTING RULES Article 40 of the Family Code is merely a rule of procedure. Declaration
AND REGULATIONS of the nullity of a void marriage for purposes of remarriage will be
 To be effective, they are required to be published only when invoked on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
they are PENAL in nature. When there are liabilities attached to marriage void.
it. When there are penalties provided.
 Otherwise, if they are not published, they will have no effect. It applies to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family
Code regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides Article 256 of
the same Code is given retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice

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vested rights. Article 40 is a rule of procedure and Brillantes has not PD No. 1638 does not contain any provision regarding its retroactive
shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of Art. 40. application, nor the same may be implied from its language. In fact,
Section 36 of PD No. 1638 clearly provides that the decree shall take
Exception to No. 2: in Carlos v. Sandoval, if the law or rule expressly effect upon its approval. Since the said PD, as amended, is about the new
provides for prospective application although it is a procedural or a system of retirement and separation from service of military personnel,
remedial law. it should apply to those who were in the service at the time of its
approval. Conversely, PD No. 1638 is not applicable to those who retired
CARLOS VS. SANDOVAL before its effectivity in 1979. The rule is familiar that after an act is
December 16, 2008 amended, the original act continues to be in force with regard to all the
rights that had accrued prior to its amendment. Thus, it does not affect
This refers to Rules of Procedure on the Declaration of Nullity of Carolino’s right to receive his retirement benefits despite the fact that he
Marriage. It is given prospective application. It only applies to cases already renounced his Filipino citizenship.
already commenced on or after March 15, 2003 although the marriage
involved is within the coverage of the Family Code. This is so, as the new Where the employee retires and meets the eligibility requirements, he
Rule, which became effective on March 15, 2003 is prospective in acquires a vested right to the benefits that is protected by the due
application. process clause. Carolino acquired vested right to the payment of his
retirement benefits which must be respected and cannot be affected by
the subsequent enactment of PD No. 1638 which provides that loss of
(3) CURATIVE LAWS – These are designed to cure the defects in
Filipino citizenship terminates benefits. Vested rights include not only
a prior law but the defects of that prior law must not be
legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but also an
substantial. Otherwise, the law becomes void;
exemption from new obligations after the right has vested.
(4) EMERGENCY LAWS – These are designed to meet urgent
situations;
(5) TAX LAWS; Article 5. Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or
(6) WHEN THE LAW GRANTS A RIGHT FOR THE FIRST TIME – prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes
This is true under Article 176 of the Family Code; their validity. (4a)

Article 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be Exceptions:
under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to (1) Article 41 of the Family Code.
support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate
child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Except Article 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a
for this modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code governing previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration
successional rights shall remain in force. (287a) of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that
Prior to the enactment of the Family Code, we have several the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where
classifications of illegitimate children. A natural child is one who was there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the
born or conceived where at the time of the conception, there was no provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years
impediment whatsoever between the parents. shall be sufficient.

Q: If the child is spurious, when shall it become an acknowledged natural For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the
child by legal fiction? If the father recognizes the child. preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive
Under the Civil Code, they receive their shares in the legitime death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of
differently. the absent spouse. (83a)
 If you are a natural child acknowledged by the father, you get ½
of the share of one (1) legitimate child. (2) By making the invalidity to depend it on the party who is the
 But if you are an acknowledged natural child by legal fiction, aggrieved party like annullable or voidable contracts.
yours is only 2/5 of the share of the illegitimate child (the  Article 45 of FC;
acknowledged natural child).  Voidable contracts under Article 1391 of the Civil Code;
But under Article 176 of the Family Code, for as long as the father The right to institute an action for annulment is granted to the aggrieved
recognizes the child as his illegitimate child, then the child immediately party, the incapacitated, the deaf-mute who is unable to read and right.
gets ½ of the share of one (1) legitimate child. And of course, the employment of any of the vices of consent.

CAROLINO VS. SENGA, ET.AL. But in Article 45, the period is different from the generally annullable
756 S 55 | J. PERALTA contracts, because it is 5 years depending on who shall file the petition
for annulment. It is only the party whose consent thereto was defective
FACTS: Carolino retired from the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) who can seek annulment of the contract.
in 1976 pursuant to RA 340 and started receiving his pension but was
stopped in March 2005. Presidential Decree No. 1638 was passed (3) By invalidating the act but recognizing legal effects flowing
whereby it provides that the name of a retiree who loses his Filipino from that act.
citizenship shall be removed from the retired list and his retirement
benefits terminated upon such loss. Carolino was informed that his loss Examples:
of Philippine citizenship caused the deletion of his name in the list of the Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
AFP pensioners’ payroll effective March 5, 2005. celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
HELD: Under Article 4 of the Civil Code, it is provided that laws shall such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. (As
have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. It is said that amended by Executive Order 227)
law looks to the future only and has no retroactive effect unless the
legislator may have formally given that effect to some legal provisions,
While it is true that children born out of void marriages are generally
that all statutes are to be construed as having only prospective
illegitimate, but by express provision of Article 54 of the Family Code,
operation, unless the purpose and intention of the legislature to give
children born out of void marriages under Arts. 36 and 53 are
retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from
legitimate.
the language used; and that every doubt must be resolved against
retrospective effect. These principles also apply to amendments of
statutes. Art. 54. Children conceived or born before the judgment of annulment
or absolute nullity of the marriage under Article 36 has become final and

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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS Review – First Exam Coverage| 1st Semester S.Y. 2018-2019
From the Lectures of Atty. Lydia Galas 3
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executory shall be considered legitimate. Children conceived or born of


the subsequent marriage under Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate. FAMANILA VS. COURT OF APPEALS
August 29, 2006
(4) Punishing the act criminally but making the contract valid.
FACTS: Mr. Famanila was working as a Messman in an international
The widow is prohibited from contracting another marriage within 300 crew ship. While in California, he was operated on because he suffered
days from the date of death of her husband. The purpose of which is to from aneurysm. He returned to the Philippines, and he was offered by
determine whether the widow is pregnant at the time of the death of the their Shipping Agency $13,200. He was asked to sign a “Release and
husband. There might be economic ramifications if she was pregnant Waiver”. He signed it in the presence of the wife and another relative.
and immediately contracts another marriage. To which marriage does
the child belong? So if the child were of the second marriage, then the Subsequently, he had a change of mind. He filed before the court an
2nd husband would be liable for the support of the child. action seeking nullity of that document claiming that it is void and
unenforceable because at the time that he signed it, his consent thereto
Article 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, was vitiated, he was in financial constraints and was suffering from
public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a physical disability since the doctor told him that he could no longer go
third person with a right recognized by law. (4a) back to work.

HELD: The SC said that it is not void if the reason for its nullification is
WAIVER – It is a relinquishment of a known right.
vitiation of consent. It is merely voidable. Likewise, it is not
unenforceable because the grounds for unenforceability are found in the
REQUISITES OF A VALID WAIVER:
Statute of Frauds or Article 1403.
1. He must have the full capacity to make the waiver;
If what you are asking is vitiation of consent, it is merely a voidable
CAPACITY - it does not only refer to the age. There must be absence also contract. But if you look at Article 1391, it does not state that physical
of other incapacities attendant to the person like civil interdiction. If one disability of financial constraints are grounds for annulment. Thus, it
is a civil interdictee, he is civilly dead and he has only three (3) rights: was a valid waiver on the part of Mr. Famanila. More so because the wife
(a) To enter into a contract of marriage; and a relative of his were present to witness the signing of the
(b) To execute a marriage settlement; document.
(c) To donate his property mortis causa.

So he cannot make a waiver that would be effective during his lifetime. OTAMIAS V. REPUBLIC
GR No. 189516 | Jun 08, 2016
2. The waiving party must actually have the right he is renouncing
must be in existence at the time that he made the waiver; Otamias and his wife decided to separate because Col. Otamias had an
affair with another woman. Col. Otamias prior to his retirement signed a
So, there can be a waiver of future inheritance or future support. On the deed of assignment whereby he assigned 50% of his pension benefits in
part of the heir, it merely is an inchoate right or a mere expectancy. favor of the wife and the children. When he retired from the service, the
wife and the children were starting to receive the pension, but suddenly
it was cut off. When she inquired from the AFP PGMC, the latter said that
GUY VS. CA
there must be an order from the court that would require them to
502 SCRA 151 | September 15, 2006
deliver the 50% of the benefits to the wife and the children.
The Release and Quitclaim signed by Remedios did not specify as to the
The wife filed the said action to the court and it was granted. A writ of
purpose why she signed that document. It merely says “in settlement of
execution was issued. Despite the writ of execution, the AFP refused to
claims of whatever nature and kind”. This does not refer to the waiver of
deliver because according to the latter, it was not made a party to the
the children’s legitime in the estate of the late Rufino Guy Susim.
petition or complaint.
Assuming that there was really a valid waiver, because parents
generally are allowed to accept legitime for and in behalf of their minor
HELD: The SC said that the subject deed of assignment was actually a
children, any renunciation must be with judicial authorization. In the
waiver by Col. Otamias with respect to the 50% of his pension benefits.
absence of any, the waiver of Remedios is invalid.
In the absence of any showing that his consent thereto was vitiated,
such is a valid waiver. More so, it is in consonance of the provisions of
From the FT: To be valid and effective, a waiver must be couched in
the Family Code on the obligation of either parent to support the child
clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of
as well as the other spouse.
a party to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. A
waiver may not be attributed to a person when its terms do not
There is no need to include the AFP because it is not a real party in
explicitly and clearly evince intent to abandon a right. In this case, there
interest because the AFP is not required to give support to the wife and
was no waiver of hereditary rights. The Release and Waiver does not
to the children.
state with clarity the purpose of its execution. It merely states that
Remedios received P300, 000.00 and an educational plan for her minor
daughters “by way of financial assistance and in full settlement of any 3. The waiver must be clear and unequivocal;
and all claims of whatsoever nature and kind x x x against the estate of 4. The waiver must not be contrary to law, public order, public
the late Rufino Guy Susim.” The document did not specifically mention policy, morals or good customs or prejudicial to a third person
minors’ hereditary share in the estate of Sima Wei, it cannot be with a right recognized by law; and
construed as a waiver of successional rights. 5. When formalities are required for its validity such as an express
condonation of a debt the formalities must be complied with.
Moreover, assuming that Remedios truly waived the hereditary rights of
the children, such waiver will not bar the latter’s claim. Their parents or Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their
guardians may accept any inheritance left to minors or incapacitated violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or
persons. Parents or guardians may repudiate the inheritance left to their practice to the contrary.
wards only by judicial authorization. Parents and guardians may not
therefore repudiate the inheritance of their wards without judicial When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution,
approval. This is because repudiation amounts to an alienation of the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
property that must pass the court’s scrutiny in order to protect the
interest of the ward. Furthermore, it must be emphasized that waiver is Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid
the intentional relinquishment of a known right. Where one lacks only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. (5a)
knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest.
Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be Laws are repealed by subsequent ones, it might be implied or it might be
established by a consent given under a mistake or misapprehension of express.
fact.

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There is no repeal on a law that has lapsed. Because by virtue of its own Article 10. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws,
very own provisions, it becomes ineffective as soon as the date it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to
mentioned in the law is met. prevail. (n)

Article 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the


Article 11. Customs which are contrary to law, public order or public
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines. (n)
policy shall not be countenanced. (n)

Judicial decisions are not laws. If they were considered as laws, it would
encroach the power of the legislature to enact laws. But they serve to Article 12. A custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of
interpret and apply the Constitution and the law. These judicial evidence. (n)
decisions refer only to decisions of the Supreme Court. These are what
we call as doctrines or jurisprudence. Article 13. When the laws speak of years, months, days or nights, it
shall be understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days each;
General Rule: Decisions of the Court of Appeals and the other lower months, of thirty days; days, of twenty-four hours; and nights from
courts do not attain the status of a doctrine. sunset to sunrise.
Exception: The Court of Appeals’ decisions, as decided by the Supreme If months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the
Court in the case of MIRANDA V. IMPERIAL, if: number of days which they respectively have.
a) The Appellate Court has decided for the first time on a very
novel issue which has not been decided by the Supreme In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day
Court; AND included. (7a)
b) Subsequently, the Supreme Court affirmed such decision.
Then, it shall attain the status of a doctrine.
Article 14. Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be
Article 9. No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in the Philippine territory,
of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws. (6) subject to the principles of public international law and to treaty
stipulations. (8a)
Take note that this would only apply to CIVIL CASES and NOT to
criminal cases because of “nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege” – there is This is in relation to Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
no crime when there is no law punishing it.
RPC; Art. 2. Application of its provisions. — Except as provided in the
Q: How will the court decide if there is silence, obscurity, or insufficiency? treaties and laws of preferential application, the provisions of this Code
1. The customs of the place; shall be enforced not only within the Philippine Archipelago, including
2. The general principles of the law; its atmosphere, its interior waters and maritime zone, but also outside
3. Decisions of foreign courts; of its jurisdiction, against those who:
4. Opinions of known authors;
1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship;
Ex. Arturo Tolentino who has always been invited, during his lifetime, by 2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the
the Supreme Court as amicus curiae. Philippine Islands or obligations and securities issued by the
Government of the Philippine Islands;
5. Applicable rules on statutory construction or legal hermeneutics. 3. Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into these
islands of the obligations and securities mentioned in the presiding
SILVERIO VS. REPUBLIC number;
537 SCRA 373 | October 19, 2007 4. While being public officers or employees, should commit an
offense in the exercise of their functions; or
Q: Why did the Supreme Court deny the petition of Silverio? 5. Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the
law of nations, defined in Title One of Book Two of this Code.
FACTS: Silverio successfully underwent sex reassignment surgery and
petitioned the court that his name be changed from Rommel Jacinto to DEL SOCORRO V. VAN WILSEN
Mely and that his sex shall also be changed from male to female to G.R. No. 193707 | December 10, 2014
reflect the result of said surgery. The trial court refused. So he cited now
Article 9 that the courts are duty bound to render judgment. FACTS: Wilsen is a national of Holland, married a Filipina, had a child,
but got divorced. At the time of the divorce, the child was about 18
ISSUE: May the trial court apply Article 9 of the Civil Code on the ground months old. Before the Filipino wife returned to the Philippines, he
of equity? promised to give the child support equivalent to P17, 500. But he did
not. Wilsen fell in love with another Filipina, and they decided to marry.
HELD: The SC said that there is no law on the matter, thus the court They resided in Cebu City; unfortunately, the first was also residing in
cannot decide on it. It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates the same city. So the first wife demanded for Wilsen’s promise to
that “no judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the support the child but Wilsen said that under his law, he has no
silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law.” However, it is not a license obligation to give support to the child because we have already been
for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to divorced.
apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it.
The first wife sued Wilsen for violation of R.A. No. 9262 or the VAWC
In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to Law, which is a penal statute for unjust refusal to give support. Wilsen
do so, to determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of the said that he couldn’t be liable because he is not a citizen of the
effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes Philippines and thus, there is no application of.
particularly important in this case where the claims asserted are
statute-based. HELD: Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands
neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support his child nor penalize
It might be possible for the court to write a protocol with respect to the the noncompliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in
effects of giving recognition of one who has become a female by virtue of the Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to be
sexual reassignment but never to write a law on the matter. It can only denied of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.
apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of
government, Congress. We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself, respondent is no
longer liable to support his former wife, in consonance with the ruling in
San Luis v. San Luis, to wit: As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino
wife, the Court ruled that she should no longer be considered married to

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the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her PILAPIL VS. IBAY-SOMERA
marital duties and obligations. It held: To maintain, as private 174 SCRA 653
respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered
still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's Reiterated the Van Dorn decision.
obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just.
Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect FACTS: The German husband had already obtained a decree of divorce,
and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should from the Federal Republic of Germany. When said divorce decree was
not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal issued, he discovered that during their marriage, the wife was having
property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if affairs with other men. So, he sued the wife for adultery.
the ends of justice are to be served.
HELD: The SC said that Van Dorn no longer have the legal standing to
However, based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that respondent sue the wife because while it may be true that Philippines does not
may be made liable under Section 5(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 for recognize divorce as a means to terminate marriage, however, its legal
unjustly refusing or failing to give support to petitioner’s son. Under the effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as foreigner spouse
aforesaid special law, the deprivation or denial of financial support to and owing to the nationality theory, if it is valid there, then it is valid
the child is considered an act of violence against women and children. here.

In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the


GARCIA A.K.A. GRACE GARCIA- RECIO VS. RECIO
Philippines, we find strength in petitioner’s claim that the Territoriality
October 2, 2001
Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the New Civil
Code, applies to the instant case, which provides that: "[p]enal laws and
FACTS: The second wife sued the husband here saying that he is not
those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live
capacitated to remarry. What he did was present the decree of divorce
and sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the principle of public
issued by the Australian court.
international law and to treaty stipulations."
HELD: What he should have been done to prove that he is capacitated to
Under Article 14 of the NCC, he rendered temporary allegiance to the
remarry if he were indeed an Australian citizen, under Article 21 of the
republic of the Philippines and thus, he will still be liable. On this score,
Family Code, was to simply obtain a certificate of legal capacity to
it is indisputable that the alleged continuing acts of respondent in
contract marriage from his consular or diplomatic official. That would
refusing to support his child with petitioner is committed here in the
have been sufficient.
Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents of the Province of
Cebu City. As such, our courts have territorial jurisdiction over the
Instead, what he presented was his divorce decree. Presentation solely
offense charged against respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that
of the divorce decree is insufficient. You must comply with Rule 132
jurisdiction over the respondent was acquired upon his arrest.
Sections 24 and 25: a writing or document may be proven as public
record of a foreign country by either (1) official publication of the
Moreover, there was failure on the part of Wilsen to prove the existence writing or document or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having
of the foreign law that does not require him to give support to the child. legal custody of the document.
Without the proof necessary, the court cannot give judicial notice to
such a contention. There must be:
a) An official publication of the law that allows divorce.
Because, if we go to the Nationality Theory, under Article 15 of the b) And in the absence thereof, a certified copy attested by the officer
New Civil Code. having legal custody of the document.

Article 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, SAN LUIS VS. SAN LUIS
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the February 6, 2007
Philippines, even though living abroad.
FACTS: Felicisimo T. San Luis contracted 3 marriages during his
This will only apply to us, regardless of where we are for as long as we lifetime. His 1st marriage was terminated when his wife died leaving
are Filipinos. Thus, we are bound by our Philippine law. behind 6 children. Five years later Felicisimo married Mary Lee, an
American citizen with whom he had 1 child. The marriage ended when
However, by analogy, we apply also this nationality theory to foreigners Mary Lee divorced Felicisimo. The decree of absolute divorce was
who come to the Philippines but only with respect to their family rights granted in December 1973. He then contracted his 3rd marriage in June
and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons. 1974 with Felicidad. When he died, Felicidad sought the dissolution of
their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s
The United States adheres to the Domiciliary Theory. That’s why there estate and prayed that letters of administration be issued to her. Two of
was this application of the “RENVOI DOCTRINE” in the case of AZNAR the children of the 1st marriage filed a motion to dismiss citing as
VS. GARCIA, 7 SCRA 95. ground, among others, that Felicidad has no legal personality to file the
petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at
VAN DORN VS. ROMILLO, JR. the time of his death was still legally married to Mary Lee. Petitioners
39 SCRA 139 (Felicisimo’s heirs) cited Articles 15 and 17 (3) of the NCC in stating that
HELD: SC said that we do not recognize divorce as a means of the divorce is void under Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are
terminating marriage by reason of public policy. But owing to the concerned.
nationality principle embodied in Art. 15 of the Civil Code, if the
foreigner spouse validly obtained a divorce decree abroad, then we give HELD: In resolving the issue, there is no need to retroactively apply the
it due recognition. And thus, the foreigner husband ceases to be the provisions of the FC, particularly Article 26 (2) as there is sufficient
husband of the Filipino wife. There is no right on the part of the jurisprudential basis to rule in the affirmative.
American husband to manage the property that was put up by the
former wife. In the light of the ruling in Van Dorn, the Filipino spouse should not be
discriminated in his own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
Only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely
divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of public allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the
policy and morality. -However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving
which may be recognized in the Philippines provided they are valid spouse.
according to their national law (Cf. Art. 26 (2) Family Code).
However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove
the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage
of Felicidad and Felicisimo under the laws of the USA. In Garcia vs.
Recio, the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and

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proving foreign law and divorce judgments. The presentation solely of Tristan was still lawfully married to Lily. The divorce decree obtained by
the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and Tristan and Lily from the Dominican Republic never dissolved the
due execution must be presented. marriage bond between them. It is basic that laws relating to family
rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either: abroad. Hence, if a Filipino regardless of whether he/she was married
1) An official publication or here or abroad, initiates a petition abroad to obtain an absolute divorce
2) A copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the from spouse and eventually becomes successful in getting an absolute
document. divorce decree, the Philippines will not recognize such absolute divorce.

ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENT NOT PRESENT IN RECIO vs. RECIO: When Tristan and Lily got married in 1968, the provisions of the Civil
If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be: Code, which took effect on August 30, 1950, governed their marriage. In
a) Accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or Tenchavez vs. Escano we held: That a foreign divorce between Filipino
consular official of the Philippines who is stationed in the foreign citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil
country where the document is kept; and Code (RA No. 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this
b) Authenticated by the seal of his office. jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage contracted with another party
by the divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of divorce,
With regard to Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized entitled to validity in the country.
in California, USA, she merely submitted photocopies of the Marriage
Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of California, LAVADIA VS. HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA
which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance GR. No. 171914 | July 23, 2014
with said law. Here, there was non-compliance. As stated in Garcia,
however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they FACTS: Atty. Juan Luna obtained a decree of divorce in Dominican
must be alleged and proved. Republic. Prior to the issuance of the said divorce decree, Atty. Luna and
his wife Eugenia had an agreement respecting the division of their
QUITA VS. COURT OF APPEALS properties, a property settlement, without the approval of the court.
300 SCRA 406 Remember that judicial separation of property shall only be valid if our
courts approve it. But Atty. Luna attached such settlement in his petition
FACTS: Fe and Arturo were married in 1941. After the relationship for divorce and as a consequence, such settlement was also approved.
turned sour Fe went to the US and in 1954 obtained a decree of absolute
divorce. Fe got married thrice. In 1972, Arturo died intestate. Fe is now When Atty. Luna died, the second wife claimed the properties. She said
claiming her right over the estate of the deceased spouse. that she was the one paying for Juan Luna’s share in the condo unit, the
HELD: Applying the ruling in the case of Van Dorn, there must be a need law books, and the cars.
to determine the citizenship of Fe when she first obtained that decree of
divorce. HELD: Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the
 If she has already renounced her Philippine citizenship when she nationality rule adopted by Philippine law. Hence, any settlement of
obtained the decree of divorce, then reapply the Van Dorn vs. property between the parties of the 1st marriage involving Filipinos
Romillo ruling. submitted as an incident of a divorce obtained in a foreign country lacks
competent judicial approval, and cannot be enforceable against the
The SC remanded the case to the lower court to determine whether the assets of the husband who contracts a subsequent marriage. It was void
second marriage of the spouse during the subsistence of the first without court approval.
marriage was contracted before or after her changed of citizenship.
Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her The law in force at the time of the solemnization was the Spanish Civil
1st divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and Fe could very well Code, which adopted the nationality rule. The Civil Code continued to
lose her right to inherit from Arturo. follow the nationality rule, to the effect that Philippine laws relating to
family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity
 But if she was still a Filipino that time, then she will be entitled to were binding upon citizens of the Philippines, although living abroad.
the share in the conjugal partnership without prejudice to Pursuant to the nationality rule, Philippine laws governed this case by
forfeiture because there is forfeiture when there is a violation of virtue of both Atty. Luna and Eugenia having remained Filipinos until
the vow to observe fidelity. the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997 terminated their marriage.

ELMAR O. PEREZ VS. COURT OF APPEALS, CATINDIG The properties, pursuant to Article 148 in the absence of any proof of
January 27, 2006 actual contribution of money, property, or industry, shall go to the
subsisting valid marriage. So it went back to the property regime of the
FACTS: Filipino spouses Tristan and Lily decided to separate from each first marriage.
other and upon advice of a friend obtained a divorce from the
Dominican Republic by merely executing a special power of attorney. On NOVERAS VS. NOVERAS
July 14, 1984, Tristan married Elmar in the State of Virginia, USA. They GR. No. 188289 | August 20, 2014
were together for 17 years and they had already a child. Elmar later on
learned that the divorce decree issued by the court in the Dominican David and Leticia resided in California, USA after their marriage on
Republic dissolving the marriage of Tristan and Lily was not recognized December 3, 1988 in Quezon City. Leticia was a nurse and David was a
in the Philippines and that her marriage to Tristan was void under businessman. The business of David did not prosper. They eventually
Philippine law pursuant to Article 15 of the New Civil Code. acquired American citizenship. During their marriage, they acquired
properties in the Philippines and in the USA.
When confronted, Tristan assured her that he would obtain an
annulment of his marriage with Lily. In 2001, he filed a petition for David returned to the Philippines to manage their properties here. Upon
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lily. Elmar then filed a motion learning that David had an extra-marital affair, Leticia filed for divorce
for leave to file intervention claiming that she has an interest in the that was granted by the California court plus custody of their 2 children
matter in litigation that was granted by the lower court. and all their properties in California. On August 8, 2005, Leticia came to
the Philippines and filed a petition for judicial separation of conjugal
ISSUE: Does Elmar have a legal interest in the annulment case between property before the RTC of Baler, Aurora.
Tristan and Lily?
The trial court recognized that since the parties are US citizens, the laws
HELD: NO. The claim of Elmar, that her status as the wife and that cover their legal and personal status are those of the USA. With
companion of Tristan for 17 years vests her the requisite legal interest, respect to their marriage, the parties are divorced by virtue of the
lacks merit. Under the law, she was never the legal wife of Tristan hence decree of dissolution of their marriage issued by the Superior Court of
her claim of legal interest has no basis. When they got married in 1984, California, County of San Mateo on June 24, 2005. Under their law, the

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parties’ marriage had already been dissolved. And since the parties did It is also in this case where the Court elaborated what law govern with
not submit any proof of their national law re. the spouses’ property respect to real and personal property. There was an obiter in the part of
regime, in accordance with the doctrine of processual presumption, then the SC saying that if one is buying real property in the Philippines, it
Philippine law shall apply. should be governed by the law of the country where the property is
situated. More so in this case where what is involved is a real property,
Based on the records, only the divorce decree was presented in and by reason of its very nature of immobility, it is governed by the
evidence. The required certificates to prove its authenticity, as well as country where the property is situated. Even, under this law, a 17-year-
the pertinent California law on divorce were not presented. old who is capacitated to acquire property in his country and comes to
the Philippines to acquire property here, he is not capacitated the
The trial court said that since they are already divorced, it should not be property because the capacity to acquire is not based on his national law
judicial separation of property but liquidation, partition, or distribution but based on our law, pursuant to Article 16, paragraph 1 of the Civil
of property. Code. Thus, the sale by Kang to Suzuki is valid. That “Kang is married”
is merely descriptive of his status but not proof that the property is
HELD: The trial court erred in immediately recognizing the divorce owned by the conjugal partnership property of the existing marriage.
decree using the doctrine of processual presumption without
compliance with Rule 132 Sections 24 and 25. ORION SAVINGS BANK vs. SUZUKI
G.R. No. 205487
In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, the Court stated that: “The starting point in any November 12, 2014
recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that
our laws do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws.” It is a universal principle thatreal or immovable property is exclusively
Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, “no sovereign is bound to give subject to the laws of the country or state where it is located. The
effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of reason is found in the very nature of immovable property — its
another country.” This means that the foreign judgment and its immobility. Immovables are part of the country and so closely
authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, connected to it that all rights over them have their natural center of
together with the alien’s applicable national law to show the effect of the gravity there.
judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made
in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action On the other hand, property relations between spouses are governed
where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his principally by the national law of the spouses. However, the party
claim or defense. invoking the application of a foreign law has the burden of proving the
foreign law. The foreign law is a question of fact to be properly pleaded
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the and proved as the judge cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. He
status of a marriage, a copy of the foreign judgment my be admitted in is presumed to know only domestic or the law of the forum.
evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in
relation to Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of the Rules of Court. To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof
and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of
Since they have been separated for more than a year and returning to Court.
the others arms are highly improbable, it should be judicial separation
of property and not liquidation, partition, and distribution of properties. Accordingly, matters concerning the title and disposition of real
property shall be governed by Philippine law while issues pertaining to
EXCEPTION: the conjugal natureof the property shall be governed by South Korean
BAYOT VS. CA law, provided it is proven as a fact.
The Court immediately gave due recognition to the decree of divorce
without need of having it proved in accordance with Rule 132 of the In the present case, Orion, unfortunately failed to prove the South
Rules of Court. Korean law on the conjugal ownership ofproperty. It merely attached a
"Certification from the Embassy of the Republic of Korea" to prove the
BAYOT VS CA existence of Korean Law. This certification, does not qualify as sufficient
G.R. No. 155635 proof of the conjugal nature of the property for there is no showing that
November 7, 2008 it was properly authenticated bythe seal of his office, as required under
Section 24 of Rule 132.
To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the holding in Garcia v. Recio
that a foreign divorce can be recognized here, provided the divorce DEL SOCORRO vs. WILSEM
decree is proven as a fact and as valid under the national law of the alien Here, there is failure on the part of the spouse to prove the law that he is
spouse. Be this as it may, the fact that Rebecca was clearly an American not under obligation to provide support to his child because of the
citizen when she secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized and decree of divorce.
allowed in any of the States of the Union, the presentation of a copy of
foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by the foreign court DEL SOCORRO vs. WILSEM
issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied
ORION SAVINGS BANK to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. In the
This involves a condo unit that was owned by a Korean national (Kang) present case, respondent hastily concludes that being a national of the
with a special kind of visa. But he decided to sell the condo unit together Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of
with the parking lot to a Japanese national, Suzuki. Despite full and capacity to support. While respondent pleaded the laws of the
payment, Kang did not deliver the unit and the titles to Suzuki. Kang Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to support
explained that the title to the unit was in the possession of Orion Savings his son, he never proved the same.
Bank. Suzuki filed an action for specific performance against the bank
and Kang. At that time, Kang had already left the country so it was the It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national
bank who actively participated in the petition. According to the bank, law of the Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the obligation
the sale of the unit was void because under Korean law, there must be to support their child (either before, during or after the issuance of a
consent of the spouse if what is involved in the sale is a conjugal divorce decree).
partnership property and attaching thereto a certificate issued by the
Korean embassy which indeed states that “when there is disposition of a In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the
conjugal partnership property, there must be consent by wife.” Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of processual presumption shall
govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly
HELD: The certification was not considered by the Court because there pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the
was failure to have it certified by the Korean embassy – it was not same as our local or domestic or internal law. Thus, since the law of the
attested to. Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been properly
pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same
with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support

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their children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith. is obviously a question of fact that is beyond the ambit of a Rule 45
petition for review.
KOIKE vs. KOIKE
Doreen is married to a Japanese national and they got a divorce. The RENVOI DOCTRINE
divorce was issued by the mayor of the City of Ichinomiya. All those AZNAR vs. GARCIA
documents related to the divorce were all properly certified by the A foreigner died testate in the Philippines and has properties in the
Mayor. When Doreen returned to the Philippines, she filed a petition for country. He had two illegitimate children. One of the daughter got a
judicial recognition of the decree of divorce pursuant to Article 26 p. 2 of bigger share in the inheritance than the other. The one prejudiced cited
the Family Code. Article 16 of the Civil Code which states that – “Article 16. xxx However,
intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order
HELD: Although Doreen submitted photocopies of the Civil Code of of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the
Japan and that there is such a law that allows divorce as a means of intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the
terminating the marriage and that the mayor has the authority. All national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
these are not properly authenticated. It was remanded to the lower whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the
court. country wherein said property may be found.”

KOIKE vs KOIKE Thus, it was referred to the Law of California where he is a citizen. This
G.R. No. 215723 was referred back to the Philippines because the Law of California states
July 27, 2016 that the distribution of the estate shall be in accordance with the law of
the place where the property is situated.
Ruling of RTC:
While the divorce documents presented by Doreen were successfully AZNAR vs. GARCIA
proven to be public or official records of Japan, she nonetheless fell G.R. No. L-16749
short of proving the national law of her husband, particularly the January 31, 1963
existence of the law on divorce. The RTC observed that the "The Civil
Code of Japan 2000" and "The Civil Code of Japan 2009," presented were This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the conflict-
not duly authenticated by the Philippine Consul in Japan as required by of-laws rule of the forum refers to a foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule
Sections 24 and 25 of the said Rules, adding too that the testimony of of which, in turn, refers the matter back again to the law of the forum.
Doreen relative to the applicable provisions found therein and its effect This is renvoi in the narrower sense.
on the matrimonial relations was insufficient since she was not
presented as a qualified expert witness nor was shown to have, at the TRANSMISSION THEORY – variety of Renvoi Doctrine which now
very least, a working knowledge of the laws of Japan, particularly those includes a third country.
on family relations and divorce. It likewise did not consider the said
books as learned treatises pursuant to Section 46 Rule 130 of the CORPUZ vs. STO. TOMAS
Revised Rules on Evidence, since no expert witness on the subject Corpuz is a former Filipino who acquired Canadian citizenship. He
matter was presented and considering further that Philippine courts married a Filipino named Daisylyn. After the marriage he had to go back
cannot take judicial notice of foreignjudgments and law. immediately to Canada. He came back to the Philippines and to his
surprise he found out that Daisylyn was having an affair with another
Ruling of SC: man. He went back to Canada and obtained a decree of divorce. It was
Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts granted effective January 2006. Three years later, he wanted to marry
cannot grant it. However, Article 26 of the Family Code - which another Filipino. Corpuz had the decree of divorce registered in the
addresses foreign marriages or mixed marriages involving a Filipino and certificate of marriage between him and Daisylyn. The officer told him
a foreigner - allows a Filipino spouse to contract a subsequent marriage that it is insufficient to have it merely registered and what he should do
in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by an alien spouse is file a petition for the recognition of the decree of divorce. The State
capacitating him or her to remarry. opposed the petition alleging that Corpuz is not a Filipino citizen and
Article 26 paragraph 2 of the Family Code applies only to a Filipino
The law confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a citizen who have been validly divorced by the foreigner spouse
foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to
determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. HELD: Article 26 paragraph 2 of the Family Code applies only to the
Filipino spouse to be issued in favor of the latter a decree capacitating
In Corpuz v. Sta. Tomas, the Court had the occasion to rule that: him or her to marry. But nonetheless, the Court heard the petition
because Daisylyn conformed to the petition, only that she doesn’t have
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the the money to institute the complaint. But according to the Court, this
acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign must be in compliance with Rule 132 Section 24 and 25 as well as all the
judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no requirements, because he is governed with his national law. Gerbert
sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment failed to attach the Canadian law on divorce that’s why it was denied.
rendered by a tribunal of another country." This means that the foreign
judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules
Article 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the
on evidence, together with the alien's applicable national law to show
law of the country where it is stipulated.
the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The
recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to
purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree
the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to
as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.
the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by
the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
Thus, in Garcia v. Recio, it was pointed out that in order for a divorce
whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the
obtained abroad by the alien spouse to be recognized in our jurisdiction,
country wherein said property may be found. (10a)
it must be shown that the divorce decree is valid according to the
national law of the foreigner. Both the divorce decree and the governing
personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be BELLIS vs. BELLIS
proven. Since our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and Bellis provided in his will that his properties in the Philippines will be
judgment, our law on evidence requires that both the divorce decree distributed in accordance with the Philippine Law even if he is not
and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven like any residing in the Philippines and a citizen of Texas, U.S.
other fact.
BELLIS vs. BELLIS
Considering that the validity of the divorce decree between Doreen and G.R. No. L-23678
Michiyuki, as well as the existence of pertinent laws of Japan on the June 6, 1967
matter are essentially factual that calls for a re-evaluation of the
evidence presented before the RTC, the issue raised in the instant appeal Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the

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national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, foreign decree of absolute divorce betiveen Filipino citizens could be a
with regard to four items: patent violation of the declared public policy of the state, specially in
a. the order of succession; view of the third paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code that
b. the amount of successional rights; prescribes the following:
c. the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and
d. the capacity to succeed. Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and
those which have for their object public order, policy and good
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills — customs, shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
one to govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate — promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in
arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his a foreign country.
Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in
executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as Article 18. In matters which are governed by the Code of Commerce and
this Court ruled that a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his special laws, their deficiency shall be supplied by the provisions of this
properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and Code. (16a)
not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot
be ignored in regard to those matters that on Article 16 of the Civil Code
states said national law should govern. General Rule: The provisions of the Civil Code shall be suppletory to
whose are governed by the Code of Commerce d.

Article 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other Exception: Transportation Laws – the Civil Code shall prevail.
public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in
which they are executed.
CHAPTER 2
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or Human Relations
consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country,
the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their
Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
execution.
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those
which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs
shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or Elements of THE PRINCIPLE OF ABUSE OF RIGHTS
by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. a. the existence of a legal right or duty
(11a) b. which is exercised in bad faith;
c. for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another
Take note that Article 16 and 17 are Conflict Rules.
FEBTC vs. PACILAN
Here, he issued four checks. When the fourth check was presented for
FORMS or SOLEMNITIES
encashment, it was dishonored. The bank closed the account of Pacilan
 Maybe be required for validity, enforceability, or convenience
for improper mishandling. The following day, he deposited the amount
 It is the technical manner in the preparation of a document
that will cover the fourth check and tried to inquire from the bank why
without necessarily delving into the intrinsic validity of the
his account was closed. There was no answer from the bank. Pacilan
provisions or stipulations of the contract or will.
sued FEBT (now BPI) for moral damages because he suffered social
humiliation, wounded feelings, insurmountable worries and sleepless
If a Filipino goes to another country and executed a last will and
nights. The indecent haste that attended the closure of his account was
testament, the formalities shall be governed by the law of the country
patently malicious and intended to embarrass him. He claimed that he is
where the document is executed.
a Cashier of Prudential Bank and Trust Company, whose branch office is
 EXCEPTION: If it is executed before a the diplomatic or located just across that of petitioner bank, and a prominent and
consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines, the respected leader both in the civic and banking communities.
solemnities established by Philippine laws shall govern.
HELD: In order for an abuse of rights to arise, there must be the
The third paragraph is more relevant to Article 15 of the Civil Code presence of three elements:
because it shall be rendered ineffective by foreign decrees, judgments, a. the existence of a legal right or duty
conventions or agreement agreed upon in a foreign country. b. which is exercised in bad faith;
c. for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another
TENCHAVEZ vs. ESCANO
It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage between Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence,
Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escaño remained subsisting and dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a
undissolved under Philippine law, notwithstanding the decree of wrong, a breach of known duty due to some motives or interest or ill-
absolute divorce that the wife sought and obtained from State of will that partakes of the nature of fraud. Malice connotes ill-will or spite
Nevada, on grounds of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." and speaks not in response to duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior
At the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta Escaño, like her and unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad faith or bad motive.
husband, was still a Filipino citizen. She was then subject to Philippine
law, and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Rep. Act No. Here, the 2nd and 3rd elements are wanting. It was established during
386), already in force at the time, expressly provided: the trial that it was actually Pacilan who abused his rights as depositor
of the bank. There were over withdrawing of his account hundreds of
Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition times for more or less four years. He also signed checks with different
and legal capacity of persons are binding upon the citizens of the signatures compared to that on file with the bank.
Philippines, even though living abroad.
CEBU COUNTRY CLUB vs. ELIZAGAQUE
The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit absolute Elizagaque bought a share in Cebu Country Club and applied for
divorce, quo ad vinculo matrimonii; and in fact does not even use that membership. But, he never received any communication from the
term, to further emphasize its restrictive policy on the matter, in Country Club. He only found out that his application was denied. His
contrast to the preceding legislation that admitted absolute divorce on appeal and motion for reconsideration was left unanswered by the
grounds of adultery of the wife or concubinage of the husband (Act Country Club.
2710). Instead of divorce, the present Civil Code only provides for legal
separation , and, even in that case, it expressly prescribes that "the HELD: There is an abuse of rights on the part of the Cebu Country Club.
marriage bonds shall not be severed" It was reasoned by the Club that they have a new rule on admission of
new members that there must be unanimous vote from the board of
For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a directors. This was not stated in the application form submitted by

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Elizagaque but such rule already have taken effect 13 years after the Calatagans bad faith and failure to observe its own By-Laws had
application. The Court said that there was bad faith on the part of Cebu resulted not merely in the loss of Clementes privilege to play golf at its
Country Club. The Club explained that the amendment was not printed golf course and avail of its amenities, but also in significant pecuniary
on the application form due to economic reasons cannot be given damage to him. For that loss, the only blame that could be thrown
appreciation. The Court cannot fathom why such a prestigious and Clementes way was his failure to notify Calatagan of the closure of the
exclusive golf country club whose members are all affluent, did not have P.O. Box. That lapse, if we uphold Calatagan would cost Clemente a lot.
enough money to cause the printing of an updated application form. But, in the first place, does he deserve answerability for failing to notify
the club of the closure of the postal box? Indeed, knowing as he did that
UYPITCHING vs. QUIAMCO Calatagan was in possession of his home address as well as residence
Quiamco alleged that the motorcycle was delivered to him by Davalan et and office telephone numbers, he had every reason to assume that the
al to amicably settle the civil aspect of a criminal case for robbery filed club would not be at a loss should it need to contact him. In addition,
by Quiamco against them. He asked for the original certificate of according to Clemente, he was not even aware of the closure of the
registration but the three accused never came to see him again. postal box, the maintenance of which was not his responsibility but his
Meanwhile, the motorcycle was parked in an open space inside employer Phimcos.
Quiamco’s business establishment, where it was visible and accessible
to the public. The utter bad faith exhibited by Calatagan brings into operation
Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code, under the Chapter on
9 years later, a lawyer together with the members of the Philippine Human Relations. These provisions, which the Court of Appeals did
Constabulary, descended on the establishment of Quiamco on the apply, enunciate a general obligation under law for every person to act
allegation that the latter got hold of Uypitching’s motorcycle. Quiamco fairly and in good faith towards one another. A non-stock corporation
was not around at that time. While waiting for him, Uypitching was like Calatagan is not exempt from that obligation in its treatment of its
uttering "Quiamco is a thief of a motorcycle" which was heard by the members. The obligation of a corporation to treat every person honestly
employee of Quiamco. When the latter did not arrive, Uypitching and in good faith extends even to its shareholders or members, even if
ordered the policemen, over the clerk’s objection, to take the the latter find themselves contractually bound to perform certain
motorcycle. Uypitching also filed a criminal complaint for qualified theft obligations to the corporation. A certificate of stock cannot be a charter
and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing Law against Quiamco but was of dehumanization.
dismissed.
ARDIENTE vs. JAVIER
Quiamco sued Uypitching for damages pursuant to Article 19 in relation Ardiente sold his house and lot to Pastorfide. The MOA stipulates that
to Article 21 of the Civil Code. Pastorfide is responsible for the transfer of the utilities from his name to
Ardiente, including the water connection. This was not complied with.
HELD: While he exercised his right as an owner of the motorcycle, there Instead, he incurred delinquency in the payment of the waterbills. Thus,
was an abuse of right committed by Uypitching. Being the owner as an the Cagayan de Oro Water District went to Ardiente and informed him
unpaid seller, he could have properly applied for the appropriate about the delinquency. The latter told the water district employee to
proceedings – in this case, foreclosure of the motorcycle. Also, he should immediately disconnect the water connection of Pastorfide.
have been armed by a search warrant which, in this case, was not
complied with. And because Uypitching is a lawyer, triple costs against HELD: Both are solidarily liable for damages, Ardiente and the water
him. district. It should have first informed Pastorfide of the delinquency,
instead of immediately disconnecting the water connection.
CALATAGAN GOLF CLUB vs. CLEMENTE
Clemente incurred delinquency in his payments of his dues. Calatagan SESBRENO vs. CA & VECO
Golf Club tried to collect Clemente’s back accounts. Both letters were Sesbreno is one of the customers of VECO. Under the contract agreed
sent back to sender with the postal note that the address had been upon, in case of violations, VOC inspectors may inspect the houses of the
closed. Despite knowledge of closure, it still proceeded to send the third clients at reasonable time without being liable for trespass to dwelling.
demand letter in the same address. Since there was no payment, the In one of their inspections, together with the Philippine Constabulary,
Club sold the share of Clemente through public auction. they went to the house of Sesbreno and were allowed to enter the
premises by the househelper, and another named Chuchie Garcia and
HELD: There is abuse of rights on the part of the Club. It should have Peter Sesbreno. They found the meter at the garage and found out that
looked into the personal records on file with the Club, he being a it is not working, in fact it was turned upside down. They sought
member. They could have merely address the demand letter to his permission to replace the meter, and they did. To determine the actual
residential address for him or call him up through the phone. This was electrical load and consumption of Sesbreno, they sought permission to
not done by the Club. enter the house. They were given permission by Garcia. The maid made
the report signed by Garcia herself. When Sesbreno learned of what had
CALATAGAN GOLF CLUB vs. CLEMENTE happened, he sued VECO and the VOC inspectors for violation of Article
G.R. No. 165443 19 in relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code that there was bad faith
April 16, 2009 exercised because at the time of inspection, they were not armed with a
search warrant.
Calatagan had failed to duly observe both the spirit and letter of its own
by-laws. The by-law provisions was clearly conceived to afford due HELD: Search warrant is only required when it is the government or
notice to the delinquent member of the impending sale, and not just to any of the agents of the state would make the search, not in this case
provide an intricate facade that would facilitate Calatagan’s sale of the since VECO is a private establishment. The presence of the member of
share. But then, the bad faith on Calatagans part is palpable. Calatagan the Philippine Constabulary is merely for assistance. It did not do the
very well knew that Clementes postal box to which it sent its previous job of the VOC inspectors. There was no basis for the award of damages.
letters had already been closed, yet it persisted in sending that final
letter to the same postal box. What for? Just for the exercise, it appears, SALADAGA vs. ASTORGA
as it had known very well that the letter would never actually reach The lawyer sold his lot though pacto de rectro. But, despite the passage
Clemente. of two years, there was no redemption made by the owner of the
property. The buyer subsequently received a notice from the Rural
It is noteworthy that Clemente in his membership application had Bank that it is foreclosing the property since the lawyer mortgaged the
provided his residential address along with his residence and office same property to it.
telephone numbers. Nothing in Section 32 of Calatagans By-Laws
requires that the final notice prior to the sale be made solely through the HELD: This is an administrative case. Nevertheless, the Court made
members mailing address. Clemente cites our aphorism-like mention of Article 19. The lawyer argued that the transaction was not a
pronouncement in Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation v. Court of deed of sale with a right of repurchase but actually an equitable
Appeals[15] that [a] simple telephone call and an ounce of good faith x x x mortgage. According to the Court, if such is true, since he is a lawyer, he
could have prevented this present controversy. That memorable could have just executed a deed of REM instead of a deed of sale with
observation is quite apt in this case. right to repurchase.

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From the Lectures of Atty. Lydia Galas 11
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SALADAGA vs. ASTORGA Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
A.C. No. 4697 performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due,
November 25, 2014 and observe honesty and good faith.

More significantly, respondent transgressed the laws and the Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently
fundamental tenet of human relations as embodied in Article 19 of the causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Civil Code:
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and shall compensate the latter for the damage.
observe honesty and good faith.
In Albenson Enterprises Corp. v. CA, this Court held that under any of the
Respondent, as owner of the property, had the right to mortgage it to above provisions of law, an act that causes injury to another may be
complainant but, as a lawyer, he should have seen to it that his made the basis for an award of damages. As explained by this Court
agreement with complainant is embodied in an instrument that clearly in GF Equity, Inc. v. Valenzona:
expresses the intent of the contracting parties. A lawyer who drafts a
contract must see to it that the agreement faithfully and clearly reflects The exercise of a right ends when the right disappears; and it
the intention of the contracting parties. Otherwise, the respective rights disappears when it is abused, especially to the prejudice of others.
and obligations of the contracting parties will be uncertain, which opens The mask of a right without the spirit of justice which gives it life is
the door to legal disputes between the said parties. Indeed, the repugnant to the modern concept of social law. It cannot be said
uncertainty caused by respondent’s poor formulation of the "Deed of that a person exercises a right when he unnecessarily prejudices
Sale with Right to Repurchase" was a significant factor in the legal another or offends morals or good customs. Over and above the
controversy between respondent and complainant. Such poor specific precepts of positive law are the supreme norms of justice
formulation reflects at the very least negatively on the legal competence which the law develops and which are expressed in three
of respondent. principles: honeste vivere, alterum non laedere and jus suum quique
tribuere; and he who violates them violates the law. For this
COCA-COLA BOTTLERS vs. BERNARDO reason, it is not permissible to abuse our rights to prejudice others.
Sps. Bernardo became the exclusive dealers of Coca-cola products.
Initially, they were merely dealers in 1987. Subsequently, Coca-cola Meanwhile, the use of unjust, oppressive, or high-handed business
offered them to become an exclusive dealer of Coca-cola products. This methods resulting in unfair competition also gives a right of action to
went on for about 13 years. Before the expiration of the contract, Coca- the injured party. Article 28 of the Civil Code provides:
cola requested them to submit a list of their clients for the purpose of
defining the territorial jurisdiction of the dealership, and if they would Art. 28. Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial
comply with the requirement, Coca-cola will extend the contract to a enterprises or in labor through the use of force, intimidation,
longer period plus the other incentives. They complied. However, Coca- deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or highhanded
cola did not renew the contract. Sps. Bernardo found out that Coca-cola method shall give rise to a right of action by the person who
talked with the clients and also, whenever they deliver to their clients, a thereby sutlers damage.
Coca-cola employee would trail them and offer the client lower price
and eventually offered a sari-sari store with coca-cola products for a COCA-COLA: The act of "a merchant [who] puts up a store near the
much lower price. Sps. Bernardo sued Coca-cola for violation of Article store of another and in this way attracts some of the latter's patrons"
19, 20, 21 and 28 of the Civil Code. Coca-Cola denied the allegation and is not an abuse of a right.
said that they approached the clients only after the expiration of the
contract. The scenario in the present case is vastly different: the merchant was
also the producer who, with the use of a list provided by its distributor,
HELD: There was bad faith on the part of Coca-Cola. knocked on the doors of the latter's customers and offered the products
at a substantially lower price. Unsatisfied, the merchant even sold its
COCA-COLA BOTTLERS vs. BERNARDO products at a preferential rate to another store within the vicinity.
G.R. No. 190667, Jurisprudence holds that when a person starts an opposing place of
November 07, 2016 business, not for the sake of profit, but regardless of Joss and for the sole
purpose of driving a competitor out of business, in order to take
Coca-Cola is liable for damages for abuse of rights and unfair advantage of the effects of a malevolent purpose, that person is guilty of
competition under the Civil Code. Both the RTC and the CA found that a wanton wrong.5
Coca-Cola had employed oppressive and high-handed schemes to
unjustly limit the market coverage and diminish the investment returns Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently
of respondents. The CA summarized its findings as follows: causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.

This [cut-throat competition] is precisely what appellant did in


 Contrary to law
order to take over the market: directly sell its products to or deal
them off to competing stores at a price substantially lower than
those imposed on its wholesalers. As a result, the wholesalers Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in
suffered losses, and in Bernardo’s case, laid of a number of manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
employees and alienated the patronage of its major customers compensate the latter for the damage.
including small-scale stores.
 Contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
It must be emphasized that Coca-Cola is not only a beverage giant, but
also the manufacturer of the products; hence, it sets the price. In BUENAVENTURA vs. CA
addition, it took advantage of the information provided by Bernardo to Isabelle alleged that whenever they quarrel, she would be the one to
facilitate its takeover of the latter's usual business area. Distributors like woo Noel back to the house. By reason of the acts of Noel, she suffered
Bernardo, who had assisted Coca-Cola in its marketing efforts, suddenly sleepless nights, humiliation, etc. The marriage was terminated because
found themselves with fewer customers. Other distributors were left of psychological incapacity of Noel. Can you hold the psychological
with no choice but to fold. incapacity of the spouse liable for damages?

Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code provide the legal bedrock for the HELD: No. For Article 21 of the Civil Code to apply, the act must be
award of damages to a party who suffers damage whenever another wilful, which is not true when the person is psychologically
person commits an act in violation of some legal provision; or an act incapacitated. There is an innate disability on the part of the
which, though not constituting a transgression of positive law, psychologically incapacitated spouse to comply with the essential
nevertheless violates certain rudimentary rights of the party aggrieved. marital obligations of marriage. It would be contrary to make Noel
liable for damages when there is that innate inability to comply.

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BUENAVENTURA vs. CA Unjust enrichment exists "when a person unjustly retains a benefit to
G.R. No. 127358 the loss of another, or when a person retains money or property of
March 31, 2005 another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good
conscience." There is unjust enrichment under Article 22 of the Civil
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, Code when:
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital 1. a person is unjustly benefited, and
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity 2. such benefit is derived at the expense of or with damages to
becomes manifest only after its solemnization. another.

Psychological incapacity has been defined, thus: Thus, the sale which created the obligation of Filinvest to pay the agreed
. . . no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a amount having been declared void, Ngilay have the duty to return the
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that down payment as they no longer have the right to keep it. The principle
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties of unjust enrichment essentially contemplates payment when there is
to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family no duty to pay, and the person who receives the payment has no right to
Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe receive it.
love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is
hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to GONZALO vs. TARNATE
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most Gonzalo won in a bidding. He subsequently subcontracted it to Tarnate.
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of Both are aware that they should have first obtained the consent of the
an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and Secretary of DPWH, which they did not. Gonzalo promised Tarnate that
significance to the marriage. . . . he would give 10% of the commission because the latter provided for
the services and the equipment needed. They executed a deed of
The Court of Appeals and the trial court considered the acts of the Noel assignment. But because Gonzalo was aware that the deed of
after the marriage as proof of his psychological incapacity, and therefore assignment is void, he revoked the same and instead collected the
a product of his incapacity or inability to comply with the essential amount with DPWH which should have been paid to Tarnate. Tarnate
obligations of marriage. Nevertheless, said courts considered these acts sued Gonzalo. Gonzalo answered that they are actuallu in pari delicto
as willful and hence as grounds for granting moral damages. It is under Article 1412 of the Civil Code and thus the Court should not come
contradictory to characterize acts as a product of psychological to their aid and should be left where they are.
incapacity, and hence beyond the control of the party because of an
innate inability, while at the same time considering the same set of acts HELD: The principle of unjust enrichment is an exception to the effect
as willful. By declaring Noel as psychologically incapacitated, the where parties are in pari delicto. If Gonzalo will be allowed, then he
possibility of awarding moral damages on the same set of facts was would be unjustly enriched at the expense of Tarnate. It was shown
negated. The award of moral damages should be predicated, not on the that, indeed, he provided for the equipment and the labor. Tarnate is
mere act of entering into the marriage, but on specific evidence that it allowed to recover. But because both were in pari delicto, there can be
was done deliberately and with malice by a party who had knowledge of dagames but only the amount due him by reason of the contract.
his or her disability and yet willfully concealed the same. No such
evidence appears to have been adduced in this case. GONZALO vs. TARNATE
G.R. No. 160600
For the same reason, since psychological incapacity means that one is January 15, 2014
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that one must assume
and discharge as a consequence of marriage, it removes the basis for the Nonetheless, the application of the doctrine of in pari delicto is not
contention that the petitioner purposely deceived the private always rigid. An accepted exception arises when its application
respondent. If the Isabelle was deceived, it was not due to a willful act contravenes well-established public policy.
on the part of Noel. Therefore, the award of moral damages was without
basis in law and in fact. Unjust enrichment exists, according to Hulst v. PR Builders, Inc., "when a
person unjustly retains a benefit at the loss of another, or when a person
Article 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, retains money or property of another against the fundamental
or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at principles of justice, equity and good conscience." The prevention of
the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the unjust enrichment is a recognized public policy of the State, for Article
same to him. 22 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that "[e]very person who through
an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or
comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without
REQUISITES OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT
just or legal ground, shall return the same to him." It is well to note that
1. A person is unjustly benefitted
Article 22 "is part of the chapter of the Civil Code on Human Relations,
2. The benefit is derived at the expense of another
the provisions of which were formulated as basic principles to be
observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the
The aggrieved party may file an accion in rem verso.
stability of the social order; designed to indicate certain norms that
spring from the fountain of good conscience; guides for human conduct
FILINVEST vs. NGILAY
that should run as golden threads through society to the end that law
This involve a sale of a parcel of land that was subsequently declared
may approach its supreme ideal which is the sway and dominance of
void by the court because it was sold during the five-year prohibitory
justice."
period. However, the seller wanted to keep the purchase price.
There is no question that Tarnate provided the equipment, labor and
HELD: The SC said it cannot be done. The seller would be unjustly
materials for the project in compliance with his obligations under the
enriched at the expense of Filinvest and thus he needs to return the
subcontract and the deed of assignment; and that it was Gonzalo as the
same.
contractor who received the payment for his contract with the DPWH as
well as the 10% retention fee that should have been paid to Tarnate
FILINVEST vs. NGILAY
pursuant to the deed of assignment. Considering that Gonzalo refused
G.R. No. 174715
despite demands to deliver to Tarnate the stipulated 10% retention fee
October 11, 2012
that would have compensated the latter for the use of his equipment in
the project, Gonzalo would be unjustly enriched at the expense of
Nevertheless, Filinvest does not err in seeking the return of the down
Tarnate if the latter was to be barred from recovering because of the
payment as a consequence of the sale having been declared void. The
rigid application of the doctrine of in pari delicto. The prevention of
rule is settled that the declaration of nullity of a contract which is void
unjust enrichment called for the exception to apply in Tarnate’s favor.
ab initio operates to restore things to the state and condition in which
Consequently, the RTC and the CA properly adjudged Gonzalo liable to
they were found before the execution thereof. Filinvest is correct in its
pay Tarnate the equivalent amount of the 10% retention fee.
argument that allowing Ngilay to keep the amount received from
Filinvest is tantamount to judicial acquiescence to unjust enrichment.

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Article 23. Even when an act or event causing damage to another's In the case of LEDESMA VS CA G.R. No. L-54598 April 15, 1988, this
property was not due to the fault or negligence of the defendant, involved the Vice President of Visayan College who refused to give
the latter shall be liable for indemnity if through the act or event he honors to Delmo despite the fact that his decision was overturned by the
was benefited. Bureau of Public Schools. Despite that and there were 3 communications
that he received, he refused to give honors that she deserved.
Example: There is a flood so the cattle went to higher grounds and ate
all the crops of the owner. According to the court, this is based on LEDESMA VS CA
Article 23 of the Civil Code on equity. There was no fault on the part of G.R. No. L-54598 April 15, 1988,
the owner of the cattle. An organization named Student Leadership Club was formed by some
students of the West Visayas College. They elected the late Violets Delmo
Article 24. In all contractual, property or other relations, when one as the treasurer. In that capacity, Delmo extended loans from the funds
of the parties is at a disadvantage on account of his moral of the club to some of the students of the school. "the petitioner claims
dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender age or that the said act of extending loans was against school rules and
other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection. regulations. Thus, the petitioner, as President of the School, sent a letter
to Delmo informing her that she was being dropped from the
 Doctrine of Parens Patriane. Inherent power of the strate to membership of the club and that she would not be a candidate for any
provide protection over the person and property of a person award or citation from the school. Delmo asked for a reconsideration of
non sui juris or the incapacitated. the decision but the petitioner denied it. Delmo, thus, appealed to the
Office of the Director of the Bureau of Public Schools. A case was filed
That’s why Article 3 of the Civil Code does not apply with equal severity where petitioner, who was then the President of the West Visayas
to minors. The latter are exempt from any criminal liability. College was found liable for damages under Article 27 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines for failure to graduate a student with honors.

July 6, 2018 HELD: We find no reason why the findings of the trial and appellate
Confesor | Mortejo courts should be reversed. It cannot be disputed that Violeta Delmo
went through a painful ordeal which was brought about by the
petitioner's neglect of duty and callousness. Thus, moral damages are
Article 25. Thoughtless extravagance in expenses for pleasure or
but proper.
display during a period of acute public want or emergency may be
stopped by order of the courts at the instance of any government or
However, in the case of CAPUGAN VS TOLENTINO, JR. This is where the
private charitable institution.
Supreme Court defined what is a purely ministerial act. A purely
ministerial act or duty is one that an officer or tribunal performs in a
This can only be ordered by the court order or at the instance of any given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate
government institution like the DSWD, the other private charitable of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own
institutions would be the NGOs. judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law
imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide
Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary,
and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when its discharge requires
similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall neither the exercise of official discretion nor the exercise of judgment.
produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:
CAPUGAN VS TOLENTINO, JR
(1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence; A.C. No. 8261, March 11, 2015
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of The register of deeds upon the receipt of the compromise agreement,
another; immediately cancelled the adverse claim that was annotated at the back
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends; of the title. Consequently, a complaint was filed against the ROD,
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, because according to them, there was no basis for the cancellation in as
lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or other much as there is no court order.
personal condition.
HELD: The court found no abuse of authority or irregularity committed
This has already come out in the 2004 Bar Exams. In CASTRO VS by ROD with respect to the cancellation of the notice of adverse claim
PEOPLE 599 SCRA 676 he was sued for a criminal offense, but when it and the notice of lis pendens annotated on TCT No. N-290546. Whether
went to the Supreme Court, it held that utmost, he would only be liable or not the RTC order dated May 16, 2008 or the letter-request dated
for damages under Article 26, (3) rather than the crime of grave oral June 30, 2008 had been falsified, fraudulent or invalid was not for them
slander. What he said to the caller was to be careful of Mr. Tan because to determine inasmuch as their duty to examine documents presented
that would be dangerous. According to the Court, it does not constitute for registration was limited only to what appears on the face of the
slander, but merely constitutes a violation of the said provision, so only documents. If, upon their evaluation of the letter-request and the RTC
for damages. order, they found the same to be sufficient in law and t]o be in
conformity with existing requirements, it became obligatory for them to
perform their ministerial duty without unnecessary delay.
Article 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public
servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform
his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief against Article 28. Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial
the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action enterprises or in labor through the use of force, intimidation, deceit,
that may be taken. machination or any other unjust, oppressive or highhanded method
shall give rise to a right of action by the person who thereby suffers
damage.
Non-feasance. The refusal or neglect of a public servant or employee to
perform his functions without just cause.
Remember this was cited in the case of COCA-COLA BOTTLERS VS
There are 3 feasance that you must now: BERNARDO. There were several acts committed by Coco-Cola like
1. Malfeasance – doing an act which he is not supposed to do at luring away the clients of Sps Bernardo when it offered their products at
all a very much lower price then they also made one of those stores near
2. Misfeasance – improper doing of an act the warehouse of the Sps Bernardo and the price is still very much lower
3. Non-feasance – not doing an act and the act referred to purely than that of their exclusive dealer. So that was a violation not only of
ministerial acts, one that would not require the exercise of Articles 19,20, and 21, but also of Article 28 because of this perceived
discretion high-handed manner Coca-Cola by trying to take away almost all the
clients of the Sps Bernardo and other dealers of Coca- Cola.

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Article 29 – 36 are no longer part of our study. This is supposed to be Likewise, in the case of PILIPINAS SHELL VS DUQUE, the Sps signed a
under the Rules on Procedure. check as payment for the rentals due to Filipinas, but the court absolved
the Sps of the crime because their personality is separate and distinct
Article 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on from the FCI. Even if they were supposedly the owners of FCI, but
the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, because the separation of juridical personality of the debtor himself
a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be from the one who controlled the check. Thus, they cannot be held liable.
instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon
motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a Instances where the law grants Independent Civil Action
bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be 1. Art. 32 – Violation of one’s constitutional rights.
malicious. 2. Art. 33 – Defamation, fraud, physical injuries
3. Art. 34 – Refusal or failure of city or municipal police to give
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable protection
doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to 4. Art. 2176 – quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana
that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or
not the acquittal is due to that ground. Article 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual,
who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner
So Article 29 is where the law does not grant an independent civil action impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another
only that the court found the guilt of the accused has not been proven person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
beyond reasonable doubt and there was no award for damages. Thus, 1. Freedom of religion;
the law grants the offended party the right to institute a separate civil 2. Freedom of speech;
action to recover damages which would only require a mere 3. Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical
preponderance of evidence. Although the defendant may pray to the publication;
court that a bond be furnished by the plaintiff to answer for the damages 4. Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
in case the complaint should be found to be malicious. 5. Freedom of suffrage;
6. The right against deprivation of property without due process
of law;
Article 30. When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil 7. The right to a just compensation when private property is
liability arising from a criminal offense, and no criminal proceedings are taken for public use;
instituted during the pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of 8. The right to the equal protection of the laws;
evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act complained of. 9. The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures;
this is likewise not where the law grants an independent civil action. 10. The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
What do you mean by dependent? It arises out of an act or omission 11. The privacy of communication and correspondence;
which is complained of as a felony. So the civil liability because of Art. 12. The right to become a member of associations or societies for
100 of the RPC, that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable. purposes not contrary to law;
And the civil liability under this particular provision are based on the 13. The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the
very act itself. It is not sourced from other sources of obligation under Government for redress of grievances;
Article 31. 14. The right to be a free from involuntary servitude in any form;
15. The right of the accused against excessive bail;
GR: The civil action is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal 16. The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel,
proceedings. to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
EXN: against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the
1. civil action is filed ahead of the criminal proceedings witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to
2. reservation of the right to institute the civil action before the secure the attendance of witness in his behalf;
prosecution starts to present evidence 17. Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's
3. offended party’s waiver to institute civil action self, or from being forced to confess guilt, or from being
induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make such
EXN to EXN: no reservation is allowed when it involves civil liability confession, except when the person confessing becomes a
arising from violation of BP 22. State witness;
This is one where the court says absolutely there can be no reservation 18. Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual
for civil liability arising from BP 22 violation. punishment, unless the same is imposed or inflicted in
accordance with a statute which has not been judicially
Article 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising declared unconstitutional; and
from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may 19. Freedom of access to the courts.
proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the
result of the latter. In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the
defendant's act or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved
party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil
Independent Civil Actions are those that can be instituted anytime
action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed
even during, before, or after the institution of the criminal case, and it
independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted),
can proceed independently of the criminal proceedings regardless of the
and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence. The indemnity
latter and shall only require a mere preponderance of evidence. Article
shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be
31 however, is not where the law grants an independent civil action,
adjudicated.
only that the civil action is not based on the act or omission complained
of as a felony, but rather it is based on the act or other sources of
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge
obligation which under Art. 1157 are law, contracts, quasi-contracts,
unless his act or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or
and quasi-delicts. The very common one is contract.
other penal statute.1
Precisely, in the case of DY VS PEOPLE. In this case, Gloria Dy was sued
by MCCI for Estafa, but the court found that there was failure on the part Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil
of the prosecution to prove that element of conversion or action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
misappropriation. It was dismissed. The lower court however, action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall
incorporated in the order of dismissal, the payment of Gloria Dy of the proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require
amount of 21m pesos. Was it proper for the court to order payment of only a preponderance of evidence.
civil liability arising from contract in a criminal case decision? NO.
Because it should be instituted in a separate civil action because the
source of the obligation was a contract of loan.
1 Take note of the last paragraph. Responsibilities here do not apply to a Judge unless his acts be
violative of the Penal Code or other Penal statues. That would fall under Articles 204-207, RPC.

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Article 34. When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or Cases Nos. Q-02-108043-44 were the criminal prosecution of Samson
fails to render aid or protection to any person in case of danger to life or for unfair competition. A common element of all such cases for unfair
property, such peace officer shall be primarily liable for damages, and competition - civil and criminal - was fraud. Under Article 33 of the Civil
the city or municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible therefor. The Code, a civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
civil action herein recognized shall be independent of any criminal action may be brought by the injured party in cases of fraud, and such
proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution. In
such action. view of its being an independent civil action, Civil Case No. Q-00-41446
did not operate as a prejudicial question that justified the suspension of
the proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-02-108043-44.
Article 35. When a person, claiming to be injured by a criminal offense,
charges another with the same, for which no independent civil action is
granted in this Code or any special law, but the justice of the peace finds BOOK I
no reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been committed, or PERSONS
the prosecuting attorney refuses or fails to institute criminal TITLE I
proceedings, the complaint may bring a civil action for damages against CIVIL PERSONALITY
the alleged offender. Such civil action may be supported by a CHAPTER 1
preponderance of evidence. Upon the defendant's motion, the court may General Provisions
require the plaintiff to file a bond to indemnify the defendant in case the
complaint should be found to be malicious.
Article 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of
legal relations, is inherent in every natural person and is lost only
If during the pendency of the civil action, an information should be
through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal
presented by the prosecuting attorney, the civil action shall be
effect, is acquired and may be lost. (n)
suspended until the termination of the criminal proceedings.

in relation to this is Articles 40 and 41. While it is true that birth


Article 36. Pre-judicial questions, which must be decided before any determines personality, but the conceived child shall be considered
criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed, shall be born for all purposes favorable to it provided it be born later in
governed by rules of court which the Supreme Court shall promulgate accordance with the provisions setforth in Art. 41. For such purpose, the
and which shall not be in conflict with the provisions of this Code. child is granted provisional personality if it is beneficial to the unborn
child (ie, recognition as legitimate child or illegitimate of the unborn
Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure[6] child, donation, contractual support). So here, the unborn child has
provides: juridical personality as it is granted provisional personality and can be
Section 7. Elements of Prejudicial Question. - The elements of a the subject of juridical relations for such purposes mentioned, but it
prejudicial question are: does not have the capacity to act.
(a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue
similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the in QUIMIGING VS ICAO, the ruling of the court is that while the child is
subsequent criminal action still in the womb of the mother, it can still receive support from the
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the putative father. Contractual Support, not the support in the family code.
criminal action may proceed.
All those that are beneficial to the conceived child shall only become
In PIMENTEL VS PIMENTEL, the criminal case was filed ahead, and the effective as soon as the child is born. So it is in accordance with the
civil action for annulment of marriage was filed subsequently. There conditions in Article 41
was no compliance with the elements, plus the fact that there was really
no prejudicial question to begin with. Criminal action involves Article 41. For civil purposes, the foetus is considered born if it is alive at
frustrated parricide and the civil action was to annul the marriage. the time it is completely delivered from the mother's womb. However, if
the foetus had an intra-uterine life of less than seven months, it is not
The perfect case where there really is PJQ is Tuanda vs Sandiganbayan. deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours after its complete
In TUANDA VS SANDIGANBAYAN, Estrellanos and Binaohan were delivery from the maternal womb. (30a)
designated as representatives for the industrial and agricultural sector
for the SB of a province in Negros Oriental by the DILG sec. Santos.
Tuanda asked for the recall of said designations which the SB denied. Article 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-
Thereafter, Tuanda filed a petition (civil case) before the RTC declare mute, prodigality and civil interdiction are mere restrictions on capacity
the designations null and void. to act, and do not exempt the incapacitated person from certain
obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts or from property
Thereafter, an information was filed before the SB charging mayor relations, such as easements. (32a)
Tuanda of undue injury to Sectoral Members of Binaohan and
Estrellanos, by his refusal to pay their per diems, salaries, and other Article 39. The following circumstances, among others, modify or limit
privileges and benefits (criminal case). The court held that there really capacity to act: age, insanity, imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute,
is a prejudicial question because if the court declares the nullity of the penalty, prodigality, family relations, alienage, absence, insolvency and
appointment, then there is no basis for the payment of the per diems, trusteeship. The consequences of these circumstances are governed in
salaries, and other privileges and benefits. this Code, other codes, the Rules of Court, and in special laws. Capacity
to act is not limited on account of religious belief or political opinion.
The PASI VS LICHAUCO ruling is a reiteration of the ruling in YAP VS
PARAS xxx As laid down in Yap v. Paras, said rule directs that the A married woman, twenty-one years of age or over, is qualified for all
proceedings may only be suspended, not dismissed, and that it may be acts of civil life, except in cases specified by law. (n)
made only upon petition, and not at the instance of the judge alone or as
in this case, the investigating officer.
Articles 38 abd 39 are mere restrictions to one’s capacity to act.
The petition is granted to the accused before the prosecution rests its
case for purposes of suspending the criminal proceedings to await for
CHAPTER 2
the determination or resolution of the civil case. There can be no PJQ
Natural Persons
when it involves an independent civil action. That is in Caterpillar vs
Samson
Article 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall
CATERPILLAR, INC VS.MANOLO P. SAMSON be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it, provided it
G.R. No. 205972 be born later with the conditions specified in the following article. (29a)
We note, to begin with, that Civil Case No. Q-00-41446, the civil case
filed by Caterpillar in the RTC in Quezon City, was for unfair
competition, damages and cancellation of trademark, while Criminal

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Article 41. For civil purposes, the foetus is considered born if it is alive And there is a distinction between residence and domicile. The former
at the time it is completely delivered from the mother's womb. However, requires physical presence while the latter only requires juridical
if the foetus had an intra-uterine life of less than seven months, it is not presence. But, the two have the same meaning in Election Laws,
deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours after its complete Naturalization, and Suffrage.
delivery from the maternal womb. (30a)
THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Article 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death.
TITLE I
Marriage
The effect of death upon the rights and obligations of the deceased is
CHAPTER 1
determined by law, by contract and by will. (32a)
Requisites of Marriage

Article 43. If there is a doubt, as between two or more persons who are Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a
called to succeed each other, as to which of them died first, whoever man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the
alleges the death of one prior to the other, shall prove the same; in the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the
absence of proof, it is presumed that they died at the same time and family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences,
there shall be no transmission of rights from one to the other. (33) and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except
that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the
Article 43 only applies to issues involving succession. This has been marriage within the limits provided by this Code. (52a)
asked in the Bar twice.
1. There is no proof of the grandparent and the children aboard For a valid marriage to exist, there are two requisites: the essential and
a ship as to which of them died first. The grandmother whose the formal requisites.
son has predeceased her, and the grandchildren were aboard
a ship and the ship sank and the bodies were not found. The There are two essential requisites:
mother now of the children claims before the intestate
proceedings of the Grandmother that the children share by Art. 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential requisites are
right of representation. Suggested Answer: Article 43 applies present:
as there was absence of proof as to which of them died first. (1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male
2. In the other bar exam question, it involves insurance and a female; and
proceeds, it was said that this provision does not apply. What (2) Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer.
applies is the disputable presumption under the Rules of (53a)
Court on survivorship.
As to #1 – It shall be subject to the decision of the SC to declare
unconstitutional that requirement of being a male and a female. That
CHAPTER 3
has already been debated upon. So we will wait for that decision. In the
Juridical Persons
case of Silverio vs Republic, Rommel Silverio prayed that his name be
changed because he intended to marry his American fiancée. What did
Article 44. The following are juridical persons: the SC say?
1. The State and its political subdivisions;
2. Other corporations, institutions and entities for public He was not allowed because of Article 2 of the Family Code, number 1
interest or purpose, created by law; their personality begins requirement. Legal Capacity does not only mean age of the contracting
as soon as they have been constituted according to law; parties (must be 18 years old and above). It also includes the absence of
3. Corporations, partnerships and associations for private impediment, except Article 41 of the FC.
interest or purpose to which the law grants a juridical
personality, separate and distinct from that of each General Rule: One cannot contract another marriage during the
shareholder, partner or member. (35a) subsistence of the marriage.
Exception: Article 41 of the FC – declaration of presumptive death.
Article 45. Juridical persons mentioned in Nos. 1 and 2 of the preceding
article are governed by the laws creating or recognizing them. As to #2 – That is why, we do not have marriages by proxy. Because in
relation to that is #3 of the formal requisites.
Private corporations are regulated by laws of general application on the
subject. There are three formal requisites:

Partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose are Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
governed by the provisions of this Code concerning partnerships. (36 (1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
and 37a) (2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in
Chapter 2 of this Title; and
Article 46. Juridical persons may acquire and possess property of all (3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the
kinds, as well as incur obligations and bring civil or criminal actions, in appearance of the contracting parties before the
conformity with the laws and regulations of their organization. (38a) solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they
take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not
less than two witnesses of legal age. (53a, 55a)
Article 47. Upon the dissolution of corporations, institutions and other
entities for public interest or purpose mentioned in No. 2 of article 44, 1st requisite – Authority of the solemnizing officer
their property and other assets shall be disposed of in pursuance of law
The officers mentioned are those enumerated in Article 7 and Article 10
or the charter creating them. If nothing has been specified on this point,
of the FC.
the property and other assets shall be applied to similar purposes for
the benefit of the region, province, city or municipality which during the
Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
existence of the institution derived the principal benefits from the same.
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's
(39a)
jurisdiction;

The domicile of the corporation is based on their Articles of I have the read the book of Rabuya and I totally disagree with his
Incorporation. Otherwise, wherever is there principal place of business. opinion because he said that:
As to persons, or purposes of fulfillment of obligations and exercise of
civil rights, the domicile is his habitual residence. “If the marriage is celebrated outside the court’s jurisdiction, the marriage
would be void.”

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He’s better than the SC? He cited 3 cases (NAVARRO VS DOMAGTOY, A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not affect the validity of
BESO VS DAGUMAN AND ARANES VS OCCIANO) and in all those cases, the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity
the SC said that the fact that the marriage is celebrated outside or it is shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. (n)
solemnized outside the court’s jurisdiction does not affect the validity of
the marriage. It is merely an irregularity. And he further said: CASES
[Some case digests were taken from the 2017 pre-bar notes of Atty. Galas]
“In contrast to the provisions of the Civil Code, the Family Code is…”
SILVERIO VS REPUBLIC 537 SCRA 373 (October 19, 2007)
But all those 3 marriages were solemnized under the Family Code.
The SC denied the petition for a change of name from Rommel to Mely
[Ma’am G continues to criticize the opinion of Rabuya] because according to the SC, in as much as he had plans to marry his
American fiancée, who actually financed his sexual re-assignment, to
That is why in case of conflict, and the opinion of the author is totally in grant his petition will substantially reconfigure or alter the laws on
disagreement with the decision of the Supreme Court, you follow the SC marriage and family relations. It willnow allow a man and a woman,
decision. Do not follow the author. Of course, the SC can always correct who used to be a man prior to sexual re-assignment, to contract
itself by reversing its earlier decision. But they would never admit that marriage. And that will be contrary to the provisions of the Family Code,
they were wrong in their decision. specifically Article 2 number 1.
[Ma’am G mentioned the case of YOSHINO-TANEDO VS REPUBLIC and
ESTRADA VS ESCRITOR] REPUBLIC VS CA and CASTRO ( 236 SCRA 257)

Facts: Husband personally attended to the processing of the documents


(2) Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of any church or
relating to their application for a marriage license. The marriage lasted
religious sect duly authorized by his church or religious sect
only 4 months. It was discovered by the wife that no marriage license
and registered with the civil registrar general, acting within
was issued by the LCR of Pasig City who certified to that effect. In her
the limits of the written authority granted by his church or
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, the wife presented as
religious sect and provided that at least one of the
evidence the certification issued by the LCR of Pasig City.
contracting parties belongs to the solemnizing officer's
church or religious sect;
The SC held that:
-A certificate of “due search and inability to find” unaccompanied by any
Who are those authorized to solemnize marriages in articulo mortis?
circumstance of suspicion issued by the local civil registrar is sufficient
proof that no marriage license is issued to the contracting parties.
(3) Any ship captain or airplane chief only in the case -“Secret marriage” – a legally non-existent phrase but ordinarily used to
mentioned in Article 31; refer to a civil marriage celebrated without the knowledge of the
(4) Any military commander of a unit to which a chaplain is relatives and/or friends of either of both of the contracting parties.
assigned, in the absence of the latter, during a military
operation, likewise only in the cases mentioned in Article
SEVILLA VS CARDENAS 497 SCRA 428 (July 31, 2006)
32;
Issue: Whether or not the certifications from the Local Civil Registrar of
(5) Any consul-general, consul or vice-consul in the case San Juan stating that no Marriage License No. 2770792 as appearing in
provided in Article 10.
the marriage contract of the parties was issued, are sufficient to declare
their marriage null and void ab initio.
Art. 10. Marriages between Filipino citizens abroad may be solemnized
by a consul-general, consul or vice-consul of the Republic of the Facts: Jaime Sevilla filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his
Philippines. The issuance of the marriage license and the duties of the marriage with Carmelita Cardenas on the ground that he never applied
local civil registrar and of the solemnizing officer with regard to the for a marriage license from any Civil Registry, consequently, no
celebration of marriage shall be performed by said consular official. marriage license was presented to the solemnizing officer. That
(75a) although marriage license no. 2770792 allegedly issued in San Juan,
Rizal on May 19, 1969 was indicated in the marriage contract, the same
You would notice that MAYORS are not included in the enumeration. It was fictitious for he never applied for any marriage license. As proof, he
is because marriages solemnized by mayors from August 3, 1988 up to presented 3 certifications that have, more or less, the same contents as
December 31, 1991 are VOID because mayors were not authorized to the first, issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Rizal that reads:
solemnize marriages at that time. “TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
No Marriage License Number 2770792 were (sic) ever issued by this
Can you invoke Article 35 that you believed in good faith that the Office. With regards (sic) to Marriage License Number 2990792, we
solemnizing officer has the authority to do so? exert all effort but we cannot find the said number.
Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our force
NO, because they were really not authorized to solemnize marriages at locating the above problem.
that time. It was just given back to them when the Local Government San Juan, MetroManila
Code took effect on January 1, 1992. March 11, 1994

VALID MARRIAGE LICENSE (SGD) RAFAEL ALISCAD, JR.


It is good for 120 days and may be used anywhere in the Philippines. “Local Civil Registrar”

The exceptions where no marriage license is required: SC: The certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar must
(1) Marriages in articulo mortis; categorically state that the document does not exist in his office or the
(2) Those who are living in very remote places; particular entry could not be found in the register despite diligent
(3) Muslims and other members of ethnic communities; and search.
(4) Legal ratification of marital cohabitation (Art.34)
Note that the first 2 certifications bear the statement that “hope and
MARRIAGE CEREMONY WITH THE APPEARANCE OF THE understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating the
CONTRACTING PARTIES AND THEIR PERSONAL DECLARATION above problem.” It could easily be implied from the said statement that
THAT THEY TAKE EACH OTHER AS HUSBAND AND WIFE, IN THE the Office of the Civil Registrar could not
PRESENCE OF AT LEAST 2 WITNESSES OF LEGAL AGE.
exert its best efforts to locate and determine the existence of Marriage
License No. 2770792 due to its “loaded work.” Likewise, both
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall certifications failed to state with absolute certainty whether or not such
render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2).

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license was issued. This implication is confirmed by the testimony of the bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he
representative from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, contracts a subsequent marriage.
who stated that they could not locate the logbook due to the fact that
the person in charge of the said logbook had already retired. Further, SYED AZHAR ABBAS v. GLORIA GOO ABBAS (G.R. No. 183896
the testimony of the said person was not presented in evidence. It does 01/30/13)
not appear on record that the former custodian of the logbook was [reiterated in the case of Kho vs Kho, GR No. 187462, June 16, 2016]
deceased or missing, or that his testimony could not be secured. Given
the documentary and testimonial evidence to the effect that utmost Syed, a Pakistani, married to Gloria, a Filipino, was sued by the latter for
efforts were not exerted to locate the logbook where Marriage License bigamy as he allegedly contracted another marriage with a certain
No. 2770792 may have been entered, the presumption of regularity of Maria Corazon Buenaventura during the existence of the previous
performance of official functions by the LCR in issuing certifications is marriage. He subsequently filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
effectively rebutted. marriage due to absence of a marriage license.

Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non- Syed presented as proof a certification issued by the Office of the Civil
issuance of Marriage License No. 2770792. It can also mean, as we Registrar of Carmona, Cavite that reads in part: “Marriage License No.
believed true in the case at bar, that the logbook just cannot be found. In 9969967 was issued in favor of Mr. Arlindo Gelatado and Miss Myrna
the absence of showing of diligent efforts to search for the said logbook, Mabilangan on January 19, 1993.
we cannot easily accept that the absence of the same also means non-
existence or falsity of entries therein. “No Marriage License was appear (sic) to have been issued to MR. SYED
AZHAR ABBAS and MISS GLORIA GOO on January 8, 1993. xxx.”
Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans
toward the validity of the marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage On appeal, the CA give credence to Gloria’s argument that the
bonds. Semper praesumitor pro matrimonio – Always presume marriage. certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to categorically state
that a diligent search for the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was
NOLLORA, JR. v. PEOPLE G.R. No. 191425 09/07/2011 conducted and thus, the said certification could not be accorded
probative value. It further ruled that there was sufficient testimonial
Facts: Nollora first contracted marriage with Jesusa in 1999 then in and documentary evidence that Gloria and Syed had been validly
2001 he contracted another marriage with Rowena whom he married married and there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by
twice- first in accordance with Catholic rites and the second, in law. Syed had admitted to having signed the marriage contract and that
accordance with Muslim rites. Sued for bigamy, he claimed that he was a the parties comported themselves as husband and wife. That Syed only
Muslim convert way back on January 10, 1992, even before he instituted the petition after Gloria filed a case against him for bigamy.
contracted he first marriage with Jesusa. As a convert, he is entitled to
marry 4 wives as allowed under the Muslim or Islam belief. He SC: In the case of Carino v. Carino, following the case of Republic v. CA, it
presented as proofs a Certificate of Conversion where it stated that was held that the certification of the Local Civil Registrar that their
Nollora allegedly converted as a Muslim since January 19, 1992 and a office had no record of a marriage license was adequate to prove the
duly approved Pledge of Conversion dated January 10, 1992. non-issuance of said license. The case of Carino further held that the
presumed validity of the marriage of the parties had been overcome,
He was not aware why in his marriage contract with Jesusa it was and that it became the burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to
indicated he was ‘Catholic Pentecostal’ when she was aware that he was prove that the marriage was valid, and that the required marriage
already a Muslim convert at the time of their marriage. While in his license had been secured. Gloria had failed to discharge the burden, and
marriage contract with Rowena, the religion indicated was ‘Catholic’ the only conclusion that can be reached is no valid marriage license was
because he was keeping as a secret his being a Muslim since the society issued. It cannot be said that there was simple irregularity in the
does not approve of marrying a Muslim. He also indicated that he was marriage that would not affect the validity of the marriage, as no license
‘single’ despite his first marriage to keep said first marriage secret. was presented by the respondent. No marriage license was proven to
have been issued to Gloria and Syed, based on the certification of the
HELD: Article 13 (2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states that “in Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite and Gloria’s failure to
case of a marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, produce a copy of the alleged marriage license.
solemnized not in accordance with Muslim Law or this Code, the
Family Code or Executive Order No. 209, in lieu of the Civil Code All the evidenced cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was
shall apply.” Nollora’s religious affiliation is not an issue. Neither is the conducted and a marriage contract was signed does not operate to cure
claim that Nollora’s marriages were solemnized according to Muslim the absence of a valid marriage license.
law. Regardless of his professed religion, Nollora cannot claim
exemption from liability for bigamy. In KHO VS KHO, the wife alleged that there was a valid marriage license
and in fact, during the trial, she presented witnesses that would attest to
Nollora asserted in his marriage certificate with Rowena that his civil the fact that there was a marriage ceremony that occurred. But
status is “single”. Both of Nollora’s marriage contracts do not state that according to the SC, the mere fact that there is a marriage ceremony or
he is a Muslim. Although the truth or falsehood of the declaration of solemnization that was conducted does not prove that there was a valid
one’s religion in the marriage certificate is not an essential for marriage, marriage license that was issued.
such omissions are sufficient proofs of Nollora’s liability for bigamy. His
false declaration about his civil status is thus further compounded by She could have presented the marriage license or a copy thereof or to
these omissions. obtain from the Civil Registrar General a copy of the marriage contract
where it may be found therein the number of the marriage license, but
MORIGO vs. PEOPLE (422 SCRA376) which she did not. Instead, she merely presented witnesses to the
solemnization of the marriage. However, solemnization is not the same
The parties (Lucio and Lucia) merely signed the marriage contract as the obtainment of the marriage license.
without the presence of the solemnizing officer and no actual marriage
ceremony took place, the SC held that the 1st element of bigamy as a SALLY GO-BANGAYAN v. BANGAYAN, JR. GR#201061 July 3, 2013
crime requires that the accused must have been legally married. In the
case at bar, legally speaking Morigo was never married to Lucia Barrete. Sally, to appease her father who is against her relationship with
Thus, there is no 1st marriage to speak of. Under the principle of Bangayan, brought the latter to an office in Santolan, Pasig City where
retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the 2 were they signed a purported contract. When the relationship ended,
never married “from the beginning”. The contract of marriage is null, it Bangayan brought an action for the declaration of nullity of his
bears no legal effect. marriage on the ground that his marriage with Sally was bigamous as
he has a prior subsisting marriage with Azucena.
The mere private act of signing a marriage contract on their own bears
no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration SC: The marriage between Sally and Benjamin “was made only in jest”
of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute and a “simulated marriage, at the instance of Sally, intended to cover
an ostensibly valid marriage for which Morigo might be held liable for her up from expected social humiliation coming from relatives, friends

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and the society especially from her parents seen as Chinese acquisition of American citizenship. A marriage may, thus, only be
conservatives.” In short, it was a fictitious marriage. declared void or voidable under the grounds provided for by law.

As it was established that no marriage license was issued to them, the Neither can the marriage be considered voidable on the ground of
marriage was also non-existent. Applying the general rules on void or fraud under Article 45 (3) of the FC. Only the circumstances listed
inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts under Article 46 of the same Code may constitute fraud. Entering into
which are absolutely simulated or fictitious are “inexistent and void a marriage for the sole purpose of evading immigration laws does not
from the beginning.” qualify under any of the listed circumstances.

For bigamy to exist, the 2nd or subsequent marriage must have all the Albios had made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage.
essential requisites for validity except for the existence of a prior Allowing her marriage with Fringer to be declared void would only
marriage. In this case, there was really no subsequent marriage. further trivialize this inviolable institution.
Benjamin and Sally just signed the purported marriage contract
without a marriage license. The supposed marriage was not recorded We have the cases of NAVARRO VS DOMAGTOY, BESO VS DAGUMAN
with the local civil registrar and the NSO. In short, the marriage and ARANES VS OCCIANO. These are administrative cases filed against
between the parties did not exist even if they lived together and Judges. One of the grounds why the three Judges involved in the above-
represented themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of mentioned cases were sued administratively is that they solemnized the
marriage. marriage outside the court’s jurisdiction. If we go back to Article 7, it is
incumbent members of the judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction.
REPUBLIC v. ALBIOS GR#198780 October 16, 2012
The jurisdiction of Municipal Trial Court (MTC) judges is just within the
Facts:Albios married American Fringer in October 2004 in place where they are supposedly assigned. They cannot go beyond
Mandaluyong City. On December 6, 2006, Albios filed a petition for unlike that of the RTC judges where the jurisdiction is regional. The
declaration of nullity of her marriage with Fringer. She alleged that appellate court (CA) and the Supreme Court justices, it is the entire
immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived as Philippines. So for MTC judges, their jurisdiction is limited.
husband and wife because they never really had any intention of
entering into a married state or complying with any of their essential However, in the above-mentioned cases, the SC said that it does not
marital obligations. Her marriage is one in jest and, therefore, null and affect the validity of the marriage even if it was solemnized outside
void ab initio. She contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable of the court’s jurisdiction. These are mere irregularities that will
her to acquire American citizenship and paid Fringer US$2,000.00. not affect the validity of the marriage.

ISSUE: IS A MARRIAGE, CONTRACTED FOR THE SOLE PURPOSE OF Article 5 refers to the age of the parties:
ACQURING AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP IN CONSIDERATION OF
US$2,000.00, VOID AB INITIO ON THE GROUND OF LACK OF Art. 5. Any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not
CONSENT? under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38, may
contract marriage. (54a)
SC: The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits.
This has led to the development of marriage fraud for the sole purpose
of availing particular benefits. In the US, marriages where a couple Art. 6. No prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of the
marries only to achieve a particular purpose or acquire specific marriage is required. It shall be necessary, however, for the contracting
benefits, have been referred to as “limited purpose” marriages. A parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer and declare
common limited purpose marriage is one entered solely for the in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take
legitimization of a child. Another, which is the subject of the present each other as husband and wife. This declaration shall be contained in
case, is for immigration purposes. But is a marriage declared as a sham the marriage certificate which shall be signed by the contracting parties
or fraudulent for the limited purpose of immigration is also legally and their witnesses and attested by the solemnizing officer.
void and inexistent.
In case of a marriage in articulo mortis, when the party at the point of
Under Article 2 of the FC (consent being an essential requisite of death is unable to sign the marriage certificate, it shall be sufficient for
marriage), for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) one of the witnesses to the marriage to write the name of said party,
made in the presence solemnizing officer. A “freely given” consent which fact shall be attested by the solemnizing officer. (55a)
requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter
into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not What is only mandatory under Article 6 is that personal appearance of
vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under the contracting parties because they are supposed to declare unto each
Articles 45 and 46 of the FC. Consent must also be conscious and other that they take each other as husband and wife. That’s the only
intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of intelligently requirement.
understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable
consequences of their act. Their understanding should not be affected Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism. (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's
jurisdiction;
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and (2) Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of any church or religious
Fringer. In fact, there was real consent because it was not vitiated nor sect duly authorized by his church or religious sect and
rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was also registered with the civil registrar general, acting within the
conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the limits of the written authority granted by his church or
beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing religious sect and provided that at least one of the contracting
impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was freely given is parties belongs to the solemnizing officer's church or
best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American religious sect;
citizenship through marriage. (3) Any ship captain or airplane chief only in the case mentioned
in Article 31;
The marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest. They have an (4) Any military commander of a unit to which a chaplain is
undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the very bond assigned, in the absence of the latter, during a military
necessary to allowing Albios to acquire American citizenship. operation, likewise only in the cases mentioned in Article 32;
(5) Any consul-general, consul or vice-consul in the case
The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the FC is to provided in Article 10. (56a)
establish a conjugal and family life. The possibility that the parties
might have no real intention to establish a life together is, however,
insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered into in accordance with
law. There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into
for purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as

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The place of marriage: Art. 22. The marriage certificate, in which the parties shall declare that
they take each other as husband and wife, shall also state:
Article. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of (1) The full name, sex and age of each contracting party;
the judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the (2) Their citizenship, religion and habitual residence;
office the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and (3) The date and precise time of the celebration of the marriage;
not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of (4) That the proper marriage license has been issued according
death or in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or to law, except in marriage provided for in Chapter 2 of this
where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in Title;
which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place (5) That either or both of the contracting parties have secured
designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect. (57a) the parental consent in appropriate cases;
(6) That either or both of the contracting parties have complied
with the legal requirement regarding parental advice in
But you can hold the marriage elsewhere if there is a request in writing
appropriate cases; and
in the form of a sworn statement.
(7) That the parties have entered into marriage settlement, if
any, attaching a copy thereof. (67a)
Suppose there was no written request and the marriage was held
somewhere else, it will still not affect the validity of the marriage.
The absence of the marriage certificate does not render the marriage
There’s always that presumption under the law – Semper praesumitor void because marriage can always be proved by other means of
evidence, such as the affidavit of witnesses to the marriage whom you
pro matrimonio – Always presume marriage.
call your principal sponsors or titles of the property (Orion Savings
Bank case) which is also descriptive of the status of the person in whose
Art. 9. A marriage license shall be issued by the local civil registrar of the favor the title is registered. In one case, the SC said that another proof
city or municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, would be the passport because it would be indicated therein the status
except in marriages where no license is required in accordance with of the passport holder.
Chapter 2 of this Title. (58a)
Under the Rules of Court, a man and a woman living together and
Art. 10. Marriages between Filipino citizens abroad may be solemnized holding themselves out to the public as married, the presumption is that
by a consul-general, consul or vice-consul of the Republic of the they are validly married.
Philippines. The issuance of the marriage license and the duties of the
local civil registrar and of the solemnizing officer with regard to the Art. 23. It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to
celebration of marriage shall be performed by said consular official. furnish either of the contracting parties the original of the marriage
(75a) certificate referred to in Article 6 and to send the duplicate and
triplicate copies of the certificate not later than fifteen days after the
In the Bar exams, excluded would be Articles 13 to 19. marriage, to the local civil registrar of the place where the marriage was
solemnized. Proper receipts shall be issued by the local civil registrar to
the solemnizing officer transmitting copies of the marriage certificate.
Art. 20. The license shall be valid in any part of the Philippines for a
The solemnizing officer shall retain in his file the quadruplicate copy of
period of one hundred twenty days from the date of issue, and shall be
the marriage certificate, the copy of the marriage certificate, the original
deemed automatically canceled at the expiration of the said period if the
of the marriage license and, in proper cases, the affidavit of the
contracting parties have not made use of it. The expiry date shall be
contracting party regarding the solemnization of the marriage in place
stamped in bold characters on the face of every license issued. (65a)
other than those mentioned in Article 8. (68a)

The marriage license is valid for 120 days and it may be used anywhere
in the Philippines before the expiration of the said period. Art. 24. It shall be the duty of the local civil registrar to prepare the
documents required by this Title, and to administer oaths to all
Can a marriage license obtained in the Philippines be used in the interested parties without any charge in both cases. The documents and
consular office? affidavits filed in connection with applications for marriage licenses
shall be exempt from documentary stamp tax. (n)
Yes. As long as it is still within the 120 day-period and because of the
Principle of Exterritoriality. Articles 23 and 24 refer to the duties of the local civil registrar, as well
as the solemnizing officer. That is why the absence of the marriage
Art. 21. When either or both of the contracting parties are citizens of a contract does not render the marriage void because the duty and
foreign country, it shall be necessary for them before a marriage license obligation to forward a copy or copies of the marriage contract is not of
can be obtained, to submit a certificate of legal capacity to contract the spouse; rather it is upon the solemnizing officer to properly forward
marriage, issued by their respective diplomatic or consular officials. this to the civil registrar and the local civil registrar to forward that to
the civil registrar general.
Stateless persons or refugees from other countries shall, in lieu of the
certificate of legal capacity herein required, submit an affidavit stating Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance
the circumstances showing such capacity to contract marriage. (66a) with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and
valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
Article 21 is in relation to the case of Garcia a.k.a. Grace Garcia-Recio prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38. (17a)
vs. Recio (October 2, 2001), where one or both contracting parties are
foreigners and desire to contract marriage pursuant to our laws. To Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
prove that they are capacitated to enter into a contract of marriage, celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
what is required from them is the Certificate of Legal Capacity to alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
contract marriage issued by their respective consular or diplomatic shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by
officials. It is sufficient proof that they are capacitated to contract Executive Order 227)
marriage pursuant to their law.
Exceptions:
So in the case of Recio, the mere presentation of the divorce decree is 1. Article 35 (1) – Parties who are below 18 years old;
insufficient due to the absence of compliance with Rule 132, sections 24 2. Article 35 (4) – Bigamous marriages, except falling under
and 25 of the Rules of Court. He could just simply obtain from his Article 41;
consular office that certificate of legal capacity to contract marriage 3. Article 35 (5) – Mistake as to the identity of one of the
instead of presenting that divorce decree as proof that he’s capacitated contracting parties;
to contract marriage under his law. 4. Article 35 (6) – Subsequent marriages that are void under
Article 53;
5. Article 36 – Psychological Incapacity;

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6. Article 37 – Incestuous marriages; and decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine
7. Article 38 – Marriages that are void by reasons of public court.
policy
Gerbert then filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce
These exceptions refer to those marriages that even though validly and /or declaration of marriage as dissolved. Daisylyn manifested that
celebrated abroad but because it is considered void under our law and if she also desires to file a similar case but was prevented by financial and
the parties thereto are Filipinos, then the marriage shall be void. personal circumstances. The RTC ruled that Gerbert is not the proper
party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign
As to paragraph 2: divorce as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. Only the Filipino spouse
It used to be that it should be the foreigner spouse who should obtain can avail of the remedy, under the 2nd paragraph of Article 26 FC, in
the divorce decree. The first case involving the application of Article 26, order for him/her to remarry under Philippine law.
paragraph 2 is the case of Republic vs Orbecido III.
SC: Essentially, the 2nd par. of Article 26 of the FC provided the
REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES vs. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to
October 5, 2005 (2012 Bar) the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her
to remarry. Without the 2nd par. of Article 26 of the FC, the judicial
Issue: Given a valid marriage between 2 Filipino citizens, where one recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding
party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another
decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our
likewise remarry under Philippine law? laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond.
The inclusion of the 2nd par. in Article 26 provides the direct exception
Facts: Cipriano and Lady Myros were married in 1981. They had 2 to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the
children. In 1986 Lady Myros left for the United States, obtained marriage between the Filipino spouse and his/her alien spouse.
American citizenship and in 2000 obtained a decree of divorce and
married one Innocent Stanley. Cipriano thereafter, filed a petition for Additionally, an action based on the 2nd par. of Article 26 of the Family
authority to remarry invoking par. 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If
The Republic thru the OSG contends that the cited provision is not the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry,
applicable to the instant case because it applies only to a valid mixed the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to
marriage; that is, between a Filipino citizen and an alien. contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can
make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already
Held: On its face, Article 26 does not appear to govern the situation established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally
presented by the case at hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at governed by his national law. The foreign judgment and its authenticity
the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino must be proven as facts under rules on evidence together with the
citizen and a foreigner. alien’s applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the
alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an action
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 Quita vs. Court of instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party
Appeals. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.
Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married
under Philippine law and can thus remarry. In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national
law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce,
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132
rule of reason, we hold that par. 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to of the Rules of Court comes into play. This section requires proof, either
include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having
marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The kept in the Philippines, these must be (a)accompanied by a certificate
Filipino should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the kept and (b)authenticated by the seal of his office.
interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import
would lead to mischievous results or contravene the literal purpose of While Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as
the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, well as the required certificates proving its authenticity, he failed to
disregarding as far as necessary the spirit of the law. include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce. It remanded to the lower
court because of Daisylyn’s conformity with the petition.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application
of par. 2 of Article 26 as follows: In the case of KOIKE VS KOIKE G.R. No. 215723 (July 27, 2016), the
1. There is a valid marriage between a Filipino citizen and parties’ (Doreen and Michiyuki) marriage actually ended in divorce but
a foreigner; and both of them obtained the divorce decree. It was an agreement and it
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse was granted by the City Mayor of Ichinomiya City of Japan. When Doreen
capacitating him or her to remarry. returned to the Philippines, all those documents relating to the divorce
decree were properly certified and sealed by our Consular Office. So she
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time filed a petition before our court for the judicial recognition of the
of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is divorce decree and the declaration of the capacity to remarry.
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to Unfortunately, she merely attached to the petition a machine copy of the
remarry. Civil Code of Japan 2009.

GERBERT R. CORPUZ v. DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and the That was fatal to her petition because the civil code will actually prove
SOLGEN that under Japanese laws, divorce can be granted merely by a Mayor.
GR No. 186571 – August 11, 2010 But since it was merely a machine copy of the law, the court has no
jurisdiction to hear the petition due to the absence of proof as to the law
Facts: Corpuz, a former Filipino citizen acquired Canadian citizenship of Japan respecting divorce.
married Filipino Daisylyn in January 2005. He divorced Daisylyn in
December 2005 when he found out that Daisylyn was having an affair [Please read the fulltext for a better understanding of the case. The 2017
with another man. The divorce decree took effect on January 8, 2006. Pre-bar notes of Atty Galas did not include this case.]
Two years later, Corpuz wanted to marry another Filipino in the
Philippines and had the Canadian divorce decree registered on his and MINORU FUJIKI v. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, et.al.
Daisylyn’s marriage certificate in the Pasig City Civil Registry. Informed GR # 196049 June 26, 2013 700 S 69
by the National Statistics Office that his marriage still subsists despite
registration of the decree and to be enforceable, the foreign divorce Facts: In 2004, Japanese national Fujiki married Filipino Marinay but

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inasmuch as the marriage did not sit well with Fujiki’s parents, the July 13, 2018
latter was unable to bring Marinay to Japan. The parties then lost Resurreccion | Lavares
contact with each other. Without her first marriage dissolved, Marinay,
in 2008 married Japanese Maekara who brought Marinay to Japan. But Try to read the ruling of the court in Tanedo vs. CA (April 2018). Court
due to alleged physical abuse committed by Maekara, she left him and cited many cases to justify that why is it not necessary that the foreigner
contacted Fujiki. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay in obtaining a judgment spouse in relation to Article 26. Tanedo was married to a Japanese
from a Japan family court declaring her marriage with Maekara void on national who obtained a decree of divorce and when he returned to the
the ground of bigamy. On January 14, 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the Philippines, he filed for the recognition of that divorce. The amended
RTC for “Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of petition however is not only for the recognition of the decree but as well
Absolute Nullity of Marriage). The RTC denied the petition on the as the cancellation of the entries in the Civil Registry. According to her,
ground that only “the husband or the wife”, in this case either Maekara in case she will contract another marriage, there will be no more issues
or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage void, and not or questions as cited in the petition. The lower court denied the petition
Fujiki. because according to the Lower Court, pursuant to the Nationality
theory, by reason of public policy, Filipinos cannot obtain a decree of
SC: The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and divorce but it was reversed by the CA. It reached the SC because the
Annulment of Voidable Marriages does not apply in a petition to Republic questions such reversal.
recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where
one of the parties is a foreign citizen of a foreign country. Neither would The SC cited that the application of Art. 15 on Nationality Theory is
the rule that only the husband or the wife can file a declaration of nullity absolute and unbending. But to justify it, it should recognize the decree
or annulment of marriage apply “if the reason behind the petition is of divorce obtained by Marelyn Tanedo-Manalo, it cited the following
bigamy” (Juliano-Llave v. Republic). cases:

A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil If you remember the case of Obrecido III where the SC cited that it is
status, condition and legal capacity of its parties. Philippine courts must not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the
determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public marriage instead it is the citizenship at the time that the decree of
policy and other mandatory laws. Citing Article 15 of the Civil Code, the divorce is obtained. It also cited Fujiki vs. Marinay where Fujiki has the
SC held that “this is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court
Thus, the Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the
recognition by Philippine courts of foreign judgment affecting ist ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as
citizens, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the married to Marinay. Also the case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, it was
status, condition and legal capacity of such citizen.” Romillo here who obtained the decree against the American husband.
The case also of Medina, it was a mutual agreement between the parties
There is no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the to obtain a decree of divorce from the mayor of Osaka, Japan and of
Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between course, Corpuz vs. STo. Tomas. The Supreme Court said that on the
Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines basis of Art. 10 of the Civil Code that in case of doubt in the
has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking
consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are body intended right and justice to prevail. According to the court, it
declared void from the beginning under Article 35 (4) of the FC. Thus, would be absurd and unjust on the part of Tanedo to be still married to
Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in the husband who is no longer married to her.
accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25 in relation to Rule 39,
Section 48 (b) of the Rules.
Chapter 2.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of Marriages Exempted from License Requirement
the judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Art. 27. In case either or both of the contracting parties are at the
Court. point of death, the marriage may be solemnized without necessity of a
marriage license and shall remain valid even if the ailing party
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese subsequently survives.
Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his For it to be considered marriage in articulo mortis, there must be
civil status as married to Marinay. awareness of the impending death of one or both parties and there is no
more necessity of obtaining marriage license.
Article 35 (4) of the FC, which declares bigamous marriages void from
the beginning, is the civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal 1. When parties are living in a place so remote that they cannot
Code, which penalizes bigamy. go to the office of the civil registrar

We also have the case of Tanedo-Manalo vs Republic (April 2018) Art. 28. If the residence of either party is so located that there is no
where it was actually Marelyn, a Filipina, who obtained a decree of means of transportation to enable such party to appear personally
divorce from Japan. When she returned to the Philippines, she filed this before the local civil registrar, the marriage may be solemnized without
petition for judicial recognition of the divorce decree. The lower court necessity of a marriage license.
refused to give due course to the petition pursuant to Article 26 of the
The other is when parties are living in such a place so remote that they
Family Code, where it is provided that it should be the foreigner spouse
cannot go to the office of the civil registrar. So there’s absence of
who should obtain the decree of divorce.
transportation to able the party or parties to appear personally before
the local civil registrar. So they are already exempt from obtaining a
The SC, in granting her petition, cited the cases of Quita vs CA and RP vs
marriage license.
Orbecido. The SC also considered the intent of Congress in deciding the
case. It believed that it would be absurd for Marelyn to be considered Those marriages in articulo mortis and those in very remote marriages,
still married to the husband while the husband is already married to there is a requirement to obtain from the solemnizing officer an
another. In short, the petition was granted because of that. Affidavit stating that he have ascertained the qualifications of the parties
and the circumstances surrounding the solemnization of the marriage
[Again, please read the fulltext for a thorough understanding of this without the necessity of the license.
landmark case.]
Art. 29. In the cases provided for in the two preceding articles, the
solemnizing officer shall state in an affidavit executed before the local
civil registrar or any other person legally authorized to administer oaths
that the marriage was performed in articulo mortis or that the residence
of either party, specifying the barrio or barangay, is so located that there

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is no means of transportation to enable such party to appear personally fact they did not cohabitate for 5 consecutive years or less than 5 years.
before the local civil registrar and that the officer took the necessary So what use would be the affidavit of cohabitation?
steps to ascertain the ages and relationship of the contracting parties
and the absence of legal impediment to the marriage. (72a) DAYOT VS. DAYOT
The 1st case here is the case of Dayot vs. Dayot, the SC held that the
affidavit serves no purpose whatsoever. It is a mere scrap of paper due
Art. 30. The original of the affidavit required in the last preceding article,
to the non-compliance of that 5-year cohabitation period because it is
together with the legible copy of the marriage contract, shall be sent by
written in the law itself that requirement of living together as husband
the person solemnizing the marriage to the local civil registrar of the
and wife without the benefit of marriage for 5 consecutive years. So
municipality where it was performed within the period of thirty days
this cannot be defeated through the simple execution of affidavit of
after the performance of the marriage. (75a)
cohabitation and but in truth and in fact the parties did not really
cohabit as husband and wife for that required period.
Art. 31. A marriage in articulo mortis between passengers or crew
members may also be solemnized by a ship captain or by an airplane SANTIAGO V. PEOPLE
pilot not only while the ship is at sea or the plane is in flight, but also In fact, in the case of Santiago v. People, Leonila who was a widow
during stopovers at ports of call. (74a) contracted marriage with Santiago and was sued by Santiago’s wife for
bigamy. Santiago cannot be found so it was only Leonila who was to
face the criminal charge. She was convicted of the crime of bigamy. It
Art. 32. A military commander of a unit, who is a commissioned officer, went up to the SC because according to her “I cannot be made liable for
shall likewise have authority to solemnize marriages in articulo mortis bigamy because my subsequent marriage with Santiago is void, there
between persons within the zone of military operation, whether was no marriage license. That entry in the marriage contract that
members of the armed forces or civilians. (74a) exempt from marriage license requirement under Article 34 of the FC
where we cohabited for 5 consecutive years was not true because we
did not execute an affidavit of cohabitation”. They merely told the
Art. 33. Marriages among Muslims or among members of the ethnic solemnizing officer that we have already cohabited for 5 consecutive
cultural communities may be performed validly without the necessity of years. According to the accused, because the subsequent marriage is
marriage license, provided they are solemnized in accordance with their void then I cannot be made liable for bigamy which is correct. In order
customs, rites or practices. for bigamy to prosper, both marriages must be valid.
Then we have Muslims or members of ethnic communities provided that The SC ruled by citing the case of Tenebro vs. CA that “state’s penal
the marriage must be solemnized in accordance with their customs, laws on bigamy should not be rendered nugatory by allowing the
rites or practice. parties to the marriage to deliberately ensure that the marriage must
be flawed at the time it was entered into. Otherwise, according to the
NOLLORA VS. NOLLORA Court, we will just be making a mockery of marriage which the
Here, the case of Nollora vs. Nollora, where he alleged that he is exempt Constitution protects. The Court held that we cannot countenance
and he is allowed to as many as 4 wives. Sc did not appreciate it and said Leonila’s acts of feigning a marriage and in the same breadth adjudge
that it is an issue of marriage since the 1st marriage was solemnized in her innocent of the crime. For us, to do so would only make a mockery
accordance with the provisions of the Family Code and thus, the 2nd of the sanctity of the marriage. It would be the height of absurdity of
marriage cannot be solemnized in accordance with the Muslim rites. He the court to allow petitioner to use her illegal acts to escape criminal
is still liable for bigamy. conviction.”
Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a
woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five Chapter 3.
years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The Void and Voidable Marriages
contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before
any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications (1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age
of the contracting parties are found no legal impediment to the even with the consent of parents or guardians;
marriage. (2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to
perform marriages unless such marriages were contracted
“There is that requirement whether it falls under Article 73 of the Civil with either or both parties believing in good faith that the
Code or Article 34 of the Family Code. There must be that 5 year solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do so;
continuous cohabitation. But the only distinction there if we follow the (3) Those solemnized without license, except those covered the
ruling of the court in cases of Bayadog and Manzano vs. Sanchez. In preceding Chapter;
NIÑAL V. BAYADOG “Where the Court said that in order for the (4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not failing under
cohabitation to be exempt from the marriage license requirement, that Article 41;
cohabitation must be akin to a perfect union. No impediment whatsoever (5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party
must exist during the entire 5 year of the cohabitation as rendered as to the identity of the other; and
imperfect only by the absence of the marriage ceremony.” Otherwise, the (6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.
marriage will be void on the ground of absence of marriage license. “
BORJA-MANZANO VS SANCHEZ (1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age
However, comes now the case of Borja-Manzano vs Sanchez - “The even with the consent of parents or guardians;
Court held that it is sufficient that at the time of the marriage, that
These are void even with the consent of the parents.
impediment is removed. What is only required is the cohabitation of 5
continuous years. But in that case, the SC said that it is sufficient that the (2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to
impediment is removed at the time of the marriage”. perform marriages unless such marriages were contracted with
either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing
We apply the Niñal ruling when the marriage is celebrated under the
officer had the legal authority to do so;
Civil Code. That requirement of perfect union is required under the Civil
Code. So there must be absence of impediment during the entire 5-year Dean Estrellado would always say that the ratification of the belief of
cohabitation. Which is NOT required anymore under the Family Code. It the parties that the solemnizing officer have the authority to do so
is sufficient that the parties are living together for 5 consecutive years would only apply to solemnizing officers mentioned in Article 7 No. 2
and the impediment is absent at the time of the solemnization of the who did not register with the Civil Registrar General and subsequently
marriage. That is when you apply the Manzano v. Sanchez if the was not issued with license because the authority of these No.2 article
marriage is celebrated under the Family Code. So it is not as strict as the 7 emanates not from the fact that they were authorized by their
requirement under the Civil Code provision. respective church but rather from that license issued by the Civil
Registrar General.
But suppose the parties to the marriage have not obtained a marriage
license instead executed an affidavit of cohabitation but in truth and in

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(3) Those solemnized without license, except those covered the SC said that marriage is not an adventure. It is a lifetime commitment.
preceding Chapter; The ground for denial.
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not failing under CHI MING TSOI CASE
Article 41; The Court declared the husband to be psychologically incapacitated
(5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as due to that refusal to have the marriage consummated. There was no
to the identity of the other; basis for his refusal to have the marriage consummated despite the
different suggestions made by the wife. According to the court, one of
Actually, this mistake to the identity under the Civil Code is merely a the essential marital obligations of marriage is procreation and an
ground for annulment. I came across that BQ. The question is that a ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. So for 8 months the wife waited
marriage is solemnized under the Civil Code and the ground for waited waited until she got tired of waiting. Although there was this
annulment is that mistake in the identity of the party. However the mention of the husband that it was the wife who has suffered pain
Family Code took over and since her action to file the action an whenever they try to have sexual intercourse.
annulment has already prescribed, the lawyer advised her to file a
petition under the Family Code for declaration for the nullity. Answer is MOLINA CASE
that there is already ratification since they have already lived together Anyway comes now the popular MOLINA guidelines where the Court
and cannot now avail of remedy under the Family Code. now enumerated what are those guidelines in order for one’s petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 shall prosper.
(6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.
There are several guidelines laid down by the court. One of which is
Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53 due to the that the psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically
non-compliance with Article 52 of the FC in the event of termination of identified by the psychiatrist or the doctor.
the marriage or declaration of nullity. There is a requirement that for
By the way in the case of Molina, here the SC enumerated all what are
void marriages, before a party may contract a subsequent marriage,
those considered as essential marital obligations of marriage. Aside
there must first be compliance with Art. 52.
from Article 68, we have Article 69 of the fixing of the family domicile.
In case of disagreement the court shall decide. Then we have 70 and 71,
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
Article 70 on the obligation of both spouses to support the family and
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
Article 71 on management of the household. Again BOTH spouses.
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
Then we have Article 220 – rights and obligations of the parents
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
toward their children. Article 221 refers to the obligation of the parents
This is borrowed from Canon 1095 of the Catholic Church and this is to pay the civil liability of children even up to the age of 21 for as long
merely a ground for annulment under the Canon Law. But the Family as living in their company and under their parental authority. I am
Code says that it is a ground for declaration of nullity. emphasizing this because of Article 236 of emancipation. Remember
that this has already been amended by RA 6809 in lowering the age of
There were at the time that the Code Commission included Article 36 as majority. So 221 is one of the essential marital obligations of marriage.
a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage, the Code Commission
refused to give any specific example of what constitutes psychological Article 225 – the parents being the guardian over the person of the
incapacity. property of the unemancipated child. All of these were enumerated by
the SC in this case.
Take note however that Canon 1095 includes grave lack of discretion.
Under our Family Code, we only recognize psychological incapacity. In MARCOS VS. MARCOS
relation to that is the case of Najera vs. Najera. Comes the case of MARCOS V. MARCOS because in this case there is
already the relaxation of the requirement of medical or clinical
SANTOS V. CA examination. The court here now said that if the totality of the evidence
Here, the SC enumerated what are the characteristics that must be would be sufficient to a warrant a finding of the spouse is indeed
complied with in order for the spouse to be considered as psychologically incapacitated then there is no need for the
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital respondent’s spouse to be medically or clinically examined.
obligations of marriage.
Subsequent to that there were several cases the court cannot decide
 The first is, according to the court, characteristic is gravity. The whether it must be medically or clinically examined or may be. It now
party must be incapable of carrying out the duties required in would depend the mind of the court because of the saying must, may
marriage and these duties are found in Articles 68, 69, 70, 71, 220, and yet in the case of:
221 and 225 of the Family Code.
 The second characteristic is juridical antecedence. It must be DEDEL CASE
rooted in the history of the spouse who is alleged to be There was this presentation of the psychologist on the part of the
psychologically incapacitated although his overt manifestation petitioner where the psychologist testified that Sharon is
emerged only after the celebration of the marriage. psychologically incapacitated suffering from dependent personality
disorder as shown by her sexual infidelity, her acts of leaving the
 And third is incurability or even if it were to be beyond the family, cohabiting with the lover, returning after. There was this Anti-
means of the spouse who is alleged to be psychologically Personality Disorder on the part of the wife and this was testified to by
incapacitated. the psychiatrist. In fact it was also shown that Sharon had been
confined but all of these were not taken by the court, were not
It is also in this case that the SC defined what constitutes psychological appreciated by the Court because according to the Court, it was not
incapacity. So it says now that it should refer to no less than a mental shown by the petitioner that all of these were rooted in the history of
not physical incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the Sharon. So juridical antecedence is wanting.
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage. The cases of TENEBRO and JARILLO, the same decision rendered by
the Court.
That is how it is defined by the SC in this case. And if you look at it the
Court denied the petition of Mr. Santos. The grounds cited by Mr. TENEBRO CASE
Santos is the inability of the wife to comply with Article 68 – The Where they contracted 2 marriages then was sued for bigamy by the
obligation of the husband and the wife to observe mutual love, respect second wife. Filed a petition for declaration of nullity under Article 36,
and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. was granted. He now moved for the dismissal of the criminal charge
claiming that he could no longer be held liable for bigamy because it
If you remember further he went to the United States to look for the retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage.
wife because the wife went to the USA to work as a nurse and was
unable to find her. So when he returned he filed this petition. But the CASE OF JARILLO
SC denied because the characteristics were not present. Moreover, the The woman entered into 2 marriages. Again there was this declaration
of nullity of the first marriage while the criminal case was still pending.
But the decision of the Court in Tenebro was merely reiterated in the

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case of Jarillo. The fact that the marriage has been declared void by the wala ka namang pera. Hiwalay na tayo! That’s how it was so they
Court is of no moment as far as the penal laws are concerned. separated. Later, Edward now filed this petition of declaration of
Moreover, even if the marriage is declared void under Article 36, these nullity of marriage claiming that he is psychologically incapacitated to
are without legal consequences. And one of the consequences is the fact comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage. He said, I
that under Article 54 of the FC, children born out of void marriages want to be a pastor. I really do not want to get married. I just want to
under Article 36 are legitimate. be a pastor. He presented the psychiatrist and the psychiatrist found
him to be suffering from dependent personality disorder. Likewise,
REPUBLIC VS. JAMANO Rowena was also considered to be psychologically incapacitated, Anti-
Can there be relaxation of the rules in Molina simply because the Social Personality Disorder and Narcissistic Personality Disorder.
respondent spouse is a foreigner? SC said that regardless of the
nationality of the respondent, you must still comply with the Molina When does one considered to be suffering from the kind of disorder
guidelines and those rules laid down in Santos case. that Edward is suffering? According to the court, he would do
demeaning jobs merely to get the approval of the other person. He
ANTONIO VS. REYES would do acts that he really does not like but he has to do it because he
Different is the case of Antonio vs. Reyes, where the wife is a wants to get the approval of the person and also he cannot decide on
pathological liar. Here the court again enumerated the Molina his own. You see how weak he is. He is so immature. In the case of
guidelines. Moreover, part of the evidence submitted by the husband Rowena, she has no *** in saying that sige patayin ka ng uncle ko. She
was the decree of annulment during the pendency of the appeal issued has no remorse whatsoever. She is merely self-centered. She is so
by the Church. Take note that in case of Najera vs. Najera, interested in herself. According to the court, both are psychologically
incapacitated.
NAJERA V. NAJERA Thus, the case of:
In this case, the wife presented also as proof that her marriage had
been already annulled by the court but the court did not appreciate HALILI V. HALILI
that annulment that was granted by the Catholic Church. The reason is The motion for reconsideration was filed by Lester. This time, the court
that the annulment is not based on psychological incapacity rather granted the petition. It reversed its earlier denial because according to
there is grave lack of discretion. The court said that there can be no the court, Lester is suffering from dependent personality disorder. All
basis in granting the petition because the decision of the National his life he never received any affirmation from the father. The father is
Matrimonial Tribunal was not one where the husband is declared to be so domineering. That is why he grew up without any self-confidence.
psychologically incapacitated but merely lacks that discretion of Very immature and not truly understanding what it meant to be a
judgment husband and what it meant to have a family life.

In Ferraris, the testimonies here were considered self –serving. TING V. TING
Was there now an abandonment of the Molina guidelines? According to
FERRARIS the court, NO, there is merely a relaxation of the Molina guidelines.
But at first the court denied the petition because the testimony of the Because in the case of Te v. Te, the court said that the Molina guidelines
psychologist, Dr. Dayan were all given by Ferraris. So hearsay have become a straitjacket that we really have to decide the case based
according to the court. There is no basis to declare the husband on the guidelines when the real purpose of the declaration of nullity
psychologically incapacitated. under Article 36 is merely to give a decent burial on a marriage that is
really dead at the time of the celebration. According to the court, we
PARAS V. PARAS must approach a petition on a case to case basis rather than
The issue here is at first the husband was suspended by the court from immediately use the Molina guidelines. In the case of Ting v. Ting, the
the practice of law through the petition filed by the wife. May factual SC said there was no abandonment. There is merely a relaxation of the
findings in a disbarment case be considered conclusive the petition for Molina guidelines.
declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 because of
Another case where the SC granted a petition is the case of:
immorality and abandonment. But according to the court one’s
unfitness to be a member of the legal profession does not mean that he MARIETTA C. AZCUETA v. REPUBLIC
is unfit to be a husband. That is the ruling of the court. And moreover, GR. No. 180668 (May 26, 2009)
you have to prove that through the Molina guidelines. Compliance with Mahirap yung mga whirlwind romance noh? Yung kay Rowena at
the Molina guidelines must be complied with. Edward 6 months, dito 2 months lang. They got married. The husband
has no work. The wife was working.
HALILI CASE
In the initial case of Halili (there are two cases filed in Halili v. Halili). The husband has no work and the wife is working. The wife told the
The first was denied by the court because Lester was not able to prove husband, why won’t you find a work? The husband said, “wala akong
that he is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential sapatos at damit”. So the wife provided it. Then the husband claimed
marital obligations of marriage. But he filed a motion for that he already has a work. So the couple were happy and everyday he
reconsideration after the court rendered a decision in Te v. Te. would leave the house to “work”. One day a neighbor approached the
wife and told her that she would often see the husband at her mother-
TE vs. TE in- law’s house everyday. She confronted the husband. The husband
Si Rowena and Edward. It was the woman who suugested to Edward cried and said, “ikaw kasi you always nag me to find a work. So I
“let’s elope”. That was after 3 months. Sabi ng lalaki ayoko. “Basta let’s pretended that I have a work. I get the money as salary from
elope”. Then they eloped. They went to Cebu. They have P80,000. mommy.”
Because they weren’t able to find a job, they returned to Manila and
The wife also complained of very unsatisfactory sexual life, which
they went separate ways. Edward went to his parents’ home while
according to the wife was only done once a month. According to the
Rowena went to his uncle’s house. But despite that, Rowena would be
husband, “No! Sex is sacred. We should not enjoy it!” Thus, the wife
calling Edward. Kapag hindi ka pumunta ditto magpakamatay ako. I
filed for a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage based on Art.
will commit suicide. Edward went to the uncle’s house.
36.
Eventually, they got married. Only to find out that he became a
Here, the husband was suffering from Dependent Personality Disorder.
prisoner of that house. He was not allowed to leave the house. He was
The reason is because all throughout his growing years, the father of
not allowed to call his parents and relatives. Moreover, the uncle said,
the husband was always absent because the father was a seaman. It
“I have this collection of guns.  That if you will leave the house, I will
was the mother who is always there. Thus, his dependency on his
use one of those guns.” Takot siya. In one of those occasions, he was
mother was rooted from childhood up to the time he had entered this
able to call the house. The mother said umuwi ka sa bahay. Sabi naman
marriage with Marieta.
niya kay Rowena, “Sabi ng kapatid ko, uwi raw tayo sa bahay.” “Ay
hindi! You go to your house, ask from your father your share in the The Court said that “his inhibitions in a sexual relationship, is
inheritance”. So uwi naman siya sa bahay. “Daddy, can I have my share preferable to an unconscious guilt feelings of defying the mother’s love.
in the inheritance?” NO! Otherwise I will disinherit you! Punta naman He has difficulty in delineating between the wife and the mother, so
siya kay Rowena. Ayaw ni Daddy, baka i-disinherit ako. Rowena said,

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that his continuous relationship with his wife produces considerable spouse. (82)
anxiety, which he is unable to handle, and crippled him psychologically.
Take note of No. 9 on intention to marry the other, killed that other
person's spouse, or his or her own spouse. What is required? Court
But the most recent decision is involving the case of: holding in the decision that the killing is motivated with the intention
of marrying the other spouse whether said finding may be in a criminal
KALAW v. FERNANDEZ case or a civil action. Absence of that declaration in the decision, then
GR# 166357 the presumption is that the marriage is valid.
January 14, 2015 (745 S 512)
When will it arise in the civil action? Remember that a declaration of
This is a motion for reconsideration because the first case was filed by nullity of marriage, it involves the husband and the wife but what if you
the husband but the court denied the petition. According to the Court, are an heir? In Bayadog case, you can raise that as a ground to declare
the fact that the wife here is a fashion model, she is constantly going to the marriage void because you will be affected. Suppose the marriage is
the parlor and plays mahjong, commits acts of adultery and goes out declared void? May the mother in law and son in law marry? Valid. The
with friends or playing mahjong at the house of her relatives or that of tie is already broken by the declaration of nullity.
the husband, she brings the children with her. So the children is not
actually being neglected because there are also yayas who will provide Let’s go to Art. 40, the need to have the prior marriage declared void.
them food and attend to their needs. This, the Court denied the first
petition that she can be considered psychological incapacitated. The Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
totally of evidence falls to the opposite direction that she is purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring
incapacitated. So the husband filed for a motion for reconsideration. such previous marriage void.

Both parties presented their respective psychologists. The husband


presented his psychologist and a canon law lawyer who is the advocate In a case of Brilliantes, it is held that Art. 40 is a mere rule of procedure
before the national matrimonial tribunal. The testimony of the and thus can be given retroactive effect. Purpose of such declaration is
psychologist must not be taken in isolation. All three testimonies must merely to remove that cloud of doubt as to the nature or status of the
be taken into account. The testimony of the psychologist of the wife subsequent marriage.
said that Elena (wife) is suffering from narcissistic personality disorder
and antisocial personality disorder. So this was of course affirmed by Take note that the word solely does not apply to remarriage because
Fr. Hili, the canon lawyer. this can also be applied for purposes other than remarriage. (Domingo
vs. CA)
So the SC reversed its first decision that the wife is not psychologically
incapacitated. Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a
REPUBLIC VS. ROMERO II previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration
In the case of Republic vs. Romero II, Romero claimed that he is of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four
suffering from Obsessive Compulsive Personality Disorder, the Court consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that
denied the petition on the ground of absence of juridical antecedence. the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where
It was not properly explained by the psychologist why Romero is there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the
suffering from OCPD simply because he is more focused in his work provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years
and in helping his family rather than spending time with his wife and shall be sufficient.
his child.
Article 41 is the exception whereby even if the party to the subsequent
CASTILLO VS. REPUBLIC marriage has a prior subsisting marriage that was celebrated (?) before
Then Castillo vs. Republic, there is again denial. The SC went back to death and annulment of declaration of nullity get (?), the said spouse
the Santos on characteristics, Molina guidelines and no independent cannot be held liable for bigamy.
witnesses. Dela Fuente vs. Dela Fuente, granted by the Court, the
husband suffered from Paranoid Personality Disorder where it all But in order for him/her to be free from the liability, these four (4)
started during his teenage years and it was proven that he acquired it requisites must be complied with:
from his parents. Republic vs. Javier, partially granted because the 1. 4 years consecutive absence of one of the spouses or 2 years
husband claimed that both of them are suffering from narcissistic if there is danger of death at the time of the disappearance, as
personality disorders. defined by Article 391 of the Civil Code;
2. Well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead;
We now go to INCESTOUS MARRIAGES. 3. Filing of petition in a summary proceeding for declaration of
presumptive death; and
Art. 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from
4. Solely for the purpose of remarriage.
the beginning, whether relationship between the parties be legitimate or
illegitimate:
In ESTRELLITA TADEO-MATIAS VS. REPUBLIC (G.R. No. 230751, April
(1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and
25, 2018), the Supreme Court denied the petition because while the
(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half
husband disappeared in 1979, the petition was filed and this was
blood
decided only this year. The Court denied the petition because it is not
Void for being AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY. one intended for remarriage. It was intended to claim the benefits as the
spouse of the husband who is a member of the Philippine Constabulary
Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for who disappeared in 1979. The Supreme Court said that Article 41 does
reasons of public policy: not apply. We will discuss later that there is no need actually for
(1) Between collateral blood relatives whether legitimate or declaration of presumptive death under Articles 390 and 391. So, this is
illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree; solely for the purpose of remarriage and not for any other purpose. If
(2) Between step-parents and step-children; there is non-compliance of the four (4) requisites, then this cannot be
(3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law; availed of the spouse present.
(4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the The Supreme Court in REPUBLIC VS. VILLANUEVA (G.R. No. 210929,
adopted child; July 29, 2015), the requirement on well-founded belief is strictly
(6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the enforced by the Supreme Court because if not, it will just be very easy to
adopter; agree that one of them will disappear and subsequently the spouse
(7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the present files a petition so that’s easier than Article 36, isn’t it? So there
adopter; must be that strict compliance of well-founded belief that the absentee
(8) Between adopted children of the same adopter; and spouse is already dead.
(9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the
other, killed that other person's spouse, or his or her own What is that well-founded belief? It must be one that is considered to
be active search, not merely a passive one. And in fact, it is one of the

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reasons why many petitions for declaration of presumptive death will owners of a radio station. He could have requested the parents to make
be denied by the Supreme Court. While they would testify that they have the necessary announcements.
required from their relatives and friends and in the case of Villanueva, In the case of SSS VS. VDA DE BAILON (G.R. No. 165545, March 24,
even went as far as the birthplace of her alleged husband, there was no 2006), there was no necessity on the part of the husband to obtain a
active search and it was merely a passive search. There was failure on decree of presumptive death after 13 years of the disappearance of his
the part of the petitioner to present all those whom alleged to have wife, Alice P. Diaz. Despite that, the husband obtained a decree of
knowledge of the whereabouts of the absentee spouse. presumptive death. When the husband died, SSS denied the claim of
benefits by the second wife claiming that the decree of presumptive
Moreover, in one of the cases, the Supreme Court ruled that there must death obtained by the deceased is void because according to Alice, she
be effort on the part of the spouse present. In the case of REPUBLIC VS. really did not disappear. The reason why she left the conjugal home was
CANTOR (?), the Supreme Court denied the petition because the mere due to the fact that the husband was a philanderer and all the time, he
act of going to the hospital and inquiring to the hospital persons is not was aware that she was only staying with her mother near the place
sufficient. It must be an active search and well-founded belief that there where the husband is residing with his second wife.
was early death on the part of the absentee spouse.
The Supreme Court said that it is the execution of the affidavit of
The first case that was decided involving Article 41 was the case of reappearance that would automatically terminate the subsequent
REPUBLIC VS. NOLASCO (G.R. No. 94053, March 17, 1993). The Court marriage. The mere act of appearing even with the knowledge of the
denied the petition because the requisites were not complied with by spouse of the subsequent marriage will not terminate the subsequent
the petitioner. He did not go to the proper authorities. Remember, the marriage. There must be that execution of affidavit of reappearance
wife is a foreigner and instead of going to the proper authorities, he under Article 42 that further requires that the affidavit of reappearance
went back to England but not on the place where the wife is alleged to not necessarily executed by the re-appearing (?) spouse but by any
be residing. It was miles away from the place where his wife is said to be interested parties (e.g. heirs of the first marriage). This affidavit of
a resident. __ He cannot present to the court this return order. There was reappearance must be furnished to the Local Civil Registrar of the place
no active search on the part of Nolasco and there was also a failure on where the subsequent marriage was solemnized and to the parties of
his part to report the incident to the proper authorities. He could have the subsequent marriage. That’s Article 42. Without that positive act of
gone to the embassy, ‘di ba? execution of affidavit of reappearance, there is no termination of the
subsequent marriage. But according to the Court, the marriage here was
The case of CALISTERIO VS. CALISTERIO (G.R. No. 136467, April 6, terminated by the death of the husband and Alice is still presumed dead
2000) is different because according to the Supreme Court, the husband here so the subsequent marriage is deemed to be the valid one.
of the first marriage disappeared under the Old Civil Code. Then, she
contracted another marriage under the Civil Code. When she died, the Art. 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article
heirs claimed that the subsequent marriage is void due to the absence of shall be automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of
declaration of presumptive death. The Supreme Court said that under reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling
the Civil Code, there is no need to obtain a decree of presumptive death. the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio.
What is applied under the provisions of the Civil Code is Article 390. A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall
That the person had disappeared for 7 consecutive years is presumed be recorded in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the
dead for all purposes, except for succession, unless he disappeared at subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested person, with due
the age of 75 then 5 years absence shall be sufficient. notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice
to the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or is disputed.
not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes,
except for those of succession. VALDEZ VS. REPUBLIC (G.R. No. 180863, September 8, 2009) is
actually a reiteration of the earlier ruling in CALISTERIO VS.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his CALISTERIO because both marriages were solemnized under the Civil
succession till after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the Code. The subsequent marriage was in 1985. So, there was no need for
age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in the wife to go to the court and take a decree of presumptive death. It is
order that his succession may be opened. the law itself that provides for the presumption for as long as the 7-year
period has been met or even shorter if he is considered to be dead and
In fact, even shorter than the 7-year period if the spouse present believed to be so by the spouse present.
considered him to be dead and believed to be so. That is the only
requirement under the Civil Code. This is not the same under the Family In the case of SANTOS VS. SANTOS (G.R. No. 187061, October 8, 2014),
Code because there are certain enumerated requirements that have to Celerina was considered presumptively dead by her husband. Then, she
be complied. learned of the order of the court a year after the decision. What she filed
was not an affidavit of reappearance but a petition or annulment of
In the case of MANUEL VS. PEOPLE (G.R. No. 165842, November 29, judgment on the ground of extrinsic fraud. This was denied because
2005), the wife disappeared in 1975. 17 years later, he contracted according to the lower court, what she should have done was only to
another marriage. Unfortunately, he left his second wife. The second execute an affidavit of reappearance. But according to Celerina: “No. If I
wife went to the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio and made an execute an affidavit of reappearance, then the effects under Article 43
investigation of the records of her husband. She found out that he was shall take place. But if based on annulment of judgment, then the
previously married to one Rubylus Gaa. So, he was sued for bigamy by marriage is void from the very beginning. Thus, if we follow Article 43,
the second wife. The defense of the husband is that there is no need for there is no conjugal or absolute community property to speak of. The
the declaration of presumptive death because Article 390 of the Civil children born out of the subsequent marriage are illegitimate which is
Code itself that provides for the presumption of death. This is also the contrary to Article 43.” The Supreme Court sided with the petitioner
opinion of Pineda. Celerina. The proper remedy is not the execution of affidavit of
reappearance but annulment of judgment by reason of extrinsic fraud.
But the Supreme Court said, NO. The best evidence that you contracted a She was deprived of her day in court and was not able to participate.
subsequent marriage in good faith is the decree of presumptive death. Thus, there was basis for the annulment of judgment.
The subsequent marriage here was contracted when the Family Code
was already effective. In the cases of REPUBLIC VS. VILLANUEVA and REPUBLIC VS.
SARENOGAN, JR., the Court denied the petition because there was no
In the case of REPUBLIC VS. CA AND ALLEGRO (G.R. No. 159614, active search. The mere act of inquiring from the relatives and friends is
December 9, 2005), likewise, the Supreme Court denied the petition. insufficient to prove that there was an active search that was conducted
While the husband went to Manila to look for his wife. How? Sa mall? by the spouse present.
Driving a taxi? While he inquired on the best friend of the wife, he never
presented such witness during the trial. Moreover, the reporting to the In Cantos (?), three (3) days after the celebration of the marriage, her
proper authorities was made belatedly. According to the court, the husband left for Jolo, Sulu because he was a member of the Armed
reporting to the appropriate authority was a mere afterthought. So, Forces of the Philippines (AFP) but never bothered to come back in
there was no well-founded belief. Moreover, the parents in law were 1975. Under the Family Code, she filed this petition for declaration of

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presumptive death. Likewise, the Court denied the petition because she Xxx
could have gone to the AFP to inquire of the whereabouts of her Take note that under Article 45 (1), the following may file a petitioner
husband. There was no active search and absence of well-founded belief. for annulment: by a) the party whose parent or guardian did not give his
The same also in the case of Matubag (?). This was also denied by the or her consent, within five years after attaining the age of twenty-one, or
Supreme Court. No active search. It was merely a passive search on the b) by the parent or guardian or person having legal charge of the minor,
part of the petitioner. at any time before such party has reached the age of twenty-one. (Article
47 par. 1)
Article 43 speaks of the effects of the execution of affidavit reappearance
of absentee spouse. On the part of the parent who did not give parental consent, it’s less. So
any time before the said party has reached the age of 21. On the other
Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the hand, the party who did not obtain parental consent, within 5 years
preceding Article shall produce the following effects: after attaining the age of 21.
(1) The children of the subsequent marriage conceived prior to
its termination shall be considered legitimate; Can parental consent be given subsequently so it would cure the defect?
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal Can it be done? Of course not, isn’t it? Because ratification is personal to
partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and the party who has the right to institute the action (i.e. the husband or
liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in wife). It cannot be given by the parent.
bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community
property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited Art. 45.
in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the (2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party
children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or in after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as
default of children, the innocent spouse; husband and wife;
(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except
that if the donee contracted the marriage in bad faith, such
Second, unsoundness of mind. This one has no prescriptive period.
donations made to said donee are revoked by operation of
law;
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other Art. 45.
spouse who acted in bad faith as beneficiary in any insurance (3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless
policy, even if such designation be stipulated as irrevocable; such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts
and constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as
(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad husband and wife;
faith shall be disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse
by testate and intestate succession. Third, fraud. What constitutes fraud? It is the definition given under
Article 46. Take note that the grounds therein are exclusive. So those not
Take note that paragraphs 2, 3, 4, and 5 shall likewise apply to found there are deemed to be not included.
marriages that are declared annulled and void under Article 40. I’m
referring to the subsequent void marriage (not the first void marriage as Art. 46. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud
held in the case of BUENAVENTURA VS. CA) due to the absence of referred to in Number 3 of the preceding Article:
declaration of nullity of the previous void marriage. Note that Articles (1) Non-disclosure of a previous conviction by final judgment of
147 and 148 will not apply to the subsequent void marriage under the other party of a crime involving moral turpitude;
Article 40 because of Article 50. So you should be able to harmonize (2) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the
that. marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband;
Let’s go back to the effects of execution of affidavit of reappearance in
accordance with Article 42. It is the fact of concealment of pregnancy; it is not the fact of
concealment as to who is the author of the pregnancy.
No. 2 - The share of the net profits of the community property is defined
by Article 102 (4) of the Family Code. That is the net profit which shall Art. 46.
be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the (3) Concealment of sexually transmissible disease, regardless of
children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or in default of its nature, existing at the time of the marriage; or
children, the innocent spouse. That’s the forfeiture;
Concealment of sexually transmissible disease is also a ground for
No. 3 – Revocations of donations by reason of marriage if the donee is annulment but the difference is that here, it is regardless of its nature. In
the guilty party by operation of law. Take note that in Article 86, it says Article 45 (6), the STD is found to be serious and appears to be
“may be revoked”. Here, it is revocation by operation of law. incurable.

Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, Art. 46.
said marriage shall be void ab initio and all donations by reason of (4) Concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism or
marriage and testamentary dispositions made by one in favor of the homosexuality or lesbianism existing at the time of the
other are revoked by operation of law. marriage.

We go now to the grounds for annulment of marriage under Article 45. This was applied by the Supreme Court in the case of Almelor vs. RTC of
First would be the absence of parental consent for parties between the Las Pinas City and Leonida Almelor (G.R. No. 179620, August 26, 2008).
ages of 18 and 21. Since this is merely voidable, it can be ratified by free Here the wife filed for a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
cohabitation. under Article 36. During the trial, the wife testified that the husband is a
homosexual as proven by the fact that she caught him using.. there was
Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, this magazines with all boys… The trial court, instead of deciding on the
existing at the time of the marriage: merits based on the petition on the ground of psychological incapacity,
annulled the marriage on the ground of homosexuality of the husband.
(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the The Supreme Court said, NO. The ground should be concealment of
marriage annulled was eighteen years of age or over but homosexuality in relation to Article 45 (4) and not homosexuality per se.
below twenty-one, and the marriage was solemnized without Homosexuality per se is not a ground for annulment.
the consent of the parents, guardian or person having
substitute parental authority over the party, in that order, The prescriptive period for No. 3 is 5 years after the discovery of the
unless after attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely fraud (Article 47 (3)).
cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband
and wife;

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Article 43 and by Article 44 shall also apply in the proper cases to


marriages which are declared ab initio or annulled by final judgment
Fourth, consent was vitiated. under Articles 40 and 45.

Art. 45. The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation,
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody
intimidation or undue influence, unless the same having and support of the common children, and the delivery of third
disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in
with the other as husband and wife; previous judicial proceedings.

The prescriptive period is 5 years counted from the time the force, All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the
intimidation or undue influence disappeared or ceased (Article 47 (4)). conjugal partnership shall be notified of the proceedings for liquidation.
Fifth, physical incapacity to consummate the marriage whether it is In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated,
impotency on the part of the man or fragility (?) on the part of the shall be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Articles 102
woman. and 129.

Art. 45. In Article 40, there are 2 void marriages: the first marriage is void
(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating because of the absence of the formal or essential requisites of marriage
the marriage with the other, and such incapacity continues and this marriage was not declared void by a court. Subsequently, the
and appears to be incurable; parties to this void marriage contracted another marriage. So, this
subsequent marriage shall likewise be void. *reads first paragraph of
In relation to this is the Doctrine of Triennial Cohabitation – the Article 50* So that void marriage mentioned in Article 50 refers to the
presumption that the husband is impotent if after 3 years the wife is still second or subsequent void marriage in Article 40. In short, the void
a virgin. But in the case of Chi Ming Tsoi, 8 months… marriage in Article 40, the property regime is not governed by Articles
147 and 148. It is governed by an absolute community or conjugal
The impotency must be absolute, hindi yung relative impotency.. partnership when it comes to the distribution, liquidation, or partition
regardless of who the person is. There is also this particular disorder of the properties acquired during the marriage. This also applies in
among women which may be considered as a ground for annulment: Article 45.
Vaginismus. It is an incurable disorder on the part of the wife that
renders sexual intercourse very painful. Impossible to have a sexual
intercourse. The prescriptive period is 5 years after the celebration of July 20, 2018
the marriage. Candolita | Resurreccion

Sixth, this refers to serious STD. In relation to the effects of annulment of marriage as well as the
subsequent void marriage under article 40. There are 2 void marriages,
the first is marriage is void and was not declared by the court and one of
Art. 45.
the parties contracted a subsequent marriage that is also void. However,
(6) That either party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible
in the event of the termination of the subsequent void marriage, the
disease found to be serious and appears to be incurable.
properties that they acquired during void marriage cannot be governed
by Articles 147 and 148, but rather governed by Article 43, paragraphs
The prescriptive period is 5 years after the celebration of the marriage 2, 3, 4 and 5.
also.
So, I’ve already discussed also Articles 46 and 47. Take note that: “No
Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the
other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune
preceding Article shall produce the following effects:
or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for
the annulment of marriage.” (Article 46, last paragraph) The
(1) The children of the subsequent marriage conceived prior to
enumeration under Article 46, with regard to fraud, is exclusive.
its termination shall be considered legitimate;
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal
Article 48 speaks of the requirements of a prosecuting attorney.
partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and
liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in
Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community
marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited
assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the
collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or in
fabricated or suppressed. default of children, the innocent spouse;
(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall that if the donee contracted the marriage in bad faith, such
be based upon a stipulation of facts or confession of judgment donations made to said donee are revoked by operation of
law;
The purpose why the State should be represented is for the protection (4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other
of the marriage as an inviolable institution. This was applied in the case spouse who acted in bad faith as beneficiary in any insurance
of ANCHETA VS. ANCHETA (G.R. No. 145370, March 4, 2004). The policy, even if such designation be stipulated as irrevocable;
husband and the wife were separated in fact and they went to court and and
had their conjugal partnership property judicially separated. The wife (5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad
informed the husband that she will be using Munting Paraiso as her faith shall be disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse
residence. When the husband filed a petition for declaration of nullity of by testate and intestate succession. (n)
marriage, the summons and complaint were sent to the former address
of the wife. So there was failure on the part of the wife to answer. He Summary:
now declared to move the wife in default and further prayed that he
present evidence ex parte. This was all granted by the court. Then, the
LAW THAT WILL GOVERN THE FIRST VOID MARRIAGE
wife filed a petition for the annulment of judgment of the RTC. The
Supreme Court censured the trial court and the prosecuting attorney Governed by Article 147 Governed by Article 148
because under the Rules of Court, there can be no default on cases There is a void marriage but the Void marriage because they are
involving annulment, legal separation, etc. parties have no impediment to not capacitated to contract
marry each other. It was merely marriage:
Now, I will discuss Article 50 because this refers to the effects: void because:  Article 35(1) which is
 There was absence of the non-age;
Art. 50. The effects provided for by paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of
authority of the  Article 35(4) for

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solemnizing officer; bigamous or Supreme Court reversed and held that homosexuality per se is not a
 There was no marriage polygamous ground. It is the concealment of homosexuality.
license; marriages;
 Mistake as to the  Article 37; Manuel Almelor vs RTC of Las Piñas City & Leonida Trinidad
identity of one of the  Article 38;
contracting parties;  The first marriage FACTS:
 Those subsequent under Article 40 Manuel married Leonida in 1989. They are both medical practitioners.
marriages that are void depending on the They begot 3 children. 11 years later, Leonida sought to annul her
under Article 53; absence of marriage with Manuel claiming that Manuel is psychologically
 Article 53 due to impediment. incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. Leonida
noncompliance of testified that Manuel is a harsh disciplinarian and that his policy
Article 52 towards their children are often unconventional and was the cause of
 Article 36 their frequent fight. Manuel has an unreasonable way of imposing
discipline towards their children but is remarkably so gentle towards
Likewise also the application of Article 44, if both parties to subsequent his mom. He is more affectionate towards his mom and this is a factor
marriage are in bad faith or in the event of annulment of marriage, which is unreasonable for Leonida. Further, Leonida also testified that
because it says the effects provided by paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5 of article 43 Manuel is a homosexual as evidenced by his unusual closeness to his
and 44 shall also apply to proper marriages void ab initio or annulled by male companions and that he concealed his homosexuality from Leonida
final judgment under Article 40 and 45 and shall include the execution prior to their marriage. She once caught Manuel talking to a man
of property for the children as well as delivery of the children’s affectionately over the phone and she confirmed all her fear when she
presumptive legitimes which may consist of cash or property under saw Manuel kiss a man. The RTC ruled that their marriage is null and
Article 51. void not because of PI but rather due to fraud by reason of Manuel’s
concealment of his homosexuality (Art 45 of the FC). The CA affirmed
the RTC’s decision.
Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith,
said marriage shall be void ab initio and all donations by reason of
ISSUE:
marriage and testamentary dispositions made by one in favor of the
Whether or not the marriage between the two can be declared as null
other are revoked by operation of law. (n)
and void due to fraud by reason of Manuel’s concealment of his
homosexuality.
Art. 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all
common children, computed as of the date of the final judgment of the HELD:
trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property or sound securities, The SC emphasized that homosexuality per se is not a ground to nullify a
unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had marriage. It is the concealment of homosexuality that would. In the case
already provided for such matters. at bar however, it is not proven that Manuel is a homosexual. The lower
court should not have taken the public’s perception against Manuel’s
The children or their guardian or the trustee of their property may ask sexuality. His peculiarities must not be ruled by the lower court as an
for the enforcement of the judgment. indication of his homosexuality for those are not conclusive and are not
sufficient enough to prove so. Even granting that Manuel is indeed a
The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no homosexual, there was nothing in the complaint or anywhere in the case
way prejudice the ultimate successional rights of the children accruing was it alleged and proven that Manuel hid such sexuality from Leonida
upon the death of either of both of the parents; but the value of the and that Leonida’s consent had been vitiated by such.
properties already received under the decree of annulment or absolute
nullity shall be considered as advances on their legitime. (n)

If the marriage has been annulled or declared void, the parties, before TITLE II
they can contract another marriage validly, there must be compliance LEGAL SEPARATION
with the requirements of Article 52 as to liquidation, partition or
dissolution of the absolute community of property or conjugal In the case of ANCHETA VS ANCHETA. The interest of the state should
partnership of gains and the delivery of children’s presumptive always be represented by the fiscal under Article 48. The fiscal never
legitimes under Article 51 and the registration in the appropriate civil objected to ruling of the court that the wife be declared in default and
registry or registry of property. So have the judgment or decree of that he be allowed to present evidence ex parte.
nullity registered. Otherwise, if any of the parties contract a subsequent
marriage, Article 53 applies and the subsequent marriage shall be void. ANCHETA vs. ANCHETA 424 SCRA 725
The exception however is Article 54 as to status of children born out of
void marriages under Article 36 and 53. Under Article 54 they are Facts:
legitimate. Spouses Rodolfo and Marietta separated-in-fact but had their conjugal
partnership property dissolved judicially. One of the properties
Art. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the adjudicated in her favor was a resort named Munting Paraiso that is
marriage, the partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses now used as residence of Marietta and the children. Rodolfo intending to
and the delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes shall be remarry filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the
recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; ground of psychological incapacity of the wife docketed as Sp. Proc. NC-
otherwise, the same shall not affect third persons. (n) 662. Although Rodolfo knew that Marietta is residing at Munting Paraiso
he had the summons served at another address. For failure to file an
Art. 53. Either of the former spouses may marry again after compliance Answer Rodolfo had the respondent wife declared in default and was
with the requirements of the immediately preceding Article; otherwise, allowed to adduce evidence ex parte. After the grant of the petition,
the subsequent marriage shall be null and void. Rodolfo contracted another marriage with Teresita on February 14,
1998. Marietta then filed a petition for the annulment of the order of the
RTC of Cavite.
Art. 54. Children conceived or born before the judgment of annulment
or absolute nullity of the marriage under Article 36 has become final and Held:
executory shall be considered legitimate. Children conceived or born of The public prosecutor condoned the acts of the trial court when he
the subsequent marriage under Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate. interposed no objection to the motion of the respondent. The trial court
forthwith rendered judgment against Marietta without a whimper of
Read the Almelor case. It refers to a petition for declaration of nullity of protest from the public prosecutor. The actuations of the trial court and
marriage filed by the wife, and during the trial she testified that she the public prosecutor are in defiance of Article 48 of the Family Code
caught the husband kissing another male doctor and reading magazines which states that “In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute
meant for women. So the court, instead of deciding the petition based on nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or
the merits, it based its decision on psychological incapacity. The fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to

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prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is to appear to commit, or to be represented in court as having
not fabricated or suppressed.” They also ignored Rule 18, Section 6, committed, a matrimonial offense, or to suppress evidence of
1985 Rules of Court now Rule 9, Section 3 (e) of the 1997 Rules of Court a valid defense, for the purpose of enabling the other to
that “there is no default in actions for annulment of marriage or legal obtain a divorce. This agreement, if not express, may be
separation.” implied from the acts of the parties. It is a ground for denying
the divorce. (Griffiths vs. Griffiths, 69 N. J. Eq. 689 60 Atl.
The following are the 10 grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of 1099; Sandoz vs. Sandoz, 107 Ore. 282, 214 Pas. 590.).
the Family Code unlike the Civil Code where there is only adultery,
concubinage and attempt against life of petitioner. Those are only the In this case, there would be collusion if the parties had
grounds under the Civil Code. arranged to make it appear that a matrimonial offense had
been committed although it was not, or if the parties had
connived to bring about a legal separation even in the
TITLE II absence of grounds therefor. ---------------
Legal Separation
CONNIVANCE (http://www.lectlaw.com/def/c283.htm) An
Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the agreement or consent, indirectly given, that something
following grounds: unlawful shall be done by another. xxx Connivance must be
(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct the act of the mind before the offence has been committed,
directed against the petitioner, a common child, or a child of while condonation is the result of a determination to forgive
the petitioner; an injury which was not known until after it was inflicted.
(2) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner Connivance also differs from collusion. The former is
to change religious or political affiliation; generally collusion for a particular purpose, while the latter
(3) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a may exist without connivance.
common child, or a child of the petitioner, to engage in
prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement; Ma’am G: If the respondent constantly inflicts physical abuse on the
(4) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment child of the respondent, can the other spouse file a petition for legal
of more than six years, even if pardoned; separation? Of course not, because it is the child of the petitioner - a
(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent; common child or a child of the petitioner.
(6) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent;
(7) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous Article 57. An action for legal separation shall be filed within five years
marriage, whether in the Philippine or abroad; from the time of the occurrence of the cause. (102)
(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;
Maam G: This is now where adultery and concubinage Art. 57 – prescriptive period in instituting petition for legal separation
have fallen. Villafuerte vs villafuerte –psychological (94) 5 years from the occurrence of the cause. [Ma’am G: not discovery]
incapacity.
(9) Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner; Article 58. An action for legal separation shall in no case be tried before
or six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition. (103)
Maam G: This was asked in the bar but the question was
there was an attempt only on the life of the child of the The exception to that is when the grounds cited by the petitioner is any
petitioner. Pero di sya pwede kasi sa child. When you say of the grounds under Republic Act 9262. In such case, the court shall
“child’, it includes child by nature and by adoption. immediately hear the petition for legal separation. BUT, if based on
(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable Article 55, then the court enjoins to allow or give chance to the parties to
cause for more than one year. reconcile.

ART. 55 – LEGAL SEPARATION (94,97,102,106) - In cases of legal


Article 59. No legal separation may be decreed unless the Court has
separation, where violence (physical or sexual or psychological) is
taken steps toward the reconciliation of the spouses and is fully
alleged by the petitioner the mandatory 6-month cooling-off period
satisfied, despite such efforts, that reconciliation is highly
under Article 58 shall not apply [Section 19, RA 9262 or VAWC Law].
improbable. (n)
What are the grounds for the court to deny the petition for legal
separation?
Article 60. No decree of legal separation shall be based upon a
Article 56. The petition for legal separation shall be denied on any of stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment.
the following grounds:
In any case, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
(1) Where the aggrieved party has condoned the offense or act
assigned to it to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and
complained of;
to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
(2) condonation comes after the act
(3) Where the aggrieved party has consented to the commission Remember the very old case of OCAMPO VS FLORENCIANO? There was
of the offense or act complained of; a confession of judgment but the SC says evidence should be
(4) Where there is connivance between the parties in the independent of the admission. So once the petition for legal separation
commission of the offense or act constituting the ground for is filed, the spouses are entitled to live separately from each other
legal separation; immediately upon the filing. Marital vinculum is not severed. What
(5) Where both parties have given ground for legal separation; happens if the court grants the petition? The effects are found in Article
(6) Where there is collusion between the parties to obtain decree 63.
of legal separation; or
De Ocampo vs. Florenciano 107 Phil 35
(7) Where the action is barred by prescription. (100a)
FACTS: Jose de Ocampo and Serafina Florenciano were married in 1938.
When is there connivance? When is there collusion? Collusion is when They begot several children who are not living with plaintiff. In March
the parties make it appear that there is ground for legal separation 1951, latter discovered on several occasions that his wife was betraying
when in truth there is none. Connivance is when parties bring an action his trust by maintaining illicit relations with Jose Arcalas. Having found
for legal separation and mutually make it appear despite the absence of out, he sent the wife to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture
any legal ground. where she stayed for one year. Again plaintiff discovered that the wife
was going out with several other man other than Arcalas. In 1952, when
OCAMPO VS FLORENCIANO the wife finished her studies, she left plaintiff and since then they had
Collusion in divorce or legal separation means the agreement. lived separately. In June 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of
. . . between husband and wife for one of them to commit, or having illicit relations with Nelson Orzame. He signified his intention of

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filing a petition for legal separation to which defendant manifested common fund the fruits of their separate property and income from their
conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in a criminal work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage
action. Accordingly, Ocampo filed a petition for legal separation in 1955. or the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by
either spouse during the marriage.”
ISSUE: Whether the confession made by Florenciano constitutes the
confession of judgment disallowed by the Family Code. From the foregoing provision, each of the couple has his and her own
property and debts. The law does not intend to effect a mixture or
HELD: Florenciano’s admission to the investigating fiscal that she merger of those debts or properties between the spouses. Rather, it
committed adultery, in the existence of evidence of adultery other than establishes a complete separation of capitals. Article 129 of the Family
such confession, is not the confession of judgment disallowed by Article Code applies in the liquidation of the couple’s properties. What remains
48 of the Family Code. What is prohibited is a confession of judgment, a of the separate or exclusive properties of the husband and the wife shall
confession done in court or through a pleading. Where there is evidence be returned to each of them.
of the adultery independent of the defendant’s statement agreeing to the
legal separation, the decree of separation should be granted since it In the instant case, since it was already established by the trial court
would not be based on the confession but upon the evidence that the spouses have no separate properties, there is nothing to return
[independent of the statement] presented by the plaintiff. What the law to any of them.
prohibits is a judgment based exclusively on defendant’s confession. The
petition should be granted based on the second adultery, which has not On the issue of retroactivity of the Family Code affecting vested rights
yet prescribed. already acquired, the SC said “The concept of “vested right” is a
consequence of the constitutional guaranty of due process that
Article 63. The decree of legal separation shall have the following expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural
effects: justice is protected against arbitrary court action. While one may not be
deprived of his “vested right”, he may lose the same if there is due
The spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other, but the process and such deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence.”
marriage bonds shall not be severed;
What about donations made? The innocent spouse may or may not
The absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be dissolved revoke the donation by reason of marriage unlike in Article 45 and
and liquidated but the offending spouse shall have no right to any share Article 43 where it says revoked by operation of law. Here, it is the
of the net profits earned by the absolute community or the conjugal option of the innocent spouse. The innocent spouse is given 5 years and
partnership, which shall be forfeited in accordance with the provisions any encumbrance or alienation registered prior to the recording of the
of Article 43(2); complaint for revocation shall be respected.

The custody of the minor children shall be awarded to the innocent Article 64. After the finality of the decree of legal separation, the
spouse, subject to the provisions of Article 213 of this Code; and innocent spouse may revoke the donations made by him or by her in
favor of the offending spouse, as well as the designation of the latter as
No child below 7 yrs of age shall be separated from the mother beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such designation be
stipulated as irrevocable. The revocation of the donations shall be
The offending spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting from the recorded in the registries of property in the places where the properties
innocent spouse by intestate succession. Moreover, provisions in favor are located. Alienations, liens and encumbrances registered in good
of the offending spouse made in the will of the innocent spouse shall be faith before the recording of the complaint for revocation in the
revoked by operation of law. registries of property shall be respected. The revocation of or change in
the designation of the insurance beneficiary shall take effect upon
Is it a matter of right that the spouse is entitled to support under legal written notification thereof to the insured.
separation? No. It must be prayed for by the innocent spouse. It is only
the unemancipated children who have this as a matter of right. The action to revoke the donation under this Article must be brought
within five years from the time the decree of legal separation become
Forfeiture under Article 43 par. 2 that they are required to live final. (107a)
separately but there must be dissolution, liquidation of conjugal
partnership same as in Article 43 (2) which refers to the share only as Arts. 61 – 64 as to effects of legal separation, Ma’am G says: Just
defined by Article 102 par. 4. What constitutes profit? It’s the increase in remember that separation does not terminate the marriage, thus they
price in market value at the time of the celebration of the marriage and are still married to each other. Only that the law grants them the right to
the market value at the time of the dissolution of the marriage. live separately from each other. But there is also that requirement that
aside from allowing the spouse to live separately from each other from
BRIGIDO QUIAO v. RITA C. QUIAO bed and board, they are also required to liquidate their CPG or ACP with
675 S 642 (July 4, 2012) forfeiture in accordance with Article 43(2). And that would refer to the
forfeiture of the share in the net profits. On forfeiture of the guilty
Parties were legally separated on October 10, 2005 with Brigido’s share spouse’s share of the net profits (Article 63 [2])
of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership forfeited in favor of
the common children. Brigido wanted to clarify the meaning of “net What happens if the parties reconcile? It depends. If the petition for
profit earned” for purposes of effecting the forfeiture authorized under legal separation is still pending in court, it will be terminated in
Article 63 of the FC. whatever stage it may be. If there is already a decree of legal separation,
then that’s Article 66 (2). It shall be set aside. But the separation of
The other issues raised were: 1) Can Article 256 of the Family Code be property and any forfeiture of share of the guilty spouse shall subsist,
given retroactive effect for purposes of determining the net profits unless, they agree to revive the former property regime. But remember
without impairing vested rights already acquired under the Civil Code; this is not 100% revival because they have to agree what will be
and 2) what properties shall be included in the forfeiture of the share of contributed anew to the revived prop regime, and those not agreed
the guilty spouse? upon can be his/her separate property.

SC: The net profits of the conjugal partnership of gains are all the fruits Pana v Heirs of Jose Juanite, Sr. and Jose Juanite, Jr.
of the separate properties of the spouses and the products of their labor December 10, 2012
and industry. Article 102 (4) applies in the instant case for purposes
only of defining “net profit”. The provision applies to both the absolute ISSUE:
community regime and conjugal partnership as provided for under Whether or not the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melencia
Article 63, No. (2) of the Family Code relative to the provisions on Legal can be levied and executed upon for the satisfaction of Melencia’s civil
Separation. liability in the aforesaid murder case.

When a couple enters into a regime of conjugal partnership of gains SUPREME COURT:
under Article 142 of the Civil Code, “the husband and the wife place in YES, provided that the conditions under Article 121 of the Family Code

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have been covered. So now we go to the obligations between husband and wife.

First of all, the Supreme Court explained that it is clear from the facts
that Efren and Melencia were married when the Civil code was still the TITLE III
operative law on marriages. The presumption, absent any evidence to Rights and Obligations Between Husband and Wife
the contrary, is that they were married under the regime of conjugal
partnership of gains. Article 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe
mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and
Furthermore, Article 119 of the Civil Code provides that the future support. (109a)
spouses main in marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative
community or conjugal partnership of gains or upon a complete In the case of SOCHI VS GOZON. The issue was: What constitutes the
separation of property, or upon any other regime. The family code itself share that will be forfeited? Not the entire share but only the share in
provides in Article 76 that marriage settlements cannot be modified the net profit. In the Quaio vs Quiao case, the SC said because all the
except prior to marriage, and clearly, under this situation, the spouses property was acquired during the marriage, can the husband who is the
cannot modify their regime. Post marriage modification of settlements claiming party get any share? It was shown that no property was
can take place only where brought into the marriage celebrated under the Civil Code. So the court
a) the absolute community or conjugal partnership was said, husband forfeited the entire share, and the basis is the value of the
dissolved and liquidated upon a decree of legal separation; property at the time.
b) the spouses who were legally separated reconciled and
agreed to revive their former property regime; SIOCHI vs. GOZON 616 SCRA 87 March 18, 2010
c) judicial separation of property had been had on the ground
that a spouse abandons the other without just cause or fails Elvira obtained a decree of legal separation against her husband Alfredo.
to comply with his obligations to the family; The dispositive portion reads: “x x x x. Being the offending spouse,
d) there was judicial separation of property under article 135; respondent (husband) is deprived of his share in the net profits and the
e) the spouses jointly filed a petition for the voluntary same is awarded to their child Winifred R. Gozon whose custody is
dissolution of their absolute community or conjugal awarded to petitioner.”
partnership of gains. None of these circumstances exists in
this case. ISSUE: Does the forfeiture refer to the one-half undivided share of
Alfredo in the property?
Furthermore, Article 119 provides as well, that in the absence of
marriage settlements, or when the same is void, the system of relative Article 63 shall have the following effects:
community or conjugal partnership of gains established under the civil (1) x x x x x;
code shall govern the property regime of the spouses. the family code (2) The absolute community or conjugal partnership shall be
contains terms governing the conjugal partnership of gains that dissolved and liquidated but the offending spouse shall have
supersede the terms of the conjugal partnership of gains under the civil no right to any share of the net profits earned by the absolute
code. Article 105 of the family code states that the provisions of such community or the conjugal partnership, which shall be
chapter on the conjugal partnership of gains shall also apply to conjugal forfeited in accordance with the provisions of Article 42 (2);
partnerships of gains already established between spouses before the (3) Xxxxx.
affectivity of this code, without prejudice to vested rights already
acquired in accordance with the civil or other laws as provided in Article Article 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in
256. the preceding Article shall produce the following effects:

Article 66. The reconciliation referred to in the preceding Articles shall X x x x. 1. The absolute community of property or the conjugal
have the following consequences: partnership, as the case may be, x x x x x x his or her share of the net
(1) The legal separation proceedings, if still pending, shall profits of the community property or conjugal partnership property
thereby be terminated at whatever stage; and shall be forfeited in favor of their common children or, x x x x x;
(2) The final decree of legal separation shall be set aside, but the
separation of property and any forfeiture of the share of the Thus, among the effects of the decree of legal separation is that the
guilty spouse already effected shall subsist, unless the spouses conjugal partnership is dissolved and liquidated and the offending
agree to revive their former property regime. spouse would have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the
conjugal partnership. It is only Alfredo’s share in the net profits which is
The court's order containing the foregoing shall be recorded in the forfeited in favor of Winifred. Article 102 (4) of the FC provides that “for
proper civil registries purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance
with Article 43 (2) and 63, No. (2), the said profits shall be the increase
Article 66 (2) is in relation to Article 67. in value between the market value of the community property at the
time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time
Article 67. The agreement to revive the former property regime of its dissolution.”
referred to in the preceding Article shall be executed under oath and
shall specify: Clearly, what is forfeited in favor of Winifred is not Afredo’s share in the
conjugal partnership property but merely in the net profits of the
(1) The properties to be contributed anew to the restored conjugal partnership property.
regime;
(2) Those to be retained as separated properties of each spouse; Remember ILUSORIO VS BILDNER? Can he be compelled by a court
and order? No, because it is purely personal on the part of the spouse to live
(3) The names of all their known creditors, their addresses and with the other spouse. The only remedy is to deprive support. Of course
the amounts owing to each. the exception is when there is justifiable ground for one spouse not to
live together with the other spouse.
The agreement of revival and the motion for its approval shall be filed
with the court in the same proceeding for legal separation, with copies Ilusorio vs. Bildner 332 SCRA 169
of both furnished to the creditors named therein. After due hearing, the
court shall, in its order, take measure to protect the interest of creditors May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live
and such order shall be recorded in the proper registries of properties. with her in conjugal bliss?

The recording of the ordering in the registries of property shall not Facts: Erlinda and Potenciano were married for 30 years. In 1972, the
prejudice any creditor not listed or not notified, unless the debtor- spouse separated from bed and board. When Potenciano arrived from
spouse has sufficient separate properties to satisfy the creditor's claim. the States in 1991 he stayed with Erlinda. The children alleged that
Erlinda gave Potenciano an overdose of antidepressant drug. On May 31,
1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio City, Potenciano did

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not return to Antipolo City with Erlinda, but instead stayed with a obligation shall be charged to the exclusive property of the spouse who
daughter at Cleveland Condominium, Makati. The wife then filed a did not obtain consent.
petition for habeas corpus. Proper?

No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to TITLE IV


live with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ Property Relations Between Husband and Wife
of habeas corpus carried out by sheriff or by any other mesne process. CHAPTER 1
That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and General Provisions
woman’s free choice.
So we have:
In the event of disagreement, the court decides, not the husband. Art 69 1. System of Absolute Community
2nd paragraph provides for the exception. The exception to the 2. Conjugal Partnership of Gains
exception is in the last sentence --- if the same is not compatible with the 3. Complete Separation of Property of the Spouses
solidarity of the family
In the absence of a marriage settlement or if the pre-nuptial agreement
Article 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of is void, it will be the Family Code and the default under the Family Code
disagreement, the court shall decide. is absolute community of property, which is different from the Civil
Code, which is conjugal partnership of gains. We still have cases decided
The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the by the SC based on provisions of the Civil Code involving disposition and
latter should live abroad or there are other valid and compelling encumbrance of conjugal property and by local customs.
reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not apply
if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family. (110a) In order for marriage settlement to be valid there are 3 requisites as
well as for any modification thereof:
1. Must be excited before the celebration of marriage
Article 70. The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the 2. In writing
family. The expenses for such support and other conjugal obligations 3. Signed by parties
shall be paid from the community property and, in the absence thereof,
from the income or fruits of their separate properties. In case of
insufficiency or absence of said income or fruits, such obligations shall Article 74. The property relationship between husband and wife shall
be satisfied from the separate properties. (111a) be governed in the following order:
(1) By marriage settlements executed before the marriage;
(2) By the provisions of this Code; and
Ma’am G: Article 70 is the management of the household. And unlike (3) By the local custom. (118)
under CC where it is only the wife who manages the household, xxx the
husband could no longer complain that washing the dishes or doing the
laundry would be that solely of the wife’s duty because Article 70 is very Article 75. The future spouses may, in the marriage settlements, agree
explicit – JOINTLY xxx. Mutual obligation na. upon the regime of absolute community, conjugal partnership of gains,
complete separation of property, or any other regime. In the absence of
a marriage settlement, or when the regime agreed upon is void, the
Article 71. The management of the household shall be the right and the
system of absolute community of property as established in this Code
duty of both spouses. The expenses for such management shall be paid
in accordance with the provisions of Article 70. (115a) shall govern. (119a)

Article 72. When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties to the Article 76. In order that any modification in the marriage settlements
conjugal union or commits acts which tend to bring danger, dishonor or may be valid, it must be made before the celebration of the marriage,
subject to the provisions of Articles 66, 67, 128, 135 and 136. (121)
injury to the other or to the family, the aggrieved party may apply to the
court for relief. (116a)
Article 77. The marriage settlements and any modification thereof shall
Article 72 is an interim relief. Now, the injury mentioned, unlike in the be in writing, signed by the parties and executed before the celebration
Civil Code which limits it to economic injury, this also allows other of the marriage. They shall not prejudice third persons unless they are
forms of injury, like emotional, physical, or moral injury because Article registered in the local civil registry where the marriage contract is
72 does not particularly define what constitutes injury. recorded as well as in the proper registries of properties. (122a)

Article 73. Either spouse may exercise any legitimate profession, Not required that it be in a public instrument. The requirement that the
occupation, business or activity without the consent of the other. The sale shall be registerd with the appropriate registry of property is to
latter may object only on valid, serious, and moral grounds. affect third persons and not for validity. Recall Article 1358 --- What are
those agreements but must be in writing not for validity but for
In case of disagreement, the court shall decide whether or not: convenience?
(1) The objection is proper; and
(2) Benefit has occurred to the family prior to the objection or Art. 1358. The following must appear in a public document:
thereafter. If the benefit accrued prior to the objection, the (1) Acts and contracts which have for their object the creation,
resulting obligation shall be enforced against the separate transmission, modification or extinguishment of real rights
property of the spouse who has not obtained consent. over immovable property; sales of real property or of an
interest therein a governed by Articles 1403, No. 2, and 1405;
The foregoing provisions shall not prejudice the rights of creditors who (2) The cession, repudiation or renunciation of hereditary rights
acted in good faith. (117a) or of those of the conjugal partnership of gains;
(3) The power to administer property, or any other power which
This refers to rights of either spouse to exercise without need of has for its object an act appearing or which should appear in a
obtaining consent from the other spouse. In case of disagreement, court public document, or should prejudice a third person;
decides based on serious, valid, and moral grounds. If the husband (4) The cession of actions or rights proceeding from an act
objects and the objection is not based on serious valid or moral grounds, appearing in a public document.
the husband can be liable for violation of RA 9262 (VAWC Law).
So to recap: Art. 74, 75, 76, & 77 – property regime of future spouses,
So if the court finds that objection is proper and there are obligations requisites (92,95,105)
incurred by the spouse who did not obtain consent., and if benefit
redounded prior to the objection, any obligation shall be charged to the Property relations between husband and wife is governed in the
absolute community or conjugal partnership. But if the obligation was following order:
incurred after the objection was found to be proper, then, any  Marriage settlements which might either be the a. absolute
community property or b. conjugal partnership of gains or c.
complete separation of property;

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 By the provisions of this Code [Ma’am G: ACP or if the MS is CHAPTER 2


void then ACP governs]; and Donations By Reason Of Marriage
 By local customs.
What are those stipulations that do not depend upon the celebration of
Ma’am G: Likewise, any modification thereof must also be made before marriage? Acknowledgement of the child, promise to provide support.
the celebration of marriage. Any modification after or during the Those are examples.
marriage shall be void. Can you still remember the Doctrine of
Immutability of the Matrimonial Property Regime that regardless of the Article 82. Donations by reason of marriage are those which are made
change of the citizenship of the parties to the marriage, their original before its celebration, in consideration of the same, and in favor of one
property regime shall remain, the purpose of which is to ensure stability or both of the future spouses. (126)
of the marriage relationship. In contrast to that, is the Mutability of the
Law, where if the law itself changes the marital property regime, then What are the requisites for a valid donation propter nuptias?
the property regime (of the spouses) must likewise change accordingly.
Before the marriage, in consideration of marriage and in favor of one or
Article 78. A minor who according to law may contract marriage may both spouses. But what are the requisites that must be observed? Article
also execute his or her marriage settlements, but they shall be valid only 83 provides the requisites. Unlike that of the Civil Code where donations
if the persons designated in Article 14 to give consent to the marriage by reason of marriage pursuant to the decision of the court in the case of
are made parties to the agreement, subject to the provisions of Title IX VALENCIA VS LOQUIAO, the donation by reason of marriage was
of this Code. (120a) governed by Article 1403 par. 2 of the Civil Code which refers to the
Statute of Frauds made in consideration of marriage other than mutual
And the law requires that the guardian must be made a party to the promise to marry. But under the Family Code, it is already governed by
marriage settlement and he is an indispensable party. ordinary rules on donation which depend whether the property is
personal or real. If personal and more than 5k--- must be in writing ang
Article 79. For the validity of any marriage settlement executed by a acceptance. If real --- must be in a public instrument and acceptance
person upon whom a sentence of civil interdiction has been pronounced must be in writing.
or who is subject to any other disability, it shall be indispensable for the
guardian appointed by a competent court to be made a party thereto. Article 83. These donations are governed by the rules on ordinary
donations established in Title III of Book III of the Civil Code, insofar as
Ma’am G: What about a person who is sentenced to a penalty that they are not modified by the following articles.
carries with it civil interdiction? We all know that a civil interdictee is
considered to be civilly dead. But nonetheless, he is allowed to enter Article 84. If the future spouses agree upon a regime other than the
into a contract of marriage. And because he is allowed to enter into a absolute community of property, they cannot donate to each other in
contract of marriage, he is also allowed to enter into a marriage their marriage settlements more than one-fifth of their present
settlement. But the requirement of the law is that there must be a property. Any excess shall be considered void.
guardian that would represent the civil interdictee; and who appoints
the guardian? It is the court who will choose the guardian of the civil Donations of future property shall be governed by the provisions on
interdictee and further requires that it is indispensable that he must be testamentary succession and the formalities of wills. (130a)
named a party thereto.
Art. 84 – Limitation in cases of donation of present property (91)
We go to exceptions:
If the spouses agree upon a regime other than the absolute community
Article 80. In the absence of a contrary stipulation in a marriage property, they cannot donate to each other in their marriage settlement
settlement, the property relations of the spouses shall be governed by more than 1/5 of their present property. The excess is void. The law on
Philippine laws, regardless of the place of the celebration of the testamentary succession and the formalities of wills will govern
marriage and their residence. donations involving future property.

This rule shall not apply: Article 85. Donations by reason of marriage of property subject to
(1) Where both spouses are aliens; governed by national law encumbrances shall be valid. In case of foreclosure of the encumbrance
siola and the property is sold for less than the total amount of the obligation
(2) With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts affecting secured, the donee shall not be liable for the deficiency. If the property
property not situated in the Philippines and executed in the is sold for more than the total amount of said obligation, the donee shall
country where the property is located; and be entitled to the excess. (131a)
(3) With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts entered into
in the Philippines but affecting property situated in a foreign This is not found in the Civil Code, only in the Family Code. It is valid to
country whose laws require different formalities for its donate property that is encumbered, but in the event of non-payment of
extrinsic validity. (124a) the donor, the property is subject to foreclosure and any deficiency is
not the liability of the donee-spouses. If there is an excess, the done-
Maam G: This refers to Article 17 respecting the instrinsic validity of spouses are entitled to the excess.
contracts about property not situated in the Philippines and executed in
the country where the property is located. Paragraph 1, Article 16 of the
Article 86. A donation by reason of marriage may be revoked by the
Civil Code as to real property, and personal propery naman ang #3.
donor in the following cases:
(1) If the marriage is not celebrated or judicially declared void ab
Ma’am G: What if the husband is a Filipino and the wife is a foreigner initio except donations made in the marriage settlements,
and they did not execute a marriage settlement? What law will govern? which shall be governed by Article 81;
The HUSBAND’S NATIONAL LAW. So it would be the ACP unless both (2) When the marriage takes place without the consent of the
are foreigners then follow Article 15 of the NCC. parents or guardian, as required by law;
(3) When the marriage is annulled, and the donee acted in bad
Article 81. Everything stipulated in the settlements or contracts faith;
referred to in the preceding articles in consideration of a future (4) Upon legal separation, the donee being the guilty spouse;
marriage, including donations between the prospective spouses made (5) If it is with a resolutory condition and the condition is
therein, shall be rendered void if the marriage does not take complied with;
place. However, stipulations that do not depend upon the celebration of (6) When the donee has committed an act of ingratitude as
the marriages shall be valid. (125a) specified by the provisions of the Civil Code on donations in
general. (132a)

Art. 86 – grounds for revocation of donations propter nuptias (96)

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Ma’am G: Now unlike that of Article 43(3) where donations by reason of


marriage, if it is the donee who is the guilty spouse, “IS REVOKED BY Now what if the marriage is declared void under Article 36? Can there
OPERATION OF LAW”, under Article 86, it is “MAY BE REVOKED.” be revocation? Because take note, in the case of BUENAVENTURA VS
CA, there can be no basis for the award of moral and exemplary
Now that provision on mandatory revocation of donation propter damages to the aggrieved spouse because there is no willfulness on the
nuptias under article 43(3) applies only when it is the spouse who is the act of the incapacitated spouse. It is an innate inability to comply with
donor but if it is a third person then we go to Article 86. If the donor is the essential marital obligations of marriage. So can there be
the innocent spouse then it is revoked by operation of law. There is no revocation? YES because it is separate and distinct from damages.
need for a revocation.
Take note of (2), there is no need for annulment of the marriage. This
(1) – “If the marriage is not celebrated or judicially declared void would refer to one of the parties to the marriage being between the ages
ab initio” – so even if the marriage is void, but there was no of 18 and 21 and did not obtain parental consent. Because paragraph (3)
judicial declaration of nullity, the donor cannot revoke, requires annulment of marriage before the donor may revoke the
because the law requires that there must be a judicial donation by reason of marriage and the donee is in bad faith.
declaration of nullity that the marriage is void from the xxx
beginning.
Article 765 of NCC for (6).
Now what if the marriage is declared void under Article 36? Can there
be revocation? Because take note, in the case of BUENAVENTURA VS Art. 87. Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or
CA, there can be no basis for the award of moral and exemplary indirect, between the spouses during the marriage shall be void, except
damages to the aggrieved spouse because there is no willfulness on the moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of
act of the incapacitated spouse. It is an innate inability to comply with any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to persons living
the essential marital obligations of marriage. So can there be together as husband and wife without a valid marriage. (133a)
revocation? YES because it is separate and distinct from damages.
Art. 87 is a prohibition against the husband and the wife. Every donation
Take note of (2), there is no need for annulment of the marriage. This between the spouses shall be void except for moderate gifts during
would refer to one of the parties to the marriage being between the ages family rejoicing, like if it’s the wife’s birthday or anniversary. Moderate
of 18 and 21 and did not obtain parental consent. Because paragraph (3) gifts would depend on financial capacity. This provision also applies to
requires annulment of marriage before the donor may revoke the persons living together without the benefit of marriage.
donation by reason of marriage and the donee is in bad faith. xxx
ARCABA vs. TABANCURA, et al.
Article 765 of NCC for (6). November 22, 2001
Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, Facts: Francisco and his late wife were owners of a parcel of land. As he
said marriage shall be void ab initio and all donations by reason of was alone, he invited his niece, a cousin of the niece, and Arcaba to stay
marriage and testamentary dispositions made by one in favor of the with him at his house. Later on, the niece and the cousin of the niece left
other are revoked by operation of law. (n) Francisco’s home leaving only Francisco and Arcaba. Before his death
Francisco donated a 150-sq. meter lot to Arcaba. The heirs of Francisco
Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the are now questioning the legality of the donation. Arcaba contended that
preceding Article shall produce the following effects: the property donated is payment for her past services rendered to the
(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except deceased. She further contends that sexual intercourse is no longer
that if the donee contracted the marriage in bad faith, such possible considering that Francisco is already old.
donations made to said donee are revoked by operation of
law; SC: -Cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse, especially when
one of the parties is already old and may no longer be interested in sex.
Article 43 (3) also speaks of revocation of donation by operation of law. At the very least, cohabitation is the public assumption by a man and a
So if the donor is the innocent spouse, it is revoked by operation of law. woman of the marital relation, and dwelling together as man and wife,
But if the donor is a third person, we apply Article 86--- may be thereby holding themselves out to the public as such. Their public
revoked. conduct indicated that theirs was not just a relationship of caregiver and
patient but that of exclusive partners akin to husband and wife. Thus,
Art. 86. A donation by reason of marriage may be revoked by the donor the donation made by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Article 87
in the following cases: of the Family Code.
(1) If the marriage is not celebrated or judicially declared void ab
initio except donations made in the marriage settlements, What are examples of grants of gratuitous advantage? A: Commodatum
which shall be governed by Article 81; and usufruct, where you are given the right to enjoy property.
(2) When the marriage takes place without the consent of the
parents or guardian, as required by law; What if the donation is made to the adult child of the previous marriage?
(3) When the marriage is annulled, and the donee acted in bad Would that be valid? A: If the child is already married, that is valid
faith; because the parent of the child would no longer be an heir, he only
(4) Upon legal separation, the donee being the guilty spouse; becomes a secondary compulsory heir. But what if the child is
(5) If it is with a resolutory condition and the condition is illegitimate? Then the iron-bar rule of succession laws apply.
complied with;
(6) When the donee has committed an act of ingratitude as Does the Iron Bar Rule apply between the illegitimate parent and the
specified by the provisions of the Civil Code on donations in child? Parang merong question sa Iron Bar Rule last year (Bar Exam).
general. (132a)

Now that provision on mandatory revocation of donation propter CHAPTER 3


nuptias under article 43(3) applies only when it is the spouse who is the System of Absolute Community
donor but if it is a third person then we go to Article 86. If the donor is SECTION 1
the innocent spouse then it is revoked by operation of law. There is no General Provisions
need for a revocation.
When shall it commence? Art. 88 says that:
(1) – “If the marriage is not celebrated or judicially declared void
ab initio” – so even if the marriage is void, but there was no Art. 88. The absolute community of property between spouses shall
judicial declaration of nullity, the donor cannot revoke, commence at the precise moment that the marriage is celebrated.
because the law requires that there must be a judicial Any stipulation, express or implied, for the commencement of the
declaration of nullity that the marriage is void from the community regime at any other time shall be void.
beginning.

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Art. 89. No waiver of rights, shares and effects of the absolute (1) The support of the spouses, their common children, and
community of property during the marriage can be made except in case legitimate children of either spouse; however, the support of
of judicial separation of property. illegitimate children shall be governed by the provisions of
this Code on Support;
*When the waiver takes place upon a judicial separation of (2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by
property, or after the marriage has been dissolved or annulled, the the designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the
same shall appear in a public instrument and shall be recorded as community, or by both spouses, or by one spouse with the
provided in Article 77. The creditors of the spouse who made such consent of the other;
waiver may petition the court to rescind the waiver to the extent of the (3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without
amount sufficient to cover the amount of their credits. the consent of the other to the extent that the family may
have been benefited;
*When the waiver takes place, it must be registered in the Local Civil (4) All taxes, liens, charges and expenses, including major or
Registry. The purpose of which is to affect third persons. minor repairs, upon the community property;
(5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during
Q: What will govern respecting the Absolute Community of Property? marriage upon the separate property of either spouse used by
A: Primarily, it will be governed by the provisions of the Family Code. the family;
Suppletorily, by the provisions of the rules on ownership. (6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete a
professional or vocational course, or other activity for self-
improvement;
SECTION 2 (7) Antenuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have
What Constitutes Community Property redounded to the benefit of the family;
(8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in
Art. 91. Unless otherwise provided in this Chapter or in the marriage favor of their common legitimate children for the exclusive
settlements, the community property shall consist of all the property purpose of commencing or completing a professional or
owned by the spouses at the time of the celebration of the marriage vocational course or other activity for self-improvement;
or acquired thereafter. (9) Antenuptial debts of either spouse other than those falling
under paragraph (7) of this Article, the support of illegitimate
children of either spouse, and liabilities incurred by either
Q: What are those that are considered to be the separate property or
spouse by reason of a crime or a quasi-delict, in case of
exclusive property of either spouse?
absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of the
A:
debtor-spouse, the payment of which shall be considered as
advances to be deducted from the share of the debtor-spouse
Art. 92. The following shall be excluded from the community property: upon liquidation of the community; and
(1) Property acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title by (10) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is
either spouse, and the fruits as well as the income thereof, if found to be groundless.
any, unless it is expressly provided by the donor, testator or
grantor that they shall form part of the community property; If the community property is insufficient to cover the foregoing
(2) Property for personal and exclusive use of either spouse. liabilities, except those falling under paragraph (9), the spouses shall be
However, *jewelry shall form part of the community solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties.
property;
(3) Property acquired before the marriage by either spouse who
Par. 9 refers to antenuptial debts. This is different from the commission
has legitimate descendants by a former marriage, and the
in Art. 122 on the conjugal partnership (CPG). This is not found on those
fruits as well as the income, if any, of such property.
that can be charged against the conjugal partnership. And this is based
on the fact that there must be first exhaustion of all responsibilities
The *jewelry here in order to be considered as forming part of the mentioned in Art. 121 before the personal obligation of the debtor-
absolute community property must be one brought to the marriage or spouse can be charged against the conjugal.
acquired during the marriage using the absolute community funds.
Because if you receive the jewelry gratuitously, that belongs to you Buado and Heirs of Juanite? (it may be BUADO VS. CA AND NICOL
exclusively. G.R. No. 145222 April 24, 2009; and PANA VS. HEIRS OF JUANITE
G.R. No. 164201 December 10, 2012): But here, if it is absolute
I have lawyers calling me, asking me if jewelry is part of absolute community property (ACP), the antenuptial debts, if the debtor-spouse
community of property. I say it’s not. It depends on how you acquired it. has no sufficient property to answer for it, may be charged against the
If you acquired it gratuitously, it is not. Otherwise, if Par. 1 would only community property and considered as advances subject to
refer to real property, it should only mention real property. But we go reimbursement upon termination of the ACP. Remember, this is NOT
back to the rules on statutory construction. If it is acquired gratuitously, found in the CPG. This is only true in ACP for antenuptial debts.
even if it is jewelry, it will be the exclusive property of the donee spouse.
Art. 95 is the same as Art. 123.
Par. 3 is different. This refers to a property acquired before the
marriage. It is brought to the marriage. However, the owner spouse has
Art. 95. Whatever may be lost during the marriage in any game of
a legitimate descendant. And the [excluded property] includes the fruit
chance, betting, sweepstakes, or any other kind of gambling, whether
and the income [from the exclusion]. But it must be a legitimate
permitted or prohibited by law, shall be borne by the loser and shall not
descendant in order for the property acquired before the marriage to be
be charged to the community but any winnings therefrom shall form
considered as an exclusive property of the owner spouse.
part of the community property.
So these are the exceptions whereby the same shall be considered as
exclusive property of either spouse. Art. 123. Whatever may be lost during the marriage in any game of
chance or in betting, sweepstakes, or any other kind of gambling
Art. 93 provides for a presumption: whether permitted or prohibited by law, shall be borne by the loser and
shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership but any winnings
Art. 93. Property acquired during the marriage is presumed to therefrom shall form part of the conjugal partnership property.
belong to the community, unless it is proved that it is one of those
excluded therefrom.
SECTION 4.
Ownership, Administrative, Enjoyment and Disposition of the
SECTION 3 Community Property
Charges and Obligations of the Absolute Community
Let’s go to Art. 96. This was the subject in the case of NOBLEZA VS.
NUEGA (G.R. No. 193038 March 11, 2015). This refers to the
Art. 94. The absolute community of property shall be liable for:

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administration and enjoyment of the ACP. In the Civil Code, it used to be


the husband. Now it is both spouses jointly. But this time, in case of Art. 98. Neither spouse may donate any community property without
disagreement the husband’s decision shall prevail subject for proper the consent of the other. However, either spouse may, without the
remedy before the court. consent of the other, make moderate donations from the community
property for charity or on occasions of family rejoicing or family
Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community property distress.
shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the
husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the Art. 125. Neither spouse may donate any conjugal partnership property
wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from without the consent of the other. However, either spouse may, without
the date of the contract implementing such decision. the consent of the other, make moderate donations from the conjugal
partnership property for charity or on occasions of family rejoicing or
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to family distress.
participate in the administration of the common properties, the other
spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not
include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or
SECTION 5
the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority
Dissolution of Absolute Community Regime
or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the
transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the
Art. 99 is the same as Art. 126. This refers to the termination of the ACP
consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a
and CPG.
binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or
authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or
both offerors. Art. 99. The absolute community terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
Take note, Art. 96 (1) refers only to acts of administration not to acts of
(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or
ownership or acts of dominion.
(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage
under Article 134 to 138.
Art. 96 (2) applies to a situation whereby one spouse is incapacitated or
otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the common
property. Then, the other spouse may assume sole powers of Art. 126. The conjugal partnership terminates:
administration. (1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
Note, that on Par. 2, it is a continuing offer between the consenting (3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or
spouse and the third person but void as to the spouse who did not give (4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage
written consent. under Articles 134 to 138.

ALEJO VS. CORTEZ (G.R. No. 206114 June 19, 2017): This is about Art. 100 and Art. 127 refer to separation in fact so that it will not affect
CPG. But this was a very good case that it properly explained continuing the ACP (and CPG) with its exceptions.
offer as well as [clarification..?]
Art. 100. The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not
NOBLEZA VS. NUEGA: Nuega worked in Israel and had a boyfriend affect the regime of absolute community except that:
(Rogelio) in the Philippines. The boyfriend asked if Nuega can send (1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live
money so he could buy a lot/land that which where they will build their therein, without just cause, shall not have the right to be
house once they get married. She sent the money so Rogelio bought the supported;
property. Then they got married. After one year, Nuega came back to (2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the
Israel. Then, she heard rumors that Rogelio had taken in another woman other is required by law, judicial authorization shall be
to replace her. She returned to the Philippines and sued Rogelio for obtained in a *summary proceeding;
concubinage and a civil case for legal separation with dissolution of the (3) In the absence of sufficient community property, the separate
property. property of both spouses shall be solidarily liable for the
support of the family. The spouse present shall, upon proper
During pendency of the proceedings, Nuega got wind of what Rogelio petition in a summary proceeding, be given judicial authority
had planned to do. He was planning to sell that house and lot. Nuega to administer or encumber any specific separate property of
informed the neighbors that that property is under litigation. One of the other spouse and use the fruits or proceeds thereof to
those who was informed was the sister of Nobleza. But despite satisfy the latter's share.
knowledge of the pending litigation between the spouses, Nobleza
bought the property. She now claimed that she is a buyer in good faith
Art. 127. The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not
because the title in the property is in the name of Rogelio. And his status
affect the regime of conjugal partnership, except that:
therein was single/unmarried. This property was bought by Rogelio
(1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live
when he was still single although the money was sourced from Nuega.
therein, without just cause, shall not have the right to be
However, a reading of the document would show that the (they made it
supported;
appear that the Deed of Sale was made prior to the filing of petition. But
(2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the
one particular entry therein that made the SC say that it was in bad faith
other is required by law, judicial authorization shall be
was the resident certificate (cedula).
obtained in a summary proceeding;
(3) In the absence of sufficient conjugal partnership property, the
The Deed of Sale was dated December 1992. But the cedula of the
separate property of both spouses shall be solidarily liable for
witnesses is dated January 1993. According to the court, although this is
the support of the family. The spouse present shall, upon
not material, but it would show that they made it appear that the same
petition in a summary proceeding, be given judicial authority
was made prior to the filing of those proceedings. But that date in the
to administer or encumber any specific separate property of
cedula would show that it was made in 1993, when there was already
the other spouse and use the fruits or proceeds thereof to
the filing of the cases against Rogelio. Hence, she cannot be considered
satisfy the latter's share.
as buyer in good faith. Plus, of course, there was this warning that was
made by Nobleza’s sister. Likewise, according to Nobleza, she should be
reimbursed of the purchase price. But according to the SC, as much as it *The summary proceeding here, the rules are found in the last chapter.
was not shown that the sale redounded to the benefit of the ACP, then That will not be covered by the summary proceedings under the Rules
there is no obligation on the part of Nuega to reimburse Nobleza. The of Court. This is governed by the rules found in the Family Code itself.
share of Rogelio was forfeited in favor of Nuega. So, Nobleza’s recourse Just like also the declaration of presumptive death. Diba it is summary in
would be to run after Rogelio. nature. That is not covered by the ordinary summary rules. It is
governed by the rules of Family Code.
Art. 98 is actually the same as Art. 125 of the Family Code.

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Art. 101 (and Art. 128) is another ground for [notification?] of the is situated shall be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the
property regime during the marriage. There is abandonment without majority of the common children choose to remain. Children
just cause of the spouses. below the age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the
mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In case there
Art. 101. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to in no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into
comply with his or her obligations to the family, the aggrieved spouse consideration the best interests of said children.
may petition the court for receivership, for judicial separation of
property or for authority to be the sole administrator of the absolute So, there will be inventory then you have payment of the debts and
community, subject to such precautionary conditions as the court may obligations. If it (the ACP) would be insufficient, payment of debts would
impose. be from the separate property of the spouses. If there is still remaining
of the separate property, that will be given back to the owner spouse.
The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph
refer to marital, parental or property relations. If the community property is sufficient and there are still remaining, it
will be divided between the spouses depending on their agreement as to
A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when her or she has the proportion of the division. In the absence, then equal division. By
left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The spouse the way, the definition of net profit is already in the provision.
who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three months or has
failed within the same period to give any information as to his or her The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered
whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have no intention of upon partition.
returning to the conjugal dwelling.
Q: What constitutes the presumptive legitimes of the common children?
Art. 128. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to A: That is Art. 888 of the law on Succession.
comply with his or her obligation to the family, the aggrieved spouse
may petition the court for receivership, for judicial separation of Article 888. The legitime of legitimate children and descendants
property, or for authority to be the sole administrator of the conjugal consists of one-half of the hereditary estate of the father and of the
partnership property, subject to such precautionary conditions as the mother.
court may impose.
The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half, subject to the rights
The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph of illegitimate children and of the surviving spouse as hereinafter
refer to marital, parental or property relations. provided.

A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she has left The basis of which is the decision of the SC in NOVERAS VS. NOVERAS
the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The spouse who (G.R. No. 188289 August 20, 2014).
has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three months or has failed
within the same period to give any information as to his or her But that is without prejudice to the ultimate successional rights of the
whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have no intention of children.
returning to the conjugal dwelling.
Q: What about the conjugal dwelling?
Q: When is the spouse deemed to have abandoned the other? How long A: See Art. 102 (6). Remember the best interest of the child principle in
must he be absent? this article.
A: It must be 3 months without any knowledge as to his/her
whereabouts or has failed within the same period to give any Art. 103 refers termination of marriage by reason of death of one of the
information as to his or her whereabouts. spouses.

Art. 103. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the


SECTION 6 community property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the
Liquidation of the Absolute Community Assets and Liabilities settlement of the estate of the deceased.

Art. 102 refers to the dissolution of ACP regime. If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse
shall liquidate the community property either judicially or extra-
Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the judicially *within six months from the death of the deceased spouse. If
following procedure shall apply: upon the lapse of the six months period, no liquidation is made, any
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the disposition or encumbrance involving the community property of the
properties of the absolute community and the exclusive terminated marriage shall be void.
properties of each spouse.
(2) The debts and obligations of the absolute community shall be Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without
paid out of its assets. In case of insufficiency of said assets, the compliance with the foregoing requirements, a mandatory regime of
spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with complete separation of property shall govern the property relations of
their separate properties in accordance with the provisions of the subsequent marriage.
the second paragraph of Article 94.
(3) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses It shall be the surviving spouse who is required to liquidate (of course!).
shall thereafter be delivered to each of them.
(4) The net remainder of the properties of the absolute *This is actually one year from the death of the deceased spouse.
community shall constitute its net assets, which shall be
divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different Art. 103 (3) is the exception to the general rule that in the absence of
proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage any marriage settlement it is presumed to be ACP. Here in Art. 103 (3), it
settlements, or unless there has been a voluntary waiver of is a mandatory regime of complete separation of property. The purpose
such share provided in this Code. For purpose of computing of which is to avoid confusion of the estate of the deceased and the
the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with present property of the parties to the subsequent marriage.
Articles 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2), the said profits shall be
the increase in value between the market value of the Now we go to the Conjugal Partnership of Gains (CPG). Primarily, CPG is
community property at the time of the celebration of the governed by the rules on partnership. Suppletorily by the provisions of
marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution. the FC.
(5) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be
delivered upon partition, in accordance with Article 51.
(6) Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partition
of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it

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CHAPTER 4
Conjugal Partnership of Gains ORION SAVINGS BANK CASE: SC said that H married to Wife is merely
SECTION 1 descriptive of his marital status. What happens then to the presumption
General Provisions under Art. 116? There was absence of proof as to when the property
was acquired. That condominium unit that was sold to Suzuki.
Art. 105. In case the future spouses agree in the marriage settlements
that the regime of conjugal partnership gains shall govern their property Q: So what are those that belongs to the CPG?
relations during marriage, the provisions in this Chapter shall be of A:
supplementary application.
Art. 117. The following are conjugal partnership properties:
The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships (1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the
of gains already established between spouses before the effectivity of expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for
this Code, without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in the partnership, or for only one of the spouses;
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided in Article 256. (2) Those obtained from the labor, industry, work or profession
of either or both of the spouses;
Art. 105 (2) speaks of its retroactivity. (3) The fruits, natural, industrial, or civil, due or received during
the marriage from the common property, as well as the net
Q: What constitutes the CPG? fruits from the exclusive property of each spouse;
A: It is in Art. 106. All the net profits of their separate properties plus all (4) The share of either spouse in the hidden treasure which the
derived from their labor and industry. law awards to the finder or owner of the property where the
treasure is found;
Art. 106. Under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains, the (5) Those acquired through occupation such as fishing or
husband and wife place in a common fund the proceeds, products, fruits hunting;
and income from their separate properties and those acquired by either (6) Livestock existing upon the dissolution of the partnership in
or both spouses through their efforts or by chance, and, upon excess of the number of each kind brought to the marriage by
dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or either spouse; and
benefits obtained by either or both spouses shall be divided equally (7) Those which are acquired by chance, such as winnings from
between them, unless otherwise agreed in the marriage settlements. gambling or betting. However, losses therefrom shall be
borne exclusively by the loser-spouse.

SECTION 2. Art. 118. Property bought on installments paid partly from exclusive
Exclusive Property of Each Spouse funds of either or both spouses and partly from conjugal funds belongs
to the buyer or buyers if full ownership was vested before the marriage
Art. 109. The following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse: and to the conjugal partnership if such ownership was vested during the
(1) That which is brought to the marriage as his or her own; marriage. In either case, any amount advanced by the partnership or by
(2) That which each acquires during the marriage by gratuitous either or both spouses shall be reimbursed by the owner or owners
title; upon liquidation of the partnership.
(3) That which is acquired by right of redemption, by barter or by
exchange with property belonging to only one of the spouses; Art. 119. Whenever an amount or credit payable within a period of time
and belongs to one of the spouses, the sums which may be collected during
(4) That which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or the marriage in partial payments or by installments on the principal
of the husband. shall be the exclusive property of the spouse. However, interests falling
due during the marriage on the principal shall belong to the conjugal
Art. 110. The spouses retain the ownership, possession, administration partnership.
and enjoyment of their exclusive properties.
Either spouse may, during the marriage, transfer the administration of Art. 120. The ownership of improvements, whether for utility or
his or her exclusive property to the other by means of a public adornment, made on the separate property of the spouses at the
instrument, which shall be recorded in the registry of property of the expense of the partnership or through the acts or efforts of either or
place the property is located. both spouses shall pertain to the conjugal partnership, or to the original
owner-spouse, subject to the following rules:
Art. 113. Property donated or left by will to the spouses, jointly and
with designation of determinate shares, shall pertain to the donee- When the cost of the improvement made by the conjugal partnership
spouses as his or her own exclusive property, and in the absence of and any resulting increase in value are more than the value of the
designation, share and share alike, without prejudice to the right of property at the time of the improvement, the entire property of one of
accretion when proper. the spouses shall belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to
reimbursement of the value of the property of the owner-spouse at the
time of the improvement; otherwise, said property shall be retained in
Art. 114 actually is an exemption to the rule that there can be no
ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise subject to reimbursement of
advances that shall be made by the CPG unless it is shown that all the
the cost of the improvement.
responsibilities mentioned in Art. 121 had been fully satisfied. This
would refer to donations that are onerous in nature. So this is one of the
In either case, the ownership of the entire property shall be vested upon
exceptions where the CPG may be used to advance.
the reimbursement, which shall be made at the time of the liquidation of
the conjugal partnership.
Art. 114. If the donations are onerous, the amount of the charges shall
be borne by the exclusive property of the donee spouse, whenever they
Art. 118 refers to property acquired through installments. What would
have been advanced by the conjugal partnership of gains.
be the basis for the presumption that it belongs to the CPG? When is
ownership vested? When property is bought in installment under a
contract to sell? What is the essential nature of a contract to sell?
SECTION 3 Ownership is reserved by the vendor to ensure payment of the purchase
Conjugal Partnership Property price. So if it was bought before the marriage, but under a contract to
sell; and titled thereto was vested during the marriage, then it belongs
Art. 116 provides for a presumption: to the CPG.

Art. 116. All property acquired during the marriage, whether the But if is a contract of sale on installment, it belongs exclusively to the
acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the owner spouse. Because in the contract of sale, the ownership is
name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the immediately transferred to the buyer subject only to the payment of the
contrary is proved. purchase price. So, with a contract to sell, if title is vested during the

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marriage, the owner spouse may demand reimbursement for the value Art. 122 was first elucidated by the SC in the case of BUADO VS. CA AND
of the property and what he or she has paid in installments from the NICOL (G.R. No. 145222 April 24, 2009) where Nicol was found to be
CPG. But if it is vested before the marriage, then the CPG is now the guilty of the crime of slander and was adjudged to pay fines and
creditor vis a vis the payment of the installments. indemnities of about 35 thousand pesos. So the sheriff now levied on the
CPG. The husband claimed that he is a stranger to the suit.
Art. 119 is with respect to interest earned. So prior to the marriage, of
course, it belongs to the creditor spouse. But during the marriage, it Is he correct? Yes. But if it redounded to the benefit of the family, the
belongs to the CPG. husband is not a stranger. He is a stranger only if it did not redound. But
in the case of Buado, SC said that there is no obligation on the part of the
Art. 120 refers to improvements. If the value of the improvement is CPG to advance because there is nothing in Art. 121 saying that personal
greater than the value of the principal, it belongs to the CPG. But if the obligations such as those arising from fines are liabilities that can be
value of the improvement is less than the value of the principal, it charged. Unless it shall be shown that all the responsibilities mentioned
belongs to the owner spouse. Remember the case of FERRER VS. in the Art. 121 have been fully satisfied.
FERRER where the SC said that if the value of the improvement is lesser
than the value of the principal upon which the improvement is attached, This was reiterated in the case of PANA VS. HEIRS OF JUANITE (G.R.
the property still belongs to the husband. No. 164201 December 10, 2012) where the wife was sued for murder
and was later on found guilty. So they levied on the CPG. The heirs now
In both instances however, there will be reimbursement either by the of Juanite claim that by reason of Art. 105 of FC, the property regime of
owner spouse or the CPG. the spouses have been converted into the ACP because of Art. 256 (on
retroactivity). That was the contention of the heirs, and thus, it is not the
ACP [that should govern the property regime].
SECTION 4.
Charges Upon and Obligations ofthe Conjugal Partnership SC cited the immutability of the matrimonial property regime (the
doctrine of the immutability of the property regime). SC said that there
Art. 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: is no conversion of the CPG. It further enumerated the five post
(1) The support of the spouse, their common children, and the marriage modifications of marriage settlement that are considered to be
legitimate children of either spouse; however, the support of valid.
illegitimate children shall be governed by the provisions of
this Code on Support; Pana vs. Heirs of Juanite
(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by (G.R. No. 164201 December 10, 2012)
the designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership of gains, or by both spouses or by one of Post-marriage modification of such settlements can take place only
them with the consent of the other; where:
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without (a) the absolute community or conjugal partnership was dissolved
the consent of the other to the extent that the family may and liquidated upon a decree of legal separation;
have benefited; (b) the spouses who were legally separated reconciled and agreed
(4) All taxes, liens, charges, and expenses, including major or to revive their former property regime;
minor repairs upon the conjugal partnership property; (c) judicial separation of property had been had on the ground that
(5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during a spouse abandons the other without just cause or fails to comply
the marriage upon the separate property of either spouse; with his obligations to the family;
(6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete a (d) there was judicial separation of property under Article 135;
professional, vocational, or other activity for self- (e) the spouses jointly filed a petition for the voluntary dissolution
improvement; of their absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains.
(7) Antenuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have
redounded to the benefit of the family; Further, the SC said in this case that it does not require termination of
(8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in the ACP before the creditor can demand payment from the CPG. There is
favor of their common legitimate children for the exclusive no need for liquidation. For as long as it is shown that the
purpose of commencing or completing a professional or responsibilities and obligations mentioned in Art. 121 have been fully
vocational course or other activity for self-improvement; and satisfied, then the CPG can be held liable for the liability of the debtor
(9) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is spouse.
found to groundless.

If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing July 27, 2018
liabilities, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance Abad | Licayan
with their separate properties.
Article 122 would refer to charges against the conjugal partnership.
Not found in Art. 121 is the Art. 94 (9) because it is found in Art. 122. Take note that any of the spouses may obtain a loan or enter into
And it is expressly provided for under Art. 122. transactions, even without the consent of the other spouse. But, only so
much of that which would redound to the benefit of the family can be
Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or charged against the conjugal partnership.
the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the
conjugal properties partnership except insofar as they redounded to the Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or
benefit of the family. the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the
conjugal properties partnership except insofar as they redounded to the
Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them benefit of the family.
be charged to the partnership.
Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them
However, the payment of personal debts contracted by either spouse be charged to the partnership.
before the marriage, that of fines and indemnities imposed upon them,
as well as the support of illegitimate children of either spouse, may be However, the payment of personal debts contracted by either spouse
enforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities before the marriage, that of fines and indemnities imposed upon them,
enumerated in the preceding Article have been covered, if the spouse as well as the support of illegitimate children of either spouse, may be
who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be enforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities
insufficient; but at the time of the liquidation of the partnership, such enumerated in the preceding Article have been covered, if the spouse
spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the purpose above- who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be
mentioned. insufficient; but at the time of the liquidation of the partnership, such
spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the purpose above-
mentioned. (163a)

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the property regime of the spouses from Conjugal to Community


For the cases falling under Article 122, we have the very old case of property because of Article 256 of the FC.
Ayala Investments Development Corporation.
But the SC said that there can be no conversion despite the
Ayala Investments vs. CA retroactivity of Article 256 because while it may be true that the
286 S 272 respective rights over their shares of the conjugal partnership are
merely inchoate prior to the termination of the marriage, however,
This refers to the Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtaining a loan from there may be vested rights that will be prejudiced if we allow such
AIDC, where Mr. Ching acted as surety for and in behalf of PBM. There retroactivity. And then it said the 5 instances.
was non-payment of the loan obligation. The court sided with the
creditor, thus the sheriff now would like to levy on the property of the *from Batacan Notes:
Ching spouses. Post-modification of such settlements can take place only where: (1)
the absolute community or conjugal partnership was dissolved and
This was objected to by the wife reasoning that the property to be levied liquidated upon the decree of legal separation;
was conjugal in nature. Subsequently, Mr. Ching also joined the wife in (2) the spouses who were legally separated reconciled and agreed to
the opposition. revive [Ma’am G: Revival here is not absolute as I have already told you
before.] their former property regime;
On the other hand, AIDC stated that the loan benefitted the family (3) judicial separation of property had been had on the ground that the
because the operation of PBM had been continued and Mr. Ching, being spouse abandons the other without just cause or fails to comply with
an employee of the corporation continued to receive salaries and his obligations to the family;
bonuses and in fact, being one of the officers of the corporation and a (4) there was judicial separation of property under Article 135;
stockholder, the value of the stocks also have increased. (5) the spouses jointly filed a petition for voluntary dissolution of their
absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains.
Held: The SC said, these are not the benefits contemplated under Article
122 in relation to Article 121. The benefit must be one that is directly
resulting from the loan obligation. This one is merely a spin-off of the SECTION 5
loan, not the direct result of the loan. And moreover, while it is true that Administration of the Conjugal Partnership Property
Mr. Ching received salaries etc, it is because he is an employee of PBM,
and thus it is merely speculative, according to the Court. So the conjugal Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership
partnership property cannot be made liable for the obligation of PBM, it shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the
being the principal creditor. husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the
wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from
CHING vs. COURT OF APPEALS the date of the contract implementing such decision.
423 S 367
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to
In Ching vs. CA, the same Mr. Ching, this time PBM obtained a loan from participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other
Allied Banking Corporation (ABC). Again, there was non-payment and spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not
there were these 500 shares of stocks of City Corp solely registered in the include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or
name of Mr. Ching. So ABC sought to levy on these stocks. Again, there the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority
was this opposition that it was a conjugal partnership property even if it or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
was registered solely in the stock transfer books of the City Corp in the
name of Mr. Alfredo Ching. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the
part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be
The SC reiterated the ruling in the Ayala case. perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse
or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or
both offerors. (165a)
BUADO vs. CA and NICOL
586 SCRA 397 (April 24, 2009) Maam G just read the 1st paragraph.

This refers to the wife being convicted of the crime of slander, and Now, the 2nd paragraph refers to the incapacity or inability of one of the
together with it are the damages, fines and indemnities amounting to spouses to administer the property, then, the other spouse may assume
P35,000. Because the property of the wife is insufficient to answer for the sole powers of administration.
civil liability arising out of the criminal offense, the sheriff now wanted to
levy on the conjugal partnership property of the spouses. But take note that it says, these powers do not include the disposition,
encumbrance or alienation, unless there is a written consent of the
This was objected to by the husband claiming that he was a stranger to spouse or judicial authorization. However, this is a continuing offer
the suit and thus there was no basis in the levy. between the consenting spouse and the 3rd person and is considered as a
perfected contract as soon as the written consent or judicial
Held: It was here were the SC said that there is nothing in Article 121 authorization is obtained, unless earlier withdrawn by either of the
that allows payment of the personal obligation of the debtor spouse, parties to the transaction. This is the same with Article 96 of the FC as
unless all the responsibilities mentioned in the said article have been regards Absolute Community of Property.
fully satisfied.
But there is this deviant decision of the court, the case of Ravina vs.
This was further reiterated by the SC in the case of Pana vs. Heirs of Villa-Abrille. Do you remember?
Juanite.
RAVINA vs. VILLA ABRILLE
PANA v. HEIRS OF JUANITE 604 SCRA 120 October 16, 2009
GR# 164201 December 10, 2012
Pedro Abrille, prior to his marriage with Mary Ann, bought a parcel of
Whereby, the Court said further that there is no need to wait for the land. And then when they got married, they purchased the adjacent lot.
liquidation for as long as all the responsibilities under Article 121 have Now, during their marriage, there was a 3rd party, it was already shaky
been fully satisfied, and then there can already be an advancement of and rocky and so Pedro told Mary Ann that he intended to sell the
the obligation of the debtor spouse to the creditor. That is the only property together with the conjugal partnership property. This was
requirement. objected to by Mary Ann, but despite such, Pedro sold the 2 lands.

Also, it is in this case where the SC enumerated 5 instances where Held: The SC said that if the wife had knowledge but did not give
there can be post modification of the marriage settlement. Because the consent, it is voidable.
Heirs of Juanite here claimed that there was automatic conversion of

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That really is a deviant decision, maybe because one of the parties 291 S 372
thereto is a Villa-Abrille. Because the 1st paragraph of Article 124 and
96 refers to acts of administration only, and not acts of dominion like Held: The court held that the basis for the status of the sale of the
sale or encumbering the property. In the 2nd paragraph, the law says conjugal partnership without the consent of the other spouse is not
that it is already void. based on when was the marriage celebrated, but rather on when was
the alienation made. Here, it was made when the FC had already taken
Okay, before we proceed with the cases under Article 124, there are still effect, thus, without the written consent of the other spouse, it is void.
decided cases that the disposition or encumbrance was made when the
Civil Code was still in effect. MANALO vs. CAMAISA
374 S 361
Foremost of which is the case of Heirs of Ayuste.
Does the mere fact that the wife was aware of the sale and participated
HEIRS of AYUSTE vs. CA and MALABONGA in the negotiation considered to have given consent to the sale?
313 S 493
Here, Manalo wanted to buy the properties of spouses Camaisa and
The wife merely discovered the alienation of the property after the during the negotiation, the wife was participating as to the price. But
death of the husband when she made an inventory of their properties. when the contracts to sell were prepared, the wife now refused to affix
She sought annulment of the sale. her signature to the agreement. And thus, according to Manalo, there
was already consent on the part of the wife and if the same cannot be
Held: The sale of the conjugal partnership property without the obtained he has the recourse to go to court to obtain judicial
consent of the other spouse is merely voidable under the Civil Code. So authorization.
in order for the petition for annulment to proceed, 2 requisites must
be complied with: Held: As to the first argument, according to the Court, the mere fact of
- Within 10 years from the date of the transaction and, being aware is not consent. What the law requires is written consent.
- During the subsistence of the marriage
In the case of Ayuste, one of the requisites is already wanting – the As to the second argument, does the 2nd par of Article 124 apply
subsistence of marriage. So it is already barred. (judicial authorization)? According to the court, no. Because this can
only be invoked if the other spouse is incapacitated. In the case at bar,
HEIRS OF REYES vs. MIJARES it was not shown that the wife was incapacitated.
410 S 97
The SC reiterated this in the case of Alejo vs. Cortez
The issue here is if the sale is annulled by the court, shall it cover the
entire property that was sold or only the share of the spouse who did ALEJO vs. SPOUSES CORTEZ & Sps Leonardo
not give consent. G.R. No. 206114 June 19, 2017

Held: Here, the SC said that it must be the entire property that was This involved the property of the Leonardo spouses, whereby the wife,
sold that must be annulled. Because the conjugal partnership is liable Jacinta, told the father-in-law to look for a buyer. The latter had his
for certain obligations including those of the personal obligations of sister Dolores buy the property. So it was actually the aunt of the
the debtor spouse for as long as the responsibilities mentioned of husband, Jorge, who bought.
Article 161 of the Civil Code is satisfied.
The wife signed the Kasunduan involving the sale of the property, the
PELAYO vs. PEREZ husband did not. Now, the purchase price was pegged at P500,000. It
459 S 475 was divided into 3 payments, the (1) P70,000 down payment shall be
made upon the signing of the kasunduan, the (2) P230,000 shall be
This refers to the application of the general rule on sale where it says paid a month later, and the (3) balance shall be paid before the end of
that “sale being consensual in nature, it is perfected by mere consent.” 1996. While the DP and 2nd payment was complied, the 3rd was not.
Prior to the arrival of the date for the payment of the last purchase
In this case the wife, Lorenza, signed on the 3rd page of the document price, Dolores was allowed to enter the property. In short, she took
provided for as witness, the first 2 pages were not signed. So when the possession of the property. Now, this was with the knowledge of the
buyer sought to have it registered in the ROD of the City of Tagum, this husband who did not give consent for he did not sign the kasunduan.
was denied because of the absence of the signature of the wife. When
the buyer Perez went to the house of Atty. Pelayo, the husband said Then, subsequently, Jorge wrote a letter to Dolores informing her that
that they are going to have the sale annulled. he did not give consent to the sale, and in fact, Jacinta would now be
filing a case nullifying the sale. Then another letter was written by
Held: According to the court, the husband who is the party responsible Jorge, this time, it was said that you pay the balance of P200,000 on or
for the fault cannot invoke the defect, it is only the wife. And moreover, before October 1996 or the purchase price shall be raised to P700,000.
there is really consent on the part of the wife, Lorenza, the fact that she Nothing came out of it. Jorge went to the house where Dolores was
signed means she is aware of the sale of the property even if she now occupying but they cannot agree on the issue of the price.
merely signed as a witness. The SC said that consent need not be in
writing. It can be given expressly or impliedly, in writing or orally. So it So what he did, he destroyed the water pump and disconnected the
is an application of the general principle of contract as regards electricity, and subsequent to that, he sold the property to the Cortez,
perfection. kaya naging Alejo vs. Cortez.

HEIRS OF HERNANDEZ, SR. vs. MINGOA, SR., et. al. There were 2 issues raised:
608SCRA 394 Was there really repudiation from the first letter?
Was there ratification by virtue of the second letter?
The heirs tried to apply Article 1409 and 1410 of the Civil Code that
refers to Void contracts because according to the heirs, there was no Held: The Court said yes, the 1st letter was a clear repudiation of the
consent by the wife. The signature of the wife was forged. sale. But was it ratified by the subsequent letter? The SC said no,
because there is now a counter offer. There is then no perfected
Held: The SC said there is no application of the general provisions of contract because the terms of the payment were changed and the
Void contracts because this is a conjugal partnership property and purchase price was changed, so there was no perfected contract.
thus governed by the provisions of the civil code on conjugal
partnership. So, according to the court, when there is no consent, it is Moreover, there can be no ratification because it is a void contract, and
merely voidable and thus the action to claim annulment has already thus cannot be ratified.
prescribed.
But, was there acceptance on the part of Jorge with respect to the 2 nd
GUIANG vs. CA letter? The answer is No, because there was a change in the terms and

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conditions of the sale, and reiterating the case of Manalo, being merely Art. 126. The conjugal partnership terminates:
aware of the negotiation does not mean written consent. (1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK vs. MIGUELA. DAILO (3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or
453 S 283 (4) In case of judicial separation of property during the
marriage under Articles 134 to 138 (175a)
In this case, the wife was not aware that the conjugal property was
registered in the name of the husband alone. Subsequently, the Now, how do you liquidate the conjugal partnership?
husband obtained a P300,000 peso loan from HOSB through an agent,
there was non-payment of the loan and then the property was Of course, the same as the liquidation of the Absolute Community of
foreclosed by HOSB. There was no redemption, so the title was Property (ACP) under Article 102 of the FC.
consolidated in the name of HOSB.
But there is one that is not found in Article 102, which is number 6 of
When the husband died, the wife now made an inventory of the Article 129
properties and found out that the said property is already in the name
of HOSB, and thus she filed this petition for annulment of the sale as Art. 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, the
well as all other petitions in relation thereto. following procedure shall apply:
(6) Unless the owner had been indemnified from whatever
HOSB said that (1) it is an exclusive property of the husband because it source, the loss or deterioration of movables used for the
was in the name of the husband alone, (2) assuming that it was a benefit of the family, belonging to either spouse, even due to
conjugal partnership property, however, Article 493 of the Civil Code fortuitous event, shall be paid to said spouse from the
on co-ownership will apply, and (3) the loan obligation incurred conjugal funds, if any.
redounded to the benefit of the family because it was supposed to
finance the construction of houses.
So this would refer to the personal property of the spouse, but used by
the family and it was lost, whether the reason for the loss was a
Held: For the first argument, the SC said on the presumption that if it
fortuitous event or the negligence of the other spouse, the conjugal
is acquired during the marriage, even if registered only in the name of
partnership is still liable for the (value?) of the movable.
one or both spouses, it belongs to the conjugal partnership.
Now 130 actually is the same with Article103.
On the argument on co-ownership, the SC said that the conjugal
partnership is a special form of partnership and is governed by the
special rules on partnership and that co-ownership applies only Art. 130. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the conjugal
suppletorily to the absolute community of property. It is governed partnership property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the
primarily by the provisions of the Family Code. settlement of the estate of the deceased.

Likewise it was not proven that the loan indeed redounded to the If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse
benefit of the family, because the burden of proof is on the part of the shall liquidate the conjugal partnership property either judicially or
creditor. extra-judicially within six months from the death of the deceased
spouse. If upon the lapse of the six-month period no liquidation is made,
FUENTES vs. ROCA any disposition or encumbrance involving the conjugal partnership
618 SCRA 702 April 21, 2010 property of the terminated marriage shall be void.

Here, the contract to sell between Tarciano and the buyer was signed Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without
before the effectivity of the Family Code, it was on January 1988. Their compliance with the foregoing requirements, a mandatory regime of
agreement was that the full payment and execution of the Deed of complete separation of property shall govern the property relations of
Absolute sale shall only be made when the written consent of Rosario, the subsequent marriage. (n)
the wife of Tarciano shall have been obtained. It was the lawyer who
promised to get the consent of Rosario, and executed this Affidaviit of This refers to:
Consent to the sale. 1. The termination of the marriage by reason of the death of one
of the spouses and
At that time, Rosario was already a resident of Manila while the 2. The requirement to liquidate the conjugal partnership
property was in Zamboanga. Atty. Plagata signed the affidavit of property
consent in Zamboanga. So, when both spouses died, the heirs now a.) within 1 year from the death of the spouse, or
questioned the validity of the sale, claiming that Rosario’s signature in b.) in the same proceeding on the liquidation of the estate of
the affidavit was a forgery. Even if one who is not conversant in the the deceased spouse.
signature specimen study would really see that it was forged.
If there is no liquidation, any encumbrance or alienation shall be void.
Held: The SC said that it was just easy for Tarciano to forge the And if the surviving spouse would contract a subsequent marriage, the
signature of Rosario, as they have been separated for more than 30 law says that the subsequent marriage shall be governed by the
years. Because it might be that she would oppose the sale or demand complete separation of property.
for her share of the price for her signature.
Before we proceed to the separation of property of the spouses, there
The date of the deed of absolute sale was already during the effectivity are some decided cases of reimbursement.
of the FC, then the contract becomes void. So the heirs are still allowed
to recover the property. Isn’t it that if the conjugal funds had been advanced, then there is that
requirement of reimbursing the conjugal partnership property. One of
So, separation-in-fact, just remember the effects. The spouse who left those is the case of Ferrer vs. Ferrer.
the conjugal dwelling without just cause is not entitled to receive
support. That in case a transaction is entered into and the consent of the JOSEFA FERRER vs. SPS. MANUEL & VIRGINIA FERRER
other spouse is required, then judicial authorization will be obtained on and SPS. ISMAEL & FLORA FERRER
a summary proceeding. 508 S 570

The husband brought to the marriage a parcel of land, then during the
SECTION 6 marriage he had it improved, I think it was an apartment or a
Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership Regime warehouse which was built on the land. However, it was proven that
the value of the improvement was lesser than the value of the land,
Article 126 refers to the termination of the conjugal partnership. and thus, it still belongs to the owner spouse.

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Now, before his death, the husband sold the property to his relative, separated in fact for at least one year and reconciliation is
another Ferrer. This time now, Josefa Ferrer, demanded from the highly improbable.
buyer the reimbursement of the improvements introduced because
conjugal funds were used in the improvement. In the cases provided for in Numbers (1), (2) and (3), the presentation
of the final judgment against the guilty or absent spouse shall be enough
Held: According to the court, it should have been the husband or the basis for the grant of the decree of judicial separation of property. (191a
debtor spouse who should be liable for the reimbursement. The
recourse of Josefa here is to go after the estate of the deceased debtor Article 136 on Voluntary Dissolution
spouse and not after the 3rd person who acquired the property.
Art. 136. The spouses may jointly file a verified petition with the court
ELENA MULLER vs. HELMUT MULLER for the voluntary dissolution of the absolute community or the conjugal
AUGUST 29, 2006 partnership of gains, and for the separation of their common properties.
This refers to the German husband who sold his house in Germany and All creditors of the absolute community or of the conjugal partnership of
decided to come to the Philippines. He bought a lot in Antipolo, and gains, as well as the personal creditors of the spouse, shall be listed in
because he knew of the prohibition on aliens owning public or private the petition and notified of the filing thereof. The court shall take
lands, he had it registered in the name of the Filipina wife, and built measures to protect the creditors and other persons with pecuniary
thereon a 2.3 Million peso house. interest. (191a)
But he discovered that the wife is not the only one who is beautiful
So, what shall the spouses do with respect to Voluntary Dissolution?
(alright!) so he left the conjugal dwelling and entered into another
They must jointly file a verified petition for the voluntary dissolution of
relationship. He filed this case demanding for his share in the property.
the properties acquired during the marriage. And take note that this can
He is asking for the reimbursement of the money used for the
only be availed of once. This has already been asked in the Bar.
purchase of the lot.
We have Disposition of the conjugal assets after the death of one of the
Held: According to the court, an alien cannot seek reimbursement
spouses. First, is the case of Go Sr. vs. Servacio
when he knowingly and willingly entered into the contract despite
knowledge of the prohibition. He cannot seek equity because he who
seeks equity must do equity, and he who claims equity must come with HEIRS OF PROTACIO GO, SR. et. al. v. SERVACIO and GO
clean hands. To grant reimbursement is to allow him to enjoy the fruits G.R. No. 157537, [September 7, 2011]
of the property which in the first place, he cannot own.
Here, the father and son bought a parcel of land. In the meantime the
mother died in 1957. 19 years after the purchase of the property, the
This is also true in the case of Beumer vs. Beumer.
son executed a waiver or renunciation over the property that they
bought because according to him, it was actually the father who bought
LLEM BEUMER v. AVELINA AMORES
the property.
GR# 195670 December 3, 2012
Subsequently, the father sold the said property to one of the children
Here, the marriage was terminated under Article 36. During their
and this was opposed by the other children claiming that the sale
marriage, there were 6 parcels of land acquired. According to the
without the liquidation is void, pursuant to Article 130.
husband, 4 of this land were bought using his pension benefit from
Holland, and that the wife Avelina has no source of income. He also had
Held: But the SC said that once the marriage is terminated by reason of
it registered in the name of the wife because he is also aware of the
death, then it becomes a co-ownership wherein all the heirs become a
prohibition.
co-owner of the property and the surviving spouse can validly sell his
inchoate share in the conjugal partnership property. And if it exceeds
Held: The same ruling was applied by the SC. And there is this issue on
the share of the surviving spouse, the buyer becomes the trustee over
unjust enrichment, otherwise, the wife will be unjustly enriched. The
the share of the heirs.
court said that the doctrine cannot be applied because in the first
place, what he did was proscribed by the Constitution. What about the
So it is void with respect to the share of the heirs who did not give
fact that he was placed at a disadvantage by reason of his foreign
consent to the sale and the buyer becomes a trustee over those shares,
citizenship? The SC said that it is the Constitution that demarcates the
but not with respect to the inchoate or intellectual share of the
rights of an alien and the Filipino citizen. There can be no
surviving spouse.
reimbursement on the real property, but he can have a share on all the
personal or movables like the 2 houses that were built on the land, but
And this was also reiterated by the SC in the case of Domingo vs. Molina.
not on the land itself.
DOMINGO vs. MOLINA
CHAPTER 5
It was also sold without liquidation of the conjugal partnership
SEPARATION OF PROPERTY OF THE SPOUSES AND
property, so the same ruling was arrived at by the court. It is valid with
ADMINISTRATION OF COMMON PROPERTY BY ONE SPOUSE
respect to his intellectual or inchoate share, but void if it exceeds his
DURING THE MARRIAGE
share in the conjugal partnership.
So, Judicial separation of property, it might be for Sufficient cause under
Article 135. However, in this case of Domingo, because the death of the spouse
occurred while the Civil Code was still in effect, then it is governed by
the Civil Code provisions.
Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for
judicial separation of property:
So the issue now is, what if it was the FC that was already effective when
(1) That the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a
the spouse died? Yan ang issue jan, so you have to wait for the… clears
penalty which carries with it civil interdiction; throat. (maam? sakit maiwan sa ere, charot!)
(2) That the spouse of the petitioner has been judicially declared
an absentee; Let us go back to Judicial separation of Property. So the grounds would
(3) That loss of parental authority of the spouse of petitioner has be, again, Sufficient cause under Article 135 and then Voluntary
been decreed by the court;
Dissolution under Article 136. Once it is granted then the spouses shall
(4) That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the latter or
be governed by Separation of property which may either, under Article
failed to comply with his or her obligations to the family as 144, refer to present or future property, it might be total or partial.
provided for in Article 101;
(5) That the spouse granted the power of administration in the Take note that if it will be partial separation, what will be the effect?
marriage settlements has abused that power; and Those property agreed upon shall be, what?
(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been

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Art. 144. Separation of property may refer to present or future In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they
property or both. It may be total or partial. In the latter case, the lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint
property not agreed upon as separate shall pertain to the absolute efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares.
community. (213a)
For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the
This is different from the revival of the conjugal partnership. Diba sa acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have
revival of the conjugal partnership under reconciliation, ano ang effect contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts
doon? They have to agree what will be contributed anew to the revived consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the
property regime. Those not agreed upon shall be his or her separate household.
property. Dito sa 144, those not agreed upon as separate shall pertain to
the absolute community. That is the difference ha. Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her
share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in
Now we have this case of Makilan vs. Makilan. common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of
their cohabitation.
VIRGILIO MAQUILAN vs. DITA MAQUILAN
524 S 166 When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the
share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in
The issue is, is it necessary for the prosecuting fiscal or attorney to be favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or
present when they arrive at the compromise agreement respecting the all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall
separation of their property? belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of
descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases,
What happened in this case was that, earlier the husband caught the the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
wife inflagrante delicto, sued and in fact convicted for adultery. (144a)
Subsequently the husband filed a petition for nullity of marriage. Then,
during the pendency of the proceedings for annulment, they arrived at Take note that Article 147 only applies to:
a compromise agreement (CA) respecting the division of their 1. Marriages that are void or
properties. But, there was no presence of the fiscal. 2. To a man and a woman living exclusively with each other as
husband and wife, and (as ruled by the SC in the case of
Virgilio now questioned the validity of the CA. However, the CA Valdez vs. Valdez) without any impediment under Articles 37
actually was judicially confirmed. There was court approval. But the and 38.
husband here changed his mind because he wanted to deprive the
wife. So exclusively, because if the relationship is not exclusive as having
several partners, even if they are capacitated to marry each other, then
Held: The SC said, there is no requirement for the prosecuting Article 147 does not apply, it will now be Article 148. They must
attorney or the fiscal to be present because it did not delve into the exclusively live together as husband and wife, capacitated and without
merits of the petition for the annulment of marriage. There is nothing the benefit of marriage or void marriages.
in the law that requires the presence of the prosecuting fiscal or
attorney when it involved judicial separation of property during the So the issue now is what are those void marriages that will be covered
marriage. by Article 147? Because, definitely, 148 will apply to marriages under
Articles 37 and 38 because of the absence of capacity, diba? That was
NOVERAS v. NOVERAS the pronouncement of the court in the case of Valdez. Okay? So meron
GR# 188289 August 20, 2014 tayong Void Marriages, and we have several:

If you remember, this involved the petition of ---- after obtaining a (1) Article 35
decree of divorce from the California USA. He came to the Philippines a. Non-age
and filed this petition for judicial separation of property. However, the b. Absence of Authority of the solemnizing officer
lower court said that because you have been properly divorced, this c. Absence of License
should no longer be judicial separation but instead it should be d. Polygamous/Bigamous Marriage
dissolution, liquidation and partition. In the absence of proof of the e. Mistake as to the identity
property regime, then it is the absolute community of property. f. Subsequent Marriages Void under Article 53
(2) Article 36 - Psychological Incapacity
Held: The SC said, it was proper for the court to apply the doctrine of (3) Article 37 – Incestous Marriages
processual presumption on their property regime. But No on the (4) Article 38 – Against Public Policy
immediate recognition of the divorce decree without complying with (5) Article 40
Rule 132, sections 34 and 35, and thus, according to the court, they are a. First Void Marriage
still married under our laws. b. Second Marriage Void d/t Absence of Nullity of the
Previous Void Marriage
So the presumption is that they are still married and the proper cause (6) Article 44
of action is of course, judicial separation of property during the
marriage and under Article 135 number 6 because they have already These are the void marriages. Now, we have to determine whether it is
been separated in fact for more than 1 year. So that was the court’s Article 147 or Article 148 , because the difference between the 2 is:
decision.

Article There is no need for actual contribution of money,


CHAPTER 7 147 property or industry, in order for the other spouse to be
PROPERTY REGIME OF UNIONS WITHOUT MARRIAGE entitled to the share of the property upon liquidation.

Now we go to the regimes of Union without marriage or are under Void It is sufficient that the contribution consists in the
marriage. So Article 147. management of the family and the household.
Article The law requires actual contribution of money,
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each 148 property or industry in order for one to be entitled to
other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the the share in the property acquired during the
benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries cohabitation.
shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by .
both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the And take note that in 147, the forfeiture refers only to void marriages. It
rules on co-ownership. does not apply to the man and woman living together as husband and
wife exclusively without the benefit of marriage.

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of Valdez, and reiterated by the SC in the case of BUENAVENTURA VS.


To determine whether it is 147 or 148, just remember “Capacitated.” If CA.
no capacity then it is Article 148.
That Carino vs. Carino ruling (2001), is actually a deviant ruling, because
*Then Maam G proceeded in identifying which among the listed void the proper interpretation are the cases of Valdez and Buenaventura
marriages fell under 147 and 148. A better table is provided at the end (2005). So it shows that the SC now had acknowledged that they were
of the TSN which was taken from the notes made by Ms.Batacan mistaken in their decision in the case of Carino. It reversed itself and
went back to the Valdez ruling.
1. Article 35
a Non-age 148 In short, that subsequent void marriage under Article 40 when the
b Absence of Authority 147 marriage is terminated, it will not be governed by 147 or 148 but rather,
c Absence of License 147 129 or 102. Do you follow?
d Polygamous/Bigamous Marriage 148
e Mistake as to the identity 147 We are referring to the liquidation, huuuy! We are referring to the
f Subsequent Marriages Void in 147 liquidation. Kuha ninyo? (ahhaa! Sorry last na to) Liquidation ang pinag-
Article 53 uusapan natin ha because 147 and 148 refers to liquidation of
2. Article 36 147 properties acquired during the cohabitation of a man and a woman
3. Article 37 148 living together exclusively as husband and wife without the benefit of
4. Article 38 148 marriage or void marriages, where the parties have no impediment to
5. Article 40 marry each other, only that the marriage is void.
a. First Void Marriage 147/148
b Second Marriage Void Marriage 102(ACP)/129(CPG) Article 148 applies to a situation where the relationship is adulterous or
by express provision under a state of concubinage or non-age, or 37 on incestuous marriages,
of Article50 or 38 on marriages void for reasons of public policy.
6. Article 44 148
So ngayon, the prevailing doctrine is the subsequent void marriage
under Article 40, when it is terminated, the property shall be liquidated
For Article 40, if you go to the decision of the court in the case of
in accordance to 102 or 129, depending on their property regime. Gets?
CARINO VS. CARINO (overturned ruling), anong sabi ng court? If the
Questions? Mahirap kasi yan. I have to read and re-read otherwise wala
first marriage subsists, it is 147. The subsequent marriage is void it is
akong mukhang maiharap sa inyo. But that really is how the SC have
148.
interpreted the provisions.
But take note of the decision of the court in the case of Valdes vs. RTC
Definitely, yung subsequent void marriage will be governed by Article
Branch 102 of QC.
43, the effects, so yung number 2 thereof refers to the liquidation,
partition, and dissolution of the ACP or CP, so paano mo siya iliquidate,
Valdes vs. RTC Branch 102 of QC
doon ka mag refer sa 102 or 129. Okay? Yehey. (lol)
July 31, 1996
Tapusin nalang natin ha.
The first paragraph of Articles 50 of the Family Code, applying
paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 relates only, by its explicit
JOHN ABING vs. JULIET WAEYAN
terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages
JULY 31, 2006
under Article 40 of the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a
subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage
Here, is Ejectment the proper remedy if the parties to the cohabitation
before the latter is judicially declared void. The latter is a special rule
would decide to terminate their relationship, and one of the parties
that somehow recognizes the philosophy and an old doctrine that void
would now buy the share of the other party?
marriages are inexistent from the very beginning and no judicial
decree is necessary to establish their nullity. In now requiring for
Juliet agreed to pay the share of John but there was non-payment of
purposes of remarriage, the declaration of nullity by final judgment of
the purchase price. So John filed an ejectment suit against Juliet.
the previously contracted void marriage, the present law aims to do
away with any continuing uncertainty on the status of the second
Held: The SC said no, because it was never shown that they were
marriage
exclusive owners of the property. The remedy of John would have to
be to ask for the payment of the purchase price or rescission of the
The SC said that exceptionally, Article 40 of the family code referring to
MOA.
the subsequent void marriage, void because of the absence of the
declaration of nullity of the previous void marriage, when it is
METROBANK vs. PASCUAL 547 SCRA 246
terminated, the property shall be liquidated in accordance to 102 or
February 29, 2009
129, depending on their property regime.
The marriage was terminated under Article 36, but before the
So the first marriage of Article 40 will be governed either by 147 or 148,
liquidation of the conjugal assets, the ex-husband decided to leave the
depending on the disability, isn’t?
conjugal dwelling. The former wife then mortgaged the property to the
bank. And when foreclosure was published, Nicholson filed this
Okay, for example, the first marriage is void because it is bigamous, they
petition for the annulment of the foreclosure claiming that he did not
should have obtained first a decree of nullity of the marriage, isn’t? But
give his consent to the mortgage.
if the party who is capacitated to marry under that bigamous marriage
will not obtain a decree of nullity of that previous void marriage and
Held: According to the court, (and ito kasi yung issue ngayon eh, even
contracts a subsequent marriage and that subsequent marriage is
lawyers would ask me this, paano ko daw iexplain) for as long as the
terminated, what would govern the properties that they have acquired
marriage is subsisting, even though void, it is still governed by the
during their marriage? The SC is clear in the case of Valdes that it should
conjugal partnership. But once the court declares the marriage void,
be in relation to article 50 of the FC, that the effects of article 43, 2,3, 4
then it is terminated, isn’t?
and 5 shall apply to voidable marriages under article 45 and
exceptionally to Article 40 to void marriages by reason of the absence of
So what happens if there is no liquidation, then it will already be
the declaration of the previous void marriage. Kuha ninyo? (Class:
governed by co-ownership. That was the ruling of the court in this
silence was everywhere… )
case.
Kasi, you go back to Article 50. The effects mentioned in Article 43
So, what is only valid as to what was mortgaged was only the share of
paragraphs 2,3,4 and 5 apply to voidable marriages under Article 45 and
Florencia but not as to the share of Nicholson because once the court
to void marriages under Article 40. So saan yang Article 40 na void
declared the marriage void, they are already governed by the rules on
marriage, does it refer to the first void marriage or does it refer to the
co-ownership, no longer the conjugal partnership.
subsequent void marriage, and this was answered by the SC in the case

TRANSCRIBED BY: Abad | Amparo | Candolita | Confesor | Estillore | Lavares | Licayan | Mortejo | Resurreccion G. | Resurreccion Q.|
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS Review – First Exam Coverage| 1st Semester S.Y. 2018-2019
From the Lectures of Atty. Lydia Galas 48
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OCAMPO v. OCAMPO Held: The SC said that only 1 of the 8 properties shall be owned by
GR# 198908 08/03/2015 Castillo. The others, in as much as they were acquired under the FC, it
shall be governed by Article 148. And in as much as it can be proven
This is the application of Article 129. The marriage was declared void that Malilin has contributed to the acquisition thereof, he being the
under Article 36, and the issue is with respect to how will you liquidate President and the woman is the treasurer.
(isn’t that part of the decision would be liquidation)?
JACINTO SAGUID vs. CA
So the SC said that you comply with Article 129. In this case, they were JUNE 10, 2003
required to submit an inventory of their properties, and later, another
order was for them to inform the court as to the division of their Saguid is the literal application of 148, because there was this receipt
properties, and since there was none, the court awarded the presented by Gina respecting the contribution of the construction of
properties equally to the spouses. the house, what she presented was only P11,000. So yun lang yung
kanya. But with respect to the movables acquired during the
This was objected to by the wife, claiming that the husband should be cohabitation, there was this admission on the part of the man that both
deprived of the properties because he was in bad faith, by reason of of them have contributed to the acquisition.
sexual perversion. According to the wife, the husband did not
participate in the acquisition of the properties and the capital here
came from her mother. LUPO ATIENZA vs. YOLANDA DE CASTRO
508 S 593
Held: The SC said, citing Article 147 and in relation to other cases,
even if the wife did not participate in the acquisition of the properties, There was absence of proof on the part of the man that he contributed
she is entitled to the share, ½, in the absence of proof to the contrary, to the acquisition of the house in Bell Air. Sabi ng court, it was proven
even if her contribution consists only to the maintenance of the family that the woman Eulanda has the capacity to acquire such as she was
home. Then why should the husband be deprived of his share in the engaged in the foreign currency exchange trading and jewelry retail.
property, as , in the case at bar?
BORROMEO vs. DESCALLAR
There was absence of proof of the sexual perversion. There was 580 SCRA 175 February 24, 2009
absence of proof as to the source of the capital, thus, the husband is
still entitled to ½ of the properties. There was no forfeiture. This refers to Jambrich, an Austrian national who bought 2 properties
in Mandue. The ROD of Mandaue denied registration because of the
Kasi may forfeiture sa 147 ha. Oh, yun na nakalimutan ko. Constitutional prohibition, so while they erased the name of
Jambbrich, his signatures were not, it was all found in the deed of sale.
Forfeiture. The forfeiture in 147 is different from the forfeiture in Jambrich had obligations to Borromeo, to pay these, he now needed
Article 43 number 2. the 2 parcels of land registered in the name of Descallar.

Article 147. Xxx Held: According to the Court, there was indeed no doubt that Jambrich
was the one who purchased the property because his signatures were
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the all over the document. If someone else had questioned it earlier, then it
share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in would have been invalidated. But in this case, the defect was cured by
favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any the subsequent transfer of the property from the alien to a Filipinol
or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share national. The SC citing another case said that, if the foreigner who
shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of bought a property subsequently obtained a Filipino citizenship, then
descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the defect is already cured.
the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
(144a) LAVADIA v. HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA
730 S 314
Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the
preceding Article shall produce the following effects: In the absence of proof as to the actual contribution of Soledad to the
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal properties they acquired during the cohabitation, then it should belong
partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and to the first marriage.
liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in
bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the Wooo! This is the coverage no for the first exam? Ok, so I’ll see
community property or conjugal partnership property shall yooouuoh.
be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are
none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous
marriage or in default of children, the innocent spouse;

Kasi dito, it is the entire share that is forfeited, but this only applies to
void marriages. And also to whom will the forfeited share go? In Article
43 it refers to the common children, then the children of the guilty
spouse from a previous marriage, then the children of the innocent
spouse. Dito, the common children, in their absence, respective
surviving descendants, then to the innocent party.

The same forfeiture also applies to Article 148. Only that, if there is a
valid subsisting marriage, it will belong now to the subsisting valid
marriage. It was held in the SC in the case of Agapay vs. Pangan.

Mallilin, Jr. vs. Castillo


333 S 628

The relationship started when the Civil Code was still in effect and they
acquired 8 parcels of land, but all these were registered in the name of
Castillo. So when they decided to terminate their relationship, Castillo
now claims that she entirely owned all the properties acquired during
the cohabitation. Because there is absence in Article 144 of the Civil
Code, it only speaks of relationship where there is no impediment
between the parties. Both of them have an impediment.

TRANSCRIBED BY: Abad | Amparo | Candolita | Confesor | Estillore | Lavares | Licayan | Mortejo | Resurreccion G. | Resurreccion Q.|
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS Review – First Exam Coverage| 1st Semester S.Y. 2018-2019
From the Lectures of Atty. Lydia Galas 49
4-Manresa | Ateneo de Davao University College of Law

*Table taken from the Notes of Maria Ayra Batcan (2017)

TRANSCRIBED BY: Abad | Amparo | Candolita | Confesor | Estillore | Lavares | Licayan | Mortejo | Resurreccion G. | Resurreccion Q.|