RSE Crim Law Case Digests 2018 (EDITED)

SURVEY OF CASES IN CRIMINAL LAW Formatted: Don't add space between paragraphs of the
same style
(January to December 2018)
AttyATTY. RAMON S. ESGUERRA
JANUARY 2018 Formatted: Font: Bold, Underline

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of the same style
People v. Villacampa
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G.R. No. 216057, 8 January 2018 same style
Carpio, J. Formatted: Style1, Left
TOPIC: Acts of Lasciviousness/Rape Formatted: Don't add space between paragraphs of the
same style
FACTS:
Sometime in March 2006, four (4) minor siblings — AAA, BBB, CCC and DDD all had
incidents with Villacampa, the common-law husband of their mother. The RTC found
Villacampa guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the charged crimes against each of the minors.
The RTC’s findings were affirmed by the Court of Appeals. AAA, BBB, CCC and DDD all
underwent medical examination with the assistance of their father and aunt. For his defense,
Villacampa, on appeal with the Supreme Court, argues that the lower courts erred in finding
him guilty of the crimes charged as the prosecution failed to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in finding Villacampa guilty of nine
(9) counts of rape through sexual assault in relation to Section 5 (b) of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7610, one (1) count of simple rape under the Revised Penal Code, and one (1) count of sexual
abuse under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610.
HELD:
The first element is the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct. As found by the
lower courts, Villacampa inserted his finger into the vagina of his minor victims in FC
Criminal Case Nos. 1359-1367. In FC Criminal Case No. 1369, Villacampa kissed CCC on the
lips, face, and neck against her will. Villacampa even inserted his finger into CCC's vagina,
even though this was not included in the Information against him. Thus, it is evident that
Villacampa committed an act of lascivious conduct against each of his victims.
The second element is that the act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse. To meet this element, the child victim must either be exploited
in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse. In this case, Villacampa, the common-law
husband of their mother, repeated the lascivious conduct against his victims, who were all
under his coercion and influence. Clearly, the second element is present and all the child
victims are considered to be subjected to other sexual abuse.
The third element, i.e., that the child is below 18 years of age, has been sufficiently
proven during the trial of the case for all of the victims. In sum, we find that all the elements
were proven beyond reasonable doubt.
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People v. Alapan
G.R. No. 199527, 10 January, 2018
Martires, J.
TOPIC: Subsidiary Imprisonment
FACTS:
In an Information dated 26 May 2006, respondent Salvador Alapan (Alapan) and his
wife Myrna Alapan (Myrna) were charged with eight (8) counts of violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22). They were convicted. They filed a petition seeking the
imposition of subsidiary imprisonment for non-payment of fine in eight (8) cases of violation
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22).
ISSUE:
Whether Alapan may undergo subsidiary imprisonment for failure to pay the fine.
HELD:
No. Administrative Circular No. 13-2001 provides that "should only a fine be imposed
and the accused be unable to pay the fine, there is no legal obstacle to the application of the
Revised Penal Code provisions on subsidiary imprisonment." However, the Circular does not
sanction indiscriminate imposition of subsidiary imprisonment for the same must still comply
with the law. Here, the judgment of conviction did not provide subsidiary imprisonment in
case of failure to pay the penalty of fine. Thus, subsidiary imprisonment may not be imposed
without violating the RPC and the constitutional provision on due process.
Punongbayan-Visitacion v. People
G.R. No. 194214, 10 January 2018
Martires, J.
TOPIC: Libel; Fine
FACTS:
Petitioner Marilou Punongbayan-Visitacion (Visitacion) was the corporate secretary

and assistant treasurer of St. Peter's College of Iligan City. On 26 July 1999, acting on the
advice of her counsel, she wrote a letter to private respondent Carmelita P. Punongbayan
(Punongbayan). Insulted, Punongbayan filed a Complaint for Libel against Visitacion. On 25
October 1999, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City issued a resolution approving the
filing of a case for libel against Visitacion.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals acted contrary to law when it, in effect, brushed aside
Visitacion's alternative plea for the application of preference of fine over imprisonment as
penalty for libel.
HELD:
A review of A.C. No. 08-08 reveals that it was issued to embody the Court's preference,
as espoused in previous jurisprudence, to impose only a fine for conviction of libel. Said
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circular, however, does not remove the discretion of courts to sentence to imprisonment the
accused in libel cases should the circumstances warrant. In other words, judicial policy states a
fine alone is generally acceptable as a penalty for libel. Nevertheless, the courts may impose
imprisonment as a penalty if, under the circumstances, a fine is insufficient to meet the
demands of substantial justice or would depreciate the seriousness of the offense. Thus,
pursuant to the policy in A.C. No. 08-08, the Court finds that the imposition of a fine, instead
of imprisonment, is sufficient in the present case. It is noteworthy that Visitacion is a first-time
offender with no other criminal record under her name. Further, the degree of publication is
not that widespread considering that the libelous letter was circulated only to a few
individuals.
People vs. Alvaro

G.R. No. 225596, 10 January 2018
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
TOPIC: R.A. No. 9165; Section 21 (Chain of Custody)
FACTS:
The instant case stemmed from an Information filed with the RTC charging
accused-appellants of violating Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, as amended, and another
Information accusing Geronimo of violating Section 11 of the same law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused-appellants' convictions for violation of Section 5, Article II of

R.A. No. 9165, and Geronimo's conviction for violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165
should be upheld.
HELD:
In view of the unaccounted gap in the chain of custody and the multiple unrecognized
and unjustified departures of the police officers from the established procedure set under
Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR), the
Supreme Court therefore concluded that the integrity and evidentiary value of the subject
drugs had been compromised. Case law states that in cases involving dangerous drugs, the
drugs presented as the corpus delicti of the offense must be established with moral certainty to
be the same illicit substance taken from the accused. Absent such conclusive identification,
there can be no finding of guilt on the part of the accused. The persistence of reasonable doubt
on the identity of the drugs seized from the accused results in the latter's acquittal, as in this
case.
People v. Udang
G.R. No. 210161, 10 January 2018
Leonen, J.
TOPIC: Rape but convicted of sexual/child abuse
FACTS:
On 8 December 2005, two (2) Informations for child abuse were filed against Udang
with the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City. Branch 22, The trial court found for the
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prosecution and convicted Udang of rape under Article 266-A(l) of the Revised Penal Code,
instead of sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610.
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused-appellant, Bienvinido Udang, Sr. y Sevilla, was correctly

convicted of rape punished under the first paragraph of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal
Code.
HELD:
The appeal is affirmed with modification. Based on the Informations, Udang was
charged with two (2) counts of sexual abuse punished under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610.
Hence, he could only be convicted of sexual abuse under the Informations filed in this case
and not for rape under the Revised Penal Code. Furthermore, upon examination of the
evidence presented, this Court finds Udang guilty of two (2) counts of sexual abuse. Thus, the
penalty erroneously imposed on him--reclusion perpetua for each count of rape--should be
reduced accordingly.
A single act may give rise to multiple offenses. Thus, charging an accused with rape,
under the Revised Penal Code, and with sexual abuse, under Republic Act No. 7610, in case
the offended party is a child 12 years old and above, will not violate the right of the accused
against double jeopardy.
People v. Mejaras
G.R. No. 225735, 10 January 2018
Leonen, J.
TOPIC: Qualified Theft
FACTS:
In an Information dated 24 May 2012, accused-appellant Belen Mejares was charged

with qualified theft of cash and jewelry amounting to Pl,556,308.00. After trial, the RTC found
accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified theft of assets
amounting to Pl,056,308.00.
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused-appellant Mejares is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the

crime of qualified theft.
HELD:
This Court affirms with modification the conviction of accused-appellant Mejares for
the crime of qualified theft. While this Court finds no reversible error in the ruling that she
was guilty beyond reasonable doubt, this Court finds it necessary to modify the penalty
initially imposed upon her. In light of the recently enacted Republic Act No. 10951 R.A. No.
10951, which adjusted the amounts of property and damage on which penalties are based,
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and considering the prosecution's failure to
establish the precise values of the stolen items, accused-appellant must be ordered released on
time served.
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People v. Gimpaya
G.R. No. 227395, 10 January 2018
Caguioa, J.
TOPIC: Murder
FACTS:
Before this Court is an Appeal filed under Section 13, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court
from the Decision 2 (assailed Decision) dated 18 September 2015 of the Court of Appeals, 6th
Division in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 06785. The assailed Decision affirmed the Judgment (RTC
Decision) dated 24 January 2014 of the RTC of Biñan, Laguna, Branch 24, in Crim. Case No.
11475-B, finding herein accused-appellant Oscar Gimpaya (Oscar) and his co-accused Roel
Gimpaya (Roel) guilty of the crime of Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC).
The Information states as follows: “That on or about September 16, 2000, in the
Municipality of Biñan, Province of Laguna, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused Oscar Gimpaya and Roel Gimpaya conspiring, confederating
together and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, abuse of superior strength and
treachery while conveniently armed with a deadly bladed weapons (sic) (kampitan), did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab Genelito Clete y
Gabuyo several times on the trunk which directly caused his death, to the damage and
prejudice of his surviving heirs. CONTRARY TO LAW.” Oscar entered a plea of "not guilty"
upon his arraignment. Roel was still at-large as of the promulgation of the RTC Decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Oscar's guilt for the crime of Murder was proven beyond reasonable
doubt.
HELD:
In this case, the Supreme Court found that the prosecution failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the existence of conspiracy between accused appellant Oscar and his
co-accused Roel in the killing of Genelito. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come
to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. The essence
of conspiracy is the unity of action and purpose. Conspiracy requires the same degree of proof
required to establish the crime — proof beyond reasonable doubt. The RTC did not discuss its
finding of conspiracy; it merely held that "both accused acted in concert towards a common
criminal goal." Conspiracy was not also discussed by the CA. The records are also wanting
of any indication of conspiracy. To determine whether Oscar conspired with Roel, the Court
must examine the overt acts of accused-appellant before, during, and after the stabbing
incident and the totality of the circumstances. The inception and location of the stabbing
incident must also be considered.
As admitted by Roselyn herself, she did not witness the actual stabbing incident.
Furthermore, her testimony that she saw Oscar strangling her husband is not supported by
the Medico-Legal Report and Death Certificate which both declare the cause of death as
"stab wound" and not strangulation. There were also no findings of abrasions or bruising in
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the neck and jaw area in the said documents to indicate strangulation. Absent any evidence
to create the moral certainty required to convict accused-appellant Oscar, the Court cannot
uphold the RTC and CA's finding of guilt. Oscar's guilt was not proven beyond reasonable
doubt.
People v. Pimentel
G.R. No. 223099, 11 January 2018
Tijam, J.
TOPIC: Finality of Acquittal Doctrine
FACTS:
Accused-appellant was charged with two counts of rape, defined and penalized
under Article 266-A, paragraph l(a) of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Republic Act
No. 83693 , of a 12-year old minor, AAA. Upon arraignment, accused-appellant entered a
plea of not guilty and trial ensued. On July 26, 2011, the RTC promulgated a Decision
acquitting the accused-appellant. On the same day, however, the RTC recalled the said
decision and issued an Order. Accused-appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration 10
arguing that a judgment of acquittal is immediately final and executory and can neither be
withdrawn nor modified, because to do so would place an accused-appellant in double
jeopardy. The RTC denied the motion in an Order.
ISSUE:
Whether or not double jeopardy has attached.
HELD:
The appeal has merit. In our jurisdiction, We adhere to the finality-of-acquittal

doctrine, that is, a judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable. Here, all the elements
were present. There was a valid information for two counts of rape over which the RTC had
jurisdiction and to which the accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty. After the trial, a
judgment of acquittal was thereafter rendered and promulgated on July 25, 2011. What is
peculiar in this case is that a judgment of acquittal was rendered based on the mistaken
notion that the private complainant failed to testify; allegedly because of the mix-up of
orders with a different case involving the same accused-appellant. This, however, does not
change the fact that a judgment of acquittal had already been promulgated. Indeed, a
judgment of acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or the appellate court, is final,
unappealable, and immediately executory upon its promulgation.
People v. Hilario
G.R. No. 210610, 11 January 2018
Leonardo-De Castro, J.
TOPIC: R.A. No. 9165; Section 5 (Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs)
FACTS:
This is an appeal filed by accused-appellant Marilou D. Hilario (Hilario) of the

Decision dated 18 July 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05244,
affirming with modification the Decision dated August' 23, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Lemery, Batangas, Branch 5 in Criminal (Crim.) Case Nos. 10-2008, 11-2008, and
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13-2008. In its assailed Decision, the appellate court found Hilario guilty of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs, in violation of Article II, Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165; but acquitted Hilario
and her co-accused Lalaine R. Guadayo (Guadayo) of illegal possession of dangerous drugs,
penalized under Article II, Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165. The RTC had previously convicted
Hilario and Guadayo of all charges against them.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution failed to establish the elements of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs, penalized under Article II, Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165.
HELD:
Yes, the lack of specific details on the planning and conduct of the buy-bust
operation on 22 January 2008 in Brgy. Maguihan casts serious doubts that it actually took
place and/or that the police officers carried out the same in the regular performance of their
official duties.
Furthermore, the prosecution failed to present during the trial the corpus delicti.
There were material inconsistencies between POI de Sagun's testimony vis-a-vis the object
and documentary evidence submitted by the prosecution itself which rendered highly
questionable whether the dangerous drug presented before the ~TC during trial was .
actually the same as that seized from Hilario during the buy-bust operation.
The identity and integrity of the sachet of shabu allegedly seized by PO1 de Sagun
from Hilario were not preserved, despite PO1 de Sagun's assertion that he had been in
possession of the said sachet from its seizure from Hilario until its turnover to the crime
laboratory. The prosecution failed to establish the identity of the corpus delicti, much less,
the identity of the corpus delicti with moral certainty. When there are doubts on whether the
seized substance was the same substance examined and established to be the prohibited
drug, there can be no crime of illegal possession or illegal sale of a prohibited drug. The
prosecution's failure to prove that the specimen allegedly seized from Hilario was the same
one presented in court is fatal to its case.
People v. Golidan
G.R. No. 205307, 11 January 2018
Leonardo-De Castro; J.
TOPIC: Alibi and Conspiracy
FACTS:
On 5 September 1995 Assistant City Prosecutor Elmer M. Sagsago filed 3 separate

Informations, approved by City Prosecutor Erdolfo V. Balajadia, with RTC of Baguio City
against appellants Golidan, Nacionales, Ogsila, and a certain "John Doe," for rape with
homicide, murder, and frustrated murder of Elizabeth Leo, Namuel Aniban, and Cherry
Mae Bantiway, respectively.
ISSUES: Formatted: Don't add space between paragraphs of the

same style, Numbered + Level: 1 + Numbering Style: a, b, c,
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(a) Whether accused’s defense of alibi is meritorious Indent at: 1"
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(b) Whether or not conspiracy exists. Formatted: Don't add space between paragraphs of the
same style, Numbered + Level: 1 + Numbering Style: a, b, c,
… + Start at: 1 + Alignment: Left + Aligned at: 0.75" +
Indent at: 1"
HELD: Formatted: Don't add space between paragraphs of the

same style
Accused’s conviction must be sustained.
(a) As regards the appellants' defense of alibi, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the
same crumbles in the ·face of the positive identification made by Cherry Mae. For alibi to
prosper, it is not enough for the accused to prove that he/she was elsewhere when the crime
was committed, but he/she must also demonstrate that it would be physically impossible for
him/her to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. In the case at bar, aside
from the positive identification made by Cherry Mae, several witnesses saw the appellants
in the vicinity of San Carlos Heights, Baguio City in the morning of 20 January 1995. Thus, it
goes without saying that it was not physically impossible for the appellants to be at the
scene of the crime.
(b) Anent the issue of conspiracy, the Court of Appeals stated that for collective
responsibility to be established, it is not necessary that conspiracy be proven by direct
evidence or prior agreement to commit the crime nor is it essential that there be proof of
previous agreement to commit a crime. Conspiracy may logically be inferred from acts and
circumstances showing the existence of a common design to commit the offense charged. It
is sufficient that the malefactors acted in concert pursuant to the same objective. Due to
conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Furthermore, conspiracy exists when, at the time of
the commission of the offense, the malefactors had the same purpose and were united in
their action.
People v. Reyes
G.R. No. 224498, 11 January 2018
Tijam, J.
TOPIC: Self-Defense; No unlawful aggression
FACTS:
Accused-appellant was charged with the murder of Danilo Estrella y Sanchez

(Danilo) in an Information dated 1 August 1991. The RTC gave more weight to the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and rejected accused-appellant's claim of
self-defense, finding no clear and convincing proof that Danilo had assaulted him or posed
an imminent threat to him. The RTC held that the killing was attended by treachery because
accused-appellant fired at Danilo suddenly and without giving him the chance to run or
defend himself The trial court likewise appreciated the qualifying circumstance of evident
premeditation, holding that accused-appellant had sufficient time to contemplate his actions
while sitting in his rocking chair before emerging from his house armed with a rifle, ready to
kill. On appeal, the CA sustained the RTC's finding that the killing was not done in
self-defense in the absence of unlawful aggression. However, finding no sufficient evidence
that would establish the aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation,
the appellate court downgraded accused-appellant's conviction from murder to homicide.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the conviction of accused is correct.

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HELD:
The verdict of conviction is affirmed. By invoking self-defense, accused-appellant

admitted inflicting the fatal injuries· that caused Danila's death, albeit under circumstances
that, if proven, would have ·exculpated him. With this admission, the burden of proof
shifted to him to show that the killing was attended by the following circumstances: (1)
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent ·or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the
part of the person invoking self-defense. Unlawful aggression is the indispensable element
of self-defense, for if no unlawful aggression attributed to the victim is established,
self-defense is unavailing for there is nothing to repel. Verily, there can be no self-defense,
whether complete or incomplete, unless the victim had committed unlawful aggression
against the person invoking it as a justifying circumstance
There is nothing in the records which would clearly and convincingly prove Enrique's Formatted: Indent: First line: 0.29", Don't add space
between paragraphs of the same style
claim that his life was in danger when he saw Danilo. Enrique claimed that when Celia
shouted his name, he saw Danilo who was about to shoot him. However, based on Celia's
testimony, Danilo was only approaching Enrique while holding a gun. Celia did 路 hnot
witness any positive act showing the actual and material unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim. Even P/Insp. Gary, whom Enrique presented as an alleged eyewitness, only
testified that he saw a man carrying a small firearm approachingi1ig Enrique and when the
latter turned to his right, a volley of gunshots followed. Evidently, the records of this case
are -bereft of any indication of unlawful aggression that would justify a finding of
self-defense.
same style
People v. Panerio
G.R. No. 205440, 15 January 2018
Martires, J.
TOPIC: Self-Defense
FACTS:
On 18 February 1991, at around 10:00p.m., at the billiard hall of a certain Piatos in

Minta!, Davao City, Panerio and Orteza, both drunk, scattered the billiard balls causing
disruption of the billiard games going on there; thus, the games stopped. Thereafter, Panerio
and Orteza left the billiard hall,,8 and saw Elesio on the road. While under the influence of
alcohol, Panerio and Orteza repeatedly stabbed Elesio. Panerio, using a fan knife or balisong,
was in front of the victim; while Orteza, using an ice pick, was at the victim's back. On 23
February 1991, Panerio and Orteza were charged with the crime of murder committed upon
the person of one Elesio4 Ung (Elesio) in an Information. In its decision, dated 4 February
2009, the RTC found Panerio and Orteza guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder. The trial court deemed Orteza had waived his right to present evidence because he
escaped detention.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Panerio’s self-defense is meritorious.

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HELD:
No. The Supreme Court was convinced of Panerio' s failure to prove that he acted in
self-defense when he and Orteza killed Elesio. Most important among the requisites of
self-defense is unlawful aggression which is the condition sine qua non for upholding
self-defense as justifying circumstance. Unless the victim commits unlawful aggression
against the accused, self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, cannot be appreciated,
for the two other essential elements of self-defense would have no factual and legal bases
without any unlawful aggression to prevent or repel. As aptly stated by the trial court,
Panerio' s uncorroborated testimony regarding the incident is unclear and unconvincing. His
assertion that Elesio, then drunk, boxed him and attempted to stab him is unsubstantiated
by any convincing proof. Moreover, Panerio's account on how many times he stabbed the
victim is miserably inconsistent with the post-mortem findings on the deceased.
Even on the assumption that Elesio was the unlawful aggressor, self-defense cannot
be appreciated on account of the evident lack of reasonable means employed necessary to
repel it. To recall, the post-mortem findings reveal that Elesio sustained eleven (11) stab and
puncture wounds. The Supreme Court found as without any basis the trial and appellate
courts' conclusion that treachery attended the commission of the crime. In fact, the trial court
merely concluded that the crime committed was murder without a single mention of any
aggravating circumstance that supposedly qualified the crime. Similarly, the appellate court
simply concurred with the trial court and ruled that the attack was treacherous because it
was sudden and unexpected, without citing any evidence showing that the attack was
indeed done so. Thus, Panerio and Orteza are found guilty for the crime of Homicide.
People v. Empuesto
G.R. No. 218245, 17 January 2018
Martires, J. Formatted: Font: Bold
TOPIC: Rape
FACTS:
In an Information docketed as Crim. Case No. 06-1679, accused-appellant was

charged with rape, which reads: “That on or about the 3rd day of July 2005 in the
Municipality of Danao, Province of Bohol, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused with criminal intent, that is, carnal lecherous
desire, with force, threat, and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously have carnal knowledge with victim AAA by inserting his penis into the vagina
of the said victim against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice in the amount to
be proved during the trial. Acts committed contrary to law, that is, Art. 266-A 1 (a) of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended. When arraigned, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty.
After trial, accused-appellant was convicted of rape.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the conviction of the accused for rape should be affirmed.
HELD:
For a charge of rape under Article 266-A(1) of R.A. No. 8353 to prosper, it must be
proved that (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman, and (2) he accomplished
such act through force or intimidation, or when she was deprived of reason or otherwise
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unconscious, or when she was under 12 years of age or was demented. The gravamen of
rape under Article 266-A (1) is carnal knowledge of a woman against her will or without her
consent. Moreover, what is decisive in a charge of rape is the complainant's positive
identification of the accused as the malefactor. Records will confirm that AAA was able to
positively identify accused-appellant as the person who surreptitiously entered her house.
She knew accused-appellant because they were neighbors. Her husband was the godfather
of accused-appellant's eldest son, thus, he called her "marehan." On the early dawn of 3 July
2005, AAA was roused from her sleep when she heard a noise coming through the bamboo
slats floor of her house. Because the room where AAA and her children were sleeping was
lighted, she was able to distinctly see accused-appellant armed with a bolo and standing
beside the mosquito net. She saw accused-appellant tum off the light and get inside the
mosquito net.
Indeed, even if accused-appellant turned off the light, she was sure that it was he
who got inside the mosquito net because she clearly recognized his voice, viz: when he
threatened her not to make any noise, otherwise, he would kill her and her children; when
he told her that he needed only her; when he ordered her to remove her panty; and when he
instructed her to breastfeed her youngest child who was then crying. AAA testified that
because she was immobilized by fear, accused-appellant was the one who removed her
panty. Accused-appellant then positioned himself on top of her and inserted his penis into
her vagina; these he did while she was breastfeeding her child. Undeniably, all the elements
of rape had been clearly and effectively proven by the prosecution and convinced the Court
to sustain the findings of the trial court.
People v. Santos
G.R. No. 223142, 22 January 2018.
Martires; J.
TOPIC: R.A. No 9165; Section 21 (Chain of Custody)
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Santos was charged before the RTC of Caloocan City with three (3)
counts of violation of certain provisions of R.A. No. 9165, as amended. Prior to the
application on 20 August 2009 by Atty. Liwalug for a search warrant before the RTC, Manila,
the RAID-NBI received information from their confidential informant that there was a group
of individuals at Tagaytay St., Caloocan City, selling drugs and using minors as runners.
After Atty. Liwalug interviewed the informant, she, along with an NBI team and the
technical staff of IJmbestigador, a GMA Channel 7 investigative program, went to the
reported area to conduct surveillance. The actual surveillance, where videos were taken of
the buying, selling, and use of drugs in the different houses on Tagaytay St., lasted for 2
weeks. During the first test-buy, Bomediano was able to buy shabu from Santos alias
"Rolando Tabo." Two informants were used by the NBI for the surveillance but the spy
camera was attached to only one of them. The informants were able to buy drugs from
Santos and to use them inside his house. The RTC ruled that the entry in the house of Santos
by the NBI team and the subsequent confiscation of the paraphernalia and marijuana were
valid and legal since the team had a search warrant. Moreover, it held that the search was
conducted following proper procedure.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the conviction of the accused should be set aside.

12
HELD:
Santos’ conviction must be affirmed. The Court has explained in a catena of cases the
four (4) links that should be established in the chain of custody of the confiscated item: first,
the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending
officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the
illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and
submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court. On the
first link, jurisprudence dictates that '"(m)arking' is the placing by the apprehending officer
of some distinguishing signs with his/her initials and signature on the items seized. It helps
ensure that the dangerous drugs seized upon apprehension are the same dangerous drugs
subjected to inventory and photography when these activities are undertaken at the police
station or at some other practicable venue rather than at the place of arrest. Consistency with
the 'chain of custody' rule requires that the 'marking' of the seized items -- to truly ensure
that they are the same items that enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in
evidence -- should be done (i) in the presence of the apprehended violator and (ii)
immediately upon confiscation.
Noteworthy, the legal teaching in our jurisprudence is that "the integrity of the
evidence is presumed to have been preserved unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill will,
or proof that the evidence has been tampered with. Santos had miserably failed in
presenting any evidence that would justify a finding that the NBI team had ill motive in
tampering with the evidence in order to hold him liable for these grave offenses.
People v. Amarela
G.R. Nos. 225642-43, 17 January 2018
Martires, J.
TOPIC: Rape
FACTS:
This is an appeal from the 17 February 2016 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR HC Nos. 01226-MIN and 01227-MIN affirming in toto the 26 June 2012 Joint
Judgment of the RTC, Branch 11 of Davao City. The RTC found Juvy D. Amarela (Amarela)
and Junard G. Racho (Racho) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) different charges of
rape. In its joint judgment, the RTC found AAA's testimony, positively identifying both
Amarela and Racho, to be clear, positive, and straightforward. Hence, the trial court did not
give much weight to their denial as these could not have overcome the categorical testimony
of AAA. As a result, Amarela and Racho were convicted.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the conviction of the accused was proper.
HELD:
The lacerations were found only at the 9 o'clock and 3 o'clock positions of the hymen.
Considering the locality of these lacerations, we cannot completely rule out the probability
that AAA voluntarily had sex that night. Moreover, the absence of bruises on AAA' s thighs
-(when she said she was punched there twice) -reinforces the theory that AAA may have
had consensual intercourse.
13
Rape is essentially a crime committed through force or intimidation, that is, against
the will of the female. It is also committed without force or intimidation when carnal
knowledge of a female is alleged and shown to be without her consent. Carnal knowledge of
the female with her consent is not rape, provided she is above the age of consent or is
capable in the eyes of the law of giving consent. The female must not at any time consent. If ;
her consent is, given at any time prior to the penetration, however reluctantly given, or if
accompanied with mere verbal protests and refusals, it prevents the act from being rape,
provided the consent is willing and free of initial coercion.
Although Amarela or Racho did not raise consensual intercourse as a defense, Wwe
must bear in mind that the burden of proof is never shifted and Aas to Racho's case, we note
that AAA testified only once for both criminal cases. This means that both Amarela and
Racho were convicted based on her lone testimony.
The prosecution in this case miserably failed to present a clear story of what
transpired. Here, we cannot ascertain what happened based on the lone testimony of AAA.
It should have been the prosecution's duty to properly evaluate the evidence if it had
enough to convict Amarela or Racho. Henceforth, we are constrained to reverse the R TC
and the CA rulings due to the presence of lingering doubts which are inconsistent with the
requirement of guilt beyond reasonable doubt as quantum of evidence to convict an accused
in a criminal case. Amarela and Racho are entitled to an acquittal, as a matter of right,
because the prosecution has failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
People v. Ramirez
G.R. No. 225690, 17 January 2018
Martires, J.
FACTS:
Lachica and Ramirez were charged before the RTC, Branch 259, Paranaque City, in
Criminal Case No. 08-1386 for violation of Section 5, in relation to Section 26, Article II of
R.A. No. 9165. In its 30 October 2013 Decision, the RTC found Lachica and Ramirez guilty as
charged. It rejected their defense of denial and frame-up because it was self-serving,
uncorroborated, and inherently weak. The RTC held that the prosecution was able to prove a
valid entrapment operation. It further ruled that the PDEA agents' failure to strictly comply
with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 was excusable since there was substantial compliance in
preserving the identity and integrity of the drugs seized.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the conviction of the accused should be set aside in view of the PDEA
agents’ non-compliance with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165.
HELD:
This would not be the first instance when the Court would reverse a conviction for
these reasons: (1) there was a patent disregard of the procedure laid out in Section 21 of R.A.
No. 9165; (2) there were gaps in the chain of custody over the seized drugs; and (3) the lack
of a valid excuse for non-compliance with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. The presence of these
14
circumstances quantify as reasonable doubt involving the most important element in drug -
related cases-the existence of the dangerous drug itself. It is of prime importance that the
identity of the dangerous drug be established beyond reasonable doubt, and that it must be
proven that the item seized during the buy-bust operation is the same item offered in
evidence. As the drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense, its preservation
is essential to sustain a conviction for illegal sale of dangerous drugs. Thus, like any other
element of a crime or offense, the corpus delicti must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
From his testimony, we gather that IOI Bautista claims that it was not safe that the
marking, physical inventory, and photography be done at the parking lot of SM Bicutan.
Contrary to the position taken by the lower courts, we cannot say that IOI Bautista's failure
to mark the two (2) heat sealed transparent plastic sachet immediately after confiscation was
excusable. We take note of the fact that there were more than enough PDEA agents at that
moment to ensure that the area was secure for IOI Bautista to mark the confiscated items.
We do not think it would take more than five (5) to ten (IO10) minutes for IOI Bautista to do
this. Instead, IOI Bautista admits that he marked the confiscated items in Quezon City,
almost one (1I) hour away from the crime scene. Thus, casting serious doubt upon the value
of the said links to prove the corpus delicti. The gaps in the prosecution's evidence create
reasonable doubt as to the existence of the corpus delicti for the illegal sale of shabu.
People v. Bejim
G.R. No. 208835, 19 January 2018
Del Castillio, J.
TOPIC: Acts of Lasciviousness/Rape
FACTS:
On 19 February 2007, appellant was charged before the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet,
with 7 counts of statutory rape under seven 7 separate Informations. After trial, the RTC
rendered on 9 December 2010 its Consolidated Judgment finding appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of 7 counts of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for each count. He was also ordered to pay the amount of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity and another P50,000.00 as moral damages for each crime.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the conviction of the accused for 7 counts of rape is correct.
HELD:
Given the foregoing and since there is neither clear showing or direct proof of penile
penetration or that appellant's penis made contact with the labias of the victims, which is an
essential element of the crime of rape, we cannot sustain appellant's conviction for the crime
of rape in Criminal Case Nos. 07-CR-6765; 07-CR-6766; 07-CR-6768; 07-CR-6769 and
07-CR-6770. However, appellant can be convicted of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336
of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610, which was the offense
proved though he was charged with rape through sexual intercourse in relation to R.A. No.
7610, applying the variance doctrine. The Supreme Court is convinced that in Criminal Case
Nos. 07-CR-6768 and 07-CR-6771, there was a slight penetration on "CCC's" genitalia. "CCC''
positively testified that appellant's penis indeed touched her vagina. That appellant's penis
15
was not inserted enough only indicates that he was able to penetrate her even partially. In
any case, complete penetration is not required to consummate the crime of rape.
16
People v. Flor Formatted: Don't add space between paragraphs of the

same style
G.R. No. 216017, 19 January 2018
Del Castillo, J.
TOPIC: R.A. No. 9165; Section 5 (Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs)
FACTS:
An Information was filed charging appellant with illegal sale of dangerous drugs in
violation of Sec. 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. The evidence of the prosecution established
that on 23 May 2008, a team of police officers of the Anti-Illegal Drug Special Operation Task
Force of the Philippine National Police (PNP), Iriga City, conducted a buy-bust operation
against appellant after a police asset reported that appellant was engaged in selling shabu in
San Francisco, Iriga City, Camarines Sur, specifically at the Philippine National Railway site
(PNR site). On 9 November 2010, the RTC of Iriga City rendered judgment finding appellant
guilty as charged. The RTC was convinced that the prosecution, through the testimonies of
the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation, was able to establish the guilt of
appellant beyond reasonable doubt. The RTC held that the prosecution positively identified
the appellant as the seller of shabu.
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused’s conviction for violation of Sec. 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165
should be sustained.
HELD:
Accused’s conviction must be affirmed. For an accused to be convicted of illegal sale

of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must establish the following elements: "the identity of
the buyer and seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold
and its payment." Time and again the Court has stressed that, "[w]hat is material is the proof
that the transaction actually took place, coupled with the presentation before the court of the
prohibited or regulated drug or the corpus delicti." In this case, the prosecution was able to
show that the appellant was positively identified by PO1 Coldas as the seller of a sachet
containing 0.1 gram of shabu and the person who received the P400.00 marked money from
the police asset who acted as the buyer. PO1 Coldas testified that the asset bought shabu
from the appellant during a buy-bust operation.
It is clear from the testimony of PO1 Coldas that he had witnessed firsthand the drug
transaction between the police asset and the appellant. He was able to positively identify the
appellant as the seller of the shabu due to the fact that the transaction happened right in
front of him at a distance of about one meter. PO l Coldas was also ble to see the object of the
transaction, which was 0.1 gram of shabu, a well as its consideration, He witnessed the
delivery made by the appellant and the payment of the asset for the shabu.
The failure of the police officers to immediately take an inventory of the seized shabu
is not fatal to the prosecution of the case. It did not render the arrest of the appellant who
was caught in flagrante delicto illegal nor did the omission render the seized drugs
inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized drugs. In this case, despite the circumstances that prevented
the police officers from immediately taking an inventory of the seized drugs, we agree and
uphold the findings of the Court of Appeals that the shabu presented in court was duly
preserved with its integrity and evidentiary value uncompromised.
17
People v. Gajo
G.R. No. 217026, 22 January 2018
Del Castillo, J.
FACTS:
This is an Information for il1egal sale of shabu against the accused. Sometime in
March 2007, Intel Personnel Department of San Mateo (Rizal) Municipal Police Station
(Police Station) conducted surveillance on LaTence, a resident of Pag-asa Compound.
Ampid San Mateo, Rizal. A week before the actual operation, PO3 Justo conducted further
surveillance, and witnessed the physical description of their target person and the
appearance of the latter's house. At about 11:20 p.m. of even date, PO3 Justo, POI Sangahin
and POl San Pedro arrived at their target area. P03 Justo immediately alighted from the
vehicle and proceeded to the house of Lawrence. He saw Lawrence standing near a lamp
post and approached him. PO3 Justo told Lawrence, '"pakuha ng dos,' handing him
(Lawrence) P200.00. Lawrence took the money, and replied, "sandali fang, asa bahay." And
thereafter, he entered his house. After a while, a man, who the police later on identified as
Rico. came out of the house and handed PO3 Justo a small sachet containing suspected
shabu. Justo removed his cap, the police's pre-arranged signal that PO3 Justo already bought
shabu. The RTC ruled that Rico and Lawrence were guilty of violating Section 5, Article II of
R.A. No. 9165. It sentenced them to life imprisonment, and ordered them to pay a
PS00.000.00 fine. It also found them guilty of violating Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165
~ imposing upon them the indeterminate penalty of 12 years and 1 day imprisonment, as
minimum, to 15 years and 1 day, as maximum, and ordering them to pay a P300,000.00 fine
each.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the judgment of conviction against accused was correct.
HELD:
No. In this case, the apprehending officer did not make a proper marking of the
seized shabu. PO3 Justo confirmed that he marked the seized items upon arrival at the Police
Station. He attested that he did not immediately mark the three sachets of shabu from Rico
and the one sachet recovered by PO1 San Pedro from Lawrence as there was a1ready a
commotion at the place of incident. Since there was no commotion that transpired after the
seizure of shabu, there was nothing that would prevent PO3 Justo from marking the shabu
immediately after confiscation. Moreover, ·PO3 Justo marked it without the presence of
Lawrence and Rico. As testified that P03 Justo himself he marked the confiscated shabu in
the presence of the two police And, POI San Pedro declared that "[the accused] was already
inside the jail" when PO3 Justo marked the recovered items. Indeed, the failure to
immediately mark the shabu after confiscation and for marking it without the presence of
the accused constituted clear gaps in the chain of custody of the seized illegal drugs.
18
People v. Abelarde Formatted: Don't add space between paragraphs of the

same style
G.R. No. 215713, 22 January 2018
Del Castillo, J.
FACTS:
On 4 April 2005, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu City charged the
accused-appellant Bobby S. Abelarde a.k.a. Roberto S. Abelarde, with violation of Section 5,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165. The single insurmountable obstacle upon which the prosecution's
case here must flounder and fail is its utter and total failure to observe the mandatory
directives embodied in Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 and Section 2l(a),
Article II thereof.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the conviction of the accused should be upheld.
HELD:
We find that the members of the Miscellaneous Team of the Cebu City PNP which
allegedly conducted the "buy-bust" operation that afternoon of March 24, 2005 miserably
failed to establish the four critical linkages aforementioned, because specifically, with
reference to the critical links in the chain of custody, we find in these two cases that - (a) The
first link started with the seizure of the seven packets of shabu subject of the buy-bust
operation and alleged illegal possession. Here, the very frugal and abbreviated testimony of
SPO1 Selibio was glaringly silent as regards the handling and disposition of the seven
packets of alleged shabu and their contents after the accused-appellant's arrest that
afternoon of March 24, 2005. Neither did SPO1 Selibio make any effort to identify the person
who had care or custody of these alleged seven packets of shabu from the time these were
allegedly confiscated from the accused-appellant at Suba, Pasil, Cebu City to the time these
were delivered to PCI Salinas at Cebu PNP Crime Laboratory, Camp Sotero Cabahug, Cebu
City. (b) The second link, consisting in the turnover of the seized seven packets of shabu
from the buy-bust team to the police investigator was not suppmted by any evidence. In fact
SPOl Selibio gave no testimony at all in regard to the turnover of the allegedly seized seven
packets of shabu from the buy-bust team to the police investigator (whoever he/she was).
And while there were some markings on the allegedly seized seven packets of shabu, SPO1
Selibio did not identify the person who made the markings and the place and the occasion
when these markings were made. Moreover, SPO 1 Selibio did not identify the person
(whoever this person was) who submitted the seven packets of alleged shabu to the police
investigator (whoever this police investigator was). (c) The third link requires evidence
respecting the custody of the seized seven packets of shabu at the said PNP Crime
Laboratory at Camp Sotero Cabahug, Cebu City. Once again, no testimony of any kind was
given by SPO 1 Selibio relative to the custody of the seven packets of the alleged shabu at the
PNP Crime Laboratory at Camp Sotero Cabahug, Cebu City. More to the point, SPOl Selibio
did not identify the person who brought the seven packets of alleged shabu to the PNP
Crime Laboratory at Camp Sotero Cabahug in Cebu City; nor did he testify that it was PCI
Salinas, resident forensic chemist, who herself took delivery or custody of the seven packets
of shabu, when those ~ere brou t to the PNP Crime Laboratory at Camp Sotero Cabahug in
Cebu City. (d) The fourth link is connected to Sections 3 and 6, paragraph 8 of the
Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 2, Series of 2004, which make it obligatory for
laboratory personnel to document the chain of custody each time a specimen is handled or
19
transferred~ until its disposal; the board regulation also requires identification of the
individuals in this part of the chain. Here, no evidence of any kind has been adduced to
attest to the fact that this Board Regulation No. 2 has ever been complied with; neither was
there any evidence to indicate how the seven packets of shabu were handled after the
laboratory examination (assuming that indeed there was such a laboratory examination) and
the identity of the person who had custody of these seven packets of shabu before their
presentation in court. As in the Denoman case, we cannot close our eyes to the fact that in
the cases under review SPO1 Selibio went through the motion of identifying in court the
packets of shabu that were allegedly recovered from the accused-appellant that afternoon of
March 24, 2005 somewhere in Barangay Pasil, Cebu City. But the lapses in procedure
heretofore set forth are just too egregious and too glaring to be shunted aside; hence such
lapses must cast serious lingering doubts upon the prosecution's claim that the packets of
alleged shabu that were "offered" as evidence in court were the self-same packets of shabu
that were seized from the herein accused-appellant that afternoon in question somewhere in
Barangay Pasil, Cebu City. Indeed, because of these yawning gaps in the prosecution's
evidence, we are not prepared to say that the body of the crime - the corpus delicti ~ has
been convincingly identified in these twin cases. And, as stressed in the Denoman case, the
failure to establish the existence of the corpus delicti must inevitably result in the acquittal of
the accused-appellant. For, it is axiomatic that in all criminal prosecutions, all the elements
constitutive of the crime charged must be duly established. Otherwise, it becomes the
constitutional duty of the Court to acquit the accused-appellant his guilt not having been
proved beyond reasonable doubt. And this is the situation here.
People v. Kalipayan
G.R. No. 229829, 22 January 2018
Gesmundo, J. Formatted: Font: Bold
TOPIC: Murder
FACTS:
Accused-appellant was charged with the crime of murder under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code. Glaiza's mother, testified that on 25 June 2008, at around 5:45 p.m., she
was watching television inside their house while Celestina and Glaiza were in the kitchen
preparing their dinner. Accused-appellant entered their house without permission,
approached Glaiza, stabbed her in the back and held her hair. Accused-appellant then made
Glaiza face him and continued stabbing her in the abdomen. Josephine tried to stop
accused-appellant but the latter poked the knife at her, telling her not to interfere as it was
none of her business. Josephine then ran outside the house and asked for help. A neighbor,
Dennis Alegre, tried to stop accused-appellant but the latter was undeterred, even when
Josephine was begging him to stop. Josephine decided to leave the house while
accused-appellant escaped. With accused-appellant gone, Josephine went back inside their
house, where she found Glaiza still breathing. Glaiza was brought to Remedios Trinidad
Romualdez Medical Foundation Hospital where she was declared dead on arrival.
The RTC found accused appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing the
crime of murder. On the matter of the circumstance of abuse of superior strength, it noted
that Glaiza was unarmed and stabbed numerous times and it showed that accused-appellant
abused his superior strength and demonstrated his brutality. Nevertheless, the RTC opined
that this circumstance is absorbed in treachery which was also present in this case. Treachery
was proven by the clear and credible testimony of Celestina. The trial court observed that
due to the suddenness of the attack, Glaiza was unable to defend herself and repel the attack.
20
On the subject of dwelling as an aggravating circumstance, the RTC stated that there is no
evidence showing that the crime was deliberately and purposely intended to be inside
Glaiza's house and to cause disrespect to the sanctity of the dwelling. It held, however, that
the evidence presented by the prosecution did not sufficiently show that the killing was
attended by evident premeditation. As pointed out by the court, though accused-appellant
planned to confront Glaiza, it was not tantamount to planning to kill Glaiza. The RTC
concluded that there was no direct or circumstantial proof demonstrated by the prosecution
to show that accused-appellant meditated and reflected on committing murder.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court erred in convicting accused-appellant of murder despite the
failure of the prosecution to establish any qualifying circumstance.
HELD:
The Supreme Court could not fully subscribe to the RTC's theory that
accused-appellant planned to confront Glaiza but did not plan to kill her. On the contrary,
the evidence shows that when he swiftly entered the house and went straight to the kitchen,
he already had a decision to harm Glaiza. However, the element that there was a sufficient
lapse of time between the decision to commit the crime and its actual commission was not
proven satisfactorily inasmuch as it would qualify the killing as murder. The testimonies
and object evidence do not necessarily yield the conclusion that he clung to the
determination to kill Glaiza. The decision to kill prior to the moment of its execution must
have been the result of meditation, calculation, reflection or persistent attempts. This aspect
was not proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt and as such, evident
premeditation cannot be said to be present here.
Treachery has long been defined by this Court, especially as to its character as a qualifying circumstance Formatted: Normal, Indent: First line: 0.29", Right: 0",
for murder. It is a circumstance that must be proven as indubitably as the crime itself and constitutes two (2) Don't add space between paragraphs of the same style
elements: (1) the employment of means of execution which gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend
or retaliate, and (2) that said means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted. Formatted: Font: (Default) +Body (Calibri), 10 pt, Font
color: Auto
Nevertheless, the conclusion that the crime is still murder stays not because of the Formatted: Don't add space between paragraphs of the
same style
existence of evident premeditation, but of treachery. Both elements of treachery are
doubtlessly attendant here. The time and place, and manner of attack were deliberately
chosen and accused-appellant was immediately cloaked with impunity to ensure its
successful execution. The time of the attack, at around 5:30 p.m., was a time in which people
usually prepare their supper and households are buzzing with activity. Accused-appellant's
mode of attack, of suddenly entering the house and going straight to where Glaiza was
while the latter was preparing food, is also clearly indicative of his nefarious plan to attack
when Glaiza was not in a position to defend herself.
Rivac v. People
G.R. No. 224673, 22 January 2018
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
TOPIC: Estafa
FACTS:
The instant case stemmed from an Information filed with the RTC of Laoag City,
Ilocos Norte, Branch 14 (RTC), charging Rivac of the crime of Estafa. The prosecution alleged
21
that on 4 August 2007, Rivac went to the jewelry store owned by private complainant
Asuncion C. Farinas (Farinas) where she received from the latter several pieces of jewelry in
the aggregate amount of P439,500.00, which were meant for her to sell on consignment basis,
as evidenced by a document called jewelry consignment agreement (consignment
document). Farifias and Rivac agreed that after seven (7) days, Rivac was obligated to either
remit the proceeds of the sold jewelry or return the unsold jewelry to Farifias should she fail
to sell the same. However, despite the lapse of the aforesaid period, Rivac failed to perform
what was incumbent upon her, causing Farinas to send her a demand letter. This prompted
Rivac to go to Farinas's store and offer her a parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. 0-9369 as partial payment for the jewelry.
During arraignment, Rivac pleaded "not guilty" and maintained that her liability is
only civil, and not criminal, in nature. She narrated that she asked Farinas for a loan as she
badly needed money for her husband's dialysis, to which the latter agreed. As such, she
went to Farinas's store and handed over OCT No. 0-936 and other supporting documents to
the latter as collateral. In tum, Farinas gave her the amount of Pl50,000.00 and asked her to
sign a blank consignment document. She further averred that she was able to pay interest for
several months but was unable to pay the entire loan. According to Rivac, Farinas told her
that she would foreclose the collateral. Thereafter, she sent her a letter demanding payment
of the principal amount of P280,000.00 plus interest. The RTC found Rivac guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged,
ISSUE:
HELD:
The elements of Estafa under Article 315 (1)(b) of the RPC are as follows: (a) the
offender's receipt of money, goods, or other personal property in trust or on commission, or
for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to deliver or to return
the same; (b) misappropriation or conversion by the offender of the money or property
received, or denial of receipt of the money or property; (c) the misappropriation, conversion
or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (d) demand by the offended party that the
offender return the money or property received. In this case, the facts clearly show the
existence of all the elements of the crime charged, considering that: (a) Rivac received
various pieces of jewelry from Farinas on a sale-on-consignment basis, as evidenced by the
consignment document; (b) Rivac was under the obligation to either remit the proceeds of
the sale or return the jewelry after the period of seven (7) days from receipt of the same; (c)
Rivac failed to perform her obligation, prompting Farinas to demand compliance therewith;
and (d) Rivac failed to heed such demand, thereby causing prejudice to Farinas, who lost the
pieces of jewelry and/or their aggregate value of P439,500.00.43
People v. Villahermoso
G.R. No. 218208, 24 January 2018
Del Castillo, J.
FACTS:
On 12 October 2006, at around 1:00p.m., PCI Fermin Armendarez III called a

conference and formed a buy-bust team to counter the selling of shabu by one Brian
22
Villahermoso in Sitio Pailob, Urgeloo St., Barangay Sambag II, Cebu City. The designated
poseur-buyer was PO2 Villaester. The buy-bust was done with prior coordination with the
PDEA (Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency). Upon dispatch at the scene, the civilian
informant contacted Brian and went with the latter to a small house where PO2 Villaester
was waiting. The informant introduced P02 Villaester as an interested buyer of P32,000.00
worth of shabu. PO2 Villaester then exhibited a bundle of money purporting to be
P32,000.00 but was in truth just boodle money wrapped with a genuine 1,000-peso bill
bearing PO2 Villaester's signature. Brian handed to PO2 Villaester two big sachets of shabu
after seeing the money. Appellant was charged for violation of R.A. No. 9165. RTC rendered
Judgment finding the appellant guilty of the charge against him
ISSUE:
Whether or not the conviction of the accused was correct.
HELD:
Jurisprudence has consistently held that "prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for
the validity of an entrapment operation x x x especially if the buy-bust team is accompanied
to the target area by their informant." 11 Such is the situation in this case. PO2 Villaester,
who was designated as the poseur buyer, was assisted by the confidential informant, who
contacted the appellant to infornn the latter that there was a prospective buyer of"shabu." As
to the Chain of Custody Rule, the Court, taking into consideration the difficulty of complete
compliance with the said rule, has considered substantial compliance sufficient "as long as
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending police officers."
In this case, it was established by the testimony of PO2 Villaester that the appellant
was apprehended pursuant to a legitimate buy-bust operation; that the appellant was
apprised of his constitutional rights; that he was brought to the office of 7RCIDU together
with the seized "shabu;" that the arrest was recorded in a police blotter; that the two sachets
of "shabu" were marked as "BV-01" and "BV-02" by SPOl Noel Triste (SPOl Triste) in the
police station; that the marked sachets were delivered on the same day by SPO 1 Triste to the
crime laboratory for examination; and that as per Chemistry Report No. D-1632-2006, the
two sachets submitted for examination were positive for "shabu." Considering the foregoing,
there is no reason for the Court to doubt the findings of the Court of Appeals that the two
sachets of "shabu" seized from the appellant were the same sachets of "shabu" presented in
evidence before the RTC.
People v. Bringcula
G.R. No. 226400, 24 January 2018
Peralta, J.
TOPIC: Robbery with Rape
FACTS:
On the night of 2 May 2011, private complainant AAA was sleeping in her house
together with her children, househelper and niece. She was awakened at early dawn by the
barking of the dog and when she stood up to see if there was any one inside their house, she
saw no one and went back to sleep. She was again awakened when a man wearing a mask
touched her shoulder and poked a firearm at her neck. The man told her that it was a
robbery and that she should keep quiet or else he would kill her. She was able to recognize
the voice of the man to be that of appellant Bringcula. Then, she was ordered to lie face
23
down and was hogtied using a shoelace. The appellant took AAA's two bracelets and
wedding ring, and asked her where her money was. AAA pointed at her bag inside
the aparador beside her bed, where she placed her money which the appellant also took.
Appellant, thereafter, made AAA lie on her back and pulled her pajama and underwear. He
also removed his own clothing including his mask. Appellant proceeded to lick AAA's
vagina, kissed her neck, laid on top of her and inserted his penis into her vagina. AAA was
unable to cry for help because appellant threatened to kill her if she does. After satisfying his
lust, appellant dressed up and took AAA's necklace and two (2) cellular phones. When
appellant left, AAA awakened her niece and told her to shout for help. A certain BBB,
Barangay Captain CCC, Kagawad EEE and some neighbors arrived at AAA's house and
when they asked who the culprit was, she opted not to immediately disclose appellant's
identity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused was correctly convicted of the alleged crime.
HELD:
The crime of Robbery with Rape is penalized under Article 294 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), as amended by Section 9 of R.A. No. 7659. Robbery with Rape is a special
complex crime under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. It contemplates a situation
where the original intent of the accused was to take, with intent to gain, personal property
belonging to another and rape is committed on the occasion thereof or as an accompanying
crime. Thus, to be convicted of robbery with rape, the following elements must concur: (1)
the taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons;
(2) the property taken belongs to another; (3) the taking is characterized by intent to gain
or animus lucrandi; and (4) the robbery is accompanied by rape. The prosecution was also
able to establish, based on AAA's testimony, that the robbery preceded the crime of rape and
that the latter crime was an incident to the original intent of the appellant to rob AAA.
People v. Dagsa
G.R. No. 219889, 29 January 2018
Peralta, J.
TOPIC: Acts of Lasciviousness
FACTS:
On October 11, 2004, the victim, AAA, a young girl who was then four (4) years old,
was walking home with two of her classmates after having been dismissed from their class
in Kapangan, Benguet. While they were on their way home, herein accused-appellant, who
is the cousin of AAA's father, blocked their path and told AAA's classmates to go ahead as
he would be 'giving AAA a candy. AAA's classmates left her and, after walking a little
farther, they looked back and saw accused-appellant remove AAA's panty and proceeded to
fondle her vagina. Thereafter, when AAA arrived home, her mother, BBB, noticed that the
victim immediately removed her panty, saying that she no longer wanted to use it. The
following day, while BBB was giving AAA a bath, the latter refused that her vagina be
washed claiming that it was painful. Upon her mother's inquiry, AAA replied that
accused-appellant played with her vagina and inserted his penis in it. BBB immediately
went to talk to AAA's classmates about the incident whereby the said classmates relayed to
her what they saw. They then proceeded to the police station to report the incident. AAA's
24
classmates gave their statements, but AAA was not able to give hers as she was too shy. A
criminal complaint for rape was eventually filed against accused-appellant. In an
Information dated November 25, 2004, the Provincial. Prosecutor of Benguet charged
accused-appellant with the crime of rape as defined under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (d)
and penalized under Article 266-B, paragraph 6(5), both of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by R.A. No. 8353, in relation to R.A. No. 7610.
ISSUE:
HELD:
The Court agrees with the ruling of the CA that accused appellant is guilty only of
the crime of acts of lasciviousness. Under the variance doctrine embodied in Section 4, 18 in
relation to Section 5, 19 Rule 120 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure and affirmed by settled
jurisprudence, even though the crime charged against the accused was for rape through
carnal knowledge, he can be convicted of the crime of acts of lasciviousness without
violating any of his constitutional rights because said crime is included in the crime of rape.
As to the first element, paragraph (h), Section 2 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations
of RA 7 610 defines lascivious conduct as a crime committed through the intentional
touching, either directly or through the clothing of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner
thigh or buttocks with the intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify
the sexual desire of any person, among others. Records show that the prosecution duly
established this element when the witnesses positively testified that accusedappellant
fondled AAA's vagina sometime in October 2004. The second element requires that the
lascivious conduct be committed on a child who is either exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse.33 This second element requires evidence proving that: (a)
AAA was either exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse; and (b) she is a child
as defined under RA 7610. Anent the third element, there is no dispute that AAA was four
years old at the time of the commission of the crime. Thus, on the basis of the foregoing, the
Court finds that the CA correctly found accused-appellant guilty of the crime of acts of
lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC in relation to Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No.
7610
People v. Jugo
G.R. No. 231792, 29 January 2018
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS:
This case stemmed from an Information filed with the RTC charging Jugo of
violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. The prosecution alleged that sometime in
2011, members of the San Fabian Police Station conducted surveillance for three (3) months
to verify the reports that Jugo was engaged in illegal drug activities.6 In the morning of 5
August, 2011, a team composed of Police Officer 2 Fernando Romero, Jr. (PO2 Romero) as
the poseur-buyer, Senior Police Officer 1 Ariel Villegas (SPOl Villegas), Police Officer 3
Edmund Disu7 (PO3 Disu), Police Officer 3 Cristobal Eslabra, and Police Officer 1 Fernando
Berongoy, Jr., prepared for a buy-bust operation to be conducted at Primicias St., cornmer
4th Block, Barangay Sagud Bahley, San Fabian, Pangasinan. At around 2:00p.m., PO2
25
Romero and the civilian informant met with Jugo and his two (2) companions, Amor
Lomibao (Lomibao) and Marvin Zamudio (Zamudio), in front of a carinderia. The civilian
informant first approached Jugo, followed by PO2 Romero. Afterwards, Jugo, Lomibao, and
Zamudio executed the transaction with PO2 Romero, who then gave the marked money to
Jugo; in stum, Jugo handed to PO2 Romero one (1) heat-sealed plastic sachet containing
white crystalline substance. After the civilian asset left, P02 Romero performed the
pre-arranged signal, prompting the rest of the team to approach them and arrest Jugo and
his two (2) companions. SPOl Villegas conducted a body search on Jugo and recovered the
marked money. PO2 Romero retained possession of the subject plastic sachet containing
white crystalline substance. The RTC found Jugo liable for the crime of Illegal Sale of
Dangerous Drugs, defined and penalized under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No.9165.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the judgment of conviction against the accused was correct.
HELD:
Here, Jugo was charged with the crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, defined
and penalized under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. In order to properly secure the
conviction of an accused charged with illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must
prove: (a) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b)
the delivery of the thing sold and the payment. In such a crime, it is essential that the
identity of the prohibited drug be established with moral certainty. Thus, in order to obviate
any unnecessary doubt on the identity of the dangerous drugs, the prosecution has to show
an unbroken chain of custody over the same. It must be able to account for each link in the
chain of custody over the dangerous drug from the moment of seizure up to its presentation
in court as evidence of the corpus delicti.
As may be gleaned from the foregoing, the preparation of the inventory, i.e.,
Confiscation Receipt, and taking of photographs were NOT done in the presence of: (a) the
accused or his representative; (b) an elected public official; and (c) a representative from the
DOJ or the media, contrary' to the express provisions of Section 21, Article II of R.A. No.
9165, as amended' by R.A. No. 10640. In such instances, the prosecution must provide a
credible explanation justifying the non-compliance with the rule as the presence of these
individuals is not just a matter of procedure. Rather, the rule exists to ensure that protection
is given to the innocent whose life and liberty are put at risk. Unfortunately, no such
explanation was proffered by the prosecution to justify the procedural lapse. By and large,
the breaches of procedure committed by the police officers militate against a finding of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt against the accused, as the integrity and evidentiary value of the
corpus delicti had been compromised. It is well-settled that the procedure in Section 21,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165 is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a
simple procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment to the conviction of
illegal drug suspects.51 Perforce, since the prosecution failed to provide justifiable grounds
for non-compliance with Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, as amended by R.A. No.
10640, as well as its, IRR, Jugo's acquittal is in order.
26
People v. Mamangon Formatted: Don't add space between paragraphs of the

same style
G.R. No. 229102, 29 January 2018
Perlas-Bernabe, J. Formatted: Font: Bold
TOPIC: R.A. No. 9165; Section 21 (Chain of Custody) Formatted: Font: Bold
FACTS:
This case stemmed from two (2) Informations filed with the RTC charging
Mamangon of the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs. In the
evening of 20 February 2009, a tip was received from a confidential informant that a certain
"Pepe," who was later on identified as Mamangon, was selling illegal drugs along the
railroad track of Dagupan Extension and Antipolo Street in Tondo, Manila. Acting on the
said tip, a buy-bust operation was organized in coordination with the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA), and the buy-bust team went to the target area at around 8:40
in the evening. 9 Upon arriving thereat, the informant, together with Police Officer (PO) 3
Erick Guzman (PO3 Guzman), the designated poseur-buyer, approached Mamangon and
ordered P300.00 worth of shabu from him. Subsequently, Mamangon handed over one (1)
piece of plastic sachet containing shabu to PO3 Guzman, who simultaneously paid the
former using the marked money. Shortly after, PO3 Guzman removed his cap, which was
the pre-arranged signal for the police to come in, and consequently, Mamangon was
apprehended. PO3 Guzman then recovered the marked money from Mamangon and
ordered him to empty his pockets, which purportedly contained another plastic sachet
of shabu. After securing the additional plastic sachet, PO3 Guzman marked it alongside the
other seized item in the presence of Mamangon. Thereafter, the team went to the barangay
hall but immediately left since noone was around. The team then proceeded to Police Station
7, where PO3 Guzman turned over Mamangon, as well as the seized items, to PO2 Rolando
Dela Cruz (PO2 Dela Cruz), the investigator on duty. 10 PO2 Dela Cruz then conducted the
requisite inventory, while PO3 Guzman took photographs of the confiscated items in the
presence of Mamangon and the other arresting officers. After conducting the inventory to
which were attached the photographs, PO2 Dela Cruz prepared the request for laboratory
examination, which was submitted together with the seized items to the Philippine National
Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for examination. Accordingly, they were received and
examined by Forensic Chemist, Police Senior Inspector Elisa G. Reyes (FC Reyes), who
confirmed that they contained methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.|The RTC
found Mamangon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sections 5 and 11 (3), Article
II of R.A. No. 9165.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the judgment conviction against the accused was correct.
HELD:
Accused should be acquitted. After a judicious study of the case, the Court finds that
the police officers committed unjustified deviations from the prescribed chain of custody
rule, thereby putting into question the integrity and evidentiary value of the dangerous
drugs allegedly seized from Mamangon. First, records reveal that while the requisite
inventory and photography of the confiscated drugs were conducted in the presence of
Mamangon and the other apprehending officers, the same were not done in the presence of
an elected public official and any representative from the DOJ and the media. Additionally,
it also appears that when the police officers subsequently arrived at the barangay hall, they
had every opportunity to coordinate with the barangay officials and secure the presence of
27
the other witnesses, yet they decided to leave and immediately proceeded to the police
station.
To make matters worse, the prosecution did not proffer a plausible explanation — apart Formatted: Indent: First line: 0.29", Don't add space
from their unsubstantiated claim that "no one is around" the barangay hall when they
arrived — in order for the saving clause to apply. Records fail to disclose that the police
officers even attempted to contact and secure the presence of an elected public official, as
well as a representative from the DOJ and the media, when they were already at the police
station. To reiterate, the law requires the presence of these witnesses to ensure the
establishment of the chain of custody and remove any suspicion of switching, planting, or
contamination of evidence. Thus, considering the police officers' unjustified non-compliance
with the prescribed procedure under Section 21 of RA 9165, the integrity and evidentiary
value of the confiscated drugs are seriously put into question.
same style
People v. Miranda
G.R. No. 229671, 31 January 2018
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS:
This case stemmed from two (2) Informations 5 filed before the RTC charging
Miranda of the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, respectively
defined and penalized under Sections 5 and 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. The RTC ruled
as follows: (a) in Crim. Case No. 13-906, Miranda was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of violating Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower courts waswere correct in rendering a verdict of conviction
against the accused.
HELD:
In this case, the prosecution failed to provide justifiable grounds for the police
officers' non-compliance with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, as well as its IRR. Thus, while
these lapses have only surfaced on appeal, reasonable doubt now persists in upholding the
conviction of the accused. As the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had
been compromised, Miranda's acquittal is perforce in order.
People v. Dejolde, Jr.

G.R. No. 219238, 31 January 2018
Del Castillo, J.
TOPIC: Large Scale Illegal Recruitment
FACTS:
This is an appeal filed by appellant Moises Dejolde, Jr. y Salino from the July 31, 2014
Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CRH.C. No. 04624, affirming with
modification the· April 3, 2010 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City,
Branch 60, in Crim. Case Nos. 27516-R, 27592-R, and 27602-R. which found appellant guilty
28
beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Recruitment in large scale defined and penalized
under .Article J3(b) in relation to Articles 38(b ), 34, and 39 of Presidential Decree Nos. 19QO
and 2018 and R.A. No. 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of l 995), and two
counts of Estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. During trial, the prosecution
presented the testimonies of private complainant They' testified that the appellant recruited
them to, work as caregivers in the United Kingdom; that he charged them P450,000.00 each
for the· processing of their visas and cost of plane fares; that one of them paid appellant the
amount of F400,000.00 while Jessie gave the amount of P450,000; that they ·later discovered
that the visas were fake and that appellant was not authorized by the POEA; that they
demanded the return of their monies; and that appellant' returned only the amounts of
P50,000.00 to Naty and Pl0,000.00 to Jessie.
The RTC rendered a Decision finding the appellant guilty of the charges against
him.illegal recruitment in a large scale, and 2 counts of estafa.
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused’s conviction was correct.
HELD:
Yes. After a careful review of the records of this case, the Court finds that the
prosecution, through its witnesses, was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that accused
recruited private complainants for employment as caregivers in the United Kingdom and
that he collected money from them in the process. Hence, his conviction is affirmed.
People v. Dela Pena

G.R. No. 219581, 31 January 2018
Del Castillo, J.
TOPIC: Piracy
FACTS:
On September 24, 2005; at around 1:00 a.m., Julita Nacoboan (Julita), her husband,
Jose Nacoboan (Jose), and their son, Manvin Nacoboan (Marwin) were about to board their
pump boat !n8dedloaded with 13 sacks of copra. These sacks of copra were supposed to be
loaded and transferred to a bigger boatr. As the Nacoboan's pump boat was about to depart,
a smaller boat suddenly blocked its path. For fear of collision, Jose stopped the engine of
their pump boat. Three armed men then immediately boarded the pump boat. One of the
armed men pointed a firearm at Jose and ordered him to proceed to the raft or the rear side
of the boat. Julita identified him as the appellant. Jose's hands were tied and his head
covered. Another armed person grabbed Julita’s bag and took the following items: I) 1,000.00
cash; 2) Earrings: 3) Cellular phone; and 4) Necklace. The RTC' rendered judgment finding
appellant guilty of piracy under PD 532.
ISSUE:
Whether appellant is guilty of piracy.
HELD:
29
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of the accused.
The Information categorically alleged that the incident happened along the river
bank of Brgy. San Roque, Municipality of Villareal, Province of Samar. Under Section 2(a) of
PD 532, "Philippine waters''' is defined as follows: [A]ll bodies of water, such as but not
limited to, seas, gulfs, bays around, between and connecting each of the Islands of the
Philippine Archipelago, irrespective of its depth, breadth, length or dimension, and all other
waters belonging to the Philippines by historic or Iegaln1 title, including territorial sea, the
sea-bed, the insular shelves, and other submarine area5 over which the Philippines has
sovereignty or jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied) From this definition, it is clear that a river is
considered part of Philippine waters. The Information also clearly alleged that the vessel's
cargo, equipment, and personal belongings of the passengers were taken by the appellant
and his armm1ed companions. It stated, in no uncertain terms, that 13 sacks of copra were
taken by the appellant through force and intimidation. Undoubtedly, these sacks of copra
were part of the vessel's cargo.
The Information also stated that the vessel's equipment which consisted of the engine,
propeller tube, and tools were taken and carried away by the appellant. Furthermore, the
Information also stated that the personal belongings of the passengers consisting of two
watches, jewelry, cellphone, and cash money were taken by the appellant and his armed
companions. The appellant was able to seize these items when he, along with armed
companions, boarded the victim’s pump boat and seized control of the same. Armed with
firearms, appellant and his companions tied Jose's hands, covered his head, and operated
their pump boat. They travelled to an island in Samar where they unloaded the sacks of
copra. Thereafter, appellant and his armed companions travelled to another island where the
engine, propeller tube, and tools of the pump boat were taken out and loaded on appellant's
boat.
From the foregoing, the Court finds that the prosecution was able to establish that the Formatted: Normal, Indent: First line: 0.29", Right: 0",
Don't add space between paragraphs of the same style
victims' pump boat was in Philippine waters when appellant and his armed companions
boarded the same and seized its cargo, equipment, and the personal belongings of the
passengers. Formatted: Font color: Auto
In this case, it was established that the appellant and his armed companions boarded the Formatted: Don't add space between paragraphs of the
same style
victims’ pump boat and seized 13 sacks of copra, the boat’s engine, propeller tube, and tools,
as well as the contents of Julita’s bag. Hence, the proper penalty should be death. However,
due to R.A. No. 9346, which prohibited the imposition of death penalty, the Court thus finds
that the penalty imposed by the RTC, which was reclusion perpetua without eligibility of
parole, was correct since the seizure of the vessel and its cargo was accomplished by
boarding the vessel.
30
FEBRUARY 2018 Formatted: Font: Bold, Underline

of the same style
People v. De Guzman
G.R. No. 219955, 5 February 2018 same style
Del Castillo, J. Formatted: Font: Bold
TOPIC: R.A. No. 9165; Section 21 (Chain of Custody Rule)
FACTS:
Appellant was charged with the illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs, as
well as the us~ of dangerous drun1gs under Sections 5, 11 and 15, Article II of R.A. No. 9165
in three !nfonnations3Information dated November 16, 2009. At the target area, appellant
approached POl Reyes and asked if he wanted to buy marijuana. POI Reyes accepted the
offer and handed the P100.00 marked money to appellant who, in tum, gave him a sachet of
marijuana fruiting tops. Once the exchange was completed, POI Reyes grabbed appellant's
right hand which served as the pre-arranged signal that the transaction had been
consummated. SPO1 Delos Reyes rushed to the scene and assisted POI Reyes in conducting
a body search on appellant. They introduced themselves as police officers, informed
appellant of his constitutional rights and placed him under arrest. After the body search,
SPOl Delos Reyes recovered the Pl00.00 marked money, four sachets of marijuana and one
plastic pack containing a small brick of marijuana fruiting tops. The entrapment team
immediately brought appellant to the police station after his relatives created a commotion
and tried to interfere in appellant's arrest. In its Decision dated 10 October 2012, the RTC
found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II R.A.
No. 9165, as amended.
ISSUE:
Whether the chain of custody over the seized items had remained unbroken despite
the arresting officers’ failure to strictly comply with the requirements under Section 21,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
HELD:
In this case, the records show that the buy-bust team had failed to strictly comply
with the prescribed procedure under Section 21, par. 1. Although the seized items were
marked at the police station, there is nothing on record to show that the marking had been
done in the presence of appellant or his representatives. Clearly, this constitutes a major
lapse that, when left unexplained, is fatal to the prosecution's case.
To be sure, non-compliance with the prescribed procedures under Section 21, par. 1,
does not, as it should not, automatically result in an accused's acquittal. The last sentence of
Section 21(1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165, as amended, provides a saving mechanism, viz.:
Provided, finally, That noncompliance of these requirements under justifiable grounds, as
long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by
the apprehending officer/learn, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and custody
over said items. However, this saving mechanism operates only "under justifiable
grom1dsgrounds, and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items
are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team." Thus, it is incumbent upon the
prosecution to: a) recognize and explain the lapse or lapses committed by the apprehending
team; and b) demonstrate that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized had
been preserved, despite the failure to follow the procedural safeguards under R.A. No. 9165.
31
Unfortunately, the prosecution failed not only to recognize and explain the procedural
lapses committed by the buy-bust team, but also to adduce evidence establishing the chain
of custody of the seized items that would demonstrate that the integrity and evidentiary
value of said items had been preserved.
Lutap v. People
G.R. No. 204061, 5 February 2018
Tijam, J.
TOPIC: Acts of Lasciviousness/R.A. No. 7610; Section 5
FACTS:
Petitioner was charged in an Information the accusatory portion of which reads:

“That on or about the 27th day of April 2004 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused
by means of force, threats and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously commit acts of sexual assault upon the person of [AAA],6 6 year[s] of age, a
minor, by then and [there] inserting his finger into complainant's genital organ against her
will and without her consent, to the damage and prejudice of said offended party. Contrary
to law.” Upon petitioner's plea of not guilty, pre-trial and trial on the merits ensued. The
RTC found petitioner guilty as charged. The RTC gave full credit to AAA's and BBB's candid
testimonies that petitioner inserted his finger in the vagina of AAA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in convicting petitioner for the crime of
attempted rape on the basis of the evidence thus presented.
HELD:
We agree with the Court of Appeals’ ruling that the fact of insertion of petitioner's
finger into AAA's sexual organ was not established beyond reasonable doubt to support
petitioner's conviction of rape by sexual assault. We also agree with the CA that there was
sexual molestation by petitioner's established act of touching AAA's vagina. Be that as it
may, the act of touching a female's sexual organ, standing alone, is not equivalent to rape,
not even an attempted one. At most, therefore, petitioner's act of touching AAA's sexual
organ demonstrates his guilt for the crime of acts of lasciviousness, an offense subsumed in
the charge of rape by sexual assault. Thus, absent any showing that there was actual
insertion of petitioner's finger into AAA's vagina, petitioner cannot be held liable for
consummated rape by sexual assault. What was established beyond reasonable doubt in this
case was that petitioner touched, using. his middle finger, AAA's sexual organ which was
then fully covered by a panty and a short pants. However, such is insufficient to hold
petitioner liable for attempted rape by sexual assault. As above intimated, the mere touching
of a female's sexual organ, by itself, does not amount to rape nor does it suffice to convict for
rape at its attempted stage. Instead, petitioner's lewd act of fondling AAA's sexual organ
consummates the felony of acts of lasciviousness.
32
People v. Pundugar Formatted: Don't add space between paragraphs of the

same style
G.R. No. 214779, 7 February 2018
Del Castillo, J.
FACTS:
Challenged in this appeal is the 28 November 2013 Decision of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R, CR-HC No. 05530 which affirmed the Judgment of RTC Branch 204,
Muntinlupa City, finding appellant Abdulwahid Pundugar guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of violation of Section 5 (illegal sale of dangerous drugs) and Section 11 (illegal possession of
dangerous drugs), Article II of R.A. No. 9165. The RTC ruled that the prosecution has
sufficiently proven that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto selling dangerous drug to
law enforcement agent who posed as buyer and a subsequent search on his body yielded
four more plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance. When these items were
subjected to chemistry examination, they were found positive for the presence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug.
ISSUE:
HELD:
Yes. Established by the prosecution were the elements for illegal possession of
regulated or prohibited drugs, to wit; (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object
which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and
(3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug." In the present case, when
appellant was lawfully arrested because of the buy-bust operation, he was also found to
have in his possession another four (4) plastic sachets of shabu. Appellant failed to show that
he had legal authority to possess the same. He did not give any explanation for such
possession; thus a prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi arises against
him.
Here, the prosecution was able to establish that the buy-bust was conducted around
6:20 p.m. in a squatter’s area. The prosectuon also explained that they were not able to invite
representatives from the media, the DOJ, or an elected public official because they could not
find anyone available and that they were pressed for time. To our mind, these are justifiable
reasons for non-compliance with the requirements. And considering that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items were properly preserved, as shown by the ubroken
chain of custody of the seized items, said non-compliance did not render void or invalid
such seizure and custody over the illegal drugs.
People v. Dumagay
G.R. No. 216753, 7 February 2018
Del Castillo, J.
FACTS:
33
Appellant was charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, The
RTC rendered a Decision finding appellant guilty of the crime charged. Appellant contends
that there was no valid buy-bust operation as he was allegedly instigated or induced to
commit the crime by the CI; and that the prosecution failed to show that the Chain of
Custody Rule was followed since the investigating officer and the forensic chemist failed to
testify in court.
ISSUE:
HELD:
The Prosecution failed to establish an unbroken chain of custody of the seized items.
In this case, it was established by the testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses and the
stipulation of facts agreed by the parties that PO3 Jimenea and SPO4 Rosales marked the
seized items with their initials at the police station; that PO3 Jimenea tun1ed over the seized
items to SPOl Gallego; that after the seized items were turned over to him, SPO1 Gallego
marked and photographed them; that an Inventory of the seized items was then made in the
presence of appellant and the representatives of the media and the DOJ; that SPO1 Gallego
then prepared a Request for the Laboratory Examination of the seized vials, which were then
brought to the crime laboratory on the same day; that PCT Diestro examined the specimen.
No testimonies or stipulations, however, were made on the details of the turnover of the
seized vials from the police station to the crime laboratory, and the turnover and submission
of the same from the crime laboratory to the court.
From the foregoing, it is very evident that the prosecution in dispensing with the
testimonies of SPO1 Gallego, the investigating officer, and PCI Diestro, the forensic chemist,
failed to show every link of the chain of custody. Without the testimonies or stipulations
stating the details on when and how the seized vials were brought to the crime laboratory,
and thereafter, to the court, as well as the details on who actually delivered and received the
same from the police station to the crime laboratory, and later, to the court for the
prosecution's presentation of evidence, the Court cannot ascertain whether the seized vials
presented in evidence were the same vials seized from appellant when he was arrested.
These gaps in the chain of custody create doubt as to whether the corpus delicti of the crime
had been properly preserved.
People v. Cirbeto
G.R. No. 231359, 7 February 2018
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
TOPIC: Murder
FACTS:
On 31 December, 2010, at around 3:15p.m., while prosecution eyewitness Roger

Dalimoos (Dalimoos) was outside a fast food restaurant in front of Marikina Sports Center at
the corner of Sumulong Highway and Toyota Avenue, Marikina City, he saw his friend
Ferdinand Casipit (Casipit) together with accused-appellant walking towards a nearby mall.
Dalimoos was on his way home then, so he boarded a jeepney by hanging on to its end
railings. Upon reaching the stoplight at the corner of Sumulong Highway and Tuazon St.,
from which vantage point he could still see Casipit and accused-appellant who were already
in front of the mall, Dalimoos saw the latter suddenly pull a knife from the right side of his
34
back, hold Casipit's shirt with his left hand, and stab him with the knife using his right hand.
Accused-appellant was able to stab Casipit once before the latter managed to run away.
However, accused-appellant ran after Casipit and caught up to him. Thereafter, the former
held the latter's shirt again, pulled him to the ground, and stabbed him repeatedly, resulting
in the latter's death. Consequently, accused-appellant was charged with the crime of Murder.
The RTC convicted accused-appellant as charged.
ISSUE:
HELD:
To successfully prosecute the crime of Murder, the following elements must be

established: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her; (3) that the
killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the
RPC; and (4) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide.
In this case, and as correctly found by the courts a quo, the prosecution was able to
establish a confluence of the foregoing elements, considering the following: (1) the victim
Casipit was killed; (2) accused-appellant was positively identified as the one who killed him;
(3) Casipit's killing was attended by treachery, a qualifying circumstance; and (4) the killing
is neither parricide nor infanticide.
Venezuela v. People
G.R. No. 205693, 14 February 2018
Reyes, Jr., J. Formatted: Font: Bold
TOPIC: Malversation Formatted: Font: Bold
Formatted: Font: Bold
FACTS:
Venezuela was the Municipal Mayor of Pozorrubio, Pangasinan from 1986 to June 30,
1998. In the course of the investigation, the Audit Team discovered a shortage of
Php2,872,808.00 on the joint accounts of Costes and Venezuela. Likewise, it noticed that the
17 cash advances made by Venezuela were illegal, due to the absence of the essential
requirements required by law. Consequently, team member Ruiz issued three demand
letters to Venezuela, ordering him to liquidate his cash advances. In response, Venezuela
sent an explanation letter acknowledging his accountability for the cash advances
amounting to Php 943,200.00, while denying the remainder of the cash advances.9 An audit
report was thereafter submitted by the Team. Venezuela denied the truth of the contents
thereof. 10 Meanwhile, on March 20, 2000, an Information 11 was filed by the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, accusing Venezuela of the crime of Malversation of Public
Funds, as defined and penalized under Article 217 of the RPC. The Sandiganbayan
promulgated the assailed Decision convicting Venezuela of the crime of Malversation of
Public Funds.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution failed to establish Venezuela's guilt beyond

reasonable doubt.
35
HELD:
No. Venezuela’s conviction is affirmed. The elements of malversation are (i) that the
offender is a public officer, (ii) that he had custody or control of funds or property by reason
of the duties of his office, (iii) that those funds or property were public funds or property for
which he was accountable, and (iv) that he appropriated, took, misappropriated or
consented or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them.
56 Verily, in the crime of malversation of public funds, all that is necessary for conviction is
proof that the accountable officer had received the public funds and that he failed to account
for the said funds upon demand without offering a justifiable explanation for the shortage.
In this case, all the elements for the crime were sufficiently proven by the prosecution
beyond reasonable doubt. To begin with, it bears stressing that payment or reimbursement
is not a defense in malversation. The payment, indemnification, or reimbursement of, or
compromise on the amounts or funds malversed or misappropriated, after the commission
of the crime, does not extinguish the accused's criminal liability or relieve the accused from
the penalty prescribed by the law. At best, such acts of reimbursement may only affect the
offender's civil liability, and may be credited in his favor as a mitigating circumstance
analogous to voluntary surrender.
Gonzalez v. People
G.R. No. 225709, 14 February 2018
Perlas-Bernabe, J. Formatted: Font: Bold
TOPIC: Violation of Section 32 of R.A. No. 7166 (COMELEC’s gun ban) Formatted: Font: Bold
FACTS:
In the early morning of 23 February, 2012, an operative of the Station Anti-Illegal

Drugs (SAID), Special Operation Task Group (SOTG), Valenzuela City, was informed of the
rampant selling of illegal drugs at a wake in Tamaraw Hills, Barangay Marulas, Valenzuela
City, which thus led to the conduct of an anti-illegal drug operation. At about 3:30 a.m.,
certain Police Officer (PO) 2 Lim, PO2 Recto, and POI Raya, together with POI Julius R.
Congson (POI Congson), proceeded to surveil the area near No. 75 Tamaraw Hills Street.
While in the area, P02 Recto and PO1 Congson saw a person coming out of an alley about
four (4) meters away, with a fan knife in his right hand. Since there was a ban issued by the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) on the carrying of deadly weapons at that time, PO2
Recto and PO1 Congson approached the person and introduced themselves as police officers.
The person, who they later identified as Gonzalez, immediately ran away, prompting the
police officers to chase and eventually, arrest him. PO1 Congson recovered the knife from
Gonzalez, frisked the latter, and ordered him to bring out the contents of his pocket, which
revealed one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing what PO1 Congson believed
to be shabu. PO1 Congson further recovered another heat-sealed transparent plastic pack,
labeled "Calypso", containing several plastic sachets. The RTC found Gonzalez guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 261 (q) of the OEC, As regard the charge of
violation of Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165, the RTC found Gonzalez not guilty due to
insufficiency of evidence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the conviction of the accused was erroneous.
HELD:
36
The Court agrees, as the prosecution failed to dispel all reasonable doubts
surrounding Gonzalez' arrest. In particular, the prosecution failed to establish its allegation
that, immediately before and at the time of his arrest, Gonzalez was holding a knife in a
public place -- the critical elements of the crime of violation of Section 26I (p)(q) of the OEC,
as amended by Section 32 of R.A. No. 7166. Thus, the conviction was set aside.
People v. Guieb
G.R. No. 233100, 14 February 2018
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS:
This case stemmed from two (2) Informations filed before the RTC charging Guieb of
the crimes of Illegal Sale and Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs. The RTC found Guieb
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged,
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly upheld Guieb' s conviction for the
crimes charged.
HELD:
Guieb was charged with the crimes of Illegal Sale and Illegal Possession of
Dangerous Drugs, respectively defined and penalized under Sections 5 and 11 (3), Article II
of R.A. No. 9165. In every prosecution of unauthorized sale of dangerous drugs, it is
essential that the following elements are proven beyond reasonable doubt: (a) the identity of
the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing
sold and the payment. Meanwhile, in order to convict an accused who is charged with
Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, the prosecution must establish the following
elements also by proof beyond reasonable doubt: (a) the accused was in possession of an
item or object identified as a prohibited drug; (b) such possession was not authorized by law;
and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.
After a judicious study of the case, the Court finds that the police officers committed
unjustified deviations from the prescribed chain of custody rule, thereby putting into
question the integrity and evidentiary value of the dangerous drugs allegedly seized from
Guieb. Verily, the procedural lapse committed by the police officers, which was
unfortunately unacknowledged and unexplained by the State, militates against a finding of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt against the accused, as the integrity and evidentiary value of
the corpus delicti had been compromised. It is well-settled that the procedure in Section 21,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165, is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a
simple procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment to the conviction of
illegal drug suspects. As such, since the prosecution failed to provide justifiable grounds for
non-compliance with Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, as well as its IRR, Guieb's
acquittal is perforce in order.
37

same style
People v. Sisracon
G.R. No. 226494, 14 February 2018
Perlta, J.
TOPIC: Rape; Circumstantial Evidence
FACTS:
According to the victim, AAA, she was fifteen (15) years old and the President of a
youth group when the incident happened on 29 February 2004. Around 11:00 p.m. of that
same day, AAA was about to go home when she passed by the basketball court. She saw a
group composed of the following: 1. John Andrew Valderama alias "John John;" 2. Luis
Padua alias "Buboy;" 3. Ranil Camaymayan alias "Sedeng;" 4. Rex Dandan alias "Itoy;" 5.
Mark Valderama alias "Macmac;" 6. Jomar Sisracon alias "Jomar;" 7. Roberto Cortez alias
"Unad;" 8. Randy Mulog alias "Randy;" and 9. Adonis Motil alias "Ulo" or "Dondon." After a
drinking spree, they were able to have carnal knowledge of AAA. Thus, the following nine
(9) Informations were filed against the appellants and their other companions.In its Decision
dated September 13, 2010, the RTC found the appellants guilty as charged.
ISSUE:
HELD:
Yes. In this case, all the elements of the crime of rape have been properly established
by the prosecution and aptly appreciated by the RTC and the CA. Appellants' contention
that conspiracy was not proven because AAA failed to identify the exact persons who raped
her because she was rendered unconscious is untenable. While it is true that there was no
direct evidence to establish that some of the appellants had carnal knowledge of AAA as the
latter was unconscious, however, proof of the commission of the crime need not always be
by direct evidence, for circumstantial evidence could also sufficiently and competently
establish the crime beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the Court had affirmed convictions for
rape based on circumstantial evidence.
Melgar v. People
G.R. No. 223477, 14 February 2018
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
TOPIC: R.A. No. 9262 (Economic Abuse)
FACTS:
AAA had a romantic relationship with Melgar, which resulted in the birth of BBB, an
illegitimate child. Melgar freely acknowledged the paternity of BBB as evidenced by the
latter's Certificate of Live Birth, as well as numerous photographs showing Melgar with BBB.
However, AAA's relationship with Melgar turned sour as the latter had an affair with a
younger woman. When BBB was just about one ( 1) year old, Melgar stopped giving support,
prompting AAA to file a case for support, which was eventually granted. This
notwithstanding, Melgar still refused to give support for her and BBB. As such, AAA was
38
constrained to file the instant criminal case against Melgar. The RTC found Melgar guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5 (e) of RA 9262
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly upheld Melgar's conviction for
violation of Section 5 (e) of R.A. No. 9262.
HELD:
"Economic abuse" may include the deprivation of support of a common child of the
man-accused and the woman-victim, whether such common child is legitimate or not. Under
this provision, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is considered an act
of violence against women and children. Notably, case law instructs that the act of denying
support to a child is a continuing offense. In this case, the courts a quo correctly found that
all the elements of violation of Section 5 (e) of RA 9262 are present, as it was established that:
(a) Melgar and AAA had a romantic relationship, resulting in BBB's birth; (b) Melgar freely
acknowledged his paternity over BBB; (c) Melgar had failed to provide BBB support ever
since the latter was just a year old; and (d) his intent of not supporting BBB was made more
apparent when he sold to a third party his property which was supposed to answer for,
among others, his support-in-arrears to BBB.
Etino v. People
G.R. No. 206632, 14 February 2018
Del Castillo, J.
TOPIC: No Frustrated Homicide; Wound from gunshot was not mortal
FACTS:
Petitioner was charged with the crime of frustrated homicide in an Information dated
19 June 2003. During the trial, Leyble testified that, "at about 4:30 o'clock in the afternoon of
5 November 2001, while he and his companions[,] Isidro Maldecir nnd Richard Magno, were
walking on their way home to Bgy. [sic] Pispis, Maasin, Iloilo, he was shot with a 12 gauge
shotgun by the [petitioner,] Eden Etino, hitting the back portion of his right shoulder and
other parts of his body." The RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of frustrated homicide.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that his guilt for the charged crime of
frustrated homicide was proven beyond reasonable doubt, since the physician who
examined the victim was not presented in court.
HELD:
It is settled that "where there is nothing in the evidence to show that the wound
would be fatal if not medically attended to, the character of the wound is doubtful," and
such doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused. In this case, we find that the
prosecution failed to present evidence to prove that the victim would have died from his
wound without timely medical assistance, as his Medical Certificate35 alone, absent the
testimony of the physician who diagnosed and treated him, or any physician for that matter,
is insufficient proof of the nature and eh1:enextent of his injury. This is especially true, given
39
that said Medical Certificate merely stated the victim's period of confinement at the hospital,
the location of the gunshot wounds, the treatments he received, and his period of healing,
Without such proof, the character of the gunshot wounds that the victim sustained enters the
realm of doubt, which the Court must necessarily resolve in favor of petitioner.
People v. Bauit
G.R. No. 223102, 14 February 2018
Del Castillo, J.
TOPIC: Qualified Rape
FACTS:
In an Informnnation dated July 25, 2011, the accused-appellant was charged with
rape. "AAA," a 12-year old high school student, born on September 21, 1998, is the daughter
of accused-appellant. In the early morning of July 20, 2011, while she was on her way to the
bathroom, accused-appellant suddenly held her and forced her to lie down in their room.
Accusedappellant pulled down her short pants and underwear. After removing his own
pants, he placed himself on top of her and inserted his penis into her vagina. "AAA" felt pain
in the process. She resisted but her effort was in vain. After taking her bath, '"AAA" went to
school as if nothing happened. Upon the arrival of her mother "BBB" from Cagayan, "AAA"
confided to her the incident. With the help of her aunts, the matter was reported to a
barangay kagawad and then to the police station wherein "AAA" gave her statement. The
trial court rendered its Decision finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of rape against "AAA," his daughter of minor age, as charged in the
Information.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused’s conviction for the crime of rape was correct.
HELD:
The twin qualifying circumstances of minority of the victim and her blood ties to the
accused-appellant were properly alleged in the Information, proved during trial, and duly
appreciated. The Birth Certificate of "AAA'' proved that she was the biological daughter of
accused-appellant. He was duly identified as the father of "AAA" and did not even impugn
such relationship during the trial. Under the circumstances, where it not for the supervening
passage of R.A. No. 9346, the proper penalty should be death following Article 266-B of the
RPC. Thus, pursuant to Section 2 of the Act, the penalty to be meted out should be reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole.
People v. Pader, Jr.

G.R. No. 223113, 19 February 2018
Del Castillo, J.
TOPIC: Rape
FACTS:
Appellant, along with accused Augusto Gonzales (Augusto) and Esmenio Pader, Jr.
(Esmenio ), was charged with rape in an Information. "AAA" was born on 01 March 1984,
per the Certificate of Live Birth; on 13 December 1999, at around 8:00 p.m., "AAA" was on
her way home [when she] met [appellPnt, Augusto, Esmenio], and Marlon on the road[.]
40
[Augusto] asked "AAA" to go with them to Uncle Viano's house; "AAA" refused, so
[appellant, Augusto, and Esmenio] dragged "AAA" to the sandpile; Marlon watched as
[Augusto] removed "AAA's" clothes, and [appellant and Esmenio] pinned ''AAA" down by
holding "AAA's" hands and feet; [Augusto and appellant] punched "AAA" on the face and
body; [appellant] kissed "AAA" on the lips and on the body, and inserted his penis in
"AAA's" vagina[.] ["AAA"] felt pain; later, [Augusto] inserted his penis into "AAA's" vagina,
and told "AAA" not to tell her parents about what happened; subsequently, [Esmenio]
inserted his penis into "AAA's" vagina, and "AAA" cried; Loma heard "AAA's" cries, and
called Barangay Kagawad Eduardo [who] chased [appellant, Augusto, Esmenio ], and
Marlon, but Barangay Kagawad Eduardo was able to apprehend only the [appellant]. The
RTC ruled to convict of the accused of the crime charged.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused was properly convicted of the crime of rape.
HELD:
The prosecution satisfactorily established the elements of the crime of rape under
Article 266-A(l)(a) of the Revised Penal Code, namely: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge
of a woman, and (2) he accomplished such act through force or intimidation. When ''AAA"
testified, she positively identified appellant as one of her rapists and candidly narrated her
ordeal. "It is settled jurisprudence that testimonies of child victims are given full weight and
credit, because when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she
says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed.
People v. Condino
G.R. No. 219591, 19 February 2018
Del Castillo, J.
TOPIC: Murder
FACTS:
Appellant was charged with the crime of murder in an lnfonnation dated 19

November 2002. On 23 September 2002, at around 2:30 p.m., appellant appeared before the
Lupon Tagapamayapa at the Barangay Hall of Barangay Lanao, Daanbantayan, Cebu, in a
hearing for the alleged destruction of a plastic chair owned by the barangay. Also present
during the hearing was the victim, Isabeio D. An-abis (An-a.bis), who was then the first
councilor of the barangay. After the hearing, the victim, together with other barangay
officials went out of the hall and sat down on a nearby bamrnboo bench for a chat. While
they were talking, appellant, who \vas just outside the gate of the Barangay Hall, calmly
walked toward the group and with his left hand, grabbed the victim's neck from behind and
stabbed the latter three to four times µsing a yellowish pointed metal, hitting a posi1tion just
below the victim's left breast. The RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE:
HELD:
41
As' for the issue on the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, we
agree with the CA's conclusion that "[t]he attack was executed in a manner that [the victim]
was rendered defenseless and unable to retaliate. There is treachery when the offender
employs means, methods or forms in the execution of any of the crimes against persons that
tend directly and especially to ensure its execution without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make. In this case, appellant, coming from behind
the victim, suddenly held the latter's neck using his left hand, and with his right hand,
stabbed the victim three to four times using a yellowish pointed metal. Clearly, the attack
was attended by treachery, considering that: a) the means of execution of the attack gave the
victim no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and b) said means of execution was
deliberately adopted by appellant.
People v Mat-an
G.R. No. 215720, 21 February 2018
Martires, J.
TOPIC: Slight Physical Injury and Murder
FACTS:
On 13 April 2009, Oscar was charged with the crimes of Attempted Homicide and
Murder in two Informations. Norma was selling halo-halo beside Minda's store at Sunnyside
Fairview, Tacay Road, Baguio City; Clyde was in front of the same store. At that time, Minda
was inside her store cradling her 18-month-old granddaughter Anthonette in a blanket, its
ends tied behind her back. Moments later, Oscar entered the store and an argument ensued
between him and Minda. Apparently, Oscar was asking Minda why Ruby had not answered
his calls. Minda responded by telling Oscar not to create trouble and to return once he was
sober. There was silence for a few seconds; after which, Norma and Clyde heard Minda
moaning as if her mouth was being covered. Norma immediately ran inside the store where
she saw Oscar stab Minda twice. Norma pulled him out of the store and away from Minda.
Norma then asked Clyde, who followed her inside the store, to look for Sheyanne, Oscar and
Ruby's daughter. Norma also called out to neighbors for help. Before calling Sheyanne,
Clyde saw Oscar leaving the vicinity. The RTC found Oscar guilty of attempted homicide
and murder.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial and appellate courts erred in adjudging accused-appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for the death of Minda Babsa-ay and injuries sustained by
Anthonette Ewangan.
HELD:
The Supreme Court concurs that the crime committed against Minda is Murder
qualified by abuse of superior strength. The circumstance of abuse of superior strength is
present whenever there is inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor,
assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor,
and the latter takes advantage of it in the commission of the crime. The appreciation of the
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength depends on the age, size, and
strength of the parties.
42
In this case, the prosecution was able to establish that Oscar abused his superiority
when he killed Minda. Indeed, it was sufficiently shown that Oscar was armed with a knife,
a deadly weapon, while Minda was then burdened by a child and had no means to defend
and repel the attacks of her assailant. Furthermore, the trial court noted that Oscar was of
heavy build and stood at 5' 10" in contrast to Minda's 4' 11" frame. Clearly, Oscar abused his
superiority afforded him by his sex, height, and build and a weapon when he attacked
Minda who was then carrying a child. Thus, the trial and appellate courts correctly
convicted him of murder.
The Court also concurs that Oscar can be held guilty only of slight physical injuries
with respect to Anthonette. The prosecution failed to present any evidence which would
show that Oscar also intended to kill Anthonette. Without the element of intent to kill, Oscar
could only be convicted for physical injury; and considering that Anthonette's wound was
only superficial, the appellate court correctly convicted Oscar of slight physical injury.
People v. Molina
G.R. No. 229712, 28 February 2018
Peralta, J.
TOPIC: Illegal Recruitment in a Large Scale
FACTS:
On 21 December 2007, accused-appellant Delia C. Molina and Juliet Pacon were

charged with the crime of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale. The case proceeded only
against accused-appellant Delia C. Molina, as co-accused Juliet Pacon was at-large. When
arraigned on 7 April 2009, accused Delia C. Molina pleaded not guilty. After pre-trial, trial
on the merits ensued. The prosecution presented as witnesses the five private complainants
and Eraida Dumigpi, Senior Labor and Deployment Officer of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA). On the other hand, the defense presented
accused-appellant Delia C. Molina as its lone witness. The trial court found accused Molina
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment in large scale.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that accused-appellant is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale.
HELD:
The testimonies of private respondents and the records show that: (1) private
complainants Wilfredo Logo, Maylen Bolda and Maria Luya applied at the recruitment
agency for employment in South Korea and paid for their respective placement/processing
fee when the agency's provisional license was already issued; (2) Benjamin Delos Santos
applied before the issuance of the provisional license but paid the placement fee when the
provisional license was already issued, and (3) Gilbert Ubifia's application and payments
were made after the agency's license was suspended and before it was alleged lifted on 31
July 2000, but before the agency's license expired on 31 March 2007. Hence, it appears that
the recruitment agency, which accused-appellant headed, was a licensee or holder of
authority when the recruitment of private complainants was made as the agency's license
expired on 31 March 2007. Nevertheless, accused-appellant is still liable under Section 6 of
R.A. No. 8042.
43
Under Section 6, paragraph (m) of R.A. No. 8042, illegal recruitment "is deemed
committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a
group," and "[i]llegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be
considered an offense involving economic sabotage." Thus, the offense charged in the
Information is illegal recruitment in large scale because it was committed against the five
private complainants. Moreover, Section 6, paragraph (m) of R.A. No. 8042 provides that in
case of juridical persons, the officers having control, management or direction of their
business shall be liable. Accused-appellant, as President of the recruitment agency, is
therefore liable for illegal recruitment in large scale for failure. to reimburse the expenses
incurred by private complainants in connection with their documentation and processing for
purposes of deployment to South Korea, which did not actually take place without their
fault under Section 6, paragraph (m) of R.A. No. 8042.
Sarto v. People
G.R. No. 206284, 28 February 2018
Martires, J.
TOPIC: Bigamy
FACTS:
On 3 October 2007, Redante was charged with the crime of bigamy for allegedly
contracting two (2) marriages: the first, with Maria Socorro G. Negrete (Maria Socorro), and
the second, without having the first one legally terminated, with private complainant Fe R.
Aguila (Fe). The charge stemmed from a criminal complaint filed by Fe against Redante on 4
June 2007. The RTC found Redante guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy.
The trial court ratiocinated that Redante's conviction is the only reasonable conclusion for
the case because of his failure to present competent evidence proving the alleged divorce
decree; his failure to establish the naturalization of Maria Socorro; and his admission that he
did not seek judicial recognition of the alleged divorce decree.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial and appellate courts erred when they found petitioner Redante
Sarto guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy.
HELD:
For a person to be convicted of bigamy, the following elements must concur: (1) that
the offender has been legally married; (2) that the first marriage has not been legally
dissolved or, in case of an absentee spouse, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed
dead according to the provisions of the Civil Code; (3) that the offender contracts a second or
subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity. Redante admitted that he had contracted two marriages. He, however,
put forth the defense of the termination of his first marriage as a result of the divorce
obtained abroad by his alien spouse. The Court is convinced that Redante failed to prove the
existence of the divorce as a fact or that it was validly obtained prior to the celebration of his
subsequent marriage to Fe. Aside from the testimonies of Redante and Maria Socorro, the
only piece of evidence presented by the defense to prove the divorce, is the certificate of
divorce allegedly issued by the registrar of the Supreme Court of British Columbia on 14
January 2008.
44
This certificate of divorce, however, is utterly insufficient to rebut the charge against
Redante. First, the certificate of divorce is not the divorce decree required by the rules and
jurisprudence. As discussed previously, the divorce decree required to prove the fact of
divorce is the judgment itself as rendered by the foreign court and not a mere certification.
Second, assuming the certificate of divorce may be considered as the divorce decree, it was
not accompanied by a certification issued by the proper Philippine diplomatic or consular
officer stationed in Canada, as required under Section 24 of Rule 132. Lastly, no copy of the
alleged Canadian law was presented by the defense. Thus, it could not be reasonably
determined whether the subject divorce decree was in accord with Maria Socorro's national
law. Further, since neither the divorce decree nor the alleged Canadian law was
satisfactorily demonstrated, the type of divorce supposedly secured by Maria Socorro -
whether an absolute divorce which terminates the marriage or a limited divorce which
merely suspends it36 - and whether such divorce capacitated her to remarry could not also
be ascertained. As such, Redante failed to prove his defense that he had the capacity to
remarry when he contracted a subsequent marriage to Fe. His liability for bigamy is,
therefore, now beyond question.
People v. Estrada
G.R. No. 225730, 28 February 2018
Martires, J.
TOPIC: Illegal Recruitment in a Large Scale and Estafa
FACTS:
Estrada was indicted for the crime of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and Esta/a
under four (4) separate Informations. Private complainants separately met Estrada on
various dates from February to April 2009. During their respective meetings, Estrada
represented herself as having power and authority to deploy persons abroad for overseas
employment. Cortez recalled that in their initial meeting, Estrada told him that she works for
Worldview International Corporation (Worldview), a private recruitment agency for
overseas employment. She later told him, however, that she changed agency because
Worldview's license had expired. After their respective meetings, Estrada offered private
complainants various jobs in Dubai. In particular, Sevillena was offered a job as a baker after
he refused the initial job offer in Saudi Arabia; Cortez was offered a job as a waiter; and
Antonio was offered a job as a cashier after she refused the first job offer as a saleslady. The
private complainants transacted only with Estrada to whom they submitted all the
documents necessary for their overseas placement and to whom they paid processing,
placement, and other fees. Specifically, Sevillena paid P8,000.00 as processing fee and Pl
7,000.00 as placement fee; Cortez similarly paid P8,000.00 as processing fee and Pl 7,000.00 as
placement fee; Antonio paid Pl0,000.00 as processing fee and Pl5,000.00 as placement fee.
However, even after undergoing PDOS, payment of the fees required, and submission of the
documentary requirements, Estrada still failed to deploy them abroad. Estrada repeatedly
promised them that their plane tickets were still being processed. Estrada, however, failed to
deliver on her promised deployment of the private complainants; thus, they were prompted
to file criminal cases against Estrada. The RTC found Estrada guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crimes of illegal recruitment in large scale and three (3) counts of estafa under
Article 315(2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE:
45
Whether the trial and appellate courts erred in finding estrada guilty of illegal
recruitment in large scale and three (3) counts of estafa despite the prosecution's failure to
prove the essential elements of these crimes by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD:
The Court is convinced that the prosecution was able to establish the essential
elements of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale. First, it is not disputed that Estrada
is not licensed or authorized to recruit workers for overseas placement. During the trial, the
defense admitted the POEA Certification which stated that Estrada is not included among
the list of employees submitted by ABCA for POEA acknowledgment. Therefore, Estrada is
not authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment. This fact was not denied by
Estrada in her defense anchored only on the allegation that she did not recruit the private
complainants but merely mentioned ABCA and Worldview to them. Second, the
prosecution was able to establish that Estrada unlawfully engaged in activities which refer to
recruitment and placement under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code and Section 6 of R.A. No.
8042. Specifically, the prosecution was able to sufficiently demonstrate that Estrada
promised and recruited private complainants for employment abroad for a fee. Finally, it is
clear that Estrada committed illegal recruitment activities against the three (3) private
complainants. Thus, the trial and appellate courts properly convicted Estrada of the crime of
illegal recruitment in large scale.
The Court also sustains Estrada's conviction for three (3) counts of estafa under
Article 3 l 5(2)(a) of the RPC. A conviction for illegal recruitment whether simple or
committed in large scale would not preclude punishment for estafa under Article 315(2)(a)
of the RPC. In this case, testimonial evidence established by proof beyond reasonable doubt
that Estrada falsely represented herself as possessing power to deploy persons for overseas
placement. By these pretenses, Estrada deceived the private complainants into believing that
she would provide them their desired jobs in Dubai. This active representation of having the
capacity to deploy the private complainants abroad despite not having the authority or
license to do so from the POEA constituted deceit - the first element of estafa. Moreover,
because of her assurances, the private complainants parted with their money in order to pay
Estrada the various fees which they thought were necessary for their deployment abroad
resulting in damage to each of the private complainants - the second element of estafa.
Formatted: Space After: 0 pt, Don't add space between
paragraphs of the same style
Formatted: No underline
46
MARCH 2018 Formatted: Font: Bold, Underline

Formatted: Centered, Space After: 0 pt, Don't add space
People v. Resurrecion Juanillo Manzano Jr., et al.
G.R. No. 217974, 5 March 2018 same style
Martires, J.
TOPIC: Murder
FACTS:
Accused Rezor Juanillo Manzano (“Rezor”) and Resurrecion Juanillo Manzano

(“Resurrecion”) were charged before the trial Court for the crime of murder. While
Resurrecion remained to be at-large, the trial proceeded with against Rezor. Considering that
Rezor raised an affirmative of self-defense, the parties agreed to have an inverted trial.
However, the trial Court ruled that Rezor failed to establish self-defense and found him guilty
of the crime of murder. On appeal, the appellate Court affirmed said ruling.
Rezor argues that it is the prosecution which has the duty to discharge the burden of
proof to establish the crime charged.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the duty to discharge the burden of evidence to establish the crime
charged remains with the prosecution despite the affirmative defense of self-defense.
HELD:
No, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused. Jurisprudence instructs that an
accused who pleads a justifying circumstance under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code
admits to the commission of acts, which would otherwise engender criminal liability.
Corollary thereto, the rule consistently adhered to in this jurisdiction is that when the accused
admit that they are the authors of the death of the victim, and their defense is anchored on
self-defense, it becomes incumbent upon them to prove the justifying circumstance to the
satisfaction of the court. With this admission, the burden of evidence is shifted to the appellant
to prove that all the essential elements of self-defense are present.
Verily, to invoke self-defense effectually, there must have been an unlawful and
unprovoked attack that endangered the life of the accused, who was then forced to inflict
severe wounds upon the assailant by employing reasonable means to resist the attack.
Self-defense, to be successfully invoked, must be proven by clear and convincing evidence that
excludes any vestige of criminal aggression on the part of the person invoking it. Conviction
follows if the evidence for the accused fails to prove the existence of justifying circumstances.
Formatted: Justified, Indent: First line: 0.5", Don't add
People v. Teng Moner same style
G.R. No. 202206, 5 March 2018
Leonardo-De Castro, J.
FACTS:
Accused Teng Moner y Adam (“Moner”) was charged before the trial Court for
violation of Section 5 and Section 11 of R.A. 9165, otherwise known as “Comprehensive
47
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.” The trial Court and the appellate Court ruled for his
conviction.
Moner argues for his acquittal considering that: (a) the confidential informant was not
called to the witness stand; and (b) the arresting officers failed to strictly comply with the
Chain of Custody rule, under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165.
ISSUES:
a. Whether the testimony of the confidential informant is required for a conviction in a

drug case; and
b. Whether the failure to strictly comply with the Chain of Custody rule calls for the
acquittal of an accused in drug case.
same style
HELD:
a. No, the testimony of the confidential informant is not required.

same style
With regard to Moner's contention that the prosecution's failure to present the
informant in court diminishes the case against him, we reiterate our pronouncement on this
matter in the recent case of People v. Lafaran:
It has oft been held that the presentation of an informant as witness is not regarded as
indispensable to the success of a prosecution of a drug-dealing accused. As a rule, the
informant is not presented in court for security reasons, in view of the need to protect the
informant from the retaliation of the culprit arrested through his efforts. Thereby, the
confidentiality of the informant's identity is protected in deference to his invaluable services to
law enforcement. Only when the testimony of the informant is considered absolutely essential
in obtaining the conviction of the culprit should the need to protect his security be disregarded.
In the present case, as the buy-bust operation was duly witnessed by SPO2 Aro and PO3 Pera,
their testimonies can take the place of that of the poseur-buyer.
b. No, the failure to strictly comply with the Chain of Custody rule does not call for the
acquittal of the accused.
same style
We have consistently ruled that noncompliance with the requirements of Section 21 of
R.A. No. 9165 will not necessarily render the illegal drugs seized or confiscated in a buy-bust
operation inadmissible. Strict compliance with the letter of Section 21 is not required if there is
a clear showing that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized illegal drugs have been
preserved, i.e., the illegal drugs being offered in court as evidence is, without a specter of
doubt, the very same item recovered in the buy-bust operation.
With regard to the foregoing, Moner asserts that he should be acquitted of the criminal
charges levelled against him specifically because of the following serious lapses in procedure
committed by the apprehending officers: (a) the physical inventory was not conducted at the
place where the seizure was made; (b) the seized item was not photographed at the place of
seizure; and (c) there was no physical inventory and photograph of the seized item in the
presence of the accused, or his representative or counsel, with an elected public official and a
representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
48
The aforementioned concerns can be squarely addressed by a careful and assiduous

review of the records of this case accompanied by a liberal application and understanding of
relevant jurisprudence in support thereof. Both object and testimonial evidence demonstrate
that the apprehending officers were able to mark the dangerous drugs seized and to prepare a
physical inventory of the same at the Las Piñas Police Station which was the place where
Moner and his co-accused were brought for processing.
In the case at bar, the records indicate that the integrity and the evidentiary value of
the seized items had been preserved despite the procedural infirmities that accompanied the
process.
Amando Juaquico v. People

G.R. No. 202206, 5 March 2018
Tijam, J.
TOPIC: Estafa
FACTS:
Accused Amando Juaquico (“Amando”) was charged before the trial Court for the
crime of Estafa under par. (2) (d) of the Revised Penal Code. Private complainant alleged that
Amando indorsed certain checks to him in exchange for cash, and upon its maturity, the
checks were returned by the bank due to insufficiency of funds.
In his defense, Amando alleged that he did not receive cash in exchange for the checks,
but rather, the checks were indorsed for the materials he purchased from private complainant.
The checks was issued to him by one of his customers, and had no knowledge that that the
drawer had no sufficient funds.
The trial Court rendered a judgment finding accused guilty of the crime charged, and was
affirmed on appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether accused is guilty of Estafa under par. (2)(d) of the Revised Penal Code despite
no knowledge as to the insufficiency of funds of the checks indorsed to private complainant.
HELD:
No, the Supreme Court held that to be guilty of Estafa under par. (2)(d) of the Revised
Penal Code, there must be knowledge that the drawer had no funds.
The elements of the offense are: (i) postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an
obligation contracted at the time the check was issued; (ii) lack of or insufficiency of funds to
cover the check; and (iii) the payee was not informed by the offender and the payee did not
know that the offender had no funds or insufficient funds.
As to the third element, the Court held in Ilagan v. People that the prosecution must
prove that the accused had guilty knowledge of the fact that the drawer of the check had no
funds in the bank at the time the accused indorsed the same.
49
In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove the same. There is no showing
whatsoever that petitioner had knowledge of the insufficiency of funds of the check he
endorsed to private complainant. Admittedly, the checks received by private complainant
were checks issued and paid to petitioner by a certain Ham. Upon notice that the subject
checks were dishonored, petitioner immediately searched for Ham but the same proved to be
futile considering that the latter already left the country.
Moreover, in Lim v. People, the Court reiterated that in the crime of estafa by postdating
or issuing a bad check, deceit and damage are essential elements of the offense and have to be
established with satisfactory proof to warrant conviction.
People v. Richard Ramirez
Del Castillo, J.
TOPIC: Qualified Statutory Rape
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Richard Ramirez y Tulunghari (“Ramirez”) was charged before the

trial Court allegedly for raping and molesting “AAA,” a six-year old child. The trial Court
found Ramirez guilty considering that “AAA” positively identified him, while accused merely
denied the allegations against him. On appeal, Ramirez’s conviction was affirmed.
Ramirez argues that he cannot be convicted because (a) “AAA” merely answered
“Yes” to all the questions of the prosecution; (b) presence of other persons when the supposed
rape was committed; and (c) the absence of any hymenal lacerations on “AAA.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused may be convicted of rape notwithstanding that: (a) the alleged
victim merely answered “Yes” to all questions; (b) presence of other person when the
supposed rape was committed; and (c) the absence of any hymenal laceration on the part of
the victim.
HELD:
Yes, the Supreme Court held that accused may still be convicted of rape. Notably, both
the RTC and the Court of Appeals found "AAA’s" testimony credible and convincing. We, too,
see no reason to disbelieve "AAA’s" testimony as regards the first rape incident, since it was
not shown that the lower courts had overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated facts or
circumstances of weight and substance which, if properly considered, would have altered the
result of the case.
The Court rejected accused’s contention that the presence of other persons during the
commission of the first rape incident rendered "AAA’s" testimony unbelievable. "It is not
impossible or incredible for the members of the victim's family to be in deep slumber and not
to be awakened while a sexual assault is being committed." After all, "[i]t is settled that lust is
not a respecter of time or place and rape is known to happen [even] in the most unlikely
places."
The Court was likewise not persuaded by appellant's claim that the absence of
lacerations on "AAA’s" hymen negated sexual intercourse. "The rupture of the hymen is not an
50
essential and material fact in rape cases; it only further confirms that the vagina has been
penetrated and damaged in the process."
Besides, as the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, the Initial Medico-Legal Report
itself stated that although there was "no evident injury at the time of examination," the
"medical evaluation cannot exclude sexual abuse."
People v. Crispian Merced Lumaya
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS:
Accused Crispian Merced Lumaya (“Crispian”) and Derek Joseph Lumaya (“Derek”)
were charged before the RTC with violation of Sections 5, 11 and 12 of R.A. No. 9165, as
amended. Crispian argues that the arresting officers failed to comply with the Chain of
Custody Rule under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, without any justifiable cause, and thus calls
for their acquittal.
The RTC rendered its judgment convicting Crispian and Derek for the charged
offenses, and was affirmed on appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the failure of the police officers, without justifiable cause, to comply with the
Chain of Custody Rule calls for the acquittal of accused in drug cases.
HELD:
Yes, the failure to comply with the Chain of Custody Rule, without any justifiable
cause, justifies the acquittal of accused.
By and large, the breaches of procedure committed by the police officers militate
against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against the accused, as the integrity and
evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been compromised. It is well-settled that the
procedure in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed
aside as a simple procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment to the
conviction of illegal drug suspects. Perforce, since the prosecution failed to provide justifiable
grounds for non-compliance with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, as amended by R.A. No. 10640,
as well as its IRR, Crispian’s acquittal is in order.
The Supreme Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions, strict
compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 may not always be
possible. In fact, the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 - which is
now crystallized into statutory law with the passage of R.A. No. 10640- provide that the said
inventory and photography may be conducted at the nearest police station or office of the
apprehending team in instances of warrantless seizure, and that non-compliance with the
requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 - under justifiable grounds - will not render void
and invalid the seizure and custody over the seized items so long as the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer or
team. In other words, the failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the
51
procedure laid out in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and the IRR does not ipso facto render the
seizure and custody over the items as void and invalid, provided that the prosecution
satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. In People v. Almorfe,
the Court stressed that for the above-saving clause to apply, the prosecution must explain the
reasons behind the procedural lapses, and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized evidence had nonetheless been preserved. Also, in People v. De Guzman, it was
emphasized that the justifiable ground for non-compliance must be proven as a fact, because
the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even exist.
People v. Raul Martines and Lito Granada

G.R. No. 226394, 7 March 2018
Reyes, Jr., J.
TOPIC: Rape
FACTS:
Accused Raul Martinez (“Martinez”) and Lito Granada (“Granada”) were charged
with rape before the RTC, for allegedly having carnal knowledge with “AAA,” a mental
retardate. In his defense, Martinez argues that he and AAA were sweethearts, and thus what
transpired was consensual. The RTC found accused guilty of the crime of rape. On appeal,
said ruling was affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the “sweet heart” defense negate any criminal intent to commit rape
with respect to a mental retardate.
HELD:
No, the “sweet heart” defense does not negate criminal intent to commit rape.
It cannot be gainsaid that in cases where the accused raises the "sweetheart defense,"
there must be proof by compelling evidence, that the accused and the victim were in fact
lovers and that the victim consented to the alleged sexual relations. The second is as important
as the first, because love is not a license for lust. Similarly, evidence of the relationship is
required, such as tokens, love letters, mementos, photographs, and the like.
At any rate, even assuming for the sake of argument that Martinez and AAA had a
romantic relation, carnal knowledge with AAA, (even if consensual) would amount to rape
due to her mental disability. Considering her mental retardation, she was incapable of giving
rational consent, as she is regarded as not having reached the level of maturity that would
give her the capacity to make prudent decisions, especially on matters involving sexuality.
Thus, sexual intercourse with her is rape.
People v. Nelson Nuyte Asma
Del Castillio, J.
TOPIC: Rape
FACTS:
same style
52
Accused Nelson Nuyte y Asma (“Nuyte”) was charged before the RTC for six (6)
counts of rape. Trial on the merits ensued and accused was found guilty of the crime charged.
On appeal, accused conviction was affirmed.
Accused argues several factors to negate the alleged crime, such as: (1) it was
unnatural for “AAA’s” mother not to take prompt action upon learning the fate suffered by
her daughter; (2) the absence of physical injury on "AAA's" body was enough proof that she
was not forced to lie on a grassy ground; and AAA’s delayed disclosure of the incidents was
just an act to protect her relationship with him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the circumstantial matters negate the crime of rape, despite the clear
presence of its elements.
HELD:
No, circumstantial matters do not negate the crime of rape.
Assuming that ''AAA's" mother did not show any sign of outrage upon learning of her
daughter's fate, such was not of relevant consideration for being extraneous. It did not refer to
the central fact of the crime and was not an element thereof. Besides, it is well-settled that
"different people react differently to a given situation or type of situation." Neither did the
delay in disclosing the incidents to her mother undermine the credibility of "AAA". "[D]elay in
reporting rape incidents, in the face of threats of physical violence, cannot be taken against the
victim because delay in reporting an incident of rape is not an indication of a fabricated charge
and does not necessarily cast doubt on the credibility of the complainant."
As to appellant's claim that there was no resistance exhibited by "AAA" before and
during the incidents since they had an amorous relation, the same cannot be taken in his favor.
"Tenacious resistance against rape is not required; neither is a determined or a persistent
physical struggle on the part of the victim necessary.
The "sweetheart theory" claimed by appellant is futile. It was never substantiated by

the evidence on record. The only evidence adduced to show such relationship were his
testimony and that of his wife. The alleged love letter supposedly written by "AAA" was never
presented in court. Thus, other than his self-serving assertion and that of his wife, which were
rightly discredited by the trial court, nothing supported his claim that he and "AAA" were
indeed lovers. As the Court emphasized in People v. Gito "being sweethearts does not negate
the commission of rape because such fact does not give appellant license to have sexual
intercourse against her will and will not exonerate him from the criminal charge of rape. Being
sweethearts does not prove consent to the sexual act."
People v. PO1 Johnny K. Sullano
Gesmundo, J. Formatted: Font: Bold
TOPIC: R.A. No. 9165; Section 15 (Use of Dangerous Drugs) Formatted: Space After: 0 pt, Don't add space between
FACTS: Formatted: Font: Bold
Pursuant to a random drug and confirmatory test, PO1 Johnny K. Sullano (“PO1 Formatted: Don't add space between paragraphs of the
same style
Sullano”) was charged for violation of Sec. 15 of R.A. No. 9165. After the presentation of
53
prosecution’s evidence, PO1 Sullano filed its demurrer to evidence, which was granted. In said
demurrer, PO1 Sullano argued that it was never asserted that respondent was apprehended or
arrested or actually caught using any dangerous drug.
In questing the granting of the said demurrer, petitioner contends that that a narrow
interpretation of Section 15 will result in an absurd situation where a person found to be
positive for use of dangerous drugs may not be penalized for not being arrested or
apprehended.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the violation of Sec. 15 of R.A. No. 9165 only pertains to those arrested
or apprehended.
HELD:
Yes. The cardinal rule in statutory construction is the plain-meaning rule. Verba legis
non est recendendum - "from the words of a statute there should be no departure." When the
statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, the words should be given its literal meaning
and applied without attempted interpretation. Especially for penal provisions, it is not enough
to say that the legislature intended to make a certain act an offense, the legislature must use
words which in some way express that intent.
Moreover, the elementary rule in statutory construction that the express mention of
one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others, also known as expressio unius est
exclusion alterius, is relevant and applicable. This rule applies where the very terms of the
statute expressly limit it to certain matters; thus it may not, by interpretation or construction,
be extended to others. In the provision in question, Congress itself confined and restricted the
liability arising from use of dangerous drugs to those who were apprehended or arrested if
charged with a violation of Section 15.
Also, criminal law is rooted in the concept that there is no crime unless a law
specifically calls for its punishment. Nullum crimen poena sine lege. Another basic criminal law
precept important to remember here is in dubiis reus est absolvendus - all doubts should be
resolved in favor of the accused. Any criminal law showing ambiguity will always be
construed strictly against the state and in favor of the accused.
People v. Hesson Callao and Junello Amad
Caguioa, J.
TOPIC: Murder
Formatted: Left, Don't add space between paragraphs of

the same style
FACTS:
same style
Accused Hesson Callao y Marcelino (“Callao”) and Junello Amad (“Amad”) were
charged for brutally murdering a certain Fernando Adlawan. Trial on the merits ensued, and
the trial court rendered a judgment convicting accused of the crime charged. In questioning
the verdict of conviction, accused argues that the conviction was merely based on an
uncorroborated testimony of a lone witness, Sario, and thus, the prosecution failed to prove
beyond reasonable doubt the crime charged.
54
ISSUE:
Whether a testimony of a lone witness is sufficient to establish the guilt of accused

beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD:
Yes, the testimony of a lone witness is sufficient to establish the guilt of accused. The
Supreme Court has carefully and assiduously examined the testimony of Sario and has found
no reason whatsoever to disturb the conclusion reached by the trial court that Sario's
testimony was straightforward, guileless and very credible.
Sario's testimony, although uncorroborated, can be relied upon. Well-settled is the

principle that the testimony of a single witness, if straightforward and categorical, is sufficient
to convict.57 As clearly put by the Court in the case of People v. Hillado:
Thus, the testimony of a lone eyewitness, if found positive and credible by the
trial court, is sufficient to support a conviction especially when the testimony
bears the earmarks of truth and sincerity and had been delivered
spontaneously, naturally and in a straightforward manner. Witnesses are to be
weighed, not numbered. Evidence is assessed in terms of quality and not
quantity. Therefore, it is not uncommon to reach a conclusion of guilt on the
basis of the testimony of a lone witness. For although the number of witnesses
may be considered a factor in the appreciation of evidence, preponderance is
not necessarily with the greatest number and conviction can still be had on the
basis of the credible and positive testimony of a single witness. Corroborative
evidence is deemed necessary "only when there are reasons to warrant the
suspicion that the witness falsified the truth or that his observation had been
inaccurate."
People v. Romeo Antido
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
TOPIC: Rape; Article 89
FACTS:
Accused Romeo Antido y Lantayan was found guilty of the crime of rape. During the
pendency of his appeal and before the promulgation of the Resolution of the appellate court,
which affirmed the ruling of the trial court, he died.
ISSUE:
Whether or not criminal liability of an accused is extinguished as he already died

before the promulgation of a Resolution finding him guilty of the crime charged.
HELD:
Yes, the criminal liability of the accused is extinguished. Under prevailing law and
jurisprudence, accused-appellant's death prior to his final conviction by the Court renders
dismissible the criminal cases against him. Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code provides
that criminal liability is totally extinguished by the death of the accused.
55
Thus, upon accused-appellant's death pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal
action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the
civil action instituted therein for the recovery of the civil liability ex delicto is ipso
facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal action.
People v. Marcelino Crispo and Enrico Herrera
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS:
Accused Marcelino Crispo y Descalso (“Crispo”) and Enrico Herrera y Montes

(“Herrera”) were convicted for their violation of R.A. 9165, otherwise known as
“Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.” Accused argues that the failure on the part of
the arresting officers to strictly comply with the Chain of Custody Rule without any justifiable
reason, by their failure to comply with the witness requirement, calls for their acquittal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the failure of the arresting officers to strictly comply with the Chain of
Custody Rule without any justifiable reason, calls for the acquittal of accused.
HELD:
Yes, the failure to strictly comply with the Chain of Custody Rule without any
justifiable reason calls for the acquittal of accused.
The law requires the presence of an elected public official, as well as representatives
from the DOJ and the media to ensure that the chain of custody rule is observed and thus,
remove any suspicion of tampering, switching, planting, or contamination of evidence which
could considerably affect a case. However, minor deviations may be excused in situations
where a justifiable reason for non-compliance is explained. In this case, despite the
non-observance of the witness requirement, no plausible explanation was given by the
prosecution.
The absence of these required witnesses does not per se render the confiscated items
inadmissible. However, a justifiable reason for such failure or a showing of any genuine and
sufficient effort to secure the required witnesses under Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165
must be adduced. In People v. Umipang, the Court held that the prosecution must show
that earnest efforts were employed in contacting the representatives enumerated under the
law for "[a] sheer statement that representatives were unavailable - without so much as an
explanation on whether serious attempts were employed to look for other representatives,
given the circumstances - is to be regarded as a flimsy excuse." Verily, mere statements of
unavailability, absent actual serious attempts to contact the required witnesses are
unacceptable as justified grounds for non-compliance. These considerations arise from the fact
that police officers are ordinarily given sufficient time - beginning from the moment they have
received the information about the activities of the accused until the time of his arrest - to
prepare for a buy-bust operation and consequently, make the necessary arrangements
beforehand knowing fully well that they would have to strictly comply with the set procedure
prescribed in Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. As such, police officers are compelled not
56
only to state reasons for their non-compliance, but must in fact, also convince the Court that
they exerted earnest efforts to comply with the mandated procedure, and that under the given
circumstances, their actions were reasonable.
Thus, for failure of the prosecution to provide justifiable grounds or show that special
circumstances exist which would excuse their transgression, the Court is constrained to
conclude that the integrity and evidentiary value of the items purportedly seized have been
compromised. It is settled that in a prosecution for the sale and possession of dangerous drugs
under RA 9165, the State carries the heavy burden of proving not only the elements of the
offense, but also to prove the integrity of the corpus delicti, failing in which, renders the case for
the State insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
People v. Nestor Año

G.R. No. 230070, 14 March 2018
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS:
Accused Nestor Año y Del Remedios (“Año”) was found guilty by the RTC for
violation of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165, as amended. In assailing his conviction, accused argues
that the failure on the part of the arresting officers to strictly comply with the Chain of
Custody Rule without any justifiable reason calls for his acquittal.
ISSUE:
Custody Rule without any justifiable reason calls for the acquittal of accused.
HELD:
justifiable reason calls for the acquittal of accused. After a judicious study of the case, the
Supreme Court finds that there are substantial gaps in the chain of custody of the seized items
from Año which were unfortunately, left unjustified, thereby putting into question their
integrity and evidentiary value.
While the fact of marking and inventory of the seized item was established by the
attached Inventory of Seized/Confiscated Items, the records are glaringly silent as to the
presence of the required witnesses, namely, the representatives from the media and the DOJ.
To reiterate, Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165, prior to its amendment by R.A. No. 10640, as well
as its IRR requires the presence of the following witnesses during the conduct of inventory
and photography of the seized items: (a) the accused or the person/s from whom such items
were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel; (b) any elected public
official; and (c) a representative from the media and the DOJ. In their absence, the prosecution
must provide a credible explanation justifying the noncompliance with the rule; otherwise, the
saving clause under the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 (and now, the amended Section 21, Article II of
RA 9165) would not apply.
Here, no such explanation was proffered by the prosecution to justify the procedural
lapse. It then follows that there are unjustified gaps in the chain of custody of the items seized
from Año, thereby militating against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt, which
57
resultantly warrants his acquittal. It is well-settled that the procedure under Section 21, Article
II of RA 9165 is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a simple
procedural technicality; or worse ignored as an impediment to the conviction of illegal drug
suspects.
People v. Edwin Sanchez
Leonen, J.
TOPIC: R.A. No. 9165; Section 21 (Chain of Custody) Formatted: Justified, Don't add space between paragraphs
of the same style
FACTS: same style
Accused Edwin Sanchez y Salvo (“Sanchez”) was convicted for violation of Section 5
and 11 of R.A. 9165, as amended. In assailing his conviction, accused argues that the failure on
the part of the arresting officers to strictly comply with the Chain of Custody Rule call for his
acquittal.
ISSUE:
Custody Rule calls for the acquittal of accused.
HELD:
No. the failure of the arresting officers to strictly comply with the Chain of Custody
Rule does not necessarily call for the acquittal of accused.
Although the testimonies differed on where the seized items were marked, the
prosecution has sufficiently demonstrated that this discrepancy did not affect the integrity or
evidentiary value of the corpus delicti.
IO1 Diocampo testified that she marked the items with "1KCD" and "2KCD" in the
presence of accused-appellant Sanchez. This testimony was corroborated by IO1 Riñopa. The
inventory of the items was done in the presence of Punong Barangay Mendoza and
Department of Justice representative Magnaye. IO1 Diocampo then personally brought the
seized items to the PNP Crime Laboratory where the items tested positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride. The apprehending officers more than substantially complied
with the chain of custody rule under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165.
People v. Clover Villarta

G.R. No. 217887, 14 March 2018
Del Castillo, J.
of the same style
FACTS: same style
Accused Clover A. Villarta (“Villarta”) was convicted for violation of Section 5 and 11
of R.A. No. 9165, as amended. In arguing for his acquittal, accused contends that the corpus
delicti of the offenses charged was not established because the arresting officers failed to
strictly comply with the Chain of Custody Rule.
ISSUE:
58
Whether or not the corpus delicti of the offenses charged was not established for the
failure to strictly comply with the Chain of Custody Rule.
HELD:
Yes, the corpus delicti of the offenses charged was not established.
The term chain of custody pertains to the "duly recorded authorized movements and
custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or
Laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the
forensic laboratory to safekeeping, to presentation in court for destruction.
The inevitable consequences of failure to observe this unflagging strictness and rigor in
the law is emphasized in the case of People v. Ismael, thus – "there was already a significant
break such that there can be no assurance against switching, planting, or contamination. The
Court has previously held that, 'failure to mark the drugs immediately after they were seized
from the accused casts doubt on the prosecution evidence warranting an acquittal on
reasonable doubt."
Furthermore, in People v. Miranda, Jr., the Supreme Court ruled that the inexcusable Formatted: Justified, Indent: First line: 0.5", Space After:
0 pt, Don't add space between paragraphs of the same style,
failure to observe the requirements regarding the physical inventory and photographs Line spacing: single
justified the acquittal of the appellant based on reasonable doubt.
same style
People v. Villarin Clemeno Formatted: Justified, Indent: First line: 0.5", Space After:
G.R. No. 215202, 14 March 2018 0 pt, Don't add space between paragraphs of the same style,
Line spacing: single
Martires, J.
TOPIC: Rape same style
FACTS:
Accused Villarin Clemeno (“Clemeno”) was convicted of the crime of rape, for
allegedly raping his daughter “AAA.” Clemeno contends the improbability of the crime
charged because of “AAA’s” failure to resist, if the allegations were true, the act complained of,
and that “AAA” failed to report the incident in the earliest possible opportunity.
ISSUE:
Whether the failure of the victim to resist or to report at the earliest possible
opportunity the alleged crime of rape, casts doubt as to the alleged rape committed.
HELD:
No, the failure of the victim to resist or to report immediately the alleged rape
committed does not cast doubt as to the alleged rape committed.
On accused-appellant's contention that AAA put up insufficient resistance to warrant a

finding that the sexual intercourse was against her will, the Court takes judicial notice that
rape victims may have differing reactions to the shock and trauma of a sexual assault. No
standard form of reaction is expected from a victim in the face of such a horrific event, because
59
the workings of the human mind placed under emotional stress are unpredictable. Indeed,
some may offer strong resistance while others none at all.
More importantly, however, this is a case of a father sexually assaulting his child. The
force or violence necessary in rape depends on the age, size, and strength of the persons
involved and their relationship to each other; and what is essential is that the act was
accomplished against the will and despite the resistance of the victim. The Court has ruled
that "in rape committed by a father against his own daughter, the father's parental authority
and moral ascendancy over his daughter substitutes for violence and intimidation."
In People v. Rodriguez, the Court even had occasion to say that "it would be plain fallacy
to say that the failure to shout or to offer tenacious resistance makes voluntary the victim's
submission to the criminal act of the offender. It is quite enough that she has repeatedly tried,
albeit unsuccessfully, to resist his advances."
On the issue of delay in reporting the incident, accused-appellant's contention deserves

scant consideration. It is settled that long silence and delay in reporting the crime of rape are
not necessarily indications of a false accusation and cannot be taken against the victim unless
the delay or inaction in revealing its commission is unreasonable and unexplained. Again, the
delay may be owed to the observation that victims of a horrific crime tend to react differently.
Formatted: Space After: 10 pt, Line spacing: Multiple 1.15

li
People v. Al Shierav Ahma Formatted: Don't add space between paragraphs of the
same style
G.R. No. 228955, 14 March 2018
Reyes, Jr., J.
of the same style
FACTS: same style
Accused Al Shierav Ahmad y Salid (“Ahmad”) was convicted for violation of Section 5
and 11 of R.A. No. 9165, otherwise known as “Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.”
In arguing for his acquittal, accused contends that the prosecution failed to establish the Chain
of Custody, and thus calls for accused’s acquittal.
ISSUE:
Whether the failure of the prosecution to establish the Chain of Custody calls for the
acquittal of accused.
HELD: Yes, the failure to establish the Chain of Custody calls for the acquittal of accused.
The prosecution bears the burden of proving that the dangerous drugs presented
before the trial court are the same items confiscated from the accused. Section 21 of R.A. No.
9165, particularly paragraph 1, provides the procedure for the custody and disposition of
confiscated, seized, or surrendered dangerous drugs.
The requirements of the law are clear. The apprehending officers

must immediately conduct a physical inventory and to photograph the seized items in the
presence of the following: (a) the accused or the person from whom the items were confiscated,
or his representative or counsel; (b) a representative from the media; (c) a representative from
60
the Department of Justice (DOJ); and (d) any elected public official. They should also sign the
inventory and be given a copy thereof.
Requiring the presence of these persons during the inventory serves to prevent
switching, planting, or contaminating the seized evidence, which taints the integrity and
evidentiary value of the confiscated dangerous drugs. In line with this, jurisprudence requires
the apprehending officers to immediately mark the seized items upon its confiscation, or at the
"earliest reasonably available opportunity," because this serves as the fundamental reference
point in establishing the chain of custody.
While non-compliance with these requirements is excusable, this only applies when
the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items were properly preserved. The
prosecution must also provide a credible justification for the arresting officers' failure to
comply with the procedure under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165.
It is readily apparent from the records that the arresting officers committed several lapses in
the prescribed procedure for the handling of the seized illegal drugs.
People v. Bonifacio Gaylon
Del Castillo, J.
FACTS:
Accused Bonifacio Gaylon y Robidillo (“Gaylon”) was convicted was convicted for
violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165, otherwise known as “Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
of 2002.” In arguing for his innocence, accused contends that the prosecution failed to establish
the elements of the offense charged for its failure to comply with the Chain of Custody Rule.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the failure to comply with the Chain of Custody Rule results in the
prosecution’s the failure to establish the guilt of accused.
HELD:
Yes, the Supreme Court held that the failure to comply with the Chain of Custody
Rule results in the prosecution’s the failure to establish the guilt of accused.
In this case, the prosecution had the burden of establishing the presence of the
elements of the crime of illegal sale of shabu in order to secure a conviction of the appellant
therefor.
In this connection, both the RTC and the CA failed to take into consideration the
buy-bust team's non-compliance with Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. In particular, (1)
the prosecution's failure to show that the Inventory of Seized Properties/Items was prepared in
the presence of a media representative, a DOJ representative, and any elected public official
who should have signed the same and received copies thereof; (2) the prosecution did not
offer as evidence any photograph of the seized shabu; and (3) no explanation for such
non-compliance was proffered by the prosecution. In short, the prosecution failed to show
61
"that the non-compliance with the requirements was upon justifiable grounds, [and] that the
evidentiary value of the seized items was properly preserved by the apprehending team."
Verily, without the State's justification for the lapses or gaps, the chain of custody so
essential in the establishment of the corpus delicti of the offense charged against [appellant]
was not shown to be unbroken and preserved.
People v. Rachael Luna

G.R. No. 219164 21 March 2018
Caguioa, J.
FACTS:
Accused Richael Luna y Torsilino (“Luna”) was convicted for violation of Section 5 and
11 of R.A. No. 9165, as amended, In arguing for his acquittal, accused contends that the failure
to comply with the Chain of Custody Rule, without any justifiable reason, calls for his
acquittal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the failure to comply with the Chain of Custody Rule, without any
justifiable reason, calls of the acquittal of accused.
HELD:
Yes, failure to comply with the Chain of Custody rule, without any justifiable reason,
warrants the acquittal of accused.
Based on the circumstances of the present appeal, however, the saving clause was not
triggered because the first prong was not satisfied - the prosecution did not offer any
justifiable grounds for the noncompliance. No explanation was proffered as to why none of
the insulating witnesses was present at the place and time of the seizure, or as to the failure to
photograph the drugs immediately after seizure in the presence of such witnesses. There was
likewise no showing of any efforts exerted by the police officers to at least coordinate with
witnesses ahead of the buy-bust operation. In fact, only two (2) out of the three (3) required
witnesses under Section 21 were eventually summoned to affix their signature on the pre--
accomplished Inventory of Confiscated Evidence. Likewise, as already mentioned above, there
was no apparent reason to defer the photographing of the corpus delicti immediately after
seizure because the buy-bust team was able to perform an inventory at the scene.
In this case, the non-compliance with Section 21 without the triggering of the saving
clause is a showing of irregularity that effectively rebuts the presumption. As previously ruled
in People v. Enriquez, any divergence from the prescribed procedure, when left unjustified, is
"an irregularity, a red flag that casts reasonable doubt on the identity of the corpus delicti.
Verily, the presumption of regularity of performance of official duty stands only when
no reason exists in the records by which to doubt the regularity of the performance of official
duty. Applied to dangerous drugs cases, the prosecution cannot rely on the presumption when
there is a showing that the apprehending officers failed to comply with the requirements laid
down in Section 21. And, in any case, the presumption of regularity cannot be stronger than
62
the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused. Otherwise, a mere rule of evidence will
defeat the constitutionally enshrined right to be presumed innocent.
All things considered, the evidence, appreciated in its totality, unequivocally points to
an acquittal. Firstly, there were patent breaches of the mandatory requirements of Section 21 of
R.A. No. 9165. Secondly, the prosecution utterly failed to trigger the saving clause as they did
not present justifiable grounds for such non-compliance. Case law has decreed that the
procedure enshrined in Section 21 is a matter of substantive law and cannot be brushed aside
as a simple procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment to the conviction of
illegal drug suspects. This being so, considering that the State left the lapses of the police
officers unacknowledged and unexplained, the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus
delicti had been compromised, thereby creating reasonable doubt as to the guilt of
accused-appellant Luna for the crimes charged. Hence, his acquittal must follow without
delay.
People v. Joel Domingo

G.R. No. 204895 21 March 2018
Caguioa, J.
TOPIC: Murder/Double Jeopardy and Right to Speedy Trial
FACTS:
Accused Joel Domingo (“Domingo”) was charged before the trial Court for two counts
of murder and one count of attempted murder. During the course of trial, the prosecution’s
failure to present evidence in the settings allocated for it proved fatal as the trial Court granted
accused motion to dismiss the cases against him, raising his right to speedy trial. The
prosecution moved for reconsideration of the said order, which was granted by the trial court.
Thereafter, the trial Court convicted accused for the crimes charged.
Accused contends that his right to speedy trial was violated, and that the prosecution’s
reconsideration violated his right to double jeopardy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the conviction of accused violated his right against double jeopardy
and speedy trial, inasmuch as the trial Court already dismissed the case against him.
HELD: Yes, the Court held that accused convictions violated his right against double jeopardy
and speedy trial.
Prejudice to the accused is determined through its effect on three interests of the
accused that the right to a speedy trial is designed to protect, which are: "(i) to prevent
oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii)
to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired.
Accused-appellant was therefore prejudiced when the prosecution failed to present its
evidence during all the settings that were given to it. Every day spent in jail is oppressive,
more so when the reason for the prolongation of incarceration is the prosecution's
unreasonable motions for postponement.
In instances where the State has been given every opportunity to present its evidence,
yet it failed to do so, it cannot claim to have been deprived of a fair opportunity to present its
63
evidence. Such failure and the resulting dismissal of the case is deemed an acquittal of the
accused even if it is the accused who moved for the dismissal of the case.
To the mind of the Court, an accused cannot be made to needlessly and baselessly
suffer incarceration or any anxiety arising from criminal prosecution, no matter the duration.
Any day in jail or in fear of criminal prosecution has a grave impact on the accused. When the
prosecution is needlessly and baselessly prolonged, causing him prejudice, the Court is
constrained, as in this case, to arrive at a finding that accused-appellant's right to a speedy trial
was violated.
People v. Alfredo Opeña
Del Castillo, J.
TOPIC: Rape
FACTS:
Accused Alfredo Opeña y Baclagon (“Opeña”) was convicted by the trial court for
allegedly raping his daughter, “AAA.” In arguing for his acquittal, Opeña contends that
“AAA’s” failure to report the said incident for a period of nine years rendered her accusation
doubtful.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the failure to report an incident involving the crime of rape for nine
years renders a victim’s accusation doubtful.
HELD:
No, the Court held that the failure to report an incident for nine years does not render
the accusation doubtful.
It has been repeatedly ruled that "delay in reporting an incident of rape is not
necessarily an indication that the charge is fabricated, particularly when the delay can be
attributed to fear instilled by threats from one who exercises ascendancy over the
victim." In People v. Coloma cited in People v. Cañada, the Court considered an eight-year delay
in reporting the long history of rape by the victim's father as understandable and insufficient
to render the complaint of a 13-year old daughter incredible. In the present case, the inaction
of "AAA" is understandable and may even be expected as she was scared due to the threat on
her and her mother if she would divulge the incident done to her.
The question of whether the circumstances of force or intimidation are absent in

accomplishing the offense charged gains no valuable significance considering that appellant,
being the biological father of "AAA," undoubtedly exerted a strong moral influence over her
which may substitute for actual physical violence and intimidation.
People v. Hon. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division) and Camilo Loyola Sabio
G.R. No. 228494-96, 21 March 2018 same style
Reyes, Jr., J.
TOPIC: Malversation of Public Funds/ Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 Formatted: Font: Bold
FACTS:
64
Accused Camilo Loyola Sabio (“Sabio”) was acquitted by the Sandiganbayan for the
charges of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and two counts of malversation of public funds, for the
prosecution’s failure to adduce sufficient evidence to establish the crimes charged.
In assailing said acquittal, the prosecution moved for the instant Petition for Certiorari,
arguing that since Sandiganbayan’s acquittal was tainted with grave abuse of discretion,
accused right against double jeopardy is not violated.
ISSUE:
Whether accused right against double jeopardy was violated when the prosecution
moved to file a Petition for Certiorari to assail his acquittal.
HELD: Yes, accused’s right against double jeopardy is violated in the absence of any showing
that the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion.
Generally, a judgment of acquittal is immediately final and executory. The prosecution

cannot appeal the acquittal lest the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy be
violated. However, the rule admits of two exceptional grounds that can be challenged in a
certiorari proceeding under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court: (1) in a judgment of acquittal
rendered with grave abuse of discretion by the court; and (2) where the prosecution had been
deprived of due process.
A cursory reading of the present petition for certiorari demonstrates a prodding to

review the judgment of acquittal rendered by the Sandiganbayan on account of grave abuse of
discretion. However, though enveloped on a pretext of grave abuse, the petition in actuality
aims to overturn the decision of Sandiganbayan due to perceived mistake in the appreciation
of facts and evidence. Unfortunately for the petitioner, the correction of this mistake does not
fall within the ambit of Rule 65.
In this case, the prosecution was given adequate opportunity to present several
witnesses and all necessary documentary evidence to prove the guilt of Sabio. However,
Sandiganbayan warranted the acquittal of Sabio due to insufficiency of evidence engendering
reasonable doubt on whether Sabio committed the offenses charged.
The Court finds no indication that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion
when it gave a verdict of acquittal in favor of Sabio. The "grave abuse of discretion"
contemplated by law involves a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner failed to discharge the burden that Sandiganbayan blatantly
abused its discretion in acquitting Sabio such that it was deprived of its authority to dispense
justice.
An action for certiorari does not correct errors of judgment but only errors of
jurisdiction. The nature of a Rule 65 petition does not entail a review of facts and law on the
merits in the manner done in an appeal. Misapplication of facts and evidence, and erroneous
conclusions based on evidence do not, by the mere fact that errors were committed, rise to the
level of grave abuse of discretion. Even granting that the Sandiganbayan erred in weighing the
sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence, such error does not necessarily amount to grave
abuse of discretion.
65
66
People v. XXX, Alfredo Gilles, Niño G. Monter Formatted: Don't add space between paragraphs of the
same style
G.R. No. 229860, March 21, 2018
Gesmundo, J.
TOPIC: Rape
FACTS:
Accused “XXX”, Aldredo Gilles (“Gilles”), Niño G. Monter (“Monter”) and Constante M.
Castil (“Castil”) were convicted for the crime of rape before the trial Court. Prosecution argues
that the accused took advantage of the victim, “AAA’s” mental condition, that she was a
mental retardate evidenced by the medical certificate issued by a certain Dr. Escalamado. Thus,
“AAA” cannot give consent as to the carnal knowledge that allegedly transpired. In arguing
for their acquittal, accused contends that “AAA” is not a mental retardate and gave consent to
what transpired in the incidents involving the case. In addition, accused argues that the
medical certificate deserved does not deserve credence because the doctor who issued said
medical certificate did not testify during trial.
ISSUE:
Whether the failure of the prosecution to prove the alleged mental condition of accused
in a crime of rape results into accused’s acquittal.
HELD:
Yes, the prosecution’s failure results into the acquittal of accused. The state of being
feeble-minded has been explained as the incapacity of thinking and reasoning like any normal
human being, not being able to think and reason from birth, and devoid or deficient in those
instincts and other mental faculties that characterize the average and normal mortal. When a
woman is feeble-minded, she has no free and voluntary will. She is incapable of freely and
voluntarily giving consent which is necessary and essential from lifting coitus from the place
of criminality. In People of the Philippines v. Dalandas, the Court had the opportunity to
distinguish between the various degrees of mental retardation, and where
"feeble-mindedness" fell within the spectrum.
All elements of the crime of rape must be proven beyond reasonable doubt, including
the victim's mental condition. Although it is true that mental abnormality or deficiency is
enough for a woman to be considered "deprived of reason," thus dispensing with the proof of
force, threat, or intimidation, abnormality or deficiency of whatever state or degree should be
sufficiently and adequately established by orthodox and reasonably available methods and
procedures. It is possible that complainant could well have been merely on the lower end of
the acceptable mean for her age group, a condition which would have been aggravated by her
lack of education, but this, by any medical or psychological yardstick, does not itself negate
autonomous choice or decision-making based on reasoning.
Here, however, the Court only has the RTC's assessment of AAA to go by and
determine that AAA was feeble-minded and therefore sexual congress with her equates to
rape. The medical certificate stated that "patient is known to have mental deficiency."
However, this was not even testified to by the doctor who signed the same.
In People of the Philippines v. Cartuano, Jr. (Cartuano), where it was held that the
deficiency of whatever state or degree should be sufficiently and adequately established by
orthodox and reasonably available methods and procedures, there was a dearth of medical
67
records to sustain a finding of mental retardation. In the recent case of People of the Philippines v.
Rodriguez (Rodriguez), where Cartuano was invoked, the prosecution presented a
neuro-psychiatric examination and evaluation conducted by a psychologist, which included
the administration of the Standford Binnet Intelligence Test. The latter case shows that the
doctrine in Cartuano, that there should be clear and convincing proof as to the mental state of
the victim, is still good law.
68
APRIL 2018 Formatted: Font: Bold, Underline

of the same style
People v. Alsarif Bintaib
G.R. No. 217805, 2 April 2018 same style
Martires, J.
FACTS:
Accused Alsarif Bintaib y Florencio (“Florencio”) was convicted for violation of Section
5 of R.A. No. 9165, otherwise known as “Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.” In
arguing for his acquittal, accused contends that the arresting officers failed to strictly comply
with the Chain of Custody Rule without any justifiable reason. On the other hand, prosecution
argues for the presumption of regularity in the exercise of their duty.
ISSUE:
Whether the failure of the arresting officers to strictly comply with the Chain of
Custody Rule without any justifiable reason, despite the presumption of regularity in the
exercise of their duty, calls for the acquittal of accused.
HELD:
Yes, the failure of the arresting officers to strictly comply with the Chain of Custody
Rule without any justifiable reason calls for the acquittal of accused.
For this reason, both law and jurisprudence have set procedural guidelines on how
confiscated drugs should be handled. The fact that the seized drug exists heavily relies on the
preservation of its identity and integrity. The identity of the confiscated drugs is preserved
when we can say that the drug presented and offered as evidence in court is the exact same
item seized or confiscated from the accused at the time of his arrest. The preservation of the
drug's integrity, on the other hand, means that its evidentiary value is intact as it was not
subject to planting, switching, tampering or any other circumstance that casts doubt as to its
existence.
To remove any doubt or uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the seized drugs,
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 outlines the prescribed procedure on how to handle confiscated,
seized, and/or surrendered dangerous drugs.
Since the apprehending team failed to comply with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, the
presumption of regularity cannot work in their favor. This presumption arises only upon
compliance with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, or by clearly or convincingly explaining the
justifiable grounds for noncompliance. Anything short of observance and compliance by the
arresting officers with what the law required means that the former did not regularly perform
their duties. Judicial reliance on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duty despite the lapses in the procedures undertaken is fundamentally unsound because the
lapses themselves are affirmative proofs of irregularity.
On this note, the saving clause in the IRR, which is now incorporated in Section 21 of
R.A. No. 9165, as amended by R.A. No. 10640, may operate because non-compliance with the
prescribed procedural requirements would not automatically render the seizure and custody
of the illegal drug invalid. However, this is true only when: (1) there is a justifiable ground for
69
such noncompliance; and (2) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item/s are
preserved.
Marcelo Salunday v.People.

G.R. No. 215305, 3 April 2018
Carpio, Acting C.J.
TOPIC: P.D. 1866 (Illegal Possession of high powered firearm, ammunition, and explosives
FACTS:
Accused Marcelo G. Saluday (“Saluday”) was convicted for violation of P.D. 1866 as
amended, for illegal possession of high-powered firearm, ammunition, and explosives. In
arguing for his acquittal, accused contends that his constitutional right was violated when the
arresting officers searched his belongings, and that his failure to object thereto does not
constitute any waiver. In this case, the search proceeded from the military checkpoint
conducted by Task Force Davao, subjecting busses from security inspection.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the failure of accused to object as to the search conducted constituted
as a waiver of right.
HELD:
Yes, accused’s failure to object constituted a waiver of right. Doubtless, the

constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right, which
may be waived. However, to be valid, the consent must be voluntary such that it is
unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or
coercion. Relevant to this determination of voluntariness are the following characteristics of
the person giving consent and the environment in which consent is given: (a) the age of the
consenting party; (b) whether he or she was in a public or secluded location; (c) whether he or
she objected to the search or passively looked on; (d) his or her education and intelligence; (e)
the presence of coercive police procedures; (f) the belief that no incriminating evidence will be
found; (g) the nature of the police questioning; (h) the environment in which the questioning
took place; and (i) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting.
In Asuncion v. Court of Appeals, the apprehending officers sought the permission of

petitioner to search the car, to which the latter agreed. According to the Court, petitioner
himself freely gave his consent to the search. In People v. Montilla, the Court found the
accused to have spontaneously performed affirmative acts of volition by opening the bag
without being forced or intimidated to do so, which acts amounted to a clear waiver of his
right. In People v. Omaweng, the police officers asked the accused if they could see the
contents of his bag, to which the accused said "you can see the contents but those are only
clothings." The policemen then asked if they could open and see it, and the accused answered
"you can see it." The Court held there was a valid consented search.
Similarly in this case, petitioner consented to the baggage inspection done by SCAA
Buco. When SCAA Buco asked if he could open petitioner's bag, petitioner answered ''yes, just
open if' based on petitioner's own testimony. This is clear consent by petitioner to the search of
the contents of his bag.
70

same style
People v. Bryan Ganaba
G.R. No. 219240, 4 April 2018
Martires, J.
TOPIC: Rape.
FACTS:
Accused Bryan Ganaba y Nam-ay (“Ganaba”) was convicted by the trial court of the
crime of rape. In his defense, accused denied that he committed the crime charged and
contends that the filing of the complaint of “AAA” was enthused merely by ill-motive because
she allegedly demanded the amount of Php200,000.00 from accused. On the other hand,
prosecution contends that the testimony of “AAA” and their witnesses are credible and
negates any ill motive.
ISSUE:
Whether or not “ill motive” calls for the acquittal of accused, despite the credible
testimony of the victim and its witnesses.
HELD:
No, “ill motive” does not result into the acquittal of accused, in the presence of credible
testimony of the prosecution. The Court notes that the testimony of AAA was full of
convincing details which, in her young age, could not have been known to her unless these
were the truth. "When the offended party is of tender age and immature, courts are inclined to
give credit to her account of what transpired, considering not only her relative vulnerability
but also the shame to which she would be exposed if the matter to which she testified is not
true. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity."
Consequently, it was incumbent upon the accused-appellant to present clear and

persuasive reasons to persuade the Court to reverse the lower courts' unanimous
determination of her credibility as a witness in order to resolve the appeal his way. The onus is
upon the accused-appellant to prove those facts and circumstances which the lower courts
allegedly failed to consider and appreciate, and that would fortify his position that they
seriously erred in finding him guilty of the crime charged. The accused-appellant, however,
miserably failed to discharge his burden.
In conjunction thereto, jurisprudence has firmly upheld the guidelines in evaluating

the testimony of a rape victim, viz: first, while an accusation for rape can be made with facility,
it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove;
second, in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually
involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and
lastly, the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be
allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence of the defense. The Court has
meticulously applied these guidelines in its review of the records of this case, but found no
reason to depart from the well-considered findings and observations of the lower courts.
In the same vein, the assertion of the accused-appellant that AAA had ill motive in
filing the present charge, i.e., demanding ₱200,000.00 in exchange for dropping the case
against him, fails to convince. Notably, it would be the accused-appellant's wife, Jane, who
would be in the best position to testify on this matter considering that AAA allegedly had
71
demanded the ₱200,000.00 from her. Jane, however, never took the witness stand to
corroborate the claim of the accused-appellant. Likewise, the record is bereft of any showing
as to any documentary evidence that would substantiate AAA's demand for ₱200,000.00.
People v. Eleuterio Urmaza

G.R. No. 219957, 3 April 2018
Martires, J.
TOPIC: Rape
FACTS:
Accused Eleuterio Urmaza y Torres (“Urmaza”) was convicted of the crime of qualified rape
before the trial Court for allegedly raping “AAA,” a deaf-mute. In arguing for his acquittal,
accused contends that he had a relationship with “AAA” and the carnal knowledge that
transpired was consensual.
ISSUE: Whether or not the carnal knowledge with a deaf-mute constitutes rape.
HELD:
Yes, carnal knowledge with a deaf-mute constitutes rape. The RTC and the Court of
Appeals both found that AAA was a mental retardate. Well-settled is the rule that findings of
fact of the trial court, particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding upon
the Supreme Court. Besides, there is no cogent reason to disturb the conclusions reached by
the tribunals a quo with respect to AAA' s mental condition.
Both clinical and testimonial evidence were presented by the prosecution to prove that
AAA was a mental retardate. The prosecution presented the Psychiatric Evaluation Report
made by Dr. Caoile whose qualification as an expert witness was admitted by the
defense. Based on the psychological tests performed on AAA, she was found to be suffering
from MENTAL RET ARDA TI ON, SEVERITY UNSPECIFIED. Such diagnosis was grounded
on AAA's significant sub-average intellectual functioning and concurrent deficits or
impairment in adaptive functioning, i.e., difficulty expressing what she likes, constant need to
be supervised with regard to hygiene and basic household chores, and difficulty
understanding or following simple instructions.
From the foregoing, it is beyond cavil that the prosecution was able to prove AAA's
mental retardation. In our jurisdiction, carnal knowledge of a woman suffering from mental
retardation is rape since she is incapable of giving consent to a sexual act. Under these
circumstances, all that needs to be proved for a successful prosecution are the facts of sexual
congress between the rapist and his victim, and the latter's mental retardation.
Urmaza does not deny having sexual congress with AAA in the morning of 7
September 2011. He, however, claims that the act was consensual as he has been in a
relationship with AAA for quite sometime now. Urmaza must be reminded that the
sweetheart theory or sweetheart defense is an oft-abused justification that rashly derides the
intelligence of this Court and sorely tests its patience. To even consider giving credence to
such defense, it must be proven by compelling evidence. Mere testimonial evidence will not
suffice. Independent proof is required - such as tokens, mementos, and photographs. None of
such were presented here by the defense.
72

73
People v. Dina Calates Formatted: Don't add space between paragraphs of the
same style
G.R. No. 214759, 4 April 2018
Bersamin, J.
FACTS:
Accused Dina Calates y Dela Cruz (“Calates”) was convicted for violation of Section 5
of R.A. 9165, otherwise known as “Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.” In arguing
for his acquittal, accused contends that the arresting officers failed to strictly comply with the
Chain of Custody Rule without any justifiable reason.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the failure to strictly comply with the Chain of Custody Rule without
any justifiable reason calls for the acquittal of accused.
HELD:
justifiable reason calls for the acquittal of accused.
The proper handling of the confiscated drug is paramount in order to ensure the chain
of custody, a process essential to preserving the integrity of the evidence of the corpus delicti. In
this connection, chain of custody refers to the duly recorded authorized movement and custody
of seized drugs, controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory
equipment, from the time of seizure or confiscation to the time of receipt in the forensic
laboratory, to the safekeeping until presentation in court as evidence and for the purpose of
destruction. The documentation of the movement and custody of the seized items should
include the identity and signature of the person or persons who held temporary custody
thereof, the date and time when such transfer or custody was made in the course of
safekeeping until presented in court as evidence, and the eventual disposition. There is no
denying that the safeguards of marking, inventory and picture-taking are all vital to establish
that the substance confiscated from the accused was the very same one delivered to and
presented as evidence in court.
The Supreme Court has consistently reminded about the necessity for the arresting
lawmen to comply with the safeguards prescribed by the law for the taking of the inventory
and photographs. The safeguards, albeit not absolutely indispensable, could be dispensed
with only upon justifiable grounds. Indeed, as pronounced in People v. Pagaduan, and other
rulings of the Court, the deviations from the standard procedure dismally compromise the
integrity of the evidence, and the only reason for the courts to overlook the deviations is for
the Prosecution to recognize the deviations and to explain them in terms of their justifiable
grounds, and to show that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized were
nonetheless substantially preserved. Any shortcoming on the part of the Prosecution in this
regard is fatal to its cause despite the saving clause stated in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165.
The records have been vainly searched for the credible justification for the entrapment
team's non-compliance with the safeguards set by law. The absence of the justification
accented the gaps in the chain of custody, and should result in the negation of the evidence of
the corpus delicti right from the outset. Clearly, the Prosecution did not discharge its burden to
prove the guilt of Dina beyond reasonable doubt.
74

People v. Jerry Bugna
Martires, J.
TOPIC: Rape
FACTS:
Accused Jerry Bugna y Britanico (“Bugna”) was convicted before the trial Court for the crime
of qualified rape, for allegedly raping his own daughter, “AAA.” In arguing for his acquittal,
accused interposed denial and alibi. The prosecution, on the other hand, contends that the
victim positively identified the accused with her credible testimony.
ISSUE: Whether or not alibi and denial overturns positive identification of the victim in a
crime of rape.
HELD: No, alibi and denial cannot overturn the positive identification of the victim.
There is qualified rape when a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by

consaguinity or affinity within the third civil degree or the common-law spouse of the victim
has carnal knowledge with a minor through force, threat or intimidation. In other words, the
element of qualified rape is as follows: (a) there is sexual congress; (b) with a woman; (c) done
by force and without consent; (d) the victim is a minor at the time of the rape; and (e) offender
is a parent (whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted) of the victim.
To defend himself, Bugna claims that he was not home from April until December 2007.
It is settled that positive identification prevails over alibi because it can easily be fabricated
and is inherently unreliable. In People v. Dadao, the Court explained that the defense of alibi
must be corroborated by disinterested witnesses, to wit:
It is a time-honored principle in jurisprudence that positive identification

prevails over alibi since the latter can easily be fabricated and is inherently
unreliable. Hence, it must be supported by credible corroboration from
disinterested witnesses, and if not, is fatal to the accused. x x x While the
witnesses presented by the defense to corroborate the respective alibis of
Marcelino Dadao and Antonio Sulindao consisted of friends and relatives who
are hardly the disinterested witnesses that is required by
jurisprudence. (emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, other than his testimony, Bugna failed to present disinterested
witnesses to corroborate his claim that he was not at home from April to December 2007.
Faced with such appalling allegations, he could only muster a measly self-serving alibi to
defend himself. Surely, such defense fails to convince the Court of Bugna's innocence
especially since AAA had positively and convincingly identified him as her abuser.
People v. Mardy Aquino, et al.
Martitres, J.
TOPIC: Attempted Homicide
FACTS:
75
Accused herein were convicted for the crime of murder before the trial Court for
allegedly helping one another, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and abuse of
superior strength, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
stab Jackie N. Caguioa, inflicting upon the latter fatal wounds which caused his death as a
consequence. In their defense, accused contend that the prosecution failed to prove the abuse
in superior strength or that there was evident premeditation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the failure of the prosecution to establish abuse of superior strength
and evidence premeditation would result in the acquittal for the charge of murder.
HELD:
Yes, the failure to establish abuse of superior strength and evidence premeditation
would result in the acquittal for the charge of murder. However, accused may still be held
guilty of homicide.
Generally, the elements of murder are: 1) That a person was killed; 2) That the accused
killed him; 3) That the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned
in Art. 248; and 4) That the killing is not parricide or infanticide.
Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces

between the victim and the aggressor/s that is plainly and obviously advantageous to the
aggressor/s and purposely selected or taken advantage of to facilitate the commission of the
crime. Evidence must show that the assailants consciously sought the advantage,23 or that they
had the deliberate intent to use this advantage. To take advantage of superior strength means
to purposely use force excessively out of proportion to the means of defense available to the
person attacked. The appreciation of this aggravating circumstance depends on the age, size,
and strength of the parties.
The prosecution in this case failed to adduce evidence of a relative disparity in age, size,
and strength, or force, except for the showing that two assailants stabbed the victim while
three others restrained him. However, the presence of several assailants does not ipso
facto indicate an abuse of superior strength. Mere superiority in numbers is not indicative of
the presence of this circumstance.
Further, the totality of the evidence shows that the encounter between the victim and
his assailants was unplanned and unpremeditated. It must be noted that it was Jackie and
Ernesto who went to the place where the accused were having a drinking session. Thus, there
was no conscious effort on the part of the accused to use or take advantage of any superior
strength that they then enjoyed. It has not been clearly established that the accused, taking
advantage of their number, purposely resorted to holding Jackie by the arms so that two of
them would be free to stab him. In view of the foregoing, the Court is compelled to rule out
the presence of abuse of superior strength as a qualifying circumstance. Hence,
accused-appellants' guilt must be limited to the crime of homicide.
76
People v. Rodolfo Advincula Formatted: Don't add space between paragraphs of the
same style
G.R. No. 218108, 11 April 2018
Martires, J.
TOPIC: Murder
FACTS:
Accused Rodolfo Advincula (“Advincula”) was convicted by the trial court for the
crime of murder. In his defense, he invoked the justifying circumstance of self-defense. On the
other hand, prosecution argued that since accused raised an affirmative defense, and thus
admitted to the alleged murder, the burden is shifted to accused.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the burden of evidence is shifted to accused when he raised the
affirmative defense of self-defense.
HELD: Yes, the burden of evidence shifted to accused.
It must be remembered that an accused who pleads a justifying circumstance under

Article (Art.) 11 of the Revised Penal Code admits to the commission of acts, which would
otherwise engender criminal liability. If the accused admits the killing, the burden of evidence,
as distinguished from burden of proof, is shifted on him to prove with clear and convincing
evidence the essential elements of the justifying circumstance of defense of a relative, viz: (1)
unlawful aggression by the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent
or repel the aggression; and (3) in case the provocation was given by the person attacked, that
the person making the defense took no part in the provocation. The justification for the shift in
the assumption of the burden is that the accused, having· admitted the killing, is required to
rely on the strength of his own evidence, not on the weakness of the prosecution's evidence
which, even if it were weak, could not be disbelieved in view of his admission.
The presence of unlawful aggression, which is a condition sine qua non for upholding
self-defense, has been described as follows:
Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial element of the
justifying circumstance of self-defense. Without unlawful aggression, there can
be no justified killing in defense of oneself. The test for the presence of unlawful
aggression under the circumstances is whether the aggression from the victim
put in real peril the life or personal safety of the person defending himself; the
peril must not be an imagined or imaginary threat. Accordingly, the accused
must establish the concurrence of three elements of unlawful aggression,
namely: (a) there must be a physical or material attack or assault; (b) the attack
or assault must be actual, or, at least, imminent; and (c) the attack or assault
must be unlawful.
Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful aggression;

and (b) imminent unlawful aggression. Actual or material unlawful aggression
means an attack with physical force or with a weapon, an offensive act that
positively determines the intent of the aggressor to cause the injury. Imminent
unlawful aggression means an attack that is impending or at the point of
happening; it must not consist in a mere threatening attitude, nor must it be
merely imaginary, but must be offensive and positively strong.
77
Imminent unlawful aggression must not be a mere threatening attitude of the

victim, such as pressing his right hand to his hip where a revolver was
holstered, accompanied by an angry countenance, or like aiming to throw a pot.
There can be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, unless the victim had
committed unlawful aggression against the person who resorted to self-defense. The absence
of any unlawful aggression on the part of Reggie renders ineffectual the accused-appellant's
alibi of defense of a relative. Consequently, the two other essential elements of self-defense
would have no factual and legal bases without any unlawful aggression to prevent or repel.
For this reason, it becomes immaterial to further discuss the two other elements of defense of a
relative.
**No cases for MAY 2018
78
JUNE 2018 Formatted: Font: Bold, Underline

Formatted: Centered
People v. Decito Francisco
G.R. No. 216728; 4 June 2018 Formatted: Don't add space between paragraphs of the
same style
Martires, J.
TOPIC: Homicide
FACTS:
One evening, Jaime Noriega III was watching a game of Lucky Nine at a wake when
the accused suddenly came from behind the latter and, without warning, stabbed him on the
left side of his body with a 13-inch knife. Noriega was brought to a hospital but died shortly
due to massive blood loss as a result of the stab wound.
ISSUE: Is the accused guilty of murder?
HELD:
No. Generally, the elements of murder are: 1) that a person was killed; 2) that the
accused killed him; 3) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances
mentioned in Article 248; and 4) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide.
Treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially
to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended
party might make. To constitute treachery, two conditions must be present: 1) the employment
of means of execution that gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to
retaliate; and 2) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.
The prosecution, however, failed to prove the existence of the second condition. The mere
fact that the attack was inflicted when the victim had his back turned will not in itself
constitute treachery. It must appear that such mode of attack was consciously adopted with
the purpose of depriving the victim of a chance to either fight or retreat.
The Supreme Court downgraded accused-appellant's conviction to the crime of Homicide.
Kim Liong v. People

G.R. No. 200630, 4 June 2018
Leonen, J.
TOPIC: Estafa
FACTS:
Liong was charged with estafa for allegedly failing to return to Equitable PCI Bank,
despite demand, a total of US$50,955.70, which was erroneously deposited in his dollar
account.
Antonio Dela Rama, the first witness for the prosecution, was presented as scheduled
on June 8, 2006. His direct examination was terminated on January 25, 2007, and the initial
date for his cross-examination was set on March 15, 2007. Since then, the cross-examination
was reset thirteen (13) times. Five (5) of the cancellations were attributable to the accused.
79
On August 27, 2009, due to another failure of accused’s counsel to appear, private
prosecutor Atty. Maningas moved that Liong be declared to have waived his right to
cross-examine Dela Rama. The trial court granted the motion and denied the subsequent
motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Did the accused waive his right to cross-examine Dela Rama?
HELD:
Yes. When an accused is given the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but fails to
avail of it, the accused shall be deemed to have waived this right. The witness' testimony given
during direct examination will remain on record. If this testimony is used against the accused,
there will be no violation of the right of confrontation.
The accused was given more than enough opportunity to cross examine witness Dela
Rama. Contrary to his allegation, five (5) of the cancellations are attributable to him. The
accused had the habit of frequently changing counsels.
The right to confront and cross-examine witnesses is a basic, fundamental human right
vested inalienably to an accused. This right ensures that courts can confidently ferret out the
facts on the basis of which they can determine whether a crime occurred and the level of
culpability of the accused. It is a basic requirement of criminal justice. However, this right
does not exist in isolation. The State, representing the people that may have been wronged by
a crime, also has the right to due process. This means that the prosecution must not be denied
unreasonably of its ability to be able to prove its case through machinations by the accused.
When the accused abuses its option to choose his counsel as in this case, he can be deemed
to have waived his right to confrontation and cross-examination. The pattern of
postponements and changes of counsel in this case is so obvious and patent. The accused
should have been dissuaded by any of the lawyers, unless they, too, connived in such an
amateurish strategy, which wastes the time and resources of our judicial system.
People v. Norjana Sood

G.R. No. 227394, 6 June 2018.
Caguioa, J.
TOPIC: R.A. No. 9165; Section 21 (Chain of Custody) Formatted: Left, Don't add space between paragraphs of
the same style
FACTS: same style
Accused was arrested in a buy-bust operation for allegedly selling shabu. Thereafter, the
accused was taken to the barangay hall. SPOl Regato prepared the Inventory of Seized
Properties/Items and the inventory was conducted before Kgd. Manette P. Salazar and Rey
Argana, a media representative. Both Kgd. Salazar and Argana signed the certificate of
inventory for the two (2) transparent plastic sachets. Afterwards, the accused was brought to
the police station. SPO 1 Regato turned over the confiscated items to their investigator, P03
Cortes, who prepared a Request for Laboratory Examination of the subject specimens.
Thereafter, SPOl Regato submitted the evidence to the crime laboratory for examination,
which gave positive results to the tests for shabu.
Thus, accused was charged with a violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165, otherwise known as
the “Dangerous Drugs Act.” The trial court convicted the accused. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.
80
ISSUE: Is the conviction proper?
HELD:
No. The prosecution failed to comply with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, as amended.
The findings of the Court of Appeals show an utter failure on the part of the police to conduct
the inventory at the place of seizure of the drugs. In this regard, the Court of Appeals
pointedly observed that the testimonies of the police officers were conflicting as to whether
the purported inventory was conducted, whether at the barangay office or at the police station.
Also, the evidence for the prosecution failed to show that witnesses during the photographing
of the seized drugs.
The plain import of Section 21of R.A. No. 9165 is that the buy-bust team is to conduct
the physical inventory and photographing of the seized items immediately after seizure and
confiscation in the presence of the accused, his counsel, or representative, a representative of
the DOJ, the media, and an elected public official, who shall be required to sign the copies of
the inventory and be given a copy thereof. And only if this is not practicable, can the inventory
and photographing be done as soon as the buy-bust team reaches the nearest police station or
the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team.
Here, the buy-bust team admittedly failed to comply with the foregoing requirements.
First, the conduct of the inventory was not conducted immediately at the place of seizure and
apprehension; indeed, the police officers even contradicted each other as to where the
inventory was supposedly conducted. This creates a very serious doubt in the Court's mind as
to whether an inventory was actually even conducted. If the members of the buy-bust team
have markedly different versions of what transpired after the seizure of the items, the Court
cannot rely on their testimonies on the conduct of the inventory and photographing.
Second, even assuming an inventory had been conducted, the prosecution failed to
comply with the requirement that the photographing be also done at the place of arrest. The
prosecution's excuse of not having a camera is flimsy as they had planned the operation.
Finally, and most revealing as to whether or not a buy-bust actually took place is the
prosecution's abject and complete failure to comply with the requirement of bringing along
the required three witnesses - from the media, the DOJ, and any elected public official. To be
certain, these witnesses should already have been present at the time of apprehension and the
drugs' seizure, as this is a requirement the buy-bust team could easily have complied with
given the nature of a buy-bust operation as a planned activity.
Leniza Reyes v. People

G.R. No. 229380; June 6, 2018 Formatted: Font: Bold
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
TOPIC: R.A. No. 9165; Section 11 Formatted: Font: Bold
The accused was charged with a violation of Section 11 of R.A. 9165. During trial, she
raised the defense that she was a victim of frame up by the police authorities. The trial court
convicted the accused by holding that the prosecution successfully proved the legality of her
arrest and possession of a sachet of shabu. On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court’s ruling.
ISSUE: Is the verdict of conviction correct?

81
HELD:
No. The Constitution mandates that a search or arrest may only be made on the
strength of a validly issued warrant and excludes any evidence obtained in violation thereof.
One of the recognized exceptions to the need of a warrant before a search may be
effected is a search incidental to a lawful arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure identifies three (3) instances when warrantless arrests may be lawfully
effected. These are: (a) an arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; ( b) an arrest of a suspect
where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable cause that said
suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which had just been committed; and ( c) an arrest of a
prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined
during the pendency of his case or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement
to another.
The Supreme Court finds that no lawful arrest was made on Reyes. POI Monteras
himself admitted that Reyes passed by them without acting suspiciously or doing anything
wrong, except that she smelled of liquor. As no other overt act could be properly attributed to
Reyes as to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO 1 Monteras that she had just committed, was
committing, or was about to commit a crime, the arrest is bereft of any legal basis. As case law
demonstrates, the act of walking while reeking of liquor per se cannot be considered a
criminal act. Neither has the prosecution established the conditions set forth in Section 5 (b ),
Rule 113, particularly, that the arresting officer had personal knowledge of any fact or
circumstance indicating that the accused had just committed a crime. "Personal knowledge" is
determined from the testimony of the witnesses that there exist reasonable grounds to believe
that a crime was committed by the accused. As ruled by the Court, "[a] hearsay tip by itself
does not justify a warrantless arrest. Law enforcers must have personal knowledge of facts,
based on their observation, that the person sought to be arrested has just committed a crime."
In this case, records failed to show that PO 1 Monteras had any personal knowledge that a
crime had been committed by Reyes, as in fact, he even admitted that he merely relied on the
two (2) teenagers' tip and that, everything happened by "chance."
In fine, there being no lawful warrantless arrest, the sachet of shabu purportedly
seized from Reyes on account of the search is rendered inadmissible in evidence for being the
proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. And since the shabu is the very corpus delicti of the
crime charged, Reyes must necessarily be acquitted and exonerated from criminal liability.
Iluminada Batac v. People

G.R. No. 191622; 6 June 2018
Martires, J.
TOPIC: Estafa Formatted: Font: Bold
FACTS:
The accused allegedly went to a Frias’store to have her checks rediscounted. Upon
Batac’s assurance, Frias was persuaded and bought a total of fourteen (14) checks. On the due
dates, the checks were returned for the reason “Account Closed.” Despite demands and after
the lapse of five (5) days to make payment, Batac failed to do so prompting Frias to file the
present case for estafa.
ISSUE:
82
Whether the accused is liable for estafa under Article ·315, paragraph 2(d) of the
Revised Penal Code1
HELD:
Yes. Jurisprudence has consistently held that such estafa consists of the following
elements: (1) the offender has postdated or issued a check in payment of an obligation
contracted at the time of the postdating or issuance; (2) at the time of postdating or issuance of
said check, the offender has no funds in the bank or the funds deposited are not sufficient to
cover the amount of the check; and (3) the payee has been defrauded.
It has been settled in jurisprudence that in the above-defined form of estafa, it is not
the nonpayment of a debt which is made punishable, but the criminal fraud or deceit in the
issuance of a check. Deceit has been defined as "the false representation of a matter of fact,
whether by words or conduct by false or misleading allegations or by concealment of that
which should have been disclosed which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he
shall act upon it to his legal injury."
The prosecution sufficiently demonstrated Batac's deceit when it established that the latter
induced Frias into buying the checks at a rediscounted rate by representing to him that she
had enough funds in her account to cover them.
Also, there is no merit to Batac's contention that, at most, she can only be held liable for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22. While sourced from the same act, i.e., the issuance of a check
subsequently dishonored, estafa and violation of B.P. Blg. 22 are separate and distinct from
each other because they pertain to different causes of action.20 The Court has held that, among
other differences, damage and deceit are essential elements for estafa under Article 315 2(d) of
the RPC, but are not so for violation under B.P. Blg. 22, which punishes the mere issuance of a
bouncing check.
People v. Benito Lababo Alias "Ben," et al.

G.R. No. 234651; 6 June 2018
Velascp, Jr.
TOPIC: Murder
FACTS:
The accused were convicted of the crimes of Murder and Frustrated Murder for the
death of AAA and the fatal wounding of BBB who would have died had he not received a
timely medical attendance. The accused allegedly conspired with each other to kill AAA and
1 2. By means of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud:
xx xx
d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the
bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. The failure of the drawer
of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the
bank and/or payee or holder that said check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prima
facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.
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BBB. It was established that only Benito shot the victims while his co-accused were only
present at the scene of the crime. Each holding a bolo.
ISSUE: Are the accused equally guilty on the basis of conspiracy?
HELD: Yes. For the charge of murder to prosper, the prosecution must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that: (1) the offender killed the victim, (2) through treachery, or by any of the
other five qualifying circumstances, duly alleged in the Information.
The prosecution sufficiently proved that AAA, an unarmed minor, sustained a single,
but fatal wound on his back through from a firearm. This, to the Court, is more than sufficient
to prove that the killing is treacherous since the attack was so sudden and unexpected that
AAA was not given an opportunity to defend himself.
As for BBB's case, the Court agrees with the RTC and CA's factual finding that the
eight gunshot wounds sustained by BBB, as contained in the Medico-Legal Ceriificate, would
have caused his death if he was not given timely medical attention. Furthermore, it does not
appear that BBB was armed or was in a position to deflect the attack. As a matter of fact, based
on CCC' s narration of the events that transpired, the suddenness of the attack upon AAA and
BBB cannot be denied. Only that, unlike AAA, BBB survived.
The act of killing becomes frustrated when an offender performs all the acts of
execution which could produce the crime but did not produce it for reasons independent of
his or her will. Here, BBB's survival was independent of the perpetrator's will.
While it is true that mere presence at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission, without actively participating in the conduct thereof, is insufficient. to prove that
the accused conspired to commit the crime, Wenefredo and FFF' s act of standing near the
victims and Benito, while wielding bolos, does not partake of this nature. The Court is
sufficiently convinced that their presence thereat has no doubt, encouraged Benito and
increased the odds against the victims, especially since they were all wielding lethal weapons.
People v. Manuel Ferrer y Remoquillo a.k.a. "Kano," Kiyaga Macmod y Usman a.k.a.
"Kiyaga" and Dimas Macmod y Mama a.k.a. "Dimas
G.R. No. 213914; 6 June 2018
Martires, J.
the same style
The accused were arrested in flagrante de licto while selling shabu in a buy-bust operation same style
conducted by police authorities. In their defense, the accused asserted that they were victims
of police extortions. The RTC and the Court of Appeals found the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of a violation of Sec. 26 of Article (Art.) II, of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165.
ISSUE: Is the appeal meritorious?
HELD: Yes. In all prosecutions for violations of R.A. No. 9165, the corpus delicti is the
dangerous drug itself, the existence of which is essential to a judgment of conviction; thus, its
identity must be clearly established beyond reasonable doubt to prove its case against the
accused. In order to preclude, therefore, any doubt on the identity of the dangerous drugs,
the prosecution has the burden to account for each link in the chain of custody over the
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dangerous drug from the moment of seizure up to its presentation in court as evidence of the
corpus delicti. In other words, it must be established with unwavering exactitude that the
dangerous drug presented in court as evidence against the accused is the same as that seized
from him in the first place. Equally significant, therefore, as establishing all the elements of
violation of R.A. No. 9165 is proving that there was no hiatus in the chain of custody of the
dangerous drugs and paraphernalia.
In conjunction with Sec. 21, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165, jurisprudence dictates the four links
in the chain of custody of the confiscated item that must be established by the prosecution:
first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by
the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending
officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal
drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and
submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.
The Court notes the silence in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses on when and
how the witnesses to the inventory affixed their respective signatures on the certificate.
Additionally, the prosecution was not able to prove that the seized items were inventoried and
photographed in the presence of the accused-appellants and that copies thereof were
furnished them. However, noncompliance with the requirements of Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165
on justifiable grounds shall not render void and invalid the seizure and custody of the
confiscated items as long as the inte~grity and the evidentiary value of the items had been
properly preserved by the apprehending team. The burden therefore is with the prosecution
to prove that: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. The record, however, is bereft of
any showing that the prosecution was able to establish the justifiable ground on why the
apprehending team did not comply with the guidelines set forth in Sec. 21, R.A. No. 9165, and
to prove that the integrity and value of the seized evidence had nonetheless been preserved.
People v. Evangeline De Dios

G.R. No. 234018; 6 June 2018
Reyes, Jr., J.
TOPIC: Trafficking of Minor
FACTS:
In an entrapment operation, the accused was caught peddling a minor for sexual trade,
hence, an information for a violation of Section 4 (a), in relation to Sections 3 (a) and 6 (a) of
R.A. No. 9208 was filed against the accused. The RTC found the accused guilty of qualified
trafficking and was affirmed by the CA on appeal.
ISSUE: Is the conviction correct?
HELD: Yes. The prosecution was able to sufficiently establish the crime's commission.
Pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 9208, being the law that defines the crime of Trafficking in
Persons, read as follows:
Section 3. Definition of Terms. — As used in this Act:
(a) Trafficking in Persons — refers to the recruitment, transportation, transfer or

harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim's consent or knowledge,
within or across national borders by means of threat or use of force, or other forms of
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coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage

of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to
achieve the consent of a person having control over another person for the purpose of
exploitation which includes at a minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of
others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude
or the removal or sale of organs.
The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of a child for the

purpose of exploitation shall also be considered as "trafficking in persons" even if it
does not involve any of the means set forth in the preceding paragraph.
(b) Child — refers to a person below eighteen (18) years of age or one who is over
eighteen (18) but is unable to fully take care of or protect himself/herself from abuse,
neglect, cruelty, exploitation, or discrimination because of a physical or mental
disability or condition.
(c) Prostitution — refers to any act, transaction, scheme or design involving the use of a
person by another, for sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct in exchange for money,
profit or any other consideration.
Section 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons. — The following are considered as qualified

trafficking:
(a) When the trafficked person is a child;
AAA, then still a minor, was among the girls offered in the illicit sexual trade upon the
promise of financial gain for their services by the accused. It did not matter that there was no
threat, force, coercion, abduction, fraud, deception or abuse of power that was employed by
De Dios when she involved AAA in her illicit sexual trade. AAA was still a minor when she
was exposed to prostitution by the prodding, promises and acts of De Dios. Trafficking in
persons may be committed also by means of taking advantage of the persons' vulnerability as
minors, a circumstance that applied to AAA, was sufficiently alleged in the information and
proved during the trial. This element was further achieved through the offer of financial gain
for the illicit services that were provided by AAA to the customers of De Dios
People v. Vicente Sipin

G.R. No. 224290; 11 June 2018
Peralta, J.
the same style
FACTS: same style
The accused was arrested in a buy bust operation after the alleged sale of shabu to an
undercover police officer. He was charged with separate Informations for possession and sale
of shabu. The trial court found him guilty. The Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction.
Hence, he appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that there is no proof beyond reasonable
doubt of his guilt for the alleged crimes.
ISSUE: Is accused’s appeal meritorious?
HELD:
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Yes. The links that must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation,
are as follows: (1) the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from
the accused by the apprehending officer; (2) the turn-over of the illegal drug seized to the
investigating officer; (3) the turn-over by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the
forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and (4) the turn-over and submission of the
illegal drug from the forensic chemist to the court.
Here, the prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt the third link in the
chain of custody. There is an unreconciled conflict between the testimonies of PO1 Diocena
and PO1 Gorospe as to who actually gave PO1 Diocena the specimens before they were
brought to the crime laboratory for examination. Serious inconsistencies in the testimonies of
the police officers also broke the chain of custody of the dangerous drugs from the time they
were seized from appellant until they were presented in court, thereby undermining the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized evidence.
People v. Junrel R. Villalobos

G.R. No. 228960; 11 June 2018
Peralta, J.
TOPIC: Rape
FACTS:
The accused, while armed with a gun, had carnal knowledge with AAA, who thereafter
was able to escape. AAA reported the incident to the police and subjected herself to a medical
examination. The accused was charged with and was tried for rape. The RTC and Court of
Appeals found the accused guilty as charged.
ISSUE: Is the conviction correct?
HELD:
Yes. In rape cases, the conviction of the accused rests heavily on the credibility of the
victim. Here, the trial court found AAA's testimony to be credible as it was made in a "candid
and straightforward manner," "coupled with her occasional crying while relaying her story."
The trial court's reliance on the victim's testimony is apt, considering that it was credible in
itself and buttressed by the testimony of the medico-legal officer. AAA narrated in the
painstaking and well-nigh degrading public trial her unfortunate and painful ordeal in a
logical manner.
People v. Gloria Nangcas

G.R. No. 218806; `13 June 2018
Martires, J.
TOPIC: Trafficking in Persons
FACTS:
The accused recruited AAA, BBB, CCC, and Judith aged fourteen (14), thirteen (13),
seventeen (17), and nineteen (19) respectively, to work as house helpers in Cagayan De Oro
City. However, the girls were taken to Marawi instead despite their objection. Also, ther girls
were not given their salaries and were treated poorly.
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When the girls were rescued, the accused was indicted for the crime of Qualified
Trafficking in Persons under Section 4 in relation to Section 6 of R.A. No. 9208. The RTCand
the Court of Appeals found accused guilty.
HELD: No.
Under R.A. No. 10364, the elements of trafficking in persons have been expanded to
include the following acts:
(1) The act of "recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering, transportation,

transfer, maintaining, harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim's
consent or knowledge, within or across national borders;"
(2) The means used include "by means of threat, or use of force, or other forms of
coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage
of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to
achieve the consent of a person having control over another person."
(3) The purpose of trafficking includes "the exploitation or the prostitution of others or
other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the
removal or sale of organs."
The information filed against Nangcas sufficiently alleged the recruitment and
transportation of Judith and three (3) other minor victims for forced labor or services, with
Nangcas taking advantage of the vulnerability of the young girls through her assurance and
promises of good salary, accessibility of place of work to their respective residences, and
weekly dayoff.
From the factual milieu, it is clear that actual fraud and deception are present in this
case, such as when Nangcas induced and coaxed the victims to go with her. She promised the
victims and their parents that their daughters would be working within Cagayan De Oro City,
with an enticing salary of P1,500.00 per month.
Slavery is defined as the extraction of work or services from any person by enticement,
violence, intimidation or threat, use of force or coercion, including deprivation of freedom,
abuse of authority or moral ascendancy, debt bondage or deception. 51 In this case, Judith and
the three (3) other minor victims were enticed to work as house helpers after Nangcas had told
them of their supposed salary and where they would be working; only to discover that they
were brought to another place without their consent. In Marawi, the victims were constrained
to work with the intention to save money for their fare going back home; however, when they
asked for their salary they were told that it had already been given to Nangcas.
People v. Ricardo Tanglao

G.R. No. 219963; 13 June 2018
Martires, J.
TOPIC: Rape in relation to R.A. No. 7610
FACTS:
88
The accused-appellant was charged with violation of R.A. No. 8353, in relation to R.A.
No. 7610, for raping his seven (7) year old daughter. The trial court and the Court of Appeals
convicted the accused, hence, this appeal.
HELD: No. The appeal is without merit.
For a successful prosecution of rape, the following elements must be proved beyond
reasonable doubt, to wit: (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) that
said act was accomplished: (a) through the use of force and intimidation, or (b) when the
victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the victim is under 12 years
of age or is demented.
AAA positively identified the accused-appellant as the one who raped her on 14
September 2001; this was incisively re-echoed by DDD when he testified. On the element of
carnal knowledge, AAA's testimony on the rape incident was straightforward and convincing,
consistent as it was with DDD's testimony on material and important details.
Clearly applicable in this case is the well-settled rule that the testimony of a rape victim
who is of tender age is credible. The revelation of an innocent child whose chastity was abused
deserves full credence. 38 Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.
What makes the case against the accused-appellant stronger were the medical findings on
AAA.
People v. Ronnie Dela Cruz a.k.a. "Barok"

G.R. No. 219088; 13 June, 2018
Martires, J.
TOPIC: Rape
FACTS:
AAA, the accused and others went drinking one night. Hours later, AAA was already
drunk and could no longer go home. The accused was asked by AAA’s friends to let AAA stay
the night at his house. When at the accused’s house, AAA was allegedly raped. The trial court
and the CA found the accused guilty for the crime of rape. Aggrieved, the accused appealed to
the SC.
ISSUE:
Is the sexual intercourse between the accused and AAA consensual, hence, not rape?
HELD:
No. In rape, the victim need not prove resistance because it is not an element of rape
and the lack thereof does not render the victim's act voluntary. Sexual congress with a person
who expresses resistance through words or deeds constitutes force. Here, AAA verbally and
physically manifested her resistance towards Dela Cruz's advances - at one point she even
cried. Nonetheless, he persisted and ultimately consummated his desire to have carnal
knowledge of her. The degree of force he employed becomes immaterial in view of AAA's
minority and the fact that her intoxication impaired her physical strength.
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People v. Benjamin Domasig a.k.a. "Manod" or "Pilikitot”

G.R. No. 217028; 13 June 2018
Martireers, J.
TOPIC: Homicide
FACTS:
The accused grabbed the victim’s money and stabbed the latter multiple times due to
his resistance. As a result, the victim died immediately died. Hence, the accused was indicted
for robbery with homicide. The trial and appellate courts found the accused guilty as charged,
hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Is the accused guilty?
HELD:
Yes. In charging robbery with homicide, the onus probandi is to establish: (a) the taking
of personal property with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; (b) the property
belongs to another; (c) the taking is characterized with animus lucrandi or with intent to gain;
and (d) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, which is used in
the generic sense, was committed. A conviction requires that robbery is the main purpose and
the killing is merely incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must precede the taking of
human life, but the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery.
The evidence presented to prove the robbery aspect of the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide, does not show that robbery had actually been committed. The witness
merely presumed that the victim was killed because of the P300.00 he supposedly had in his
possession. Thus, it appears that the witness had no personal knowledge that the victim was
robbed. The element of taking, as well as the existence of the money alleged to have been lost
and stolen by accused-appellant, was not adequately established.
The Supreme Court recognizes that the information charged accused-appellant with
the crime robbery with homicide. The established rule, however, is that the nature and
character of the crime charged are determined not by the given designation of the specific
crime but by the facts alleged in the information. In this case, all the elements relevant to
the killing and the taking of property were properly stated in the information but the specific
crime committed should be correctly made. The information failed to allege any circumstance
which would qualify the victim's killing to murder. Thus, accused-appellant should be held
liable only for the crime of homicide
People v. Lulu Battung y Narmar

G.R. No. 230717; 20 June 2018
Peralta, J.
FACTS:
The accused was arrested for selling shabu in a buy-bust operation. Both the trial court
and the Court of Appeals found the accused guilty for violation of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165.
ISSUE: Was the accused’s guilt proven beyond reasonable doubt?

90
HELD:
No. R.A. No. 10640, which amended Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, now only requires
two (2) witnesses to be present during the conduct of the physical inventory and taking of
photograph of the seized items, namely: (a) an elected public official; and (b) either a
representative from the National Prosecution Service or the media.
However, under the original provision of Section 21 and its IRR, which is applicable at
the time the appellant committed the crimes charged, the apprehending team was required to
immediately conduct a physical inventory and photograph the drugs after their seizure and
confiscation in the presence of no less than three (3) witnesses, namely: (a) a representative
from the media, and (b) the DOJ, and; (c) any elected public official who shall be required to
sign copies of the inventory and be given copy thereof. The presence of the three witnesses
was intended as a guarantee against planting of evidence and frame up, as they were
"necessary to insulate the apprehension and incrimination proceedings from any taint of
illegitimacy or irregularity.”
Admittedly, there was no physical inventory of the seized item. Without such
inventory, a doubt is created whether the shabu was really taken from appellant. There were
also no photographs taken of the inventory in the presence of appellant or his representative
or counsel and the required witnesses under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, to wit: a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official. In fact, it was not established at all that the police officers exerted any effort to secure
the presence of the required witnesses.
While the last paragraph of Section 21 (a) of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 provides that
non-compliance with the requirements of Section 21 will not render void and invalid the
seizure and custody of the seized items, it was made clear that this is so under justifiable
ground and the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by
the apprehending officer or team. In other words, the procedural lapse must first be
acknowledged and adequately explained. We held that the justifiable ground for
non-compliance must be proven as a fact as the Court cannot presume what these grounds are
or that they even exist. 47 Here, we find nothing on record of any explanation proffered by the
prosecution for the procedural lapse.
The prosecution never alleged and proved that the presence of the required witnesses
was not obtained for any justifiableof the following reasons.
People v. Herminio Vibal, Jr. Y Uayan @ "Pato," Arnold David Y Cruz @ "Anot," Cipriano
Refrea, Jr. Y Almeda @ "Cobra," Ricardo H. Pineda @ "Peter," Edwin R. Barqueros @
"Marvin," And Daniel Yason @ "Ace", Accused, Herminio Vibal, Jr. Y Uayan @ "Pato," And
Arnold David Y Cruz @ "Anot"
G.R. No. 229678; 20 June 2018
Peralta, J.
TOPIC: Direct Assult with Murder
FACTS:
Mayor Arcillas and police escorts PO2 Rivera and PO3 Almendras were ambushed by
the accused. Mayor Arcillas and PO2 Rivera died for sustaining multiple gunshot wounds.
PO3 Almendras luckily survived and only sustained arm and leg injuries. Hence, the accused
91
were charged in separate informations for two (2) counts of direct assault with murder and
direct assault with frustrated murder. The trial court convicted the accused as charged. The
Court of Appeals, however, affirmed the conviction of the accused for two (2) counts of direct
assault with murder but modified the direct assault with frustrated murder conviction to
direct assault with attempted murder. Undaunted, the accused appealed before the Supreme
Court.
HELD:
No. Direct assault, a crime against public order, may be committed in two ways: first,
by "any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation
for the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and
sedition;" and second, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, "shall attack,
employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents,
while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance.”
Appellants committed the second form of assault, the elements of which are: 1) that
there must be an attack, use of force, or serious intimidation or resistance upon a person in
authority or his agent; 2) the assault was made when the said person was performing his
duties or on the occasion of such performance; and 3) the accused knew that the victim is a
person in authority or his agent, that is, that the accused must have the intention to offend,
injure or assault the offended party as a person in authority or an agent of a person in
authority.
Here, Mayor Arcillas was a duly elected mayor of Sta. Rosa, Laguna and thus, was a
person in authority while PO2 Rivera and PO3 Almendras were agents of a person in
authority. There is no dispute that all of the three victims were in the performance of their
official duties at the time of the shooting incident.
When the assault results in the killing of an agent or of a person in authority for that
matter, there arises the complex crime of Direct Assault with murder or homicide. Here,
treachery qualified the killing of Mayor Arcillas and PO2 Rivera to murder. Treachery also
attended the shooting of PO3 Almendras. In the case at bench, the shooting was deliberate and
without a warning, done in a swift and unexpected manner. Mayor Arcillas, PO2 Rivera and
PO3 Almendras were absolutely unaware of the imminent deadly assaults, and were for that
reason in no position to defend themselves or to repel their assailants. Vibal and David, who
were armed with guns, suddenly appeared in front and at the back of Mayor Arcillas, PO2
Rivera and PO3 Almedras and shot the three victims.
People v. Michelle Parba-Rural and May Almohan-Daza,

G.R. No. 231884; 27 June 2018
Peralta, J.
TOPIC: Kidnapping for Ransom
FACTS:
Nenita and others were forcibly abducted by the accused and boarded in a van for the
purpose of demanding money and jewellry. Due to threats to her life, she was forced to take a
cab with the accused to her house to get her jewelry amounting to 3 million. Thereafter, the
92
accused forced her to withdraw money from her PNB account. While in the bank, police
officers came, hence, the accused were arrested.
The accused then were charged with kidnapping for ransom. The trial found the
accused guilty as charged, and the appellate court affirmed the same.
ISSUE: Are the accused guilty of kidnapping for ransom?
HELD: Yes. Under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, thus:
Article 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. — Any private individual who shall
kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped
or detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is
any of the parents, female or a public officer.
In prosecuting a case involving the crime of kidnapping for ransom, the following
elements must be established: (i) the accused was a private person; (ii) he kidnapped or
detained, or in any manner deprived another of his or her liberty; (iii) the kidnapping or
detention was illegal; and (iv) the victim was kidnapped or detained for ransom. Ransom
means money, price or consideration paid or demanded for the redemption of a captured
person that will release him from captivity. No specific form of ransom is required to
consummate the felony of kidnapping for ransom as long as the ransom is intended as a
bargaining chip in exchange for the victim's freedom. The amount of, and purpose for, the
ransom is immaterial.
In this case, the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the existence
of the above-mentioned elements. In her testimony, Nenita, a private person, narrated how
she was deprived of her liberty from the time she was forcibly taken by the appellants and
their companions for the purpose of extorting money and jewelry from her until she relented
to their demands.
People v. Junie (Or Dioney) Salvador, Sr.

G.R. No. 223566; 27 June 2018
Martires, J.
TOPIC: Parricide and Murder
FACTS:
The accused in this case killed his son, his step daughter, live-in partner, and his two
nieces. The trial court and the Court of Appeals were convinced that the accused is the author
of the killings. Hence, the accused appeals before the Supreme Court arguing, among others,
that he was insane at the time he had a killing spree.
93
ISSUE: Was the accused insane at the time of the commission of the crimes therefore
exempting him from criminal liability?
HELD:
No. Jurisprudence dictates that every individual is presumed to have acted with a
complete grasp of one's mental faculties. Insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation
of intelligence while committing the act, i.e., when the accused is deprived of reason, he acts
without the least discernment because there is a complete absence of power to discern, or
there is total deprivation of freedom of the will. The legal teaching consistently maintained in
our jurisprudence is that the plea of insanity is in the nature of confession and avoidance.
Hence, if the accused is found to be sane at the time he perpetrated the offense, a judgment of
conviction is inevitable because he had already admitted that he committed the offense.
He who invokes insanity as a defense has the burden of proving its existence; thus,
for accused-appellant's defense of insanity to prosper, two (2) elements must concur: (1) that
defendant's insanity constitutes a complete deprivation of intelligence, reason, or discernment;
and (2) that such insanity existed at the time of, or immediately preceding, the commission of
the crime.
Dr. Villanueva personally examined accused-appellant on 27 September 2012, or one

(1) year and seven (7) months from the incident, and found him to be suffering from the
disorder. However, no documentary proof was presented by the defense to show how Dr.
Villanueva was able to arrive at his diagnosis. Likewise noted, Dr. Villanueva cannot state for
sure that when accused-appellant committed the crimes he was suffering from any mental
illness. It is even significant that Dr. Villanueva admitted it was possible that
accused-appellant's present condition was triggered by the massacre that he committed and
not because he already had the disorder at the time he killed his victims.
By his own admission, accused-appellant purposely put out of his mind what he had
done to his victims on 11 February 2011; not because he did not know what he did that day
but because he grieved whenever he thought about it.
In the Philippines, the courts have established a clearer and more stringent criterion
for insanity to be exempting as it is required that there must be a complete deprivation of
intelligence in committing the act, i.e., the accused is deprived of reason; he acted without the
least discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to discern, or that there is a
total deprivation of the will. Accused-appellant's claim that he allegedly failed to remember
what had happened on 11 February 2011, neither qualifies him as insane nor negates the truth
that he was fully aware that he had killed his victims. For sure, accused-appellant's statement
right after he surrendered to Salaysay — "If I want to kill a lot of people, I could but I only
killed my family" — persuasively disproves his claim of not knowingly or voluntarily killing
his victims.
People v. YYY
G.R. No. 224626; 27 June 2018
Martires, J.
TOPIC: Rape
FACTS:
94
Accused YYY was charged of three (3) counts of raping AAA, his half-sister who is ten
(10) years old. The RTC gave credence to the AAA’s positive identification of YYY and
convicted the latter of the charges. The conviction was upheld by the Court of Appeals, hence,
accused AAA questioned the decision arguing, among others, that the prosecution failed to
prove force and intimidation.
ISSUE:
Assuming that the prosecution failed to prove force and intimidation, is YYY still
guilty of rape?
HELD:
Yes. Even assuming that the prosecution failed to prove force and intimidation, this still
could not favor YYY. In incestuous rape of a minor, it is not necessary that actual force or
intimidation be employed.26 YYY is AAA's older half-brother. In addition, the gravamen of
statutory rape is carnal knowledge with a woman below 12 years old; and it is unnecessary
that force and intimidation he proven because the law presumes that the victim, on account of
his or her tender age, does not have a will of his or her own. In all the rape incidents, AAA had
yet to reach 12 years of age.
Clearly, this feeble attempt at exoneration deserves scant consideration because even if
YYY did not employ force and intimidation in those three instances, he would still be guilty of
rape. In the present case, the presence of actual force or intimidation is rendered immaterial on
account of YYY's relationship with AAA and her age at the time of the alleged sexual
encounters.
Melita O. Del Rosario v. People

G.R. No. 199930; 27 June 2018
Bersamin, J.
TOPIC: Violation of Section 8 of R.A. No. 6713
FACTS:
Accused Del Rosario, Chief of Valuation and Classification Division-Office of the

Commissioner (VCD-OCOM), Bureau of Customs (BOC) was charged by the Ombudsman on
11 March 2008 of violating Section 8 of R.A. No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Official and Employees, for her failure to file her
detailed Sworn Statement of Assets, Statements, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALNs) for years
1990 to 1991. Accused Del Rosario moved for the dismissal of the criminal case on the ground
of prescription. Section 1 of Act No. 3326 provides that crimes punishable by imprisonment
for two years or more but less than 6 years prescribe in 8 years. Accused argued that the
prescriptive period shall be reckoned from the non-filing of the SALNs. On the other hand, the
State argues that the prescriptive period shall be reckoned from date of discovery (the
“Discovery Rule” or the “Blameless Ignorance Doctrine”).
ISSUE: Has the crime prescribed?
HELD: Yes. The Discovery Rule or the Blameless Ignorance Doctrine does not apply in this
case.
1. As a general rule, prescription begins to run from the date of the commission of the Formatted: Space Before: 0 pt, After: 0 pt, Don't add
offense.
95
2. If the date of the commission of the violation is not known, it shall be counted form the
date of discovery thereof.
3. In determining whether it is the general rule or the exception that should apply in a Formatted: Space Before: 0 pt, After: 0 pt, Don't add
particular case, the availability or suppression of the information relative to the crime
should first be determined.
same style
Whether it is the general rule or the exception that should apply in a particular case
depends on the availability or the suppression of information relative to the crime should first
be ascertained. If the information, data, or records from which the crime is based could be
plainly discovered or were readily available to the public, as in the case of the petitioner
herein, the general rule should apply, and prescription should be held to run from the
commission of the crime; otherwise, the discovery rule is applied.
In this case, the offenses charged against accused were not susceptible of concealment.
As such, the offenses could have been known within the eight-year period starting from the
moment of their commission. Indeed, the Office of the Ombudsman or the CSC, the two
agencies of the Government invested with the primary responsibility of monitoring the
compliance with R.A. No. 6713, should have known of her omissions during the period of
prescription.
Farouk B. Abubakar, v. People

Ulama S. Baraguirvs. People
Datukan M. Guiani vs. People
G.R. Nos. 202408, 202409 & 202412; 27 June 2018
Leonen, J.
TOPIC: Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019
FACTS:
Abubakar, Baraguir, and Guiani were public officials of the Department of Public Works
and Highways in ARMM (DPWH-ARMM) when violations of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No.
3019 were allegedly committed. When the cases reached the Supreme Court, they were
consolidated.
ISSUE: Are the accused guilty as charged?
HELD:
Yes. Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, punishes a public officer who causes
"any undue injury to any party, including the Government" or gives "any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative
or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence."
A conviction under this provision requires the concurrence of the following elements:
1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions;
2. He [or she] must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or [gross]
inexcusable negligence; 3. That his [or her] action caused any undue injury to any party,
including the government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his functions.
96
This Supreme Court found that petitioners Baraguir and Guiani gave unwarranted
benefits and advantage to several contractors by allowing them to deploy their equipment
ahead of the scheduled public bidding. The acts of identifying certain contractors ahead of the
scheduled public bidding and of allowing the advanced deployment of their equipment
through the issuance of certificates of mobilization are glaring irregularities in the bidding
procedure that engender suspicion of favoritism and partiality towards the seven (7)
contractors. These irregularities create a reasonable, if not conclusive, presumption that the
concerned public officials had no intention of complying with the rules on public bidding and
that the results were already predetermined.
Also, Section 4 of the Contract for Survey Work gave Arce Engineering Services the
right to secure 30% of the contract cost as advance payment or mobilization fee upon the
contract's execution. This is clearly contrary to the implementing rules and regulations of P.D.
No. 1594 on advance payment. Guiani cannot shift the blame to his subordinates because he
entered into the contract with Arce Engineering Services as Regional Secretary. In consenting
to the 30% advance payment, petitioner Guiani, through evident bad faith, gave unwarranted
benefits to Arce Engineering Services. Bad faith, as contemplated under Section 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019, connotes "not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent and
dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing."
Abubakar and Baraguir, in allowing the disbursement, gave unwarranted benefits to

Arce Engineering Services through evident bad faith. They cannot seek refuge in the argument
that they relied in good faith on what was stated in the Contract for Survey Work because the
illegality was patent on the face of the contract. The disbursement should not have been
allowed for being contrary to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1594. Furthermore,
they are not entitled to the justifying circumstance of "any person who acts in obedience to an
order issued by a superior" under Article 11 (6) of the Revised Penal Code as the order issued
by the superior must be for a lawful purpose. In this case, the contractual provision allowing
Arce Engineering Services to claim 30% of the contract price as mobilization fees is clearly
unlawful.
97
JULY 2018 Formatted: Font: Bold, Underline

Formatted: Centered
People v. Ejercito
G.R. 229861, 2 July 2018
J. Perlas-Bernabe
Topic:TOPIC: Art 335 of RPC; R.A No. 8353 & R.A. No. 7610
FACTS:
In October 2001, then 15-year old high school student (AAA) was pointed a gun by
Ejercito (accused) and was dragged to a nearby barn. Ejercito undressed AAA, placed himself
on top of her and covered her mouth with his right hand and used the left hand to point the
gun at her as he inserted his penis into her vagina and made back and forth movements. After
the sexual act, Ejercito warned AAA not to tell anybody or else her parents will get killed.
AAA tearfully narrated the incident to CCC, her aunt and requested CCC to remain silent.
AAA moved to another city, but she was tracked by Ejercito who made AAA his sex slave
from 2002-2005. She was forced to take shabu and sexually abused by Ejercito. Eventually,
AAA got hooked on drugs and portrayed herself as Ejercito’s paramour and decided to live
together. After rehabilitation, AAA disclosed to her parents that she was raped by Ejercito
back in 2001, and the same was reported to the authorities. Ejercito argued that they were
sweethearts.
The RTC found Ejercito guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and separately pay AAA and her parents
P50,000 each as moral damages. Ejercito appealed to the CA, which affirmed the conviction of
the RTC with modification. The CA sentenced Ejercito to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, and ordered him to pay AAA the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto,
P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages, with legal interest of six
percent ( 6%) per annum to be imposed on all monetary awards from finality of the ruling
until fully paid.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Ejercito should be convicted under Article 335 of RPC, which is the
old provision of the law;
2. Whether or not Ejercito should be convicted both under RA 8353 and Sec 5(b) of
RA 7610?
RATIO:
1. No, RA 8353 should apply.
At the onset, the Court observes that the CA, in modifying the RTC ruling, erroneously
applied the old Rape Law, or Article 335 of the RPC, since the same was already repealed
upon the enactment of RA 8353 in 1997. To recount, the Information alleges "[t]hat on or about
the 10th day of October 2001 xx x [Ejercito], with lewd design and by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie and succeed in
having carnal knowledge with [AAA], a minor who is only fifteen (15) years old at the time of
the commission of the offense against her will and consent x xx"; hence, in convicting Ejercito
of Rape, the CA should have applied the provisions of RA 8353, which enactment has resulted
in the new rape provisions of the RPC under Articles 266-A in relation to 266-B.
98
For a charge of rape by sexual intercourse under Article 266-A (1) of the RPC, as
amended by R.A. No. 8353, to prosper, the prosecution must prove that: (a) the offender had
carnal knowledge of a woman; and (b) he accomplished this act under the circumstances
mentioned in the provision, e.g., through force, threat or intimidation. The gravamen of rape is
sexual intercourse with a woman against her will. In this case, the prosecution was able to
prove beyond reasonable doubt the presence of all the elements of Rape by sexual intercourse
under Article 266-A (1) of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 8353.
2. No. Ejercito should be convicted only under Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended
by R.A. No. 8353.
Ejercito committed the act of sexual intercourse against and without the consent of
AAA, who was then only fifteen (15) years old. As such, AAA may be considered under said
law as a ·child "exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse." Hence, Ejercito's
act may be classified as a violation of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610.
However, as between Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, and
Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610, the Court deems it apt to clarify that Ejercito should be
convicted under the former. Verily, penal laws are crafted by legislature to punish certain acts,
and when two (2) penal laws may both theoretically apply to the same case, then the law
which is more special in regardless of the time of enactment, should prevail. In much
deliberation, the Court observed that RA 8353 amending the RPC should now be uniformly
applied in cases involving sexual intercourse committed against minors, and not Section 5 (b)
of RA 7610. Indeed, while RA 7610 has been considered as a special law that covers the sexual
abuse of minors, RA 8353 has expanded the reach of our already existing rape laws. These
existing rape laws should not only pertain to the old Article 33528 of the RPC but also to the
provision on sexual intercourse under Section 5 (b)29 of R.A. No.· 7610 which, applying
Quimvel' s characterization of a child "exploited in prostitution or subjected to other abuse,"
virtually punishes the rape of a minor.
Notably, in the more recent case of “People v. Caoili (Caoili)”, the Court encountered a
situation wherein the punishable act committed by therein accused, i.e., lascivious conduct,
may be prosecuted either under "Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC in
relation to Section 5 (b) of RA 7610" or "Lascivious Conduct under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610." In
resolving the matter, the Court did not consider the "focus" of the evidence for the prosecution
nor the penalty imposed. Rather, it is evident that the determining factor in designating or
charging the proper offense, and consequently, the imposable penalty therefor, is the nature of
the act committed, i.e., lascivious conduct, taken together with the attending circumstance of
the age of the victim.
same style
Osorio v. People
G.R. 207711, 2 July 2018
J. Leonen.
Topic:TOPIC: Estafa; Variance Doctrine
FACTS:
Gabriel, proprietor of a stall in Paco, Manila was visited by Osorio and introduced
herself as agent of Philippine American Life and General Insurance Company (Philam Life).
Osorio offered an insurance coverage, Gabriel availed of Philam Life’s Tri-Life Plan and
Excelife Gold Package. Gabriel consistently paid the quarterly premiums from February
99
2001 to November 2001. Then, Osorio offered Gabriel an investment opportunity which would
be placed under a time deposit scheme that would earn 20% annually. Osorio informed
Gabriel that the proceeds of her investment may be channeled to pay for her insurance
premiums. Enticed by the offer, Gabriel tendered P200,000.00 to Osorio, who in tum issued in
her favor Philam Life receipts.
A few months later, Gabriel discovered that her insurance policies had lapsed due to
non-payment of premiums. When Gabriel confronted Osorio about the matter, Osorio assured
Gabriel that she would take responsibility for said failure. Meanwhile, in May 2002, Gabriel
received a letter from Philippine Money Investment Asset Management (PMIAM), thanking
her for investing in the company. In the same letter, PMIAM informed Gabriel that her
investment would earn interest on a semi-annual basis starting 20 June 2002. Gabriel
confronted Osorio on why her investment was diverted to PMIAM. Osorio explained that
PMIAM investments would yield a higher rate of return. Displeased with what had happened,
Gabriel asked for a refund of her initial investment.
Later, PMIAM informed Gabriel that her initial investment and unpaid interest income
would be released to her on 14 May 2004. Unfortunately, she was unable to recover it. She
then visited Philam Life’s office to see Osorio but she was nowhere to be found.
The RTC found Osorio guilty of estafa and sentenced the latter to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional as minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum. She was also directed
to pay P200,000.00 plus six percent (6%) legal interest per annum from the date of the filing of
the complaint until satisfaction. Osorio appealed to the CA arguing good faith in investing the
money with PMIAM and that the elements of estafa under Art 315(2)(a) were not established –
that only damage part was proven, and that there was no deceit employed, but the CA
affirmed the conviction of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner's acts constitute estafa as defined and punished under
Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code?
RATIO:
No, but Osorio is criminally liable under Art. 318 of the Revised Penal Code.
In this case, although there is no proof that petitioner used a fictitious name or
pretended to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, or business in
soliciting private complainant's money, petitioner should nevertheless be held criminally
liable for misrepresenting to private complainant that the latter's money would be invested in
Philam Life Fund Management and that its proceeds may be utilized to pay for private
complainant's insurance premiums. Private complainant accepted the investment opportunity
offered by petitioner due to the promise that her money would be invested in Philam Life, a
company with which she had existing insurance policies. She parted with her funds because of
the representation that her investment's earnings would be conveniently channeled to the
payment of her insurance premiums. As a result of petitioner's representations, private
complainant no longer saw the need to pay for the succeeding insurance premiums as they fell
due. Moreover, petitioner's issuance of Philam Life receipts led private complainant to believe
that her money was already as good as invested in the company. The false representations
committed by petitioner in this case fall beyond the scope of "other similar deceits" under
100
Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code. The phrase "other similar deceits" in Article
3l5(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code has been interpreted in Guinhawa v. People as I limited to
acts of the same nature as those specifically enumerated.
Nevertheless, petitioner may be held criminally liable for other deceits under Article
318 of the Revised Penal Code. Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code is broad in application. It
is intended as a catch-all provision to cover all other kinds of deceit not falling under Articles 3
15, 316, and 31 7 of the Revised Penal Code. 64 For an accused to be held criminally liable
under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code, the following elements must exist: (a) [The
accused makes a] false pretense, fraudulent act or pretense other than those in [Articles 315,
316, and 317]; (b) such false pretense, fraudulent act or pretense must be made or executed
prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; and (c) as a result, the offended
party suffered damage or prejudice.
All the elements of Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code are present in this case.
Petitioner, in soliciting private complainant's money, falsely I represented that it would be
invested in Philam Life and that its proceeds would be used to pay for private complainant's
insurance premiums. This false representation is what induced private complainant to part
with her funds and disregard the payment of her insurance premiums. Since petitioner
deviated from what was originally agreed upon by placing the investment in another
company, private complainant's insurance policies lapsed.
Although petitioner was charged of estafa by means of deceit under Article 315(2)(a) of
the Revised Penal Code, she may be convicted of other deceits under Article 318 of the
Revised Penal Code. As a rule, an accused can only be convicted of the crime with which he or
she is charged. This rule proceeds from the Constitutional guarantee that an accused shall
always be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him or her.68 An
exception to this is the rule on variance under Rule 120, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
Rule 120, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure simply means that if
there is a variance between the offense charged and the offense proved, an accused may be
convicted of the offense proved if it is included in the offense charged. An accused may also
be convicted of the offense charged if it is necessarily included in the offense proved.
People v Rashid Binasing y Disalungan

G.R. No. 221439, July 4, 2018
J. Del Castillo
Topic:TOPIC: Chain of Custody
No new doctrine.
The apprehending team failed to comply with Section 21, Article II of RA 9165. The
said provision clearly requires the apprehending team to mark and conduct a physical
inventory of the seized items and to photograph the same immediately after seizure and
confiscation in the presence of the accused or his representative or counsel and the insulating
witnesses, namely, any elected public official and a representative of the National Prosecution
Service or the media. The law mandates that the insulating witnesses be present during the
marking, the actual inventory, and the taking of photographs of the seized items to deter
[possible planting of] evidence.18 Failure to strictly comply with this rule, however, does not
ipso facto invalidate or render void the seizure and custody over the items as long as the
prosecution is able to show that "(a) there is justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the
101
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved."1However, in case
of non-compliance, the prosecution must be able to "explain the reasons behind the procedural
lapses, and that the integrity and value of the seized evidence had nonetheless been preserved
x x x because the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even exist. "
In this case, the marking and physical inventory, as well as the taking of the
photograph of the seized items were not done in the presence of the insulating witnesses. And
since no explanation was offered to justify the non-compliance, the Court finds that the
prosecution failed to show that the seized substance from the accused were the same
substances offered in court. Thus, the integrity of the corpus delicti was not properly
established. In addition, although the Seizure Receipt bore the signature of the accused, his
presence during the marking and the physical inventory of the seized items was likewise not
established as the prosecution's witnesses failed to categorically state that the marking and the
physical inventory were done in the presence of the accused or his representative or counsel.
Thus, appellant is acquitted.
People v Rogelio Baguion AKA Rogel

G.R. 223553, 4 July 2018
J. Martires
Topic:TOPIC: Statutory rape
No new doctrine.
Statutory rape is committed by sexual intercourse with a woman below 12 years of age
regardless of her consent, or the lack of it, to the sexual act. Proof of force, intimidation or
consent is unnecessary as they are not elements of statutory rape, considering that the absence
of free consent is conclusively presumed when the victim is below the age of 12. At that age,
the law presumes that the victim does not possess discernment and is incapable of giving
intelligent consent to the sexual act.
Thus, to convict an accused of the crime of statutory rape, the prosecution carries the
burden of proving: (a) the age of the complainant; (b) the identity of the accused; and (c) the
sexual intercourse between the accused and the complainant. As to the first element, AAA'
s age at the time of the commission of the offense is uncontroverted. Her birth certificate,
which was duly presented and offered in evidence, shows that she was born on 1 7 January
1999, thus, she was only 10 years and 8 months old at the time she was raped. As regards the
second and third elements, AAA positively identified accused-appellant as the person who
molested her. She clearly and straightforwardly narrated the incidence of rape.
The Court finds that pursuant to People v. Jugueta, the award of damages in the
present case must be modified. As regards statutory rape, the award should be P75,000.00 as
civil indemnity; P75,000.00 as moral damages; and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages. In
addition, all the damages awarded shall earn legal interest at the rate of 6o/o per annum from
the date of finality of the judgment until fully paid.
102
People v. Mercindo Bobotiok, Jr.

G.R. No. 237804, 4 July 2018
J. Velasco, Jr.
Topic:TOPIC: Chain of custody
No new doctrine.
Accused-appellant hinges his appeal on the alleged failure of the prosecution to

establish a continuous and unbroken chain of custody of the seized illegal drug and the lack of
integrity of the evidence in view of the non-compliance with Section 21, Article II of RA 9165.
Chain of custody is defined as the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized
drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of
each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to
safekeeping, to presentation in court for destruction.
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 outlines the procedural safeguards that police officers
must follow in handling seized illegal drugs to preserve their identity, integrity, and
evidentiary value, the pertinent portions of which read:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered

Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. -The PDEA shall take
charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, x x x so confiscated, seized and/or
surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the dangerous drugs x
x x shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical inventory of the
seized items and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the persons from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, with an
elected public official and a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media
who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;
Provided, That the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where
the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided,
finally, That noncompliance of these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and custody over
said items.
Records show that the buy-bust team had failed to strictly comply with the prescribed
procedure under Section 21.
The prosecution justified the conduct of the inventory and photograph of the seized
item at the police station instead of the place of the buy-bust operation by raising the issue of
security. However, a reading of the transcript of PO 1 Balbin' s testimony reveals that this
justification is a mere afterthought since his initial reason is the darkness of the place of arrest.
It was only after the diligent prodding by the public prosecutor that PO1 Balbin mentioned the
risk of security. Other than this statement, nowhere in the records was it shown that there was
any actual threat or risk taken by the buy-bust team during the arrest that had actually
prevented them from conducting the inventory and photographing of the seized drugs.
103
People v Rodel Belmonte

G.R. No. 224588, 4 July 2018
J. Martires
Topic:TOPIC: Presumption of innocence; Corpus Delicti
No new doctrine.
Basic in all criminal prosecutions is the presumption that the accused is innocent until
the contrary is proved. Thus, the well-established jurisprudence is that the prosecution bears
the burden to overcome such presumption; otherwise, the accused deserves a judgment of
acquittal. Concomitant thereto, the evidence of the prosecution must stand on its own strength
and not rely on the weakness of the evidence of the defense. Rule 133, Sec. 2 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence specifically provides that the degree of proof required to secure the
accused's conviction is proof beyond reasonable doubt, which does not mean such a degree of
proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is
required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. To
stress, "(W)hile not impelling such a degree of proof as to establish absolutely impervious
certainty, the quantum of proof required in criminal cases nevertheless charges the
prosecution with the immense responsibility of establishing moral certainty, a certainty that
ultimately appeals to a person's very conscience."
Corpus Delicti
In all prosecutions for violations of RA No. 9165, the corpus delicti is the dangerous
drug itself, the existence of which is essential to a judgment of conviction; thus, its identity
must be clearly established. The strict requirement in clearly establishing the identity of the
corpus delicti was explained as follows: Narcotic substances are not readily identifiable. To
determine their composition and nature, they must undergo scientific testing and analysis.
Narcotic substances are also highly susceptible to alteration, tampering, or contamination. It is
imperative, therefore, that the drugs allegedly seized from the accused are the very same
objects tested in the laboratory and offered in courto mi as evidence. The chain of custody, as a
method of authentication, ensures that unnecessary doubts involving the identity of seized
drugs are removed. Jurisprudence identified four critical links in the chain of custody of the
dangerous drugs, to wit: ''first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug
recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal
drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the
investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and
fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic
chemist to the court. "
Considering that the police officers in these cases had obviously failed to comply with
the procedure laid out in Sec. 21 of RA No. 9165 and its IRR, the burden is with the
prosecution to prove that there was justifiable ground for the noncompliance by the police
officers, and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated items were properly
preserved.
A review of the records will show that the prosecution was unsuccessful in eliciting
from its witnesses the justification for their apparent failure to comply with Sec. 21 of the Act
and its IRR. It must be emphasized that the justifiable ground for noncompliance must be
proven as a fact, because the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even
exist.
104
People v. Alcantara, et al.

G.R. No. 207040, July 4, 2018
J. Tijam
Topic:TOPIC: Probable cause to be personally determined by the judge
No new doctrine.
It must, however, be emphasized that the determination of probable cause has two
separate and distinct kinds -an executive function and a judicial function. In the case of
Mendoza v. People, et al., this Court distinguished the two, thus:
There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial. The
executive determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is
a function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to
determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have
committed the crime as defined by law and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise stated,
such official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminal case must
be filed in court. Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by the public
prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of
probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be
compelled to pass upon.
The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the
judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge
must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the
accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no
probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant. The difference is clear:
The executive determination of probable cause concerns itself with whether there is enough
evidence to support an Information being filed. The judicial determination of probable cause,
on the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued.
The determination of the judge of the probable cause for the purpose of issuing a
warrant of arrest does not mean, however, that the trial court judge becomes an appellate
court for purposes of assailing the determination of probable cause of the prosecutor. The
proper remedy to question the resolution of the prosecutor as to his finding of probable cause
is to appeal the same to the Secretary of Justice.
If the Information is valid on its face and the prosecutor made no manifest error or his
finding of probable cause was not attended with grave abuse of discretion, such findings
should be given weight and respect by the courts. The settled policy of non-interference in the
prosecutor's exercise of discretion requires the courts to leave to the prosecutor the
determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the
purpose of filing an information to the court. Courts can neither override their determination
nor substitute their own judgment for that of the latter; they cannot likewise order the
prosecution of the accused when the prosecutor has not found a prima facie case.
105
People v Ronelo Bermudo and Rolando Bermudo,

G.R. No. 225322, 4 July 2018,
J. Martires
Topic:TOPIC: Conspiracy; Elements of murder - Treachery
No new doctrine.
All the elements of the crime of murder were proven beyond reasonable doubt, viz: (1)
a person was killed; (2) the accused killed the victim; (3) the killing was attended by any of the
qualifying circumstance in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, i.e., treachery or alevosia;
and (4) the killing is neither parricide nor infanticide.
Treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially
to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended
party might make. In turn, its elements are: (1) employment of means, method or manner of
execution which will ensure the safety of the malefactor from defensive or retaliating acts on
the part of the victim; and (2) deliberate adoption of such means, method or manner of
execution. In other words, the means of attack, consciously adopted by the assailant, rendered
the victim defenseless.
In the present case, it is readily apparent that Gilberto was completely defenseless at
the time of the attack because he was surprised by Rommel with a blow to the head causing
him to fall to the ground. Rommel and co-accused continued to attack him causing him
multiple injuries, including the fatal ones. From the inception of the assault until the coup de
grace was inflicted, Gilberto was never in a position to defend himself. Further, Rommel and
his co-accused consciously adopted the means of attack because, as noted by the CA, they
were already armed when they proceeded to the crime scene. In addition, it is noteworthy that
Rommel suddenly, without warning or provocation, attacked Gilberto from behind
manifesting that their actions were planned and orchestrated, and not merely impetuous.
In Gilberto's death, Rommel and his co-accused are equally guilty of murder as
conspirators. Conspiracy arises when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning
the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. While there was no express agreement
between the malefactors, their concerted actions indicate that they conspired with each other.
There is an implied conspiracy when two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the
accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts,
though apparently independent, are in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness
of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment. In other words, there must be unity
of purpose and unity in the execution of the unlawful objective
In this case, Rommel and his co-accused clearly acted with a common purpose to kill
Gilberto as manifested by their coordinated actions. Accused-appellant initiated the assault
and assisted his co-accused in accomplishing their goal. It must be remembered that when
Philip tried to help Gilberto, Rommel swung an axe at him and, with a horrified Grace nearby,
urged and encouraged Ronelo to kill the victim. Thus, even if there is no direct evidence to
establish who among the culprits inflicted the mortal blow, they are all guilty of murder as
conspirators because their mutual purpose impelled them to execute their harmonized attack
on Gilberto.
106
People v Cordova and Eguiso

G.R. No 231130, 9 July 2018
J. Perlas-Bernabe
FACTS:
Cordova was charged with the crimes of Illegal Sale and Illegal Possession of
Dangerous Drugs, while Eguiso was charged with the crime of Illegal Possession of
Dangerous Drugs. Notably, in order to properly secure the conviction of an accused charged
with Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, the prosecution must prove: (a) the identity of the buyer
and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment.
Meanwhile, in instances wherein an accused is charged with Illegal Possession of

Dangerous Drugs, the prosecution must establish the following elements to warrant his
conviction: (a) the accused was in possession of an item or object identified as a prohibited
drug; (b) such possession was not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and
consciously possessed the said drug.
Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 provides the chain of custody rule, outlining the
procedure that police officers must follow in handling the seized drugs, in order to preserve
their integrity and evidentiary value. Under the said section, prior to its amendment by R.A.
No. 10640, the apprehending team shall, among others, immediately after seizure and
confiscation conduct a physical inventory and photograph the seized items in the presence of
the accused or the person from whom horn the items were seized, or his representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected
public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of
the same, and the seized drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime· Laboratory within
twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for examination.
In People v. Mendoza, the Court stressed that "[w]ithout the insulating presence of the
representative from the media or the DOJ, any elected public official during the seizure and
marking of the (seized drugs), the evils of switching, 'planting' or contamination of the
evidence that had tainted the buy-busts conducted under the regime of RA 6425 (Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as to negate the integrity and credibility of
the seizure and confiscation of the (said drugs) that were evidence herein of the corpus delicti,
and thus adversely affected the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused. Indeed,
the x x x presence of such witnesses would have preserved an unbroken chain of custody."
The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with
the requirements of Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 may not always be possible. In fact,
the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 which is now crystallized into
statutory law with the passage of R.A. No. 10640 provide that the said inventory and
photography may be conducted at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending
team in instances of warrantless seizure, and that non-compliance with the requirements of
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 -under justifiable grounds -will not render void and invalid
the seizure and custody over the seized items so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer or team.
In other words, the failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the
procedure laid out in Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR does not ipso facto
107
render the seizure and custody over the items as void and invalid, provided that the
prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b)
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved.
Court finds that the deviations from the prescribed chain of custody rule were
unjustified, thereby putting into question the integrity and evidentiary value of the items
purportedly seized from Cordova and Eguiso.
First. As stated-above, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 requires that the
apprehending team shall immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a physical
inventory and photograph the seized items in the presence of, among others, the accused or
the person from whom the items were seized. However, as admitted by P03 Sebastian, Eguiso,
who is one of the accused-appellants, was not present during the required photography of the
seized items as shown by his absence in the photos taken
Second. Records also fail to disclose that the other required witnesses, i.e., the
representatives from the DOJ and the media, were present during the required inventory and
photography of the seized items as required by law. As evinced by the Certification 50 signed
by the barangay kagawads, the signatures of Eguiso, i.e., the other accused-appellant, as well
as the representatives from the media and the DOJ attesting to the propriety of the police
action are clearly missing therefrom. In fact, there is dearth of evidence to show that the police
officers even attempted to contact and secure these witnesses, notwithstanding the fact that
buy-bust operations are usually planned out ahead of time. Neither did the police officers
provide any explanation for their non-compliance, such as a threat to their safety and security
or the time and distance which the other. witnesses would have had to consider.
Finally. It appears that the chain of custody of the seized items was actually tainted by
irregular circumstances. In particular, records show that the time of apprehension on April 8,
2005 was at 1:50 p.m. As disclosed by P03 Sebastian during trial, the said items were not
delivered to the crime laboratory immediately because there was no chemist present in the
afternoon of April 8, 2005, a Friday.
People v. Carino and Aquino

G.R. No 232624, 9 July 2018
J. Reyes, Jr.
Topic:TOPIC: Robbery with Homicide; Carnapping
FACTS:
On 28 August 2002, Leonardo Advincula was driving a taxi when he was flagged
down by Carino. Carino asked Advincula to take him to Ortigas. They stopped along the
comer of Julia Vargas and Meralco Avenue. While parked thereat, a silver Nissan Sentra with
plate number USD 666 arrived. Carino alighted and approached the Nissan Sentra driven by
Mirko Moeller. Upon returning to the taxi, they followed the Nissan Sentra. After driving for a
short distance, the Nissan Sentra entered Gate 1 of the Corinthian Gardens Subdivision in
Quezon City. Moeller, a resident of Corinthian Gardens, informed the security guard stationed
in Gate 1 that the passenger inside the taxi was his visitor. The security guard noticed that
Moeller was accompanied by Aquino inside the car.
Upon reaching Moeller’s house, Carino alighted from the taxi and asked Advincula to
wait for his payment. Moeller then alighted from the Nissan Sentra and approached the taxi to
pay Advincula for Carino's fare.
108
Subsequently, at around 7:30 a.m. of 29 August 2002, Nena Taro, the housemaid of
Moeller arrived at the latter's home. Taro noticed that the main gate and the door of the house
were unlocked. Upon entering the house, she was surprised to see dried blood on the wall
beside the light switch. She walked to the backdoor leading to the swimming pool to look for
Moeller. There, she was horrified to see him lying face down in front of the swimming pool.
Shocked by what she had seen, she rushed out of the house to ask for help. Moments later, the
security guards and the police arrived.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused-appellants were guilty of robbery with homicide and carnapping?
HELD/RATIO: Yes.
Parenthetically, to sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide under Article 294 of
the RPC, the prosecution must prove the existence of the following elements, namely, (i) "the
taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons; (ii) the
property taken belongs to another; (iii) the taking is [with] animo lucrandi; and (iv) by reason
of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide is committed."
Notably, the phrase "by reason of the robbery," covers a situation where the killing of
the person is committed either before or after the taking of personal property. It is imperative
to establish that "the intent to rob must precede the taking of human life but the killing may
occur before, during or after the robbery."
Remarkably, homicide is said to be committed by reason of, or on the occasion of

robbery if for instance, it was committed: (i) "to facilitate the robbery or the escape of the
culprit; (ii) to preserve the possession by the culprit of the loot; (iii) to prevent discovery of the
commission of the robbery; or (iv) to eliminate witnesses in the commission of the crime."
Thus, a conviction for robbery with homicide requires certitude that the robbery is the
main purpose and objective of the malefactor and the killing is merely incidental to the
robbery.
Consequently, once it has been established with certainty that a person was killed on
the occasion of the robbery, the accused may be convicted of robbery with homicide. It is
equally important to note that a conviction for robbery with homicide need not be proven
solely through direct evidence of the malefactor's culpability. Rather, the offender's guilt may
likewise be proven through circumstantial evidence, as long as the following requisites are
present: (i) there must be more than one circumstance; (ii) the inference must be based on
proven facts; and (iii) the combination of all circumstances produces a conviction beyond
doubt of the guilt of the accused. Imperatively, all the circumstances taken together must form
an unbroken chain of events leading to one fair reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused,
to the exclusion of all others, as the author of the crime. To rule otherwise, would lead to
the pernicious situation wherein felons would be set free to the detriment of the judicial
system, and thereby cause danger to the community.
Here, the circumstances surrounding the fateful day of 28 August 2002, when the
victim was robbed and killed, lead to an unbroken chain of facts, which establish beyond
reasonable doubt the accused-appellants' culpability.
109
Moreover, the accused-appellants' unexplained possession of the stolen articles gave

rise to the presumption that they were the taker and the doer of the robbery. This presumption
applies considering that (i) the property was stolen; (ii) the crime was committed recently; (iii)
the stolen property was found in their possession; and (iv) they were unable to explain their
possession satisfactorily. It must be noted that during their arrest, the police officers found
Moeller's camera, video camera and charger in their hideout. They were unable to offer any
satisfactory and believable explanation justifying their possession of the subject articles.
Carnapping is defined and penalized under Section 2 of RA No. 6539, or the

Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended, as "the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor
vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things." Notably, the elements of carnapping
are: (i) the taking of a motor vehicle which belongs to another; (ii) the taking is without the
consent of the owner or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or by using
force upon things; and (iii) the taking is done with intent to gain. Essentially, carnapping is the
robbery or theft of a motorized vehicle. Significantly, the taking of the motor vehicle is
deemed complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has
no opportunity to dispose of the same. The intent to gain or the. animus lucrandi, being an
internal act, is presumed from the unlawful taking of the motor vehicle.
Notably, "[a]ctual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to

gain." Likewise, the term gain is not limited to a pecuniary benefit, but also includes the
benefit which in any other sense may be derived or expected from the act which is performed.
Thus, the mere use of the thing which was taken without the owner's consent already
constitutes gain.
Here, the prosecution proved the existence of all the elements of carnapping beyond
reasonable doubt. The Nissan Sentra, which was owned by Moeller, was stolen by the
accused-appellants from the victim's house, and brought to Isabela. To eradicate all traces of
its previous ownership, the accused-appellants even changed the vehicle's plate number.
However, despite their attempt to conceal their crime, the police discovered that the retrieved
vehicle bore the same engine and chassis number as the victim's stolen vehicle.
People v. XXX and YYY

G.R. No. 235652, 9 July 2018
J. Perlas-Bernabe
Topic:TOPIC: Human trafficking
FACTS:
The prosecution claimed that AAA, BBB, and CCC are the minor children of spouses
XXX and YYY. AAA claimed that sometime in April 2010, when she was just 13 years old, her
mother XXX brought her to a hotel in Makati to meet with a certain John Hubbard who
proceeded to have sexual intercourse with her. AAA further alleged that from 2008 to 2011,
XXX ordered her to engage in cybersex for three (3) to four (4) times a week in pornographic
websites where AAA was shown in her underwear and made to do sexual activities in front of
the computer. For their part, BBB and CCC corroborated AAA' s statements, both averring
that from 2010 to 2011, XXX ordered them to dance naked in front of the computer with
internet connectivity while facilitating the webcam sessions and chatting with a certain "Sam,"
their usual client. BBB and CCC alleged that during those sessions, their father YYY would be
outside the room or fixing the computer. The children all claimed that they were made to do
110
sexual activities to earn money for their household expenses which were collected by YYY in
remittance centers.
After making an investigation and a technical verification of the pornographic websites

which revealed photos and transactions of AAA, the NBI applied for and was granted a search
warrant. Subsequently, the law enforcement authorities implemented the search warrant,
resulting in the rescue of AAA, BBB, and CCC, the confiscation of the computer units and
paraphernalia connected with the alleged crimes, and the arrest of both XXX and YYY.
ISSUE:
Whether or not XXX and YYY are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four (4) and three (3)
counts, respectively, of Qualified Trafficking in Persons.
HELD/ RATIO: Yes.
Section 3 (a) of RA 9208 defines the term "Trafficking in Persons" as the "recruitment,
transportation, transfer or harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim's consent
or knowledge, within or across national borders by means of threat or use of force, or other
forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking
advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or
benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person for the purpose
of exploitation which includes at a minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of others or
other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal
or sale of organs." The same provision further provides that "[t]he recruitment, transportation,
transfer, harboring or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall also be considered
as 'trafficking in persons' even if it does not involve any of the means set forth in the preceding
paragraph."
The crime of "Trafficking in Persons" becomes qualified under, among others, the
following circumstances: Section 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons. The following are
considered as qualified trafficking:
(a) When the trafficked person is a child;
xx xx
(d) When the offender is an ascendant, parent, sibling, guardian or a person who
exercises authority over the trafficked person or when the offense is committed by a
public officer or employee;
As correctly ruled by the courts a quo, accused-appellants are guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of Qualified Trafficking in Persons under Section 4 (e) in
relation to Section 6 (a) and (d) of RA 9208 as the prosecution had established beyond
reasonable doubt that: (a) they admittedly are the biological parents of AAA, BBB, and CCC,
who were all minors when the crimes against them were committed; ( b) they made their
children perform acts of cybersex for different foreigner customers, and thus, engaged them in
prostitution and pornography; (c) they received various amounts of money in exchange for
the sexual exploitation of their children; and (d) they achieved their criminal design by taking
advantage of their children's vulnerability as minors and deceiving them that the money they
make from their lewd shows are needed for the family's daily sustenance.
111
In the same manner, the courts a quo likewise correctly convicted XXX of one (1) count
of the same crime, this time under Section 4 (a) in relation to Section 6 (a) and (d) of RA 9208,
as it was shown that XXX transported and provided her own minor biological child, AAA, to a
foreigner in Makati City for the purpose of prostitution, again under the pretext that the
money acquired from such illicit transaction is needed for their family's daily sustenance.
In light of the foregoing, the Court finds no reason to deviate from the factual findings
of the trial court, as affirmed by the CA, as there is no indication that it overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied the surrounding facts and circumstances of the case. In fact, the
trial court was in the best position to assess and determine the credibility of the witnesses
presented by both parties, and hence, due deference should be accorded to the same. As such,
accused-appellants' conviction for Qualified Trafficking in Persons must be upheld.
same style
People v. Gervero, et al.
G.R. No. 206725, 11 July 2018
J. Martires
Topic:TOPIC: Mistake of fact; Justifying circumstance
FACTS:
At around 8:00p.m., while Delia was inside their house at Barangay Milan, Lemery, Formatted: Don't add space between paragraphs of the
same style
Iloilo, her husband Jose, together with his Barangay Civilian Volunteer Organization (CVO)
co-members, Hernando and Benito, passed by. Delia peeped through the window, called
Jose's attention, and told him not to stay long at the wake. With the area being illuminated by
a light bulb, Delia saw the three walk along the national road and cross towards the rice field.
A few minutes later, Isaac, Jose's younger brother and also a CVO member, passed by Delia's
house together with Roda. Isaac shouted to call the attention of Hernando, who was then
already in the middle of the rice field. Roda, Delia, and Isaac could hear the three CVOs
laughing while they were traversing the rice field.
When they heard the gunfire, Isaac dropped to the ground and ran back to his house;
Roda took cover among the rice paddies, looked at the direction of the gunshots, and saw
persons with long firearms. When Roda reached Hernando's house, she saw Hernando's son
Ronnie and told him that his father was shot but warned him not to go out as he might also be
harmed. Delia and Isaac heard men pass by their houses thereafter. Isaac recognized some of
the gunmen to be his friends and positively identified the accused as the armed men he saw.
The defense argued they thought the three (3) were members of NPA and that it was a
fulfillment of duty. The RTC found the accused guilty of murder. The CA affirmed the RTC’s
conviction but modified the award of damages.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not mistake of fact is applicable in this case;

2. Whether or not the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty is applicable;
3. Whether or not there is treachery.
HELD/RATIO:
1. No.
112
First, there was no reason for the accused not to recognize the victims because they
were traversing an open area which was illuminated not only by moonlight, but also by a light
bulb. In addition, the witnesses testified that the victims were conversing and laughing loudly.
It must be borne in mind that it was not the first time that the accused had seen the victims as,
in fact, accused Bafies and Castigador met Hernando just a few hours before the shooting.
Moreover, they all reside in the same town and, certainly, the accused who were all members
of the CAFGU would know the residents of that town so as to easily distinguish them from
unknown intruders who might be alleged members of the NPA.
Second, when Jose fell down, Hernando identified himself and shouted, "This is
Hernando!" However, instead of verifying the identities of the victims, the accused continued
to fire at them. One of them even shouted, "Birahi na!" ("Shoot now!").
Third, when the victims fell down, the accused approached their bodies. At that point,
they could no longer claim that they didn't recognize the victims; and still not contented, they
sprayed them with bullets such that Jose suffered 14 gunshot wounds, Hernando 16 gunshot
wounds, and Benito 20 gunshot wounds.
Fourth, contrary to their testimonies during trial to the effect that the victims were the
first to fire their weapons, Brgy. Capt. Balinas testified that when he asked the accused
whether the victims had fired at them, the accused answered him in the negative.
Fifth, the accused would like the Court to believe that the victims knew the safe word
"Amoy" which must be uttered in response to "Simoy" in order to easily determine whether
they were members of the NPA. However, the victims could not have known the safe words
as accused Gervero himself stated in his testimony that only he and his co-accused were
present when their commanding officer briefed them about the safe words to be used in their
operation. All these circumstances negate accused-appellants' claim of mistake of fact and
point instead to a concerted action to eliminate the victims.
2. No.
In People v. Oanis, the Court set forth two requisites in order that fulfillment of duty
and exercise of a right may be considered as justifying circumstance, namely: (a) that the
offender acts in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right; and (b) that the
injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such
duty or in the lawful exercise of such right or office. If one is absent, accused is entitled to the
privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete fulfillment of duty or lawful exercise of right
or office.
In this case, it could not even be said that the accused acted in the performance of their
duty. Indeed, Gervero narrated that they conducted the operation on 25 November 1991, on
the verbal instruction of Senior Inspector Baldevinos who later on testified in court to
corroborate this claim. However, even assuming that they were indeed tasked to capture
members of the NPA, their actions on that fateful night disprove their defense of fulfillment of
duty as shown by the way they had viciously attacked their helpless victims. The evidence
speaks in no uncertain terms that the accused, instead of fulfilling their sworn duty to protect
the public in accordance with law, allowed their personal grudges and thirst for vengeance to
prevail and killed Jose, Hernando, and Benito in cold blood.
3. Yes.
113
The witnesses were all consistent in declaring that accused-appellants suddenly fired
at the three unsuspecting victims who never had a chance to mount a defense. The victims,
who were on their way to attend a wake and happily conversing with one another, were
caught off guard when all of a sudden, they were met with multiple gunshots. In such a rapid
motion, accused-appellants shot the victims, affording the latter no opportunity to defend
themselves or fight back. Without any doubt, the manner of execution was deliberately
adopted by the accused who were all armed with heavily powered firearms. They positioned
themselves in what they termed as "ambush position," at a distance where their victims could
not easily see them, thereby ensuring that they hit and terminate their targets.

same style
People v. Cabilida, Jr.
G.R. No. 222964, 11 July 2018
J. Del Castillo
Topic:TOPIC: Rape; Sweetheart theory
No new doctrine.
Appellant's defense that he and AAA were having an illicit affair and that it was AAA
who asked him to come to her house that night so that they could have sex also fails to inspire
belief from the Court. As aptly pointed out by the RTC:
How can a mother of four young children invite a lover to her house so that she could
have sex with him in the presence of her children, sleeping or awake, with the likelihood of
their seeing her in a tryst with her lover and her husband suddenly arriving and catching
them out?
Indeed, if they were really and truly lovers who had had sexual trysts for no less than
ten times, they could have continued to meet at the same places. Definitely, not in private
complainant's home, on Christmas Eve, while the children were with her, awaiting their
father's return. Besides, even if true, the existence of such relationship did not negate the
commission of rape. Having a relationship with the victim is not a license to have sexual
intercourse against her will, and will not exonerate the accused from the criminal charge of
rape as “[b]eing sweethearts does not prove consent to the sexual act.”
People v Palaras
G.R. No. 219582, 22 July 2018,
J. Martires
Topic:TOPIC: Sec. 5, Art. II, R.A. No. 9165
FACTS:
Pursuant to the said reports, P/Supt. Francisco, Jr., the Chief of Police of PNP-Silay City,
ordered surveillance, monitoring, and casing operation on accused-appellant. A test-buy
operation was then undertaken with the use of a confidential asset, who acted as the
poseur-buyer. A sachet of shabu was purchased by the poseur-buyer from accused-appellant
for the sum of Two Hundred Fifty Pesos (P250.00). The item purchased from the
accused-appellant in said test-buy was brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory of the Negros
Occidental Provincial Police Office (NOPPO). The contents of the said plastic sachet was
"positive" for methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug. A buy-bust
operation was thus set to be conducted by the same police unit on accused-appellant Palaras.
Two (2) P100-peso bills and a 150-peso bill were marked by underlining the last digit of the
114
serial numbers on each of them. The same were subscribed to before Prosecutor as the money
to be used in said buy-bust operation. This was entered in the blotter of the PNP-Silay City.
The planned buy-bust operation was coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement
'Agency (PDEA), Regional Office 6.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of violation of Sec 5 and Sec 11, Art II of RA 9165.
HELD/RATIO: No.
As a "trap for the unwary criminal," a buy-bust operation is generally considered a

valid means of arresting those who commit violations under RA No. 9165, where the idea to
commit the crime originates from the offender without inducement or prodding from
anybody. It finds its basis in the validity of an in flagrante delicto arrest, when a suspect has
just committed, or is in the act of committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
However, proof of the transaction constituting the crime must be credibly and
completely established in order to secure a conviction because in every criminal prosecution,
the State bears the burden of proving the crime beyond reasonable doubt.
An accused may only be convicted of illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5,
Article II of RA No. 9165 if the prosecution is able to prove the following elements: (1) the
identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale and its consideration; and (2) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. It is important that the sale transaction is
properly established and that the object of the transaction, the seized drugs, be presented in
court and identified as the same items seized from the accused.
P02 Bernil's testimony shows that the members of the buy-bust team apprehended
accused-appellant based on the pre-arranged signal from the poseur-buyer that the transaction
with accused-appellant had been consummated. However, the prosecution did not present the
poseur-buyer during the trial to describe the said transaction. The records also show that it
was P02 Bernil who was tasked to monitor the movements of accused-appellant and the
poseur-buyer and was positioned the closest to the subject transaction, but he was located ten
(10) meters away from the transaction.
While it is true that the non-presentation of the poseur-buyer is fatal only if there is no
other eyewitness to the illicit transaction, P02 Bernil and the other members of the buy-bust
team cannot be considered as eyewitnesses to the illegal sale of drugs because their distance
raises doubt that they could confirm whether what transpired was actually a sale, considering
the legal characterizations of the act constituting the crime.
Consequently, the non-presentation of the poseur-buyer in this case is fatal to the

prosecution's case. Without an eyewitness account to the illegal sale, the evidence of the
prosecution does not satisfy the quantum of proof necessary for accused-appellant's
conviction. Since the poseur-buyer was not presented to testify on the details of the subject
transaction, the act of accused-appellant as witnessed by the members of the buy-bust team
cannot, therefore, be limited to illegal sale of drugs. It was capable of multiple explanations.
It is a well-established rule that "if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable
of two or more interpretations, one of which being consistent with the innocence of the
accused and the other or others consistent with his guilt, then the evidence in view of the
115
constitutional presumption of innocence has not fulfilled the test of moral certainty and is thus
insufficient to support a conviction.
On accused-appellant's conviction for illegal possession of shabu, this Court is also

constrained to reverse the same. A conviction for illegal possession of dangerous drugs
requires the prosecution to establish the following: (1) that the accused was in possession of
dangerous drugs; (2) that such possession was not authorized by law; and (3) that the accused
was freely and consciously aware of being in possession of dangerous drugs. The seizure of
the items marked as "BIT2" "BIT3" "BIT4" and "BIT5" was made after a warrantless search on
accused-appellant incidental to his arrest based on the buy-bust operation. However, as
discussed earlier, since the sale transaction was not sufficiently established and no crime for
sale of illegal drugs could be attributed to accused-appellant, then there could have been no
basis for the warrantless search. Any item it yielded could not, therefore, be used as evidence
against the accused-appellant.
People v Lumagui
G.R. 224293, 23 July 2018
J. Martires
No new doctrine.
The teaching consistently upheld in our jurisdiction is that in all prosecutions for
violations of RA No. 9165, the corpus delicti is the dangerous drug itself, the existence of
which is essential to a judgment of conviction; thus, its identity must be clearly established.
The prosecution must be able to account for each link in the chain of custody over the
dangerous drug from the moment of seizure up to its presentation in court as evidence of the
corpus delicti.
The chain of custody of the dangerous drugs has been jurisprudentially established as
follows: "first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the
accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the
apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating
officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the
turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the
court."
It is worthy to note that, although there was a photograph showing accused-appellant,

Rueda, and the barangay official with the seized items, the requirement specified in Sec. 2l(a)
of the IRR of RA No. 9165 was not complied with. A reading of the testimony of PO1 Cruz and
PO2 Llorente will readily show that the physical inventory envisioned in the IRR was
substituted by the police officers with the recording of the incident in the barangay blotter. It
must be stressed, however, that this alternate method resorted to by the police officers is not
sanctioned by RA No. 9165. It was only during the cross-examination and after he was
reminded of the provisions of Sec. 21 of RA No. 9165 that PO1 Cruz belatedly claimed that a
physical inventory of the seized items was conducted after the buy-bust operation. However,
no physical evidence was presented and formally offered by the prosecution to prove that the
police officers actually undertook an inventory of these items. Indeed, PO1 Cruz's admission
that the alleged inventory was not submitted to the prosecutors' office or attached to the
records of these cases buttresses the logical conclusion that no inventory had taken place.
116
In this instance, the prosecution failed to elicit from the police officers a single
justifiable ground in not complying with the requirement of Sec. 21 of RA No. 9165 and its IRR;
thus, the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even exist.
People v. Laguerta
G.R. 233542, 19 July 2018
J. Reyes, Jr.
Topic:TOPIC: Rape under Art. 266-ASimple Rape
FACTS:
At around 2:30 p.m. of 5 October 2006, AAA, then 17 years old, was at home with her
two younger sisters. AAA's house was located in Quezon Province. Her parents were then in
Manila. After cleaning the house, AAA allowed her sisters to watch television at a neighbor's
house, which was at a distance of about 10 to 20 meters away from their home. After
cleaning, AAA decided to take a nap. While she was locking-the front door of the house,
somebody suddenly chanced upon her and covered her mouth with a handkerchief. AAA
looked behind her and saw a man whose face was covered with a black shirt. Immediately,
she noticed the assailant's physical built, his fair skin ("hindi kaputian o kapusyawan"), and
distinguishing marks on his feet ("may butong nakabukol sa hinlalaki ng paa at yung daliri ay
nakabaluktot sa isa pang daliri ng paa ), as well as his voice. Instantly, she recognized the
assailant as her Tiyo Fidel (Laguerta), who is her uncle by affinity. Then AAA awoke, it was
already dark, and she was lying half naked on the bed, with her underwear and shorts placed
at the foot thereof. She felt an excruciating pain in her private organ, as well as in her thighs.
She looked for her younger sisters, and found them at the neighbor's house still watching
television. After which, AAA and her sisters proceeded to their grandmother's house. She did
not report the matter to her parents out of fear that Laguerta will pursue his threat of hanging
her and her sisters. Sometime in February 2007, AAA suddenly felt ill. She was taken to the
hospital, and there, it was discovered that she was pregnant. This prompted AAA to report
the rape incident to her parents.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty rape under Art 266-A of the RPC or Sec 5(b) of
R.A. No. 7610.
HELD/RATIO:
To sustain a conviction for rape through sexual intercourse under Art. 266-A of the
RPC, the prosecution must prove the following elements beyond reasonable doubt, namely, (i)
that the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (ii) that said act was accomplished (a)
through the use of force or intimidation, or (b) when the victim is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious, or ( c) by means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority,
or (d) when the victim is under 12 years of age or is demented. Parenthetically, proof of the
essential elements in a conviction for rape may rest on direct as well as circumstantial
evidence. "Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances
from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common
experience." Notably, in cases where the victim cannot testify on the actual commission of the
rape as she was rendered unconscious when the act was committed, the accused may be
convicted based on circumstantial evidence, provided that more than one circumstance is duly
proven and that the totality or the unbroken chain of the circumstances proven lead to no
other logical conclusion than the appellant's guilt of the crime charged. To rule otherwise, and
strictly rely on direct evidence to prove rape will lead to the pernicious result of obstructing
117
the successful prosecution of a rapist who renders his victim unconscious before the
consummation.
A perusal of the Information shows that Laguerta was charged with rape under Article
266-A, paragraph l(a) of the RPC, in relation to RA No. 7610, Section 5, by "attacking and
assaulting AAA, a minor, by having carnal knowledge with her without her consent and
against her will, which debases, degrades and demeans her intrinsic worth and dignity as a
human being. "
In the cases of People v. Abay, People v. Pangilinan, and People of the Philippines v.
Nicolas Tubillo y Abella, the Court discussed the proper imposable penalty in case the
accused is charged with rape by carnal knowledge in relation to Section 5 of RA No. 7610. In
these instances, the Court scrutinized the wordings in the indictment, in addition to the facts
proven by the prosecution during the trial. Particularly, in Abay, the Court explained that
although the Information alleged the crime of rape, in relation to RA No. 7610, therein
appellant must be convicted of rape considering that the prosecution's evidence only
established that therein appellant forced the victim to engage in sexual intercourse through
force and intimidation. The Court explained that:
Under Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 in relation to RA 8353, if the victim of sexual
abuse is below 12 years of age, the offender should not be prosecuted for sexual abuse but for
statutory rape under Article 266-A(l)(d) of the RPC and penalized with reclusion perpetua. On
the other hand, if the victim is 12 years or older, the offender should be charged with either
sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of RA 7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except paragraph l[d])
of the RPC. However, the offender cannot be accused of both crimes for the same act because
his right against double jeopardy will be prejudiced. A person cannot be subjected twice to
criminal liability for a single criminal act.
Likewise, rape cannot be complexed with a violation of Section 5(b) of RA 7610. Under
Section 48 of the RPC (on complex crimes), a felony under the RPC (such as rape) cannot be
complexed with an offense penalized by a special law. In this case, the victim was more than
12 years old when the crime was committed against her. The Information against appellant
stated that AAA was 13 years old at the time of the incident. Therefore, appellant may be
prosecuted either for violation of Section 5(b) of RA 7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except
paragraph 1 [d]) of the RPC.
While the Information may have alleged the elements of both crimes, the prosecution's
evidence only established that appellant sexually violated the person of AAA through force
and intimidation by threatening her with a bladed instrument and forcing her to submit to his
bestial designs. Thus, rape was established.
Guided by the foregoing, the Court notes that similar to the facts in-the
afore-mentioned jurisprudence, the evidence in the instant case focused on the fact that
Laguerta had carnal knowledge of AAA through force and intimidation. The prosecution
sufficiently established that Laguerta chanced upon AAA, poked her neck with a bladed
weapon, covered her eyes and nose, and thereafter had sexual intercourse with her against her
will. Accordingly, this striking similarity of facts calls for the same ruling as laid down in
Abay, Pangilinan, and Tubillo.
Although the Information alleged that AAA was a minor and that Laguerta was her
uncle by affinity ("uncle-in-law"), the prosecution however failed to establish the precise
118
nature of the relationship between Laguerta and AAA. Absent proof of the degree of the
relationship between them, Laguerta should only be convicted of simple rape.
People v Ascarraga
G.R. 222337, 23 July 2018
J. Del Castillo
Topic:TOPIC: Murder
No new doctrine.
The fact that witness Dictado was wearing eyeglasses with prescription grade of more
than 200 did not affect her positive identification of appellant considering that she was only
more or less two arm's length away from the victim. Moreover, appellant seems to forget that
witness Dictado was not the only witness who positively identified him as the assailant. Aside
from witness Dictado, the prosecution also presented as witness BSDO Abendano who was
the emcee during the flag ceremony. He testified that he was only an arm's length or about a
meter away from the victim; that he saw appellant approach and point a gun at the victim;
and that the gun was fired at the victim's forehead. 'Thus, the Court finds no reason to
doubt the positive identification of appellant by the prosecution's witnesses who have no ill
motive to testify falsely against him. It bears stressing that ''the positive identification of the
[assailant], when categorical and consistent and without any [ill motive] on the part of the
eyewitnesses testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial."
In this case, the prosecution's eyewitnesses, witness BSDO Abendano and witness
Dictado, both positively identified appellant as the assailant in open court. Appellant's lack of
motive for killing the victim likewise has no bearing as jurisprudence consistently holds that
"motive is generally x x x immaterial because it is not an element of the crime [of murder]."
People v. Japag and Liporada

G.R. No 223155, 23 July 2018
J. Del Castillo
Topic:TOPIC: Self-defense
No new doctrine.
It is settled that when an accused invokes self-defense, the burden of proof is shifted
from the prosecution to the defense, and it becomes incumbent upon the accused to prove, by
clear and convincing evidence, the existence of the following requisites of self-defense: first,
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; second, reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and third, lack of sufficient provocation on the
part of the person defending himself. As the burden of proof is shifted to the defense, the
accused must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution's
evidence. After all, by invoking self-defense, the accused, in effect, admits having killed or
injured the victim, and he can no longer be exonerated of the crime charged if he fails to prove
the requisites of self-defense.
The most important requisite of self-defense is unlawful aggression which is the

condition sine qua non for upholding self-defense as a justifying circumstance. In other words,
unless it is shown by clear and convincing evidence that the victim had committed unlawful
aggression against the accused, "self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, cannot be
appreciated, for the two other essential elements [thereof] would have no factual and legal
bases without any unlawful aggression to prevent or repel."
119
Unlawful aggression "contemplates an actual, sudden and unexpected attack, or

imminent danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude. The person
defending himself must have been attacked with actual physical force or with actual use of [a]
weapon. "
After a thorough review of the records, we find that appellant failed to discharge the
burden of proving that the unlawful aggression had originated from the victim.
First, it is undisputed that appellant boarded a motorcycle and fled the situs criminis
immediately after stabbing the victim at the back. "Flight is a veritable badge of guilt and
negates the plea of self-defense."
Second, the location, nature and seriousness of the wound sustained by the victim is
inconsistent rather with self-defense as, these factors indicate a determined effort to kill.
And third, both the RTC and the CA found the testimony of Ramil (the victim's twin
brother) to be clear and convincing in its vital points, i.e., on his detailed narration of the
stabbing incident and his positive identification of appellant as one of his brother's assailants.
Treachery
There is treachery when the offender employs means, methods or forms in the
execution of any of the crimes against persons that tend directly and especially to ensure its
execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make.
In this case, the records clearly show that the victim's killing was attended by treachery,
considering that: (a) the victim was fatally stabbed by appellant from behimf1 behind
immediately after receiving a punch in the face from Liporada; (b) the victim was held in place
by Macalalag when the stabbing blow was delivered by appellant; and (c) the attack was so
sudden and unexpected that the victim's brother and even the nearby security guards were
unable to prevent it.
The totality of these circumstances clearly shows that the means of execution of the
attack gave the victim no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate, and said means of
execution was deliberately adopted by appellant.
Formatted: Indent: First line: 0.5"
same style
People v. Roy
G.R. No. 225604, 23 July 2018
J. Del Castillo
Topic:TOPIC: Exempting circumstance – imbecility
No new doctrine.
Paragraph 1, Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code provides that an imbecile or insane
person is exempt from criminal liability, unless he acted during a lucid interval. "[It] requires a
complete deprivation of rationality in committing the act, i.e. that the accused be deprived of
reason, that there be no consciousness of responsibility for his acts, or that there be complete
absence of the power to discern."
120
The law presumes that every person is sane. Anyone who pleads the exempting
circumstance of insanity bears the burden to prove that he was completely deprived of reason
when he committed the crime charged. Note that the proof of an accused's insanity must
"relate to the time immediately preceding or simultaneous with the commission of the offense
with which he is charged." Here, the defense failed to overcome the presumption of sanity. As
correctly observed by the CA, Dr. Domingo's report could not positively and certainly
conclude that appellant's state of imbecility afflicted him at the time he raped AAA. Moreover,
we agree with the CA's observation, affirming the findings of the trial court, that the actions of
appellant negated complete destruction of intelligence at the time the rape was committed.
People v. Gajila
G.R. No. 227502, July 23, 2018,
J. Del Castillo
No new doctrine.
In criminal cases, the burden lies upon the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. However, when the accused invokes self-defense, the burden of
proof is shifted from the prosecution to the defense, and it becomes incumbent upon the
accused to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, the existence of the following requisites of
self-defense: first, unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; second, reasonable necessity
of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and third, lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
In such cases, the accused must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the
weakness of the prosecution's evidence. After all, by invoking self-defense, the accused, in
effect, admits having killed or injured the victim, and he can no longer be acquitted of the
crime charged if he fails to prove the essential requisites of self-defense.
The most important requisite of self-defense is unlawful aggression which is the

condition sine qua non for upholding self-defense as a justifying circumstance. In simpler
terms, the accused must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the victim committed
unlawful aggression against him; otherwise, "self-defense, whether complete or incomplete,
cannot be appreciated, for the two other essential elements [thereof] would have no factual
and legal bases without any unlawful aggression to prevent or repel."
After a thorough review of the records, we find that appellant failed to discharge the
burden of proving that the unlawful aggression had originated from the victim.
First, it is undisputed that appellant tried to flee the situs criminus immediately after
the stabbing incident. It was only through the concerted efforts of the civilians and barangay
tanods at the market that appellant's escape attempt was thwarted. "Flight is a veritable badge
of guilt and negates the plea of self-defense." We find no merit in appellant's contention that
he "ran after the stabbing incident because he intended to voluntarily surrender himself at the
barangay." He could have easily surrendered to Milagros Reyes, one of the barangay tanods
chasing after him, but he kept on running away until he was eventually subdued by Edgardo
Reyes.
Second, the location, nature and seriousness of the wounds sustained by the victim are
inconsistent with a plea of self-defense; rather, these factors indicate a determined effort to kill.
121
And third, appellant's own account of the stabbing incident is simply inconsistent with
the evidence on record. Appellant testified that he stabbed the victim just once on the left side,
right below the armpit, while he was underneath the victim on the ground. Under these
circumstances, the direction of the stab wound should have been a downward thrust.
However, based on Dr. Salen's post-mortem examination of the victim's body, the victim
sustained two stab wounds, and the direction of the stab wound at the victim's back was an
upward, not downward, thrust.
same style
People v. San Jose
G.R. No. 179148, 23 July 2018
J. Bersamin
No new doctrine.
Prosecutions involving narcotics and other illegal drugs, the confiscated and allied
articles themselves constitute the corpus delicti of the offense. This is because the offense is not
deemed committed unless the substances and articles subject of the accused's illegal dealing or
illegal possession are themselves presented to the trial court as evidence. The fact of the
existence of the substances and articles is vital to sustain a judgment of conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
The concept of corpus delicti -the body, foundation, or substance of a crime -consists of
two elements, namely: (a) that a certain result has been established, for example, that a man
has died in prosecution for homicide; and (b) that some person is criminally responsible for
the result. The Prosecution has to prove the corpus delicti beyond reasonable doubt either by
direct evidence or by circumstantial or presumptive evidence. Else, the accused must be set
free.
The process essential to proving the corpus delicti calls for the preservation and
establishment of the chain of custody. In drug-related criminal prosecutions, chain of custody
specifically refers to the documented various movements and custody of the subjects of the
offense -be they seized drugs, controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs, and
equipment for their production- from the moment of seizure or confiscation to the time of
receipt in the forensic laboratory, to their safekeeping until their presentation in court as
evidence and their eventual destruction. The documentation includes the inventory, the
identity of the person or persons who held temporary custody thereof, the date and time when
any transfer of custody was made in the course of safekeeping until presentation in court as
evidence, and disposition.
The safeguards of marking, inventory and photographing are all essential in

establishing that such substances and articles seized or confiscated were the very same ones
being delivered to and presented as evidence in court.
Yet, in this case, the testimony of poseur buyer SPO1 Edwin A. Anaviso, the State's
main witness, bears out that no inventory and accounting of the confiscated substances were
made herein at the time and at the scene of the seizure xxx
The chain of custody in drug-related prosecutions always starts with the marking of
the relevant substances or articles immediately upon seizure or confiscation. This, because the
succeeding handlers would be using the marking as reference. The marking further serves to
separate the marked substances or articles from the corpus of all other similar or related
122
articles from the time of the seizure or confiscation from the accused until disposal at the end
of the criminal proceedings, thereby obviating the hazards of switching, "planting," or
contamination of the evidence. Verily, switching, or "planting," or contamination of the
evidence destroys the proof of the corpus delicti.
The marking likewise insulates and protects innocent persons from dubious and
concocted searches as well as shields the sincere apprehending officers from harassment
claims based on false allegations of planting of evidence, robbery or theft.
The arresting officers of the accused herein were also very aware that they would be
turning over all the substances recovered during the supposed transaction with him to the
evidence custodian and to the laboratory. Such awareness imposed on ·them the duty to
preserve the chain of custody by· marking the substances to prevent their being mixed up with
other material in the custody and keeping of the evidence custodian or the laboratory. The
marking became crucial to the chain of custody and ceased to be a mere measure of precaution
once the arresting officers decided to transport the arrestees and the pieces of evidence from
the scene of the arrest to the police office, which, physically speaking, was some distance.
As above discussed, the marking of the seized substances was admittedly done only at
the police office. That was another critical lapse on the part of the arresting lawmen because it
broke the chain of custody of the corpus delicti. Even if deferring the marking at the scene of
the arrest and seizure to a later time, at the police office, was probably the tolerated practice
for buy-bust arrests under RA No. 6425, the practice did not really justify the failure to do the
marking immediately after the arrest of the accused and the seizure of the substances if the
objective thereof was precisely to prevent planting, substitution or tampering of evidence. The
arresting officers had to explain the failure to do the marking immediately, for to dispense
with the reasonable explanation was to undervalue the chain of custody as the means of
insulating the evidence from the risks of planting, substitution or tampering. Yet, no
explanation was tendered during the trial.
We cannot presume that the marking could not be done at the place of the arrest
because of risks present thereat. Based on the records, the arresting officers were under no
threat by virtue of their anti-drug operation being actually backed up by four policemen from
the Regional Mobile Group of the National Capital Region Police Office. The State did not also
establish that the substances presented during the trial had been safeguarded from tampering
or substitution in subsequent phases of the custodial chain. Poseur buyer SPO1 Anaviso might
have detailed the conduct of the buy-bust operation and attested to the marking being done
later at the police office, but no witness actually testified during the trial about how the seized
substances were sealed and transported to the crime laboratory for the examination and
confirmatory tests. The lack of such testimony signified that the seized substances were not
shown to have been kept intact while in transit from the scene of the arrest to the police office,
and from the police office to the laboratory. In view of all the foregoing, the integrity of the
evidence presented in court became suspect.
123
People v. Rodolfo Olarre

G.R. No. 227421, 23 July 2018
J. Bersamin
No new doctrine
same style
Olarbe and his wife Juliet were sleeping in their house. Suddenly they were awakened
by the sound of a gunshot and shouting from Arca who appeared to be drunk. Arca was
holding a rifle (an airgun converted to a calibre .22) and shouted "mga putang ina ninyo,
pagpapatayin ko kayo." Then, Arca forcibly entered their house and aimed the gun at them.
Olarbe immediately grabbed the gun from him and they grappled for its possession. Olarbe
managed to wrest the gun away from Arca. In a jiff, Olarbe shot Arca causing the latter to lean
sideward ("napahilig"). Nevertheless, Arca managed to get his bolo from his waist and
continued to attack them. Olarbe grabbed the bolo and in their struggle for its possession, they
reached the outer portion of the house. Olarbe was able to wrestle the bolo and instantly, he
hacked Arca. After the killing incident, Olarbe voluntarily surrendered to the police
authorities.
RTC found him guilty of murder as charged. It observed that the initial unlawful
aggression by Arca had ceased when Olarbe shot him in the head and caused him to "lean
sideward." It disbelieved Olarbe's insistence that Arca had still been able to grab his bolo and
assault Olarbe's common-law spouse therewith for being implausible considering that Arca
had by then been hit in the head.
ISSUE: Whether or not the killing was legally justified.
HELD/RATIO: Yes.
An accused who pleads any justifying circumstance in Article 11 of the Revised Penal
Code admits to the commission of acts that show the commission of a crime. It thus becomes
his burden to prove the justifying circumstance with clear and convincing evidence; otherwise,
his conviction for the crime charged follows.
In order for Olarbe to exonerate himself on the ground of self-defense under Article 11,
paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code, he must establish the following facts, namely: (1)
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed
to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person resorting to self-defense.
Olarbe also invoked defense of stranger under Article 11, paragraph 3, of the Revised
Penal Code because Arca was likewise attacking his common-law spouse. Defense of stranger
requires clear and convincing evidence to prove the following, to wit: (1) unlawful aggression
by the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the 'means to prevent or repel it; and (3) the person
defending be not induced by revenge, resentment or other evil motive.
The indispensable requisite for either of these justifying circumstances is that the
victim must have mounted an unlawful aggression against the accused or the stranger.
Without such unlawful aggression, the accused is not entitled to the justifying circumstance.
The essence of the unlawful aggression indispensable in self-defense or defense of stranger has
been fully discussed in People v. Nugas, thus:
124
Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial element of the
justifying circumstance of self-defense. Without unlawful aggression, there can be no justified
killing in defense of oneself. The test for the presence of unlawful aggression under the
circumstances is whether the aggression from the victim put in real peril the life or personal
safety of the person defending himself; the peril must not be an imagined or imaginary threat.
Accordingly, the accused must establish the concurrence of three elements of unlawful
aggression, namely: (a) there must be a physical or material attack or assault; (b) the attack or
assault must be actual, or, at least, imminent; and (c) the attack or assault must be unlawful.
There was no credible showing that the shot to the head had rendered Arca too weak
to draw the bolo and to carry on with his aggression in the manner described by Olarbe. The
conclusion of the RTC and the CA was obviously speculative. Secondly, the State did not
demonstrate that the shot from the airgun converted to .22 caliber fired at close range sufficed
to disable Arca from further attacking with his bolo. Without such demonstration, the RTC
and the CA clearly indulged in pure speculation. Thirdly, nothing in the record indicated
Arca' s physical condition at the time of the incident. How could the CA then reliably conclude
that he could not have mounted the bolo assault? And, lastly, to rule out any further
aggression by Arca with his bolo after the shot in the head was again speculative.
Olarbe's account of what did happen on that fateful night was highly plausible. At the
minimum, the details and sequence of the events therein described conformed to human
experience and the natural course of things. Armed with both the gun and the bolo, Acra not
only disturbed Olarbe's peace but physically invaded the sanctity of latter's home at midnight.
Given that the aggression by Arca was unprovoked on the part of Olarbe, and with no other
person disputing the latter's account, we should easily see and understand why Olarbe would
feel that his and his common-law spouse's lives had been put in extreme peril.
In judging pleas of self-defense and defense of stranger, the courts should not demand
that the accused conduct himself with the poise of a person not under imminent threat of fatal
harm. He had no time to reflect and to reason out his responses. He had to be quick, and his
responses should be commensurate to the imminent harm. This is the only way to judge him,
for the law of nature -the foundation of the privilege to use all reasonable means to repel an
aggression that endangers one's own life and the lives of others -did not require him to use
unerring judgment when he had the reasonable grounds to believe himself in apparent danger
of losing his life or suffering great bodily injury.
The test is whether his subjective belief as to the imminence and seriousness of the
danger was reasonable or not, and the reasonableness of his belief must be viewed from his
standpoint at the time he acted. The right of a person to take life in self-defense arises from his
belief in the necessity for doing so; and his belief and the reasonableness thereof are to be
judged in the light of the circumstances as they then appeared to him, not in the light of
circumstances as they would appear to others or based on the belief that others may or might
entertain as to the nature and imminence of the danger and the necessity to kill.
125
People v. Castillo Formatted: Don't add space between paragraphs of the

same style
G.R. No. 202129, 23 July 2018
J. Martires
No new doctrine.
Jurisprudence has been instructive in illustrating the links in the chain that need to be
established:
First, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug

recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer;
Second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending
officer to the investigating officer;
Third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the
forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and
Fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized
by the forensic chemist to the court.
The records in this case show no evidence that the buy-bust team followed the outlined
procedure.
The integrity of the evidence presented -the corpus delicti no less -became suspicious
by the inability of the records to illustrate the links in the chain of custody after the alleged
buy-bust transaction at Capiz Emmanuel Hospital.
Crucial in proving the chain of custody is the marking of the seized drugs or other
related items immediately after they have been seized from the accused. "Marking" means the
placing by the apprehending officer or the poseur-buyer of his/her initials and signature on
the items seized. Marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link; hence, it is
vital that the seized contraband be immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the
specimens will use the markings as reference. The marking of the evidence serves to separate
the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time
they are seized from the accused until they are disposed of at the end of the criminal
proceedings, thus, preventing switching, planting or contamination of evidence.
Here, the prosecution failed to establish that PO1 Bernardez or any member of
apprehending team had placed their initials and signature on the shabu seized from Evelyn
during the buy-bust operation. Xxx The police officers did not even bother to explain why
they failed to mark or why they could not have marked the seized items immediately upon
confiscation. Since the drugs were not properly marked, it could not, therefore, be determined
how the unmarked drugs were handled. Evidently, alteration of the seized items was a
possibility absent immediate marking.
126
People v. Reynaldo Rojas, Jr.

G.R. No. 222563, July 23, 2018
, J. Bersamin
No new doctrine
In the prosecution of a violation of RA No. 9165, the State bears the burden of proving
not only the elements of the offenses of sale and possession of the dangerous drugs but also of
the corpus delicti. Corpus delicti has been defined as the body or substance of the crime and,
in its primary sense, refers to the fact that a crime has actually been committed. As applied to a
particular offense, it means the actual commission by someone of the particular crime charged.
The corpus delicti is a compound fact made up of two things, namely: the existence of a
certain act or result forming the basis of the criminal charge, and the existence of a criminal
agency as the cause of this act or result.
The dangerous drug is itself the corpus delicti of the violation of the law prohibiting
the mere possession of the dangerous drug. Consequently, the State does not comply with the
indispensable requirement of proving the corpus delicti when the drugs are missing, or when
substantial gaps occur in the chain of custody of the seized drugs as to raise doubts on the
authenticity of the evidence presented in court. The substitution, or tampering, or adulteration
of the seized drugs prevents the establishment of the corpus delicti. In view of these
considerations, the duty to prove the corpus delicti of the crime is as essential as proving the
elements of the crime itself.
Here, there is a serious doubt as to whether the drugs supposedly seized from
Reynaldo were still the same articles presented to the trial court. This doubt stemmed from the
failure of the arresting officers to execute the safeguards set by law, particularly Section 21 of
RA No. 9165.
The chain of custody vis-a-vis the drugs seized during entrapment is divided into four
parts, each designed to contribute to the preservation of the integrity of the seized drugs as
evidence. The seizure and marking, if practicable, of the seized drugs by the apprehending
officer constitute the first part. Second is the turnover of the marked seized drugs by the
apprehending officer to the investigating officer. The turnover of the marked seized drugs by
the investigating officer to the forensic chemist for the laboratory examination is third. The
turnover and submission of the marked seized drugs by the forensic chemist to the trial court
make up the fourth part.
The arresting officers' non-adherence to the procedure laid down by Section 21,
entitled him to acquittal on the ground of reasonable doubt. Indeed, the State did not
discharge its burden of proving Reynaldo's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error,
produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. Acquittal of Reynaldo should follow.
127
People v. Allan Lumagui

, G.R. No. 224293, July 23, 2018
, J. Martires
Topic:TOPIC: Sec. 11 and 26, Article II, of RA No. 9165; Corpus delicti
No new doctrine
While it is true that the Court has consistently declared that under varied field
conditions, strict compliance with the requirements of Sec. 21 may not always be possible, the
IRR of RA No. 9165, however, has provided that the said inventory and photography may be
conducted at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team in instances of
warrantless seizure, and that noncompliance with the requirements of Sec. 21, under
justifiable grounds -will not render void and invalid the seizure and custody over the seized
items so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved
by the apprehending officer or team.
The failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in
Sec. 21 of RA No. 9165 and its IRR does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the
items as void and invalid, provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is
justifiable ground for noncompliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved.
Here, the prosecution failed to elicit from the police officers a single justifiable ground
in not complying with the requirement of Sec. 21 of RA No. 9165 and its IRR; thus, the Court
cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even exist.
same style
People v. Marciano Ubungen
, G.R. No. 225497, July 23, 2018
, J. Martires
Topic:TOPIC: Sec. 5, Article II, of RA No. 9165; Corpus delicti
same style
No new doctrine
Jurisprudence teaches that to secure a conviction for illegal sale of dangerous drugs
under Section 5, Article II of RA No. 9165, the prosecution must establish the following
elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale and its consideration;
and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material is the proof
that the accused peddled illicit drugs, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus
delicti.
In cases of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the dangerous drug
seized from the accused constitutes the cmpus delicti of the offense. Thus, it is of utmost
importance that the integrity and identity of the seized drugs must be shown to have been
duly preserved. The chain of custody rule performs this function as it ensures that
unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.
Prosecution failed to establish an unbroken chain of custody of the seized drugs in

violation of Section 21, Article II of RA No. 9165. The identity of the subject drug was therefore
not established with moral certainty.
Establishing every link in the chain of custody is crucial to the preservation of the
integrity, identity, and evidentiary value of the seized illegal drug. Failure to demonstrate
128
compliance with even just one of these links creates reasonable doubt that the substance
confiscated from the accused is the same substance offered in evidence.
People v. Caliao,
G.R. No. 226392, 23 July 2018
J. Martires
Topic:TOPIC: Murder; Self defense
Pursuant to the presumption of innocence enshrined in our Constitution, it is

incumbent upon the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the crime charged rather
than for the accused to prove his innocence. However, a person invoking self-defense in effect
admits to having performed the criminal act but claims no liability therefor, because the actual
and imminent danger to his or her life justified his infliction of harm against an aggressor.
This dispenses with the prosecution's burden to prove that the accused performed the criminal
act; what remains to be established is whether the accused was justified in inflicting the harm.
This the accused must prove with clear and convincing evidence.
To successfully invoke self-defense, an accused must prove the following: (1) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person resorting to self-defense.
Among these three elements, the condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance
of self-defense is unlawful aggression. Without said aggression coming from the victim, there
can be no self-defense.
As found by both the CA and the RTC, it was accused-appellant who attacked the
victim when the former suddenly appeared at the latter's store and stabbed him. Both courts
found accused-appellant's version of the events improbable, given that he failed to offer any
explanation as to why the victim would suddenly pour kerosene on his heartpuso; or why, if
such was the case, accused-appellant did not attempt to stop the victim and merely waited to
see what the victim would do next, which he claimed was to strike accused-appellant with an
iron pipe. Moreover, when Roberto testified that he saw the incident because he worked for
accused-appellant's mother at Taboan Market where the incident happened, the prosecution
presented rebuttal evidence through Belinda, who testified that in all her years as a vendor in
the said market, she had never seen Roberto work there, considering that her store and that of
accused-appellant's mother were only five (5) meters apart.
On the other hand, the CA and the RTC gave credence to the evidence of the
prosecution. Both found that the prosecution was able to give a more credible account of the
event, having ably established the root cause of accused-appellant's attack on the victim.
People v. Michael Cabuhay

G.R. No. 225590, 23 July 2018
J. Martires
Topic:TOPIC: Sec. 5, Article II, of RA No. 9165; Corpus delicti Formatted: Don't add space between paragraphs of the
same style
No new doctrine
The prosecution must account for the following links in the chain of custody of the
seized illegal drug, to wit: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug
recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal
129
drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the
investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and
fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic
chemist to the court.
Unfortunately, in this case, the prosecution failed to demonstrate an unbroken chain of

custody.
ln this case, the prosecution was able to submit an inventory of the two (2) sachets of
illegal drugs allegedly confiscated from Michael. However, the only signatories to this
inventory are the arresting officers PO3 Dela Cruz and SPO1 Lobrin, and the investigating
officer PO3 Montero. Readily apparent from the same inventory is the fact that none of the
persons required to sign the inventory, as enumerated under the law, were made to sign the
same. The signatures of the accused or his counsel, or the representatives from the media, the
Department of Justice, or any elected public official were clearly absent. Moreover, the
prosecution did not present a single photograph of the seized illegal drug taken during the
inventory as required by Section 21, RA No. 9165.
This evident non-observance of the mandatory requirements under Section 21 of RA

No. 9165 necessarily casts doubt on the integrity of the shabu supposedly seized from
accused.36 This, in turn, creates reasonable doubt in the conviction of herein
defendant-appellant for violation of Article II, Section 5 of RA No. 9165.
People v Gozo
G.R. No. 225605, 23 July 2018
J. Martires
Topic:TOPIC: Statutory Rape
FACTS:
On 27 October 2011, AAA was staying in the restaurant where her father BBB worked
as a stay-in cook. When it was time for her to sleep, she went up to the second floor of the
restaurant. Thereafter, Gozo, who also worked in the restaurant as a stay-in janitor, decided to
follow her inside the room. There, he began his advances and started molesting AAA. At first,
Gozo inserted his fingers into AAA's vagina but because his lust was not satiated, he
eventually inserted his penis into the victim's genitals. After he was through abusing her, he
instructed AAA not to tell anyone because it would cause a fight between him and BBB.
Nevertheless, AAA immediately told BBB about the incident when he arrived. They
then went to the police station to report what happened and proceeded to the hospital for
physical examination. The genital physical examination revealed that AAA had fresh shallow
lacerations in her hymen at the 3, 6, and 9 o'clock positions.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gozo is guilty of statutory rape.
HELD/RATIO: No.
In convicting the accused for statutory rape, the prosecution has the burden to prove
the following elements: (1) the age of the complainant; (2) the identity of the accused; and (3)
the sexual intercourse between the accused and the complainant. In turn, conviction may
result on the basis of the victim's sole testimony, provided it is credible, natural, and consistent
with human nature and the normal course of things.
130
Considering the element of the victim's age, the trial court ruled that although the
prosecution failed to present evidence as to AAA's age, Gozo should still be held guilty of
statutory rape. It ratiocinated that upon observation of the victim while testifying, she could
not have been more than 12 years old. On appeal, the CA also found that all elements of
statutory rape were present because Gozo never questioned the trial court's findings of fact.
In this case, no documentary evidence such as a birth certificate or other authentic

documents were offered to prove AAA's age and there was no explanation why none was
presented. Neither was there testimonial evidence from the concerned individuals to establish
her age as only the medico-legal testified as to AAA's age. While the medico-legal may have
testified as to her age, he was not among the individuals enumerated in Pruna who may testify
in case the birth certificate or authentic documents were lost or otherwise unavailable. In
addition, his testimony as to AAA's age was hearsay as he had no personal knowledge
because BBB merely relayed the said information to him. Thus, it is readily apparent that the
prosecution miserably failed to prove AAA's exact age.
As outlined in Pruna, the prosecution has the burden to prove the age of the offended
party and the lack of opposition to the testimonial evidence on the part of the accused should
not be taken against him. It is noteworthy that in the present case, there was no testimonial
evidence that Gozo could have objected to. In addition, the trial court is required to make a
categorical finding of the victim's age. Here, however, the RTC simply opined, based on its
observation, that AAA could not have been more than 12 years of age. Clearly, the prosecution
failed to prove with sufficient and appropriate evidence that AAA was below 12 years of age.
People v. Salga and Namalata
G.R. No. 233334, 23 July 2018
J. Bersamin
Topic:TOPIC: Special complex crime; Robbery with homicide
FACTS:
Joan Camille Zulita testified that on 14 February 2010, at around 4 pm, she was
watching television in their house when she noticed that three persons entered their gate. The
two persons proceeded to the main door while the third one went to the garden where their
helper Catalina Arcega was tending to the plants. Joan was shocked and could not move out
of fear because the two persons who went towards her were armed. One of the two persons
aimed a gun at her and ordered her to keep quiet. Out of fear, she maintained that she could
not shout for help nor move as she didn't know what to do. Afterwards, the man who told her
to keep quiet and who was later identified as appellant John Carlo Salga (Salga) asked her
about the location of the vault. She alleged that when she could not open the vault, Salga told
her to get the keys from her mother's room. She followed the robbers' order.
At that time, when the robbers left her inside the bedroom, she hurriedly hid under the
bed. While hiding under the bed, she affirmed that she heard a gunshot from outside. When
she sensed that the armed men had already left, she went out of her hiding place and went to
the living room, where she saw the vault already emptied of its content. The armed men took
cash amounting to P34,000.00 from the vault and her Samsung E590 cellphone worth P6,000.00.
She and her mother looked for their househelp Catalina Arcega, but failed to find the latter.
Then later on, they found the househelp, who at that time was already seriously wounded.
The attending physician said it was due to the hacking of her head that resulted to a depressed
skull fracture, so she died the following day.
131
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of robbery with homicide.
HELD/RATIO: Yes.
Robbery with homicide is a special complex crime that requires the concurrence of the
following elements, namely: (1) the taking of personal property belonging to another; (2) with
intent to gain; (3) with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; and (4) on the
occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, as used in its generic sense, was
committed. A conviction requires certitude that the robbery is the main purpose and objective
of the malefactor, and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must
precede the taking of human life but the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery.
A special complex crime, also known as a composite crime, is composed of two or

more crimes but is treated by the law as a single indivisible and unique offense for being the
product of one criminal impulse. It is a specific crime with a specific penalty provided by law,
and differs from the compound or complex crime under Article 4810 of the Revised Penal
Code. The composite crime and the complex or compound crime are really distinct and
different.
The composition of the offenses in the composite crime is fixed by law, but the
combination of the offenses in a complex or compound crime is not specified but generalized,
that is, grave and/or less grave, or one offense being the necessary means to commit the other.
In the composite crime, the penalty for the combination of crimes is specific, but the penalty in
the complex or compound crime is that corresponding to the most serious offense, to be
imposed in the maximum period. A light felony that accompanies the commission of the
complex or compound crime may be subject to a separate information, but the light felony that
accompanies the composite crime is absorbed.
The SC concurred with the CA that robbery with homicide was committed. The
evidence adduced by the Prosecution in that regard was ample, competent and beyond
reasonable doubt. Joan positively identified John as one of the three persons who had entered
their home and taken possession of her phone and money, and househelper Catalina Arcega
was killed in the course or on the occasion of the robbery. Without question, the intent to rob
the Zulitas preceded the taking of human life.
Mariñas v. People Formatted: Don't add space between paragraphs of the

same style
G.R. No. 232891, 23 July 2018,
J. Reyes, Jr.
Topic:TOPIC: Sec. 11, Article II, of R.A. No. 9165; Corpus delicti
No new doctrine.
same style
To convict an accused who is charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the
prosecution must establish the following elements by proof beyond reasonable doubt: (a) the
accused was in possession of dangerous drugs; (b) such possession was not authorized by law;
and (c) the accused was freely and consciously aware of being in possession of dangerous
drugs.
The prosecution must prove with moral certainty the identity of the prohibited drug,
considering that the dangerous drug itself forms part of the corpus delicti of the crime. The
prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody over the dangerous drugs so as to
132
obviate any unnecessary doubts on the identity of the dangerous drugs on account of
switching, "planting," or contamination of evidence. Accordingly, the prosecution must be
able to account for each link in the chain of custody from the moment that the illegal drugs are
seized up to their presentation in court as evidence of the crime.
The petitioner was caught in flagrante delicto. For a warrantless arrest of an accused
caught in flagrante delicto to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested
must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view
of the arresting officer.
All the foregoing requirements for a lawful search and seizure are present in this case.
The police officers had prior justification to be at the petitioner's place as they were conducting
a follow-up operation on carnapping incidents in the area when they chanced upon the
petitioner standing by, holding a plastic sachet containing suspected illegal drugs; when they
approached petitioner and upon introducing themselves as police officers, petitioner ran away.
As the crystalline substance was plainly visible, the police officers were justified in seizing
them. Simply put, when the arresting officers arrested the petitioner and confiscated the
subject sachet of drugs, they did so pursuant to a lawful warrantless arrest and seizure.
People v. Aljon Guadaña,

G.R. No. 234160, July 23, 2018
Reyes, Jr., J.
Topic:TOPIC: Sec. 5, Article II, of RA No. 9165; Corpus delicti
No new doctrine.
In Belmonte v. People, the Court reinstated the factors that must be proven to secure a
conviction for Illegal Sale of dangerous drugs, to wit: In order to secure the conviction of an
accused charged with illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must prove the: (a)
identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b) delivery of the
thing sold and the payment. In this relation, it is essential that the identity of the prohibited
drug be established beyond reasonable doubt.
In order to obviate any unnecessary doubts on the identity of the dangerous drugs, the
prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody over the same. It must be able to
account for each link in the chain of custody over the dangerous drug from the moment of
seizure up to its presentation in court as evidence of the corpus delicti. Since the confiscated
drugs consist the corpus delicti of the crime charged, a break or substantial gap in the chain of
custody is fatal to the case of the prosecution. It, thus, becomes of paramount importance for
the prosecution to prove that there was compliance with the chain of custody rule found in
Section 21(1) of RA No. 9165.
The buy-bust operation was conducted past 9:00 p.m., on a bridge that was located in a
remote area. Given the surrounding circumstances, it was neither practical nor safe for the
arresting team to conduct the required inventory at the place of apprehension.
With respect to the absence of the two other required witnesses, i.e., the Department of
Justice (DOJ) representative and media representative, the same was reasonably justified, to
wit: Accordingly, there was neither DOJ representative nor media man available in Manito,
Albay because of its distance from Legazpi City, where these representatives are staying.
Besides the highway connecting the Municipality of Manito and the City of Legazpi is a
133
critical area in terms of security due to the insurgency. They tried to contact a DOJ
representative to no avail.
Although the Court strongly encourages strict compliance with the provisions of
Section 21, it is also well aware that a perfect chain of custody is difficult to achieve especially
in cases of buy-bust operations. It is precisely for this reason that the IRR provided a saving
clause stating that non-compliance will not render void and invalid the seizure of and custody
over the said items so long as there are justifiable grounds to support it.
Time, safety, location and availability of the required witnesses are some of the factors
that must be considered in determining whether or not to apply the saving clause found in
Section 21.
People v. Jaime
G.R. No. 225332, 23 July 2018
J. Martires
Topic:TOPIC: Rape under Art. 266-A vis-à-vis Sec 5(b) of RA 7610; ISL
FACTS:
At around eight o'clock in the evening of 14 December 2002, the victim was on her way
to buy medicine for her headache when the accused-appellant, who was then driving a tricycle
"de padyak" or pedicab, stopped by her and introduced himself as "Torning." Accused asked
her to board the pedicab or he would kill her parents if she refused to do so. Gripped with fear,
she boarded. Accused stripped from the waist down, knelt on the victim's thighs while she
was lying on her back, and removed her lower garment and panty, before forcibly inserting
his penis into her vagina.
A barangay tanod fetched BBB from their residence. After being informed of what
happened to her daughter, BBB brought AAA to Camp Crame for medical examination and
assisted her in filing a complaint against accused-appellant.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Jaime is guilty under Art 266-A of the RPC, as amended or Sec 5(b) of
RA 7610; and
2. Whether or not the ISL should be applied considering the penalty is reclusion
perpetua.
HELD/RATIO:
Art. 266-A of the RPC, as amended, is applicable. The RTC found accused-appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape in relation to RA 7610. On appeal, the CA
found him guilty of one (1) count of simple rape under Article 266-A, paragraph l(a) of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353. The difference in the terms used
to designate the crime may have caused some confusion: the SC thus clarified the crime for
which accused-appellant was charged and convicted by the RTC and the CA.
Under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the RPC, the crime of rape is committed when a
man shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: (a)
through force, threat, or intimidation; (b) when the offended party is deprived of reason or
134
otherwise unconscious; (c) by means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;

and (d) when the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though
none of the circumstances previously mentioned are present. It is penalized with reclusion
perpetua as provided under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic
Act No. 8353.
The essential elements of Section 5(b) of RA 7610 are: (a) the accused commits the act of
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (b) the said act is performed with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and, (c) the child whether male or female, is
below 18 years of age. The imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period to
reclusion perpetua, except that the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under
twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period.
In People v. Abay, the RTC found the accused "guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
committing the crime of rape under A1ticle 335 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to
Section 5, Article III of RA No. 7610" and imposed upon him the death penalty; although, on
appeal, the CA found the accused guilty only of simple rape and reduced the penalty imposed
to reclusion perpetua. The Court instructs that if the victim is 12 years or older, the offender
should be charged with either sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of RA No. 7610, or rape under
Article 266-A (except paragraph l(d)) of the Revised Penal Code; but, he cannot be accused of
both crimes. Otherwise, his right against double jeopardy will be prejudiced. Neither can these
two (2) crimes be complexed.
As in the case of Abay, the elements alleged in the information in this case may pertain
to either rape in violation of Article 266-A (1) or sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of RA No.
7610. It must be noted though that according to the R TC, it was established during trial that
the crime of rape was committed and thus it sentenced accused-appellant with the indivisible
penalty of reclusion perpetua in accordance with Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code,
rather than impose upon him the penalty provided for under RA No. 7610. The CA decision
made it clear when it stated that "[a]ccused-appellant Joel Jaime is hereby found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of one (1) count of Simple Rape under Art. 266-A, paragraph l(a) of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353, and is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua xx x”
The elements of rape under Article 266-A, paragraph (l)(a) of the RPC, as amended, are:
(1) the act is committed by a man; (2) that said man had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (3)
that such act was accomplished through force, threat, or intimidation. Both the CA and the
RTC found that these elements are present in this case. Accused-appellant had carnal
knowledge of the victim through force, threat, and intimidation.
Accused-appellant's argument that the commission of the crime is highly improbable

based on prosecution's evidence deserves scant consideration. Depraved individuals stop at
nothing in order to accomplish their purpose. Perverts are not used to the easy way of
satisfying their wicked cravings.14 Thus, it cannot be gainsaid that commission of the crime of
rape was highly improbable because the pedicab could have easily tipped over if the
accused-appellant was on his knees and exerting effort to penetrate the victim's vagina.
2. Yes. Formatted: Don't add space between paragraphs of the

same style
The CA sentenced accused-appellant "to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua

without eligibility for parole." Section 2 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103 as
amended by Act No. 4225) states that the Act "shall not apply to, among others, persons
135
convicted of offenses punishable with the death penalty or life imprisonment." Although there
was no reference to persons convicted of offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua, this
Comi Court has, time and again, considered the penalty of reclusion perpetua to be
synonymous to life imprisonment for purposes of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and has
ruled that this law does not apply to persons convicted of offenses punishable with reclusion
perpetua.
It should be noted, however, that the Supreme Court En Banc issued A.M. No.
15-08-02-SC, the Guidelines for the Proper Use of the Phrase "Without Eligibility for Parole" in
Indivisible Penalties. It aims to promote uniformity in the court's promulgated decisions and
resolutions and thus prevent confusion. It provides that the phrase "without eligibility for
parole" is to be used to qualify the penalty of reclusion perpetua when circumstances are
present warranting the imposition of the death penalty but which penalty is not imposed
because of RA No. 9346.
Igdalino and Igdalino v People

G.R. No. 233033, 23 July 2018
J. Tijam
Topic:TOPIC: Qualified Theft
FACTS:
Lot No. 1609, the land on which the subject coconut trees were planted, is registered in
the name of Francisco Jaboli (“Francisco”) and covered by TCT. Said land was allegedly
acquired by Francisco from one Mauricio Gabejan. Upon Francisco's death, his children, one of
whom is Avertino, inherited the property. A caretaker in the person of Felicisimo Bacarra
(“Felicisimo”) was hired.
In the morning of 29 June 2000, Felicisimo saw the Igdalinos together with their two
sons picking nuts from the coconut trees. The men climbed the trees while Rosita was on the
ground gathering the coconuts. Allegedly, the Igdalinos gathered a total of 2,500 pieces of
coconuts which were piled, with the husks removed and shells broken.
Rosita testified that the parcel of land was owned by her father Narciso Gabejan as
shown in the Original Certificate of Title No. 1068 covering Lot No. 1609. She testified that her
father tilled the land and harvested coconuts from the plantation every three months without
anybody preventing him from doing it. She further testified that her father continued to till the
land until she married Romeo. When her father died in 1985, she inherited the said property.
She admitted having known Avertino because the latter had filed a case against them, the
status of which she had no knowledge of until she inquired from the Register of Deeds
sometime in 2002 and while the criminal case for qualified theft was already pending.
The testimony of Pedro Labay, a former barangay captain since 1987, was also offered
to establish that for about twenty years, the Igdalinos were into farming, including the
planting of coconut trees on the land they own. Ruben Dacutanan, a resident of the same
barangay, also testified that the Igdalinos were living on the land since their marriage and that
Narciso personally cultivated the land and planted coconut trees thereon until his death.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused are guilty of qualified theft.
HELD/RATIO: No.
136
For the crime of theft to prosper, it must be established beyond doubt that the accused
had the intent to steal personal property. This animus furandi pertains to the intent to deprive
another of his or her ownership or possession of personal property, apart from but concurrent
with the general criminal intent which is an essential element of dolo malus. The intent to steal
is presumed from the taking of personal property without the consent of the owner or its
lawful possessor. As in all presumptions, this may be rebutted by evidence showing that the
accused took the personal property under a bona fide belief that he owns the property.
Clearly, jurisprudence has carved out an instance when the act of taking of personal
property defeats the presumption that there is intent to steal -when the taking is open and
notorious, under an honest and in good faith belief of the accused of his ownership over the
property.
Contrary to the CA's observations, the Court finds that the Igdalinos' open and
notorious harvesting of coconuts was made under their belief that they, in fact, owned the
land where the plantation is situated. This belief is honest and in good faith considering that
they held, in their favor, OCT No. 1068 covering the disputed land under Narciso's name. We
find that this honest belief was not tarred by the adjudication in Avertino's favor of the civil
case for quieting of title over the same land. Knowledge that the land was finally adjudicated
in favor of Avertino came to the Igdalinos only when Rosita inquired from the Register of
Deeds in 2002, or long after the complained harvest was made. Neither was there any showing
that the civil court had already rendered a final decision in Avertino's favor at the time the
coconuts were harvested by the Igdalinos. All these tend to show that the Igdalinos' claim of
ownership over the disputed land is bona fide. In sum, the prosecution failed to establish the
elements of unlawful taking and thus, reasonable doubt persists.

People v. XXX
, G.R. No. 225059, 9, July 23, 2018
, J. Caguioa
Topic:TOPIC: Article 266-A, par. 1, in relation to Article 266-B, par. 2, Revised Penal Code
No new doctrine.
FACTS:
BBB is the daughter of the accused, [XXX]. She is the only girl in the brood of three.
Her mother is a manicurist while the accused is a pedicab driver. She recounted that on four
different occasions, her father ravished her, inside their residence.
HELD/RATIO:
It is a long-standing rule that in rape cases, an accused may be convicted based on the
victim's sole testimony, provided that it is logical, credible, consistent, and convincing. The
rule becomes more binding where-as in the instant case -the victims are young and immature,
not only because of their relative vulnerability, but also because of the shame and
embarrassment which they stand to suffer during trial, if indeed the matters to be testified on
were untrue.
BBB was able to describe in clear detail how each incident of rape was committed by
XXX.
137
In criminal prosecutions, “proof beyond reasonable doubt" does not mean such degree
of proof, excluding possibility ·of error, that produces absolute certainty; only "moral
certainty" is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced
mind.

People v. Jacinto Andes
, G.R. No. 227738, July 23, 2018
, J. Caguioa
Topic:TOPIC: Rape
No new doctrine.
The two elements of rape -viz.: ( 1) that the offender had carnal knowledge of the girl,
and (2) that such act was accomplished through the use of force or intimidation -are both
present as duly proven by the prosecution in this case. AAA was able to testify in detail how
Andes committed the rape. AAA's testimony, found to be clear, straightforward, and
believable, was given weight and credence not just by the RTC, but also by the CA upon
appeal.
In rape cases, the accused may be convicted on the basis of the lone, uncorroborated
testimony of the rape victim, provided that her testimony is clear, convincing, and otherwise
consistent with human nature.
AAA sufficiently explained that despite the fact that no weapon was poked at her body
at the time the actual rapes were committed, she was of the belief that maybe Andes was still
holding the weapon and that she could not ascertain where the weapon was because it was
dark.
It is established that the law does not impose on the rape victim the burden of proving
resistance. In rape, the force and intimidation must be viewed in the light of the victim's
perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime and not by any hard and
fast rule.
Revilla v Sandiganbayan (First Division) and People,

G.R. No 218232, 24 July 2018
J. Carpio
Topic:TOPIC: Bail; Plunder; Writ of Attachment
FACTS:
G.R. No. 218232
On 5 June 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman filed an Information in the

Sandiganbayan charging petitioners Revilla, Cambe, and Napoles, among others, with the
crime of Plunder, defined and penalized under Section 2 of Republic Act No. (RA) 7080, as
amended.
Upon arraignment, Napoles and Cambe pleaded not guilty to the charge against them,
while petitioner Revilla refused to enter any plea; thus, the Sandiganbayan entered a plea of
not guilty in his behalf pursuant to Section 1 ( c ), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court.
138
Sandiganbayan issued warrants of arrest against Revilla, Cambe, and Napoles. On the
same day, Revilla voluntarily surrendered to the Philippine National Police (PNP) and filed a
Motion to Elect Detention Facilities Ad Cautelam praying for his detention at the PNP
Custodial Center in Camp Crame. On 20 June 2014, Cambe also voluntarily surrendered to the
Sandiganbayan and filed an Urgent Motion to Commit Accused to Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group (CIDG) pending trial of the case.
Revilla filed a Petition for Bail Ad Cautelam dated 20 June 2014; Cambe filed an
Application for Bail15 dated 23 June 2014; and Napoles filed a Joint Petition for Bail dated 25
June 2014, together with co-accused Ronald John Lim (Lim) and John Raymund De Asis (De
Asis).
As per the prosecution’s evidence, from 2007 to 2009, accused Revilla was allocated
and utilized [Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF)] in the total amount of
P517,000,000.00, covered by twelve (12) [Special Allotment Release Orders (SAROs)], for
livelihood and agricultural projects.
Accused Revilla's commissions represented 50% of the project cost, 25% percent of
which was released by accused Napoles upon showing that the DBM already received accused
Revilla's endorsement letter with project listings. The other 25% was released upon issuance of
the SARO. On the other hand, accused Cambe's share was 5% of the project cost. xxx
To make it appear that there were implementations of the projects for which accused
Revilla's PDAFs were intended, the NGOs submitted liquidation documents such as official
receipts, delivery receipts, accomplishment reports, which were all fake, and lists of
beneficiaries which were just fabricated having only signed by Napoles' employees, children,
household helpers, drivers, and security guards. The receipts were issued by bogus suppliers
which were likewise owned or controlled by accused Napoles.
In a Resolution dated 1 December 2014, 18 the Sandiganbayan denied the separate

applications for bail filed by Revilla, Cambe, and Napoles. The Sandiganbayan held that the
prosecution duly established with strong evidence that Revilla, Cambe, and Napoles, in
conspiracy with one another committed the crime of plunder defined and penalized under RA
7080; thus, they are not entitled to the constitutional right to bail.
(Note: Revilla withdrew his petition before the Court assailing the Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan denying him bail. In withdrawing his petition, he stated "[he] will avail of the
remedies available to him in [the plunder case before the Sandiganbayan] once the
insufficiency of the evidence against him is established)
G.R. No. 218903
Meanwhile, on 14 July 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Office of the
Special Prosecutor, filed a Motion to Transfer the Place of Detention of Accused22 Revilla,
Cambe, and Napoles to the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP) facility in Camp
Bagong Diwa or other similar facilities of the BJMP. The motion states that the PNP Custodial
Center is not a detention facility within the supervision of BJMP under RA 6975 and their
continued detention in a non-BJMP facility affords them special treatment.
Revilla opposed. Sadniganbayan denied the motion for failure to advance justifiable
grounds for Revilla and Cambe's transfer. The Sandiganbayan held that detention in facilities
139
other than a jail is sanctioned in our jurisdiction and there is no law mandating that detention
prisoners shall only be detained in a jail supervised by the BJMP.
G.R. No. 219162
On 27 October 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, filed an Ex Parte Motion for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary
Attachment/Gamishment against the monies and properties of Revilla to serve as security for
the satisfaction of the amount of P224,512,500.00 alleged as ill-gotten wealth, in the event that
a judgment is rendered against him for plunder.
On 14 November 2014, Revilla filed an Opposition to the prosecution's motion, arguing

that the factual basis for the issuance of the writ is yet to be proven, and that the issuance of
the writ would unduly preempt the proceedings in his bail application.
The Sandiganbayan held that the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment is

properly anchored on Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 57, and Sections 1 and 2 (b) and (c) of Rule 127
of the Rules of Court. Revilla filed an MR, which was denied by Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE: WON Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in denying bail to Cambe and Napoles, who are charged with the crime of
plunder, after finding strong evidence of their guilt?
HELD/RATIO: No.
In the present case, we find that the Sandiganbayan did not abuse its discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied bail to Cambe and Napoles, upon a
finding of strong evidence that they committed the crime of plunder in conspiracy with one
another. Plunder, defined and penalized under Section 2 57 of RA 7080, as amended, has the
following elements: (a) that the offender is a public officer, who acts by himself or in
connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business
associates, subordinates or other persons; (b) that he amasses, accumulates or acquires
ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts described in Section
l(d) hereof; and (c) that the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed,
accumulated or acquired is at least Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00).xxx
In finding strong evidence of guilt against Cambe, the Sandiganbayan considered the
PDAF documents and the whistleblowers' testimonies in finding that Cambe received, for
Revilla, the total amount of P103,000,000.00, in return for Revilla's endorsement of the NGOs
of Napoles as the recipients of Revilla's PDAF. It gave weight to Luy's summary of rebates and
disbursement ledgers containing Cambe's receipt of money, which Luy obtained from his hard
drive. The Sandiganbayan likewise admitted Narciso as expert witness, who attested to the
integrity of Luy's hard drive and the files in it.
In finding strong evidence of guilt against Napoles, the Sandiganbayan considered the
AMLC Report, as attested by witness Santos, stating that Napoles controlled the NGOs, which
were the recipients of Revilla's PDAF. The Sandiganbayan found that the circumstances stated
in the AMLC Report, particularly that the bank accounts of these NGOs were opened by the
named presidents using JLN Corp. IDs, these accounts are temporary repository of funds, and
the withdrawal from these accounts had to be confirmed first with Napoles, are consistent
with the whistleblowers' testimonies that they were named presidents of Napoles' NGOs and
they withdrew large amounts of cash from the NGOs' bank accounts upon instruction of
140
Napoles. The Sandiganbayan also took note of the COA report, as confirmed by the testimony
of Garcia, that Revilla's PDAF projects failed to comply with the law, Napoles' NGOs were
fake, no projects were implemented and the suppliers selected to supply the NGOs were
questionable.
Accordingly, there is no basis for the allegation of Cambe that the Sandiganbayan
Resolutions were based on mere presumptions and inferences. On the other hand, the
Sandiganbayan considered the entire record of evidence in finding strong evidence of guilt.
ISSUE: WON Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack and/or
excess of jurisdiction when it denied the prosecution's motion to transfer the detention of
Revilla and Cambe from the PNP Custodial Center to a BJMP-operated facility?
HELD/RATIO: No.
In the present case, both Revilla and Cambe voluntarily surrendered to the
Sandiganbayan upon the issuance of the warrants of arrest against them, albeit with motion to
elect the detention facilities in the PNP Custodial Center. Upon their voluntary surrender, they
are deemed arrested and taken into custody. The Sandiganbayan thereafter allowed both
Revilla and Cambe to be detained in the PNP Custodial Center barracks. Under the Rules of
Court, the court, such as the Sandiganbayan in the present case, shall exercise supervision
over all persons in custody for the purpose of eliminating unnecessary detention.
When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court, all auxiliary writs, processes and
other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court; and if the
procedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by
law or by these rules, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which
appears comfortable to the spirit of the said law or rules. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan
acted within its jurisdiction and did not abuse its discretion in ordering the commitment of
Revilla and Cambe in the PNP Custodial Center.
Clearly, Section 24 of RA 6975 vests authority in the PNP to detain arrested persons
such as Revilla and Cambe, and the Revised PNP Police Operational Procedures Manual
includes the PNP Detention/Custodial Center as an institution where any person arrested due
to the commission of a crime/s can be detained/admitted.
In the same manner, there is nothing in Section 63 of RA 697 5 which expressly

mandates and limits the place of detention in BJMP-controlled facilities. On the other hand, it
merely provides that: "there shall be established and maintained in every district, city and
municipality a secured, clean, adequately equipped and sanitary jail x x x." When the language
of the law is clear and explicit, there is no room for interpretation, only application. Section 61
of the same law states that the BJMP shall exercise supervision and control over all city and
municipal jails, while the provincial jails shall be supervised and controlled by the provincial
government within its jurisdiction. Evidently, a provincial jail is a place of detention not
within the supervision and control of the BJMP. From the law itself, there are places of
detention for the accused, which are not within the control and supervision of the BJMP.
Thus, to argue, as the prosecution did, that Revilla and Cambe 's detention in the PNP
Custodial Center afforded them special treatment because it is not a jail supervised by the
BJMP would be similar to saying that detention of an accused in a provincial jail supervised by
the provincial government would afford such accused special treatment.
141
Aside from its bare statements, the prosecution did not advance compelling reasons to
justify the transfer of detention of Revilla and Cambe. The prosecution likewise failed to
substantiate its allegation of special treatment towards Revilla.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to

lack or excess of jurisdiction in ordering the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment
against Revilla's monies and properties?
HELD/RATIO: No.
We find that the Sandiganbayan acted within its jurisdiction since all the requisites for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment have been complied with. Revilla, while still a
public officer, is charged with plunder, committed by amassing, accumulating, and acquiring
ill-gotten wealth, through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts xxx.
Clearly, the crime of plunder is based on a claim for public funds or property
misappropriated, converted, misused, or malversed by the accused who is a public officer, in
the course of his employment as such. The filing of the criminal action for plunder, which is
within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, 105 is deemed to necessarily carry with it the
filing of the civil action. Accordingly, the writ of preliminary attachment is an available
provisional remedy in the criminal action for plunder.
Furthermore, in its Resolution dated 1 December 2014 denying bail to Revilla, the
Sandiganbayan held that the prosecution duly established with strong evidence that Revilla,
Cambe, and Napoles, in conspiracy with one another, committed the crime of plunder. The
finding of strong evidence for purposes of bail is a greater quantum of proof required than
prima facie factual foundation for the attachment of properties. Thus, the Sandiganbayan
properly exercised its discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary attachment upon
appreciating and evaluating the evidence against Revilla.
Moreover, the Affidavit of Merit attached to the Motion and executed by graft
investigators of Revilla's PDAF likewise established that (1) a sufficient cause of action exists
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment; (2) the case is one of those mentioned in
Sections 57 and 127 of the Rules of Court, and (3) that Revilla has no visible sufficient security
in the event that judgment is rendered against him. The sufficiency of the affidavit depends
upon the amount of credit given by the Sandiganbayan, and its acceptance, upon its sound
discretion. We refuse to interfere in its exercise of discretion, absent any showing that the
Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion.
Ramos v. People
, G.R. No. 233572, July 30, 2018,
J. Perlas-Bernabe
Topic:TOPIC: Section 11, Article II, Republic Act No. 9165
No new doctrine.
In order to properly secure the conviction of an accused charged with Illegal

Possession of Dangerous Drugs, the prosecution must prove that: (a) the accused was in
possession of an item or object identified as a dangerous drug; (b) such possession was not
authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.
142
The absence of these required witnesses under Section 21 of RA 9165 does not per se
render the confiscated items inadmissible. However, a justifiable reason for such failure or a
showing of any genuine and sufficient effort to secure the required witnesses must be
adduced.
In People v. Umipang, the Court held that the prosecution must show that earnest
efforts were employed in contacting the representatives enumerated under the law for "a sheer
statement that representatives were unavailable without so much as an explanation on
whether serious attempts were employed to look for other representatives, given the
circumstances is to be regarded as a flimsy excuse."
Mere statements of unavailability, absent actual serious attempts to contact the

required witnesses are unacceptable as justified grounds for non-compliance. These
considerations arise from the fact that police officers are ordinarily given sufficient time
-beginning from the moment they have received the information about the activities of the
accused until the time of his arrest -to prepare for a buy-bust operation and consequently,
make the· necessary arrangements beforehand knowing full well that they would have to
strictly comply with the set procedure prescribed in Section 21 of RA 9165. As such, police
officers are compelled not only to state reasons for their non-compliance, but must in fact, also
convince the Court that they exerted earnest efforts to comply with the mandated procedure,
and that under the given circumstance, their actions were reasonable.
For failure of the prosecution to provide justifiable grounds or show that special
circumstances exist which would excuse their transgression -as in fact the only reason given
was that "they exerted effort but nobody was available" -the Court is constrained to conclude
that the integrity and evidentiary value of the items purportedly seized from Ramos have been
compromised.
People v. Labagala and Labagala

, July 30, 2018, G.R. No 221427,
J. Del Castillo
Topic:TOPIC: Robbery with homicide; Principals; Conspiracy
FACTS:
On 12 June 2002, at around 7:30 p.m., Jun Alberto (“Jun”) was having dinner with the
victim under a mango tree at the latter's residence when Salve entered the yard to buy a pack
of cigarettes. As he was attending to Salve, he noticed four men enter the premises. Jun
identified two of them in open court as appellants Alvin and Romeo Labagala. Jun saw
Alvin poke a gun at the victim and whip him with a gun while the other three held him in
place. Alvin then took the victim's jewelry consisting of two rings, a necklace and a
wristwatch.
Afterwards, Jun witnessed the victim being dragged inside the house by Alvin. At the
time, he was cornered at the backyard by one of Alvin's companions. There was a
commotion inside the house and he heard someone moaning. Alvin and his companions
immediately ran away. When he went inside the house, he found the victim already dead.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused a guilty of robbery with homicide.
HELD/RATIO: Yes.
143
For the accused to be convicted of robbery with homicide, the prosecution must prove
the following elements: (a) the taking of personal property with the use of violence or
intimidation against the person; (b) the property taken belongs to another; (c) the taking is
characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi; and (d) on the occasion or by reason of the
robbery, the crime of homicide, as used in its generic sense, was committed.
In robbery with homicide, it must be established that the original criminal design of the
malefactor/s is to commit robbery, and the killing is merely incidental thereto. "The intent
to commit robbery must precede the taking of human life but the homicide may take place
before, during or after the robbery."
A thorough review of the records shows that the prosecution was able to prove all the
elements of the crime of robbery with homicide xxx.
An accused who participated as a principal in the commission of a robbery will also be

held liable as a principal of robbery with homicide even if he did not actually take part in the
killing that was committed by reason or on the occasion of the robbery, unless it is clearly
shown that he tried to prevent the same.
Per the records, it was established that appellants, together with their co-accused,
entered the victim's yard where they took the victim's personal effects by means of force, and
with an obvious intent to gain. That they cooperated with each other to achieve this purpose
was plainly manifested by their actions xxx
Since it was not shown that appellants had endeavored to prevent the victim's killing,
they are both liable as principals of the crime of robbery with homicide.
IN RE: CORRECTION G.R. No. 237721 /ADJUSTMENT OF PENALTY PURSUANT TO
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10951, IN RELATION TO HERNAN V. SANDIGANBAYAN -
ROLANDO ELBANBUENA Y MARFIL
G.R. No. 237721, 31 July 2018
J. Jardeleza
TOPIC: R.A. No. 10951
FACTS:
Petitioner worked as a Disbursing Officer of Alingilan National High School in

Alingilan, Bacolod. He was charged with four counts of malversation of public funds through
falsification of a public document under Articles 217 and 171, in relation to Article 48 of the
RPC. After trial, Elbanbuena was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged
in the Information and was sentenced as follows:
1. To suffer imprisonment in Criminal Cases Nos. 95-17264, 95-17265,

95-17266, from prision mayor maximum or ten (10) years one (1) day to
twelve (12) years to reclusion temporal maximum or seventeen (17)
years four (4) months and one (1) day to twenty (20) years; in three (3)
counts;
2. To suffer imprisonment in Criminal Case No. 95-17263 of prision mayor
medium or eight years one (1) day to ten (10) years to reclusion temporal
minimum or twelve (12) years one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and
eight (8) months; and
144
3. To suffer civil interdiction and absolute disqualification during the period

of the sentence.
Since Elbanbuena did not appeal the decision of the RTC, it became final and executory
on 10 August 2000. On 9 January 2003, Elbanbuena started serving his sentence at the New
Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa City.
On 29 August 2017, RA No. 10951 was promulgated, which amended the RPC and
reduced the penalties for certain crimes, including malversation punishable under Article 217
of the RPC which was amended as follows:
Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property. -Presumption of

malversation. -Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is
accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same, or shall
take or misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment or negligence,
shall permit any other person to take such public funds or property, wholly or
partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation
of such funds or property, shall suffer:
1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum

periods, if the amount involved in the misappropriation or malversation does
not exceed Forty thousand pesos (P40,000).
2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if

the amount involved is more than Forty thousand pesos (P40,000) but does not
exceed One million two hundred thousand pesos (Pl,200,000).
Hence, this petition which seeks, among others, the modification, in conformity with
R.A. No. 10951, of the Decision of the RTC and, pursuant thereto, Elbanbuena's immediate
release from confinement.
ISSUE: Whether or not Elbanbuena is entitled to be released from confinement.
HELD/RATIO:
Case remanded to RTC. As held by this Court in Hernan v. Sandiganbayan, the

passage of RA No. 10951 is an exceptional circumstance which warrants not only the
re-opening of an already terminated case, but also the recall of an Entry of Judgment for
purposes of modifying the penalty to be served. Thus, in Hernan, this Court re-opened the
case for the sole purpose of re-computing the proper sentence to be imposed in accordance
with RA No. 10951. In contrast, petitioner Elbanbuena here seeks not only a modification of
his sentence in accordance with RA 10951, he also seeks immediate release from confinement
on account of his alleged full service of the re-computed sentence. The determination of
whether he is entitled to immediate release, however, would necessarily involve ascertaining,
among others, the actual length of time Elbanbuena has actually been in confinement and
whether time allowance for good conduct should be allowed. Such an exercise would, at the
first instance, be better undertaken by a trial court, which is relatively more equipped to make
findings of both fact and law.
Case is REMANDED to the RTC for the determination of: (1) the proper
penalty/penalties in accordance with RA No. 10951; and (2) whether petitioner ROLANDO
145
ELBANBUENA y MARFIL is entitled to immediate release on account of full service of his

sentences, as modified.
Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman, et al.,
G.R. No. 212761-62, 31 July 2018
, J. Carpio
Topic:TOPIC: R.A. No. 3019, as amended; Probable Cause
FACTS:
Petitioners are charged as co-conspirators for their respective participation in the

illegal pillaging of public funds sourced from the Priority Development Assistance Fund
(PDAF) of Estrada for the years 2004 to 2012.
The NBI Complaint alleged that, based on the sworn statements of Benhur Luy (Luy)
along with several other JLN employees including Marina Sula (Sula) and Merlina Sufnas
(Sunas) (collectively, the whistle blowers), the PDAF scheme would commence with Napoles
and the legislator -in this case, Estrada -discussing the utilization of the latter's PDAF. During
this stage, the legislator and Napoles would discuss the list of projects, description or purpose
of the projects, corresponding implementing government agency, project cost, and
"commission" or "rebate" of the legislator, ranging from 40-60% of the total project cost or the
amount stated in the Special Allotment Release Order (SARO). After the negotiations and
upon instruction of Napoles, Luy would prepare the so-called "Listing," containing the list of
projects allocated by the legislator to Napoles and her NGOs, project title or description, name
of the IA under the General Appropriations Act (GAA) Menu, and the project cost. Thereafter,
Napoles would submit the "Listing" to the legislator. The legislator would prepare a letter,
which incorporated the "Listing" submitted by Napoles, addressed to the Senate President and
the Finance Committee Chairperson in the case of a Senator, or to the House Speaker and
Chairperson of the Appropriations Committee in the case of a Congressman, who would then
endorse such request to the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) for the release of
the SARO. Upon receipt by the DBM of a copy of the letter with the endorsement, the
legislator would give Napoles a copy of the letter with a "received" stamp and Napoles would
give the legislator the agreed advance legislator's commission.
Thereafter, Luy and other Napoles' employees would follow-up the release of the
SARO from the DBM, by citing the details of the legislator's letter to expedite the release of the
SARO. Upon release of the SARO, the DBM would furnish a copy of it to the legislator, who in
tum, would give a copy of it to Napoles. Upon receipt of the copy of the SARO, Napoles
would order her employees to prepare the balance of the legislator's commission, which
would be delivered by Napoles to the legislator or his/her authorized representative.
Napoles, who chose the NGO owned or controlled by her that would implement the
project, would instruct her employee to prepare a letter for the legislator to sign endorsing her
NGO to the IA. The legislator would sign the letter endorsing Napoles' NGOs to the IAs,
based on the agreement with Napoles. The IA would then prepare a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) between the legislator, the IA, and the selected NGO. Napoles' employee
would secure a copy of the MOA. Thereafter, the DBM would release the Notice of Cash
Allocation (NCA) to the IA concerned, and the head of the IA would expedite the transaction
and release of the corresponding check representing the PDAF disbursement, in exchange for
a 10% share in the project cost.
146
Under this modus operandi, Estrada, with the help of Napoles and De Asis, among
others, funneled his PDAF amounting to around P262,575,000.008 to the JLN-controlled
NGOs.
On the other hand, the FIO Complaint alleged that Estrada and Labayen, in conspiracy
with Napoles and her NGOs, committed plunder through repeated misuse of public funds as
shown by the series of SAROs issued to effect releases of funds from the PDAF allocation of
Estrada to Napoles' NGOs, and through accumulation of more than P50,000,000.00 in the form
of kickbacks. 10 Estrada likewise violated Section 3( e) of RA 3019 by acting with manifest
partiality and evident bad faith in endorsing MAMFI and SDPFFI in violation of existing laws,
such as the GAA, Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9184, Government Procurement
Policy Board Resolution No. 012-2007 and Commission on Audit (COA) Circular 2007-01.
Estrada denied having received, directly or indirectly, any amount from Napoles, or
any person associated with her, or any NGO owned or controlled by her, and having amassed,
accumulated, or acquired ill-gotten wealth. He further denied instructing or directing any of
his staff to commit and/or participate in any irregular and unlawful transaction involving his
PDAF allocations.
On 28 March 2014, the Ombudsman issued the assailed Joint Resolution finding probable
cause to charge petitioners and several other respondents in the NBI and FIO Complaints for
one (1) count of Plunder and eleven (11) counts of violation of Section 3( e) of RA 3019.
MRs were denied. Then, Ombudsman filed several Informations before the
Sandiganbayan, charging petitioners with one (1) count of Plunder and eleven (11) counts of
violation of Section 3(e) ofRA3019. Thus, Estrada, De Asis, and Napoles filed their separate
petitions for certiorari assailing the Joint Resolution and Joint Order of the Ombudsman.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ombudsman committed any grave abuse of discretion in rendering the
assailed Resolution and Order ultimately finding probable cause against Estrada, De Asis, and
Napoles for the charges against them?
HELD/RATIO: No.
In the present case, petitioners are charged with the crime of plunder and violation of
Section 3(e) RA 3019. Plunder, defined and penalized under Section 2 of RA 7080, as amended,
has the following elements: (a) that the offender is a public officer, who acts by himself or in
connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business
associates, subordinates or other persons; (b) that he amasses, accumulates or acquires
ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts described in Section
1 ( d) hereof; and ( c) that the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed,
accumulated, or acquired is at least Fifty Million Pesos (PS0,000,000.00). On the other hand, the
elements of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 are: (a) that the accused must be a public
officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions (or a private individual acting
in conspiracy with such public officers); (b) that he with manifest partiality, evident bad faith,
or inexcusable negligence; and ( c) that his action caused undue injury to any party, including
the government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in
the discharge of his functions.
The Ombudsman did not abuse its discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in finding probable cause to indict Estrada for one count of plunder and 11 counts
of violation of Section 3( e) of RA 3019.
147
In its Joint Resolution dated 28 March 2014, the Ombudsman found that probable
cause exists to indict Estrada for plunder, after finding that the elements of the crime charged
are reasonably apparent based on the evidence on record:
First, it is undisputed that Senator Estrada was a public officer at the time material to
the charges.
Second, he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth.
As disclosed by the evidence, he repeatedly received sums of money from Janet

Napoles for endorsing her NGOs to implement the projects to be funded by his PDAF.
As previously discussed, the indorsements enabled Napoles to gain access to

substantial sums of public funds. The collective acts of Senator Estrada, Napoles, et al. allowed
the illegal diversion of public funds to their own personal use.
Worse, the evidence indicates that he took undue advantage of his official position,
authority and influence to unjustly enrich himself at the expense, and to the damage and
prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines, within the purview of Sec.
1 (d) (6) of RA 7080. He used and took undue advantage of his official posit10n, authority and
influence as a Senator of the Republic of the Philippines to access his PDAF and illegally divert
the allocations to the possession and control of Napoles and her cohorts, in exchange for
commissions, kickbacks, percentages from the PDAF allocations.
In concluding that there is probable cause to indict Estrada for 11 counts of violation of
Section 3(e) RA 3019, the Ombudsman likewise examined the evidence on record in finding
that it is reasonably apparent that the elements of the crime are present:
First, respondents Senator Estrada, Labayen, x x x were all public officers at the time
material to the charges. Their respective roles in the processing and release of PDAF
disbursements were in the exercise of their administrative and/or official functions.
Second, Senator Estrada and respondent-public officers of the IAs were manifestly
partial to Napoles, her staff and the NGOs affiliated she controlled.
Third, the assailed PDAF-related transactions caused undue injury to the Government
in the aggregate amount of PHP278,000,000.00.
Fourth, respondents Estrada, Labayen x x x, granted respondent Napoles unwarranted

benefits.
In Clave v. Office of the Ombudsman, we held that in order to arrive at a finding of

probable cause, the Ombudsman only has to find enough relevant evidence to support its
belief that the accused most likely committed the crime charged. Otherwise, grave abuse of
discretion can be attributed to its ruling.
Given the ample supporting evidence it has on hand, the Ombudsman's exercise of
prerogative to charge Estrada with plunder and violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 was not
whimsical, capricious, or arbitrary, as to amount to grave abuse of discretion. Estrada's bare
claim to the contrary cannot prevail over such positive findings of the Ombudsman.
148
In Reyes, we unanimously ruled that the Ombudsman did not gravely abuse its
discretion in finding probable cause to indict Reyes of plunder and violation of Section 3(e) of
RA 3019 after its consideration that the testimonial and documentary evidence are substantial
enough to reasonably conclude that Reyes had, in all probability, participated in the PDAF
scam and, hence, must stand trial therefor. The testimonial and documentary evidence relied
upon by the Ombudsman in Reyes are: (a) the declarations of the whistleblowers Luy, Sula,
and Sunas; (b) Tuason's verified statement which corroborated the whistle blowers accounts;
(c) the business ledgers prepared by witness Luy, showing the amounts received by Senator
Enrile, through Tuason and Reyes, as his "commission" from the so-called PDAF scam; (d) the
2007-2009 COA Report documenting the results of the special audit undertaken on PDAF
disbursements -that there were serious irregularities relating to the implementation of PD
AF-funded projects, including those endorsed by Senator Enrile; and (e) the reports on the
independent field verification conducted in 2013 by the investigators of the FIO which secured
sworn statements of local government officials and purported beneficiaries of the supposed
projects which turned out to be inexistent.
In the present case, the Ombudsman relied upon the same testimonial and
documentary evidence relied upon by the Ombudsman in Reyes and Cambe, specifically: (a)
the testimonies of the whistle blowers Luy, Sula, and Sunas; (b) the affidavits of Tuason and
other co-respondents in the NBI and FIO Complaints; (c) the business ledgers prepared by Luy,
showing the amounts received by Estrada, through Tuason and Labayen, as his "commission"
from the so-called PDAF scam; (d) the COA Report documenting the results of the special
audit undertaken on PDAF disbursements; and (e) the reports on the independent field
verification conducted by the FIO. Aside from the said pieces of evidence, the Ombudsman
pointed to the PDAF documents, corporate papers of JLN-controlled NGOs, and admissions
made by some of Estrada's co-respondents themselves, in concluding that a person of ordinary
caution and prudence would believe, or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that plunder
and violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 were indeed committed by Estrada, among the
respondents named in the Joint Resolution.
Applying our ruling in Reyes and Cambe to the present case, the Ombudsman, thus,
did not abuse its discretion in holding that the same pieces of evidence, taken together, are
already sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that the crimes charged were committed
and Estrada is probably guilty thereof, since it remains apparent that: (a) Estrada, a public
officer, connived with Napoles and several other persons in entering into transactions
involving the illegal disbursement of PDAF funds; (b) Estrada acted with manifest partiality
and/or evident bad faith by repeatedly endorsing the JLN-controlled NGOs as beneficiaries of
his PDAF in violation of existing laws, rules, and regulations on government procurement; (c)
the PDAF-funded projects turned out to be inexistent; (d) such acts caused undue injury to the
government, and at the same time, gave unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference to the
beneficiaries of the scam; and (e) Estrada, through Tuason and Labayen, was able to
accumulate and acquire ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least Pl83, 793, 750.00.
The Ombudsman is empowered to determine, in the exercise of its discretion, whether

probable cause exists, and to charge the person believed to have committed the crime as
defined by law. The Ombudsman's finding of probable cause does not touch on the issue of
guilt or innocence of the accused. All that the Ombudsman did was to weigh the evidence
presented together with the counter-allegations of the accused and determine if there was
enough reason to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused are probably
guilty thereof.
149
Thus, there is no evidence that the Ombudsman acted in capnc10us capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. No manifest error
or grave abuse of discretion or bad faith can be imputed to the public prosecutor, or the
Ombudsman in this case. In fine, the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause prevails over
petitioners' bare allegations of grave abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the Court must defer to
the exercise of discretion of the Ombudsman, in the absence of actual grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the Ombudsman.
150
AUGUST 2018 Formatted: Font: Bold, Underline

Formatted: Centered
Macad v. People
G.R. No. 227366, 1 August 2018
J. Gesmundo
Section 21 of RA No. 9165 requires the apprehending team, after seizure and
confiscation, to immediately conduct a physically inventory; and photograph the same in the
presence of (1) the accused or the persons from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, (2) a representative from the media and (3) the
DOJ, and (4) any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof. In the amendment of RA No. 10640, the apprehending
team is now required to conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and photograph the
same in (1) the presence of the accused or the persons from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, (2) with an elected public official and (3) a
representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. In the present case, as the alleged
crimes were committed on November 27, 2011, then the provisions of Section 21 of RA No.
9165 and its IRR shall apply.
Notably, Section 21 of the IRR provides a saving clause which states that
non-compliance with these requirements shall not render void and invalid such seizures of
and custody over the confiscated items provided that such non-compliance were under
justifiable grounds and the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer or team. The exception found in the IRR of RA 9165
comes into play when strict compliance with the prescribed procedures is not observed. This
saving clause, however, applies only (I) where the prosecution recognized the procedural
lapses, and thereafter explained the cited justifiable grounds, and (2) when the prosecution
established that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized had been preserved.
The prosecution, thus, loses the benefit of invoking the presumption of regularity and bears
the burden of proving -with moral certainty -that the illegal drug presented in court is the
same drug that was confiscated from the accused during his arrest.
The Court finds that the prosecution was able to sufficiently comply with the chain of
custody rule under Section 21 of RA No. 9165 and its IRR. When petitioner was apprehended,
he and his baggage were brought to the Municipal Police Station. There, the seized items,
consisting of eleven (11) bricks of marijuana from the carton baggage and six (6) bricks of
marijuana from the Sagada woven bag, were marked, photographed and inventoried. At that
moment, the presence of petitioner, Barangay Chairman Erlinda Bucaycay, DOJ representative
Prosecutor Golda Bagawa, a media representative Gregory Taguiba, and a certain Atty.
Alsannyster Patingan were secured by the police officers. Accordingly, all the required
witnesses under Section 21 of RA No. 9165 were obtained. Petitioner does not even question
the sufficiency of the required witnesses. The seized items were also immediately weighed.
The eleven (11) bricks from the carton baggage weighed 10.1 kilograms; while six (6) bricks
from the Sagada woven bag weighed 5.9 kilograms. After the marking, inventory and taking
of photographs, SPO1 Jessie Lopez (SPO1 Lopez) prepared the inventory report and allowed
the witnesses to sign it. SPO 1 Lopez also signed the spot report. The seized items were then
turned over to PO2 Jonathan Canilang (PO2 Canilang), who thereafter brought the said items
along with the request for laboratory examination to SPO3 Oscar Cayabas (SPO3 Cayabas) of
the Provincial Crime Laboratory, Bontoc, Mountain Province. SPO3 Cayabas then made a
request for examination to the Regional Crime Laboratory Office. There, PSI Alex Biadang (PSI
151
Biadang) received the request for examination, along with the seized items. After the
examination, all the bricks tested positive for marijuana. The subject bag and carton, together
with the seized marijuana bricks, were all identified in open court by PO1 Falolo and PSI
Biadang. Clearly, the prosecution was able to establish the chain of custody of the seized drugs.
They were able to prove that all the persons who handled the drugs were duly accounted for
and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were maintained by these
persons until their presentation in court.
People v. Ocampo
G.R. No. 232300, 18 August 2018
J. Peralta
Topic:TOPIC: Amendatory rule on chain of custody
FACTS:
Police Chief Inspector Allan Rabusa Ruba of the Valenzuela Police Station formed a
team to validate the reports and complaints of the residents of Barangay Pinalagad and to
conduct a surveillance in the said barangay. On June 5, 2012, at 9 o'clock in the morning, the
team went to Barangay Pinalagad. The team interviewed a confidential informant, a known
resident in the area and learned that a certain "alias ER," herein appellant, is engaged in the
illegal trade of marijuana and is usually doing business inside a billiard hall situated near the
Pinalagad Elementary School. The team then proceeded near the front part of the said school
at around 5 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day and conducted a surveillance on the
appellant. It was observed that appellant used his bicycle to deliver the marijuana, engaged a
young boy as an errand boy and waited inside the billiard hall for his customers.
The confidential informant met with the team and informed PO1 Llacuna, the
designated poseur-buyer, that appellant was inside the billiard hall repacking marijuana
leaves. Afterwards, the confidential informant brought PO1 Llacuna inside the billiard hall
and introduced him to appellant as a buyer. Appellant then asked PO1 Llacuna how much he
was going to buy and the latter replied "five pesos" which really meant "five hundred pesos."
PO1 Llacuna handed the marked money to appellant, thereafter, the latter pulled out five (5)
pieces of heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets containing suspected marijuana leaves from a
Zesto juice box. PO1 Llacuna immediately motioned the confidential informant to rush out of
the billiard hall which was the pre-arranged signal for the other team members. PO1 Llacuna
then grabbed the appellant and introduced himself as a police officer and informed him of his
constitutional rights. PO1 Llacuna searched the appellant and recovered the marked money
from the latter's pocket.
After that, the team conducted an inventory at the place of arrest in the presence of the
appellant, and a barangay official. The inventory report was executed and signed by PO1
Llacuna as the arresting officer, SPO1 Garcia as the investigating officer, and Kagawad
Sherwin De Guzman as the witness. The conduct of the inventory was also photographed.
Immediately after, SPO1 Garcia turned over the seized items which were sealed and labeled to
the Crime Laboratory Office of Valenzuela City. The items were received by PO1 Pataueg and
turned over the same to Forensic Chemist PCI Cejes who personally received the same
evidence and as a result of her examination, the same items tested positive for marijuana, a
dangerous drug.
In both cases involving illegal sale and illegal possession, the illicit drugs confiscated
from the accused comprise the corpus delicti of the charges. In People v. Gatlabayan, the
Court held that it is of paramount importance that the identity of the dangerous drug be
152
established beyond reasonable doubt; and that it must be proven with certitude that the
substance bought during the buy-bust operation is exactly the same substance offered in
evidence before the court. In fine, the illegal drug must be produced before the court as exhibit
and that which was exhibited must be the very same substance recovered from the suspect.
Thus, the chain of custody carries out this purpose "as it ensures that unnecessary doubts
concerning the identity of the evidence are removed."
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 21 of RA 9165 should apply given the amendatory rule regarding
the said provision was subsequently implemented.
HELD/RATIO: Yes.
On 15 July 2014, RA No. 10640 was approved to amend RA No. 9165. Among other
modifications, it essentially incorporated the saving clause contained in the IRR, thus:
The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the

dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals,
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical inventory of the seized items
and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, with an elected public official and a representative of the National
Prosecution Service or the media who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, That the physical inventory
and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is
served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless
seizures: Provided, finally, That noncompliance of these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items.
Under the original provision of Section 21, after seizure and confiscation of the drugs,
the apprehending team was required to immediately conduct a physical inventory and
photograph of the same in the presence of (1) the accused or the person/s from whom such
items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, (2) a representative
from the media and (3) the DOJ, and ( 4) any elected public official who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. It is assumed that the presence of
these three persons will guarantee "against planting of evidence and frame up," i.e., they are
"necessary to insulate the apprehension and incrimination proceedings from any taint of
illegitimacy or irregularity." Now, the amendatory law mandates that the conduct of physical
inventory and photograph of the seized items must be in the presence of (1) the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, (2) with an elected public official and (3) a representative of the National Prosecution
Service or the media who shall sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
In the present case, the old provisions of Section 21 and its IRR shall apply since the
alleged crime was committed before the amendment.
Although the requirements stated in Section 21 of RA No. 9165 have not been strictly
followed, the prosecution was able to prove a justifiable ground for doing so. The refusal of
153
the members of the media to sign the inventory of the seized items as testified to by PO1
Llacuna can be considered by the Court as a valid ground to relax the requirement.
If, from the examples of justifiable grounds in not strictly following the requirements in
Section 21 of RA No. 9165, as provided by this Court, the presence of the required persons can
be dispensed with, there is more reason to relax the rule in this case because the media
representatives were present but they simply refused to sign the inventory. It needs no
elucidation that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty must be seen
in the context of an existing rule of law or statute authorizing the performance of an act or
duty or prescribing a procedure in the performance thereof.
People v. Maralit, 1 August 2018
, G.R. No. 232381, J. Reyes, Jr.
Topic:TOPIC: Sec. 5, Article II, R.A. No. 9165
No new doctrine.
While an accused charged with the violation of this provision is usually caught in the act of
selling illegal drugs, Section 5, Article II of RA No. 9165 also punishes the trade, delivery,
distribution, and giving away of any dangerous drug to another. Section 3, Article I of RA No.
9165 defines the punishable acts of "deliver" and "trading" as follows:
(k) Deliver. -Any act of knowingly passing a dangerous drug to another, personally or
otherwise, and by any means, with or without consideration.
xx xx
(jj) Trading. -Transactions involving the illegal trafficking of dangerous drugs and/or
controlled precursors and essential chemicals using electronic devices such as, but not limited
to, text messages, email, mobile or landlines, two-way radios, internet, instant messengers and
chat rooms or acting as a broker in any of such transactions whether for money or any other
consideration in violation of this Act.
Clearly, the presence (or absence) of consideration in exchange for the delivery of
dangerous drugs is not material when an accused is charged with committing the other acts
punishable under Section 5, Article II of RA No. 9165. The act of giving away, transporting, or
delivering the two (2) bricks of marijuana is already a punishable act in itself.
As applied in the present case, the prosecution correctly charged Maralit with the
violation of Section 5, Article II of RA No. 9165. Maralit could not be accused of the illegal sale
of dangerous drugs because the transaction was not consummated prior to his arrest-there
being no money taken in return for the marijuana bricks. This notwithstanding, his mere act of
delivering and conveying these marijuana bricks to IOI Esmin already constitutes a violation
of Section 5, Article II of RA No. 9165.
It was therefore unnecessary for the prosecution to present the money used in the
entrapment operation in order to prove Maralit's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In the same
manner, neither may Maralit disprove the fact of delivery by simply pointing out that there
was no consideration received in exchange for the dangerous drugs.
154
People v. Barrera, Aug 1, 2018

, G.R. No. 232337, J. Tijam
No new doctrine.
The rules clearly provides that the apprehending team should mark and conduct a
physical inventory of the seized items and to photograph the same immediately after seizure
and confiscation in the presence of the accused or his representative or counsel, as well as any
elected public official and a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media.
The law mandates that the insulating witnesses be present during the marking, the actual
inventory, and the taking of photographs of the seized items to deter [possible planting of]
evidence. In this case, there was failure all together for the police to conduct the inventory and
photograph the same before the insulating witnesses.
The OSG admits the same in its Brief: While a photograph of the seized drug was not
taken and there was no elected public official or a representative from the media or the DOJ
present during the inventory, these, however, are likewise not fatal to the chain of custody.
What is particularly disturbing is that there was no justifiable explanation proffered by the
prosecution as regards the absence of these insulating witnesses.
Considering the absence of a justifiable explanation as to the non-compliance with the

rules, We find that the prosecution failed to show that the seized substance from the accused
was the same substance offered in Court. The corpus delicti's integrity cannot then be said to
have been properly established. The breaches in the procedure committed by the police
officers, and left unacknowledged and unexplained by the State, militate against a finding of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt against the appellants as the integrity and evidentiary value of
the corpus delicti had been compromised. The Court, therefore, acquits on the basis of
reasonable doubt.
People v. Patacsil, 6 August, 2018
, G.R. No. 234052, J. Perlas-Bernabe
Topic:TOPIC: Sec 21 of R.A. No. 9165
No new doctrine.
The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with
the requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 may not always be possible. In fact, the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 -which is now crystallized into
statutory law with the passage of RA 10640 -provide that the said inventory and photography
may be conducted at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team in instances
of warrantless seizure, and that non-compliance with the requirements of Section 21, Article II
of RA 9165 -under justifiable grounds -will not render void and invalid the seizure and
custody over the seized items so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items
are properly preserved by the apprehending officer or team. In other words, the failure of
the apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21, Article II
of RA 9165 and its IRR does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items as
void and invalid, provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is
justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved.
155
In People v. Almorfe the Court explained that for the above-saving clause to apply, the
prosecution must explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses, and that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized evidence had nonetheless been preserved. Also, in People v. De
Guzman, it was emphasized that the justifiable ground for non-compliance must be proven as
a fact, because the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even exist.
After a judicious study of the case, the Court finds that the arresting officers committed
unjustified deviations from the prescribed chain of custody rule, thereby putting into question
the integrity and evidentiary value of the dangerous drugs allegedly seized from Patacsil.
Here, a plain examination of P03 Meniano's handwritten Confiscation Receipt dated

September 28, 2012 -which stood as the inventory receipt -shows that while P03 Meniano
claims that representatives from the media witnessed the conduct of inventory, no such
representatives signed the document. Further, it also appears that no public elected official
was present when such inventory was made.
In this case, PO3 Meniano himself admitted that no public elected official, e.g.,
barangay officials, was present during the inventory because "they were not around" and that
he simply forgot to let the media representatives sign the inventory receipt because he "forgot"
to do so. Verily, these flimsy excuses do not justify a deviation from the required witnesses
rule, hence, the Court is impelled to conclude that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
items purportedly seized from Patacsil -which constitute the corpus delicti of the crimes
charged -have been compromised.
It is well-settled that the procedure in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 is a matter of

substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality; or worse,
ignored as an impediment to the conviction of illegal drug suspects. As such, since the
prosecution failed to provide justifiable grounds for non-compliance with the aforesaid
procedure, Patacsil' s acquittal is perforce in order.
People v. Quiapo, Aug 6, 2018

, G.R. No. 218804, J. Del Castillo
Topic:TOPIC: Elements of Rape; Statutory Rape
No new doctrine.
"[T]he date of the commission of the rape is not an essential element of the crime of
rape, for the gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a woman. Inconsistencies and
discrepancies in details which are irrelevant to the elements of the crime are not grounds for
acquittal.” Thus, any discrepancy regarding the dates, place and time of the incidents deserves
scant consideration. In People v. Sarcia, the Court "ruled, time and again that the date is not an
essential element of the crime of rape, for the gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a
woman. As such, the time or place of commission in rape cases need not be accurately stated."
Neither the delay of AAA and MMM in reporting the incidents undermines their
credibility. We have already ruled that "delay in reporting rape incidents, in the face of threats
of physical violence, cannot be taken against the victim because delay in reporting an incident
of rape is not an indication of a fabricated charge and does not necessarily cast doubt on the
credibility of the complainant." The courts below correctly rejected appellant's defenses of
denial and alibi. Well established is the rule that "a mere denial, without any strong evidence
156
to support it, can scarcely overcome the positive declaration by the victim of the identity and
involvement of appellant in the crimes attributed to him." The same is true with his claim of
alibi. As observed by the courts below, appellant failed to prove his physical impossibility to
be at the crime scene during their alleged commissions.
The Court agrees with the CA that appellant should be held liable for statutory rape in
Criminal Case Nos. L-0098 and L-0099. The elements of the crime of statutory rape under
Article 266-A (l)(d) are: (1) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that
such a woman is under 12 years of age or is demented. Essentially, the foregoing elements are
the same as those provided under paragraph 3 of Article 335, the law in force when the rapes
on MMM transpired. Thus based on records, the prosecution had established the element of
carnal knowledge through the testimony of MMM with her age of being under 12 years old
supported by her Certificate of Live Birth.
People v. Aspa, Jr.

, Aug 6, 2018, G.R. No. 22950, Aug 6, 2018
7, J. Peralta Formatted: Font: Bold
Topic:TOPIC: Sec 5, Article II, RA 9165
Primarily, buy-bust operations are recognized in this jurisdiction as a legitimate form

of entrapment of the persons suspected of being involved in drug dealings. Unless there is a
clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust team were inspired by any
improper motive or were not properly performing their duty, their testimonies with respect to
the operation deserve full faith and credit. In the prosecution of illegal sale of dangerous drugs
in a buy-bust operation, there must be a concurrence of all the elements of the offense: (1) the
identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of
the thing sold and the payment thereof. The prosecution must also prove the illegal sale of the
dangerous drugs and present the corpus delicti in court as evidence. The commission of the
offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs requires merely the consummation of the selling
transaction, which happens the moment the buyer receives the drug from the seller. The crime
is considered consummated by the delivery of the goods.
All the above elements are present in the case at bench. PO1 Italin gave an unequivocal
account of the sale that took place on September 2, 2011 leading to the arrest of the appellant.
PO1 ltalin testified that he was assigned to accompany the confidential informant who acted
as the poseur-buyer in a buy-bust operation conducted at the northern part of the Vigan City
Public Market; that upon reaching the target site, he and the confidential informant proceeded
in front of Pardo' s Lechon Manok, while the rest of the team strategically positioned
themselves around the parking area of the market; that after a few minutes, Aspa arrived and
led the informant to an alley; that he followed them closely as he was then only 2 to 3 meters
away from the two; that he heard the informant asked Aspa if ifhe has the marijuana, to
which Aspa answered in the affirmative; and, that Aspa handed the three sachets containing
dried marijuana leaves to the informant who, in tum, gave the buy-bust money consisting of
three Pl00.00 bills with the marking "DR," the initials of PO2 Dennis Reoliquio, the one who
prepared the buy-bust money. SPO1 Somera and PO2 Reoliquio corroborated the testimony of
PO1 Italin in its material points having also seen how the transaction between Aspa and the
confidential informant took place. This Court notes that the accounts of these police operatives
of the incident dovetailed each other and uniformly testified of having apprehended Aspa in
the entrapment operation.
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People v. Charlie Flores, Daniel Flores and Sammy Flores

G.R. No. 228886, 8 August 2018
J. Del Castillo
Topic:TOPIC: Murder
FACTS:
The evidence for the prosecution revealed that, at around 8:45 p.m. on December 25,
2002, the victim, Larry Parcon (Larry) and Eduardo Mabini (Eduardo) were on their way home
aboard a motorcycle when it ran out of fuel right in front of a videoke bar in Barangay
Tignoan, Real, Quezon. After telling Eduardo to buy fuel and giving him money, Larry went
inside the videoke bar. When he was about to go in, Eduardo, who was an arm's length away
from the door of the videoke bar, heard a commotion coming from inside the bar. He decided
to go inside and climb the stairs, located in front of the bar, to check. There he saw Larry
pacifying Sammy and Daniel who were fighting and Larry telling them, "bakit kayo nag
aaway, paskong pasko." Then suddenly, Rodel ran towards Larry and stabbed him. Sammy,
Daniel, and Rodel then turned to Eduardo and took turns punching him. Sammy tried to stab
Eduardo but the latter failed because Eduardo had fallen down the stairs. Sammy and Daniel
went back to Larry and, using seven-inch double-blade knives, alternately stabbed him on the
lower right and left sides of his body while Charlie held him by the armpits. Gary also stabbed
Larry on the head while another one, identified as “Belgar,” likewise stabbed him on his right
side. When the assailants had fled through the back door, Eduardo sought help at the
barangay hall. Larry was boarded on one of the barangay tanod's vehicle and rushed to the
hospital. Unfortunately, he was pronounced dead on arrival after suffering five fatal stab
wounds.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused are guilty of murder?
HELD/RATIO: Yes.
To successfully prosecute the crime of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), the following elements must be established: "(1) that a person was killed; (2) that
the accused killed him or her; (3) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying
circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the [RPC]; and (4) that the killing is not parricide or
infanticide." In this case, the prosecution was able to clearly establish all the elements. The lone
witness for the prosecution, Eduardo, was able to categorically identify accused-appellants.
At the time of the incident, the videoke bar was well lighted by three fluorescent lamps
while a fourth lamp illuminated the counter. No ill motive was also shown for the lone
prosecution eyewitness to testify against accused-appellants. This Court thus finds no error in
the affirmance by the appellate court of the trial court's finding of guilt of the
accused-appellants based on the sole testimony of the prosecution witness who positively
identified the perpetrators.
Meanwhile, the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength was proven by

the prosecution. In the instant case, the prosecution clearly established that the
accused-appellants, taking advantage of their number, purposely resorted to holding Larry by
the armpit so that all the knife-wielders would be free to stab him, albeit successively.
In People v. Garchitorena, the Court en banc appreciated the qualifying circumstance

of abuse of superior strength after finding that therein "accused-appellants, armed with a
deadly weapon, immobilized the victim and stabbed him successively using the same deadly
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weapon." Moreover, in terms of numbers, Larry was with his lone companion, Eduardo, while
the assailants, totaling five, participated in the attack. A disparity in strength and size was
thus apparent.
People v. Gidoc, Aug 13, 2018

, G.R. No. 230553, Aug 13, 2018
J. Tijam
Topic:TOPIC: Chain of custody; buy-bust
No new doctrine.
In this case, the prosecution failed to prove the legitimacy of the buy-bust operation
simply because it failed to proffer any documentary proof of the same. The testimony of SPO 1
Mortel during cross-examination reveal that there was no coordination report submitted with
the PDEA prior to the buy-bust operation.
While we are mindful of the rule that minor deviations from the procedures under RA
9165 would not automatically exonerate an accused, this rule, however, could not defeat our
findings that the police operatives are negligent of their duties to preserve the integrity of the
seized items from the appellant.
The record is bereft of any showing that the police operatives, headed by SPOI Mortel,
have complied with the procedural safeguards under RA 9165. Given SPOI Mortel's testimony,
the police operatives committed not just an error that constitute a simple procedural lapse but
also errors that amount to a gross, systematic, or deliberate disregard of the safeguards drawn
by the law.19 We cannot brush aside the apparent lack of coordination with the PDEA and the
failure of the police operatives, having initial custody and control of the drugs, to physically
inventory and photograph the same immediately after seizure and confiscation. What is
particularly disturbing is that no prosecution witness did ever explain why these procedures
were not followed.

IN RE: CORRECTION/ ADJUSTMENT OF PENALTY PURSUANT TO REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 10951, IN RELATION TO HERNAN v. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 240347, 14 August 2018
J. Tijam
TOPIC: R.A. No. 10951
FACTS:
Petitioner was convicted of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the RPC
for pretending to be a lawyer, a certain "Atty. Amos Saganib Sabling" who will help private
complainants to facilitate the release of their friend from jail in exchange for Pl00,000.00 as
attorney’s fees. Despite receipt of the said amount, however, the prisoner was never released
and worse, he died in jail.
The RTC Decision became final and executory on 12 February 2012 per the court's Entry of
Judgment dated February 20, 2012.
Per his Prison Record, petitioner already has two (2) years, seven (7) months, and six (6) days
time served with earned good conduct time allowance as of June 6, 2018.
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Meanwhile, RA No. 10951 was promulgated on 29 August 2017, which provides amending
Article 315, paragraph 3 to the effect that estafa, involving an amount of over P40,000.00 but
not exceeding P1,200,000.00 shall be punishable by arresto mayor in the maximum period to
prision correccional in its minimum period.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled of modifying his sentence in accordance with
RA 10951.
HELD/RATIO: Case is remanded to RTC. While the petitioner correctly invoked RA No. 10951
for the modification of his sentence, in the recent case of In Re: Correction/Adjustment of
Penalty pursuant to RA No. 10951 in Relation to Hernan v. Sandiganbayan -Rolando
Elbanbuena y Marfil, this Court, however, ruled that the determination of whether the
petitioner is entitled to immediate release would necessarily involve ascertaining, among
others, the actual length of time actually served and whether good conduct time allowance
should actually be allowed, and thus should be better undertaken by the trial court, which is
relatively more equipped to make findings of both fact and law. In the said case, the Court
also had the occasion to issue Guidelines considering the anticipated influx of similar
petitions.
The Decision dated January 28, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch
3 in Criminal Case No. 27487-R is hereby REMANDED to the said court for the determination
of: (1) the proper penalty in accordance with Republic Act No. 10951; and (2) whether
petitioner Samuel Saganib y Lutong is entitled to immediate release on account of full service
of his sentence, as modified.
IN RE: CORRECTION/ ADJUSTMENT OF PENALTY PURSUANT TO REPUBLIC ACT

NO. 10951, IN RELATION TO HERNAN v. SANDIGANBAYAN
Montillano, Petitioner.
G.R. No. 240563, 14 August 2018
J. Tijam
TOPIC: R.A. 10951
FACTS:
Petitioner was convicted of the crime of Simple Theft of personal property worth Php
6,000.00, she is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six (6) months
of arrest a mayor as minimum, to four (4) years of prision correccional as maximum.
Considering that the property in this case has been recovered, no civil liability is imposed.
Per the RTC Branch Clerk of Court's Certification6 dated November 7, 2017, no appeal
was filed in the said case. Per her Prison Record, petitioner already has two (2) years, three (3)
months, and twenty-seven (27) days’ time served with earned good conduct time allowance as
of May 8, 2018.
Meanwhile, RA No. 10951 was promulgated on August 29, 2017, which provides under
Section 81, paragraph 4 thereof, that any person guilty of theft shall be punished by arresto
mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum period8 if the value of the
property stolen is over P5,000.00 but does not exceed P20,000.00.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled of modifying his sentence in accordance with
RA 10951.
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HELD/RATIO: Case is remanded. The Decision dated June 15, 2017 of the Regional Trial Court
of Muntinlupa City, Branch 204 in Criminal Case No. 16-782 is hereby REMANDED to the
said court for the determination of: (1) the proper penalty in accordance with Republic Act No.
10951; and (2) whether petitioner Emalyn Montillano y Basig @ "Dagul" is entitled to
immediate release on account of full service of her sentence, as modified.
People v. Collamat, Aug 15, 2018,
G.R. No. 218200, Aug 15, 2018
, J. Del Castillo
Topic:TOPIC: Murder
No new doctrine.
In light of appellant's positive identification as one of the victim's assailants, his

defenses of alibi and denial must necessarily fail. After all, it is settled that "alibi and denial
are inherently weak defenses and 'must be brushed aside when the prosecution has
sufficiently and positively ascertained the identity of the accused’," as in this case. As regards
the issue on the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, we agree with the CA's
conclusion that the victim's stabbing was carried out in such a way that afforded the victim no
opportunity to escape or retaliate.
There is treachery when the offender employs means, methods or forms in the
execution of any of the crimes against persons that tend directly and especially to ensure its
execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make.
In this case, appellant and two others held the victim in place, while Jimbo delivered
the stabbing thrusts on the victim's body. And of the five punctured wounds sustained by the
victim, three were fatal-the victim's left and right lungs, as well as his thoracic cavity, were
punctured during the stabbing incident. Clearly, the victim's stabbing was attended by
treachery, considering that (a) the means of execution of the attack gave the victim no
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) said means of execution was deliberately
adopted by appellant and his co-accused. Given these circumstances, we find no cogent reason
to overturn the factual findings and conclusions of the lower courts, as they are supported by
the evidence on record and applicable laws.
People v Ramos, Aug 15, 2018,

G.R. No, 210435, Aug 15, 2018
, J. Reyes, Jr.
Topic:TOPIC: Rape
No new doctrine.
Essentially, to sustain a conviction for rape through sexual intercourse, the prosecution
must prove the following elements beyond reasonable doubt, namely, (i) that the accused had
carnal knowledge of the victim; and (ii) that said act was accomplished (a) through the of force
or intimidation, or (b) when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or ( c)
by means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority, or (d) when the victim is
under 12 years of age or is demented. 34 In the case at bar, the prosecution sufficiently
established beyond reasonable doubt that Ramos had carnal knowledge with AAA on
December 27, 2007, through force and intimidation by pushing and pinning her down, and
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inserting his penis into her vagina, against her will and without her consent. The linchpin of
AAA' s testimony was that Ramos had sexual intercourse with her, despite her struggles and
protestations. Her narration revealed the continuous struggle that she put up, and how Ramos
overpowered her in consummating his bestial desires. On this matter, AAA did not waver.
The Court on numerous occasions held that by the peculiar nature of rape cases, conviction
thereon most often rests solely on the basis of the offended party's testimony, if credible,
natural, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. This
ruling exactly mirrors AAA's testimony.
It cannot be gainsaid that in cases where the accused raises the "sweetheart defense,"
there must be proof by compelling evidence, that the accused and the victim were in fact
lovers, and that the victim consented to the alleged sexual relations. The second is as
important as the first, because love is not a license for lust. Similarly, evidence of the
relationship is required, such as tokens, love letters, mementos, photographs, and the like.
Ramos' utter failure to present any iota of evidence to establish his purported amorous
relationship with AAA, clearly renders his claim self-serving and of no probative value. In fact,
not a single co-employee came forward to confirm his tale that he and AAA were lovers.
Although Ramos explained that this was due to fact that they were the only ones who knew of
their relationship, it is hard to believe that no one suspected their relationship, especially
considering that they were all living in the same barracks.
same style
Josie Castillo-Co v. Honorable Sandiganbayan (Second Division) and People
G.R. No. 184766, 15 August 2018
J. A. Reyes, Jr.
Topic:TOPIC: Anti- Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
FACTS:
Rep. Cua Representative of the Province of Quirino and the Chairman of the
Committee on Good Government of the House of Representatives, filed a letter-complaint
before the Office of the Ombudsman against Gov. Co, and the Provincial Engineer of the
Province of Quirino, Engr. Ringor, for violations of Section 3(e) and (g) of the Anti-Graft and
Corn1pt Practices Acts, Frauds Against the Public Treasury, and Malversation of Public
Funds.
Rep. Cua alleged that irregularities attended the purchase of heavy equipment by the
Provincial Government of Quirino from Nakajima Trading. According to Rep. Cua, prior to
contracting with Nakajima Trading and in order to fund the purchase, Gov. Co entered into a
loan agreement with the Philippine National Bank (PNB) by virtue of a resolution of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Quirino. The resolution authorized Gov. Co to obtain a loan to
fund the purchase of brand new heavy equipment.
However, Gov. Co entered into an agreement to purchase reconditioned heavy

equipment instead, with the Province of Quirino as the buyer and Nakajima Trading as the
seller.
Rep. Cua additionally averred that the equipment purchased by the Province of
Quirino was overpriced. To substantiate this allegation, he presented quotations comparing
the prices of the equipment furnished by Nakajima Trading and similar or equivalent models
of the same machines from local suppliers. Lastly, Rep. Cua alleged that despite full payment
of the purchase price, the Province of Quirino did not receive everything owing it under the
agreement with Nakajima Trading.
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Sandiganbayan found Gov. Co guilty of entering into a transaction grossly and

manifestly disadvantageous to the government.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gov. Co entered into a transaction grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the provincial government of Quirino.
HELD/RATIO: Yes.
Section 3(g) of RA No. 3019, under which Gov. Co was charged and found guilty,
relevantly provides:
Section. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or

omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following
shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared
to be unlawful:
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or

transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or
not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.
In Henry T. Go vs. Sandiganbayan, the elements of the offense defined in Section 3(g) of
RA No. 3019 were enumerated, to wit: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he or she
entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and (3) that such contract
or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.
There is no debate as to the existence of the first two elements. That the petitioner is a
public officer is settled. There is also no disputing that the Agreement with Nakajima Trading
was a contract or transaction that Gov. Co entered into on behalf of the Provincial Government
of Quirino.
Gov. Co now contends that the third element cannot exist because, assuming that the
province suffered disadvantage, the same was not gross and manifest. This assertion, however,
has no merit.
Section 3(g) of RA No. 3019 is intended to be flexible in order to give judges some
latitude in determining whether the disadvantage to the government, occasioned by the act of
a public officer in entering into a particular contract is, indeed, gross and manifest. Otherwise
stated, there is no hard and fast rule against which the disadvantageous acts complained of
should be calibrated. The determination of whether the disadvantage caused was gross and
manifest, as contemplated by Section 3(g), should be done on a case-to-case basis.
Sandiganbayan finds, and that Court agrees, that the following acts caused gross and
manifest disadvantage to the Province of Quirino:
First, entering into an agreement to purchase reconditioned heavy

equipment, contrary to the terms of Sangguniang Panlalawigan Resolution No.
120, which authorized Gov. Co to purchase only brand new heavy equipment;
Second, advancing forty (40%) percent of the total contract price to
Nakajima Trading, in violation of Section 338 of the Local Government Code,
which explicitly prohibits advance payments; and
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Third, paying the balance, or sixty (60%) percent of the total contract
price, despite non-compliance by Nakajima Trading with a provision in the
agreement, which provided that delivery had to be effected within ninety (90)
days from payment.
By purchasing reconditioned instead of brand new heavy equipment in contravention

of the terms of her authority, Gov. Co entered into a contract grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the Province of Quirino. Such disadvantage was brought about because
the province had set aside public funds for brand new heavy machinery only to receive used
albeit reconditioned equipment.
When a local legislative board gives the local chief executive authority to perform a
certain act or enter into a specific transaction, the latter ought to strictly abide by the express
terms of such authority. Any deviation therefrom, to the detriment of the local government
unit, constitutes an offense punishable under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for
which the chief executive must be held accountable.
People v Libre
G.R. No. 235980, 20 August 2018
J. Perlas-Bernabe
Topic:TOPIC: Sec 21, RA 9165
No new doctrine.
The absence of a DOJ representative during the inventory and photography of the
seized drugs is not per se fatal to the prosecution's cause. However, as earlier intimated, it is
incumbent upon the prosecution to demonstrate that genuine and earnest efforts were
employed in securing the presence of the DOJ representative or that there exists a justifiable
reason for non-compliance. Here, the police officers, in their affidavits, merely stated that "the
team exerted efforts to contact any representative from the Department of Justice but to no
avail." Far from satisfying the legal requirement, this statement partakes of a mere general
conclusion that is bereft of any discernible detail regarding the steps and efforts the police
officers had undertaken to secure the presence of the DOJ representative. As the Court held in
People v. Umipang, "[a] sheer statement that representatives were unavailable -without so
much as an explanation on whether serious attempts were employed to look for other
representatives, given the circumstances -is to be regarded as a flimsy excuse" -as in this case
-and hence, not a valid excuse for non-compliance. At this juncture, it must be emphasized
that the procedure in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 is a matter of substantive law, and
cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality. Accordingly, in light of the
unjustified breach of procedure as explained above, the Court is impelled to conclude that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been compromised. As such, the
acquittal of the accused-appellant, Leonila, is in order.
People v. Salaver
G.R. No 223681, 20 August 2018
J. Del Castillo
Topic:TOPIC: Qualified Rape
Rape is qualified when "the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender
is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the
third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim."28 The elements of
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qualified rape are: "(1) sexual congress; (2) with a woman; (3) done by force and without
consent; (4) the victim is under [eighteen] years of age at the time of the rape; and (5) the
offender is a parent (whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted) of the victim." The
prosecution satisfactorily established the elements of qualified rape. The Court, thus, finds no
reason to reverse the CA in affirming the ruling of the RTC finding appellant guilty of three
counts of qualified rape.
The inconsistency alluded to in "AAA's" testimony, with respect to whether or not she
immediately reported the first rape incident to her mother, was trivial and should be liberally
construed considering that it was not an essential element of the crime of rape. "What is
decisive is that [appellant's] commission of the crime charged has been sufficiently proved."
"Such inconsistencies on minor details are in fact badges of truth, candidness, and the fact that
the witness is unrehearsed."
The Court has held that "[t]he failure to physically resist the attack, xx x, does not
detract from the established fact that a reprehensible act was done to a child[-]woman by no
less than a member of her family. In cases of qualified rape, moral ascendancy or influence
supplants the element of violence or intimidation. Physical resistance need not be established
when intimidation is brought to bear on the victim and the latter submits herself out of fear."
People v. Baptista
G.R. No. 225783, 20 August 2018
J. Perlas-Bernabe
Topic:TOPIC: Sec 21, R.A. No. 9165
No new doctrine.
In this case, Regaspi did not provide a sufficient explanation why no barangay official
was present during the requisite inventory and photography. Simply stating that the
witnesses were invited, without more, is too plain and flimsy of an excuse so as to justify
non-compliance with the positive requirements of the law. Worse, the police officers had no
qualms in admitting that they did not even bother contacting a DOJ representative, who is also
a required witness.
Verily, as earlier mentioned, there must be genuine and sufficient efforts to ensure the
presence of these witnesses, else non-compliance with the set procedure would not be excused.
Jurisprudence dictates that the procedure enshrined in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 is a
matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality; or
worse, ignored as an impediment to the conviction of illegal drug suspects.
In view of the foregoing, There has been an unjustified breach of procedure and hence,
the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been compromised. Consequently,
Baptista's acquittal is in order.
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People v Asdali
G.R. No. 219835, 29 August 2018
J. Tijam
Topic:TOPIC: Sec 5 and 11, Art II, RA 9165
No new doctrine.
The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs are: (1) the identity
of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale and its consideration; and (2) the delivery of
the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of
dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the
presentation in court of evidence of the corpus delicti evidence. For illegal possession of
regulated or prohibited drugs, the prosecution must establish the following elements: (1) the
accused was in possession of an item or an object, which is identified to be a prohibited or
regulated drug; 2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and
consciously possessed the drug.
In the present case, several observations jump out as red flags to be considered. The
marking of the sachets allegedly recovered from accused-appellant was conducted at the
police station, with no statement that it was done in the presence of accused-appellant and
absent any indication as to why it was not done in the vicinity of the arrest. Furthermore, it is
undisputed that no inventory of the seized drugs was made by the arresting team, nor were
there photographs taken of the seized evidence, whether at the site of the arrest and seizure or
at the police station. There was no media representative, elected official, or representative
from the Department of Justice to witness even the initial marking of the evidence. No
explanation was proffered to justify the lapses. Worse, the evidence for the prosecution yields
no plausible reason for the deviation. Finally, there was no attempt to show what measures
the arresting team had taken to ensure that the seized specimens subjected to laboratory
testing and presented during trial were the very same substances allegedly recovered from
accused-appellant. Considering that the buy-bust team ostensibly underwent a pre-operation
briefing, with ample time to prepare, it is baffling that not a single member of the arresting
team could secure the presence of even a single barangay kagawad at the place of arrest and
seizure. It may be recalled that other team members were assigned to secure the perimeter.
Both the planning and the arrest took place at regular hours of the day. While it is alleged that
accused-appellant resisted arrest, he was unarmed, alone, outnumbered, and was easily
overcome. Such an incident could not have gone unnoticed by barangay officials, yet the
marking of the seized drugs was not promptly conducted at or near the place of arrest and
seizure, like the barangay hall. The Zamboanga City Police Station could not have been
without resources to properly conduct an inventory and/or photograph the evidence.
In this case, however, the prosecution confuses non-compliance with substantial

compliance. While Section 21, Article II of RA No. 9165, in relation to its IRR, anticipated that
there might be instances of non-compliance, such is allowed only for justifiable reasons and if
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items had been duly preserved by the
apprehending officers. Non-compliance is clearly not an option, as the law actually
contemplates substantial compliance.
The prosecution has the burden of showing that two conditions were complied with:
first, deviation was called for under the circumstances; and second, that the identity and
integrity of the evidence could not have been, at any stage, compromised. These two
conditions ensure that the spirit and intention of the chain of custody requirement are
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complied with. Viewed in this light, substantial compliance is not mere token compliance, but
essentially conforms to strict compliance with the chain of custody requirement.
People v. Quilang,
G.R. No. 232619, 29 August 2018
J. Perlas-Bernabe
Topic:TOPIC: Sec 21, R.A. No. 9165
No new doctrine.
For the conviction of an accused charged with Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs under
Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, the prosecution must prove: (a) the identity of the buyer and
the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment. Here, the courts a quo correctly found that all the elements of the crime charged are
present, as the records clearly show that Quilang was caught in flagrante delicto selling shabu
to the poseur-buyer during a legitimate buy-bust operation conducted by the operatives of
PDEA Region 2. Since there is no indication that the said courts overlooked, misunderstood, or
misapplied the surrounding facts and circumstances of the case, the Court finds no reason to
deviate from their factual findings. In this regard, it should be noted that the trial court was in
the best position to assess and determine the credibility of the witnesses presented by both
parties.
In an attempt to absolve himself from criminal liability, Quilang argues, inter alia, that
the PDEA agents failed to comply with the chain of custody rule as the marking and inventory
of the seized items were not done immediately at the place of the alleged buy-bust operation
but at the PDEA Region 2 Office, and that such failure had created doubt as to the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized item.
In this case, it is glaring from the records that the buy-bust team comprising of PDEA
operatives conducted the marking, physical inventory, and photography of the item seized
from Quilang at their office, i.e., PDEA Region 2 Office, and in the presence of a public elected
official, a DOJ representative, and a media representative. Moreover, the poseur-buyer, IO1
Benjamin Binwag, Jr., positively identified during trial the item seized from Quilang during
the buy-bust operation. In view of the foregoing, the Court holds that there is sufficient
compliance with the chain of custody rule, and thus, the integrity and evidentiary value of the
corpus delicti has been preserved. Perforce, Quilang's conviction must stand.
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SEPTEMBER 2018 Formatted: Font: Bold, Underline

Formatted: Centered
People v. Yasser Abbas Asjali
G.R. No. 216430, 3 September 2018
Leonardo-De Castro, CJ.
FACTS:
During the buy-bust operation, the informant introduced P02 Seril to Yasser. After
handing over the marked P100.00 bill to Yasser, PO2 Seril scratched his head, the pre-arranged
signal to the buy-bust team that the sale had already been consummated. The buy-bust team
placed the accused under arrest. SPOl Jacinto searched Yasser’s body and recovered from the
latter's right pants' pocket the marked Pl00.00-bill and two more sachets of shabu. The packets
of shabu were marked by P/Insp Tubo at the police station and later submitted for forensic
analysis.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the buy-bust team followed the chain of custody when the packets of
shabu were seized from the accused.
HELD:
No, the buy-bust team failed to follow the chain of custody rule. Since the corpus
delicti was not established in this case, the Supreme Court acquitted the accused.
There is dearth of evidence in the case at bar that the buy-bust team complied with the
prescribed procedure for handling the alleged illegal drugs from accused-appellant. The
markings on the three (3) sachets of shabu, purportedly seized or confiscated from
accused-appellant, was done not by any of the members of the buy-bust team who
apprehended accused-appellant, but by P/Insp. Tubo, the assigned investigating officer, at the
police station where accused-appellant was brought following his arrest. There is also totally
no proof that the markings were done in the presence of accused-appellant.
The records do not bear any stipulation between the parties, or a statement in the
affidavits of the buy-bust team members, or an averment in the prosecution witnesses'
testimonies that a physical inventory and photograph of the seized drugs were actually taken
immediately upon accused-appellant's arrest or even later on at the police station. No
certificate of inventory or inventory receipt or photograph of the seized drugs is attached to the
records of the case.
There is also no showing at all that representatives from the media and the DOJ and an
elected public official were present at the place of arrest or at the police station to witness,
together with accused-appellant or his representative or counsel, the conduct of the physical
inventory and taking of photographs of the seized drugs.
Ultimately, the corpus delicti has not been satisfactorily established by the prosecution
in this case. That the prosecution failed to present evidence to account for the very first link in
the chain of custody already puts the rest of the chain into question and compromises the
integrity and evidentiary value of the three sachets of shabu supposedly seized from
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accused-appellant. Thus, there is already reasonable doubt as to whether the seized drugs were
exactly the same drugs presented in court as evidence.
People v. Wilt Sam Bangalan

G.R. No. 232249, 3 September 2018
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS:
The prosecution alleged that at around 5:30p.m. of 27 July 2012, a team composed of
members of the PNP Tuguegarao City Police Station, with coordination from the PDEA,
conducted a buy-bust operation against Bangalan, during which 8.12 grams of dried
marijuana leaves were recovered from him.
The team, together with Bangalan, then proceeded to the Tuguegarao City Police
Station where the seized item was marked, photographed, and inventoried in the presence of
Brgy. Kagawad Remigio Cabildo (Kgwd. Cabildo). Thereafter, it was brought to the crime
laboratory where, after examination, it was confirmed to be marijuana, a dangerous drug.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the chain of custody rule was followed when the evidence was seized
from the accused.
HELD:
No, the Court, in People v. Miranda, issued a definitive reminder to prosecutors when
dealing with drugs cases. It implored that "[since] the [procedural] requirements are clearly set
forth in the law, the State retains the positive duty to account for any lapses in the chain of
custody of the drugs/items seized from the accused, regardless of whether or not the defense
raises the same in the proceedings a quo; otherwise, it risks the possibility of having a
conviction overturned on grounds that go into the evidence's integrity and evidentiary value,
albeit the same are raised only for the first time on appeal, or even not raised, become
apparent upon further review."
In this case, it is apparent that the inventory of the seized item was not conducted in
the presence of any representative of the DOJ and the media contrary to the afore-described
procedure. During trial, Police Officer 2 Albert Caranguian (P02 Caranguian) effectively
admitted to this lapse when he testified in court.
Because of these deviations, the Court is therefore constrained to conclude that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the items purportedly seized from Bangalan were
compromised, which consequently warrants his acquittal.
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People v. Jennie Manlao

G.R. No. 234023, 3 September 2018
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS:
An Information was filed charging Jennie with the crime of Qualified Theft. Jennie was
hired as a housemaid by Spouses Villaraza. One day, Jennie answered a phone call wherein
she was told that her employers met an accident. She was instructed to look for dollars in her
employers’ room. When she could not find any dollars, she was directed to take various
jewelries and watches. Thereafter, she gave the items to a woman she was instructed by the
person on the phone to meet with. When she got back to the house of her employers, they
were waiting for her unharmed.
Jennie insists that she was merely tricked in a modus operandi when she complied with
the verbal instructions relayed over the phone by a person whom she thought to be her
employer. She further points out that her non-flight manifests her lack of intent to gain;
otherwise she would not have returned to her employers’ residence.
ISSUE:
a. Whether or not Jennie is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Qualified Theft.

b. Whether or not R.A. No. 10951 will apply in determining the penalty to be imposed
on Jennie
HELD:
(a) Yes, the prosecution was able to establish that the accused committed the crime of
Qualified Theft beyond reasonable doubt.
The elements of Qualified Theft are as follows: (a) the taking of personal property; (b)
the said property belongs to another; (c) the said taking be done with intent to gain; (d) it be
done without the owner's consent; (e) it be accomplished without the use of violence or
intimidation against persons, nor force upon things; and (f) it be done under any of the
circumstances enumerated in Article 310 of the RPC, i.e., committed by a domestic servant.
Verily, the Court finds that these elements concur in this case as the prosecution,
through its witnesses, was able to establish that Jennie, while employed as Carmel's housemaid,
admittedly took all of the latter's pieces of jewelry from the bathroom drawer without her
authority and consent.
Jurisprudence provides that intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act which
can be established through the overt acts of the offender and is presumed from the proven
unlawful taking. Actual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain.
In this case, suffice it to say that Jennie's animus lucrandi is presumed from her
admitted taking of the stolen items. Further, her aforesaid excuse that she was merely tricked
cannot be given credence for likewise being illogical, especially in view of employer’s warning
against scammers and explicit directive not to entertain such phone calls.
(b) Yes, R.A. No. 10951 should be given retroactive effect.

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Anent the proper penalty to be imposed on Jennie, it is well to stress that pending the
final resolution of this case, Republic Act No. (RA) 10951 was enacted into law. As may be
gleaned from the law's title, it adjusted the value of the property and the amount of damage on
which various penalties are based, taking into consideration the present value of money, as
opposed to its archaic values when the RPC was enacted in 1932.
While it is conceded that Jennie committed the crime way before the enactment of RA
10951, the newly-enacted law expressly provides for retroactive effect if it is favorable to the
accused, as in this case.
People v. Emma T. Pagsigan

G.R. No. 232487, 3 September 2018
Tijam, J.
TOPIC: Qualified Theft
FACTS:
A buy-bust operation was conducted. The informant introduced P02 Constantino as

the person interested to buy shabu. P02 Constantino handed to accused-appellant the marked
money and in exchange, she handed to him one plastic sachet containing shabu. P02
Pediglorio then rushed to the scene after P02 Constantino executed the pre-arranged signal of
taking off his hat. When asked to empty her pockets, another plastic sachet of shabu and the
marked money were recovered from accused-appellant. She was then brought to the barangay
hall where the seized plastic sachets were marked by P02 Constantino in the presence of
barangay officials.
P02 Constantino testified that the seized items were marked at the barangay hall
because the place of arrest is a critical place but they did not execute any inventory
confiscation receipt. He also testified that they did not coordinate with the Department of
Justice (DOJ) and media representatives.
The accused was charged with the sale and possession of dangerous drugs. RTC and
CA convicted the accused.
Accused-appellant questions her conviction and submits that the prosecution failed to
prove beyond reasonable doubt the corpus delicti of the crime on account of substantial gaps in
the chain of custody and points out the various non-compliance with Section 21 of R.A. No.
9165, i.e., failed to have any inventory, confiscation receipt or photographs of the drugs
allegedly seized, failed to present evidence to prove that they contacted any member of the
media and the DOJ to witness the marking. She stresses that no justifiable ground to explain
their failure to comply with the law was offered
ISSUE:
from the accused.
HELD:
No, the Supreme Court acquitted the accused because the prosecution failed to
establish the corpus delicti of the crime.
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The Supreme Court held that non-compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of
R.A. No. 9165 casts doubt on the integrity of the seized items and creates reasonable doubt on
the guilt of the accused-appellant. "Compliance with Section 21's requirements is critical. Non-
compliance is tantamount to failure in establishing identity of corpus delicti, an essential
element of the offenses of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs. By failing to
establish an element of these offenses, non- compliance will, thus, engender the acquittal of an
accused."
Considering the absence of a justifiable explanation as to the non-compliance with the

rules, the Supreme Court found that the prosecution failed to show that the seized substance
from the accused-appellant was the same substance offered in Court, especially since the
amount involved in this case is minuscule.
Here, the Supreme Court cannot accept the grounds or reasons cited by the police
officers as justifiable to explain their non-compliance. We note that both police officers have
been members of the force for more than five years and have stated that they are familiar with
the rules set forth in R.A. No. 9165. Despite the same, the glaring non-compliance and
seemingly nonchalant attitude in their attempts to comply with the said requirements appalls
the Court. Had these police officers truly understood the utmost significance of the said
requirements and what it seeks to protect, they would surely have found time to bring
provisions to prepare an inventory, take photographs and ensure the presence of the insulating
witnesses.
In Mallillin v. People, this court said that "the likelihood of tampering, loss or mistake
with respect to an exhibit is greatest when the exhibit is small and is one that has physical
characteristics fungible in nature and similar in form to substances familiar to people in their
daily lives." The integrity then of the corpus delicti cannot be said to have been properly
established. The Court, therefore, acquits accused-appellant on the basis of reasonable doubt.
People v. Romy Lim y Miranda

G.R. No. 231989, 4 September 2018
Peralta, J.
FACTS:
A buy-bust operation was conducted based on the report of a confidential informant

(CI). Intelligence Officer Carin and the CI alighted from the vehicle near the comer leading to
the house of "Romy," The CI knocked at the door and uttered, "ayo, nong Romy." Gorres came
out and invited them to enter. Inside, Lim was sitting on the sofa while watching the television.
When the CI introduced Carin as a shabu buyer, Lim nodded and told Gorres to get one inside
the bedroom. Gorres stood up and did as instructed. After he came out, he handed a small
medicine box to Lim, who then took one piece of heat-sealed transparent plastic of shabu and
gave it to Carin. In tum, Carin paid him with the buy-bust money.
After examining the plastic sachet, Carin executed a missed call, which was the
pre-arranged signal. The rest of the team members, immediately rushed to Lim's house.
Orellan took into custody the marked moneye 11500.00 bill, the plastic box with the plastic
sachet of white substance, and a disposable lighter. Carin turned over to him the plastic sachet
that she bought from Lim. While in the house, Orellan marked the two plastic sachets. Despite
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exerting efforts to secure the attendance of the representative from the media and barangay
officials, nobody arrived to witness the inventory-taking.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the chain of custody rule was followed when the drugs were seized.
HELD:
No, Lim should be acquitted based on reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court has held
that the immediate physical inventory and photograph of the confiscated items at the place of
arrest may be excused in instances when the safety and security of the apprehending officers
and the witnesses required by law or of the items seized are threatened by immediate or
extreme danger such as retaliatory action of those who have the resources and capability to
mount a counter-assault. The present case is not one of those.
In this case, Orellan testified that no members of the media and barangay officials
arrived at the crime scene because it was late at night and it was raining, making it unsafe for
them to wait at Lim's house Intelligence Officer Orcales similarly declared that the inventory
was made in the PDEA office considering that it was late in the evening and there were no
available media representative and barangay officials despite their effort to contact them. He
admitted that there are times when they do not inform the barangay officials prior to their
operation as they might leak the confidential information. We are of the view that these
justifications are unacceptable as there was no genuine and sufficient attempt to comply with
the law.
The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses also failed to establish the details of an
earnest effort to coordinate with and secure presence of the required witnesses. They also
failed to explain why the buy-bust team felt "unsafe" in waiting for the representatives in
Lim's house, considering that the team is composed of at least ten (10) members, and the two
accused were the only persons in the house.
To conclude, judicial notice is taken of the fact that arrests and seizures related to illegal
drugs are typically nmde without a warrant; hence, subject to inquest proceedings. Relative
thereto, Sections 1 (A.1.10) of the Chain of Custody Implementing Rules and Regulations
directs:
A. I. I 0. Any justification or explanation in cases of noncompliance with

the requirements of Section 2I (1) of R.A. No. 9I65, as amended, shall be clearly
stated in the sworn statements/affidavits of the apprehending/seizing officers, as
well as the steps taken to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized/confiscated items. Certification or record of coordination for operating
units other than the PDEA pursuant to Section 86 (a) and (b), Article IX of the
IRR of R.A. No. 9I65 shall be presented.
While the above-quoted provision has been the rule, it appears that it has not been
practiced in most cases elevated before Us. Thus, in order to weed out early on from the courts'
already congested docket any orchestrated or poorly built up drug-related cases, the following
should henceforth be enforced as a mandatory policy:
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1. In the sworn statements/affidavits, the apprehending/seizing officers must state

their compliance with the requirements of Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165, as
amended, and its IRR.
2. In case of non-observance of the provision, the apprehending/seizing officers must

state the justification or explanation therefor as well as the steps they have taken in
order to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized/ confiscated
items.
3. If there is no justification or explanation expressly declared in the sworn statements

or affidavits, the investigating fiscal must not immediately file the case before the
court. Instead, he or she must refer the case for further preliminary investigation in
order to determine the (non) existence of probable cause.
4. If the investigating fiscal filed the case despite such absence, the court may exercise
its discretion to either refuse to issue a commitment order (or warrant of arrest) or
dismiss the case outright for lack of probable cause in accordance with Section 5, 40
Rule 112, Rules of Court.
People v. Marcelo Sanchez y Calderon

G.R. No. 221458, 5 September 2018
Gesmundo, J.
FACTS:
PO1 Ignacio and the informant alighted from the vehicle, and the latter pointed to a
man whom he called "Kiting" standing in front of a house. They approached him and the
informant introduced PO1 Ignacio. Kiting then asked POI Ignacio how much he would buy, to
which the latter replied "Dalawang Piso" (which meant P200.00 worth). POI Ignacio handed
the buy-bust money to Kiting who, in turntum, placed the money inside his right pocket and,
thereafter, gave POI Ignacio the plastic sachet
POI Ignacio immediately grabbed Kiting while PO I Flores recovered the buy-bust
money from Kiting's right side pocket. POI Ignacio marked the suspected shabu with his
initials "AI."
In the Joint Affidavit of Arrest executed by affiants PO I Ignacio and POI Flores, they
claimed that the specimen was marked with "AI-MS." Interestingly, however, POI Ignacio - the
poseur-buyer and apprehending officer who marked the sachet of shabu - testified that he
marked the specimen with his initials "AI" which means Aldrin Ignacio.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution was able to establish the corpus delicti beyond
reasonable doubt
HELD:
No, after an assiduous examination of the records, however, the Court is not convinced
that the identity of the corpus delicti was properly established. There is reasonable doubt as to
the alleged unbroken chain of custody. The Supreme Court acquitted the accused.
174
In cases of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the dangerous drug
seized from the accused constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense. Thus, it is of utmost
importance that the integrity and identity of the seized drugs must be shown to have been duly
preserved. "The chain of custody rule performs this function as it ensures that unnecessary
doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed."
Nowhere in the testimony, either during the direct or cross-examination, of PO I

Ignacio did he ever mention marking the specimen with "AI-MS." Nothing in the records
would show that the prosecution attempted to reconcile the seeming discrepancy between POI
Ignacio's testimony and the specimen submitted to the crime laboratory for examination
relating to the alleged markings made by POI Ignacio. In fact, the prosecution merely brushed
it aside and considered the same as trivial and inconsequential because it was not even raised
during the trial.
The Court cannot, however, treat the matter lightly because the identity and integrity
of the corpus delicti becomes uncertain. There is now doubt whether the sachet marked with
"AI," as testified to by the very witness who placed the said marking, was the same sachet
marked with "AIMS" which was brought to the crime laboratory and ultimately presented in
court.
People of the Philippines v. YYY

G.R. No. 234825, 5 September 2018
Gesmundo, J.
TOPIC: Rape
FACTS:
AAA was the daughter of YYY. At the time of the first incident, she was 15 years old.
Sometime in March 1993, YYY hit her head with a broom and she lost consciousness. When
she regained consciousness, she felt pain in her body, particularly her hands and vagina.
Thereafter, AAA saw YYY seated in the veranda. With regard to the second incident, this
allegedly happened on November 14, 2001 at nighttime while AAA was sleeping. She claimed
that when she woke up the next morning, she was naked and that YYY was seated at the
veranda. AAA felt pain in her vagina. In both instances YYY allegedly threatened to kill AAA,
her mother, and her siblings if she would report the incidents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the
accused YYY committed the crime of rape.
HELD:
Yes. All the elements of the crime of qualified rape have been proven by the
prosecution.
The age of AAA, only fifteen (15) years old at the time of the first incident, had been
proven by her birth certificate, and by her testimony. On the other hand, AAA's relationship
with YYY, her father, was established by AAA's testimony and YYY's own admission. While
AAA did not provide a direct testimony on the details of the actual incident of rape because
she was unconscious at the time of the dastardly act, the prosecution established the
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circumstantial evidence proving that YYY had sexual intercourse with his own daughter
against the latter's will.
It is settled that the crime of rape is difficult to prove because it is generally left unseen
and very often, only the victim is left to testify for herself. However, the accused may still be
proven as the culprit ·despite the absence of eyewitnesses. Direct evidence is not a condition
sine qua non to prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt. For in the absence of
direct evidence, the prosecution may resort to adducing circumstantial evidence to discharge
its burden. Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from
which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common
experience.
The combination of all the pieces of circumstantial evidence prove beyond reasonable
doubt the crime of qualified rape. The Court is convinced that the testimony of AAA, who was
merely fifteen (15) years old at the time of the rape incident, should be given full force and
credence. Despite the taxing cross-examination, AAA' s testimony regarding the incident of
rape in March 1993 was consistent and definite. It is a well-settled rule that the testimonies of
rape victims who are young and of tender age are credible. The revelation of an innocent child
whose chastity was abused deserves full credence.
People v. Jessie Haloc

G.R. No. 227312, 5 September 2018
Bersamin J.
TOPIC: Murder/Attempted Murder
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Jessie Haloc y Codon, then fifty-one (51) years old, was
apprehended by barangay officials after he hacked Allan de la Cruz, nine (9) years and his
brother Amel, four (4) years old, inside the de la Cruz's yard at Barangay Union, Gubat,
Sorsogon on June 22, 2008 at around 12 noon. Amel died as a result of the hacking blow to his
neck, while Allan sustained injuries on his upper arm.
ISSUE:
(a) Whether or not the accused could be held guilty of murder and attempted murder.
(b) Whether or not the exempting circumstance of insanity will apply in this case.
HELD:
(a) Yes, there is no denying that the crimes committed by the accused-appellant were
murder and attempted murder. Allan dela Cruz, the victim in the attempted murder, declared
that the accused-appellant had stormed into their house in order to hack Ambrosio, the
victims' father, but Ambrosio had been able to escape the assault by running away. His escape
prompted his five sons, including Amel and Allan, to run away after him. The
accused-appellant pursued them, and he first hacked the 9-years old Allan, hitting him in the
arm, and then seized the 4-year old Amel, hacking him in the neck causing his instantaneous
death.
The informations charged the accused-appellant with murder and attempted murder,
averring that the crimes were committed with treachery. The convictions were warranted. The
killing of or assault against a child by an adult assailant is always treated as treacherous, even
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if the treacherous manner of the assault is not shown. Indeed, the weakness of the minor
victim because of his tender years results in the absence of any danger or risk to the adult
assailant.
(b) No, the accused failed to establish the exempting circumstance of insanity. Formatted: Don't add space between paragraphs of the
same style
The defense of insanity rests on the test of cognition on the part of the accused. Insanity,
to be exempting, requires the complete deprivation of intelligence, not only of the will, in
committing the criminal act. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude
imputability. The accused must be so insane as to be incapable of entertaining a criminal intent.
He must be deprived of reason, and must be shown to have acted without the least
discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to discern or a total deprivation
of freedom of the will.
The accused-appellant did not establish the exempting circumstance of insanity. His
mental condition at the time of the commission of the felonies he was charged with and found
guilty of was not shown to be so severe that it had completely deprived him of reason or
intelligence when he committed the felonies charged.
Based on the records, he had been administered medication to cure his mental illness,
but there was no showing that he suffered from complete deprivation of intelligence. On the
contrary, the medical professionals presented during the trial conceded that he had been
treated only to control his mental condition. There was also no showing that the
accused-appellant's actions manifested his insanity immediately after the hacking incidents.
His own sister, Araceli Haloc-Ayo, declared that he had recognized her and had surrendered
the bolo to her after his deadly assault. Clearly, he had not been totally deprived of the capacity
of cognition.
People v. Richard Dillatan, Sr., et al.

G.R. No. 212191, 5 September 2018
Peralta, J.
TOPIC: Robbery with Homicide
FACTS:
Around 6:00 p.m. of 7 February 2010, the Sps. Henry and Violeta Acob, together with
their son, Homer, closed their stall and proceeded home by riding together on their
motorcycle. They were approaching the entrance to their barangay around 6:30 p.m. when
they noticed two persons near a motorcycle. When they passed, accused-appellants rode the
motorcycle and tailed them. Accused Dillatan forced them to stop and immediately declared a
holdup. Violeta embraced Homer, while Dillatan grabbed her belt bag. Thereafter, Dillatan
uttered, "barilin mo na." Garcia then fired at the victims hitting, first, the left hand of Violeta.
The bullet went through the left hand of Violeta and pierced Homer's chest causing the latter
to fall down together with the motorcycle. Garcia also fired at Henry thereby hitting his right
knee.
Accused-appellants question the credibility of the prosecution's key witnesses, Henry

and Violeta Acob, who identified them as the malefactors.
ISSUE:
177
Whether or not the accused are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with
homicide.
HELD:
Yes, the records show that Henry and Violeta positively, categorically and
unhesitatingly identified Dillatan as the one who declared the holdup and successfully
grabbed Violeta's belt bag, while Garcia was the one who fired at the victims, thereby killing
Homer and wounding Henry and Violeta. The Court is not persuaded by accused-appellants'
insistence on their argument that given the circumstances surrounding the commission of the
crime, the prosecution failed to establish their identity as the malefactors. It is settled that
when the conditions of visibility are favorable, as in this case, the eyewitness identification of
accused-appellants as the malefactors and the specific acts constituting the crime should be
accepted. Add the fact that Violeta and Henry had an unhindered view of the faces of
accused-appellants during the whole time that the crime was being committed. Thus,
accused-appellants' attack on the positive identification by Violeta and Henry must, therefore,
fail.
Lastly, accused-appellants' lackluster defenses of denial and alibi fail to cast doubt on
the positive identification made by Henry and Violeta and the continuous chain of
circumstances established by the prosecution. This Court has consistently held that alibi and
denial being inherently weak cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused as
the perpetrator of the crime. They are facile to fabricate and difficult to disprove, and are thus
generally rejected. Besides, for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only
that he was at some other place at the time of the commission of the crime but also that it was
physically impossible for him to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity. The
excuse must be so airtight that it would admit of no exception. Where there is the least
possibility of accused-appellants' presence at the crime scene, as in this case, the alibi will not
hold water. The Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the ruling of the lower courts that
apart from their self-serving testimony that they were someplace else at the time of the
commission of the crime, accused-appellants were unable to sufficiently show that it was
physically impossible for them to be at the scene of the crime when it was committed.
At this stage, the Court notes that, on the occasion of the robbery, aside from Homer
being killed, the Spouses Acob also sustained injuries by reason of the gunshots fired by Garcia.
It bears to reiterate at this point that the component crimes in a special complex crime have no
attempted or frustrated stages because the intention of the offender/s is to 'commit the principal
crime which is to rob but in the process of committing the said crime, another crime is
committed. "Homicide," in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, is understood
in its generic sense and forms part of the essential element of robbery, which is the use of
violence or the use of force upon anything. Stated differently, all the felonies committed by
reason of or on the occasion of the robbery are integrated into one and indivisible felony of
robbery with homicide. Thus, as in the present case where, aside from the killing of Homer, the
Spouses Acob, on the occasion of the same robbery, also sustained injuries, regardless of the
severity, the crime committed is still robbery with homicide as the injuries sustained by the
Spouses Acob are subsumed under the generic term "homicide" and, thus, become part and
parcel of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.
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People v. Jimboy Suico

G.R. No. 229940, 10 September 2018
Del -Castillo, J.
FACTS:
The Checkpoint Team received a text message from an informant saying that there is
an approaching red Motorstar driven by a person carrying a backpack and a yellow sack
containing marijuana. Upon seeing the checkpoint, the motorcycle immediately made a u-tum,
however, the driver of the motorcycle fell down. The driver then disembarked from the
motorcycle and then attempted to run. However, one of the members of the team was able to
hold the backpack of the driver after he fell down and the other members of the team
requested him to open it. Subsequently, the driver admitted that he was carrying marijuana.
After confiscating the backpack and the sack containing marijuana, the driver of the
motorcycle was taken to the police station where an inventory of the seized items was made.
The preparation of the said inventory was witnessed by the Municipal Mayor. Photographs
were taken after the inventory of the confiscated items. After making the inventory, the
members of the Team turned over the confiscated items to the duty investigator at that time,
who after marking them, brought the items to Provincial Laboratory.
ISSUE:
(a) Whether or not the accused was properly charged with illegal transportation of
dangerous drugs.
(b) Whether or not the chain of custody was followed when the packs of marijuana were
seized from the accused.
HELD:
(a) Yes, "the essential element of the charge of illegal transportation of dangerous drugs is
the movement of the dangerous drug from one place to another." As used under the
Dangerous Drugs Act, "transport" means "to carry or convey from one place to another." The
fact of an actual conveyance or transportation itself is sufficient to support a finding that the
criminal act was committed.
Here, it was well established during trial that appellant was caught carrying a
backpack and sack with bundles of marijuana when he was flagged down on board his
motorcycle. The prosecution had proven in the trial the fact of transportation of dangerous
drugs. Appellant's denial and defense of frame-up cannot be given credence.
(b) Yes, here, the physical inventory was made at the police station by the apprehending
officers/arresting team as shown by their signatures in the Receipt/Inventory of Property
Seized. As the law now stands, the apprehending officer has the option whether to mark,
inventory, and photograph the seized items immediately at the place where the drugs were
seized, or at the nearest police station, or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer,
whichever is the most practicable or suitable for the purpose. In this case, the apprehending
officers found it more practicable to mark, inventory, and photograph the seized drugs at the
police station. As aptly noted by the CA, the marking at the place of confiscation which was a
checkpoint was rather difficult considering that it was in the middle of a public road.
People v. Hilario Nepomuceno y Visaya

179
G.R. No. 216062, 19 September 2018

Bersamin, J.
FACTS:
A buy-bust operation was conducted. Baladjay prepared three (3) marked one hundred
pesos (Phpl00.00) bills and he was designated as poseur buyer. During the operation, Baladjay
was introduced to appellant by informant (sic) as a buyer. Nepomuceno (Appellant) asked
Baladjay, "magkano?" to which he replied three hundred pesos (Php300.00). Appellant then
pulled from his pocket two (2) small plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance and
asked Baladjay to pick one. After Baladjay picked one (1) sachet, he gave the three hundred
pesos (Php300.00) to appellant and executed the pre-arranged signal. Baladjay then introduced
himself as a police officer and arrested appellant. Baladjay recovered the other sachet and the
marked money. Several persons tried to prevent the arrest hence they had to first bring
appellant to the police station before marking the sachets and the money.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the chain of custody was followed when the evidence was seized from
the accused
HELD:
No. The arresting officers failed to explain their lapses, particularly the failure to take
photographs of the confiscated drug as directed in the law, the supposed unavailability of a
camera was obviously improbable simply because almost every person at that time carried a
mobile phone with a camera feature. Even more obvious is the fact that the arrest resulted
from a buy-bust operation in relation to the conduct of which the police officers had more than
sufficient time to anticipate the need for the camera.
Also, the preparation of the spot report did not replace the conduct of the actual
inventory that R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR specifically required. The inventory and the spot
report were entirely distinct and different from each other. The latter referred to an immediate
initial investigative or incident narrative on the commission of the crime (or occurrence of
natural or manmade disaster or unusual incidents involving loss of lives and damage to
properties), and was addressed to higher officers; it was an internal report on the arrest
incident prepared without the participation of other persons like the accused, representatives
of the media, the DOJ and a public official to witness the preparation of the inventory and to
sign the inventory. In contrast, the inventory indicated the drugs and related material seized
or recovered from the suspect, and should bear the signatures of the relevant persons that
would insulate the process of incrimination from suspicion. Another distinction related to the
requirement to furnish the suspect a copy of the inventory, which did not apply to the spot
report.
180
People v. Carpio Marzan y Lutan

G.R. No. 207397, 24 September 2018
J. Del Castillo
TOPIC: Murder and Frustrated Homicide
FACTS:
The accused was charged with the crime of murder and frustrated homicide. At the
outset, it must be stated that accused-appellant does not deny that he stabbed his brothers
Apolonio Marzan (Apolonio) and Bernardo Marzan (Bernardo) with a bolo on May 22, 2003.
Nonetheless, accused-appellant interposes the defense of insanity. The defense claimed that
accused-appellant was insane at the time of the incident. To prove accused-appellant's insanity,
the defense presented his wife Isabel Marzan (Isabel). As regards the stabbing incident, Isabel
recounted that, on that fateful day, she saw her husband going back and forth mumbling
something. She, together with her mother-in-law and brotherin-law Eduardo Marzan, tried to
calmirn accused-appellant but the latter suddenly ran towards Apolonio's house while
holding a bolo and uttering the words, "kesa ako ang maunahan nila, unahan ko na sila".
According to Isabel, accused-appellant, after stabbing his brothers Apolonio and Bernardo,
just sat down and remained tulala until the police arrived and handcuffed him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court should have considered the plea of insanity.
HELD:
No, the Supreme Court upheld the ruling of the RTC, which was affirmed by the CA,
that accused-appellant was not completely deprived of intelligence immediately prior to or at
the time of the commission of the crime and that treachery was present. Even assuming that
the testimony of the wife of the accused is true, [accused-appellant]'s abnormal behavior
immediately prior [to] the stabbing incident and at the time of the incident, while suggestive
of an aberrant behavior[,] cannot be equated with a total deprivation of will or an absence of
the power to discern.
A careful scrutiny of the applicable law and jurisprudential rule on the matter reveals
that for insanity to be appreciated in favor of the accused, there must be complete deprivation
of intelligence in committing the act, that is, the accused is deprived of reason or there is a
complete absence of the power to discern or a total deprivation of the will. Mere abnormality of
the mental faculties will not exclude imputability. Clearly, schizophrenia does not fall within
the stringent standard contemplated by law as an exempting circumstance. In fact, even
accused- appellant's psychological report supports this conclusion.
Here, as correctly found by the RTC and the CA, both requisites of treachery were
present. The sudden attack on the victim who was then at home, bedridden, recuperating
from sickness, completely unaware of any danger and unable to defend himself constituted
treachery because the accused-appellant was there ensured that the victim would not be in
any position to ward off or evade his blows, or strike back at him. Evidently, the attack was
executed in a manner that the victim was rendered defenseless and unable to retaliate. There is
thus no doubt that treachery attended the killing.
181
People v. Alberto Petalino alias "Lanit"

G.R. No. 21322, 24 September 2018
Bersamin, J.
TOPIC: Murder
FACTS:
At around 1:30a.m., Bariguit and the victim decided to leave a party. They then headed
towards the YMCA where they intended to get their respective rides for home. Bariquit
walked behind the victim when the two passed through a narrow alley towards Iznart St.
While they were walking, Bariquit saw a person, whom he later identified as accused Alberto
Petalino alias Lanit, walking towards them from the opposite direction. When accused had
passed the victim, he suddenly turned towards him, grabbed his hair and without warning,
stabbed the victim in the back. The victim tried to run away, but he fell down after running a
distance.
ISSUE:
Whether the accused could be held liable for murder and whether the qualifying
circumstance of treachery was proven by the prosecution
HELD:
No, the Supreme Court disagrees with the lower courts and held that there is no
treachery in the present case. The accused is only liable for homicide.
It is clear from the averments to the effect that "accused, armed with a knife, with
treachery and evident premeditation, with a decided [purpose] to kill .... stab, hit and wound
Johnny Nalangay with the said knife ... causing upon the latter injuries on vital parts of his
body which caused his death" did not state that the accused-appellant had deliberately
adopted means of execution that denied to the victim the opportunity to defend himself, or to
retaliate; or that the accused-appellant had consciously and deliberately adopted the mode of
attach to ensure himself from any risk from the defense that the victim might make.
Secondly, the finding of the attendance of treachery, assuming the sufficiency of the
allegations thereon in the information, should be based on clear and convincing evidence. The
attendance of treachery cannot be presumed. The same degree of proof to dispel any
reasonable doubt was required before treachery could be considered either as an aggravating
or qualifying circumstance. In short, such evidence must be as conclusive as the fact of killing
itself.
For treachery to be properly appreciated, the State must show not only that the victim
had been unable to defend himself, but also that the accused had consciously adopted the
mode of attack to facilitate the perpetration of the killing without risk to himself. The fact alone
that the attack mounted by the accused-appellant against the victim was sudden and
unexpected, and did not afford the latter any opportunity to undertake any form or manner of
defense or evasion did not necessarily justify a finding that treachery was attendant without
any showing that the accused-appellant had consciously and deliberately adopted such mode
of attack in order to insure the killing of the victim without any risk to himself arising from the
defense that the latter could possibly adopt. That showing was not made herein. For one, the
stabbing was committed when the victim was walking together with Bariquit, whose presence
even indicated that the victim had not been completely helpless. Also, Bariquit' s testimony
182
indicated that the encounter between the victim and the accused-appellant had been only
casual because the latter did not purposely seek out the victim. In this connection, treachery
could not be appreciated despite the attack being sudden and unexpected when the meeting
between the accused and the victim was casual, and the attack was done impulsively. There
being no treachery, the crime committed by the accused- appellant was homicide.
People v. Janet Peromingany Geroche

G.R. No. 218401, 24 September 2018
Bersamin, J.
People v. Carpio Marzan y Lutan
FACTS:
SPO3 Rolando Del Rosario testified that on 1 July 2008 at around 10:00 a.m., their
Office received a telephone call from an unidentified caller informing them that a woman in
black blouse and maong shorts, who was selling illegal drugs, was at the house of a certain
pusher named Onin. A buy-bust operation was conducted.
At the target area, he saw from a distance of about 10-15 meters a woman in black
blouse and maong shorts; that when he passed in front of the woman whose identity he later
came to know as Janet Peromingan, the latter asked him "Kukuha ka?",· that he replied: "Yes"
and pulled out a P200 bill from his pocket and handed it to Janet Peromingan; that the accused
in turn, handed to him a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance; that after
receiving the plastic sachet, he immediately arrested Janet Peromingan and identified himself
as a police officer
At the police station, he marked the plastic sachet which he bought from the accused
with the marking SAID, after which, he turned it over together with the buy-bust money to
their Investigator, SPO l Antonio Marcos, who then prepared the request for laboratory
examination and delivered the specimen to the Crime Laboratory Unit
ISSUE:
from the accused
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court acquitted the accused based on the prosecution’s failure to
establish the corpus delicti of the crime.
A review of the records reveals that the police officers did not follow the procedural
safeguards prescribed by law, and thereby created serious gaps in the chain of custody of the
confiscated dangerous drug. SP03 Del Rosario, the only Prosecution witness who testified,
readily admitted that the officers did not coordinate with any media representative,
Department of Justice (DOJ) representative, or elected official during the physical inventory.
Worse, SP03 Del Rosario did not show that the marking and the inventory of the seized
dangerous drugs were done in the presence of the accused-appellant or her representative.
There was also no proof that any photograph was taken to document the evidence seized.
183
People v. Jelmer Matutina and Robert Romero

G.R. No. 227311, 26 September 2018
Peralta, J.
TOPIC: Rape
FACTS:
According to AAA, in the morning of October 17, 2009, she and three of her classmates
agreed not to go to school ("cut class") and just converse in a billiard hall. From 12 noon until
5:00 p.m., they drank Matador brandy at Oliver's house. As a result, she felt dizzy and did not
know what she was doing. She heard that somebody wanted to escort her on the way home.
Instead of taking her home, she was taken by Matutina, Romero, and Lim at the back of a
house near a dark and grassy portion of the Manolo Compound. They made her lie down in a
stony area and told her to keep quiet. Romero and Lim, however, held her hands as Matutina
took off her shorts and panty. Romero and Lim kissed and touched her breasts, while
Matutina forced his penis into her vagina but was not able to place it inside due to her
resistance.
ISSUE:
(a) Whether or not the accused are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape.
(b) Whether or not there is conspiracy between among the accused.
HELD:
(a) Yes, the Supreme Court held that the prosecution was able to establish beyond
reasonable doubt that the crime of rape has been committed.
Unlike the belief of Matutina and Romero, consummated rape was committed in this
case. Consistent with People v. Campuhan, the penis of Matutina indubitably touched the
labias or slid into the genital organ of AAA and not merely stroked its external surface. Based
on the physical examination of medico-legal officer PCI Cabrera, the posterior fourchette of
AAA showed clear evidence of blunt penetrating trauma. In open court, PCI Cabrera attested
that the whole posterior fourchette of AAA was swollen and that the presence of abrasion
therein would point to the blunt penetrating trauma caused by contact with a blunt and hard
object such as an erect penis or finger. On this score, We agree with the CA that when AAA
professed that Matutina was unable to place his penis inside her private part as he was forcing
it, it could only mean that he was not able to place the full length of his penis inside AAA' s
vagina.
The absence of proof of hymenal laceration is inconsequential. It has been invariably

held that an intact hymen does not negate a finding that the victim was raped. Penetration of
the penis by entry into the lips of the vagina, even the briefest of contacts and without rupture
or laceration of the hymen, is enough to justify a conviction for rape.
(b) Yes, conspiracy was, likewise, proven since the prosecution sufficiently showed that
Matutina and Romero acted in a concerted manner. Each performed specific acts with such
close coordination as to indicate beyond reasonable doubt a common criminal design or
purpose. As the OSG countered, common experience dictates that the act of Romero (together
with Lim) of holding the hands of AAA had no other purpose but to restrain her from escaping
184
and resisting as well as to allow Matutina to succeed in having sexual intercourse with AAA.
Indeed, there was a community of purpose and concurrence of sentiment to do a bestial act.
People v. Francisco Damayo y Jaime

G.R. No. 232361, 26 September 2018
Peralta, J.
TOPIC: Kidnapping for Ransom of a Minor
FACTS:
On 7 August 2006, Damayo took Jerome Rosario y Sampaga (Jerome), who was then
eleven years of age, from his school and brought the latter to his house in Pampanga where he
deprived the said victim of his personal liberty for three (3) days and that Damayo demanded
ransom of Pl 50,000.00 from Edna, Jerome's mother, for the release of her son from captivity.
According to the RTC, Jerome convincingly testified on the events that transpired during the
kidnapping incident from August 7 to 9, 2006 and positively identified Damayo as his
abductor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Jerome could be held liable for kidnapping with ransom.
HELD:
Yes, the elements of kidnapping as embodied in Article 267 of RPC have been
sufficiently proven in the case at bench.
In order that the accused can be convicted of kidnapping and serious illegal detention,
the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime, namely: (a)
the offender is a private individual; (b) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner
deprives the latter of his liberty; ( c) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and ( d)
in the commission of the offense any of the following circumstances is present: (1) the
kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (2) it is committed by simulating public
authority; (3) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained
or threats to kill him are made; or ( 4) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a
public officer.
If the victim of kidnapping and serious illegal detention is a minor, the duration of his
detention is immaterial. Also, if the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose
of extorting ransom, the duration of his detention is immaterial. It is settled that the curtailment
of the victim's liberty need not involve any physical restraint upon the latter's person and it is
not necessary that the offender kept the victim in an enclosure or treated him harshly. The
crime of serious illegal detention is committed by detaining a person or depriving him in any
manner of his liberty. Its essence is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty, coupled with
indubitable proof of the intent of the accused to effect such deprivation.
It is undisputed that Damayo is a private individual, and that he took Jerome from his
school at Sucat Elementary School, Barangay Sucat, Muntinlupa City on August 7, 2008 at
12:00 noon, brought said victim to his house at No. 301 Telabastaga, San Fernando, Pampanga,
and kept him there until he was safely recovered by his parents and the police officers on
August 9, 2008. That Damayo had no justification whatsoever to detain Jerome is undeniable.
185
Here, bringing minor Jerome to a house located somewhere in Pampanga, a place

which is totally unfamiliar to him and very far from his residence at Sucat, Muntinlupa City,
would constitute denial of the said victim's liberty. Even if Jerome had the freedom of
locomotion inside the house of Damayo, he did not have the freedom to leave the same at will
or escape therefrom because he did not know where to go and could not possibly go back
home to his mother Edna as he didn't know how to do so. Jerome was merely waiting and
hoping that he would be brought home or that his parents would fetch him. Verily, the
prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that Damayo intended to deprive
Jerome of his liberty, and his parents, with the custody of their minor son.
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OCTOBER 2018 Formatted: Font: Bold, Underline

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People v. Ferdinand De Guzman
G.R. No. 234190, 1 October 2018 same style
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
TOPIC: Rape
FACTS:
AAA was sleeping in her room when she was awakened by her aunt’s husband,
Ferdinand, who was already on top of her. Ferdinand then kissed her, undressed her and
forcible inserted his penis into her vagina. After a few months, the incident happened again.
AAA was sleeping in the living room when she felt that somebody carried her to the bedroom.
Upon realizing that someone was on top of her, she opened her eyes and saw Ferdinand,
prompting her to push him away. However, Ferdinand overpowered her, removed her lower
garments, and had carnal knowledge of her. After Ferdinand finished, he again threatened
AAA before leaving the scene. Eventually, AAA was able to reveal her ordeal to her parents,
resulting in the filing of the rape cases against Ferdinand.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused could be held liable of statutory rape.
HELD:
Yes. In this case, the Court agrees with the findings of the courts a quo that the
prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Ferdinand had carnal knowledge
of his niece-in-law, AAA, on two (2) separate occasions through force and intimidation and
when she was still below twelve (12) years of age.
Statutory Rape under Article 266-A (1) (d) of the RPC is committed by having sexual
intercourse with a woman below twelve (12) years of age regardless of her consent, or lack of it,
to the sexual act. Proof of force, threat, or intimidation, or consent of the offended party is
unnecessary as these are not elements of Statutory Rape, considering that the absence of free
consent is conclusively presumed when the victim is below the age of twelve (12). The law
presumes that the offended party does not possess discernment and is incapable of giving
intelligent consent to the sexual act. Thus, to sustain a conviction for Statutory Rape, the
prosecution must establish the following: (a) the age of the complainant; (b) the identity of the
accused; and (c) the sexual intercourse between the accused and the complainant. 20
Furthermore, these acts of Rape shall be qualified pursuant to Article 266-B (1) of the RPC if: (i)
the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age; and (ii) the offender is a parent, ascendant,
step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
In this regard, it has been long settled that "a young girl would not concoct a sordid
tale of a crime as serious as rape at the hands of her [own relative], allow the examination of
her private part, and subject herself to the stigma and embarrassment of a public trial, if her
motive were other than a fervent desire to seek justice. Hence, there is no plausible reason
why AAA would testify against her own relative, imputing to him the grave crime of rape, if
this crime didthis not happen, as in this case. In view of the foregoing, as well as the fact that
AAA's minority and her relationship with Ferdinand were not only alleged in the
187
Informations but also proven during the trial, the Court finds it proper to upgrade Ferdinand's
convictions to two (2) counts of Qualified Statutory Rape.
Melky Concha and Romeo Managuelod v. People

G.R. No. 208114, 3 October 2018
Leonen, J.
TOPIC: Carnapping
FACTS:
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Isabela filed two (2) criminal Informations
against Marlon Caliguiran (Caliguiran), Alvin Tamang, Concha, and Managuelod, charging
them with two (2) counts of carnapping under Republic Act No. 6539 or the Anti-Camapping
Act of 1972. At about 11 :00 p.m., as Macutay and his group was traversing the road when
the motorcycle had a flat tire. The group decided to push the motorcycle. While doing so, they
chanced upon a parked white car on the highway. As they got near the car, four ( 4) armed
persons emerged from it and one of them pointed a gun at Macutay and declared "holdup."
The armed men then took his Seiko watch, t-shirt, and wallet, which contained P400.00 in cash
and his license. They told Macutay to run. When Macutay was near the edge of the road, he
jumped. Macutay and his group then hid as the armed men took his motorcycle and left the
sidecar behind. One of the armed men drove the motorcycle while the others returned to the
white car and left.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused could be held liable for carnapping.
HELD:
No. A careful scrutiny of the records shows that both the

Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals misapprehended the
facts of this case. This Court hereby takes cognizance of their
Petition. Before the prosecution concerns itself with the existence of the
elements of a crime, it must first discharge the burden of proving
that an accused is correctly identified.
As to whether the out-of-court identification of petitioners satisfied

the totality of circumstances test, this Court finds that it did not.
Although there was no significant lapse of time from the day of
the incident up to the day when Macutay identified his supposed
assailants, his identification fell short on the remaining factors.
First, Macutay failed to provide descriptions of his attackers when he reported the
incident to the police. Despite insisting that the place was illuminated at the time of the
carnapping and claiming that he was able to observe his assailants when he hid after jumping
from the edge of the road, Macutay did not describe them as to their height, skin color, clothes,
or any distinguishing mark that could have made them stand out. Without any of these
descriptions, any group of four (4) men is susceptible of being identified as the perpetrators.
Second, Macutay was admittedly scared and confused, which reduced his degree of attention.
His disorientation was apparent when he gave his watch, wallet, and even his t-shirt to his
assailants as soon as he heard "holdup." He did not even wait for them to tell him what they
needed from him. Third, it was not shown how certain Macutay was in his identification of
188
petitioners. Without any prior description, the basis of his identification is questionable. It also
remains uncertain whether the t-shirt that petitioner Concha wore during the police show-up
was the same t-shirt that Macutay gave to his assailants, since he failed to describe that piece
of clothing in his report before the police. Finally, the out-of-court identification was tainted
with improper suggestion. The Supreme Court acquitted the petitioner.
When Macutay, the sole witness, was invited by the police to

identify his assailants, his mind was already conditioned that he
would come face-to- face with the persons who robbed him. He knew
that the group that attacked him consisted of four ( 4} persons.
Consequently, when he was shown four ( 4) persons in the police
show-up, it registered to him that they were the perpetrators. With
no prior description of his assailants, it was highly likely that
Macutay's identification was tainted with apparent suggestiveness. Therefore,
there was no positive and credible identification made by the
prosecution's witness.
People v. Marianito Arces, Jr.

G.R. No. 225624, 3 October 2018
Carpio, J.
TOPIC: Rape
FACTS:
AAA was left alone in the house. While sleeping, AAA, who was nine years old at that
time, was awakened by her uncle, Arces who appeared beside her and started to undress her.
Arces took off his clothes, positioned himself on top of AAA and inserted his penis into her
vagina. AAA complained that what he was doing was painful. Arces stopped, dressed AAA,
put on his clothes, and warned AAA not to tell anyone what had happened. The following
day, Arces returned to AAA's house where she was again left alone. Arces took off his clothes,
laid on top of AAA, and made pumping motions while AAA was. fully clothed. AAA never
revealed these incidents with Arces with anyone.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused could be held guilty of the crime of rape.
HELD:
No, the RTC and the CA relied heavily on the testimony of AAA to find Arces guilty of
the crime of rape. And while an accused may be convicted of rape solely on the basis of the
testimony of the complainant, such testimony should meet the test of credibility - it should be
straightforward, clear, positive, and convincing. In this case, we find that the testimony of
AAA did not meet these requirements.
A review of AAA's testimony would show that she is very indifferent and nonchalant
about the events that had allegedly transpired. In addition to the manner of her testimony, her
attitude after the alleged incidents is also very odd and not in accordance with ordinary
human experience. AAA stated that she did not speak or even cry and merely went to sleep
after the alleged incidents as if nothing happened. While it is true that victims of rape are not
expected to act in a certain way, her actions after the alleged incidents, together with the
indifferent manner of her testimony, raise doubts on her narration of the events. Although the
trend in procedural law is to give wide latitude to the questioning of a child witness, the Court
189
must not lose track of the basic tenet that the truth must be ascertained. In this case, we find
that the testimony of AAA raises too many questions and doubts, and is insufficient to prove
beyond reasonable doubt the allegations made against Arces.
Antonio Planteras, Jr. v. People

G.R. No. 238889, 3 October 2018
Peralta, J.
FACTS:
The Regional Investigation Detective Management Division (RIDM) Conducted

surveillance after receiving information that petitioner and his wife were offering the sexual
services of young girls to various customers at their lodge. The police officers proceeded to the
Lodge armed with a concealed -camera and at the said place, they were met by Marlyn
Buhisan who offered girls for sex. The girls were made to line up in front of the police officers.
Thereafter, Buhisan led the police officers upstairs where they saw at the reception counter
who appeared to be aware and listening to the on-going negotiation. An entrapment operation
was conducted. Thereafter, Buhisan, Tawi, petitioner and his wife, Christina, were arrested.
ISSUE:
Whether the accused could be held liable for recruiting, transporting and maintaining for
purposes of prostitution, pornography or sexual exploitation of four females, one of which is
17 years old, with qualifying circumstances of: (1) trafficked persons are children; and (2) the
crime is committed in large scale.
HELD:
Yes, the Supreme Court held that the accused guilty of trafficking in persons.
In order for one to be convicted of the offense of

promoting trafficking in persons, the accused must (a) knowingly lease
or sublease, or allow to be used any house, building or
establishment, and (b) such use of the house, building or
establishment is for the purpose of promoting trafficking in persons.
Trafficking in persons is defined under Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 9208
Petitioner insists that there is no direct evidence that he knowingly
allowed the use of the New Perlito's Lodge as a place for the'
trafficking of persons. He further maintains that he has no
participation in the negotiation for the sexual services of, among
others, AAA and that he did not hear the conversation among the
police officers, Buhisan, and Tawi on April 28, 2009. He also
contends that there was, in fact, no human trafficking because AAA
was not recruited to be a prostitute. As such, according to
petitioner, he is not guilty of promoting trafficking in persons.
However, this Court finds otherwise. It is indisputable that petitioner
owns and manages the Lodge. Evidence was also presented to
establish that the pimps, customers and prostitutes who hang out
near the said place utilize the same place for their illegal activities.
Petitioner's knowledge about the activities that are happening inside his
190
establishment was also properly established by the prosecution, most

notably, through the testimony of AAA.
It must be remembered that, "[n]o general rule can be laid down as to the quantity of
circumstantial evidence which in any case will suffice. All the circumstances proved must be
consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the
same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational
hypothesis except that of guilt. " In this case, the totality of the circumstantial evidence
presented by the prosecution prove beyond reasonable ground that petitioner allowed the use
of his establishment in the promotion of trafficking in persons.
As to the claim of petitioner that AAA freely engaged in prostitution, thus, no

trafficking in person was committed, such is unmeritorious. Knowledge or consent of the
minor is not a defense under Republic Act No. 9208. The victim's consent is rendered
meaningless due to the coercive, abusive, or deceptive means employed by perpetrators of
human trafficking. Even without the use of coercive, abusive, or deceptive means, a minor's
consent is not given out of his or her own free will.
Jose Paulo Legaspi v. People / Victor Daganas v. People

G.R. No. 225753/225799, 15 October 2018
Tijam, J.
TOPIC: Estafa
FACTS:
Private complainant is a businessman in Hongkong. In May 2005, he met Daganas in

Hongkong who then proposed a "joint venture" by buying 10% share of iGen-Portal. Private
complainant went to the Philippines in November 2005 where he was presented with
iGen-Portal's income analysis, articles of incorporation and projected income analysis. Private
complainant agreed to invest in iGen-Portal upon his return to Hongkong. Thus, in November
15, 2005, private complainant remitted the amount of P9,500,000.00 as payment for the 10%
shares of iGen-Portal. Private complainant requested for the issuance of a stock certificate in
his name but none was allegedly given. In January 2006, private complainant met with
petitioners in Hongkong. Instead of issuing his stock certificate, petitioners allegedly made
new proposals which private complainant turned down. Legaspi and Daganas were charged
with the crime of estafa committed under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC)
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners could be held liable for estafa.
HELD:
No. For one, Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) requires proof of

receipt by the offender of the money, goods, or other personal
property in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under
any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to
return the same. In other words, mere receipt of the money, goods,
or personal property does not satisfy the first element, it must be
demonstrated that the character of such receipt must either be in
trust, on commission or for administration or that the accused has
191
the obligation to deliver or return the same money, goods or

personal property received. 28 It is therefore essential to prove that
the accused acquired both material or physical possession and juridical
possession of the thing received. he Information itself is bereft of
any indication that petitioners received private complainant's money in
such manner as to create a fiduciary relationship between them.
On the contrary, the Information reads that private complainant

"invested" his money with iGen-Portal. It is undisputed that at the
time material to the instant case, iGen-Portal was a duly-registered
corporation engaged in wholesale and retail business, 30 the existence of
which was never denied by private complainant as he himself
admitted having scrutinized iGen-Portal's Articles of Incorporation, income
analysis and projected income analysis. Clearly, by the transfer of
stocks in exchange for the amount of P9,500,000.00, no fiduciary
relationship was created between petitioners and private complainant.
To convert or to misappropriate invariably require that the accused used or disposed

the property as if it were his own or devoted the same to an entirely different purpose than
that agreed upon. Here, there was not the slightest demonstration that petitioners used the
amount of P9,500,000.00 at any time after private complainant deposited said money to
iGen-Portal. In fact, the CA had to rely on a mere presumption that petitioners converted or
misappropriated said money anchored upon the latter's failure to issue the stock certificate in
private complainant's name. In the absence of the first and second elements, there can be no
crime of estafa; petitioners' acquittal should follow as a matter of course. It is apparent that
private complainant departed with a considerable amount of money for purposes of investing
in iGen-Portal. It is an unfortunate occurrence that after his investment, iGen-Portal suffered
successive breakaways of its distributors. But the Court cannot hold petitioners liable, much
less criminally, only because of private complainant's unfruitful investment.
192
People v. XXX Formatted: Don't add space between paragraphs of the

same style, Tab stops: 0.44", Left
G.R. No. 226467, 17 October 17, 2018
Caguioa. J. same style
TOPIC: Acts of Lasciviousness
FACTS:
In July 2003, around 8:30 in the morning, while she was inside their house, appellant
raped her by inserting his penis into her vagina. She was 10 years old at that time. She was
lying on the bed when appellant arrived and laid beside her. Appellant embraced her while
his hands touched her body. She was afraid and immobilized. Appellant asked her to give him
a massage on his chest, but she refused. As result, appellant pulled her left hand and placed it
on his chest as if massaging it, then pulled it down further to his penis. Appellant only
stopped when he heard her mother arrive from the market. He stood from the bed and told
her to fix her appearance. It took her a long time to report the incident because appellant
threatened her mother and older sister.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused could be held liable for statutory rape.
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court modified the conviction of XXX from Statutory Rape to Acts of
Lasciviousness in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, as the prosecution was unable to
prove that he committed the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt. The Information in this
case accuses XXX of committing Statutory Rape for having sexual intercourse with his then
10-year old daughter "sometime in 2003." The RTC and the CA convicted him of the crime
charged essentially for the same reasons, to wit: (1) carnal knowledge was sufficiently proved
as XXX himself admitted having had sexual intercourse with AAA, albeit in 2007; and (2) the
discrepancy as to the date was immaterial as the exact time and place of the commission of the
crime is not an element of the offense.
While the Court denounces XXX's acts, he himself having admitted to engaging in
sexual intercourse with his minor daughter, the Court has no choice but to modify the
conviction of XXX on the ground that the prosecution failed to sufficiently establish the
elements of the crime of Rape, whether statutory or otherwise. On its own, the testimony of
AAA, as shown above, establishes that what happened "sometime in July 2003" was that XXX
put her hand on his penis. She likewise testified that nothing else happened as XXX was
interrupted because BBB already arrived from the market. Thus, the prosecution's evidence
failed to establish the most crucial element of the crime of Rape -that is, the sexual intercourse
between the accused and the complainant.
The crime committed would thus be Acts of Lasciviousness, in

relation to Section 5(b), R.A. 7610, as the current prevailing
jurisprudence holds that the said law "finds application when the
victims of abuse, exploitation or discrimination are children."
People v. Ludivico Patrimonio Bandojo, Jr. and Kenny Joy Villacorta Ileto
G.R. No. 234161, 17 October 2018
A. Reyes, Jr., J.
193
FACTS:
The private complainant, AAA, was born on April 9, 1995. At the time the crime was
committed on November 8, 2012, she was 1 7 years old. She met the accused who offered a
“raket” wherein AAA would have sexual intercourse with men for money. Due to financial
contrainsts, AAA agreed. In an extrapment operation, the accused were arrested for recruiting
and hiring a minor for purposes of sexual exploitation and prostitution. The NBI conducted a
surveillance operation after they heard from an informant that the accused was posting
pictures of women, one of which was AAA, on Facebook with captions that they are available
for sexual favors.
ISSUE:
(a) Whether or not the accused could be held liable for trafficking in persons.
(b) Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove consipiracy
same style
HELD:
(a) Yes. In the instant case, the prosecution was able to establish
the presence of all the elements of the crime by testimonial and
documentary evidence.
As to the first element and third elements, the testimony of AAA established that it
was Kenny Joy who recruited her to engage in prostitution by offering her rakets where she
could earn money by having sexual relations with clients the latter had found.AAA further
averred that Kenny Joy accompanied her to meet such clients, waited for her, and received
money after her relations with the clients concluded. Meanwhile, the testimony of NBI Agent
Sefiora established that Ludivico (under the name Jhanne David), provides the sexual services
of women through a Facebook account. It was Ludivico, together with Kenny Joy, who
brought AAA to meet Agent Sefiora during the entrapment operation. The down payment,
consisting of four Php 500.00 bills dusted with fluorescent powder, was paid by Agent Sefiora
to Ludivico. During the latter's arrest, the said entrapment money was recovered from him as
evidenced by the results of the Fluorescent Powder Examination where Ludivico and the bills
were found positive for the presence of fluorescent powder.
As to the second element, while .AAA did not immediately accede to the proposition
initially made by Kenny Joy, she eventually yielded and asked for a raket because she needed
the money. It is, thus, apparent that the accused-appellants took advantage of AAA's and her
family's abject poverty in recruiting her to engage in prostitution.
As to the accused-appellants' submission, the fact that AAA had

asked Kenny Joy for a raket and that she visited the said
accused-appellant in prison does not negate their criminal liability. As
previously cited, Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 9208 clearly states that
trafficking in persons may be committed with or without the victim's
consent or knowledge.
Accused likewise argue that the prosecution failed to prove their

knowledge of AAA's minority at the time the crime was committed.
As observed by the CA, under Section 6(a) of R.A. No. 9208,
Trafficking in Persons automatically becom.es qualified upon proof that
194
the trafficked person is a minor or a person below 18 years of

age. Evidently, knowledge of the accused-appellants with regard to
AAA's minority is inconsequential with respect to qualifying the
crime of Trafficking in Persons. Accordingly, the Court finds that all
elements of the crime of Violation of Section 4(a), in relation to
Section 6(a), of R.A. No. 9208 were duly established by the
prosecution.
(b) Yes, the prosecution was able to prove conspiracy.
Anent the second issue, testimonial evidence of the prosecution

established that Agent Sefiora, after conducting technical surveillance on
Ludivico's Facebook account, contacted the latter where they agreed
that sexual services will be provided by two ,girls at a hotel on
November 8, 2012 for the price of Php 3,000.00 each. Meanwhile,
Kenny Joy contacted AAA regarding the said transaction. AAA then
met with Kenny Joy and Ludivico before proceeding to the hotel
where the latter obtained the down payment consisting of the
entrapment money. After the NBI agents identified themselves, both
Ludivico and Kenny Joy were arrested while they were waiting for
the girls. The entrapment money was likewise recovered and the
same, along with Ludivico, tested positive for the presence of
fluorescent powder.
Taken all together, the foregoing circumstances reveal a joint

purpose, design, and concerted action in committing the crime of
qualified trafficking in persons. Through their conceited efforts, the
accused-appellants facilitated the prostitution of AAA, a minor, where
she was made to render sexual services in exchange for monetary
consideration.
195
NOVEMBER 2018 Formatted: Font: Bold, Underline

of the same style
People of the Philippines v. Federico Señeres, Jr. y Ajero alias Junior/Wally
G.R. No. 231008, 5 November 2018 same style
Peralta, J.:
TOPIC: R.A. No. 9165; Section 21 (Chain of Custody) Formatted: Font:
FACTS
On September 14, 2011, around 12 noon, a confidential informant reported to the

Taguig City Police Station that a certain Dennis was illegally selling dangerous drugs. PO2
Joseph More was designated as the poseur buyer and PO2 Alexander Saez as the immediate
back-up. PO2 More was given five pieces of P500.00 buy-bust money. Thereafter, the team
went to the target area, the food court of Market! Market! Mall. The informant received a call
from Dennis that he cannot come because of an emergency but will send two trusted persons
to replace him, the appellant and Federico Valencia, Jr. The confidential informant, who also
knew them, introduced PO2 More to the two as a drug dependent who wanted to buy shabu
from them. PO2 More was asked to show the money then after Valencia counted the money,
the sachet of shabu was given to PO2 More from Valencia’s pocket. Thereafter, PO2 Saez
approached them and held appellant, while PO2 More held Valencia. Two sachets of Shabu
were recovered from More and Valencia. The Officer-in-Charge of the mall was asked to
witness the preparation by PO2 More of the inventory of the seized sachets of shabu. PO2
More had custody of the recovered items from the place of arrest until they all reached the
police station. PO3 Valle brought the confiscated items to the crime laboratory and were
eventually tested positive for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride.
Two Informations were filed against appellant and Valencia. Both were charged with
violation of section 5, paragraph 1, Article II of RA No. 9165, while Valencia was also charged
with violation of Section 11, paragraph 2 of the same law. Meanwhile, Valencia died and the
charges against him were dismissed. The RTC rendered its Decision finding appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the charge against him. Appellant elevated the case to the CA.
The CA dismissed the appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a gap in the chain of custody of the seized items.
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative, thereby acquitting the accused.
Under the original provision of Section 21 of RA No. 9165, after seizure and
confiscation of the drugs, the apprehending team is required to immediately conduct a
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of ( 1) the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel; (2) a representative from the media and (3) from the DOJ; and (4) any elected public
official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
Now, the amendatory law mandates that the conduct of physical inventory and photograph of
the seized items must be in the presence of (1) the accused or the person/s from whom such
items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel; (2) an elected public
official; and (3) a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. In the present case, the old
196
provisions of Section 21 of RA No. 9165 and its IRR shall apply since the alleged crime was
committed before the amendment.
In this case, during the physical inventory and photograph of the items seized there
were no representatives from the media and the DOJ, and there was no elected public official
present. Instead, only a security guard of the mall witnessed the said inventory. An
explanation of the absence of the required witnesses is also not provided nor was there any
evidence to prove that the police officers exerted any effort to seek their presence. The absence
of the witnesses has been admitted by P03 More.
People of the Philippines v. Ariel Manabat Cadenas and Gaudioso Martije

G.R. No. 233199, 5 November 2018
Peralta, J.
TOPIC: Rape with Homicide
FACTS:
Cadenas and Martije were indicted for Rape with Homicide. When arraigned, both
pleaded not guilty to the charge. The version of the prosecution as summarized is as follows:
Castillo testified that AAA, the victim, was his live-in partner. On February 12, 2012, from 7
a.m to 6 p.m., he was at the copra drier together with Escribano. AAA was also with them but
she left at 8 a.m to prepare food in their house. At 9 p.m., Castillo asked Escribano to get the
food which AAA prepared but the latter returned and informed Castillo that he saw Cadenas
and Martije going out of their house running away. Castillo and Escribano then went back to
the house and upon arrival thereat, they saw AAA already dead, lying on her back naked. The
accused-appellants denied the accusations and narrated their version of the facts in the
following manner: On the same date, at around 5 p.m., upon going home, Martije passed by
the beach to buy food. He met his co-accused Cadenas at the beach. After arriving at both their
houses, they did not leave. Both were apprehended the next day and were surprised they
were accused of killing the victim.
The RTC rendered its Decision finding accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged. The CA affirmed their conviction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the guilt of the accused-appellants were established beyond reasonable
doubt.
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative, thereby acquitting accused-appellants.
Every criminal conviction requires the prosecution to prove two things: (1) the fact of
the crime, i.e., the presence of all the elements of the crime for which the accused stands
charged, and (2) the fact that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime. When a crime is
committed, it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the identity of the perpetrator of the
crime beyond reasonable doubt for there can be no conviction even if the commission of the
crime is established. Apart from showing the existence and commission of a crime, the State
has the burden to correctly identify the author of such crime. Both facts must be proved by the
State beyond cavil of a doubt on the strength of its evidence and without solace from the
weakness of the defense. In the case at bench, there is no direct evidence that could link
197
appellants to the commission of the crime. As observed by the RTC, "nobody witnessed the
actual rape and killing of the victim." The RTC was, thus, compelled to resort solely on
circumstantial evidence.
Conviction may be warranted on the basis of circumstantial evidence only if the

following requisites concur: first, there is more than one circumstance; second, the facts from
which the inferences are derived are proved; and third, the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Jurisprudence
teaches us that for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all
circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the
accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent.
The circumstances proven should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion that points to the accused, to the exclusion ·of others, as the guilty
person.
The RTC, as well as the CA, immediately rushed to the conclusion that the presence of
the appellants at the crime scene (they were seen running away from the house of Castillo and
AAA) as sufficient to incriminate them to the commission of the crime charged. Admittedly,
this circumstance may raise a speculation, as, in fact, inevitably made Cadenas and Martije the
prime suspects, but it is far too inadequate to support a conviction.
People v. Jerry Jamila y Viray

G.R. No. 206398, 5 November 2018. Formatted: Don't add space between paragraphs of the
same style
Tijam, J.
TOPIC: R.A. No. 9165; Section 21 (Chain of Custody) Formatted: Font:
FACTS:
Acting on information received by the SAID-SOTF of Muntinlupa City, a surveillance

and monitoring operation was conducted against a certain “Jerry” who allegedly was selling
shabu at Purok 4 PNR Site, Barangay Alabang. The team went to the target place. PO3
Villareal and the informant approached “Jerry” who was then having a drinking session with
two other persons. The informant introduced PO3 Villareal to “Jerry” as a taxi driver
interested to buy shabu. PO3 Villareal gave “Jerry” the marked peso bill and the latter, in turn,
took from his pocket a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance and gave it to PO3
Villareal. Upon examination, PO3 Villareal made the pre-arranged signal to alert his backup
team. Immediately, he handcuffed “Jerry” and informed him of his constitutional rights and
brought him to the SAID-SOTF office where he was identified as Jeremy Jamila. At the station,
P03 Villareal marked the confiscated plastic sachet with the initial "JJ". He also prepared an
Inventory, Booking and Information Sheet, Sport Report, Request for Laboratory Examination,
Request for Drug Test, photocopied the buy bust-money, and took pictures of
accused-appellant, as well as the confiscated items. After the laboratory examinations, the
specimen yielded positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug.
An Information was filed against the accused-appellant for violation of Section 5,

Article II of RA No. 9165. The RTC rendered its Decision finding accused-appellant guilty of
the crime charged. The CA affirmed the Decision in toto.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution failed to establish every link in the chain of custody of
the seized item.
198
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative, thereby acquitting accused-appellant.
Jurisprudence dictates that the identity of the prohibited drug must be established
beyond reasonable doubt, since it is an integral key part of the corpus delicti of the crime.
Thus, the prosecution must prove with certitude each link in the chain of custody over the
dangerous drug. The dangerous drug recovered from the suspect must be the very same
object presented before the court as exhibit.
Section 21 (a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9165 states: “x x x (a)
The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in
the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and
photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served.
In the present case, a punctilious review of the records shows that the failure of the
police officers to comply with the procedural safeguards prescribed by law left a reasonable
doubt in the chain of custody of the confiscated dangerous drug. There was no representative
from the media or the DOJ, and any elected official to witness the inventory of the confiscated
item, and no justifiable ground was provided for their absence. Second, P03 Villareal testified
that the marking, inventory, and taking of photograph of the confiscated item were not
conducted at the place of the arrest but at the SAID-SOTF. In Candelaria v. People, the Court
emphasized that immediate marking upon confiscation or recovery of the dangerous drug is
indispensable in the preservation of its integrity and evidentiary value.
People v. Rodel Magbuhos y Diola alias "Bodil"

G.R. No. 227865, 7 November 2018.
Caguioa, J.
TOPIC: Murder
FACTS:
Rodel was charged with the crime of Murder. The prosecution presented as witnesses
Angelito and Michael, the victim’s nephew and son, respectively. Angelito testified that he
was at the billiard hall of his father at Batangas when he saw Rodel approach his uncle,
Enrique, who was then sitting. Angelito noticed that when Rodel arrived at the billiard hall, he
was already under the influence of liquor. Without saying a word, Rodel suddenly stabbed
Enrique on his left chest. Rodel then ran towards the south direction and left the billiard hall.
Michael also testified that Rodel approached his father and using a fan knife, stabbed his
father once at the left chest. Michael immediately attended to his father and noticed that Rodel
had ran away. They brought his father to the San Juan District Hospital and they decided later
on to transfer him to the Villa Hospital in Lipa City but he died on the way to the said hospital.
Rodel, on the other hand, raised self-defense.
The RTC rejected Rodel’s claim of self-defense for failing to substantiate it with clear
and convincing proof and found Rodel guilty of Murder. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the
ruling of the RTC and also held that the killing of Enrique was attended by the qualifying
199
circumstance of treachery because the assault was totally unexpected by the victim that the
latter had no opportunity to defend himself, much less retaliate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Rodel is guilty of Murder.
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Instead, the Court held that Rodel is only
guilty of Homicide as treachery and evident premeditation were not established beyond
reasonable doubt.
It is established that qualifying circumstances must be proved with the same quantum
of evidence as the crime itself, that is, beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, for Rodel to be
convicted of Murder, the prosecution must not only establish that he killed Enrique; it must
also prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that the killing was attended by treachery or evident
premeditation.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means and methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend to directly and
specially ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make. To qualify an offense, the following conditions must exist: (1) the
assailant employed means, methods or forms in the execution of the criminal act which give
the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) said means,
methods or forms of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by the assailant. In
People v. Caliao, the Court explained that: Treachery cannot be appreciated if the accused did
not make any preparation to kill the deceased in such manner as to insure the commission of
the killing or to make it impossible or difficulty for the person attacked to retaliate or defend
himself.
The prosecution in this case also failed to prove that Rodel intentionally sought
Enrique for the purpose of killing him or that Rodel carefully and deliberately planned the
killing in a manner that would ensure his safety and success.
Johnny Garcia Yap v. People

G.R. No. 234217, 14 November 2018
Peralta, J.
TOPIC: Slight Physical Injuries
FACTS:
In an Information filed by the Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila, petitioner was

charged with the crime of attempted murder, in relation to Article 6 of the RPC. Upon
arraignment, Yap entered a plea of not guilty. During pre-trial, he manifested that he invokes
self-defense. The defense and the prosecution presented conflicting versions of the facts.
According to the defense, petitioner Yap and the alleged victim, Ang, around 3:20 in
the afternoon of November 5, 2012, Yap and Ang met at the KFC store along Vito Cruz Manila
for the purpose of meeting some girls. Since it was drizzling, they decided to wait inside Ang’s
car. They had an argument then Ang punched Yap’s face causing the latter to retaliate. Ang
got hold of a rolling pin and used the same to hit Yap on the forehead. Yap was eventually
200
able to wrest possession of the rolling pin and was able to hit Ang also in the forehead causing
wound from which blood oozed. Ang tried to recover possession of the rolling pin from Yap,
but the latter bit the former’s hand. The rolling pin fell and thereafter, both Yap and Ang got
out of the car. On the other hand the prosecution alleged that on the same day, Yap arrived
carrying two cups of coffee and plastic bag. Yap then offered Ang a cup of coffee but the latter
refused because he does not drink coffee. Yap, nonetheless, insisted saying that the cup of
coffee he bought was expensive. Ang acceded and took a sip but Yap encouraged him to finish
his coffee. Shortly thereafter, he felt groggy and, subsequently, lost consciousness. Upon
regaining consciousness, Ang felt something hit his head. Thereupon, he saw Yap holding a
bloodied rolling pin and hitting him with it.
The RTC rendered judgment finding Yap guilty as charged. Upon appeal, the CA
found no merit and affirmed the judgment of the RTC. The CA held that by invoking
self-defense during pre-trial, Yap has admitted performing the criminal act and it is incumbent
upon him to prove the presence of any claimed justifying circumstance.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not Yap may invoke self-defense;

2. Whether or not the CA correctly upheld the conviction of petitioner for attempted
murder
HELD:
1. On the first issue, the Supreme Court ruled in the negative.
The Court finds that petitioner's claim of self-defense does not deserve merit. It is Formatted: Don't add space between paragraphs of the
same style
settled that a person invoking self-defense admits to having inflicted harm upon another
person – a potential criminal act under Title Eight of the RPC. However, he or she makes the
additional, defensive contention that even as he or she may have inflicted harm, he or she
nevertheless incurred no criminal liability as the looming danger upon his or her own person
justified the infliction of protective harm to an erstwhile aggressor. Hence, it becomes
incumbent upon the accused to prove by clear and convincing evidence the three (3) elements
of self defense, namely: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Of these elements, the accused must,
initially, prove unlawful aggression, because without it, there can be no self-defense. In the
instant case, both the RTC and the CA found that, contrary to the claims of petitioner, the
evidence of the case shows that there was no unlawful aggression coming from Ang.
2. Likewise, on the second issue, the Supreme Court ruled in the negative, and declared
that Yap is only guilty of Slight Physical Injuries.
same style
With respect to attempted or frustrated murder, the principal and essential element
thereof is the intent on the part of the assailant to take the life of the person attacked. Such
intent must be proved in a clear and evident manner to exclude every possible doubt as to the
homicidal intent of the aggressor. In the instant case, a careful review of the records reveals
that petitioner's alleged intent to kill Ang cannot be clearly inferred from the surrounding
circumstances. While it is clear that petitioner really intended to harm Ang, it cannot be
concluded nor inferred beyond doubt that in causing the injuries of Ang, petitioner had
201
intended to kill him. When such intent is lacking but wounds are inflicted upon the victim, the
crime is not attempted murder but physical injuries only.
Article 266 of the RPC provides that "[t]he crime of slight physical injuries shall be
punished by arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall
incapacitate the offended party for labor from one to nine days, or shall require medical
attendance during the same period." Indeed, although the charge in the instant case is for
attempted murder, a finding of guilt for the lesser offense of slight physical injuries is proper,
considering that the latter offense is necessarily included in the former, as the essential
ingredients of slight physical injuries constitute and form part of those constituting the offense
of murder.
People of the Philippines v. CCC

G.R. No. 231925; 19 November 2018
Peralta, J.
TOPIC: Qualified Rape
FACTS:
AAA, the victim, and her twin sister were raised by VVV, a foster mother until they
were 11 years old. They were sent back to their biological parents in 2009. On November 27,
2011, AAA was asleep when appellant carried her downstairs to his bed. Appellant placed
himself on top of AAA, proceeded to kiss her and then inserted his penis inside her vagina.
According to AAA, appellant repeated the deed several times on different dates. The last
incident happened on December 30, 2012. On the evening of the date, appellant brought AAA
along the seashore of a nearby village using his boat. While on the seashore, appellant made
AAA lie down on the sand, brought himself down and kissed her and inserted his penis in
AAA’s vagina while he was on top of her. AAA tried to fight back but appellant delivered a
first blow on her abdomen. Unable to bear the burden, AAA confided to her twin sister. Her
twin sister sought help from their foster mother. Appellant was eventually arrested and held
in custody.
The RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The CA affirmed the Decision of the
RTC with modification that appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of
Qualified Rape under Article 266-A(1) of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA No. 8353.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution was able to establish the elements of the crime of rape.
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative.
Under paragraph l(a), Article 266-A of the RPC, the elements of rape are: (1) that the
offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that such act was accomplished through
force, threat, or intimidation. However, when the offender is the victim's father, as in this case,
there need not be actual force, threat or intimidation because when a father commits the
odious crime of rape against his own daughter, who was also a minor at the time of the
commission of the offenses, his moral ascendancy or influence over the latter substitutes for
violence and intimidation. Thus, all the elements are present. Furthermore, the Certificate of
202
Live Birth of AAA proves that she was 15 years old when she was raped by appellant and that
the latter is indeed her biological father, making the said crime committed by appellant that of
qualified rape.
People v. Orlando Tagle y Roqueta

G.R. No. 229348, 19 November 2018
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
TOPIC: Rape
same style
FACTS:
An Information was filed before the RTC charging Tagle of Rape. The prosecution
alleged that at around midnight of May 6, 2007, AAA was invited by her friend to get some
clothes from a certain “Mata” at Las Pinas City. Upon arrival thereat, “Mata” invited AAA
and her friend to join a drinking spree, and thereafter, brought them to an unlighted grassy
area, here Tagle and 4 other male individuals were drinking without any tables and chairs.
The men offered AAA some beer and forced her to drink but she poured the contents at her
back when no one was looking. After an hour, “Mata” and the 4 male individuals held AAA.
Tagle and the others undressed AAA and she tried to resist and run away but she was boxed
on her stomach and subsequently restrained. AAA claimed that while she was lying down,
Tagle touched her breasts, removed her short pants, mounted her, and inserted his penis into
her vagina. Meanwhile, the other 5 men did not do anything except watch Tagle rape AAA.
After the incident, they poked a knife at AAA and warned her not to report what happened to
anyone or else something might happen to her family. AAA’s friend returned at around 2 a.m.
and found AAA crying at the grassy area. AAA revealed that she was raped. She was brought
to the Barangay Hall and then to the police station to report the incident.
The RTC found Tagle guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape, defined
and penalized under Article 266-A of the RPC, in relation to RA 7610. The CA affirmed Tagle’s
conviction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Tagle’s conviction for Rape should be upheld.
HELD:
For the successful prosecution of the crime of Rape by sexual intercourse under Article
266-A, paragraph 1 of the RPC, the prosecution must establish that: (a) the offender had carnal
knowledge of a woman; and (b) he accomplished this act through force, threat or intimidation,
or when the victim was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or by means of
fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority, or when the victim is under twelve (12)
years of age or is demented. Essentially, the gravamen of Rape is sexual intercourse with a
woman against her will.
In this case, the Court agrees with the findings of both the RTC and the CA that the
prosecution established, that: (a) on May 6, 2007, AAA and her friend went to the place of
"Mata" at Las Pinas City; (b) when AAA and her friend arrived at the place of "Mata," the
latter brought them to an unlighted grassy area, where Tagle and four (4) other male
individuals were drinking; (c) when AAA's friend momentarily left her, AAA was held down,
boxed on her stomach, and undressed by the male individuals for Tagle to have carnal
203
knowledge of her; (d) after Tagle had carnal knowledge of AAA, the other male individuals
took turns in raping her as well; ( e) after the incident, AAA reported the matter to the
barangay and police authorities; and (j) upon the conduct of medical examination, Dr. Palmero
confirmed that AAA was indeed raped.
Verily, the assessment and findings of the trial court are generally accorded great
weight, and are conclusive and binding to the Court if not tainted with arbitrariness or
oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence, which exceptions do not
obtain in this case.
People v. Metokur Adbula y Mama

G.R. No. 212192, November 21, 2018
Gesmundo, J.
TOPIC: R.A. No. 9165; Section 21 (Chain of Custody) Formatted: Normal, Don't add space between paragraphs of
the same style
FACTS:
In an Information, the accused-appellant was indicted for the illegal sale of dangerous
drugs. On October 24, 2007, at about 7 a.m., a confidential informant went to the Office of the
Special Enforcement Group of PDEA and reported to PO3 Letrodo that a certain “Mike” was
illegally peddling dangerous drugs in Metro Manila and that he could easily purchase such
contrabands from him. In response, SPO3 Letrodo immediately formed a buy-bust team. He
instructed the informant to contract Mike and to place an order of 10 grams of shabu worth
P36,000.00.
The team arrived at SM City Manila, the target place, before 11 a.m. Mike arrived
carrying a small blue SM plastic bag and approached the informant who introduced PO1
Sandaan as the buyer. When Mike asked for the payment PO1 Sandaan handed him the bag
she was carrying and told him that the money was inside. In return, Mike gave the blue SM
plastic bag to IO1 Sandaan and told her that the drugs were inserted in the slippers inside the
bag. Mike was then arrested by PO2 Gabona who recovered the marked money. The team
then proceeded to the Security Office of SM City Manila. There they pried the slippers open in
the presence of Mike and the SM security guard and found the suspected drugs inside. The
investigator took pictures of the small blue SM plastic bag and the slippers that concealed the
suspected dangerous drugs.
Thereafter, the team brought Mike to the barangay hall near SM City Manila. In the
presence of Barangay Chairperson Dr. Pomperada, they inventoried the seized items. PO1
Sandaan marked the illegal drug specimens with her initials. Next, she prepared a request for
laboratory examination as well as a request for drug test. The RTC rendered a judgment of
conviction. The CA affirmed the RTC judgment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the conviction of Abdula should be upheld.
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative, and declared that Abdula should be acquitted.
In the implementation of Section 5 of RA No. 9165, the Court has declared that a
"buy-bust operation has been recognized in this jurisdiction as a legitimate form of entrapment
204
of the culprit." Since a buy-bust operation ultimately leads to the arrest and corresponding
search of the person of the accused without any warrant, the law has set up procedural
safeguards for the protection of the accused's constitutional rights. One safeguard frequently
referred to in past rulings involving the illegal sale or possession of dangerous drugs is "chain
of custody." The prosecution must account for each link in the chain of custody of the
dangerous drug, from the moment of seizure from the accused until presented in court as
proof of the corpus delicti. The rule ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity
of the evidence are removed. It seeks a guarantee that the substance illegally possessed in the
first place is the same offered in court and is established with the same unwavering exactitude
as that requisite to make a finding of guilt.
Jurisprudence has been instructive in illustrating the links in the chain that need to be
established, to wit: (a) the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered
from the accused by the apprehending officer; (b) the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the
apprehending officer to the investigating officer; ( c) the turnover by the investigating officer
of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and (d) the turnover and
submission of the marked illegal drug seized by the forensic chemist to the court.
Concomitantly, Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA No. 9165
requires that the physical inventory and photograph of the seized items shall be conducted
where the search warrant is served. Otherwise, warrantless seizures shall be conducted at the
nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team.
A thorough examination of the photographs taken by the team showed the seized
items merely included a marked P500.00 bill, a small blue SM plastic bag and a pair of blue
slippers. Although the photograph labelled as Exhibit M-1 showed that the upper right side of
the right slipper appeared to be cut apart, no image of the subject drugs allegedly found inside
the slippers was captured in the same photograph. It is puzzling that not one of the
prosecution's witnesses gave an explanation as to why they were able to photograph the
confiscated blue SM plastic bag and a pair of slippers but failed to photograph the three (3)
sachets of dangerous drugs they had seized. Such gross and unexplained omission
automatically discredits the "regularity" in the performance of duty by the handling law
enforcers. For purposes of presenting evidence, the Court emphasizes that it is not the absence
of a photograph of the confiscated item which renders it inadmissible as evidence. Rather, it is
the lack of justification to do so.
People v. Fernando Balles y Fojas, et al.

G.R. No. 226143, 21 November 2018
Del Castillo, J.
the same style
Formatted: Font:
*NO NEW DOCTRINE
same style
FACTS:
Appellants were charged with the illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5,
Article II of RA 9165. Apellant Fernando was also charged with the illegal possession of
dangerous drugs under Section 11, Article II of RA 9165. P/Insp. Arnuflo Ibanez of the
Western Police District (WPD) District Anti-Illegal Drugs (DAID) received information from a
confidential informant (CI) that two individuals with the aliases “Mang Fernand” and “Aling
Ester” were selling illegal drugs along Tondo, Manila. On the basis of said information, P/Insp.
Ibanez formed a buy-bust team with PO2 Jimenez as the designated poseur-buyer.
205
At the target area, 2 women approached PO2 Jimenez and the CI while they were
walking along the street. The CI whispered to PO2 Jimenez that the two women were working
with Mang Fernan and Aling Ester. Two 2 women sold them shabu however Emma told PO2
Jimenez and the CI that she will accompany them to Mang Fernan because they only had 2
plastic sachets in their possession. Upon reaching Mang Fernan’s house, Aling Ester handed
Fernando a small camera film container where the latter took a plastic sachet of suspected
shabu and gave it to PO2 Jimenez. In return, PO2 Jimenez handed Fernando a P100.00-bill PO2
Francisco then arrested Emma and Carmelita and recovered 2 P100.00-marked bills. Similarly,
PO2 Jimenez took custody of Fernando and retrieved the small camera film container, three
plastic sachets of suspected shabu and one P100.00-marked bill. Aling Ester, however eluded
arrest by escaping through the backdoor of the house.
Appellants were brought to the hospital for a physical examination. Afterwards, the
buy-bust team took them to the office of the WPD-DAID where they were turned over to PO1
Casupli for investigation. PO2 Jimenez turned over the seized plastic sachets to PO1 Casupli
who marked the same.
The RTC found appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. The
CA affirmed the RTC Decision in toto.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated drugs had been
preserved.
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative, and declared that appellants should be
acquitted.
Since the buy-bust operation against appellants took place in 2003, the procedure
under Section 2l(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9165, prior to
its amendment by RA 10640 in 2014, is applicable in this case, viz: “x x x (a) The apprehending
officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure
and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused
or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory
and be given a copy thereof: x x x.”
The buy-bust team utterly failed to comply with the prescribed procedure. For one, the
arresting officers had failed to mark the confiscated plastic sachets immediately after seizure
either at the place of arrest or at the nearest police station. For another, the records do not
show that the seized items were ever inventoried or photographed in the presence of
appellants or their representatives, a representative from the media and the DOJ, and any
elected public official. Here, the prosecution failed not only to recognize and explain the
buy-bust team's utter non-compliance with Section 21(a), but also to adduce evidence
establishing the chain of custody over said items that would unequivocally demonstrate that
the illegal drugs presented in court were the same illegal drugs actually recovered from
appellants during the buy-bust operation.
206
People v. Joseph Espera y Banñano

G.R. No. 227313, 21 November 2018
Del Castillo, J.
the same style
Formatted: Font:
*NO NEW DOCTRINE
same style
FACTS:
Appellant was charged with the illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5, Article
II of RA 9165. PO2 Sacolles, an agent of PDEA, received information from a confidential
informant (CI) that appellant was distributing shabu in Tuguegarao and was currently looking
for a buyer of said dangerous drug. A buy-bust team was formed with PO2 Sacolles as team
leader and PO1 Sumalag as poseur-buyer.
Upon reaching the target area, the CI introduced PO1 Sumalag. Appellant then took
out a heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance from his
right pocket and gave it to PO1 Sumalag. In return, PO1 Sumalag handed appellant the
marked money. Once the exchange was completed, the other members of the buy-bust team
immediately rushed to the scene. PO1 Cabanilla frisked appellant and recovered the buy-bust
money. PO1 Socalles informed appellant of his constitutional rights while he was being
handcuffed by PO1 Cabanilla. Meanwhile, PO1 Sumalag marked the confiscated plastic sachet
with his own initials "JAS 09-02-PO" and his signature while still at the scene. The buy-bust
team then returned to the PDEA Regional Office with appellant on board the PDEA Toyota
Revo service vehicle. PO1 Sumalag had custody over the seized plastic sachet while en route
to their office while PO1 Cabanilla held on to the marked money. At the PDEA Regional Office,
PO1 Ventura prepared the Inventory of Seized Properties/Items IZ and other documents in the
presence of appellant. The incidents in the PDEA office were all duly documented by
photographs. The inventory-taking of the seized items were witnessed by appellant, media
representatives, Barangay Captain Pagulayan and DOJ representative.
The RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The
CA affirmed the RTC’s Judgment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove the integrity and identity of the seized
shabu.
HELD:
In People v. Dumlao, the Court explained that the illegal sale of dangerous drugs is
consummated upon the completion of the sale transaction between the buyer and seller. In
this case, the prosecution positively identified appellant as the seller of the white crystalline
substance which was later found to be methamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly known as
shabu. It was also shown that appellant had sold the shabu to PO1 Sumalag. The heat-sealed,
transparent plastic sachet containing said white crystalline substance presented before the trial
court was likewise positively identified by PO1 Sumalag as the shabu sold.
207
The Court likewise uphold the CA’s conclusion that the integrity and evidentiary value
of the seized shabu had been preserved. Clearly, the prosecution's evidence sufficiently
established an unbroken chain of custody over the seized sachet of shabu from the entrapment
team to the crime laboratory, to the evidence custodian for safe-keeping, up to the time it was
offered in evidence before the court.
Eliseo Soriano v. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 225010, 21 November 2018
Tijam, J.
TOPIC: Libel
same style
FACTS:
Petitioner Eliseo Soriano was indicted for libel. The information states: The accused
being then the anchorman of a religious radio program “Ang Dating Daan” of DZAL at Iriga
City, with intent to cause and expose to public ridicule, dishonour, discredit or contempt upon
the persons comprising the Jesus Miracle Crusade, International Ministry, publicly aired his
prepared taped broadcast containing false, injurious, and defamatory statements with no good
intention or justifiable motive in the guise of preaching the gospel of the Lord by branding its
leader as “BULAAN PROFETA, TARANTADO AND GAGO,” its pastors as “PASTOR NG
DEMONY, MGA PASTOR NA IMPAKTO and GAGO” and its members as “ISANG DAKOT
NA GAGO and SIRA ULO.” A similar Information for Libel was also filed against petitioner
on a later date.
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty of two counts of libel. The CA affirmed
RTC’s Decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is guilty of libel.
HELD:
Libel under Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code is defined "as a public and malicious
imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition,
status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or
juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.” For an imputation to be
libelous, the following requisites must be present: (a) it must be defamatory; (b) it must be
malicious; (c) it must be given publicity; and (d) the victim must be identifiable.
In determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are to be construed

in their entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural, and ordinary meaning as they
would naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless it appears that they were
used and understood in another sense. Moreover, a charge is sufficient if the words are
calculated to induce the hearers to suppose and understand that the person or persons against
whom they were uttered were guilty of certain offenses or are sufficient to impeach the
honesty, virtue or reputation or to hold the person or persons up to public ridicule.
From the abovementioned tests, petitioner's words stated during the airing of his
program are clearly defamatory.
208
Christine Fernandez y Medina v. People

G.R. No. 217542, 21 November 2018
Leonen, J.
TOPIC: Child Abuse/Physical Abuse
same style
FACTS:
Two (2) Informations for violation of Section 10(a) of RA 7610 or the Special Protection
of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act were filed against
Fernandez.
BBB testified that Fernandez was her stepmother previously hired as a house helper by
her biological mother to take care of her and her younger brother, AAA. Eventually,
Fernandez cohabited with the 2 children and their father. In the beginning, the relationship
was harmonious, however, eventually, Fernandez started inflicting abuse on AAA and BBB.
During breakfast on November 11, 2011, BBB said that Fernandez pinched her stomach,
crimped her ears with pliers, and hit her back with a bamboo stick, causing her to vomit blood.
Fernandez also ordered her to lie down, then kicked her in the stomach, and hit her eyes with
rubber slippers. Fernandez then dragged her by the hair and spun her around like a helicopter.
On a previous occasion, Fernandez scalded BBB with a cooking pot. AAA and BBB’s father
was often not around because he was a driver. Whenever their father saw the marks, BBB said
that Fernandez would force her to lie. AAA also testified that Fernandez beat him and his
older sister. He recounted that Fernandez clipped, pulled, and rotated his right ear with rusty
pliers after he spilled rice by accident. Fernandez also forbade them to cry so he just wiped the
blood off his ear with a handkerchief. She also banged his head on the floor several times, and
hit him on the nape and back with a broom until the broom broke. After the incident, BBB
said that Fernandez prohibited her from going to school for a week. On the day she went back
to school, initially BBB refused to answer his teacher, Malabanan’s questions but upon
prodding she disclosed that her stepmother hit her as well as her brother, AAA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Fernandez is guilty of child abuse.
HELD:
Under Article I, Section 3 of RA 7610,child abuse refers to the maltreatment, whether

habitual or not, of the child which includes any of the following: (1) Psychological and
physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment; (2) Any act by
deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child
as a human being.
Here, records show that the minors suffered physical injuries in petitioner’s hands.
AAA’s and BBB’s testimonies were clear, positive and direct. AAA and BBB’s testimonies
sufficiently established that petitioner committed physical violence against the minors. They
validated their testimonies with properly identified photos depicting the injuries they had
suffered from petitioner, further corroborated by their medical certificates. Thus, there is
sufficient basis to conclude that they were telling the truth.
209
People of the Philippines vs. Fatima Tumangong y Diaz

G.R. No. 227015, 26 November 2018
Del Castillo, J.
the same style
Formatted: Font:
*NO NEW DOCTRINE
same style
FACTS:
Appellant was charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 or the

Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. A confidential informant reported to the office
of the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Group (SAID-SOTG) of the Taguig
City Police Station that appellant was engaged in illegal drug activities along General Santos
Ave, Upper Bicutan. Acting on said information, PCI Payao formed a buy-bust team
designating PO3 Briones as poseur-buyer. About 10 meters away from the target area, the
informant pointed to the accused standing in front of Landbank waiting for possible
customers. The informant introduced PO3 Briones to appellants and convinced her that PO3
Briones was interested to buy P1,000.00 worth of shabu. Appellant told them to wait and left.
After 30 minutes, appellant return with a plastic sachet of shabu and asked that she be paid
first.
After the transaction, the buy-bust team arrested the appellant. PO3 Briones and PO1
Balbin introduced themselves as police officers and informed appellant of the reason why she
was being arrested, as well as her constitutional rights. They tried to secure the presences of
barangay officials or the DOJ but to no avail. PO3 Briones then inventoried the item seized
and marked the plastic sachet of shabu and the place of arrest. The police officers then brought
appellant to their headquarters, with PO3 Briones keeping custody of the seized item.
The RTC rendered its Decision finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged. The CA denied the appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution failed to prove the integrity of the seized shabu.
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. Accused-appellant should be acquitted.
For the conviction of illegal sale of drugs, the prosecution must prove: (1) the identity
of the buyer and the seller of the subject drug; (2) the object and the consideration of the sale;
and, (3) the delivery of the item sold and its payment. Further, it is crucial that the integrity of
the seized drug be preserved; in this regard, the prosecution must prove an unbroken chain of
custody over the subject illegal drug. This means that every link in the chain of custody, from
the time of its confiscation until its presentation in court, must be clearly established. The
Court find that the prosecution failed to establish an unbroken chain of custody of the seized
drugs.
Independently of the gap in the chain of custody of the seized specimen which is
already fatal to the prosecution's case, the Court likewise observes that neither photograph nor
inventory of the seized item had been made in the presence of an elected public official, a
representative of the DOJ and of the media. Section 21 of Article II of RA 9165, prior to its
210
amendment by RA 10640 on July 15, 2014, which is the law applicable at the time of the
commission of the offense, clearly requires the apprehending team to mark, conduct a physical
inventory, and to photograph the seized item in the presence of the accused or his
representative or counsel, with an elected public official and a representative of DOJ and the
media.
People v. Edwin Cabezudo y Rieza

G.R. No. 232357, 28 November 2018.
Caguioa, J.
the same style
Formatted: Font:
*NO NEW DOCTRINE
same style
FACTS:
A confidential informant (CI) went to PDEA, Camarines Norte Unit and informed the
officers therein that accused-appellant is engaged in illegal drug trade in Paracale, Camarines
Norte. A buy-bust team was formed designating SI2 Magpantay as poseur-buyer. The CI and
SI2 Magpantay waited in a store near a cockpit. When the accused-appellant arrived, the CI
introduced SI2 Magpantay to the accused. The accused asked SI2 to walk further in an attempt
to conceal the sale. While walking, he handed Magpantay the sachet and in exchange the latter
gave the P500.00. The team then went to the scene to arrest the accused. At the scene of the
crime, SI2 Magpantay marked the confiscated items. Other members of the team
photographed the accused and the seized items. Later on, they transferred to the barangay hall
where the witnesses, Barangay Chairman, representatives from the media and the DOJ, signed
the inventory report. SI2 Magpantay was in possession of the seized drugs from Brgy. Palanan
to the Office of PDEA until the same were delivered to the laboratory for examination.
The RTC convicted Cabezudo of the violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165. The CA
affirmed the RTC’s conviction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution failed to prove Cabezudo’s guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. Cabezudo is acquitted.
While it is true that a buy-bust operation is a legally effective and proven procedure,
sanctioned by law, for apprehending drug peddlers and distributors, the law nevertheless
requires strict compliance with the procedures laid down by it to ensure that rights are
safeguarded. Thus, the Court, in each case, looks into whether the police officers involved
adhered to the step-by-step procedure outlined in Section 21 of RA 9165. This is because, in all
drugs cases, compliance with the chain of custody rule is crucial in any prosecution that
follows such operation.
In this connection, Section 21, RA 9165, the applicable law at the time of the
commission of the alleged crime, lays down the procedure that police operatives must follow
to maintain the integrity of the confiscated drugs used as evidence. The provision requires: (1)
that the seized items be inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or
confiscation; (2) that the physical inventory and photographing must be done in the presence
211
of (a) the accused or his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official, ( c) a
representative from the media, and ( d) a representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ),
all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
In the present case, while all three required witnesses signed the inventory receipt, a
thorough review of the records reveals that (a) none of them was present at the time of seizure
and apprehension, and (b) only one of them was present during the actual conduct of the
inventory. The prosecution failed to recognize and justify the police officers’ deviation from
the procedure provided in Section 21, RA 9165. The integrity and evidentiary value of the
corpus delicti were thus compromised.
People v. Mario Bulutano

G.R. No. 232649, 28 November 2018
Caguioa, J.
TOPIC: Homicide
same style
FACTS:
An Information was filed against the accused-appellant and Serad for the murder of
Wilbert Augusto. Reynaldo and Mark Gil were at M. Aquino, Makati City. Reynaldo saw
Abeng, Jeremy, and another person known as alias “Panot” as well as 3 other persons buying
at a nearby store. Abeng stared at Reynaldo and said “Why are you staring at me” to which
the latter replied “You are not the person I am looking at” Abeng then turned to Mark Gil and
said “Ikaw, papalag ka ba? Ang sama mo makatingin ah” but Mark Gil did not respond. The
two engaged in a fist fight. Reynaldo tried to pacify them but Abeng’s brother, “Kulot” also
boxed Reynaldo which made the latter fall into the canal. When Reynaldo stood up he saw the
group of Bulutano and Serad rushing towards them. Sensing danger, Reynaldo ran away and
hid at a nearby street.
Around the same time of that fateful night, Allan was at his house having a drinking
spree with his friends when he heard a commotion. Afraid that his friends were involved, he
immediately went outside the house and proceeded to M. Aquino corner M.H. Del Pilar Street.
Allan inquired from the group what the problem was and tried to talk them into settling it.
Allan was then facing the group while Wilbert, who was just passing by after making a phone
call at a nearby site, stood next to him. At that moment, Vermel told his group members not to
hurt Allan because the latter was his classmate. Suddenly, Serad surreptitiously went behind
Wilbert and hit the latter with a piece of wood. Wilbert fell on the ground, shaking. Thereafter,
a fight ensued. Allan was pulled away by one of his companions while the others retreated
upon seeing that their adversaries were armed with weapons. While Allan was retreating
from the place, he looked back and there he saw Bulutano hit Wilbert on the head even if the
latter was already lying on the ground gasping for breath. Pengpeng, Vermel and Dennis
likewise kicked and mauled the hapless Wilbert. Wilbert was pronounced dead when he was
being brought to the hospital.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Bulutano is guilty of the crime of murder.
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Bulutano is only guilty of Homicide.
212
It was error for both the RTC and the CA to conclude that the killing was attended by
the qualifying circumstance of treachery simply because the victim was suddenly attacked by
Serad, and he was already defenseless at the time that Bulutano continued attacking him. It
does not always follow that because the attack is sudden and unexpected, it is tainted with
treachery.
Mere suddenness of the attack is not sufficient to hold that treachery is present, where
the mode adopted by the appellants does not positively tend to prove that they thereby
knowingly intended to insure the accomplishment of their criminal purpose without any risk
to themselves arising from the defense that the victim might offer. Specifically, it must clearly
appear that the method of assault adopted by the aggressor was deliberately chosen with a
view to accomplishing the act without risk to the aggressor.
In the case at bar, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses reveal that the melee
was only a chance encounter between the warring groups. More importantly, the deceased
Wilbert "was just passing by after making a phone call at a nearby site" when he was hit in the
head by Serad with a piece of wood and then later on continually hit by Bulutano. The
foregoing thus negates the existence of the second requisite for treachery to be appreciated,
namely, that the offenders deliberately and consciously adopted the particular means, method
or form of attack employed by him. The meeting between the parties - Bulutano, Serad, and
the victim Wilbert - was casual, and the attack was done impulsively. Therefore, the killing
could not have been attended by treachery.
213
DECEMBER 2018 Formatted: Font: Bold, Underline

of the same style
People v. Jayson Torio
Formatted: Underline
G.R. No. 225780, 3 December 2018.
Del Castillo, J. same style
the same style
*NO NEW DOCTRINE Formatted: Font:
same style
FACTS:
Appellant was charged with illegal possession and sale of dangerous drugs under two
separate Informations. SPO1 Delos Santos received a text message from a civilian asset
informing him of an upcoming transaction of drugs involving the appellant. SPO1 Delos
Santos informed his Chief of Police about the tip. A buy-bust team was formed composed of
SPO1 Delos Santos as the team leader. The buy-bust team proceeded to the target area.
Appellant arrived riding his tricycle and stopped in front of the civilian asset. The drug
transaction took place then the buy-bust team arrested the appellant. SPO1 Delos Santos and
PO1 Vidal introduced themselves as police officers and informed appellant of his
constitutional rights. The civilian asset handed the plastic sachet to SPO1 Delos Santos.
Appellant was then subjected to a body search. Immediately thereafter, SPO1 Delos Santos
marked the sachet subject of the sale. Kagawad Cuesta and Disini were present during the
arrest and confiscation. The members of the buy-bust team were not able to invite members of
the media since the operation was sudden and to avoid leakage of the impending operation.
Photographs were taken at the police station showing the appellant with the confiscated items
and marked money. An inventory was also conducted.
The RTC rendered its Decision finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
illegal sale and possession of shabu. The CA affirmed the RTC’s judgment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not appellant was guilty of illegal sale and possession of shabu.
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Appellant is acquitted.
R.A. No. 9165 requires that the marking, physical inventory, and taking of photograph
of the seized items be conducted immediately after seizure and confiscation of the same. The
said law further requires that the physical inventory and taking of photograph of the seized
items be done in the presence of the accused or the person from whom the items were seized,
or his representative or counsel, as well as certain required witnesses, namely: (a) if prior to
the amendment of RA 9165 by RA 10640, any elected public official, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ); or (b) if after the amendment of RA 9165 by R.A.
No. 10640, any elected public official and a representative from either the National
Prosecution Service or the media.
In this case, since the buy-bust operation against appellant was conducted in 2012, or
prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 10640 in 2014, the physical inventory and taking of
photograph of the seized items must be witnessed by the following persons: (a) any elected
public official; (b) a DOJ representative; and ( c) a media representative. However, while SPO
214
1 Delos Santos marked the seized items in the presence of Kagawad Cuesta and Kagawad
Disini, the prosecution failed to establish that the physical inventory and taking of photograph
were made in the presence of the appellant or his representative, as well as representatives
from the DOJ and media. In fact, the members of the buy-bust team deliberately did not invite
members of the media to avoid leakage of the impending operation. Thus, it is clear that the
arresting officers did not comply with the rule requiring the presence of representatives from
both the DOJ and the media.
People v. Bong Chan and Elmo Chan

G.R. No. 226836, 5 December 2018
Del Castillo, J.
TOPIC: Kidnapping
same style
FACTS:
The victim was the nephew of Ernesto’s wife, who testified that at around 9:00 p.m.,
the victim went to Ernesto’s house to visit his (victim’s) son, who was living with Ernesto and
his wife; that the victim stayed at Ernesto’s house for about two hours; that the victim told
Ernesto that, earlier that evening, the victim had a quarrel with Melrose and her husband,
Ronnie, because Melrose refused to sell the victim liquor from her store and that Melrose’s
father, appellant Elmo, threatened to kill the victim; that upon hearing this, Ernesto told the
victim that it would be better for the latter to stay the night; that the victim refused because his
wife might look for him; that around 11:00 p.m., the victim left Ernesto’s house; that Ernesto
followed the victim was about 10-20 meters ahead of Ernesto; that when the victim reached
Melrose’s house, Ernesto saw appellants hit the victim with bamboo sticks on the neck and
kept hitting him even after he became unconscious and fell to the ground face down; that
appellants went inside the yard; that they came back carrying a sack; that the appellants
placed the victim, who was then unconscious, inside the sack and carried him inside their
yard; that Ernesto did not see what happened thereafter.
The RTC rendered its Decision finding appellants guilty of the crime of Kidnapping
and Serious Illegal Detention. The CA affirmed the Decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellants are guilty of the crime charged.
HELD:
Under Article 267 of the RPC, the elements of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious
Illegal Detention are, as follows: "(1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or
detains another or in any other manner deprives the victim of his liberty; (3) the act of
kidnapping or detention is illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense, any of the
following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three
days; (b) it is committed by simulating public authority; (c) serious physical injuries are
inflicted on the victim or threats to kill are made; or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a
minor, female or public officer.
215
All the elements of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention are present
in this case. First, appellants are both private individuals. Second, the fact that they kidnapped
the victim was clearly established by the testimony of the prosecution's eyewitness, Ernesto.
Third, appellants' act of kidnapping was illegal. Lastly, the victim has been detained for more
than three days. In fact, until now, the victim has not returned, nor his body been found.
People v. Nila Malana

G.R. No. 233747, 5 December 2018
Caguioa, J.
*NO NEW DOCTRINE Formatted: Don't add space between paragraphs of the
same style
FACTS:
An informer reported that a female individual, Malana, was engaged in rampant

selling of shabu at Cagayan. SPO1 Urian then related the information to Chief of Police P/C
Insp. Cablarda who immediately conducted a briefing. An entrapment operation was formed,
the informer, Cortez, designated as the civilian poseur buyer. Cortez ordered through text
message shabu worth P2,500 from Malana to be delived at Brgy Dugo, Cagayan at 2:30 in the
afternoon on the same date. Unfortunately, Malana failed to appear so they scheduled another
entrapment operation the following day.
The following day, Cortez informed the team that he will meet Malana at a waiting
shed in Brgy. Dugo, Cagayan. At around 4:14p.m., a multicab from Aparri stopped near the
designated waiting shed where Malana alighted. SPO1 Urian observed that Cortez and
Malana had a brief conversation. Malana then handed something to Cortez, who in turn,
handed something to Malana. From where he was standing, SPO1 Urian could neither identify
the things being exchanged by the two individuals because they were covering each other nor
did he overhear their conversation. When Cortez gave the pre-arranged signal, the team
immediately frisked Malana and recovered the marked money. P/C Insp. Cablarda took
possession of the plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance handed by Malana to
Cortez. For documentation, they sought the assistance of Brgy. Captain Philip Arce, and
kagawads Gonzaga and Arellano, who witnessed the inventory as evidenced by the
Confiscation Receipt and photographs on record. SPO1 Urian marked the seized plastic sachet
with his initals. After, they proceeded to the Camalaniugan Police Station and prepared the
Request for Laboratory Examination.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the guilt of the accused was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative and declared that accused-appellant should
be acquitted.
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, the applicable law at the time of the commission of the
alleged crime, lays down the procedure that police operatives must follow to maintain the
integrity of the confiscated drugs used as evidence. The provision requires that: (1) the seized
items be inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; (2) that the
physical inventory and photographing must be done in the presence of (a) the accused or
216
his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official, (c) a representative from the
media, and (d) a representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ), all of whom shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
Section 21 of RA 9165 further requires the apprehending team to conduct a physical

inventory of the seized items and the photographing of the same immediately after seizure
and confiscation. The said inventory must be done in the presence of the aforementioned
required witness, all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy thereof.
In the present case, none of the three required witnesses was present at the time of
seizure and apprehension, and only one of them was present during the conduct of the
inventory.
Reynaldo Arbas Recto v. People

G.R. No. 236461. December 5, 2018.
Caguioa, J.
TOPIC: Murder
same style
FACTS:
An Information for Murder was filed against petitioner Recto for the death of Carlosita.
The Information reads, “x x x the above-named accused, being then armed with a hard object,
with intent to kill, qualified by treachery and evident premeditation, abuse of superior
strength, did there and there, willfulling, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and hit
one Margie Carlosita on the head and on the parts of her body with the use of said hard object,
thereby inflicting upon the latter traumatic injuries on the head and her trunk, which caused
her instantaneous death x x x.”
Thereafter, a Petition for Bail was denied as the court gave credence to the testimony of
prosecution witness Rabillas, son of Carlosita, that Recto was the one who killed his mother.
Trial on the merits ensued. After the prosecution rested its case, Recto filed a Demurrer to
Evidence for insufficiency of evidence to hold him guilty of the crime of Murder. The RTC
denied the Demurrer to Evidence. Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion to Fix Bail alleging
that the prosecution was able to show that the crime charged should be Homicide only and
not Murder. He pointed out that Rabillas, who was five years old at the time of the incident,
testified that Carlosita was hit by the bottle during a quarrel over money. The RTC denied the
Motion. Aggrived, the RTC filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Motion to Fix Bail should be granted.
HELD:
The denial of the Motion to Fix Bail by the RTC amounted to an evasion or refusal to
perform a positive duty enjoined by law. The Order denying the Motion to Fix Bail was thus
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
217
In the present case, Recto was charged with Murder - an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua. Thus, the RTC was acting within its powers or jurisdiction when it denied
Recto's initial Petition for Bail. The RTC possesses sufficient discretion to determine, based on
the evidence presented before it during the bail hearing, whether the evidence of guilt is
strong. However, after the prosecution had rested its case, Recto filed a Motion to Fix Bail on
the ground that bail had become a matter of right as the evidence presented by the
prosecution could only convict Recto of Homicide, not Murder. This Motion to Fix Bail was
denied by the RTC, reiterating its earlier finding that, in its judgment, the evidence of guilt is
strong. This is where the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion, and the CA thus erred in
upholding the RTC's Order denying the Motion to Fix Bail.
As correctly pointed out by Recto, the evidence of the prosecution could, at best, only
convict him of Homicide and not Murder. The testimony of the main prosecution witness,
Rabillas, was to the effect that his mother and Recto had an argument prior to her death. The
RTC should have determined whether the evidence of guilt is strong for Murder, as opposed
to simply determining if the evidence that he was responsible for Carlosita's death was strong.
People v. Randolph S. Ting and Salvacion I. Garcia

G.R. No. 221505, 5 December 2018
Peralta, J.
TOPIC: Double Jepardy Formatted: Font: 11 pt, Bold
FACTS: Formatted: Don't add space between paragraphs of the
same style
In an Information, respondent City Mayor Ting and City Treasurer Garcia, both of
Tuguegarao City in the year 2004, were charged with violation of Section 261 (w)(b) of B.P. 881,
otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, for issuing a treasury warrant during the
45-day election ban period as payment for two parcel of land to be used as a public cemetery
for the city. Upon arraignment, respondents entered a plea of not guilty. During pre-trial, it
was found that COMELEC eventually dismissed the charges against them finding that since
the issuance of the treasury warrant was not for public works, no liability could arise
therefrom. After the pre-trial, the prosecution filed its Formal Offer of Evidence but instead of
presenting their evidence, respondents filed a Motion for Leave to File a Demurrer to
Evidence and, subsequently, a Demurrer to Evidence. The RTC granted the same and
acquitted respondents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in granting the demurrer to Evidence despite
sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence on record.
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. Thus, RTC should not have granted the demurrer
to evidence but petitioners should be acquitted due to double jeopardy.
Section 261 (w)(b) of the Omnibus Election Code states: x x x During the period of
forty-five days preceding a regular election and thirty days before a special election, any
person who (a) undertakes the construction of any public works, except for projects or works
exempted in the preceding paragraph; or (b) issues, uses or avails of treasury warrants or any
device undertaking future delivery of money, goods or other things of value chargeable
against public funds.
218
The attending circumstances in the instant case depict a violation of the provision cited
above. First, the subject Treasury Warrant No. 0001534514 was dated 30 April 2004, which
date falls within the election ban period beginning on 26 March 2004 and ending on the
election day or 10 May 2004. As such, it is deemed prima facie to have been drawn, made,
accepted, and indorsed on said date. On the basis of said presumption, it follows that the
treasury warrant was delivered to the Almazans, for delivery naturally precedes acceptance.
Moreover, while this presumption is disputable, respondents merely filed their Demurrer to
Evidence and presented no evidence to challenge the same.
However, petitioners should be acquitted due to the rule on double jeopardy. The rule
on double jeopardy is not without exceptions. It has been held in the past that the only
instance when the accused can be barred from invoking his right against double jeopardy is
when it can be demonstrated that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was not allowed the
opportunity to make its case against the accused or where the trial was a sham. In the instant
case, the Court finds that the elements of double jeopardy are present herein. It must be noted,
moreover, that while an acquittal by virtue of a demurrer to evidence may be subject to review
via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, not by a petition for review
under Rule 45 like in this case, there is no showing that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process.
People v. Brandon Dela Cruz and James Francis Bautista

G.R. No. 225741, 5 December 2018
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
same style
FACTS:
The case stemmed from an Information filed with the RTC charging
accused-appellants of the crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs. The prosecution alleged
that at around 5:00 p.m., members of the Bambang Police Station successfully implemented a
buy-bust operation against accused-appellants, during which 0.029 gram of white crystalline
substance was recovered from them. The police officers then took accused-appellants and the
seized item to the police station where the marking, inventory, and photography were done in
the presence of Municipal Councilor Allas and Gaffuy, an employee of the DOJ. The seized
item was then brought to the crime laboratory where, after examination, the contents thereof
tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug.
The RTC found accused-appellants guilty of the crime charged in its Decision. The CA
affirmed the RTC.
ISSUE:
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative.

219
To establish the identity of the dangerous drug with moral certainty, the prosecution
must be able to account for each link of the chain of custody from the moment the drugs are
seized up to their presentation in court as evidence of the crime. As part of the chain of
custody procedure, the law requires, inter alia, that the marking, physical inventory, and
photography of the seized items be conducted immediately after seizure and confiscation of
the same. In this regard, case law recognizes that "marking upon immediate confiscation
contemplates even marking at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team."
Hence, the failure to immediately mark the confiscated items at the place of arrest neither
renders them inadmissible in evidence nor impairs the integrity of the seized drugs, as the
conduct of marking at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team is
sufficient compliance with the rules on chain of custody. The law further requires that the said
inventory and photography be done in the presence of the accused or the person from whom
the items were seized, or his representative or counsel, as well as certain required witnesses,
namely: namely: (a) if prior to the amendment of R.A. No. 9165 by R.A. No. 10640, "a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official"; or (b) if after the amendment of R.A. No. 9165 by R.A. No. 10640, "an elected public
official and a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media." The law
requires the presence of these witnesses primarily "to ensure the establishment of the chain of
custody and remove any suspicion of switching, planting, or contamination of evidence."
After an examination of the records, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to
comply with the above-described procedure since the inventory and photography of the
seized item were not conducted in the presence of a media representative.
People v. Jefferson Medina

G.R. No. 225747, 5 December 2018
Perlas-Bernabe, J.:
same style
FACTS:
An Information was filed with the RTC accusing Medina of violating Section 5, Article
II of R.A. No. 9165. The prosecution alleged that members of the District Anti-Illegal Drug –
Special Operation Task Group, Northern Police District successfully implemented a buy-bust
operation against Medina, during which one plastic sachet containing white crystalline
substance was recovered from him. PO3 Quintero then marked the seized item at the place of
arrest, and thereafter, brought it to the police station along with Medina. Thereat, PO3 Rana
conducted the inventory and photography of the seized item in the presence of Santos, a
media representative, and thereafter prepared the necessary paperworks for examination.
Finally, the seized items was then brought to the crime laboratory where upon examination,
the contents thereof tested positive for 0.05 gram of methylamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu, a dangerous drug.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the conviction of Medina should be upheld.
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Thus, Medina should be acquitted.
220
In cases for Illegal Sale and/or Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs under R.A. No.
9165, it is essential that the identity of the dangerous drug be established with moral certainty,
considering that the dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of the corpus delicti of the
crime. To establish the identity of the dangerous drug with moral certainty, the prosecution
must be able to account for each link of the chain of custody from the moment the drugs are
seized up to their presentation in court as evidence of the crime. As part of the chain of
custody procedure, the law requires, inter alia, that the marking, physical inventory, and
photography of the seized items be conducted immediately after seizure and confiscation of
the same. In this regard, case law recognizes that "marking upon immediate confiscation
contemplates even marking at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team."
In this case, there was a deviation from the witness requirement as the conduct of
inventory and photography was not witnessed by an elected public official and a DOJ
representative. This may be easily gleaned from the Inventory of Drug Seized/Items which
only proves the presence of a media representative. It is incumbent upon the prosecution to
account for these witnesses' absence by presenting a justifiable reason therefor or, at the very
least, by showing that genuine and sufficient efforts were exerted by the apprehending officers
to secure their presence.
People v. Christopher Bana Ilagan alias “Weng”

G.R. No. 227021, 5 December 2018
Caguioa, J.
same style
*NO NEW DOCTRINE
FACTS:
At around 5:00 pm. of 11 September 2012, a civilian asset went to the San Jose
Municipal Police Station and reported to SPO 1 Flores and P02 Mitra that there is a certain
"Weng", a helper of the Juennesse Flower Shop, who is engaged in the selling marijuana. SPO
1 Flores and P02 Mitra informed their Chief, PCI Eduard Padilla Mallo, who immediately
instructed them to prepare for a buy-bust operation. When P02 Mitra and the civilian asset
entered the flower shop, the only person inside was "Weng" who at that time was lying on a
chair. The asset told the latter that his companion will buy marijuana and upon hearing the
same, "Weng" immediately stood up. P02 Mitra was just beside the asset while they were
talking to "Weng". P02 Mitra then gave the 2 P100.00 bills amounting to Php200.00 to the asset
and at that moment, "Weng" brought out from his right pocket three (3) pieces of heat sealed
sachet containing suspected marijuana. P02 Mitra gave the money to the civilian asset who
handed it to "Weng".
After receiving the money, "Weng" gave to P02 Mitra the suspected marijuana. As a
pre-arranged signal, P02 Mitra scratched his nape to inform SPOl Flores that he already
bought marijuana. When SPO 1 Flores saw the pre-arranged signal, he immediately entered
the shop and help (sic) P02 Mitra in arresting the pusher. The RTC of Batangas City found the
accused Christopher guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Judgment of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused’s guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

221
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The Supreme Court resolves to acquit
accused Christopher as the prosecution utterly failed to prove that the buy-bust team
complied with the mandatory requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165; thus resulting in its
failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
In order to convict a person charged with the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs
under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, the prosecution must prove the following elements:
(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (2) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. In this connection, Section 21, 27 Article II
of R.A. No. 9165, the applicable law at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, lays
down the procedure that police operatives must follow to maintain the integrity of the
confiscated drugs used as evidence. The provision requires that: (1) the seized items be
inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; (2) that the physical
inventory and photographing must be done in the presence of (a) the accused or his/her
representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official, ( c) a representative from the media,
and ( d) a representative from the DOJ, all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof.
In this case, the buy-bust team failed to comply with the requirements of Section 21(1)
of R.A. No. 9165. First, no photographs of the seized drugs were taken at the place of seizure.
Even if there were photographs taken at the barangay hall, this is still not what the law
contemplates as the photographing should be done at the place of apprehension, unless a
justifiable reason to do it in some other place has been established. Second, neither was the
inventory and marking of the alleged seized items done at the place of apprehension. There
was no justifiable ground offered by the prosecution on why the marking of the seized drugs
was done in the barangay hall and not at the place of apprehension of accused Christopher.
Lastly, there was no compliance with the three-witness rule.
People v. Cesar Libonao Dela Cruz

G.R. No. 234151, 5 December 2018.
Caguioa, J.
same style
*NO NEW DOCTRINE
FACTS:
The PDEA office received a phone call from a confidential informant through SO2
Pagulayan disclosing that a certain Cesa Dela Cruz alias Sesi is engaged in illegal drug
activities in Aparri, Cagayan. PCI Bayongan instructed SO2 Pagulayan to lead a team for a
possible buy-bust operation. A team was formed a briefing was conducted. PO2 Molina was
designated as the poseur buyer. The team arrived at Aparri Cagayan at 6 p.m. on the same day.
The team immediately met the confidential informant at a safe place and had a final briefing.
At 8:30 in the evening, SO2 Pagulayan instructed PO2 Molina and the confidential informant
to proceed to the residence of the accused. Upon reaching Zone 2, the team saw a man
standing along the highway which is Cesar Dela Cruz. When the transaction was completed
the accused was then arrested. SO2 Pagulayan apprised the accused of his constitutional rights.
The PDEA agents brought the accused including the seized items in the Aparri Police Station
222
for marking and inventory of the confiscated items. The inventory was witnessed by two
Barangay officials.
The RTC ruled that the prosecution’s evidence sufficiently established the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. The CA affirmed Dela Cruz’s conviction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Dela Cruz's guilt for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 was proven
beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that the appeal is meritorious. The accused is acquitted.
Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, the applicable law at the time of the commission
of the alleged crime, outlines the procedure which the police officers must strictly follow to
preserve the integrity of the confiscated drugs and/or paraphernalia used as evidence. The
provision requires that: (1) the seized items be inventoried and photographed immediately
after seizure or confiscation; (2) the physical inventory and photographing must be done in the
presence of (a) the accused or his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official, (c)
a representative from the media, and (d) a representative from the DOJ, all of whom shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same and the seized
drugs must be turned over to a forensic laboratory within 24 hours from confiscation for
examination.
In this case, the buy-bust team failed to strictly comply with the mandatory
requirements under Section 21, par. 1 of R.A. No. 9165. First, the arresting officers failed to
mark and photograph the seized illegal drug at the place of arrest. Moreover, none of the three
required witnesses was present at the time of seizure and apprehension. Second, even more
revealing is the fact that Barangay Kagawad Anthony Pipo (Kagawad Pipo), whose signature
was affixed on the inventory, did not witness the actual preparation of the inventory and
photographing of the seized items. As to the Barangay Captain who allegedly signed the
inventory, he failed to take the witness stand. Thus, these anomalies in the custodial chain
create serious doubt as to the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized illegal drug. Lastly,
the buy-bust team failed to offer any explanation for their failure to strictly comply with the
requirements of Section 21.
People v. Stanley Romero Maderazo

G.R. No. 235348, 10 December 2018
Peralta, J.
TOPIC: Illegal Search
FACTS:
On 31 March 2015, P/Supt. Jaycees De Sagun Tolentino (Tolentino) filed with the
RTC of Calapan City, Branch 40 two (2) separate applications for search warrants against
Maderazo, Nestor Alea (Alea), Daren Mabansag (Mabansag) and Lovely Joy Alcantara
(Alcantara). In his search warrant applications, Tolentino alleged that he has been informed by
barangay officials, Loida Tapere Roco (Roco) and Rexcel Lozano Rivera (Rivera, that
Maderazo, along with Alea, Mabansag and Alcantara, is keeping an undetermined quantity of
223
dangerous drugs, drug paraphernalia, and firearms of unknown caliber and ammunitions
inside his residence in Barangay Lazareto, Calapan City, Oriental Mindoro.
On 31 March 2015, after the preliminary investigation of witnesses Roco and Rivera,
under oath, Executive Judge Tomas C. Leynes (Judge Leynes) issued Search Warrant No.
09-2015 for violation of R.A No. 9165 and Search Warrant No. 10-2015 for violation of R.A. No.
10591. On even date, both search warrants were served in the subject house in Barangay
Lazareto, Calapan City, Oriental Mindoro. Maderazo, Alea, and Mabansag were, subsequently,
charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs and drug paraphernalia, and illegal
possession of firearm. On 1 July 2015, Maderazo filed the Motion to Quash, arguing that
Search Warrant Nos. 09-2015 and 10-2015 were issued without probable cause; thus, all items
seized by virtue of their enforcement were inadmissible in evidence. He claimed that
Tolentino did not have personal knowledge of Maderazo's supposed possession of illegal
drugs and an unlicensed firearm, because the police officer merely relied on Roco and Rivera's
statements.
On 14 August 2015, the trial court rendered its Order denying the motion to quash.
Maderazo moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied in its September 21, 2015
Order. Thus, before the appellate court, Maderazo filed a petition for certiorari alleging grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court
when it denied the motion to quash search warrants. On April 26, 201 7, the CA granted the
petition for certiorari, and nullified and set' aside Search Warrant Nos. 09-2015 and 10-2015.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Judge Leynes committed
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Orders, denying respondent’s motion to
quash the subject search warrants.
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative as a search warrant may be issued only if
there is probable cause in connection with a specific offense alleged in an application based on
the personal knowledge of the applicant and his witnesses. This is the substantive requirement
for the issuance of a search warrant. Procedurally, the determination of probable cause is a
personal task of the judge before whom the application for search warrant is filed, as he has to
examine the applicant and his or her witnesses in the form of "searching questions and
answers" in writing and under oath.
In determining the existence of probable cause in an application for search warrant, the
mandate of the judge is for him to conduct a full and searching examination of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce. The searching questions propounded to the
applicant and the witnesses must depend on a large extent upon the discretion of the judge.
Although there is no hard-and-fast rule as to how a judge may conduct his examination, it is
axiomatic that the said examination must be probing and exhaustive and not merely routinary,
general, peripheral or perfunctory. He must make his own inquiry on the intent and factual
and legal justifications for a search warrant. The questions should not merely be repetitious of
the averments stated in the affidavits/deposition of the applicant and the witnesses.
Following the foregoing principles, the Court agrees with the CA in ruling that the trial
judge failed to conduct the probing and exhaustive inquiry as mandated by the Constitution.
A perusal of the preliminary examination taken on all the witnesses on March 31, 2015
224
appeared to be coached in identical form of questions and answers. The trial judge failed to
propound questions as to how the applicants came to know of the existence of the items,
where they found it, or what they have seen and observed inside the premises. There were no
probing, exhaustive, and extensive questions.
Moreover, as correctly pointed out by the CA, insofar as Search Warrant No. 10-2015
was issued in connection with the offense of illegal possession of firearms, the elements of the
offense should be present, to wit: (1) the existence of the subject firearm; and (2) the fact that
the accused who owned or possessed it does not have the license or permit to possess the
same. In the instant case, neither the testimonies of the witnesses nor Tolentino's application
for the issuance of the search warrants mentioned that Maderazo had no license to possess a
firearm. No certification from the appropriate government agency was presented to show that
Maderazo was not licensed to possess a firearm. They, likewise, failed to adduce the evidence
required to prove the existence of probable cause that Maderazo had no license to possess a
firearm.
In ruling against the admissibility of the items seized, the Court: held that prohibited
articles may be seized but only as long as the search is valid. In this case, it was not because: (1)
there were no valid search warrants; and (2) absent such a warrant, the right thereto was not
validly waived by Maderazo.

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