11. Albenson Enterprises vs.
CA
10. PNB v CA
83 SCRA 237 – Business Organization – Corporation Law – Corporation’s Liability for
Negligence
Rita Tapnio owes PNB an amount of P2,000.00. The amount is secured by her sugar
crops about to be harvested including her export quota allocation worth 1,000 piculs.
The said export quota was later dealt by Tapnio to a certain Jacobo Tuazon at P2.50
per picul or a total of P2,500. Since the subject of the deal is mortgaged with PNB, the
latter has to approve it. The branch manager of PNB recommended that the price
should be at P2.80 per picul which was the prevailing minimum amount allowable.
Tapnio and Tuazon agreed to the said amount. And so the bank manager
recommended the agreement to the vice president of PNB. The vice president in turn
recommended it to the board of directors of PNB.
However, the Board of Directors wanted to raise the price to P3.00 per picul. This
Tuazon does not want hence he backed out from the agreement. This resulted to
Tapnio not being able to realize profit and at the same time rendered her unable to pay
her P2,000.00 crop loan which would have been covered by her agreement with
Tuazon.
Eventually, Tapnio was sued by her other creditors and Tapnio filed a third party
complaint against PNB where she alleged that her failure to pay her debts was because
of PNB’s negligence and unreasonableness.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tapnio is correct.
HELD: Yes. In this type of transaction, time is of the essence considering that Tapnio’s
sugar quota for said year needs to be utilized ASAP otherwise her allotment may be
assigned to someone else, and if she can’t use it, she won’t be able to export her crops.
It is unreasonable for PNB’s board of directors to disallow the agreement between
Tapnio and Tuazon because of the mere difference of 0.20 in the agreed price rate.
What makes it more unreasonable is the fact that the P2.80 was recommended both
by the bank manager and PNB’s VP yet it was disapproved by the board. Further, the
P2.80 per picul rate is the minimum allowable rate pursuant to prevailing market trends
that time. This unreasonable stand reflects PNB’s lack of the reasonable degree of care
and vigilance in attending to the matter. PNB is therefore negligent.
A corporation is civilly liable in the same manner as natural persons for torts, because
“generally speaking, the rules governing the liability of a principal or master for a tort
committed by an agent or servant are the same whether the principal or master be a
natural person or a corporation, and whether the servant or agent be a natural or
artificial person. All of the authorities agree that a principal or master is liable for every
tort which it expressly directs or authorizes, and this is just as true of a corporation as
of a natural person, a corporation is liable, therefore, whenever a tortious act is
committed by an officer or agent under express direction or authority from the
stockholders or members acting as a body, or, generally, from the directors as the
governing body.”
ALBENSON vs. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
Albenson Ent. delivered mild steel plates to Guaranteed Industries Inc. A Pacific
Banking Corporation Check was paid and drawn against the account of EL
Woodworks. Check was later dishonored for the reason “Account Closed.”
Company traced source of check and later discovered that the signature
belonged to one Eugenio Baltao. Albenson made an extrajudical demand upon Baltao
but latter denied that he issued the check or that the signature was his. Company filed
a complaint against Baltao for violation of BP 22. It was later discovered that
private respondent had son: Eugene Baltao III, who manages the business
establishment, EL Woodworks. No effort from the father to inform Albenson of such
information. Rather the father filed complaint for damages against Albenson.
ISSUE:
Whether there is indeed cause for the damages against Albenson Enterprise.
RULING:
Based on Art 19, 20, 21 of the civil code, petitioners didn’t have the intent to cause
damage to the
respondent or enrich themselves but just to collect what was due to them. There was
no abuse of right on
the part of Albenson on accusing Baltao of BP 22.
Albenson Corp. honestly believed that it was private respondent who issued check
based on ff inquiries:
  SEC records showed that president to Guaranteed was Eugene Baltao
  Bank said signature belonged to EB
  EB did not do his part in clarifying that there were in fact 3 Ebs, Jr., Sr. and the
III.

There was no malicious prosecution on the part of Albenson: there must be proof
that:
  the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person
and
  that damages was initiated deliberately by defendant knowing that his charges
were false
and groundless
Elements of abuse of right under Article 19:
1. there is a legal right or duty
2. exercised in bad faith
3. for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another
Elements under Article 21: contra bonus mores:
1. there is an act which is legal
2. but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order or public policy
3. it is done with intent to injure
A person who has not been paid an obligation owed to him will naturally seek ways to
compel the debtor
to pay him. It was normal for petitioners to find means to make the issuer of the check
pay the amount
thereof. In the absence of a wrongful act or omission or of fraud or bad faith, moral
damages cannot be
awarded and that the adverse result of an action does not per se make the action
wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of damages, for the law could not have
meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in
C.A. G.R. C.V. No.
14948 dated May 13, 1989, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Costs against
respondent Baltao
Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of
rights, sets certain standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of one's
rights but also in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the following:
to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. ..A
right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may
nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a
manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in
damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must
be held responsible
12. FLORES V. LINDO
G.R. No. 183984, [April 13, 2011]
FACTS:
Respondent Edna Lindo obtained a loan from Petitioner Arturo Flores amounting to
P400,000 and secured it with a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage. The mortgage covered
property in the name of Edna and her husband, co-respondent Enrico Lindo, Jr. Edna
likewise signed a Promissory Note and the Deed for herself and for Enrico as his
attorney-in-fact.
She issued three checks as partial loan payments, all of which were dishonored for
insufficiency of funds. Flores therefore filed a complaint for foreclosure of the mortgage
with damages. The RTC ruled that petitioner was not entitled to judicial foreclosure as
the Deed was without consent and authority of Edna’s husband. The Deed was
executed on October 31, 1995, while the Special Power of Attorney was executed by
Enrico only on November 4, 1995. Accordingly, the mortgage is void pursuant to Article
96 of the Family Code. The RTC, however, ruled that petitioner may still recover the
loan through a personal action against Edna, but that it had no jurisdiction over the said
personal action which should be filed where plaintiff or defendant resides.
Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money and damages. The respondents alleged
that Enrico was not a party to the loan because it was contracted by Edna without
Enrico’s signature. They also prayed for the dismissal of the case on grounds of
improper venue, res judicata and forum-shopping. The RTC ruled that res judicata will
not apply to rights, claims or demands which, though growing out of the same subject
matter, constitute separate or distinct causes of action.
The Court of Appeals set aside the RTC ruling. It noted that petitioner allowed the
earlier decision of the RTC to become final and executory without asking the courts for
an alternative relief. The Court of Appeals stated that petitioner merely relied on the
declarations of these courts that he could file a separate personal action and thus failed
to observe the rules and settled jurisprudence on multiplicity of suits, closing petitioner’s
avenue for recovery of the loan.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the promissory note and deed of mortgage are void
(2) Whether there remains an available remedy for petitioner
HELD:
(1) NO. Article 124 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall
belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband’s decision shall
prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be
availed of within five years from the date of contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers
of administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without
authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such
authority or consent the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the
transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting
spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the
acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is
withdrawn by either or both offerors. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 124 of the Family Code of which applies to conjugal partnership property, is a
reproduction of Article 96 of the Family Code which applies to community property.
Both Article 96 and Article 127 of the Family Code provide that the powers do not
include disposition or encumbrance without the written consent of the other spouse.
Any disposition or encumbrance without the written consent shall be void. However,
both provisions also state that “the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer
on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a
binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse x x x beforethe offer is
withdrawn by either or both offerors.”
In this case, the Promissory Note and the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage were executed
on 31 October 1995. The Special Power of Attorney was executed on 4 November
1995. The execution of the SPA is the acceptance by the other spouse that perfected
the continuing offer as a binding contract between the parties, making the Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage a valid contract.
(2) YES. In Chieng v. Santos, this Court ruled that a mortgage-creditor may institute
against the mortgage-debtor either a personal action for debt or a real action to
foreclose the mortgage. The Court ruled that the remedies are alternative and not
cumulative and held that the filing of a criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 was in effect a collection suit or a suit for the recovery of the mortgage-debt. In
that case, however, this Court pro hac vice, ruled that respondents could still be held
liable for the balance of the loan, applying the principle that no person may unjustly
enrich himself at the expense of another.
The principle of unjust enrichment is provided under Article 22 of the Civil Code which
provides:
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other
means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter
without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.
There is unjust enrichment “when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of
another, or when a person retains money or property of another against the
fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience.” The principle of unjust
enrichment requires two conditions: (1) that a person is benefited without a valid basis
or justification, and (2) that such benefit is derived at the expense of another. The main
objective of the principle against unjust enrichment is to prevent one from enriching
himself at the expense of another without just cause or consideration. The principle is
applicable in this case considering that Edna admitted obtaining a loan from petitioners,
and the same has not been fully paid without just cause. The Deed was declared void
erroneously at the instance of Edna, first when she raised it as a defense before the
RTC, Branch 33 and second, when she filed an action for declaratory relief before the
RTC, Branch 93. Petitioner could not be expected to ask the RTC, Branch 33 for an
alternative remedy, as what the Court of Appeals ruled that he should have done,
because the RTC, Branch 33 already stated that it had no jurisdiction over any personal
action that petitioner might have against Edna.
Edna should not be allowed to unjustly enrich herself because of the erroneous
decisions of the two trial courts when she questioned the validity of the Deed.
13. OMINGO GONZALO, Petitioner, vs. JOHN TARNATE, JR., Respondent.
G.R. No. 160600 January 15, 2014
PONENTE: Bersamin, J.
TOPIC: Void or inexistent contract
FACTS:
After the DPWH had awarded on July 22, 1997 the contract for the
improvement of the Sadsadan-Maba-ay Section of the Mountain Province-Benguet
Road to his company, Gonzalo Construction, petitioner Gonzalo subcontracted to
respondent Tarnate on October 15, 1997, the supply of materials and labor for the
project under the latter’s business known as JNT Aggregates. Their agreement
stipulated, among others, that Tarnate would pay to Gonzalo eight percent and four
percent of the contract price, respectively, upon Tarnate’s first and second billing in the
project.
In furtherance of their agreement, Gonzalo executed on April 6, 1999 a deed
of assignment whereby he, as the contractor, was assigning to Tarnate an amount
equivalent to 10% of the total collection from the DPWH for the project. This 10%
retention fee was the rent for Tarnate’s equipment that had been utilized in the project.
In the deed of assignment, Gonzalo further authorized Tarnate to use the official receipt
of Gonzalo Construction in the processing of the documents relative to the collection of
the 10% retention fee and in encashing the check to be issued by the DPWH for that
purpose. The deed of assignment was submitted to the DPWH on April 15, 1999.
During the processing of the documents for the retention fee, however, Tarnate learned
that Gonzalo had unilaterally rescinded the deed of assignment by means of an affidavit
of cancellation of deed of assignment dated April 19, 1999 filed in the DPWH on April
22, 1999; and that the disbursement voucher for the 10% retention fee had then been
issued in the name of Gonzalo, and the retention fee released to him.
Tarnate demanded the payment of the retention fee from Gonzalo, but to no
avail.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subcontract and deed of assignment are void contracts.
HELD:
YES. The Court held that the subcontract agreement and deed of assignment
between Gonzalo and Tarnate are void for being contrary to law. However, even though
both parties are in pare delicto the Court allowed Tarnate to recover his retention fee,
as an exception, due to unjust enrichment.
Contract is void
Every contractor is prohibited from subcontracting with or assigning to
another person any contract or project that he has with the DPWH unless the DPWH
Secretary has approved the subcontracting or assignment. Gonzalo, who was the sole
contractor of the project in question, subcontracted the implementation of the project to
Tarnate in violation of the statutory prohibition. Their subcontract was illegal, therefore,
because it did not bear the approval of the DPWH Secretary. Necessarily, the deed of
assignment was also illegal, because it sprung from the subcontract.
Obviously, without the Sub-Contract Agreement there will be no Deed of
Assignment to speak of. The illegality of the Sub-Contract Agreement necessarily
affects the Deed of Assignment because the rule is that an illegal agreement cannot
give birth to a valid contract. To rule otherwise is to sanction the act of entering into
transaction the object of which is expressly prohibited by law and thereafter execute an
apparently valid contract to subterfuge the illegality. The legal proscription in such an
instance will be easily rendered nugatory and meaningless to the prejudice of the
general public.
Under Article 1409 (1) of the Civil Code, a contract whose cause, object or
purpose is contrary to law is a void or inexistent contract. As such, a void contract
cannot produce a valid one. To the same effect is Article 1422 of the Civil Code, which
declares that “a contract, which is the direct result of a previous illegal contract, is also
void and inexistent.”
Rigid application of in pare delicto in void contracts; exception
According to Article 1412 (1) of the Civil Code, the guilty parties to an illegal
contract cannot recover from one another and are not entitled to an affirmative relief
because they are in pari delicto or in equal fault. The doctrine of in pari delicto is a
universal doctrine that holds that no action arises, in equity or at law, from an illegal
contract; no suit can be maintained for its specific performance, or to recover the
property agreed to be sold or delivered, or the money agreed to be paid, or damages
for its violation; and where the parties are in pari delicto, no affirmative relief of any kind
will be given to one against the other.
Nonetheless, the application of the doctrine of in pari delicto is not always
rigid. An accepted exception arises when its application contravenes well-established
public policy.
There is no question that Tarnate provided the equipment, labor and
materials for the project in compliance with his obligations under the subcontract and
the deed of assignment; and that it was Gonzalo as the contractor who received the
payment for his contract with the DPWH as well as the 10% retention fee that should
have been paid to Tarnate pursuant to the deed of assignment. Considering that
Gonzalo refused despite demands to deliver to Tarnate the stipulated 10% retention
fee that would have compensated the latter for the use of his equipment in the project,
Gonzalo would be unjustly enriched at the expense of Tarnate if the latter was to be
barred from recovering because of the rigid application of the doctrine of in pari delicto.
The prevention of unjust enrichment called for the exception to apply in Tarnate’s favor.
14. Ople v Torres
Facts: Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled
"Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two
important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress
to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of
privacy. We grant the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner
need stronger barriers against further erosion.
A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January
22, 1997 and January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition
against respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the
government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee,
are charged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining its implementation.
Issue: Petitioner contends:
A. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION
REFERENCE SYSTEM REQUIRES A LEGISLATIVE ACT. THE ISSUANCE OF A.O.
NO. 308 BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES IS,
THEREFORE, AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE
POWERS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.
B. THE APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS BY THE PRESIDENT FOR THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION
OF THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OF CONGRESS TO APPROPRIATE PUBLIC FUNDS
FOR EXPENDITURE.
C. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 INSIDIOUSLY LAYS THE
GROUNDWORK FOR A SYSTEM WHICH WILL VIOLATE THE BILL OF RIGHTS
ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION."
Held: IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Administrative Order No. 308
entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System"
declared null and void for being unconstitutional. SO ORDERED.
Ratio: It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the
Administrative Code of 1987. It establishes for the first time a National Computerized
Identification Reference System. Such a System requires a delicate adjustment of
various contending state policies — the primacy of national security, the extent of
privacy interest against dossier-gathering by government, the choice of policies, etc.
Indeed, the dissent of Mr. Justice Mendoza states that the A.O. No. 308 involves the
all-important freedom of thought.
Nor is it correct to argue as the dissenters do that A.O. No. 308 is not a law because
it confers no right, imposes no duty, affords no protection, and creates no office. Under
A.O. No. 308, a citizen cannot transact business with government agencies delivering
basic services to the people without the contemplated identification card. No citizen will
refuse to get this identification card for no one can avoid dealing with government. It is
thus clear as daylight that without the ID, a citizen will have difficulty exercising his
rights and enjoying his privileges. Given this reality, the contention that A.O. No. 308
gives no right and imposes no duty cannot stand.
In view of standing
Petitioner Ople is a distinguished member of our Senate. As a Senator, petitioner is
possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of
A.O. No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative power. As taxpayer and member of the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), petitioner can also impugn the legality
of the misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSIS funds to implement A.O.
No. 308.
The ripeness for adjudication of the petition at bar is not affected by the fact that the
implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails
A.O. No. 308 as invalid per se and as infirmed on its face. His action is not premature
for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects. Moreover, the
respondents themselves have started the implementation of A.O. No. 308 without
waiting for the rules. As early as January 19, 1997, respondent Social Security System
(SSS) caused the publication of a notice to bid for the manufacture of the National
Identification (ID) card.
In view of the need for Legislative Act
 An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to
specific aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony
with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying
out the legislative policy.
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing
orders as determined by proper governmental organs. 21 It enables the President to
fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his
agents. To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations.
Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is
not appropriate to be covered by an administrative order. An administrative order is:
"Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. — Acts of the President which relate to particular
aspects of governmental operation in pursuance of his duties as administrative head
shall be promulgated in administrative orders."
Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrative order but a law and
hence, beyond the power of the President to issue. He alleges that A.O. No. 308
establishes a system of identification that is all-encompassing in scope, affects the life
and liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign resident, and more particularly, violates
their right to privacy.
Petitioner's sedulous concern for the Executive not to trespass on the lawmaking
domain of Congress is understandable. The blurring of the demarcation line between
the power of the Legislature to make laws and the power of the Executive to execute
laws will disturb their delicate balance of power and cannot be allowed.
In view of right to privacy
Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a
fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government
to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state interest and that it is
narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two considerations: (1) the need to
provide our citizens and foreigners with the facility to conveniently transact business
with basic service and social security providers and other government instrumentalities
and (2) the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and
misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services. It is debatable whether these
interests are compelling enough to warrant the issuance of A.O. No. 308. But what is
not arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which
if implemented will put our people's right to privacy in clear and present danger.
The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for a Population
Reference Number (PRN) as a "common reference number to establish a linkage
among concerned agencies" through the use of "Biometrics Technology" and
"computer application designs." A.O. No. 308 should also raise our antennas for a
further look will show that it does not state whether encoding of data is limited to
biological information alone for identification purposes. In fact, the Solicitor General
claims that the adoption of the Identification Reference System will contribute to the
"generation of population data for development planning." This is an admission that the
PRN will not be used solely for identification but for the generation of other data with
remote relation to the avowed purposes of A.O. No. 308. Clearly, the indefiniteness of
A.O. No. 308 can give the government the roving authority to store and retrieve
information for a purpose other than the identification of the individual through his PRN
.
His transactions with the government agency will necessarily be recorded —
whether it be in the computer or in the documentary file of the agency. The individual's
file may include his transactions for loan availments, income tax returns, statement of
assets and liabilities, reimbursements for medication, hospitalization, etc. The more
frequent the use of the PRN, the better the chance of building a huge and formidable
information base through the electronic linkage of the files. The data may be gathered
for gainful and useful government purposes; but the existence of this vast reservoir of
personal information constitutes a covert invitation to misuse, a temptation that may be
too great for some of our authorities to resist.
Well to note, the computer linkage gives other government agencies access to the
information. Yet, there are no controls to guard against leakage of information. When
the access code of the control programs of the particular computer system is broken,
an intruder, without fear of sanction or penalty, can make use of the data for whatever
purpose, or worse, manipulate the data stored within the system. It is plain and we hold
that A.O. No. 308 falls short of assuring that personal information which will be gathered
about our people will only be processed for unequivocally specified purposes. 60 The
lack of proper safeguards in this regard of A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the
individual's liberty of abode and travel by enabling authorities to track down his
movement; it may also enable unscrupulous persons to access confidential information
and circumvent the right against self-incrimination; it may pave the way for "fishing
expeditions" by government authorities and evade the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures. The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometrics
and computer technology are accentuated when we consider that the individual lacks
control over what can be read or placed on his ID, much less verify the correctness of
the data encoded. They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks to
prevent.
In Morfe v. Mutuc, we upheld the constitutionality of R.A. 3019, the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, as a valid police power measure. We declared that the law, in
compelling a public officer to make an annual report disclosing his assets and liabilities,
his sources of income and expenses, did not infringe on the individual's right to privacy.
The law was enacted to promote morality in public administration by curtailing and
minimizing the opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a standard of
honesty in the public service.
In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all
incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and
technological advancements that enhance public service and the common good. It
merely requires that the law be narrowly focused and a compelling interest justify such
intrusions. Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards and
well-defined standards to prevent unconstitutional invasions.
15. Cordero v Buigasco
16. Madeja v Caro
FACTS:
In Criminal Case No. 75-88 of the defunct Court of First Instance of Eastern Samar,
DR. EVA A. JAPZON is accused of homicide through reckless imprudence for the death
of Cleto Madeja after an appendectomy. The complaining witness is the widow of the
deceased, Carmen L. Madeja. The information states that: "The offended party Carmen
L. Madeja reserving her right to file a separate civil action for damages." (Rollo, p. 36.)
The criminal case still pending, Carmen L. Madeja sued Dr. Eva A. Japzon for damages
in Civil Case No. 141 of the same court. She alleged that her husband died because of
the gross negligence of Dr. Japzon. The respondent judge granted the defendant's
motion to dismiss which motion invoked Section 3(a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court
There are at least two things about Art. 33 of the Civil Code which are worth noting,
namely:
1. The civil action for damages which it allows to be instituted is ex-delicto. This
is manifest from the provision which uses the expressions "criminal action" and
"criminal prosecution." This conclusion is supported by the comment of the Code
Commission, thus:têñ.£îhqwâ£
The underlying purpose of the principle under consideration is to allow the citizen to
enforce his rights in a private action brought by him, regardless of the action of the
State attorney. It is not conducive to civic spirit and to individual self-reliance and
initiative to habituate the citizens to depend upon the government for the vindication of
their own private rights. It is true that in many of the cases referred to in the provision
cited, a criminal prosecution is proper, but it should be remembered that while the State
is the complainant in the criminal case, the injured individual is the one most concerned
because it is he who has suffered directly. He should be permitted to demand reparation
for the wrong which peculiarly affects him. (Report, p. 46.)
And Tolentino says:têñ.£îhqwâ£
The general rule is that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery
of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal
action, unless the offended party reserves his right to institute it separately; and after a
criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense can
be prosecuted. The present articles creates an exception to this rule when the offense
is defamation, fraud, or physical injuries, In these cases, a civil action may be filed
independently of the criminal action, even if there has been no reservation made by the
injured party; the law itself in this article makes such reservation; but the claimant is not
given the right to determine whether the civil action should be scheduled or suspended
until the criminal action has been terminated. The result of the civil action is thus
independent of the result of the civil action." (I Civil Code, p. 144 [1974.])
2. The term "physical injuries" is used in a generic sense. It is not the crime of
physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical
injuries but consummated, frustrated and attempted homicide.têñ.£îhqwâ£
The Article in question uses the words 'defamation', 'fraud' and 'physical injuries.'
Defamation and fraud are used in their ordinary sense because there are no specific
provisions in the Revised Penal Code using these terms as means of offenses defined
therein, so that these two terms defamation and fraud must have been used not to
impart to them any technical meaning in the laws of the Philippines, but in their generic
sense. With this apparent circumstance in mind, it is evident that the terms 'physical
injuries' could not have been used in its specific sense as a crime defined in the Revised
Penal Code, for it is difficult to believe that the Code Commission would have used
terms in the same article-some in their general and another in its technical sense. In
other words, the term 'physical injuries' should be understood to mean bodily injury, not
the crime of physical injuries, bacause the terms used with the latter are general terms.
In any case the Code Commission recommended that the civil action for physical
injuries be similar to the civil action for assault and battery in American Law, and this
recommendation must hove been accepted by the Legislature when it approved the
article intact as recommended. If the intent has been to establish a civil action for the
bodily harm received by the complainant similar to the civil action for assault and
battery, as the Code Commission states, the civil action should lie whether the offense
committed is that of physical injuries, or frustrated homicide, or attempted homicide, or
even death," (Carandang vs. Santiago, 97 Phil. 94, 96-97 [1955].

17. Newsounds Broadcasting Network v Dy
G.R. Nos. 170270 & 179411 April 2, 2009
Facts:
Petitioners operate and run Bombo Radyo DZNC Cauayan (DZNC), an AM radio
broadcast station, and Star FM DWIT Cauayan, an FM radio broadcast station, in
Cauayan Citry, Isabela. Back in 1996, Newsounds commenced relocation of its
broadcasting station, management office, and transmitters on propery located in
Minante 2, Cauayan City, Isabela.
On July 1996, the Housing & Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and Office of the
Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator (OMPDC) affirmed and certified that
the commercial structure to be constructed conformed to local zoning regulations,
noting as well that the location is classified as a “commercial area”. The radio station
was able to fully operate smoothly thereafter.
In 2002 however, when petitioners applied for a renewal of mayor’s permit, City Zoning
Administratior-Designate Bagnos Maximo refused to issue zoning clearance on the
grounds that petitioners were not able to submit conversion papers showing that the
agricultural land was converted to commercial land. Petitioners asked the court to
compel the issuance of mayor’s permit but the court denied the action. In the meantime,
the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Region II office issued to petitioners a formal
recognition of conversion of the property from agricultural to commercial.
In 2003, petitioners again filed their application for renewal of mayor’s permit, attaching
the DAR Order. Respondent Felicisimo Meer, acting City Administrator of Cauayan City
denied the same, claiming that it was void on the grounds that they did not have record
of the DAR Order.
The deadline lapsed on Febuary 15, 2004, and respondents Meer and Racma
Fernandez-Garcia, City Legal Officer of Cauayan City, closed the radio station. Due to
the prvosion of Omnibus Election Code which prohibits the closure of radio station
during the pendency of election period, COMELEC issued an order allowing the
petitioners to operate before Febuary 17, 2004, but was barred again by respondent
Mayor Ceasar Dy on the grounds that the radio station had no permit. Nonetheless,
COMELEC allowed them to run again until June 10, 2004 after elections.
Petitioners filed the case to the RTC and CA for the issuance of mayor’s permit but
both courts denied the petition.
A municipal or city mayor is likewise authorized under the LGC to issue licenses and
permits, and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the conditions upon which
said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance. In case of
Cauayan City, the authority to require a mayor’s permit was enacted through Ordinance
No. 92-004, enacted in 1993. However, nothing in the ordinance requires an application
for a mayor’s permit to submit “either an approved land conversion papers from DAR,
showing that its property was converted from prime agricultural land or an approved
resolution from the Sangguniang Bayan or Sangguniang Panglungsod authorizing the
reclassification of property from agricultural to commercial land.
In 1996, the HLURB issued a zoning decision that classified the property as
commercial. Petitioners are also armed with several certifications stating that the
property is indeed a commercial area. Also, petitioners paid real property taxes based
on the classification of property as commercial without objections raised by the
respondents.
Petitioners argued that this consistent recognition by the local government of Cauayan
of the commercial character of the property constitutes estoppels against respondents
from denying the fact before the courts. The lower courts had ruled that “the
government of Cauayan City is not bound by estoppels, but petitioners classified that
this concept is understood to only refer to acts and mistakes of its official especially to
those which are irregular.
Issue:
Whether the lower court is correct in contending that the government of Cauayan City
is not bound by estoppels on the grounds that the state is immune against suits.
Held:
No. While it is true that the state cannot be put in estoppels by mistake or error of its
officials or agents, there is an exception.
Estoppels against the public are little favored. They should not be invoked except in
rare and unusual circumstances, and may not be invoked where they would operate to
defeat the effective operation of a policy adopted to protect the public. They must be
applied with circumspection and should be applied only in those special cases where
the interests of justice clearly require it. Nevertheless, the government must not be
allowed to deal dishonorably or capriciously with its citizens, and must not play an
ignoble part or do a shabby thing; and subject to limitations . . ., the doctrine of equitable
estoppel may be invoked against public authorities as well as against private individuals
Thus, when there is no convincing evidence to prove irregularity or negligence on the
part of the government official whose acts are being disowned other than the bare
assertion on the part of the State, the Supreme Court have declined to apply State
immunity from estoppel. Herein, there is absolutely no evidence other than the bare
assertions of the respondents that the Cauayan City government had previously erred
when it certified that the property had been zoned for commercial use. The absence of
any evidence other than bare assertions that the 1996 to 2001 certifications were
incorrect lead to the ineluctable conclusion that respondents are estopped from
asserting that the previous recognition of the property as commercial was wrong.
Respondents were further estopped from disclaiming the previous consistent
recognition by the Cauayan City government that the property was commercially zoned
unless they had evidence, which they had none, that the local officials who issued such
certifications acted irregularly in doing so. It is thus evident that respondents had no
valid cause at all to even require petitioners to secure “approved land conversion
papers from the DAR showing that the property was converted from prime agricultural
land to commercial land.”
Respondents closure of petitioner’s radio stations is clearly tainted with ill motvies.
Petitioners have been aggressive in exposing the widespread election irregularities in
Isabela that appear to have favored respondent Dy and his political dynasty. Such
statement manifests and confirms that respondent’s denial of the renewal applications
on the ground that property is commercial and merely a pretext, and their real agenda
is to remove petitioners from Cauayan City and suppress the latter’s voice. This is a
blatant violation of constitutional right to press freedom.WHEREFORE, the petitions
are GRANTED. The assailed decisions of the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial
Court of Cauayan City, Branch 24, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
instant petition for mandamus is hereby GRANTED and respondents are directed to
immediately issue petitioners’ zoning clearances and mayor’s permits for 2004 to
petitioners.
18. Corpuz v Paje
Facts:
—December 23, 1956 in Lubao, Pampanga, the passenger bus driven by Felardo Paje
collided with the jeep driven by Clemente Marcia resulting to Clemente’s death and
physical injuries to two other persons. —A case was filed against Paje in the CFI of
Pampanga for homicide and double serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence. —On November 7, 1960, Paje was found guilty but he appealed the
judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals (CA). —On November 21, 1961, while
Paje’s appeal was pending decision in the CA, Corpus instituted in the CFI of Rizal a
separate civil action (Civil Case No. 6880) for damages based upon the criminal act of
reckless imprudence against Paje & Victory Liner Transportation Co., Inc. —Corpus
was claiming that the defendants be ordered to pay jointly and separately the amounts
of damages. —On November 9, 1962, CA promulgated its decision in the appeal of Paje
reversing the appealed judgement and acquitting him after finding that the reckless
imprudence charged against him did not exist, and that the collision was a case of pure
accident. —On December 29, 1962, Paje & Victory Liner filed in the civil action a motion
to dismiss on the ground that the action was barred by the acquittal by the CA but the
motion was denied.
Issue:
Whether or not Corpus could claim the damages from Paje & Victory Liner as per the
civil case she filed.
Held:
—No. Corpus could not claim for any damages filed on the civil case as the CFI of Rizal
dismissed the complaint on May 31, 1966 on the ground that Corpus’ action was based
upon a quasi-delict.
—Quasi-delict is an act whereby a person, without malice, but by fault, negligence or
imprudence not legally excusable, causes injury to another.
—As per Article 1146 of the Civil Code, upon a quasi-delict , the action must be instituted
within four years. Corpus filed a civil case against Paje on November 21, 1961 which
was already 4 years & 11 months since the incident happened on December 23, 1956.
——Rules of Court (Rule 111, Sec.3) the extinction of the criminal action by acquittal of
the defendant on the ground that the criminal act charged against him did not exist,
necessarily extinguished also the civil action for damages based upon the same act.
19. Maniago v CA
MANIAGO V. CA (G.R. NO. 104392)
Facts:
One of the shuttle buses owned by petitioner Ruben Maniago, and driven by Herminio
Andaya, figured in a vehicular accident with a passenger jeepney owned by respondent
Boado along Loakan Road, Baguio City. A criminal case for reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property and multiple physical injuries was filed against
petitioner’s driver. A month later, respondent Boado filed a civil case for damages
against petitioner Maniago himself. Petitioner moved that the civil case be suspended
citing that a criminal case was already pending. The trial court denied the motion on
the ground that the civil action could proceed independently of the criminal action. On
appeal to CA, petitioner reiterated his contention adding that the civil action could not
proceed because no reservation to bring it separately was made in the criminal case.
CA affirmed the trial court’s decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the civil action may proceed independently of the criminal action when
no reservation of right to bring it separately was made.
Ruling: NO.
*We have reached the conclusion that the right to bring an action for damages under
the Civil Code must be reserved as required by Rule III, §1, otherwise it should be
dismissed.
To begin with, §1 quite clearly requires that a reservation must be made to institute
separately all civil actions for the recovery of civil liability, otherwise they will be deemed
to have been instituted with the criminal case. Such civil actions are not limited to those
which arise “from the offense charged,” as originally provided in Rule III before the
amendment of the Rules of Court in 1988. In other words the right of the injured party
to sue separately for the recovery of the civil liability whether arising from crimes (ex
delicto) or from quasi delict under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code must be reserved
otherwise they will be deemed instituted with the criminal action.
*NOTA BENE: This case is decided under the old rules on criminal procedure. Now,
there is no more need for a reservation of the right to file independent civil actions under
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The reservation and
waiver referred to refers only to the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising
from the offense charged (Case on Point: DMPI Employees Credit Cooperative v.
Velez, G.R. No. 129282, November 29, 2001)