Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

EN BANC

PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS G.R. No. 190529

BROTHERHOOD, INC. (PGBI),
represented by its Secretary- Present:
General GEORGE FGBF PUNO, C.J.,
GEORGE DULDULAO, CARPIO,
Petitioner, CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
- versus - BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
Promulgated:
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondent. April 29, 2010
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

BRION, J.:

The Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) seeks in this petition

for certiorari[1] and in the motion for reconsideration it subsequently filed to nullify
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Resolution No. 8679 dated October 13, 2009
insofar as it relates to PGBI, and the Resolution dated December 9, 2009 denying
PGBIs motion for reconsideration in SPP No. 09-004 (MP). Via these resolutions,
the COMELEC delisted PGBI from the roster of registered national, regional or
sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system.

BACKGROUND

Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941 (RA 7941), otherwise known as the
Party-List System Act, provides:

Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC

may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or
cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or
sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:

xxxx

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to
obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in
the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has
registered.[Emphasis supplied.]

The COMELEC replicated this provision in COMELEC Resolution No. 2847 the
Rules and Regulations Governing the Election of the Party-List Representatives
through the Party-List System which it promulgated on June 25, 1996.

For the upcoming May 2010 elections, the COMELEC en banc issued on October
13, 2009 Resolution No. 8679 deleting several party-list groups or organizations
from the list of registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or
coalitions.Among the party-list organizations affected was PGBI; it was delisted
because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it did not participate in
the 2007 elections. Nevertheless, the COMELEC stated in this Resolution that any
national, regional sectoral party or organizations or coalitions adversely affected can
personally or through its authorized representative file a verified opposition on
October 26, 2009.

PGBI filed its Opposition to Resolution No. 8679, but likewise sought, through its
pleading, the admission ad cautelam of its petition for accreditation as a party-list
organization under the Party-List System Act. Among other arguments, PGBI
asserted that:

(1) The assailed resolution negates the right of movant and those similarly
situated to invoke Section 4 of R.A. No. 7941, which allows any party,
organization and coalition already registered with the Commission to no
longer register anew; the party though is required to file with the
Commission, not later than ninety (90) days before the election, a
manifestation of its desire to participate in the party-list system; since PGBI
filed a Request/Manifestation seeking a deferment of its participation in the
2007 elections within the required period prior to the 2007 elections, it has
the option to choose whether or not to participate in the next succeeding
election under the same conditions as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed;

(2) The Supreme Courts ruling in G.R. No. 177548 Philippine Mines Safety
Environment Association, also known as MINERO v. Commission on
Elections cannot apply in the instant controversy for two reasons: (a) the
factual milieu of the cited case is removed from PGBIs; (b) MINERO, prior
to delisting, was afforded the opportunity to be heard, while PGBI and the
25 others similarly affected by Resolution No. 8679 were not. Additionally,
the requirement of Section 6(8) has been relaxed by the Courts ruling in
G.R. No. 179271 (Banat v. COMELEC) and the exclusion of PGBI and the
25 other party-list is a denial of the equal protection of the laws;

(3) The implementation of the challenged resolution should be suspended

and/or aborted to prevent a miscarriage of justice in view of the failure to
notify the parties in accordance with the same Section 6(8) or R.A. No.
7941.[2]

The COMELEC denied PGBIs motion/opposition for lack of merit.

First, the COMELEC observed that PGBI clearly misunderstood the import
of Section 4 of R.A. 7941.[3] The provision simply means that without the required
manifestation or if a party or organization does not participate, the exemption from
registration does not arise and the party, organization or coalition must go through
the process again and apply for requalification; a request for deferment would not
exempt PGBI from registering anew.

Second, the MINERO ruling is squarely in point, as MINERO failed to get 2%

of the votes in 2001 and did not participate at all in the 2004 elections.
 Third, PGBI was given an opportunity to be heard or to seek the
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of the essence of due process; this
is clear from Resolution No. 8679 which expressly gave the adversely affected
parties the opportunity to file their opposition.

As regards the alternative relief of application for accreditation, the COMELEC

found the motion to have been filed out of time, as August 17, 2009 was the deadline
for accreditation provided in Resolution 8646. The motion was obviously filed
months after the deadline.

PGBI came to us in its petition for certiorari, arguing the same positions it raised
with the COMELEC when it moved to reconsider its delisting.
We initially dismissed the petition in light of our ruling in Philippine Mines Safety
Environment Association, also known as MINERO v. Commission on
Elections (Minero);[4] we said that no grave abuse of discretion exists in a ruling that
correctly applies the prevailing law and jurisprudence. Applying Section 6(8) of RA
7941, the Court disqualified MINERO under the following reasoning:

Since petitioner by its own admission failed to get 2% of the votes in 2001 and did
not participate at all in the 2004 elections, it necessarily failed to get at least two
per centum (2%) of the votes cast in the two preceding elections. COMELEC,
therefore, is not duty bound to certify it.

PGBI subsequently moved to reconsider the dismissal of its petition. Among

other arguments, PGBI claimed that the dismissal of the petition was contrary to law,
the evidence and existing jurisprudence. Essentially, PGBI asserts that Section 6(8)
of RA 7941 does not apply if one is to follow the tenor and import of the
deliberations inclusive of the interpellations in Senate Bill No. 1913 on October 19,
1994. It cited the following excerpts from the Records of the Senate:

Senator Gonzales: On the other hand, Mr. President, under ground no. (7), Section
5 there are actually two grounds it states: Failure to participate in the last two (2)
preceding elections or its failure to obtain at least ten percent (10%) of the votes
case under the party-list system in either of the last two (2) preceding elections for
the constituency in which it has registered

In short, the first ground is that, it failed to participate in the last two (2) preceding
elections. The second is, failure to obtain at least 10 percent of the votes cast under
the party-list system in either of the last two preceding elections, Mr. President,
 Senator Tolentino: Actually, these are two separate grounds.

Senator Gonzales: There are actually two grounds, Mr. President.

Senator Tolentino: Yes, Mr. President.[5] [Underscoring supplied.]

PGBI thus asserts that Section 6(8) does not apply to its situation, as it is obvious
that it failed to participate in one (1) but not in the two (2) preceding
elections. Implied in this is that it also failed to secure the required percentage in one
(1) but not in the two (2) preceding elections.

Considering PGBIs arguments, we granted the motion and reinstated the petition in
the courts docket.

THE ISSUES
We are called upon to resolve: (a) whether there is legal basis for delisting
PGBI; and (b) whether PGBIs right to due process was violated.

OUR RULING

We find the petition partly impressed with merit.

a. The Minero Ruling

Our Minero ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941; hence, it

cannot sustain PGBIs delisting from the roster of registered national, regional or
sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system.

First, the law is clear the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified
complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing,
the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition
if it: (a) fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections; or (b) fails to
obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in
the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.[6] The
word or is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence of one thing
from the other things enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in
which it ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word.[7] Thus, the plain, clear and
unmistakable language of the law provides for two (2) separate reasons for delisting.

Second, Minero is diametrically opposed to the legislative intent of Section

6(8) of RA 7941, as PGBIs cited congressional deliberations clearly show.

Minero therefore simply cannot stand. Its basic defect lies in its
characterization of the non-participation of a party-list organization in an election as
similar to a failure to garner the 2% threshold party-list
vote. What Minero effectively holds is that a party list organization that does not
participate in an election necessarily gets, by default, less than 2% of the party-list
votes. To be sure, this is a confused interpretation of the law, given the laws clear
and categorical language and the legislative intent to treat the two scenarios
differently. A delisting based on a mixture or fusion of these two different and
separate grounds for delisting is therefore a strained application of the law in
jurisdictional terms, it is an interpretation not within the contemplation of the
framers of the law and hence is a gravely abusive interpretation of the law.[8]

What we say here should of course take into account our ruling in Barangay
Association for Advancement and National Transparency v. COMELEC[9] (Banat)
where we partly invalidated the 2% party-list vote requirement provided in RA 7941
as follows:

We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued

operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as
found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941
is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it
mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list
seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued
operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats
frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the
House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.
The disqualification for failure to get 2% party-list votes in two (2) preceding
elections should therefore be understood in light of the Banat ruling that party-list
groups or organizations garnering less than 2% of the party-list votes may yet qualify
for a seat in the allocation of additional seats.

We need not extensively discuss Banats significance, except to state that a party-list
group or organization which qualified in the second round of seat allocation cannot
now validly be delisted for the reason alone that it garnered less than 2% in the last
two elections. In other words, the application of this disqualification should
henceforth be contingent on the percentage of party-list votes garnered by the last
party-list organization that qualified for a seat in the House of Representatives, a
percentage that is less than the 2% threshold invalidated in Banat. The
disqualification should now necessarily be read to apply to party-list groups or
organizations that did not qualify for a seat in the two preceding elections for the
constituency in which it registered.

To reiterate, (a) Section 6(8) of RA 7941 provides for two separate grounds for
delisting; these grounds cannot be mixed or combined to support delisting; and (b)
the disqualification for failure to garner 2% party-list votes in two preceding
elections should now be understood, in light of the Banat ruling, to mean failure to
qualify for a party-list seat in two preceding elections for the constituency in which
it has registered. This, we declare, is how Section 6(8) of RA 7941 should be
understood and applied. We do so under our authority to state what the law is,[10] and
as an exception to the application of the principle of stare decisis.

The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents
and not to unsettle things which are established) is embodied in Article 8 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines which provides, thus:

ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the

Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.

The doctrine enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires courts in a

country to follow the rule established in a decision of its Supreme Court. That
decision becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by all
courts in the land. The doctrine of stare decisis is based on the principle that once a
question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and
closed to further argument.[11] The doctrine is grounded on the necessity for securing
certainty and stability of judicial decisions, thus:

Time and again, the court has held that it is a very desirable and necessary
judicial practice that when a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable
to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future
cases in which the facts are substantially the same. Stare decisis et non quieta
movere. Stand by the decisions and disturb not what is settled. Stare decisis simply
means that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be
applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though
the parties may be different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice
that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be
decided alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to the same event have been
put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and
decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to
relitigate the same issue.[12]
The doctrine though is not cast in stone for upon a showing that circumstances
attendant in a particular case override the great benefits derived by our judicial
system from the doctrine of stare decisis, the Court is justified in setting it aside.[13]
As our discussion above shows, the most compelling reason to
abandon Minero exists; it was clearly an erroneous application of the law an
application that the principle of stability or predictability of decisions alone cannot
sustain. Minero did unnecessary violence to the language of the law, the intent of the
legislature, and to the rule of law in general. Clearly, we cannot allow PGBI to be
prejudiced by the continuing validity of an erroneous ruling. Thus, we now
abandon Minero and strike it out from our ruling case law.

We are aware that PGBIs situation a party list group or organization that failed to
garner 2% in a prior election and immediately thereafter did not participate in the
preceding election is something that is not covered by Section 6(8) of RA
7941. From this perspective, it may be an unintended gap in the law and as such is a
matter for Congress to address. We cannot and do not address matters over which
full discretionary authority is given by the Constitution to the legislature; to do so
will offend the principle of separation of powers. If a gap indeed exists, then the
present case should bring this concern to the legislatures notice.
b. The Issue of Due Process
On the due process issue, we agree with the COMELEC that PGBIs right to due
process was not violated for PGBI was given an opportunity to seek, as it did seek,
a reconsideration of Resolution No. 8679. The essence of due process, we have
consistently held, is simply the opportunity to be heard; as applied to administrative
proceedings, due process is the opportunity to explain ones side or the opportunity
to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial-
type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirement is
satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain
their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is absolute lack of notice
and hearingx x x.[14] We find it obvious under the attendant circumstances that PGBI
was not denied due process. In any case, given the result of this Resolution, PGBI
has no longer any cause for complaint on due process grounds.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition and

accordingly ANNUL COMELEC Resolution No. 8679 dated October 13, 2009
insofar as the petitioner PGBI is concerned, and the Resolution dated December 9,
2009 which denied PGBIs motion for reconsideration in SPP No. 09-004
(MP). PGBI is qualified to be voted upon as a party-list group or organization in the
coming May 2010 elections.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

RENATO C. CORONA
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice
Associate Justice
 PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice
Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE C
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice


CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified

that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

[1]
Filed under Rule 65 of the RULES OF COURT.
[2]
Rollo, pp. 42-48.
[3]
Sec. 4. Manifestation to Participate in the Party-List System. Any party, organization or coalition already registered
with the Commission need not register anew. However, such party, organization or coalition shall file with the
Commission, not later than ninety (90) days before the election, a manifestation of its desire to participate in the
party-list system.
[4]
G.R. No. 177548, May 10, 2007; see rollo of G.R. No. 177548, pp. 46-48.
[5]
Rollo, pp. 74-75.
[6]
Numbering supplied.
[7]
Agpalo, Statutory Construction, p. 204 (2003); see also The Heirs of George Poe v. Malayan Insurance Company,
Inc. G.R. No. 156302, April 7, 2009.

[8]
See Varias v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 189078, February 11, 2010 where we held that the use of wrong
considerations is an act not in contemplation of law a jurisdictional error for this is one way of gravely abusing ones
discretion.
[9]
G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009.
[10]
Marbury v. Madison (1 Cranch [5 US] 137, 2 L ed 60 [1803]) holds that it is emphatically the province and duty
of the judicial department to say what the law is.
[11]
See Lazatin v. Desierto, G.R. No. 147097, June 5, 2009, citing Fermin v. People, G.R. No. 157643, March 28,
2008, 550 SCRA 132.
[12]
Id., citing Chinese Young Men's Christian Association of the Philippine Islands v. Remington Steel
Corporation, G.R. No. 159422, March 28, 2008, 550 SCRA 180.
[13]
Ibid.
[14]
Bautista v. Comelec, 460 Phil, 459, 478 (2003).