49. Is it possible for the system to deny compensation for a work-related injury? Ans.: See Manila Railroad Co.

Railroad Co. v. Perez

Ans.: b. Is there a provision in the Labor Code providing for the prescriptive
50. Supposing you assaulted your co-employee, and then got hurt because of period?
self-defense, will your claim be denied? Ans.:
Ans.: c. Which do we follow? Why?
51. Supposing you tried to commit suicide but failed, will your claim be denied? Ans.:
Ans.: d. Why is it from the time of impairment of earning capacity and not from
52. What if work-related but you were the unlawful aggressor? the time the illness was incurred?
Ans.: Ans.:
53. What is willful intent to injure or kill another? e. What is being compensated by the law?
Ans.: Ans.:
54. Is suicide compensable? 62. X, a private employee, sustains a work-related injury. Upon investigation, it
Ans.: was found that the employer’s negligence was the cause of the injury.
55. NAESS Shipping Phil. v. NLRC a. Where will X file the claim?
Ans.: Ans.:
56. What if it was not work related? b. Can X claim compensation from the employer instead of from the
Ans.: system?
57. Is there a presumption? Ans.:
Ans.: c. After having sued the employer, can X still file a claim with the system?
58. What is notorious negligence? Ans.:
Ans.: d. Supposing that after claiming from the system, there is a deficiency. Can
59. Distinguish between simple negligence and notorious negligence. Illustrate. the claimant go after the employer for the remaining balance?
Ans.: Ans.:
a. Solidium v. GSIS e. Supposing it was the other way around, that the claimant filed a case
Ans.: against the employer and recovered an amount, but there was a
b. Quizon v. GSIS deficiency. Can the claimant claim the remaining balance from the
Ans.: system?
c. Distinguish the two cases. Ans.:
Ans.: 63. GSIS v. CA & Balais
60. If the employee drinks a poisonous substance, when will it be simple Ans.:
negligence and when will it be notorious negligence? 64. Central Azucarera Don Pedro v. de Leon
Ans.: Ans.:
a. Supposing an employee brings liquor without knowledge that it has
poison, simple negligence or notorious negligence? Title III. Medicare (Art. 216) (R.A. No. 7875 [National Health Insurance Act of
Ans.: 1995], as amended by R.A. No. 9241 [Amendment] and R.A. No. 10606 [National
b. What if the friend said, “Don’t drink it. It’s poison.” Simple negligence or Health Insurance Act of 2013])
notorious negligence? *n/a
Ans.:
61. Give an example for the “otherwise provided under this Title” ground under Title IV. Adult Education (Art. 217)
Art. 178. *n/a
Ans.: Prescription
a. What is the prescriptive period? SOCIAL LEGISLATION

1
1. R.A. No. 8282 (Social Security Act of 1997) Ans.:
*n/a c. How much would a retiree get as retirement pay?
2. R.A. No. 8291 (Government Service Insurance Act of 1997) Ans.: See if there is a retirement plan or a collective bargaining
*n/a agreement. What is provided by the law is only the minimum
3. R.A. No. 7699 (Portability Law)
a. What are the salient features of the law?
Ans.:
b. What is totalization?
Ans.:
c. What is portability?
Ans.:
d. When is there a totalization?
Ans.:
e. When do we totalize?
Ans.:
f. Is totalization always necessary when you transfer from one system to
another?
Ans.:
4. R.A. No. 9994 (Expanded Senior Citizens’ Act of 2010), as amended by R.A.
No. 10645
a. Who is a senior citizen?
Ans.:
b. What are the benefits of a senior citizen?
Ans.:
c. Are the benefits available for legal services? Why?
Ans.: No. The reason being that most of the lawmakers are lawyers, thus,
if they discount the legal services, they will not be able to get full
credit
d. What are the allowed IDs?
Ans.:
5. R.A. No. 7277 (Magna Carta for Disabled Persons), as amended by R.A. No.
9442 and R.A. No. 10070
a. Who is a PWD?
Ans.:
b. What are the benefits of a PWD?
Ans.:
6. R.A. No. 10606 (National Health Insurance Act of 2013)
*n/a
7. R.A. No. 2641 (Retirement Pay Law)
a. What are the 2 types of retirement?
Ans.: Optional and compulsory
b. How much is the retirement pay under the law?

2
IX. 21. SICKNESS, DEFINED; OCCUPATIONAL OR COMPENSABLE DISEASE
Next to injury or accident, we now discuss sickness, the other cause that gives
rise to a compensation claim. Article 173(1) of the Labor Code defines
compensable “sickness” as “any illness definitely accepted as an occupational
disease listed by the Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject
to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is increased by
working conditions. For this purpose, the Commission is empowered to
determine and approve occupational diseases and work-related illnesses that
may be considered compensable based on peculiar hazards of employment.”1
Section 1(b), Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation
further amplifies “sickness,” thus: “For the sickness and the resulting disability
or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational
disease listed under Annex ‘A’ of these Rules with the conditions set therein
satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the
disease is increased by the working conditions.”2
If the illnesses are not occupational diseases, the claimant must present proof
that he contracted them in the course of his employment. He who alleges a fact
has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence.3
21.1 Occupational Disease
Meñez vs. Employees’ Compensation Commission, et al., G.R. No. L-48488,
April 25, 1980 —
Facts: Petitioner, G.D. Meñez, was employed by the Department (now Ministry)
of Education and Culture as a school teacher. She retired on August 31, 1975
under the disability retirement plan at the age of 54 after 32 years of teaching,
due to rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis. Before her retirement, she was
assigned at Raja Soliman High School in Tondo-Binondo, Manila, near a dirty
creek. On October 21, 1976, petitioner filed a claim for disability benefits under
P.D. No. 626, as amended, with respondent Government Service Insurance
System which denied the claim on October 25, 1976 on the ground that
petitioner’s ailments were not occupational diseases, taking into consideration
the nature of her particular work. Requests for reconsideration were also
denied by the System; hence, the case was elevated to the Employees’
Compensation Commission for review. On March 1, 1978, the Commission en
banc affirmed the decision of respondent GSIS.
In her petition for review on certiorari, petitioner claims that she contracted
pneumonitis and/or bronchiectasis with hemoptysis and rheumatoid arthritis
on January 27, 1975 after wetting and chilling during the course of
employment. She claimed these diseases are permanent and recurring in
nature and work-connected.
Ruling: An occupational disease is one ‘which results from the nature of the
employment, and by nature is meant conditions to which all employees of a
class are subject and which produce the disease as a natural incident of a
particular occupation, and attach to that occupation a hazard which
distinguishes it from the usual run of occupations and is in excess of the hazard
attending the employment in general.’1
To be occupational, the disease must be one due wholly to causes and
conditions which are normal and constantly present and characteristic of the
particular occupation; that is, those things which science and industry have not
yet learned how to eliminate. Every worker in every plant of the same industry
is alike constantly exposed to the danger of contracting a particular
occupational disease.2
An occupational disease is one which develops as a result of hazards peculiar to
certain occupations, due to toxic substances (as in the organic solvents
industry), radiation (as in television repairment), repeated mechanical injury,
emotional strain, etc.3
From the foregoing definitions of occupational disease of ailments, rheumatoid
arthritis and pneumonitis can be considered as such occupational diseases. All
public high school teachers, like herein petitioner, admittedly are the most
underpaid but overworked employees of the government, and are subject to
emotional strains and stresses, dealing as they do with intractable teenagers,
especially young boys, and harassed as they are by various extra-curricular or
nonacademic assignments, aside from preparing lesson plans until late at night,
if they are not badgered by very demanding superiors.
In the case of the petitioner, her emotional tension is heightened by the fact
that the high school in which she teaches is situated in a tough area — Binondo
District, which is inhabited by thugs and other criminal elements and further
aggravated by the heavy pollution and congestion therein as well as the stinking
smell of the dirty Estero de la Reina nearby. Women, like herein petitioner, are
most vulnerable to such unhealthy conditions. The pitiful situation of all public
school teachers is further accentuated by poor diet, for they can ill-afford
nutritious food.
But even if rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis are not occupational diseases,
there is ample proof that petitioner contracted such ailments by reason of her
occupation as a public high school teacher due to her exposure to the adverse
working conditions above-mentioned.
Indisputably, petitioner contracted pneumonitis and/or bronchiectasis with
hemoptysis and rheumatoid arthritis on January 27, 1975 after being drenched
and the consequent ‘chilling during the course of employment which are
permanent and recurring in nature and work-connected.’ Undoubtedly,
petitioner’s ailments thus become compensable under the New Labor Code
since under Rule III, Section 1(c) of its Implementing Rules, ‘only sickness or
3
injury which occurred on or after January 1975 and the resulting disability or
death shall be compensable under these Rules.’
The ECC’s decision was set aside and the Ministry of Education and Culture is
ordered (1) to pay petitioner the sum of P6,000.00 as disability income benefits
and (2) to reimburse petitioner’s medical and hospital expenses duly supported
by receipts.
21.2 Duties of Employer Regarding Occupational Diseases
Under Rule III, Sec. 2 of the Amended ECC Rules, the employer is bound to
require preemployment examination of all prospective employees and to
provide periodic medical examination of employees exposed to occupational
diseases.
X. 22. THEORY OF INCREASED RISK
If an ailment is not included in the list of occupational diseases as drawn up by
the Commission, the claimant has the burden of proving that the nature of the
work increased the risk of contracting the disease.
To establish compensability under the increased risk theory, the claimant must
show proof of reasonable work-connection, not necessarily direct causal
relation. The degree of proof required is merely substantial evidence which
means such relevant evidence as will support a decision, or clear and convincing
evidence. Strict rules of evidence are not applicable. To require proof of actual
causes or factors which lead to an ailment would not be consistent with the
liberal interpretation of the Labor Code and the social justice guarantee in favor
of the workers. Although strict rules of evidence are not applicable, yet the
basic rules that mere allegation is not evidence cannot be disregarded.
22.1 Illustrative Case: Increased Risk Shown
Narazo vs. Employees’ Compensation Commission, G.R. No. 80157, February 6,
1990 —
Facts: The death of petitioner’s husband was caused by “Uremia due to
obstructive nephropathy and benign prostatic hypertrophy,” which is
admittedly not among those listed as occupational diseases. As per finding of
the ECC, “Uremia is a toxic clinical condition characterized by restlessness,
muscular twitching, mental disturbance, nausea, and vomiting associated with
utenal insufficiency brought about by the retention in blood of nitrogenous
urinary waste products.” One of its causes is the obstruction in the flow of
urinary waste products.
The nature of the work of the deceased as Budget Examiner in the Office of the
Governor dealt with the detailed preparation of the budget, financial reports
and review and/or examination of the budget of other provincial and municipal
offices.
Full concentration and thorough study of the entries of accounts in the budget
and/or financial reports were necessary, such that the deceased had to sit for
hours, and more often than not, delay and even forego urination in order not to
interrupt the flow of concentration. In addition, tension and pressure must
have aggravated the situation.
Ruling: Under the foregoing circumstances, the cause of death of petitioner’s
husband is work-connected, i.e., the risk of contracting the illness was
aggravated by the nature of the work, so much so that petitioner is entitled to
receive compensation benefits for the death of her husband.
From human experience, prolonged sitting down and putting off urination
result in stagnation of the urine. This encourages the growth of bacteria in the
urine, and affects the delicate balance between bacterial multiplication rates
and the host defense mechanisms. Delayed excretion may permit the retention
and survival of microorganisms which multiply rapidly, and infect the urinary
tract. These are predisposing factors to pylonephritis and uremia. Thus, while
we may concede that these illnesses are not directly caused by the nature of
the duties of a teacher, the risk of contracting the same is aggravated by their
working habits necessitated by demands of job efficiency.
XI. 22.2 Illustrative Cases: Increased Risk Not Shown
Ten years later, in another case of uremia, the Court denied the claim of a
widow because she failed to show that her husband’s uremia was aggravated or
caused by the job. Her husband was a stevedore whose duties included
handling of steel cargoes, and loading and unloading of lumber products. In
denying the widow’s claim the court said:
“Petitioner did not adduce any proof of a responsible connection between the
work of the deceased and the cause of his death. There was no showing that
the progression of the disease was brought about largely by the conditions in
the job. Indeed, she presented no medical history, or record of physician’s
report in order to substantiate her claim that the working conditions at the Port
Area increased the risk of uremia, renal failure or glomerulonephritis.”
The court advised that the quantum of evidence to prove the cause of the
ailment or the increased risk from the job “can obviously be determined only on
a case-to-case basis.”1
The case-to-case determination of compensability of uremia is exemplified
further in Limbo vs. ECC, decided two years after Riño, where, this time, uremia
is again held compensable.
4
Limbo vs. Employees’ Compensation Commission and Social Security System,
G.R. No. 146891, July 30, 2002 —
Facts: Petitioner R. Limbo was employed at Nestle Philippines since 1966 as a
salesman and was later promoted as Areas Sales Supervisor in 1977. In
December 1994, he was confined for one week at the Philippine General
Hospital for joint pains. It was revealed that he had elevated BUN, creatinine
and anemia, and that he had chronic renal disease. He underwent a renal
transplant and was discharged on January 13, 1995. He claimed compensation
benefits under the SSS-ECC invoking P.D. 626; however, his claim was denied on
the ground that his illness had no causal relationship to his job as Area Sales
Supervisor. He appealed to the Employees’ Compensation Commission which
affirmed the decision of the SSS. The Court of Appeals likewise dismissed his
petition.
Issue: Whether or not “end-stage renal disease secondary to uric acid
nephropathy” is compensable under P.D. 626 as amended.
Ruling: The Court considered the workload and areas of responsibility of
petitioner and found that it was not unlikely for him to develop hypertension
leading to uremia. In determining whether a disease is compensable, it is
enough that there exists a reasonable work connection as the workmen’s claim
is based on probability and not certainty.
Under the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation, “(f)or the sickness and
the resulting disability to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an
occupational disease listed under Annex “A” of these Rules with the conditions
set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of
contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions.” Concededly,
“end-stage renal disease secondary to uric acid nephropathy” is not among the
Occupational Diseases under Annex “A” of the Amended Rules on Employees’
Compensation. This, however, would not automatically bar petitioner’s claim
for as long as he could prove that the risk of contracting the illness was
increased by his working conditions.
Petitioner’s job description showed that he was responsible for the following:
(1) Territory’s collection, merchandising, market hygiene and promotion goals;
(2) Nestle’s principal satisfaction provider to the company’s customers and
business partners, government and other significant entities;
(3) Principal Liason of the territory with the National Sales Manager, Areas Sales
Manager and other Nestle units;
(4) Leads and manages territory sales force and 3rd party support.
Considering the workload and areas of responsibility of petitioner in this case,
it is not unlikely for him to develop hypertension, which in turn led to uremia. It
should be stressed that in determining whether a disease is compensable, it is
enough that there exists a reasonable work connection. It is sufficient that the
hypothesis on which the workmen’s claim is based is probable since probability,
not certainty, is the touchstone.
XII. CANCER: NEW DOCTRINE: PROOF IS REQUIRED
Raro vs. Employees’ Compensation Commission, G.R. No. 58445, April 27, 1989
Cancer is a disease that strikes people in general. The nature of a person’s
employment appears to have no relevance. Cancer can strike a lowly paid
laborer or a highly paid executive or one who works on land, in water, or in the
bowels of the earth. It makes no difference whether the victim is employed or
unemployed, a white collar employee or a blue collar worker, a housekeeper,
an urban dweller or a resident of a rural area.
Jurisprudence on the compensability of cancer ailments has of late become a
source of confusion among the claimants and the government agencies
enforcing the employees’ compensation law. The strongly lingering influence of
the principles of “presumption of compensability” and “aggravation” found in
the defunct Workmen’s Compensation Act but expressly discarded under the
present compensation scheme has led to conflict and inconsistency in
employees’ compensation decisions.
The problem is attributable to the inherent difficulty in applying the new
principle of “proof of increased risk.” There are two approaches to a solution in
cases where it cannot be proved that the risk of contracting an illness not listed
as an occupational disease was increased by the claimant’s working conditions.
One approach is that if a claimant cannot prove the necessary work connection
because the causes of the disease are still unknown, it must be presumed that
working conditions increased the risk of contracting the ailment. The other
approach is that if there is no proof of the required work connection, the
disease is not compensable because the law says so.
It is not correct to say that all cancers are not compensable. The list of
occupational diseases prepared by the Employees’ Compensation Commission
includes some cancers as compensable. There is no arbitrariness in the
Commission’s allowing vinyl chloride workers or plastic workers to be
compensated for brain cancer.
There are certain cancers which are reasonably considered as strongly induced
by specific causes. Heavy doses of radiation as in Chernobyl, USSR, cigarette
smoke over a long period for lung cancer, certain chemicals for specific cancers,
and asbestos dust, among others, are generally accepted as increasing the risks
of contracting specific cancers. What the law requires for others is proof.
Cancer is a disease of still unknown origin which strikes people in all walks of
life, employed or unemployed. Unless it be shown that a particular form of
cancer is caused by specific working conditions (e.g., chemical fumes, nuclear
5
radiation, asbestos dust, etc.), the Court cannot conclude that it was the
employment which increased the risk of contracting the disease.
For the guidance of the administrative agencies and practicing lawyers
concerned, the decision of the Supreme Court in Raro vs. Employees’
Compensation Commission, G.R. No. 58445, April 27, 1989, en banc, Gutierrez,
Jr., J. supersedes the decisions in Panotes vs. Employees’ Compensation
Commission (128 SCRA 473 [1984]); Mercado vs. Employees’ Compensation
Commission (127 SCRA 664 [1984]); Ovenson vs. Employees’ Compensation
Commission (156 SCRA 2 [1987]); Nemaria vs. Employees’ Compensation
Commission (155 SCRA 166 [1987]) and other cases with conclusions different
from those stated in Raro vs. Employees’ Compensation Commission.
XIII. 1.2c Suicide, When Compensable
NAESS Shipping Phil. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 73441, September 4, 1987 —
Facts: While plying the seas from Brazil to Egypt, the vessel’s chief steward,
named Dublin, fatally stabbed Fernandez, the second cook, during a quarrel.
Dublin then ran to the deck from which he jumped or fell overboard. The body
was never recovered.
For the death of Dublin, his widow Zenaida collected the amount of P75,000
under the ITF Collective Bargaining Agreement. She also filed with the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) a complaint against
NAESS for payment of death benefits totalling US$74,512, under both the
Special Agreement and what she claimed to be also the applicable Singapore
Workmen’s Compensation Ordinance. Under the special agreement, a crewman
of the vessel is entitled to compensation for “loss of life.” The POEA rendered
judgment for complainant, holding Dublin’s death compensable under the
Special Agreement.
NAESS went to the Supreme Court charging grave abuse of discretion by POEA
and raised the issue whether “death caused by suicide” (jumping overboard) is
compensable.
Ruling: No law or rule would make it illegal for an employer to assume the
obligation to pay death benefits in favor of his employee in their contract of
employment. Since NAESS freely bound itself to a contract which on its face
makes it unqualifiedly liable to pay compensation benefits for Dublin’s death
while in its service, regardless of whether or not it intended to make itself the
insurer, in the legal sense, of Dublin’s life, NAESS cannot escape liability.
Contracts which are the private laws of the contracting parties should be
fulfilled according to the literal sense of their stipulation, if their terms are clear
and leave no room for doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, for
contracts are obligatory, no matter what their form may be, whenever the
essential requisites for their validity are present.
The argument — that to compel payment of death benefits would amount not
only to rewarding the act of murder or homicide, but also inequitably places on
NAESS the twin burdens of compensating both the killer and his victim, who
allegedly had also been employed under a contract with a similar death benefits
clause — confuses the legal implications and effects of two distinct and
independent agreements. It carries within itself the seeds of its own refutation.
Entitlement of Dublin to death benefits resulted from his death while serving
out his contract of employment. It was not a consequence of his killing of
Fernandez. If the latter’s death is also compensable, that is due to the solitary
fact of his death while covered by a similar contract, not precisely to the fact
that he met death at the hands of Dublin.
That both deaths may be related by abuse and effect and NAESS is the single
obligor liable for compensation in both cases must, insofar as factual and legal
basis of such liability is concerned, be regarded as purely accidental
circumstances.
According to American authorities, suicide is compensable in the following
cases:
(a) When it results from insanity resulting from compensable work injury or
disease;
(b) When it occurs during a delirium resulting from compensable disease.1
Self-destruction is not presumed. In cases where compensation is sought for a
violent death due to accident, our courts have refused so far to impute to the
victim an intention to end his life. The laborer is presumed to take the
necessary precautions to avoid injury to himself, unless an intention is
attributed to him to end his life.
That presumption is based on the instinct of self-preservation.2
______________
The court, in short, declares NAESS liable under the contract which covers “loss
of life” during the employment regardless of the cause of death.
XIV. 1.3 Notorious Negligence
The degree of negligence of the employee that exempts the State Insurance
Fund from liability is notorious negligence.
Notorious negligence is something more than simple or contributory
negligence. It signifies a deliberate act of the employee to disregard his own
personal safety. Disobedience to rules and/or prohibition does not in itself
constitute notorious negligence, if no intention can be attributed to the injured
to end his life.1
In most cases where the defense of notorious negligence had been raised, the
primary consideration for not finding notorious negligence is usually (1) lack of
knowledge or awareness of the peril or the seriousness of the existing danger;
6
or (2) the unexpectedness, under the circumstances, of the accident. Failure to
avoid a known danger by a laborer engrossed in his work who momentarily
forgets it is not negligence; neither is his failure to exercise incessant vigilance
in avoiding a known danger.2
The employee’s disregard of warning that the banca was overloaded did not
constitute notorious negligence.3
On the other hand, a driver, injured by collision while overspeeding on a
descending slope approaching a curve with the front view obstructed by
vegetation, was held notoriously negligent.4
A laborer injured while boarding rear platform of train as it was moving
backwards was held notoriously negligent.5
Illustrative Cases: Notorious Negligence
Solidum vs. GSIS, ECC Case No. 4061, promulgated on November 23, 1988 —
Facts: Solidum was an enlisted man of the Philippine Marines, assigned to the
10th Marine Battalion, stationed at Zamboanga City.
One morning in March 1987, Solidum, who was then resting after a patrol
mission, jokingly challenged his comrades to a duel, but they all ignored him.
Pointing the muzzle of his loaded rifle at his temple and, saying “Bahala na,”
Solidum squeezed
the trigger. He died instantly.
His father filed a claim for death benefits under P.D. No. 626. The GSIS
denied his claim because the contingency did not arise out of and in the course
of
employment. The System pointed out that the deceased was not performing his
duties
as a soldier when the accident occurred. Moreover, it said, the deceased’s
death was
caused by his notorious negligence and not by an accident or by “an act of
God.”
After his request for reconsideration failed, the appellant elevated the case to
the Employees’ Compensation Commission.
Ruling: The ECC sustained the System’s decision. The ECC noted that the
deceased pointed the muzzle of his rifle to himself and squeezed its trigger
causing
his death.
“Such an act, we believe, constitutes notorious negligence. The employees’
compensation program under which the appellant seeks relief is designed to
compensate only the working men who are victims of work-connected injuries
and
other contingencies. In the case before us, the contingency did not arise out of
and
in the course of employment, and therefore is not compensable.”
______________
Illustrative Case: Not Notorious Negligence
XV. Quizon vs. GSIS, ECC Case No. 3015, promulgated on October 26, 1987 —
Facts: A Philippine Army soldier died in December 1980 due to dynamite blast
at Tumalutab detachment in Ipil, Zamboanga City.
Investigation showed that after lunch that day, he asked permission from his
unit to test the dynamite they had earlier confiscated. He took a civilian
pumpboat and proceeded towards nearby Sinonog Island. Along the way,
however, he accidentally ignited the fuse of the dynamite, causing it to explode
prematurely. The soldier died on the spot.
For his death, his father filed a claim for compensation benefits but the GSIS
denied it because the deceased at the time of accident was not performing his
duties aside from being notoriously negligent.
Appellant sought a reconsideration of the ruling. He averred that his son
belonged to the Ranger Training Group whose primary mission is to develop
selected soldiers in the field of specialized small unit tactics, particularly on
weapons, explosives, and hand-to-hand combat, among others. Thus, testing a
dynamite was part of the deceased’s training as a ranger. “In fact,” appellant
said, “no less than the Minister of National Defense through his legal chief, Brig.
Gen. Samuel Soriano, supported the line of duty status of his son’s death.”
“Moreover,” appellant added, “it was not the commanding officer of the
deceased as alleged in respondent’s adverse decision who advised him not to
test the dynamite, but merely a colleague of the same rank as the deceased.”
Ruling: We [the ECC] believe that there was indeed negligence on the part of
the deceased soldier. However, his negligence was not notorious as perceived
by the respondent. Notorious negligence is something more than simple or
contributory negligence. It signifies a deliberate act of the employee to
disregard his own personal safety. Disobedience to rules does not in itself
constitute notorious negligence, if no intention can be attributed to the injured
to end his life.
Thus, in line with the principle of liberally construing compensation law, to
attain its purpose for which it was enacted, the correct view to be followed is
that no man in his right senses would deliberately court death. The
presumption then to be adopted is that any person by his instinct of self-
preservation wants to avoid such danger unless an intention is attributed to him
to end his life.
7

Considering the soldier’s training on explosives as a ranger, his desire to test the
confiscated dynamite is but a natural reaction on his part to the extent that he
even ignored the advice of his colleague against his plan. Unfortunately, the
dynamite exploded prematurely causing his instant death.
______________
The ECC reversed the respondent System’s decision and ordered payment of
the claim.
ART 197-199
XVI. 6.1 Conversion from Permanent Partial Disability to Permanent Total
Disability
GSIS vs. Court of Appeals and R. Balais, G.R. No. 117572, January 29, 1998 —
Facts: In December 1989, the employee claimant was diagnosed to be suffering
from Ruptured Aneurysm. She underwent craniotomy.
But despite her operation, she could not perform her duties as cashier in the
NHA as efficiently as she did before her illness. This forced her to retire on
March 1, 1990 at the age of sixty-two (62). She filed a claim for disability
benefits.
The GSIS granted her temporary total disability (TTD) benefits and,
subsequently, permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits for nine months.
In November 1992, she requested the GSIS to convert the classification of her
disability benefits from permanent partial disability (PPD) to permanent total
disability (PTD).
GSIS denied the request and informed her that her condition did not satisfy the
criteria for permanent total disability. She asked for reconsideration. GSIS
denied it, and ECC affirmed the denial. But on a petition for review, the Court of
Appeals promulgated a decision favorable to her. GSIS petitions the Supreme
Court to reverse the Court of Appeals.
Issue: Is private respondent entitled to conversion of her benefits from
permanent partial disability to permanent total disability?
Ruling: The Supreme Court, through Justice Romero, refused to reverse the
Court of Appeals.
While it is true that the degree of private respondent’s physical condition at
the time of her retirement was not considered as permanent total disability,
yet, it cannot be denied that her condition subsequently worsened after her
head operation and consequent retirement. In fact, she suffered afterwards
from some ailments like headaches, dizziness, weakness, inability to sleep
properly, inability to walk without support and failure to regain her memory. All
these circumstances ineluctably demonstrate the seriousness of her condition,
contrary to the claim of petitioner.
More than that, it was also undisputed that private respondent was made to
take her medication for life.
“A person’s disability may not manifest fully at one precise moment in time but
rather over a period of time. It is possible that an injury which at first was
considered to be temporary may later on become permanent or one who
suffers a partial disability becomes totally and permanently disabled from the
same cause.”1
In the same vein, this Court has ruled that “disability should not be understood
more on its medical significance but on the loss of earning capacity.”2 Private
respondent’s persistent illness indeed forced her to retire early which, in turn,
resulted in her unemployment, and loss of earning capacity.
Judicial precedents likewise show that disability is intimately related to one’s
earning capacity. It has been a consistent pronouncement of this Court that
“permanent total disability means disablement of an employee to earn wages
in the same kind of work, or work of a similar nature that she was trained for or
accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of her mentality
and attainment could do.”1
“It does not mean state of absolute helplessness, but inability to do
substantially all material acts necessary to prosecution of an occupation for
remuneration or profit in substantially customary and usual manner.2
The Court construed permanent total disability as the “lack of ability to follow
continuously some substantially gainful occupation without serious discomfort
or pain and without material injury or danger to life.”3 It is, therefore, clear
from established jurisprudence that the loss of one’s earning capacity
determines the disability compensation one is entitled to.
It is also important to note that private respondent was constrained to retire at
the age of 62 years because of her impaired physical condition. This, again, is
another indication that her disability is permanent and total.
______________
There is nothing in the law that prohibits the conversion of permanent partial
disability benefit to permanent total disability benefit if it is shown that the
employee’s ailment qualifies as such. Furthermore, the grant of permanent
total disability benefit to an employee who was initially compensated for
permanent partial disability but is found to be suffering from permanent total
disability would not be prejudicial to the government to give it reason to deny
the claim.4
8
XVII. 7. IS EARNING CAPACITY “IMPAIRED” IF EARNING IS HIGHER AFTER THE
INJURY?
Central Azucarera Don Pedro vs. C. de Leon, in his capacity as Workmen’s
Compensation Commissioner and L. Alla, No. L-10036, December 28, 1957 —
The claimant laborer was granted benefit for temporary total disability. When
the disability ceased, he found a new employment at a higher salary.
Meantime, he filed a claim for permanent partial disability but the ECC denied
the claim because in fact his salary was higher than before.
Ruling: The alleged new employment does not appear to have been duly
established and, indeed, even supposing it to be true, that fact would not in
itself necessarily affect the laborer’s claim for compensation for a permanent
partial disability.
An injured laborer’s incapacity for work is not to be measured solely by the
wages he receives, or his earning, after the injury, since the amount of such
wages or earnings may be affected by various extraneous matters or factors.1
As noted in the American Law Reports, “there are a number of possible
explanations of the fact that an employee who receives higher wages after an
injury than what he earned before may still have suffered an impairment of
earning capacity. Thus, it may indicate:
(1) that the employee is the beneficiary of a mere gratuity and does not actually
‘earn’ his wages;
(2) that the employee, by education and training, has fitted himself for more
remunerative employment;
(3) that the employee works longer hours than he did before his injury, his
hourly remuneration having increased;
(4) that a general change in wage scales has taken place for the type of work or
in the industry;
(5) that the new wages are intended as an inducement to him to refrain from
pursuing a claim;
(6) that the employee, before his injury, was younger or a minor;
(7) that the employment in which the employee was employed after the injury
was of uncertain duration.”
1. All cases remaining (1-2 per person)
2. What is Limited Portability Law?
3. Define totalization; portability
4. Is totalization always necessary when you transfer from one system to
another?
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7699 LIMITED PORTABILITY
SECTION 2. De􀀸nition of Terms . — As used in this Act, unless the context
indicates
otherwise, the following terms shall mean:
b) "Portability" shall refer to the transfer of funds for the account and benefit
of a worker who transfers from one system to the other.
e) "Totalization" shall refer to the process of adding up the periods of
creditable services or contributions under each of the Systems, for purposes of
eligibility and computation of benefits.
LIMITED PORTABILITY LAW [RA 7699]
COVERAGE
(1) Workers who transfer employment from one sector to another; or
(2) Those employed in both sectors (public and private).
PROCESS
The covered worker shall have his credible services or contributions in both
Systems credited to his service or contribution record in each of the Systems
and shall be totalized for purposes of old-age, disability, survivorship and other
benefits in case the covered member does not qualify for such benefits in either
or both systems without totalization: Provided, however, That overlapping
periods of membership shall be credited only once for purposes of totalization
[Sec. 3]
SECTION 3. Provisions of any general or special law or rules and regulations to
the
contrary notwithstanding, a covered worker who transfers employment from
one sector to
another or is employed in both sectors shall have his creditable services or
contributions
in both Systems credited to his service or contribution record in each of the
Systems and
shall be totalized for purposes of old-age, disability, survivorship and other
benefits in case
the covered member does not qualify for such bene􀀸ts in either or both
Systems without
totalization: Provided, however, That overlapping periods of membership shall
be credited
only once for purposes of totalization.
“Totalization” shall refer to the process of adding up the periods of creditable
services or contributions under each of the Systems, for purposes of eligibility
and computation of benefits [Sec. 2e].
9
Note:
Overlapping periods of membership in case of those employed in both sectors
at once are to be counted only ONCE for purposes of totalization.
WHY?
To be able to satisfy eligibility requirements of benefits provided for by either
SSS or GSIS.
5. Who is a senior citizen?
6. What are the privileges of a senior citizen?
7. PWD Benefits
49. Expanded Senior Citizens’ Act (R.A. No. 9994)
a. Who is a senior citizen?
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9257 Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003
"SECTION 2. Definition of Terms . — For purposes of this Act, these
terms are defined as follows:
(a) "Senior citizen" or "elderly" shall mean any resident citizen of the
Philippines at least sixty (60) years old;
b. What are their rights and privileges?
A: 20% discount, etc.
SECTION 3. Contribution to the Community . — Any qualified senior citizen as
determined by the Ofice for Senior Citizens Affairs (OSCA) may render his/her
services to the community which shall consist of, but not limited to, any of the
following:
(a) Tutorial and/or consultancy services;
(b) Actual teaching and demonstration of hobbies and income generating skills;
(c) Lectures on specialized fields like agriculture, health, environmental
protection and the like;
(d) The transfer of new skills acquired by virtue of their training mentioned in
Section 4, paragraph (d); and
(e) Undertaking other appropriate services as determined by the Ofice for
Senior Citizens Affairs (OSCA) such as school trafic guide, tourist aide, pre-
school assistant, etc.
In consideration of the services rendered by the qualified elderly, the Office for
Senior Citizens Affairs (OSCA) may award or grant benefits or privileges to the
elderly, in addition to the other privileges provided for under this Act."
SECTION 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens. — The senior citizens shall be
entitled to the following:
(a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative
to the utilization of services in hotels and similar lodging establishments,
restaurants and recreation centers, and purchase of medicines in all
establishments for the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens, including
funeral and burial services for the death of senior citizens;
(b) a minimum of twenty percent (20%) discount on admission fees charged by
theaters, cinema houses and concert halls, circuses, carnivals, and other similar
places of culture, leisure and amusement for the exclusive use or enjoyment of
senior citizens;
(c) exemption from the payment of individual income taxes;
Provided, That their annual taxable income does not exceed the poverty level as
determined by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for
that year;
(d) exemption from training fees for socio-economic programs;
(e) free medical and dental services, diagnostic and laboratory fees such as,
but not limited to, x-rays, computerized tomography scans and blood tests, in
all government facilities, subject to the guidelines to be issued by the
Department of Health in coordination with the Philippine Health Insurance
Corporation (PHILHEALTH);
(f) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount on medical and dental services,
and diagnostic and laboratory fees provided under Section 4(e) hereof,
including professional fees of attending doctors in all private hospitals and
medical facilities, in accordance with the rules and regulations to be issued by
the Department of Health, in coordination with the Philippine Health Insurance
Corporation;
(g) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount in fare for domestic air and sea
travel for the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens;
(h) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount in public railways, skyways and
bus fare for the exclusive use and enjoyment of senior citizens;
(i) educational assistance to senior citizens to pursue post secondary, tertiary,
post tertiary, as well as vocational or technical education in both public and
private schools through provision of scholarship, grants, financial aid, subsidies
and other incentives to qualified senior citizens, including support for books,
10
learning materials, and uniform allowance, to the extent feasible: Provided,
That senior citizens shall meet minimum admission requirements;
(j) to the extent practicable and feasible, the continuance of the same benefits
and privileges given by the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), Social
Security System (SSS) and PAG-IBIG, as the case may be, as are enjoyed by
those in actual service.
(k) retirement benefits of retirees from both the government and private
sector shall be regularly reviewed to ensure their continuing responsiveness
and sustainability, and to the extent practicable and feasible, shall be upgraded
to be at par with the current scale enjoyed by those in actual service.
(l) to the extent possible, the government may grant special discounts in special
programs for senior citizens on purchase of basic commodities, subject to the
guidelines to be issued for the purpose by the Department of Trade and
Industry (DTI) and the Department of Agriculture (DA); and
(m) provision of express lanes for senior citizens in all commercial and
government establishments; in the absence thereof, priority shall be given to
them. In the availment of the privileges mentioned above, …
c. Does the discount include legal fees? Why?
A: Because the authors of the law are lawyers, and if they will discount the legal
services, they will not be able to get full credit? [sic]
d. What will you present to show that you are a senior citizen?
… the senior citizen or elderly person may submit as proof of his/her
entitlement thereto any of the following:
(a) an ID issued by the city or municipal mayor or of the barangay captain of the
place where the senior citizen or the elderly resides;
(b) the passport of the elderly person or senior citizen concerned; and
(c) other documents that establish that the senior citizen or elderly person is a
citizen of the Republic and is at least sixty (60) years of age. The establishment
may claim the discounts granted under (a), (f), (g) and (h) as tax deduction
based on the net cost of the goods sold or services
51. Retirement Pay Law (R.A. No. 2641)
a. What are the 2 types of retirement?
A: Optional and compulsory
SSS LAW [RA 8282] COVERAGE
Compulsory
(1) Employers as defined above;
(2) Employees not over 60 years including domestic helpers with at least P1,000
monthly pay; and
(3) Self-employed as may be determined by the Commission, but not limited to:
(a) Self-employed professionals
(b) Partners and single proprietors of businesses
(c) Actors and actresses, directors, scriptwriters, and news correspondents who
do not fall within the definition of the term “employee” under Section 8 (d)
(d) Professional athletes, coaches, trainers and jockeys
(e) Individual farmers and fishermen
Voluntary
(1) Spouses who devote full time to managing household and family affairs,
unless they are also engaged in other vocation or employment (which is subject
of compulsory coverage);
(2) OFWs recruited by foreign-based employers;
(3) Employees (previously under compulsory coverage) already separated from
employment or those self-employed (also under compulsory coverage) with no
realized income for a given month, who chose to continue with contributions to
maintain right to full benefit.
Note: Foreign governments, international organizations or their wholly owned
instrumentality employing workers in the Philippines may enter into an
agreement with the Philippine government to include their employees in the
SSS except those already covered by their civil service retirement system.
EXCLUSIONS FROM COVERAGE
(1) Employment purely casual and not for the purpose of occupation or
business of the employer;
(2) Service performed on or in connection with an alien vessel by an employee if
he is employed when such vessel is outside the Philippines;
(3) Service performed in the employ of the Philippine Government or
instrumentality or agency thereof;
(4) Service performed in the employ of a foreign government or international
organization, or their wholly-owned instrumentalities; and
(5) Services performed by temporary and other employees which may be
excluded by SSS regulation. Employees of bona fide independent contractors
shall not be deemed employees of the employer engaging the services of said
contractors.
b. How much is the retirement pay under the law?
11
c. How much would a retiree get as retirement pay?
A: See if there is a retirement plan or a collective bargaining agreement. What is
provided by the law is only the minimum.
BENEFITS
Monthly pension
Computationof monthly pension: the monthly pension shall be the highest of
the following amounts:
(1) P300 + [20% x (ave. monthly credit)]+ [2% x (ave. monthy credit)x (# of cash
credited years of service in excess of 10 years)]; or
(2) 40% x [ave. monthly credit]; or
(3) P1,000; provided, that the monthly pension shall in no case be paid for an
aggregate amount of less than 60 months.
(4) Notwithstanding the abovementioned, minimum pension is P1,200 for
members with at least 10 years credit service, P2,400 for those with 20 years.
Dependents’ pension
(a) Paid when member dies, retires or with permanent total disability;
(b) Paid to each child conceived on or prior to contingency, but not exceeding 5,
beginning with the youngest and preferring the legitimate;
(c) Amount is either P250 or 10% of the monthly pension as computed above,
whichever is higher.
Retirement benefits
Eligibility requirements
(1) 120 monthly contributions;
(2) Age
(a) 65 years old; or
(b) a member who has reached 60 years may also avail if he is already
separated from employment or has ceased to be self-employed.
Benefit– entitlement to monthly pension from retirement until death.
Lump Sum Alternative
Member may opt to receive his first 18 monthly pensions in lump sum but such
is discounted at a preferential rate of interest.
To those ineligible– to the 60 year old with less than 120 monthly contributions
who is no longer employed or self-employed, and who is not continuing
contributions independently, he is entitled to a lump sum equal to his total
contributions paid.
Permanent disability benefits
(a) Eligibility requirement: 36 monthly contributions prior to the semester of
disability; same as death benefit; only difference is that the pension is paid
directly to the member.
(b) In case the permanently disabled member dies, it would be given the same
treatment as a retiree dying.
(c) For permanent partial disability, the pension is not lifetime. (e.g. loss of
thumb entitles member to only 10 months of pension, while loss of arm 50
months).
(1) It shall be paid in lump sum if the period is less than 12 months.
(2) For multiple partial disabilities, they shall be additive when related or
deteriorating – the percentage shall be equal to the number of months the
partial disability is entitled to divided by 75 months. (e.g. loss of sight in one eye
25/75; loss of arm 50/75; if both occur due to same cause, then 25/75 +
50/75 = 100% so treated as if it were permanent total disability.)
Death benefits
Eligibility requirement:36 monthly contributions prior to the semester of death.
Benefit– monthly pension to primary or secondary beneficiaries.
To those ineligible– lump sum benefit which shall be the higher between the
two:
(a) (monthly pension) x 12; or
(b) (monthly pension) x (# of monthly contributions)
Funeral benefits
P12,000 in cash or in kind, upon death of member
Loan. — Social Security Commission Resolution No. 669. Moreover, several SSS-
issued circulars such as Circular No. 21-P and No. 52 pertain to the treatment of
salary loans, sometimes providing for more flexible payment terms or
condonation for delinquent payers; Santiago v. CA and SSS, GR # L-39949 (1984)
resolved an issue involving the treatment of salary loan repayments; SSS
website also shows loans
Sickness benefits
Eligibility requirements and other conditions
(1) Inability to work due to sickness or injury
(2) Confined for at least 4 days either in a hospital or elsewhere with SSS
approval;
(3) At least 3 months of contributions in the 12 month period immediately
before the semester of sickness or injury has been paid;
(4) All company sick leaves with pay for the current year has been used up;
(5) Maximum of 120 days per 1 calendar year [so maximum permissible for the
same sickness and confinement is 240 days for 2 consecutive years];
12
(6) The employer has been notified, or, if a separated, voluntary or self-
employed member, the SSS directly notified within 5 days of confinement;
(7) Notice to employer or SSS not needed when confinement is in a hospital;
notice to employer not required as well when Employee became sick or injured
while working or within premises of the employer.
Benefit: daily cash allowance paid for the number of days a member is unable to
work due to sickness or injury equivalent to 90% x (average daily salary credit)
Maternity leave benefits. — (limited only to first four deliveries or miscarriage)
Note: All of these benefits are tax-exempt.
BENEFICIARIES
Primary
(a) Dependent spouse – until remarriage (see above);
(b) Dependent children (legitimate, legitimated, legally adopted, and
illegitimate) (see above); illegitimate children are entitled only to 50% of the
share of legitimate children unless there are no legitimate children, in which
case, they get 100%.
Secondary– shall only receive when the primary beneficiaries are absent
(a) Dependent parents
Others– shall only receive when the primary and secondary beneficiaries are
absent
(a) Any other person designated by member as his/her secondary beneficiary.
GSIS [RA 8291]
COVERAGE
All public sector employees below the compulsory retirement age of 65,
irrespective of employment status.
EXCLUSIONS FROM COVERAGE
(a) AFP and PNP;
(b) Members of the Judiciary and Constitutional Commissions who are covered
only by life insurance as they have separate retirement schemes;
(c) Contractual employees with no employer-employee relationship with the
agency they serve.
BENEFITS
Monthly pension
The amount shall be:
(a) 37.5% x (revalued ave. monthly compensation)
(b) Plus 2.5 x (revalued ave. monthly compensation) x [years in service in excess
of 15 years].
(1) The monthly pension shall not exceed 90% of the average monthly
compensation.
(2) It shall not be less than P2,400 for those with 20 years of service and not less
than P1,300 for everyone else.
Retirement benefits
Eligibility requirements
(1) 15 years service;
(2) 60 years of age; and
(3) Not receiving pension benefit from permanent total disability.
Note: Retirement is compulsory for employees 65 years of age who have
rendered at least 15 years of service; if employee has less than 15 years of
service, he may be allowed to continue in accordance with civil service laws.
Benefit: choice between
(a) 60 x [basic monthly pension]lump sum payment at the time of retirement
plus basic monthly pension payable monthly for life after expiry of the 5-year
guaranteed period which is already covered by the lump sum; or
(b) Cash payment equivalent to 18 x [basic monthly pension]plus monthly
pension for life immediately but with no 5-year guarantee
Permanent disability benefits
Eligibility requirements for Permanent Total Disability
(1) Disability not due to employee’s own gravemisconduct, notorious
negligence, habitual intoxication, or willful intention to kill himself or another;
(2) Employee is: in service at the time of disability; orb]even if separated, he has
paid at least 36 monthly contributions within the 5-year period immediately
prior to disability or has paid a total of at least 180 monthly contributions prior
to disability; and
(3) Member is not enjoying old-age retirement benefit.
Injuries deemed as Permanent Total Disability
(1) Complete loss of sight of both eyes
(2) Loss of two limbs at one or above the anke or wrist
(3) Permanent complete paralysis of two limbs
(4) Brain injury resulting in incurable imbecility, insanity, or other irreversible
conditions
Benefit for Permanent Total Disability
Monthly income benefit for life equal to basic monthly pension –This is
effective from date of disability;
(1) If member is in service at the time of disability and he has paid at least 180
monthly contributions, in addition to the monthly income benefit, he shall
receive an additional cash payment of 18 times basic monthly pension.
13

To the ineligible
If member has rendered at least 3 years of service, then he shall receive cash
payment equal to 100% of ave. monthly compensation for each year of service
(essentially total amount of contributions made)or P12,000 whichever is higher.
Partial Disability
Injuries deemed as Permanent Partial Disability
Complete and permanent loss of the use of: any one finger, any toe, one arm,
one hand, one foot, one leg, one or both ears, sight of one eye or such other
cases as may be determined by the GSIS
Computation of benefits
(1)If member is in the service, benefit is:
Cash payment (CP) = Basic Monthly Pension (BMP) X nos. of Permanent Partial
Disability (PPD) months as recommended by the GSIS medical evaluator
(2)If the member is separated from the service but has paid 36 monthly
contributions within the last 5 years immediately preceding the disability or has
paid at least 180 monthly contributions, benefit is:
CP = BMP X nos. of PPD months as recommended by the GSIS medical evaluator
Death Benefits
When member dies, the primary beneficiaries are entitled to only one of the
following:
(a) Survivorship pension (check G.1 above)
(1) If he was in the service when he died; or
(2) Even if separated from the service, he has at least 3 years of service and has
paid 36 monthly contributions within the 5 years immediately preceding death;
or
(3) Even if separated from the service, he has paid 180 monthly contributions
prior to death.
(b) Survivorship pension plus cash payment of 100% ave.monthly compensation
for every year of service [so essentially, pension plus total contributions made]
(1) If he was in the service when he died; and
(2) With 3 years of service.
(c) Cash payment equivalent to 100% ave.monthly compensation for each year
of service he paid contributions or P12,000 whichever is higher
(1) With 3 years of service; and
(2) He has failed toqualify in the prior 2 schemes.
Funeral benefits
Fixed by GSIS rules and regulations (currently at P20,000)
Entitled to this are the following:
(1) Active member;
(2) Member separated from service but still entitled to funeral benefit;
(3) Pensioner;
(4) Retiree who at the time of retirement was of pensionable age but opted to
retire under RA 1616.
Loan – GSIS website provides for this
Temporary disability benefits(similar to sickness)
Eligibility requirements and other conditions:
(5) Employee must be
(a) in service at the time of disability; or
(b) if separated, he has rendered at least 3 years of service and paid at least 6
monthly contributions in the 12 month period immediately prior to disability;
(6) All sick leave credits including CBA sick leaves for the current year has been
used up; and
(7) Maximum of 120 days per 1 calendar year (so maximum permissible for the
same sickness and confinement is 240 days for 2 consecutive years).
Benefit
75% of the current daily compensation for every day or fraction thereof of
disability or P70 whichever is higher.
Separation benefits
Eligibility requirements
(1) 60 years of age, or separation from service with at least 3 years but not over
15 years served
(2) Below 60 years of age, but at least 15 years of service rendered.
Benefit
(1) For 60 years of age or separated from service with 3 to 15 years of service:
cash payment of 100% of ave. monthly compensation for each year of service
(so essentially, the total amount of all contributions paid) or P12,000 whichever
is higher.
(2) Below 60 years of age and at least 15 years of service: cash payment
equivalent to 18 x (monthly pension) at the time of resignation or separation
plus an old-age pension benefit equal to basic monthly pension.
Unemployment benefits– Sec 11
Eligibility requirements
(a) Employee separated from service due to abolition of his office or position;
and
14
(b) Employee has been paying integrated contributions for at least 1 year prior
to separation.

Benefit
Monthly cash payments of 50% of average monthly compensation for a
duration which is proportional to years rendered, ranging from 2 months to 6
months.
Survivorship benefits
Beneficiaries are entitled to the following:
(a) Basic survivorship pension which is 50% of basic monthly pension; and
(b) Dependent children’s pension not exceeding 50% of the basic monthly
pension.

15
Republic Act No. 11210 otherwise known as the “105-day Expanded Maternity
Leave Law” The new law will take effect after fifteen (15) days from its publication in the
Official Gazette (21 February 2019) or in a newspaper of general circulation. The
The salient features of the law are as follows: implementing rules are expected to be issued within 60 days.

It grants to all covered female workers in the government and the private The EML Act complements the recent passage of Republic Act 11148, or the
sector, including the informal economy, 105 days of fully paid leave. Previously, Kalusugan at Nutrisyon ng Mag-Nanay Act. With the EML Act, women are given
female workers could take maternity leaves for 60 days for normal delivery and additional economic support through ensuring that their one hundred and five
78 days for caesarian operations. (105) days (with additional 15 days for single mothers) of maternity leave are
paid, regardless of economic and social background.
The maternity leave is extendible by another 30 days but without pay.
If the female worker is a solo parent, as defined in the Solo Parent Act (R.A. No.
8972) she can have an additional 15 days of fully paid leave.
Female workers who suffered a miscarriage or had to undergo an emergency
termination of the pregnancy are allowed to have a 60-day maternity leave.

The mother can transfer 7 days of her leave benefits to the father, extending
the latter’s paid paternity leave to 14 days.

In the death, absence or incapacity of the father, the mother can choose to
allocate up to 7 days of her maternity leave benefits to a relative within the
fourth civil degree of consanguinity or the current partner of the mother, so
long as they share the same household.
The leave benefits provided under the law are without prejudice to a superior
benefit provided under a collective bargaining agreement.

The law expressly prohibits the act of discriminating against the hiring of
women and protects their security of tenure by ensuring that there is no
diminution of their benefits even by reason of their having gone on maternity
leave.
Employers who fail or refuse to comply with the provision of the law may be
subject to a fine of not less than P20 000 but not more than P200 000, and
imprisonment of not less than 6 months and 1 day but not more than 12 years.

If the employer is an association, partnership, corporation or any other

organization, its managing head, directors or partners shall be held liable.

16
Republic Act 7699
The Portability Law
AN ACT INSTITUTING LIMITED PORTABILITY SCHEME IN THE SOCIAL SECURITY
INSURANCE SYSTEMS BY TOTALIZING THE WORKERS' CREDITABLE SERVICES OR
CONTRIBUTIONS IN EACH OF THE SYSTEMS
SECTION 1. It is hereby declared the policy of the State to promote the welfare
of our workers by recognizing their efforts in productive endeavors and to
further improve their conditions by providing benefits for their long years of
contribution to the national economy. Towards this end, the State shall
institute a scheme for totalization and portability of social security benefits with
the view of establishing within a reasonable period a unitary social security
system.
Sec. 2. Definition of Terms. — As used in this Act, unless the context indicates
otherwise, the following terms shall mean:
(a) "Contributions" shall refer to the contributions paid by the employee or
worker to either the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) or the Social
Security System (SSS) on account of the worker's membership;
(b) "Portability" shall refer to the transfer of funds for the account and
benefit of a worker who transfers from one system to the other;
(c) "Sector" shall refer to employment either in the public or private sector;
(d) "System" shall refer to either the SSS as created under Republic Act No.
1161, as amended or the GSIS as created under Presidential Decree No. 1146,
as amended; and
(e) "Totalization" shall refer to the process of adding up the periods of
creditable services or contributions under each of the Systems, for purposes of
eligibility and computation of benefits.
Sec. 3. Provisions of any general or special law or rules and regulations to the
contrary notwithstanding, a covered worker who transfers employment from
one sector to another or is employed in both sectors shall have his credible
services or contributions in both Systems credited to his service or contribution
record in each of the Systems and shall be totalized for purposes of old-age,
disability, survivorship and other benefits in case the covered member does not
qualify for such benefits in either or both Systems without totalization:
Provided, however, That overlapping periods of membership shall be credited
only once for purposes of totalization.
Sec. 4. All contributions paid by such member personally, and those that were
paid by his employers to both Systems shall be considered in the processing of
benefits which he can claim from either or both Systems: Provided, however,
That the amount of benefits to be paid by one System shall be in proportion to
the number of contributions actually remitted to that System.
Sec. 5. Nothing in this Act shall be construed to diminish or reduce the benefits
being enjoyed by a covered worker arising from existing laws, issuances, and
company policies or practices or agreements between the employer and the
employees.
Sec. 6. The Department of Labor and Employment for the private sector and the
Civil Service Commission for the government sector, together with the SSS and
the GSIS shall, within ninety (90) days from the effectivity of this Act,
promulgate the rules and regulations necessary to implement the provisions
hereof: Provided, That any conflict in the interpretation of the law and the
implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of the workers.
Sec. 7. All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or parts thereof, which
are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.
Sec. 8. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its complete publication
in the Official Gazette or in at least two (2) national newspapers of general
circulation, whichever comes earlier.
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REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8187
AN ACT GRANTING PATERNITY LEAVE OF SEVEN (7) DAYS
WITH FULL PAY TO ALL MARRIED MALE EMPLOYEES
IN THE PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTORS FOR THE
FIRST FOUR (4) DELIVERIES OF THE LEGITIMATE
SPOUSE WITH WHOM HE IS COHABITING AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
Philippines in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Short Title. – This Act shall be known as the
"Paternity Leave Act of 1996."
SEC. 2. Notwithstanding any law, rules and regulations to the contrary, every
married male employee in the private and public sectors shall be entitled to a
paternity leave of seven (7) days with full pay for the first four (4) deliveries of
the legitimate spouse with whom he is cohabiting. The male employee applying
for paternity leave shall notify his employer of the pregnancy of his legitimate
spouse and the expected date of such delivery.
For purposes of this Act, delivery shall include childbirth or any miscarriage.
SEC. 3. Definition of Term. – For purpose of this Act,
Paternity Leave refers to the benefits granted to a married male employee
allowing him not to report for work for seven (7) days but continues to earn the
compensation therefor, on the condition that his spouse has delivered a child or
suffered a miscarriage for purposes of enabling him to effectively lend support
to his wife in her period of recovery and/or in the nursing of the newly-born
child.
SEC. 4. The Secretary of Labor and Employment, the
Chairman of the Civil Service Commission and the Secretary of Health shall,
within thirty (30) days from the effectivity of this Act, issue such rules and
regulations necessary for the proper implementation of the provisions hereof.
SEC. 5. Any person, corporation, trust, firm, partnership, association or entity
found violating this Act or the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder
shall be punished by a fine not exceeding Twenty-five thousand pesos (P25,000)
or imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days nor more than six (6) months.
If the violation is committed by a corporation, trust or firm, partnership,
association or any other entity, the penalty of imprisonment shall be imposed
on the entity's responsible officers, including, but not limited to, the president,
vice-president, chief executive officer, general manager, managing director or
partner directly responsible therefor.
SEC. 6. Non-diminution Clause. – Nothing in this Act shall be construed to
reduce any existing benefits of any form granted under existing laws, decrees,
executive orders, or any contract agreement or policy between employer and
employee.
SEC. 7. Repealing Clause. – All laws, ordinances, rules, regulations, issuances, or
parts thereof which are inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly.
SEC. 8. Effectivity. – This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days from its
publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two (2) newspapers of national
circulation.
Approved, June 11, 1996.
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