G.R. No. 132344 February 17, 2000 Def. Conflict of Laws — x-1-87-88, Practice Court I Inc.
, 1-
UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST, petitioner,
vs.
ROMEO A. JADER, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
May an educational institution be held liable for damages for
misleading a student into believing that the latter had satisfied all the
requirements for graduation when such is not the case? This is the
issue in the instant petition for review premised on the following
undisputed facts as summarized by the trial court and adopted by the
Court of Appeals (CA),1 to wit:
Plaintiff was enrolled in the defendants' College of Law from
1984 up to 1988. In the first semester of his last year (School
year 1987-1988), he failed to take the regular final
examination in Practice Court I for which he was given an
incomplete grade (Exhibits "2", also Exhibit "H"). He enrolled
for the second semester as fourth year law student (Exhibit
"A") and on February 1, 1988 he filed an application for the
removal of the incomplete grade given him by Professor
Carlos Ortega (Exhibits "H-2", also Exhibit "2") which was
approved by Dean Celedonio Tiongson after payment of the
required fee. He took the examination on March 28, 1988.
On May 30, 1988, Professor Carlos Ortega submitted his
grade. It was a grade of five (5). (Exhibits "H-4", also Exhibits
"2-L", "2-N").1âwphi1.nêt
In the meantime, the Dean and the Faculty Members of the
College of Law met to deliberate on who among the fourth
year students should be allowed to graduate. The plaintiff's
name appeared in the Tentative List of Candidates for
graduation for the Degree of Bachelor of Laws (LL.B) as of
Second Semester (1987-1988) with the following annotation:
JADER ROMEO A.
1
87-88 C-1 to submit transcript with S.O. (Exhibits "3", "3-C-
1", "3-C-2").
The 35th Investitures & Commencement Ceremonies for the
candidates of Bachelor of Laws was scheduled on the 16th
of April 1988 at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, and in the
invitation for that occasion the name of the plaintiff appeared
as one of the candidates. (Exhibits "B", "B-6", "B-6-A"). At
the foot of the list of the names of the candidates there
appeared however the following annotation:
This is a tentative list Degrees will be conferred upon
these candidates who satisfactorily complete
requirements as stated in the University Bulletin and
as approved of the Department of Education, Culture
and Sports (Exhibit "B-7-A").
The plaintiff attended the investiture ceremonies at F. dela
Cruz Quadrangle, U.E., Recto Campus, during the program
of which he went up the stage when his name was called,
escorted by her (sic) mother and his eldest brother who
assisted in placing the Hood, and his Tassel was turned from
left to right, and he was thereafter handed by Dean
Celedonio a rolled white sheet of paper symbolical of the
Law Diploma. His relatives took pictures of the occasion
(Exhibits "C" to "C-6", "D-3" to "D-11").
He tendered a blow-out that evening which was attended by
neighbors, friends and relatives who wished him good luck in
the forthcoming bar examination. There were pictures taken
too during the blow-out (Exhibits "D" to "D-1").
He thereafter prepared himself for the bar examination. He
took a leave of absence without pay from his job from April
20, 1988 to September 30, 1988 (Exhibit "G") and enrolled at
the pre-bar review class in Far Eastern University. (Exhibits
"F" to "F-2"). Having learned of the deficiency he dropped his
review class and was not able to take the bar examination.2
Consequently, respondent sued petitioner for damages alleging that
he suffered moral shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless nights when
he was not able to take the 1988 bar examinations arising from the
latter's negligence. He prayed for an award of moral and exemplary
damages, unrealized income, attorney's fees, and costs of suit.
In its answer with counterclaim, petitioner denied liability arguing
mainly that it never led respondent to believe that he completed the
requirements for a Bachelor of Laws degree when his name was
included in the tentative list of graduating students. After trial, the
lower court rendered judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant
ordering the latter to pay plaintiff the sum of THIRTY FIVE
THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED SEVENTY PESOS
(P35,470.00) with legal rate of interest from the filing of the
complaint until fully paid, the amount of FIVE THOUSAND
PESOS (P5,000.00) as attorney's fees and the cost of suit.
Defendant's counterclaim is, for lack of merit, hereby
dismissed.
SO ORDERED.3
which on appeal by both parties was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals (CA) with modification. The dispositive portion of the CA
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the lower Court's
Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
defendant-appellee, in addition to the sum adjudged by the
lower court in favor of plaintiff-appellant, is also ORDERED
to pay plaintiff-appellant the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND
(P50,000.00) PESOS for moral damages. Costs against
defendant-appellee.
SO ORDERED.4
2
Upon the denial of its motion for reconsideration, petitioner UE
elevated the case to this Court on a petition for review under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, arguing that it has no liability to respondent
Romeo A. Jader, considering that the proximate and immediate
cause of the alleged damages incurred by the latter arose out of his
own negligence in not verifying from the professor concerned the
result of his removal exam.
The petition lacks merit.
When a student is enrolled in any educational or learning institution,
a contract of education is entered into between said institution and
the student. The professors, teachers or instructors hired by the
school are considered merely as agents and administrators tasked to
perform the school's commitment under the contract. Since the
contracting parties are the school and the student, the latter is not
duty-bound to deal with the former's agents, such as the professors
with respect to the status or result of his grades, although nothing
prevents either professors or students from sharing with each other
such information. The Court takes judicial notice of the traditional
practice in educational institutions wherein the professor directly
furnishes his/her students their grades. It is the contractual obligation
of the school to timely inform and furnish sufficient notice and
information to each and every student as to whether he or she had
already complied with all the requirements for the conferment of a
degree or whether they would be included among those who will
graduate. Although commencement exercises are but a formal
ceremony, it nonetheless is not an ordinary occasion, since such
ceremony is the educational institution's way of announcing to the
whole world that the students included in the list of those who will be
conferred a degree during the baccalaureate ceremony have
satisfied all the requirements for such degree. Prior or subsequent to
the ceremony, the school has the obligation to promptly inform the
student of any problem involving the latter's grades and performance
and also most importantly, of the procedures for remedying the
same.
Petitioner, in belatedly informing respondent of the result of the
removal examination, particularly at a time when he had already
commenced preparing for the bar exams, cannot be said to have
acted in good faith. Absence of good faith must be sufficiently
established for a successful prosecution by the aggrieved party in a
suit for abuse of right under Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good faith
connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking undue
advantage of another, even though the forms and technicalities of
the law, together with the absence of all information or belief of facts,
would render the transaction unconscientious.5 It is the school that
has access to those information and it is only the school that can
compel its professors to act and comply with its rules, regulations
and policies with respect to the computation and the prompt
submission of grades. Students do not exercise control, much less
influence, over the way an educational institution should run its
affairs, particularly in disciplining its professors and teachers and
ensuring their compliance with the school's rules and orders. Being
the party that hired them, it is the school that exercises general
supervision and exclusive control over the professors with respect to
the submission of reports involving the students' standing. Exclusive
control means that no other person or entity had any control over the
instrumentality which caused the damage or injury. 6
The college dean is the senior officer responsible for the operation of
an academic program, enforcement of rules and regulations, and the
supervision of faculty and student services.7 He must see to it that
his own professors and teachers, regardless of their status or
position outside of the university, must comply with the rules set by
the latter. The negligent act of a professor who fails to observe the
rules of the school, for instance by not promptly submitting a
student's grade, is not only imputable to the professor but is an act of
the school, being his employer.
Considering further, that the institution of learning involved herein is
a university which is engaged in legal education, it should have
practiced what it inculcates in its students, more specifically the
principle of good dealings enshrined in Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil
Code which states:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and
in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
3
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or
negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the
latter for the same.
Art. 19 was intended to expand the concept of torts by granting
adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which
is impossible for human foresight to provide specifically in statutory
law.8 In civilized society, men must be able to assume that others will
do them no intended injury — that others will commit no internal
aggressions upon them; that their fellowmen, when they act
affirmatively will do so with due care which the ordinary
understanding and moral sense of the community exacts and that
those with whom they deal in the general course of society will act in
good faith. The ultimate thing in the theory of liability is justifiable
reliance under conditions of civilized society. 9 Schools and
professors cannot just take students for granted and be indifferent to
them, for without the latter, the former are useless.
Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their
academic status and not wait for the latter to inquire from the former.
The conscious indifference of a person to the rights or welfare of the
person/persons who may be affected by his act or omission can
support a claim for damages.10 Want of care to the conscious
disregard of civil obligations coupled with a conscious knowledge of
the cause naturally calculated to produce them would make the
erring party liable.11 Petitioner ought to have known that time was of
the essence in the performance of its obligation to inform respondent
of his grade. It cannot feign ignorance that respondent will not
prepare himself for the bar exams since that is precisely the
immediate concern after graduation of an LL.B. graduate. It failed to
act seasonably. Petitioner cannot just give out its student's grades at
any time because a student has to comply with certain deadlines set
by the Supreme Court on the submission of requirements for taking
the bar. Petitioner's liability arose from its failure to promptly inform
respondent of the result of an examination and in misleading the
latter into believing that he had satisfied all requirements for the
course. Worth quoting is the following disquisition of the respondent
court:
 It is apparent from the testimony of Dean Tiongson that
defendant-appellee University had been informed during the
deliberation that the professor in Practice Court I gave
plaintiff-appellant a failing grade. Yet, defendant-appellee still
did not inform plaintiff-appellant of his failure to complete the
requirements for the degree nor did they remove his name
from the tentative list of candidates for graduation. Worse,
defendant-appellee university, despite the knowledge that
plaintiff-appellant failed in Practice Court I, again included
plaintiff-appellant's name in the "tentative list of candidates
for graduation which was prepared after the deliberation and
which became the basis for the commencement rites
program. Dean Tiongson reasons out that plaintiff-
appellant's name was allowed to remain in the tentative list
of candidates for graduation in the hope that the latter would
still be able to remedy the situation in the remaining few days
before graduation day. Dean Tiongson, however, did not
explain how plaintiff appellant Jader could have done
something to complete his deficiency if defendant-appellee
university did not exert any effort to inform plaintiff-appellant
of his failing grade in Practice Court I.12
Petitioner cannot pass on its blame to the professors to justify its own
negligence that led to the delayed relay of information to respondent.
When one of two innocent parties must suffer, he through whose
agency the loss occurred must bear it.13 The modern tendency is to
grant indemnity for damages in cases where there is abuse of right,
even when the act is not illicit.14 If mere fault or negligence in one's
acts can make him liable for damages for injury caused thereby, with
more reason should abuse or bad faith make him liable. A person
should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of
his right, that is, when he acts with prudence and in good faith, but
not when he acts with negligence or abuse.15
However, while petitioner was guilty of negligence and thus liable to
respondent for the latter's actual damages, we hold that respondent
should not have been awarded moral damages. We do not agree
with the Court of Appeals' findings that respondent suffered shock,
trauma and pain when he was informed that he could not graduate
and will not be allowed to take the bar examinations. At the very
4
least, it behooved on respondent to verify for himself whether he has
completed all necessary requirements to be eligible for the bar
examinations. As a senior law student, respondent should have been
responsible enough to ensure that all his affairs, specifically those
pertaining to his academic achievement, are in order. Given these
considerations, we fail to see how respondent could have suffered
untold embarrassment in attending the graduation rites, enrolling in
the bar review classes and not being able to take the bar exams. If
respondent was indeed humiliated by his failure to take the bar, he
brought this upon himself by not verifying if he has satisfied all the
requirements including his school records, before preparing himself
for the bar examination. Certainly, taking the bar examinations does
not only entail a mental preparation on the subjects thereof; there are
also prerequisites of documentation and submission of requirements
which the prospective examinee must meet.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner is ORDERED to PAY
respondent the sum of Thirty-five Thousand Four Hundred Seventy
Pesos (P35,470.00), with legal interest of 6% per annum computed
from the date of filing of the complaint until fully paid; the amount of
Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as attorney's fees; and the costs
of the suit. The award of moral damages is DELEIED.
[G.R. No. 111211. July 24, 1997]
ABS-CBN EMPLOYEES UNION and JOSE
ENTRADICHO, petitioners, vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION and ABS-CBN BROADCASTING
CORPORATION, respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
This petition for certiorari assails the July 12, 1993, decision of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversing the
judgment of Labor Arbiter Oswald B. Lorenzo dated August 31,
1990, but ordering private respondent to pay petitioner the amount
of P1,000.00 as indemnity.
Petitioner Jose Entradicho was employed by respondent ABS-CBN
Broadcasting Corporation (ABS-CBN) as cameraman on September
7, 1987 until his dismissal on August 4, 1989.
It is undisputed that on July 15, 1989, petitioner did not report for the
taping of an ABS-CBN production entitled Kris at 18. The taping
thereof was allegedly delayed, mishandled and haphazardly done to
the damage and prejudice of ABS-CBN. The latters TV Engineering
Director, Fernando Morales, directed petitioner to explain within 48
hours why no action should be taken against him for his absence on
said date. He retorted that he brought his sick daughter to the
hospital for immediate medical attention and borrowed from relatives
the necessary funds to answer for the expenses which may be
incurred. Morales accepted his explanation with a stern warning that
a repetition of a similar offense would be meted a corresponding
disciplinary action.
On July 16, 1989, however, ABS-CBN's Personnel Manager
Hermilindo[1] P. Ocampo, saw the name of petitioner in the closing
credits of the program Supermodels aired on People's Television 4
(PTV 4),[2] a fact later confirmed by Engr. Tony Lidua of said station.
With this discovery, Ocampo required petitioner to report to him the
circumstances regarding the July 15, 1989, incident. Petitioner
denied deserting his assignment with ABS-CBN in favor of the
production of Supermodels. He admitted, however, that his fleeting
stint with PTV 4 started only late in the afternoon of July 15, 1989, a
job he was forced to accept" because of an urgent financial need "to
defray the medical expenses of his sick child.[3]
On August 2, 1989, petitioner was terminated from his employment
on the ground of acts constituting disloyalty.
In a complaint for illegal dismissal filed by petitioner against ABS-
CBN, Labor Arbiter Oswald B. Lorenzo rendered a decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads thus:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby
rendered as follows:
5
1. Declaring the dismissal of complaint JOSE ENTRADICHO by
respondent firm as having been illegally effected;
2. Ordering respondent firm to immediately reinstate herein
complainant to his former or substantially equivalent position without
loss of seniority rights and benefits previously enjoyed;
3. Ordering respondent to pay complainant his full back wages from
04 August 1989 up to 31 August 1990 or a total of FORTY-SIX
THOUSAND NINETY-TWO PESOS AND TWENTY-FOUR
CENTAVOS (P46,092.24), or a period of 12.97 months
times P3,556.50 per month;
4. Ordering respondent to pay complainant the amount of ONE
THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT PESOS AND
TWENTY-FIVE CENTAVOS (P1,778.25), representing his fifteen
(15) days suspension or the equivalent one-half month pay;
5. Ordering respondent to pay complainant for and as attorneys fees
the amount of FOUR THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY
SEVEN AND FOUR CENTAVOS (P4,787.04), representing ten (10)
per cent of the total award in this case.
Finally respondent firm is hereby ordered to show compliance of the
immediate reinstatement of complainant ENTRADICHO, either
physically or merely in the payroll at the option of the former within
five (5) days from the receipt of this decision.
On appeal, the NLRC set aside said decision and dismissed the case
for lack of merit, but ABS-CBN was ordered to indemnify petitioner in
the amount of P1,000.00 for its non-observance of due process in
the termination of his services. Without filing any motion for
reconsideration of the NLRCs decision, petitioner filed the instant
special civil action.
The petition must be dismissed.
At the outset, the instant petition is procedurally defective for failure
of petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration with the NLRC before
availing of the special civil action of certiorari. In the case of Building
Care Corporation v. NLRC,[4] the Court declared that this premature
action constitutes a fatal infirmity thus:
x x x The unquestioned rule in this jurisdiction is that certiorari will lie
only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law against the acts of public
respondent. In the instant case, the plain and adequate remedy
expressly provided by the law was a motion for reconsideration of the
assailed decision, based on palpable or patent errors, to be made
under oath and filed within ten (10) days from receipt of the
questioned decision.
(T)he filing of such a motion is intended to afford public respondent
an opportunity to correct any actual or fancied error attributed to it by
way of a re-examination of the legal and factual aspects of the
case. Petitioners inaction or negligence under the circumstances is
tantamount to a deprivation of the right and opportunity of the
respondent Commission to cleanse itself of an error unwittingly
committed or vindicate itself of an act unfairly imputed. x x x
x x x And for failure to avail of the correct remedy expressly provided
by law, petitioner has permitted the subject Resolution to become
final and executory after the lapse of the ten day period within which
to file such motion for reconsideration.
A motion for reconsideration is indispensable for it affords the NLRC
an opportunity to rectify errors or mistakes it might have committed
before resort to the courts can be had.[5] We had an occasion to
stress this significant matter in Zapata v. NLRC, [6] where we ruled in
this wise:
Petitioner cannot, on its bare and self-serving representation that
reconsideration is unnecessary, unilaterally disregard what the law
requires and deny respondent NLRC its right to review its
pronouncements before being haled to court to account therefor. On
policy considerations, such prerequisite would provide an expeditious
termination to labor disputes and assist in the decongestion of court
dockets by obviating improvident and unnecessary recourse to
judicial proceedings. The present case exemplifies the very
contingency sought to be, and which could have been, avoided by
the observance of said rules.
Rule VII, Section 14 of the NLRC Rules of Procedure provides that
motions for reconsideration must be filed within ten (10) calendar
days from receipt of the order, resolution, or decision of the
6
NLRC,[7] a procedure which is jurisdictional. Hence certiorari, as in
this case, will not prosper.[8] Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure clearly provides that:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of
such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as
law and justice may require.
xxx xxx xxx.
In the absence of a motion for reconsideration filed within the ten-day
reglementary period, the assailed order, resolution, or decision of the
NLRC becomes final and executory after ten calendar days from
receipt thereof.[9]
On the merits, we find no persuasive reason to depart from the
NLRCs decision.
It must be noted that under Article XIII, Section 1, paragraph 10 of
the ABS-CBN collective bargaining agreement:
The COMPANY and UNION agree that in order to render efficient,
competent and competitive service to the public, the COMPANY
must maintain a high standard of operation. For this reason, the
COMPANY and the UNION agree that the following acts of an
employee are subject to disciplinary measures and shall warrant
dismissal.
xxx
(1) Gross inefficiency and acts of disloyalty
x x x (Underscoring supplied).
The NLRC correctly declared that by rendering his services to a
business rival, petitioner was not only guilty of acts of disloyalty but
also of serious misconduct and willful breach of trust which under the
Labor Code, as amended, are valid and just grounds for the
termination of an employment.
A dismissal, however, must not only be for a valid or substantial
cause; the employer must also observe the procedural aspect of due
process by giving the employee proper notice and the opportunity to
be heard and to defend himself.[10] Rule XIV, section 2 of the
implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code provides
that:
Notice of Dismissal. Any employer who seeks to dismiss a worker
shall furnish him a written notice stating the particular acts or
omissions constituting the grounds for his dismissal.(Underscoring
supplied)
xxx xxx xxx"
Hermilindo P. Ocampos memorandum to petitioner was worded in
this wise:
You are hereby required to report to the undersigned to answer
certain allegations and statements presented to the attention of
Personnel in connection with your absence last Saturday, July 15,
1989.[11]
We adopt the ruling of the Labor Arbiter on this point. The
memorandum hinges only on allegations and statements supposedly
prejudicial to petitioner, without, however, indicating explicitly the
circumstances surrounding the same, thus violating the
aforementioned rule and regulations of the Labor Code. The Labor
Code requires the employer to furnish the employee with a written
notice containing a statement of the cause for termination and to
afford said employee ample opportunity to be heard and to defend
himself with the assistance of his representative, if he so
desires. Moreover, the employer is also required to notify the worker
in writing of the decision to dismiss him, stating clearly the reasons
therefore.[12]
As to the consequence of the failure to observe the requirement of
due process in the dismissal of an employee, we ruled
in Aurelio v. NLRC,[13] that in case where there was a valid ground to
7
dismiss an employee but there was non-observance of due process,
this Court held that only a sanction must be imposed upon the
employer for failure to give formal notice and to conduct an
investigation required by law before dismissing the employee in
consonance with the ruling in Wenphil v. NLRC, 170 SCRA 69
(1989); Shoemart, Inc. v. NLRC, supra; and in Pacific Mills,
Inc. v. Zenaida Alonzo, 199 SCRA 617 (1991). x x x In the Pacific
Mills, Inc., and Wenphil cases, this Court awarded P1,000.00 as
penalty for non-observance of due process.
In the recent case of MGG Marine Services, Inc., et. al.
v. NLRC,[14] we held that the failure to show due process taints the
dismissal. This does not mean however that the private respondent
would be entitled to back wages or reinstatement or even separation
pay. Under prevailing jurisprudence, one is entitled only to indemnity
or damages, the amount of which depends on the peculiar
circumstances of each case.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The decision of
the National Labor Relations Commission dated July 12, 1993, is
accordingly AFFIRMED in toto. No pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. 85464 October 3, 1991
DAVID P. LLORENTE, petitioner,
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Padilla Law Office for petitioner.
SAMIENTO, J.:
The petitioner questions the Decision of the Sandiganbayan * holding
him civilly liable in spite of an acquittal. The facts are not disputed:
Atty. Llorente was employed in the PCA, a public corporation (Sec. 1,
PD 1468) from 1975 to August 31, 1986, when he resigned. He
occupied the positions of Assistant Corporate Secretary for a year,
then Corporate Legal Counsel until November 2, 1981, and, finally,
Deputy Administrator for Administrative Services, Finance Services,
Legal Affairs Departments. ...
As a result of a massive reorganization in 1981, hundreds of PCA
employees resigned effective October 31, 1981. Among them were
Mr. Curio, Mrs. Perez, Mr. Azucena, and Mrs. Javier (TSN, Oct.
22/87, p. 2; Exhs. M-2, N-1, and O-1). They were all required to
apply for PCA clearances in support of their gratuity benefits (Exhs.
C, M-2, N-1, and 0-1). Condition (a) of the clearance provided:
The clearance shall be signed by the PCA officers concemed only
when there is no item appearing under "PENDING
ACCOUNTABILITY" or after every item previously entered
thereunder is fully settled. Settlement thereof shall be written in RED
ink. (Exhs. D or D-1 and 1-B)
After the clearance was signed by the PCA officers concerned, it was
to be approved, first, by Atty. Llorente, in the case of a rank-and-file
employee, or by Col. Duefias, the acting administrator, in the case of
an officer, and then by Atty. Rodriguez, the corporate auditor ...
Notwithstanding Condition (a) just quoted, the clearances of Mrs
Perez and Mr. Azucena both dated October 30, 1981, were favorably
acted upon by the CPA officers concerned, including Mrs. Sotto,
acting for the accounting division, even if the clearances showed
they had pending accountabilities to the GSIS and the UCPB, and
subsequently approved by Attys. Llorente and Rodriguez (Exhs. M
and N). Thereafter, the vouchers for their gratuity benefits, also
indicating their outstanding obligations were approved, among
others, by Atty Llorente, and their gratuity benefits released to them
after deducting those accountabilities. ...
The clearanceof Mrs. Javier of the same date of October 30, 1991
was also signed by all PCA officers concerned, including Mrs. Sotto
even though the former had unsettled obligations noted
thereon, viz 'SIS loan — P5,387.00 and UCPB car loan P19,705.00,
or a total of P25,092.00, and later on approveed by Col. Dueñas, Mrs
Javier being an officer, and Atty. Rodriguez "Exh. (O)". Similariv the,
8
voucher of Mrs Javier for her gratuity benefits likewise recited her
accountabilities of P25,092.00 plus P92.000.00, which was
handwritten. Both accounts were deducted from her gratuity benefits,
and the balance released to her on November 16, 1981. The
voucher passed post-audit by Atty. Rodriguez on December 1, 1981
(Exhs. L,
L-1, L-2, and L-3).
The said P92,000.00 was the disallowed portion of the cash
advances received by Mr. Curio in connection with his duties as
"super cargo" in the distribution of seed nuts throughout the country.
He received them through and in the name of Mrs. Javier from the
UCPB. When the amount was disallowed, the UCPB withheld from
the PCA certain receivables; the latter, in turn, deducted the same
amount from the gratuity benefits of Mrs. Javier, she being primarily
liable therefor (Exhs, L, L-1, L-2, and L-3), At the time of the
deduction, the additional liquidation papers had already been
submitted and were in process. Just in case she would not be
successful in having the entire amount wiped out, she requested Mr.
Curio, who admittedly received it, to execute, as he did, an affidavit
dated November 26, 1981, in which he assumed whatever portion
thereof might not be allowed ...
The clearance of Mr. Curio dated November 4,1981, (Exh. D or D-1)
likewise favorably passed all officers concerned, including Mrs.
Sotto, the latter signing despite the notation handwritten on
December 8, 1981, that Mr. Curio had pending accountabilities,
namely: GSIS loan — 2,193.74, 201 accounts receivable —
P3,897.75, and UCPB loan — P3,623.49, or a total of P10,714.78.
However, when the clearance was submitted to Atty. Llorente for
approval, he refused to approve it. For this reason, the clearance
was held up in his office and did not reach Atty. Rodriguez, ...
The reason given by Atty. Llorente was that when the clearance was
presented to him on December 8, 1981, he was already aware of the
affidavit dated November 26, 1981, in which Mr. Curio assumed to
pay any residual liability for the disallowed cash advances, which at
the time, December 8, 1981, stood at P92,000.00 (Exhs. 2 and 2-A).
Moreover, Mr. Curio had other pending obligations noted on his
clearance totalling Pl0,714.98 (Exh. 1-a). To justify his stand, Atty.
Llorente invoked Condition (a) of the clearance (Exhs. D and I-B),
which, he said, was "very stringent" and could not be interpreted in prospective employers, the item applied for was P2,500.00 a month.
any other way ... At that time, he was only about 45 years old and still competitive in
the job market. But in 1986, being already past 50 years, he could no
On December 1, 1982, Mr. Curio brought the matter of his longer be hired permanently, there being a regulation to that effect.
unapproved clearance to Col. Dueñas (Exh. G), who referred it to the His present employment with the Philippine Ports Authority, which
Legal Department, which was under Atty. Llorente as Deputy started on March 16, 1987, was casual for that reason. Had his
Administrator for legal affairs. After follow-up in that department, Mr. gratuity benefits been paid in 1981, he would have received a bigger
Curio received the answer of Col. Dueñas dated February 11, 1983, amount, considering that since then interest had accrued and the
saying that the clearance was being withheld until the former settled foreign exchange rate of the peso to the dollar had gone up ... 1
his alleged accountability for P92,000.00 reduced already to
P56,000.00 (Exh. I). Mr. Curio elevated the matter to the Chairman of
the PCA Board, who indorsed it to Col. Dueñas, who, in turn, sent it On December 10, 1986, an Information for violation of Section 3(c) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
to the Legal Department. This time the latter, through its Manager, Act was filed against the petitioner:
Manuel F. Pastor, Jr., first cousin of Atty. Llorente, submitted a
formal report under date of August 14, 1986, to the PCA Chairman,
justifying the action taken by Atty. Llorente and Col. Dueñas (Exh.
12). The PCA Chairman did not respond in writing, but advised Mr.
Curio to wait for the resolution of the Tanodbayan with which he (Mr.
That on or about December 8, 1981 and/or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the
Curio) had filed this case initially against Atty. Llorente and, later on,
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused David Pastor Llorente, Deputy Administrator for the Philippine
against Col. Duerias also. On August 31, 1986, Atty. Llorente
Coconut Authority (PCA), and as such was empowered among others to approve clearances of
resigned from the PCA; the clearance, however, could not be issued
employees thereat, taking advantage of his position, through evident bad faith, did then and there, wilfully
because, according to the PCA Corporate Legal Counsel, Arthur J.
and unlawfully refuse to issue a certificate of clearance to Herminigildo M. Curio, an employee thereat,
Liquate, the PCA did not want to preempt the Tanodbayan. On
who was forced to resign as a result of the abolition of his item pursuant to the 1981 reorganization of the
November 12, 1986, the latter decided to institlite this case in court ...
PCA, resulting in his deprivation to receive his gratuity benefits amounting to P29,854.90, and to secure

Nine days thereafter, or on November 21, 1986, Mr. Curio employment with other offices to his damage and prejudice, and that of the public service.

accomplished another clearance, which no longer imposed Condition

(a) of his earlier clearance (Exh. E). The new clearance was
approved, even if he still had pending accountabilities, totalling
P10,714.78 that had remained unsettled since December 1981. His
voucher was also approved, and his gratuity benefits paid to him in
the middle of December 1986, after deducting those obligations
(Exh. F). Nothing was mentioned anymore about the disallowed cash
advances of P92,000.00, which had been reduced to P55,000.00 ...
Between December 1981 and December 1986, Mr. Curio failed to
get gainful employment; as a result, his family literally went hungry,
In 1981, he applied for work with the Philippine Cotton Authority, but
was refused, because he could not present his PCA clearance. The
same thing happened when he sought employment with the
Philippine Fish Marketing Administration in January 1982. In both
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Manila, Philippines, December 10, 1986. 2
As indicated at the outset, the Sandiganbayan acquitted the petitioner in the absence of any evidence that
he acted in bad faith. 3
The Sandiganbayan cited three considerations that
precluded bad faith:
First, when Atty. Llorente withheld favorable action on the clearance
on and after December 8, 1981, there was still the possibility, remote
though it was when viewed after the fact, that the accountability,
which Mrs. Javier was primarily liable therefor and which was fully
settled by deduction from her gratuity benefits on November 16,

9
1981 (Exhs. L, L-1, L-2, and
L-3), would be reinstated and charged directly to Mr. Curio, for the
latter executed on November 26, 1981, an affidavit assuming
responsibility for the obligation to the extent of the amount finally
disallowed, and the affidavit was on December 8, 1981, already
pending consideration by the PCA management (Exhs. 2 and 2-A).
Second, Atty. Llorente was appointed Deputy Administrator for
administrative services, finance services, and legal affairs
departments only on November 2,1981 (TSN, March 9/87, p. 3).
Being new in his job, it was but natural that he was zealous in the
performance of his functions — in fact, overzealous in the protection
of the PCA interests, even if that protection was not necessary, as
the P92,000.00 accountability had already been paid (See Exh. 12,
4th paragraph).
Finally, Atty. Llorente was officiously, though incidentally, taking care
also of the interest of Mrs. Javier who, justice and equity demanded,
should not be made to shoulder the P92,000.00 unliquidated cash
advances, for the reason that it was Mr. Curio who admittedly spent
them or who, at the very least, should be able to get reimbursement
of what she paid, totally or partially, from his gratuity benefits (See
Exh. 5, pp. 2-3 ). 4
The Sandiganbayan, as we also indicated earlier, took the
petitioner to task civilly, and ordered him to pay "compensatory
damages" in the sum of P90,000.00. According to the
Sandiganbayan, the petitioner was guilty nonetheless of abuse
of right under Article 19 of the Civil Code and as a public officer,
he was liable for damages suffered by the aggrieved party
(under Article 27).
The petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan's Decision is
erroneous even if the Sandiganbayan acquitted him therein,
because he was never in bad faith as indeed found by the
Sandiganbayan.
Under the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, amending Rules
110 through 127 of the Rules of Court, the judgment of the court
shall include, in case of acquittal, and unless there is a clear
showing that the act from which the civil liability might arise did
not exist, "a finding on the civil liability of the accused in favor
10
of the offended party." 5 The rule is based on the provisions of substantive law, 6 that if
acquittal proceeds from reasonable doubt, a civil action, lies
nonetheless.
The challenged judgment found that the petitioner, in refusing to
issue a certificate of clearance in favor of the private offended party,
Herminigildo Curio, did not act with "evident bad faith," one of the
elements of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3819. 7 We agree with
tile judgment, insofar as it found lack of evident bad faith by the
petitioner, for the reasons cited therein basicallv, because the
petitioner was acting within the bounds of law in refusing to clear
Curio although "[t]he practice was that the clearance was
nevertheless approved, and then the amount of the unsettled
obligation was deducted from the gratuity benefits of the
employee." 8
We also agree with the Sandiganbaya (although the Sandiganbayan did not say it) that although the
petitioner did not act with evident bad faith, he acted with bad faith nevertheless, for which he should
respond for damages.
The records show that the office practice indeed in the Philippine Coconut Authority was to clear the
employee (retiree) and deduct his accountabilities from his gratuity benefits. There seems to be no debate
about the existence of this practice (the petitioner admitted it later on) and in fact, he cleared three
employees on the condition that their obligations should be deducted from their benefits. 9 We
quote:
Confronted with these evidence (sic), Atty. Llorente conceded, albeit
grudgingly, the existence of the practice by the accounting division of
not complying with Condition (a). He, however, claimed that he
learned of the practice only during the trial of the case and that he
must have inadvertently approved the clearances of Mrs. Perez, Mr.
Azucena, and possibly others who were similarly situated (TSN,
March 9/88,pp. 4-5). This the evidence belies. First, he himself
testified that when the clearance of Mr. Curio was presented to him
in December 1981, it already bore the signature of Mrs. Sotto of the
accounting division and the notation set opposite her name about the
outstanding accountabilities of Mr. Curio; but he (Atty. Llorente)
significantly did not ask her why she signed the clearance (TSN,
Nov. 24/87, pp. 24-25). Second, in that month, Atty. Llorente It is the essence of Article 19 of the Civil Code, under which the petitioner was made to pay

approved Mrs. Perez's and Mr. Azucena's vouchers showing that hey damages, together with Article 27, that the performance of duty be done with justice and good
has pending obligations to the GSIS and the UCPB, which were faith. In the case of Velayo vs. Shell Co. of the Philippines, 13 we held the defendant liable under
being deducted from their gratuity benefits. Attached to those Article 19 for disposing of its propertv — a perfectly legal act — in order to escape the reach of a
vouchers were the clearances as supporting documents (Exhs. M-2 creditor. In two fairly more recent cases, Sevilla vs. Court of Appeals 14 and Valenzuela vs. Court
and N-1; TSN, Dec. 7/87, pp. 13,23). And third, in the same month, of Appeals, 15
Atty. Llorente was already aware of the cae of Mrs. Javier whose we held that a principal is liable under Article 19 in
clearance and voucher were, according to him, preciselywithheld terminating the agency — again, a legal act — when terminating the
because of her unsettled accountability for the cash advances of agency would deprive the agent of his legitimate business.
P92,000.00, but here later on given due course; and her gratuity We believe that the petitioner is liable under Article 19.
benefits released on November 16, 1981, minus that amount (TSN,
Nov. 24/87, pp. 31-32; Exhs. L, L-1, L-2 and L-3). The Court finds the award of P90,000.00 to be justified bv Article
2202 of the Civil Code, which holds the defendant liable for all
The cash advances of P92,000.00 were the primary obligation of "natural and probable" damages. Hennenegildo Cunct presented
Mrs. Javier, since they were secured through her and in her name evidence that as a consequence of the petitioner's refusal to clear
from the UCPB. That was why they were charged to and deducted him, he failed to land a job at the Philippine Cotton Authority and
from, her gratuity benefits. Consequently, as early as that date and in Philippine First Marketing Authority. He also testified that a job in
so far as the PCA and the UCPB were concerned, the accountability either office would have earned him salary of P2,500.00 a month, or
was already fully paid. The assumption of residual liability by Mr. P150,000.00 in five years. Deducting his probable expenses of
Curio for the cash advances on November 26, 1981, was a matter reasonably about P1,000.00 a month or P60,000.00 in five years, the
between him and Mrs. Javier (Exhs. 2 and 2-A). 10 petitioner owes him a total actual damages of P90,000.00
The general rule is that this Court is bound by the findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan. 11
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. No
As we said, the acts of the petitioner were legal (that is, pursuant to procedures), as he insists in this pronouncement as to costs.
petition, yet it does not follow, as we said, that his acts were done in good faith. For emphasis, he had no
valid reason to "go legal" all of a sudden with respect to Mr. Curio, since he had cleared three employees
who, as the Sandiganbayan found, "were all similarly circumstanced in that they all had pending G.R. No. L-21438 September 28, 1966
obligations when, their clearances were filed for consideration, warranting similar official action." 12
AIR FRANCE, petitioner,
vs.
RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and the HONORABLE COURT OF
The Court is convinced that the petitioner had unjustly discriminated against Mr. Curio.
APPEALS, respondents.
It is no defense that the petitioner was motivated by no ill-will (a grudge, according to the Sandiganbayan),
Lichauco, Picazo and Agcaoili for petitioner.
since the facts speak for themselves. It is no defense either that he was, after all, complying merely with
Bengzon Villegas and Zarraga for respondent R. Carrascoso.
legal procedures since, as we indicated, he was not as strict with respect to the three retiring other
employees. There can be no other logical conclusion that he was acting unfairly, no more, no less, to Mr.
Curio.

SANCHEZ, J.:

11
The Court of First Instance of Manila 1 sentenced petitioner to pay
respondent Rafael Carrascoso P25,000.00 by way of moral
damages; P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; P393.20 representing
the difference in fare between first class and tourist class for the
portion of the trip Bangkok-Rome, these various amounts with
interest at the legal rate, from the date of the filing of the complaint
until paid; plus P3,000.00 for attorneys' fees; and the costs of suit.
On appeal,2 the Court of Appeals slightly reduced the amount of
refund on Carrascoso's plane ticket from P393.20 to P383.10, and
voted to affirm the appealed decision "in all other respects", with
costs against petitioner.
The case is now before us for review on certiorari.
The facts declared by the Court of Appeals as " fully supported by
the evidence of record", are:
Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino
pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes on March 30, 1958.
On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized
agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a "first class" round
trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok,
plaintiff travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of the
defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the "first class" seat that he
was occupying because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G.
Cuento, there was a "white man", who, the Manager alleged, had a
"better right" to the seat. When asked to vacate his "first class" seat,
the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told defendant's
Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body; a
commotion ensued, and, according to said Ernesto G. Cuento,
"many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class;
when they found out that Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot
discussion with the white man [manager], they came all across to Mr.
Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the white
man" (Transcript, p. 12, Hearing of May 26, 1959); and plaintiff
reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in the plane.3
1. The trust of the relief petitioner now seeks is that we review "all
the findings" 4 of respondent Court of Appeals. Petitioner charges
that respondent court failed to make complete findings of fact on all
12
the issues properly laid before it. We are asked to consider facts
favorable to petitioner, and then, to overturn the appellate court's
decision.
Coming into focus is the constitutional mandate that "No decision
shall be rendered by any court of record without expressing therein
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based". 5 This is echoed in the statutory demand that a judgment
determining the merits of the case shall state "clearly and distinctly
the facts and the law on which it is based"; 6 and that "Every decision
of the Court of Appeals shall contain complete findings of fact on all
issues properly raised before it". 7
A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity. It is open
to direct attack. 8 The law, however, solely insists that a decision
state the "essential ultimate facts" upon which the court's conclusion
is drawn. 9 A court of justice is not hidebound to write in its decision
every bit and piece of evidence 10 presented by one party and the
other upon the issues raised. Neither is it to be burdened with the
obligation "to specify in the sentence the facts" which a party
"considered as proved". 11 This is but a part of the mental process
from which the Court draws the essential ultimate facts. A decision is
not to be so clogged with details such that prolixity, if not confusion,
may result. So long as the decision of the Court of Appeals contains
the necessary facts to warrant its conclusions, it is no error for said
court to withhold therefrom "any specific finding of facts with respect
to the evidence for the defense". Because as this Court well
observed, "There is no law that so requires". 12 Indeed, "the mere
failure to specify (in the decision) the contentions of the appellant
and the reasons for refusing to believe them is not sufficient to hold
the same contrary to the requirements of the provisions of law and
the Constitution". It is in this setting that in Manigque, it was held that
the mere fact that the findings "were based entirely on the evidence
for the prosecution without taking into consideration or even
mentioning the appellant's side in the controversy as shown by his
own testimony", would not vitiate the judgment. 13 If the court did not
recite in the decision the testimony of each witness for, or each item
of evidence presented by, the defeated party, it does not mean that
the court has overlooked such testimony or such item of
evidence. 14 At any rate, the legal presumptions are that official duty
has been regularly performed, and that all the matters within an issue
in a case were laid before the court and passed upon by it. 15
Findings of fact, which the Court of Appeals is required to make,
maybe defined as "the written statement of the ultimate facts as
found by the court ... and essential to support the decision and
judgment rendered thereon". 16They consist of the
court's "conclusions" with respect to the determinative facts in
issue". 17 A question of law, upon the other hand, has been declared
as "one which does not call for an examination of the probative value
of the evidence presented by the parties." 18
2. By statute, "only questions of law may be raised" in an appeal by
certiorari from a judgment of the Court of Appeals. 19 That judgment
is conclusive as to the facts. It is not appropriately the business of
this Court to alter the facts or to review the questions of fact. 20
With these guideposts, we now face the problem of whether the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals support its judgment.
3. Was Carrascoso entitled to the first class seat he claims?
It is conceded in all quarters that on March 28, 1958 he paid to and
received from petitioner a first class ticket. But petitioner asserts that
said ticket did not represent the true and complete intent and
agreement of the parties; that said respondent knew that he did not
have confirmed reservations for first class on any specific flight,
although he had tourist class protection; that, accordingly, the
issuance of a first class ticket was no guarantee that he would have
a first class ride, but that such would depend upon the availability of
first class seats.
These are matters which petitioner has thoroughly presented and
discussed in its brief before the Court of Appeals under its third
assignment of error, which reads: "The trial court erred in finding that
plaintiff had confirmed reservations for, and a right to, first class
seats on the "definite" segments of his journey, particularly that from
Saigon to Beirut". 21
And, the Court of Appeals disposed of this contention thus:
Defendant seems to capitalize on the argument that the issuance of
a first-class ticket was no guarantee that the passenger to whom the
13
same had been issued, would be accommodated in the first-class
compartment, for as in the case of plaintiff he had yet to make
arrangements upon arrival at every station for the necessary first-
class reservation. We are not impressed by such a reasoning. We
cannot understand how a reputable firm like defendant airplane
company could have the indiscretion to give out tickets it never
meant to honor at all. It received the corresponding amount in
payment of first-class tickets and yet it allowed the passenger to be
at the mercy of its employees. It is more in keeping with the ordinary
course of business that the company should know whether or riot the
tickets it issues are to be honored or not.22
Not that the Court of Appeals is alone. The trial court similarly
disposed of petitioner's contention, thus:
On the fact that plaintiff paid for, and was issued a "First class" ticket,
there can be no question. Apart from his testimony, see plaintiff's
Exhibits "A", "A-1", "B", "B-1," "B-2", "C" and "C-1", and defendant's
own witness, Rafael Altonaga, confirmed plaintiff's testimony and
testified as follows:
Q. In these tickets there are marks "O.K." From what you know, what
does this OK mean?
A. That the space is confirmed.
Q. Confirmed for first class?
A. Yes, "first class". (Transcript, p. 169)
xxx xxx xxx
Defendant tried to prove by the testimony of its witnesses Luis
Zaldariaga and Rafael Altonaga that although plaintiff paid for, and
was issued a "first class" airplane ticket, the ticket was subject to
confirmation in Hongkong. The court cannot give credit to the
testimony of said witnesses. Oral evidence cannot prevail over
written evidence, and plaintiff's Exhibits "A", "A-l", "B", "B-l", "C" and
"C-1" belie the testimony of said witnesses, and clearly show that the
plaintiff was issued, and paid for, a first class ticket without any
reservation whatever.
Furthermore, as hereinabove shown, defendant's own witness
Rafael Altonaga testified that the reservation for a "first class"
accommodation for the plaintiff was confirmed. The court cannot
believe that after such confirmation defendant had a verbal
understanding with plaintiff that the "first class" ticket issued to him
by defendant would be subject to confirmation in Hongkong. 23
We have heretofore adverted to the fact that except for a slight
difference of a few pesos in the amount refunded on Carrascoso's
ticket, the decision of the Court of First Instance was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals in all other respects. We hold the view that such a
judgment of affirmance has merged the judgment of the lower
court. 24Implicit in that affirmance is a determination by the Court of
Appeals that the proceeding in the Court of First Instance was free
from prejudicial error and "all questions raised by the assignments of
error and all questions that might have been raised are to be
regarded as finally adjudicated against the appellant". So also, the
judgment affirmed "must be regarded as free from all error". 25 We
reached this policy construction because nothing in the decision of
the Court of Appeals on this point would suggest that its findings of
fact are in any way at war with those of the trial court. Nor was said
affirmance by the Court of Appeals upon a ground or grounds
different from those which were made the basis of the conclusions of
the trial court. 26
If, as petitioner underscores, a first-class-ticket holder is not entitled
to a first class seat, notwithstanding the fact that seat availability in
specific flights is therein confirmed, then an air passenger is placed
in the hollow of the hands of an airline. What security then can a
passenger have? It will always be an easy matter for an airline aided
by its employees, to strike out the very stipulations in the ticket, and
say that there was a verbal agreement to the contrary. What if the
passenger had a schedule to fulfill? We have long learned that, as a
rule, a written document speaks a uniform language; that spoken
word could be notoriously unreliable. If only to achieve stability in the
relations between passenger and air carrier, adherence to the ticket
so issued is desirable. Such is the case here. The lower courts
refused to believe the oral evidence intended to defeat the covenants
in the ticket.
14
The foregoing are the considerations which point to the conclusion
that there are facts upon which the Court of Appeals predicated the
finding that respondent Carrascoso had a first class ticket and was
entitled to a first class seat at Bangkok, which is a stopover in the
Saigon to Beirut leg of the flight. 27 We perceive no "welter of
distortions by the Court of Appeals of petitioner's statement of its
position", as charged by petitioner. 28 Nor do we subscribe to
petitioner's accusation that respondent Carrascoso "surreptitiously
took a first class seat to provoke an issue". 29And this because, as
petitioner states, Carrascoso went to see the Manager at his office in
Bangkok "to confirm my seat and because from Saigon I was told
again to see the Manager". 30 Why, then, was he allowed to take a
first class seat in the plane at Bangkok, if he had no seat? Or, if
another had a better right to the seat?
4. Petitioner assails respondent court's award of moral damages.
Petitioner's trenchant claim is that Carrascoso's action is planted
upon breach of contract; that to authorize an award for moral
damages there must be an averment of fraud or bad faith;31 and that
the decision of the Court of Appeals fails to make a finding of bad
faith. The pivotal allegations in the complaint bearing on this issue
are:
3. That ... plaintiff entered into a contract of air carriage with the
Philippine Air Lines for a valuable consideration, the latter acting as
general agents for and in behalf of the defendant, under which said
contract, plaintiff was entitled to, as defendant agreed to furnish
plaintiff, First Class passage on defendant's plane during the entire
duration of plaintiff's tour of Europe with Hongkong as starting point
up to and until plaintiff's return trip to Manila, ... .
4. That, during the first two legs of the trip from Hongkong to Saigon
and from Saigon to Bangkok, defendant furnished to the plaintiff First
Class accommodation but only after protestations, arguments and/or
insistence were made by the plaintiff with defendant's employees.
5. That finally, defendant failed to provide First Class passage, but
instead furnished plaintiff only Tourist Class accommodations from
Bangkok to Teheran and/or Casablanca, ... the plaintiff has
been compelled by defendant's employees to leave the First Class
accommodation berths at Bangkok after he was already seated.
6. That consequently, the plaintiff, desiring no repetition of the
inconvenience and embarrassments brought by defendant's breach
of contract was forced to take a Pan American World Airways plane
on his return trip from Madrid to Manila.32
xxx xxx xxx
2. That likewise, as a result of defendant's failure to furnish First
Class accommodations aforesaid, plaintiff suffered inconveniences,
embarrassments, and humiliations, thereby causing plaintiff mental
anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, social humiliation, and
the like injury, resulting in moral damages in the amount of
P30,000.00. 33
xxx xxx xxx
The foregoing, in our opinion, substantially aver: First, That there
was a contract to furnish plaintiff a first class passage covering,
amongst others, the Bangkok-Teheran leg; Second, That said
contract was breached when petitioner failed to furnish first class
transportation at Bangkok; and Third, that there was bad faith when
petitioner's employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class
accommodation berth "after he was already, seated" and to take a
seat in the tourist class, by reason of which he suffered
inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing
him mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social
humiliation, resulting in moral damages. It is true that there is no
specific mention of the term bad faith in the complaint. But, the
inference of bad faith is there, it may be drawn from the facts and
circumstances set forth therein. 34 The contract was averred to
establish the relation between the parties. But the stress of the action
is put on wrongful expulsion.
Quite apart from the foregoing is that (a) right the start of the trial,
respondent's counsel placed petitioner on guard on what Carrascoso
intended to prove: That while sitting in the plane in Bangkok,
Carrascoso was ousted by petitioner's manager who gave his seat to
a white man; 35 and (b) evidence of bad faith in the fulfillment of the
contract was presented without objection on the part of the petitioner.
It is, therefore, unnecessary to inquire as to whether or not there is
sufficient averment in the complaint to justify an award for moral
damages. Deficiency in the complaint, if any, was cured by the
15
evidence. An amendment thereof to conform to the evidence is not
even required. 36 On the question of bad faith, the Court of Appeals
declared:
That the plaintiff was forced out of his seat in the first class
compartment of the plane belonging to the defendant Air France
while at Bangkok, and was transferred to the tourist class not only
without his consent but against his will, has been sufficiently
established by plaintiff in his testimony before the court, corroborated
by the corresponding entry made by the purser of the plane in his
notebook which notation reads as follows:
"First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against
his will, and that the captain refused to intervene",
and by the testimony of an eye-witness, Ernesto G. Cuento, who was
a co-passenger. The captain of the plane who was asked by the
manager of defendant company at Bangkok to intervene even
refused to do so. It is noteworthy that no one on behalf of defendant
ever contradicted or denied this evidence for the plaintiff. It could
have been easy for defendant to present its manager at Bangkok to
testify at the trial of the case, or yet to secure his disposition; but
defendant did neither. 37
The Court of appeals further stated —
Neither is there evidence as to whether or not a prior reservation was
made by the white man. Hence, if the employees of the defendant at
Bangkok sold a first-class ticket to him when all the seats had
already been taken, surely the plaintiff should not have been picked
out as the one to suffer the consequences and to be subjected to the
humiliation and indignity of being ejected from his seat in the
presence of others. Instead of explaining to the white man the
improvidence committed by defendant's employees, the manager
adopted the more drastic step of ousting the plaintiff who was then
safely ensconsced in his rightful seat. We are strengthened in our
belief that this probably was what happened there, by the testimony
of defendant's witness Rafael Altonaga who, when asked to explain
the meaning of the letters "O.K." appearing on the tickets of plaintiff,
said "that the space is confirmed for first class. Likewise, Zenaida
Faustino, another witness for defendant, who was the chief of the
Reservation Office of defendant, testified as follows:
"Q How does the person in the ticket-issuing office know what
reservation the passenger has arranged with you?
A They call us up by phone and ask for the confirmation." (t.s.n., p.
247, June 19, 1959)
In this connection, we quote with approval what the trial Judge has
said on this point:
Why did the, using the words of witness Ernesto G. Cuento, "white
man" have a "better right" to the seat occupied by Mr. Carrascoso?
The record is silent. The defendant airline did not prove "any better",
nay, any right on the part of the "white man" to the "First class" seat
that the plaintiff was occupying and for which he paid and was issued
a corresponding "first class" ticket.
If there was a justified reason for the action of the defendant's
Manager in Bangkok, the defendant could have easily proven it by
having taken the testimony of the said Manager by deposition, but
defendant did not do so; the presumption is that evidence willfully
suppressed would be adverse if produced [Sec. 69, par (e), Rules of
Court]; and, under the circumstances, the Court is constrained to
find, as it does find, that the Manager of the defendant airline in
Bangkok not merely asked but threatened the plaintiff to throw him
out of the plane if he did not give up his "first class" seat because the
said Manager wanted to accommodate, using the words of the
witness Ernesto G. Cuento, the "white man".38
It is really correct to say that the Court of Appeals in the quoted
portion first transcribed did not use the term "bad faith". But can it be
doubted that the recital of facts therein points to bad faith? The
manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a
first class seat; worse, he imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly
ejected him from his seat, made him suffer the humiliation of having
to go to the tourist class compartment - just to give way to another
passenger whose right thereto has not been established. Certainly,
this is bad faith. Unless, of course, bad faith has assumed a meaning
different from what is understood in law. For, "bad faith"
contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive
design or with some motive of self-interest or will or for ulterior
purpose." 39
16
And if the foregoing were not yet sufficient, there is the express
finding of bad faith in the judgment of the Court of First Instance,
thus:
The evidence shows that the defendant violated its contract of
transportation with plaintiff in bad faith, with the aggravating
circumstances that defendant's Manager in Bangkok went to the
extent of threatening the plaintiff in the presence of many
passengers to have him thrown out of the airplane to give the "first
class" seat that he was occupying to, again using the words of the
witness Ernesto G. Cuento, a "white man" whom he (defendant's
Manager) wished to accommodate, and the defendant has not
proven that this "white man" had any "better right" to occupy the "first
class" seat that the plaintiff was occupying, duly paid for, and for
which the corresponding "first class" ticket was issued by the
defendant to him.40
5. The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its
employees need not be essayed. It is well settled in law. 41 For the
willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his
employer, must answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says:
ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in
a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for the damage.
In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal precept;
and, we held that upon the provisions of Article 2219 (10), Civil
Code, moral damages are recoverable. 42
6. A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and
degree from any other contractual relation. 43 And this, because of
the relation which an air-carrier sustains with the public. Its business
is mainly with the travelling public. It invites people to avail of the
comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage,
therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or
malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally, could give ground
for an action for damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a
right to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect,
courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected
against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and
abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rule or discourteous
conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the
latter an action for damages against the carrier. 44
Thus, "Where a steamship company 45 had accepted a passenger's
check, it was a breach of contract and a tort, giving a right of action
for its agent in the presence of third persons to falsely notify her that
the check was worthless and demand payment under threat of
ejection, though the language used was not insulting and she was
not ejected." 46 And this, because, although the relation of passenger
and carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature" nevertheless
"the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort". 47 And in
another case, "Where a passenger on a railroad train, when the
conductor came to collect his fare tendered him the cash fare to a
point where the train was scheduled not to stop, and told him that as
soon as the train reached such point he would pay the cash fare from
that point to destination, there was nothing in the conduct of the
passenger which justified the conductor in using insulting language
to him, as by calling him a lunatic," 48 and the Supreme Court of
South Carolina there held the carrier liable for the mental suffering of
said passenger.
Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public
duty. The stress of Carrascoso's action as we have said, is placed
upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the
petitioner air carrier — a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.
7. Petitioner draws our attention to respondent Carrascoso's
testimony, thus —
Q You mentioned about an attendant. Who is that attendant and
purser?
A When we left already — that was already in the trip — I could not
help it. So one of the flight attendants approached me and requested
from me my ticket and I said, What for? and she said, "We will note
that you transferred to the tourist class". I said, "Nothing of that kind.
That is tantamount to accepting my transfer." And I also said, "You
are not going to note anything there because I am protesting to this
transfer".
17
Q Was she able to note it?
A No, because I did not give my ticket.
Q About that purser?
A Well, the seats there are so close that you feel uncomfortable and
you don't have enough leg room, I stood up and I went to the pantry
that was next to me and the purser was there. He told me, "I have
recorded the incident in my notebook." He read it and translated it to
me — because it was recorded in French — "First class passenger
was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the
captain refused to intervene."
Mr. VALTE —
I move to strike out the last part of the testimony of the witness
because the best evidence would be the notes. Your Honor.
COURT —
I will allow that as part of his testimony. 49
Petitioner charges that the finding of the Court of Appeals that the
purser made an entry in his notebook reading "First class passenger
was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the
captain refused to intervene" is predicated upon evidence
[Carrascoso's testimony above] which is incompetent. We do not
think so. The subject of inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster
incident. Testimony on the entry does not come within the
proscription of the best evidence rule. Such testimony is
admissible. 49a
Besides, from a reading of the transcript just quoted, when the
dialogue happened, the impact of the startling occurrence was still
fresh and continued to be felt. The excitement had not as yet died
down. Statements then, in this environment, are admissible as part of
the res gestae. 50 For, they grow "out of the nervous excitement and
mental and physical condition of the declarant". 51 The utterance of
the purser regarding his entry in the notebook was spontaneous, and
related to the circumstances of the ouster incident. Its
trustworthiness has been guaranteed. 52 It thus escapes the
operation of the hearsay rule. It forms part of the res gestae.
At all events, the entry was made outside the Philippines. And, by an
employee of petitioner. It would have been an easy matter for
petitioner to have contradicted Carrascoso's testimony. If it were
really true that no such entry was made, the deposition of the purser
could have cleared up the matter.
We, therefore, hold that the transcribed testimony of Carrascoso is
admissible in evidence.
8. Exemplary damages are well awarded. The Civil Code gives the
court ample power to grant exemplary damages — in contracts and
quasi- contracts. The only condition is that defendant should have
"acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent
manner." 53 The manner of ejectment of respondent Carrascoso from
his first class seat fits into this legal precept. And this, in addition to
moral damages.54
9. The right to attorney's fees is fully established. The grant of
exemplary damages justifies a similar judgment for attorneys' fees.
The least that can be said is that the courts below felt that it is but
just and equitable that attorneys' fees be given. 55 We do not intend
to break faith with the tradition that discretion well exercised — as it
was here — should not be disturbed.
10. Questioned as excessive are the amounts decreed by both the
trial court and the Court of Appeals, thus: P25,000.00 as moral
damages; P10,000.00, by way of exemplary damages, and
P3,000.00 as attorneys' fees. The task of fixing these amounts is
primarily with the trial court. 56 The Court of Appeals did not interfere
with the same. The dictates of good sense suggest that we give our
imprimatur thereto. Because, the facts and circumstances point to
the reasonableness thereof.57
On balance, we say that the judgment of the Court of Appeals does
not suffer from reversible error. We accordingly vote to affirm the
same. Costs against petitioner. So ordered.
18
Tison v. Spouses Pomasin – Doria
Facts: Vehicular collision involving two vehicles, a tractor-trailer and
a jitney (i.e. share taxi or minibus) along Maharlika highway resulting
in multiple death and injuries to those in the jitney driven by Laarni
Pomasin Spouses Pomasin et al filed a complaint for damages
against Tison, the owner of the truck, and Jabon, the driver TC:
dismissed complaint because it was Pomasin who was negligent and
this was proximate cause CA: Jabon’s reckless driving caused
collision CA also noted that the restriction in Jabon’s driver’s license
was violated, thus giving rise to the presumption that he was
negligent at the time of the accident
Issue: w/n Jabon was negligent
Held: No. Actually it was Laarni, the jitney driver, who was negligent
and that this was the proximate cause of the accident. Case
dismissed. The court noted that it was indeed true that at the time of
the incident, Jabon was prohibited from driving the truck due to the
restriction imposed on his driver’s license. Jabon even asked that the
LTO reinstate his articulate license containing restriction code to
allow him to drive a tractor-trailer. However, although driving without
a proper license is a violation of traffic regulation, and vis-a-vis Art.
2185, the legal presumption of negligence arises if at the time of the
mishap, a person is violating any traffic regulation, a causal
connection must exist between the injury received and the violation
of the traffic regulation. It must be proven that the violation of the
traffic regulation was the proximate or legal cause of the injury or that
it substantially contributed thereto (Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc. v.
CA). Negligence, consisting in whole or in part, of violation of law,
like any other negligence, is without legal consequence unless it is a
contributing cause of the injury. WISE WORDS FROM THE GOOD
BOOK: The highlighted portion should not be interpreted to mean
that the presumption of negligence only arises when the traffic
violation was the proximate cause of the injury.
1. There is nothing in the text of the article which would suggest such
a requirement. 2. Such a requirement would put the cart before the
horse, so to speak. A presumption of negligence only provides
evidence of negligence in the absence of proof to the contrary. To
establish proximate cause, one would have to prove that the
negligent act in question is the legal cause of the injury. If one were
able to prove that a negligent act is the proximate cause, the one
would not need a presumption any more. Instead, the Court’s
statements in Tison should be interpreted to mean that despite the
presumption of negligence arising from the traffic regulation violation,
the claimant must still prove that such negligence was the proximate
cause in order to successfully claim for damages.
NORMAN A. GAID v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No.
171636 April 7, 2009 TINGA, J
FACTS: - Petitioner was driving his passenger jeepney along a two-
lane road where the Laguindingan National High School is located
toward the direction of Moog in Misamis Oriental. - At the time
several students were coming out of the school premises.
Meanwhile, a fourteen year-old student, Michael Dayata (Dayata),
was seen by eyewitness Artman Bongolto (Bongolto) sitting near a
store on the left side of the road. From where he was at the left side
of the road, Dayata raised his left hand to flag down petitioner’s
jeepney which was traveling on the right lane of the road. However,
nei ther did petitioner nor the conductor, Dennis Mellalos (Mellalos),
saw anybody flagging down the jeepney to ride at that point. The
next thing Bongalto saw, Dayatas feet was pinned to the rear wheel
of the jeepney, after which, he laid flat on the ground behind the
jeepney. - Another prosecution witness, Usaffe Actub (Actub), who
was also situated on the left side of the street but directly in front of
the school gate, heard a strong impact coming from the jeep
sounding as if the driver forced to accelerate in order to hurdle an
obstacle. Dayata was then seen lying on the ground] and caught in
between the rear tires. Petitioner felt that the left rear tire of the
jeepney had bounced and the vehicle tilted to the right side. - Dr.
Tammy Uy issued an autopsy report stating cranio-cerebral injuries
as the cause of death. She testified that the head injuries of Dayata
could have been caused by having run over by the jeepney.
Issue: WON petitioner is negligent
Held: Yes but Gaid is not liable. -presence or absence of negligence
on the part of petitioner is determined by the operative events
19
leading to the death of Dayata which actually comprised of two
phases or stages. The first stage began when Dayata flagged down
the jeepney while positioned on the left side of the road and ended
when he was run over by the jeepney. The second stage covered the
span between the moment immediately after the victim was run over
and the point when petitioner put the jeepney to a halt. - During the
first stage, petitioner was not shown to be negligent. -Reckless
imprudence consists of voluntarily doing or fail ing to do, without
malice, an act from which material damage results by reason of an
inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing
or failing to perform such act. - Petitioner was driving slowly at the
time of the accident, as testified to by two eyewitnesses. Prosecution
witness Actub affirmed this fact on cross-examination. Petitioner
stated that he was driving at no more than 15 kilometers per hour. -It
appears from the evidence Dayata came from the left side of the
street. Petitioner, who was driving the jeepney on the right lane, did
not see the victim flag him down. He also failed to see him go near
the jeepney at the left side.
Understandably, petitioner was focused on the road ahead. In
Dayatas haste to board the jeep which was then running, his feet
somehow got pinned to the left rear tire, as narrated by Bongolto.
Actub only saw Dayata after he heard a strong impact coming from
the jeep. -With the foregoing facts, petitioner cannot be held liable
during the first stage. Specifically, he cannot be held liable for
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The proximate cause of
the accident and the death of the victim was definitely his own
negligence in trying to catch up with the moving jeepney to get a ride.
- For the second stage, petitioner is negligent for failing to stop
driving at the time when he noticed the bouncing of his vehicle -
Negligence has been defined as the failure to observe for the
protection of the interests of another person that degree of care,
precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand,
whereby such other person suffers injury.
-The elements of simple negligence: are (1) that there is lack of
precaution on the part of the offender; and (2) that the damage
impending to be caused is not immediate or the danger is not clearly
manifest. -The standard test in determining whether a person is
negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage results to the
person or property of another is this: could a prudent man, in the
position of the person to whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm
to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course
actually pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain
from that course or to take precautions to guard against its
mischievous results, and the failure to do so constitutes negligence.
Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the
admonition born of this provision, is always necessary before
negligence can be held to exist. -For one to be liable for negligence,
It must be shown that his negligence was the proximate cause of the
accident. Proximate cause is defined as that which, in the natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient, intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not
have occurred. In order to establish a motorist's liability for the
negligent operation of a vehicle, it must be shown that there was a
direct causal connection between such negligence and the injuries or
damages complained of. Thus, negligence that is not a substantial
contributing factor in the causation of the accident is not the
proximate cause of an injury. -The head injuries sustained by Dayata
at the point of impact proved to be the immediate cause of his death,
as indicated in the post-mortem findings. His skull was crushed as a
result of the accident. Had petitioner immediately stopped the
jeepney, it would still not have saved the life of the victim as the
injuries he suffered were fatal.
St. Luke’s College of Medicine vs. Perez
G.R. No. 222740
Fact: In February 2010, St. Luke's sent 4 of its 4th year medical
students to the clinic, namely: Spouses Perez's daughter Jessa,
Spouses Quintos' daughter Cecille, Jerillie Ann Murillo (Murillo) and
Miguel Rafael Ramos (Ramos).They were tasked to complete a four-
week clerkship rotation at the clinic and like the previous batches,
they warehoused in the second floor of the clinic in the Municipality
of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija.When their shift ended at 5pm, the group
went for a jog and returned to the clinic at around 7pm. They went
20
out at9pm to buy beverages, cooking oil and other items needed for
their breakfast the next day and went to sleep sometime after
midnight. Ramos admitted that one of the beverages they bought
was an alcoholic beverage called The Bar, which consisted of either
vodka or gin. Ramos was awakened sometime between 3 to 3:30am
when he heard Murillo shouting from the other side of theroom that
there was a fire. Ramos immediately ran to the door which led to the
living room and when he opened the same, he saw thick smoke
coming from living room. He ran to the bathroom to get a pail of
water with which he tried to extinguish the fire. The girls, who
had followed him to the bathroom, stayed behind. He went back to
the bathroom and poured water on the girls in an attempt to alleviate
the extreme heat coming from the fire. Unfortunately, the fire resulted
in the deaths of the Jessa and Cecille due to
asphyxia. As a result of the deaths, St. Luke's compensated the pare
nts of the three deceased students in the amount ofPhP300,000.00
each from insurance proceeds. BFP conducted an investigation and
certified that the fire was purely accidental in nature due to
unattended cooking and that the students were drinking alcoholic
beverages on the night of the fire, to which the parents did not
accept.They believed that there was a cover-up.Spouses Perez
sought the help of NBI. NBI then declared that the construction of the
clinic building was in violation of the Revised Fire Code of the
Philippines, that the cause of the fire was due to faulty electrical
wiring, and that St.
Luke’s negligence is criminal in nature.
All the windows at the second floor are also covered by permanent
iron grills. There are no fire exits, fire alarms, fire extinguishers,
sprinklers, emergency lights. The main and secondary panel boards
were wrongly situated at the ground floor, above which is the location
of a comfort room, where water could easily slip to the panel
boards. As a learning institution, which sends out its students
to rural areas to comply with its curriculum requirement, St. Luke’s
has the duty and responsibility to see to it that the premises to where
it sends its students are safe.
RTC dismissed the spouses’ complaint. CA reversed.
The CA held that although schools cannot be insurers of its students
against all risks, the safety of the victims was within the reach of
petitioners and the hazard of a fire was not unforeseeable.
17
Also, while the fire was beyond the control of petitioners, their
decision to house their students in a place where there are no means
of escape in case of such an emergency shows a blatant disregard
for the students ‘welfare
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner St. Luke’s College commit breach of
contract through negligence
Ruling:
Yes, petitioner is negligent. When an academic institution accepts
students for enrollment, there is established a contract between
them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound
to comply with. For its part, the school undertakes to provide the
student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him
with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a
profession. On the other hand, the student covenants to abide by the
school's academic requirements and observe its rules and
regulations. It is settled that in culpa contractual, the mere proof of
the existence of the contract and the failure, of its
compliance justify, prima facie, a corresponding right of relief. In the
case at bar, it was amply shown that petitioners and the victims were
bound by the enrollment contracts, and that petitioners were
negligent in complying with their obligation under the said contracts
to ensure the safety and security of their students. For this
contractual breach, petitioners should be held liable
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS CORPORATION vs
PURIFICACION VIZCARA
G.R. No. 190022, February 15, 2012
Facts:
21
On May 14, 2004, at about three oclock in the morning, Reynaldo
Vizcara was driving a passenger jeepney headed towards Bicol to
deliver onion crops, with companions, namely, Cresencio, Crispin,
Samuel, Dominador and Joel. While crossing the railroad track in
Tiaong, Quezon, a Philippine National Railways (PNR) train, then
being operated by respondent Japhet Estranas (Estranas), suddenly
turned up and rammed the passenger jeepney. The collision resulted
to the instantaneous death of Reynaldo, Cresencio, Crispin, and
Samuel. On the other hand, Dominador and Joel, sustained serious
physical injuries. The survivors of the mishap, Joel and Dominador,
together with the heirs of the deceased victims, filed an action for
damages against PNR, and the alternate driver of the train. The
petitioners claimed that they exercised due diligence in operating the
train and monitoring its roadworthiness. They asseverate that right
before the collision, Estranas was driving the train at a moderate
speed. The Trial Court ruled in favor of the private respondents.
Unyielding, the petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the CA. The
CA affirmed the RTC decision with modification. Thus this petition.
Issues:
(1)Whether or not the proximate cause of the accident was the
negligence of the petitioners.
(2)Whether or not the doctrine of last clear chance finds no
application in the instant
case
(3)Whether or not there was contributory negligence on the part of
the respondents.
Ruling:
Yes, the petitioners’ negligence was the proximate cause of the
accident. Both courts ruled that the petitioners fell short of the
diligence expected of it, taking into consideration the nature of its
business, to forestall any untoward incident. In particular, the
petitioners failed to install safety railroad bars to prevent motorists
from crossing the tracks in order to give way to an approaching train.
Aside from the absence of a crossing bar, the Stop, Look and Listen
signage installed in the area was poorly maintained, hence,
inadequate to alert the public of the impending danger. A reliable
signaling device in good condition, not just a dilapidated Stop, Look
and Listen signage, is needed to give notice to the public. It is the
responsibility of the railroad company to use reasonable care to keep
the signal devices in working order. Failure to do so would be an
indication of negligence. Having established the fact of negligence
on the part of the petitioners, they were rightfully held liable for
damages.
The doctrine of last clear chance is not applicable. The doctrine of
last clear chance provides that where both parties are negligent but
the negligent act of one is appreciably later in point of time than that
of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or
negligence brought about the occurrence of the incident, the one
who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm but
failed to do so, is chargeable with the consequences arising
therefrom. Stated differently, the rule is that the antecedent
negligence of a person does not preclude recovery of damages
caused by the supervening negligence of the latter, who had the last
fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due
diligence. To reiterate, the proximate cause of the collision was the
petitioners negligence in ensuring that motorists and pedestrians
alike may safely cross the railroad track. The unsuspecting driver
and passengers of the jeepney did not have any participation in the
occurrence of the unfortunate incident which befell them. Likewise,
they did not exhibit any overt act manifesting disregard for their own
safety. Thus, absent preceding negligence on the part of the
respondents, the doctrine of last clear chance cannot be applied.
There was no contributory negligence on the part of the respondents.
Contributory negligence is a conduct on the part of the injured party,
contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls
below the standard which he is required to conform for his own
protection. It is an act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care
22
on the part of the person injured which, concurring with the
defendants’ negligence, is the proximate cause of the injury. Hence,
we cannot see how the respondents could have contributed to their
injury when they were not even aware of the forthcoming danger.
G.R. No. L-33722 July 29, 1988
FEDERICO YLARDE and ADELAIDA DORONIO petitioners,
vs.
EDGARDO AQUINO, MAURO SORIANO and COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
In this petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 36390-R entitled
"Federico Ylarde, et al. vs. Edgardo Aquino, et al.," a case which
originated from the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, We are
again caned upon determine the responsibility of the principals and
teachers towards their students or pupils.
In 1963, private respondent Mariano Soriano was the principal of the
Gabaldon Primary School, a public educational institution located in
Tayug, Pangasinan-Private respondent Edgardo Aquino was a
teacher therein. At that time, the school was fittered with several
concrete blocks which were remnants of the old school shop that
was destroyed in World War II. Realizing that the huge stones were
serious hazards to the schoolchildren, another teacher by the name
of Sergio Banez started burying them one by one as early as 1962.
In fact, he was able to bury ten of these blocks all by himself.
Deciding to help his colleague, private respondent Edgardo Aquino
gathered eighteen of his male pupils, aged ten to eleven, after class
dismissal on October 7, 1963. Being their teacher-in-charge, he
ordered them to dig beside a one-ton concrete block in order to make
a hole wherein the stone can be buried. The work was left
unfinished. The following day, also after classes, private respondent
Aquino called four of the original eighteen pupils to continue the
digging. These four pupils — Reynaldo Alonso, Francisco Alcantara,
Ismael Abaga and Novelito Ylarde, dug until the excavation was one
meter and forty centimeters deep. At this point, private respondent
Aquino alone continued digging while the pupils remained inside the
pit throwing out the loose soil that was brought about by the digging.
When the depth was right enough to accommodate the concrete
block, private respondent Aquino and his four pupils got out of the
hole. Then, said private respondent left the children to level the loose
soil around the open hole while he went to see Banez who was
about thirty meters away. Private respondent wanted to borrow from
Banez the key to the school workroom where he could get some
rope. Before leaving. , private respondent Aquino allegedly told the
children "not to touch the stone."
A few minutes after private respondent Aquino left, three of the four
kids, Alonso, Alcantara and Ylarde, playfully jumped into the pit.
Then, without any warning at all, the remaining Abaga jumped on top
of the concrete block causing it to slide down towards the opening.
Alonso and Alcantara were able to scramble out of the excavation on
time but unfortunately fo Ylarde, the concrete block caught him
before he could get out, pinning him to the wall in a standing
position. As a result thereof, Ylarde sustained the following injuries:
1. Contusion with hematoma, left inguinal region and suprapubic
region.
2. Contusion with ecchymosis entire scrotal region.
3. Lacerated wound, left lateral aspect of penile skin with phimosis
4. Abrasion, gluteal region, bilateral.
5. Intraperitoneal and extrapertitoneal extravasation of blood and
urine about 2 liters.
23
6. Fracture, simple, symphesis pubis
7. Ruptured (macerated) urinary bladder with body of bladder almost
entirely separated from its neck.
REMARKS:
1. Above were incurred by crushing injury.
2. Prognosis very poor.
(Sgd.) MELQUIADES A. BRAVO
Physician on Duty. 1
Three days later, Novelito Ylarde died.
Ylarde's parents, petitioners in this case, filed a suit for damages
against both private respondents Aquino and Soriano. The lower
court dismissed the complaint on the following grounds: (1) that the
digging done by the pupils is in line with their course called Work
Education; (2) that Aquino exercised the utmost diligence of a very
cautious person; and (3) that the demise of Ylarde was due to his
own reckless imprudence. 2
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the lower
court.
Petitioners base their action against private respondent Aquino on
Article 2176 of the Civil Code for his alleged negligence that caused
their son's death while the complaint against respondent Soriano as
the head of school is founded on Article 2180 of the same Code.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre- existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed
by the provisions of this Chapter.
On the other hand, the applicable provision of Article 2180 states:
Art. 2180. x x x
xxx xxx xxx
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall
be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody. 3
The issue to be resolved is whether or not under the cited provisions,
both private respondents can be held liable for damages.
As regards the principal, We hold that he cannot be made
responsible for the death of the child Ylarde, he being the head of an
academic school and not a school of arts and trades. This is in line
with Our ruling in Amadora vs. Court of Appeals, 4 wherein this Court
thoroughly discussed the doctrine that under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code, it is only the teacher and not the head of an academic school
who should be answerable for torts committed by their students. This
Court went on to say that in a school of arts and trades, it is only the
head of the school who can be held liable. In the same case, We
explained:
After an exhaustive examination of the problem, the Court has come
to the conclusion that the provision in question should apply
to all schools, academic as well as non-academic. Where the school
is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature,
responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the
teacher in charge of such student, following the first part of the
provision. This is the general rule. In the case of establishments of
arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who shall be held
liable as an exception to the general rule. In other words, teachers in
general shall be liable for the acts of their students except where the
school is technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof who
shall be answerable. Following the canon of reddendo singula
sinquilis 'teachers' should apply to the words "pupils and students'
and 'heads of establishments of arts and trades to the word
"apprentices."
Hence, applying the said doctrine to this case, We rule that private
respondent Soriano, as principal, cannot be held liable for the reason
that the school he heads is an academic school and not a school of
arts and trades. Besides, as clearly admitted by private respondent
Aquino, private respondent Soriano did not give any instruction
regarding the digging.
24
From the foregoing, it can be easily seen that private respondent
Aquino can be held liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code as the
teacher-in-charge of the children for being negligent in his
supervision over them and his failure to take the necessary
precautions to prevent any injury on their persons. However, as
earlier pointed out, petitioners base the alleged liability of private
respondent Aquino on Article 2176 which is separate and distinct
from that provided for in Article 2180.
With this in mind, the question We need to answer is this: Were there
acts and omissions on the part of private respondent Aquino
amounting to fault or negligence which have direct causal relation to
the death of his pupil Ylarde? Our answer is in the affirmative. He is
liable for damages.
From a review of the record of this case, it is very clear that private
respondent Aquino acted with fault and gross negligence when he:
(1) failed to avail himself of services of adult manual laborers and
instead utilized his pupils aged ten to eleven to make an excavation
near the one-ton concrete stone which he knew to be a very
hazardous task; (2) required the children to remain inside the pit
even after they had finished digging, knowing that the huge block
was lying nearby and could be easily pushed or kicked aside by any
pupil who by chance may go to the perilous area; (3) ordered them to
level the soil around the excavation when it was so apparent that the
huge stone was at the brink of falling; (4) went to a place where he
would not be able to check on the children's safety; and (5) left the
children close to the excavation, an obviously attractive nuisance.
The negligent act of private respondent Aquino in leaving his pupils
in such a dangerous site has a direct causal connection to the death
of the child Ylarde. Left by themselves, it was but natural for the
children to play around. Tired from the strenuous digging, they just
had to amuse themselves with whatever they found. Driven by their
playful and adventurous instincts and not knowing the risk they were
facing three of them jumped into the hole while the other one jumped
on the stone. Since the stone was so heavy and the soil was loose
from the digging, it was also a natural consequence that the stone
would fall into the hole beside it, causing injury on the unfortunate
child caught by its heavy weight. Everything that occurred was the
natural and probable effect of the negligent acts of private
respondent Aquino. Needless to say, the child Ylarde would not have
died were it not for the unsafe situation created by private
respondent Aquino which exposed the lives of all the pupils
concerned to real danger.
We cannot agree with the finding of the lower court that the injuries
which resulted in the death of the child Ylarde were caused by his
own reckless imprudence, It should be remembered that he was only
ten years old at the time of the incident, As such, he is expected to
be playful and daring. His actuations were natural to a boy his age.
Going back to the facts, it was not only him but the three of them who
jumped into the hole while the remaining boy jumped on the block.
From this, it is clear that he only did what any other ten-year old child
would do in the same situation.
In ruling that the child Ylarde was imprudent, it is evident that the
lower court did not consider his age and maturity. This should not be
the case. The degree of care required to be exercised must vary with
the capacity of the person endangered to care for himself. A minor
should not be held to the same degree of care as an adult, but his
conduct should be judged according to the average conduct of
persons of his age and experience. 5 The standard of conduct to
which a child must conform for his own protection is that degree of
care ordinarily exercised by children of the same age, capacity,
discretion, knowledge and experience under the same or similar
circumstances. 6 Bearing this in mind, We cannot charge the child
Ylarde with reckless imprudence.
The court is not persuaded that the digging done by the pupils can
pass as part of their Work Education. A single glance at the picture
showing the excavation and the huge concrete block 7 would reveal a
dangerous site requiring the attendance of strong, mature laborers
and not ten-year old grade-four pupils. We cannot comprehend why
the lower court saw it otherwise when private respondent Aquino
himself admitted that there were no instructions from the principal
requiring what the pupils were told to do. Nor was there any showing
that it was included in the lesson plan for their Work Education. Even
the Court of Appeals made mention of the fact that respondent
Aquino decided all by himself to help his co-teacher Banez bury the
concrete remnants of the old school shop. 8 Furthermore, the
excavation should not be placed in the category of school gardening,
25
planting trees, and the like as these undertakings do not expose the
children to any risk that could result in death or physical injuries.
The contention that private respondent Aquino exercised the utmost
diligence of a very cautious person is certainly without cogent basis.
A reasonably prudent person would have foreseen that bringing
children to an excavation site, and more so, leaving them there all by
themselves, may result in an accident. An ordinarily careful human
being would not assume that a simple warning "not to touch the
stone" is sufficient to cast away all the serious danger that a huge
concrete block adjacent to an excavation would present to the
children. Moreover, a teacher who stands in loco parentis to his
pupils would have made sure that the children are protected from all
harm in his company.
We close by categorically stating that a truly careful and cautious
person would have acted in all contrast to the way private
respondent Aquino did. Were it not for his gross negligence, the
unfortunate incident would not have occurred and the child Ylarde
would probably be alive today, a grown- man of thirty-five. Due to his
failure to take the necessary precautions to avoid the hazard,
Ylarde's parents suffered great anguish all these years.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby
GRANTED and the questioned judgment of the respondent court is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another judgment is hereby
rendered ordering private respondent Edagardo Aquino to pay
petitioners the following:
(1) Indemnity for the death of Child Ylarde P30,000.00
(2) Exemplary damages 10,000.00
(3) Moral damages 20,000.00
SO ORDERED.
JARCO MARKETING CORPORATION V. CA
G.R. No. 129792, 21 December 1999
Facts:
On May 9, 1983, Criselda and her 6 year old daughter Zhieneth were
at the second floor of Syvel’s Department Store, Makati City. While
Criselda was signing her credit card slip at the counter, suddenly she
felt a sudden gust of wind and heard a loud thud. As she looked
behind her, she saw Zhieneth's body pinned by the entire structure of
the store's gift-wrapping counter. Zhieneth was quickly rushed to the
Makati Medical Center where she was operated on.
The following day, Zhieneth lost her speech and can only
communicate through a magic slate. Unfortunately, she died 14 days
later because of the severity of her injuries. After the burial, Crisielda
demanded upon Jarco Marketing the reimbursement of the
hospitalization, medical bills and wake and funeral expenses which
they had incurred. But, they refused to pay hence, Crisielda filed for
a complaint for damages.
In Jaco’s counterclaim, they denied any liability. They claimed that
Criselda was negligent in exercising care and diligence over her
daughter by allowing her to freely roam around in a store filled with
glassware and appliances. Further, they contended that Zhieneth
too, was guilty of contributory negligence since she climbed the
counter, triggering its eventual collapse on her. Petitioners also
emphasized that the counter was made of sturdy wood with a strong
support; it never fell nor collapsed for the past fifteen years since its
construction.
Issue:
Whether Jarco marketing was negligent or it was an accident.
Ruling:
Yes, Jaco Marketing was negligent. What transpired was not an
unforeseen event in which would attach no fault on the part of the
defendant. Jaco Marketing failed to observe for the protection of the
interest of another person and show that degree of care, precaution
and vigilance. Under the circumstances thus described, it is
unthinkable for Zhieneth, a child of such tender age is incapable of
contributory negligence. In our jurisdiction, a person under nine
years of age is conclusively presumed to have acted without
26
discernment, and is, on that account, exempt from criminal liability.
The same presumption and a like exemption from criminal liability
obtains in a case of a person over nine and under fifteen years of
age, unless it is shown that he has acted with discernment.
Further, even if we attribute contributory negligence to Zhieneth and
assume that she climbed over the counter, no injury should have
occurred if we accept petitioners' theory that the counter was stable
and sturdy.
DR. RUBU LI vs. SPS. SOLIMAN
G.R. No. 165279/ June 7, 2011
651 SCRA 32
Facts:
Angelica Soliman, the daughter of Sps. Soliman underwent a
biopsy of the mass located in her lower extremity at the St. Lukes
Medical Center (SLMC).Results showed that Angelica was suffering
from a highly malignant cancer of the bone. Angelica’s right leg was
amputated in order to remove the tumor. To eliminate any remaining
cancer cells, chemotherapy was administered by herein petitioner Dr.
Rubi Li, a medical oncologist.
Angelica was admitted to SLMC. However, she died 11 days
after the administration of the first cycle of the chemotherapy
regimen. Respondents filed a damage suit against Dr. Li and other
doctors and against SLMC, charging them with negligence and
disregard of Angelica’s safety, health and welfare by their careless
administration of the chemotherapy drugs, their failure to observe the
essential precautions in detecting early the symptoms of fatal blood
platelet decrease and stopping early on the chemotherapy, which
bleeding led to hypovolemic shock that caused Angelicas untimely
demise.

Petitioner denied having been negligent in administering the
chemotherapy drugs to Angelica and asserted that she had fully
explained to respondents the effects of chemotherapy. On her
supposed non-disclosure of all possible side effects of
chemotherapy, including death, petitioner argues that it was
foolhardy to imagine her to be all-knowing. While the theoretical side
effects of chemotherapy were explained by her to the respondents,
as these should be known to a competent doctor, petitioner cannot
possibly predict how a particular patient’s body constitution would
respond to the treatment. These are obviously dependent on too
many known, unknown and immeasurable variables, thus requiring
that Angelica be closely monitored during the treatment. Petitioner
asserts that she did everything within her professional competence to
attend to the medical needs of Angelica.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner can be held liable for failure to fully
disclose serious side effects to the parents of the child patient who
died while undergoing chemotherapy, despite the absence of finding
that petitioner was negligent in administering the said treatment.
Ruling:
No. There are four essential elements a plaintiff must prove
in a malpractice action based upon the doctrine of informed consent:
"(1) the physician had a duty to disclose material risks; (2) he failed
to disclose or inadequately disclosed those risks; (3) as a direct and
proximate result of the failure to disclose, the patient consented to
treatment she otherwise would not have consented to; and (4)
plaintiff was injured by the proposed treatment." The gravamen in an
informed consent case requires the plaintiff to "point to significant
27
undisclosed information relating to the treatment which would have
altered her decision to undergo it.
In this case, there was adequate disclosure of material risks
inherent in the chemotherapy procedure performed with the consent
of Angelica’s parents. On the other hand, the suing parents failed to
establish the existence of the risks or side-effects Dr. Li should have
disclosed to them in the use of chemotherapy in the treatment of
osteosarcoma. The doctor presented as witness does not qualify as
expert testimony to establish the standard of care in obtaining
consent for chemotherapy treatment. In the absence of expert
testimony in this regard, the Court felt hesitant in defining the scope
of mandatory disclosure in cases of malpractice based on lack of
informed consent. Thus, the Court has no factual basis to declare
that the chemotherapy administered by the petitioner proximately
caused Angelica’s death.
Cruz vs Court of Appeals
GR No. 122445 November 18, 1997
Facts: On March 22, 1991, prosecution witness, Rowena Umali de
Ocampo, accompanied her mother to the Perpetual Help Clinic and
General Hospital situated in Balagtas Street, San Pablo City,
Laguna. They arrived at the said hospital at around 4:30 in the
afternoon of the same day. Prior to March 22, 1991, Lydia was
examined by the petitioner who found a “Myoma” in her uterus, and
scheduled her for a hysterectomy operation on March 23, 1991.
Rowena and her mother slept in the clinic on the evening of March
22, 1991 as the latter was to be operated on the next day at 1pm.
According to Rowena, she noticed that the clinic was untidy and the
windows and the floor were very dusty prompting her to ask the
attendant fora rag to wipe the window and floor with. Prior to the
operation, Rowena tried to convince her mother to not proceed with
the operation and even asked petitioner for it to be postponed,
however it still pushed through after the petitioner told Lydia that
operation must be done as scheduled. During the operation, the
assisting doctor of the petitioner, Dr. Ercillo went out of the operating
room and asked that tagmet ampules be bought which was followed
by another instruction to buy a bag of blood. After the operation,
when Lydia came out of the OR, another bag of blood was requested
to be bought, however, the same was not bought due to
unavailability of type A from the blood bank. Thereafter a person
arrived to donate blood which was later transferred to Lydia. Rowena
then noticed her mother, who was attached to an oxygen tank,
gasping for breathe apparently, the oxygen tank is empty, so her
husband and petitioner’s driver bought an oxygen. Later, without the
knowledge of Lydia’s relatives,she was decided by the doctors to be
transferred to San Pablo District Hospital were she was supposed to
be re-operated. After Lydia experienced shocks, she died.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner has been negligent which caused
the death of Lydia Umali.
Held: Yes. Whether or not a physician has committed an
“inexcusable lack of precaution” in the treatment of his patient to be
determined according to the standard of care observed by other
members of the profession in good standing under similar
circumstances bearing in mind the advanced state of the profession
at the time of treatment or the present state of medical science. A
doctor in effect represents that, having the needed training and skill
possessed by physicians and surgeons practicing in the same field,
he will employ such training, care and skill in the treatment of his
patients. He therefore has a duty to use at least the same level of
care that any other reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a
condition under the same circumstances. It is in this aspect of
medical malpractice that expert testimony is essential to establish not
only the standard of care of the profession but also that the
physician’s conduct in the treatment and care falls below such
standard. Further, in as much as the causes of the injuries involved
in malpractice actions are determinable only in the light of scientific
knowledge, it has been recognized that expert testimony is usually
necessary to the conclusion as to causation.
In litigations involving medical negligence, the plaintiff has the
burden of establishing appellant’s negligence and for a reasonable
conclusion of negligence, there must be proof of breach of duty on
28
the part of the surgeon as well as causal connection of such breach
and the resulting death of his patient.
In order that there may be recovery for an injury, however, it must be
shown that the injury for which recovery is sought must be legitimate
consequence of the wrong done; the connection between the
negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural reference of
events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes. In other words, the
negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. For
negligence, no matter what it consists, cannot create a right of action
unless it is the proximate cause of the injury complained of and the
proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury and without which the result would have
occurred.
The elements of reckless imprudence are:
1. That the offender does or fails to do an act;
2. That the doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary;
3. That it be without malice;
4. That material damage results from the reckless imprudence;
and
5. That there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of
the offender, taking into consideration his employment or
occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition, and
other circumstances regarding persons, time, and place.
The possible causes of hemorrhage during an operation are: 1.) the
failure of the surgeon to tie or suture a cut blood vessel; 2.) allowing
a cut blood vessel to get out of control; 3.) the subsequent loosening
of the tie or suture applied to a cut blood vessel; and 4.)and a clotting
defect known as DIC.
29