SECTION 14 CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS
Ferdinand E. Marcos. On April 1, 1980, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint of
G.R. No. 72335-39 March 21, 1988
FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioner,
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, and THE TANODBAYAN, respondents.
YAP, J.:
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition, with preliminary injunction, dated
October 16, 1985, petitioner seeks to annul and set aside the resolution of the
Tanodbayan of April 7, 1985, and the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan, dated
August 9, 1985, August 12,1985 and September 17, 1985, and to enjoin the
Tanodbayan and the Sandiganbayan from continuing with the trial or any other
proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 10499, 10500, 10501, 10502 and 10503, an
entitled "People of the Philippines versus Francisco S. Tatad."
The petition alleges, among other things, that sometime in October 1974, Antonio de
los Reyes, former Head Executive Assistant of the then Department of Public
Information (DPI) and Assistant Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Broadcasts, filed
a formal report with the Legal Panel, Presidential Security Command (PSC),
charging petitioner, who was then Secretary and Head of the Department of Public
Information, with alleged violations of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Apparently, no action was taken on said
report.
Then, in October 1979, or five years later, it became publicly known that petitioner
had submitted his resignation as Minister of Public Information, and two months
after, or on December 12, 1979, Antonio de los Reyes filed a complaint with the
Tanodbayan (TBP Case No. 8005-16-07) against the petitioner, accusing him of graft
and corrupt practices in the conduct of his office as then Secretary of Public
Information. The complaint repeated the charges embodied in the previous report
filed by complainant before the Legal Panel, Presidential Security Command (PSC).
On January 26, 1980, the resignation of petitioner was accepted by President
Antonio de los Reyes to the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) for fact-finding
investigation. On June 16, 1980, Roberto P. Dizon, CIS Investigator of the
Investigation and Legal Panel, PSC, submitted his Investigation Report, with the
following conclusion, ". . . evidence gathered indicates that former Min. TATAD
have violated Sec. 3 (e) and Sec. 7 of RA 3019, respectively. On the other hand, Mr.
ANTONIO L. CANTERO is also liable under Sec. 5 of RA 3019," and recommended
appropriate legal action on the matter.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint against him, claiming immunity from
prosecution by virtue of PD 1791, but the motion was denied on July 26, 1982 and
his motion for reconsideration was also denied on October 5, 1982. On October 25,
1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavits were with the Tanodbayan for final
disposition. On July 5, 1985, the Tanodbayan approved a resolution, dated April 1,
1985, prepared by Special Prosecutor Marina Buzon, recommending that the
following informations be filed against petitioner before the Sandiganbayan, to wit:
l. Violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of RA. 3019 for giving D'
Group, a private corporation controlled by his brother-in-law,
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official functions through manifest partiality and evident bad faith;
2. Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) of RA. 3019 for receiving a
check of P125,000.00 from Roberto Vallar, President/General
Manager of Amity Trading Corporation as consideration for the
release of a check of P588,000.00 to said corporation for printing
services rendered for the Constitutional Convention Referendum in
1973;
3. Violation of Section 7 of RA. 3019 on three (3) counts for his
failure to file his Statement of Assets and Liabilities for the calendar
years 1973, 1976 and 1978.
Accordingly, on June 12, 1985, the following informations were flied with the
Sandiganbayan against the petitioner:
1
Re: Criminal Case No. 10499
The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses Francisco
S. Tatad with Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) of Republic Act
No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, committed as follows:
That on or about the 16th day of July, 1973 in the City of Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above- named accused, being then the Secretary of the Department
(now Ministry) of Public Information, did then and there, wilfully
and unlawfully demand and receive a check for Pl25,000.00 from
Roberto Vallar, President/General Manager of Amity Trading
Corporation as consideration for the payment to said Corporation of
the sum of P588,000.00, for printing services rendered for the
Constitutional Convention Referendum of January, 1973, wherein
the accused in his official capacity had to intervene under the law in
the release of the funds for said project.
That the complaint against the above-named accused was filed with
the Office of the Tanodbayan on May 16, 1980.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Re: Criminal Case No. 10500
The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses
FRANCISCO S. TATAD with Violation of Section 7 of Republic
Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practice Act, committed as follows:
That on or about the 31st day of January, 1974 in the City of Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above- named accused, a public officer being then the Secretary of
the Department (now Ministry) of Public Information, did then and
there wilfully and unlawfully fail to prepare and file with the Office
of the President, a true detailed and sworn statement of his assets and
liabilities, as of December 31, 1973, including a statement of the
amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and
family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next
preceding calendar year (1973), as required of every public officer.
That the complaint against the above-named accused was flied with
the Office of the Tanodbayan on June 20, 1980.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Re: Criminal Case No. 10501
The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses
FRANCISCO S. TATAD with Violation of Section 3, paragraph (e)
of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, committed as follows:
That on or about the month of May, 1975 and for sometime prior
thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer
being then the Secretary of the Department (now Ministry) of Public
Information, did then and there, wilfully and unlawfully give
Marketing Communication Group, Inc. (D' Group), a private
corporation of which his brother-in-law, Antonio L. Cantero, is the
President, unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official functions, through manifest partiality and
evident bad faith, by allowing the transfer of D' GROUP of the
funds, assets and ownership of South East Asia Research
Corporation (SEARCH), allegedly a private corporation registered
with the Securities and Exchange Corporation on June 4, 1973, but
whose organization and operating expenses came from the
confidential funds of the Department of Public Information as it was
organized to undertake research, projects for the government,
without requiring an accounting of the funds advanced by the
2
 Department of Public Information and reimbursement thereof by D'
GROUP, to the damage and prejudice of the government.
That the complaint against the above-named accused was filed with
the Office of the Tanodbayan on May 16, 1980.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Re: Criminal Case No. 10502
The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses
FRANCISCO S. TATAD with Violation of Section 7 of Republic
Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, committed as follows:
That on or about the 31st day of January, 1977 in the City of Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, a public officer being then the Secretary of
the Department (now Ministry) of Public Information, did then and
there wilfully and unlawfully fail to prepare and file with the Office
of the President, a true and sworn statement of his assets and
liabilities, as of December 31, 1976, including a statement of the
amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount of
income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year (1976), as
required of every public officer.
That the complaint against the above-named accused was filed with
the Office of the Tanodbayan on June 20, 1988.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Re: Criminal Case No. 10503
The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses
FRANCISCO S. TATAD with Violation of Section 7 of Republic
Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, committed as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of April, 1979, in the City of Manila
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, a public officer being then the Secretary of
the Department (now Ministry) of Public Information, did then and
there wilfully and unlawfully fail to prepare and file with the Office
of the President, a true, detailed and sworn statement of his assets
and liabilities, as of December 31, 1978, including a statement of the
amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and
family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next
preceding calendar year (1978), as required of every public officer.
That the complaint against the above-named accused was filed with
the Office of the Tanodbayan on June 20, 1980.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On July 22, 1985, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a consolidated motion to
quash the informations on the follow grounds:
1 The prosecution deprived accused-movant of due process of law
and of the right to a speedy disposition of the cases filed against him,
amounting to loss of jurisdiction to file the informations;
2. Prescription of the offenses charged in Crim. Case Nos. 10499,
10500 and 10501;
3. The facts charged in Criminal Case No. 10500 (for failure to file
Statement of Assets and Liabilities for the year 1973) do not
constitute an offense;
4. No prima facie case against the accused-movant exists in Criminal
Cases Nos. 10500, 10502 and 10503;
3
 5. No prima facie case against the accused-movant exists in Criminal
Case No. 10199 for Violation of Sec. 3, par. (b) of R.A. 3019, as
amended;
6. No prima facie case against the accused-movant exists in Criminal
Case No. 10501 (for Violation of Sec. 3 (e) of R.A. 3019, as
amended.
On July 26, 1985, the Tanodbayan filed its opposition to petitioner's consolidated
motion to quash, stating therein in particular that there were only two grounds in said
motion that needed refutation, namely:
1. The offense charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 10499,10500 and
10501, have already prescribed and criminal liability is extinguished;
and
2. The facts charged in the information (Criminal Case No. 10500 —
For failure to file Statement of Assets and Liabilities for the year
1973) do not constitute an offense.
On the issue of prescription, Tanodbayan citing the case of Francisco vs. Court of
Appeals, 122 SCRA 538, contended that the filing of the complaint or denuncia in
the fiscal's office interrupts the period of prescription. Since the above-numbered
cases were filed with the Office of the Tanodbayan in 1980 and the alleged offenses
were committed on July 16, 1973, January 31, 1974 and in May 1975, respectively,
although the charges were actually filed in Court only on July 9, 1985, the
Tanodbayan has still the right to prosecute the same, it appearing that the ten (10)
year prescriptive period has not yet lapsed. Moreover, Tanodbayan pointed out that a
law such as Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, extending the period of limitation with respect
to criminal prosecution, unless the right to acquittal has been acquired, is
constitutional.
Tanodbayan likewise said that the requirement for the filing of the Statement of
Assets and Liabilities in P.D. 379 is separate and distinct from that required pursuant
to the provisions of the Anti-Graft Law, as amended. For while the former requires
"any natural or juridical person having gross assets of P50,000.00 or more..." to
submit a statement of assets and liabilities "... regardless of the networth," the
mandate in the latter law is for ALL government employees and officials to submit a
statement of assets and liabilities. Hence, the prosecution under these two laws are
separate and distinct from each other. Tanodbayan also explained that delay in the
conduct of preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the informations
filed and that neither will it render said informations defective. Finally, Tanodbayan
added that P.D. 911, the law which governs preliminary investigations is merely
directory insofar as it fixes a period of ten (10) days from its termination to resolve
the preliminary investigation.
On August 9, 1985, the Sandiganbayan rendered its challenged resolution denying
petitioner's motion to quash, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, prescinding therefrom, We find, and so hold, that the
accused's "Consolidated Motion to Quash" should be as it is hereby,
denied for lack of merit. Conformably to Rule 117, Section 4 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, the defect in the information in
Criminal Case No. 10500 being one which could be cured by
amendment, the Tanodbayan is hereby directed to amend said
information to change the date of the alleged commission of the
offense therein charged from January 31, 1974 to September 30,
1974 within five (5) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.
On August 10, 1985, in compliance with the Sandiganbayan's resolution of August 8,
1985, the Tanodbayan filed an amended information in Criminal Case No. 10500,
changing the date of the commission of the offense to September 30, 1974.
On August 30, 1985, petitioners filed a consolidated motion for reconsideration
which was denied by the Sandiganbayan September 17, 1985. Hence, petitioner filed
this petition on October 16, 1985 assailing the denial of his motion to quash. On
October 22, 1985, the Court, without giving due course the petition, resolved to
require the respondents to comment thereon and issued a temporary restraining order
effective immediately and continuing until further orders of the Court, enjoining the
respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan from continuing with the trial and other
4
proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 10499, 10500, 10501, 10502 and 10503. In
compliance with said resolution, the respondents, through ,Solicitor General Estelito
P. Mendoza, filed their comment on January 6, 1986.
On April 10, 1986, the Court required the parties to move in the premises considering
the supervening events, including the change of administration that had transpired,
and the provisions of Sec. 18, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, insofar far as the Public
respondents were concerned, which requires the successor official to state whether or
not he maintains the action or position taken by his predecessor in office. On June 20,
1986, the new Tanodbayan manifested that since "the charges are not political
offenses and they have no political bearing whatsoever," he had no alternative but to
pursue the cases against the petitioner, should the Court resolve to deny the petition;
that in any event, petitioner is not precluded from pursuing any other legal remedies
under the law, such as the filing of a motion for re-evaluation of his cases with the
Tanodbayan. The new Solicitor General filed a manifestation dated June 27, 1986 in
which he concurred with the position taken by the new Tanodbayan.
Pursuant to the above manifestation of the new Tanodbayan, the petitioner filed a
motion for re-evaluation with the Office of the Tanodbayan, dated July 21, 1986,
praying that the cases in question be re-evaluated and the informations be quashed.
The Court is not aware of what action, if any, has been taken thereon by the
Tanodbayan. However, be that as it may, the filing of the aforesaid motion for re-
evaluation with the Tanodbayan has no material bearing insofar as the duty of this
Court to resolve the issues raised in the instant petition is concerned.
Petitioner has raised the following issues in his petition:
1. Whether the prosecution's long delay in the filing of these cases
with the Sandiganbayan had deprived petitioner of his constitutional
light to due process and the right to a speedy disposition of the cases
against him.
2. Whether the crimes charged has already prescribed.
3. Whether there is a discriminatory prosecution of the petitioner by
the Tanodbayan.
4. Whether Sandiganbayan should have ruled on the question of
amnesty raised by the petitioner.
5. Whether petitioner's contention of the supposed lack or non-
existence of prima facie evidence to sustain the filing of the cases at
bar justifies the quashal of the questioned informations.
Petitioner claims that the Tanodbayan culpably violated the constitutional mandate of
"due process" and "speedy disposition of cases" in unduly prolonging the termination
of the preliminary investigation and in filing the corresponding informations only
after more than a decade from the alleged commission of the purported offenses,
which amounted to loss of jurisdiction and authority to file the informations. The
respondent Sandiganbayan dismissed petitioner's contention, saying that the
applicability of the authorities cited by him to the case at bar was "nebulous;" that it
would be premature for the court to grant the "radical relief" prayed for by petitioner
at this stage of the proceeding; that the mere allegations of "undue delay" do not
suffice to justify acceptance thereof without any showing "as to the supposed lack or
omission of any alleged procedural right granted or allowed to the respondent
accused by law or administrative fiat" or in the absence of "indubitable proof of any
irregularity or abuse" committed by the Tanodbayan in the conduct of the preliminary
investigation; that such facts and circumstances as would establish petitioner's claim
of denial of due process and other constitutionally guaranteed rights could be
presented and more fully threshed out at the trial. Said the Sandiganbayan:
That there was a hiatus in the proceedings between the alleged
termination of the proceedings before the investigating fiscal on
October 25, 1982 and its resolution on April 17, 1985 could have
been due to certain factors which do not appear on record and which
both parties did not bother to explain or elaborate upon in detail. It
could even be logically inferred that the delay may be due to a
painstaking an gruelling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether
the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation merited
prosecution of a former high-ranking government official. In this
respect, We are the considered opinion that the provision of Pres.
Decree No. 911, as amended, regarding the resolution of a complaint
by the Tanodbayan within ten (10) days from termination of the
5
 preliminary investigation is merely "directory" in nature, in view of
the nature and extent of the proceedings in said office.
The statutory grounds for the quashal of an information are clearly
set forth in concise language in Rule 117, Section 2, of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure and no other grounds for quashal may
be entertained by the Court prior to arraignment inasmuch as it
would be itself remiss in the performance of its official functions and
subject to the charge that it has gravely abused its discretion. Such
facts and circumstances which could otherwise justify the dismissal
of the case, such as failure on the part of the prosecution to comply
with due process or any other constitutionally-guaranteed rights may
presented during the trial wherein evidence for and against the issue
involved may be fully threshed out and considered. Regrettably, the
accused herein attempts to have the Court grant such a radical relief
during this stage of the proceedings which precludes a pre-cocious or
summary evaluation of insufficient evidence in support thereof.
This brings us to the crux of the issue at hand. Was petitioner deprived of his
constitutional right to due process and the right to "speedy disposition" of the cases
against him as guaranteed by the Constitution? May the court, ostrich like, bury its
head in the sand, as it were, at the initial stage of the proceedings and wait to resolve
the issue only after the trial?
In a number of cases, 1 this Court has not hesitated to grant the so-called "radical
relief" and to spare the accused from undergoing the rigors and expense of a full-
blown trial where it is clear that he has been deprived of due process of law or other
constitutionally guaranteed rights. Of course, it goes without saying that in the
application of the doctrine enunciated in those cases, particular regard must be taken
of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.
Coming to the case at bar, the following relevant facts appear on record and are
largely undisputed. The complainant, Antonio de los Reyes, originally filed what he
termed "a report" with the Legal Panel of the Presidential Security Command (PSC)
on October 1974, containing charges of alleged violations of Rep. Act No. 3019
against then Secretary of Public Information Francisco S. Tatad. The "report" was
made to "sleep" in the office of the PSC until the end of 1979 when it became widely
known that Secretary (then Minister) Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos
and had resigned from the Cabinet. On December 12, 1979, the 1974 complaint was
resurrected in the form of a formal complaint filed with the Tanodbayan and
docketed as TBP Case No. 8005-16-07. The Tanodbayan acted on the complaint on
April 1, 1980-which was around two months after petitioner Tatad's resignation was
accepted by Pres. Marcos — by referring the complaint to the CIS, Presidential
Security Command, for investigation and report. On June 16, 1980, the CIS report
was submitted to the Tanodbayan, recommending the filing of charges for graft and
corrupt practices against former Minister Tatad and Antonio L. Cantero. By October
25, 1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavits were in the case was already for
disposition by the Tanodbayan. However, it was only on July 5, 1985 that a
resolution was approved by the Tanodbayan, recommending the ring of the
corresponding criminal informations against the accused Francisco Tatad. Five (5)
criminal informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan on June 12, 1985, all
against petitioner Tatad alone.
A painstaking review of the facts can not but leave the impression that political
motivations played a vital role in activating and propelling the prosecutorial process
in this case. Firstly, the complaint came to life, as it were, only after petitioner Tatad
had a falling out with President Marcos. Secondly, departing from established
procedures prescribed by law for preliminary investigation, which require the
submission of affidavits and counter-affidavits by the complainant and the
respondent and their witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the
Presidential Security Command for finding investigation and report.
We find such blatant departure from the established procedure as a dubious, but
revealing attempt to involve an office directly under the President in the prosecutorial
process, lending credence to the suspicion that the prosecution was politically
motivated. We cannot emphasize too strongly that prosecutors should not allow, and
should avoid, giving the impression that their noble office is being used or
prostituted, wittingly or unwittingly, for political ends or other purposes alien to, or
subversive of, the basic and fundamental objective of serving the interest of justice
even handedly, without fear or favor to any and all litigants alike, whether rich or
poor, weak or strong, powerless or mighty. Only by strict adherence to the
6
established procedure may the public's perception of the of the prosecutor be
enhanced.
Moreover, the long delay in resolving the case under preliminary investigation can
not be justified on the basis of the facts on record. The law (P.D. No. 911) prescribes
a ten-day period for the prosecutor to resolve a case under preliminary investigation
by him from its termination. While we agree with the respondent court that this
period fixed by law is merely "directory," yet, on the other hand, it can not be
disregarded or ignored completely, with absolute impunity. It certainly can not be
assumed that the law has included a provision that is deliberately intended to become
meaningless and to be treated as a dead letter.
We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the
Tanodbayan in the instant case to be violative of the constitutional right of the
accused to due process. Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law
governing the conduct of preliminary investigation, including substantial compliance
with the time limitation prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case by the
prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by the
fundamental law. Not only under the broad umbrella of the due process clause, but
under the constitutional guarantee of "speedy disposition" of cases as embodied in
Section 16 of the Bill of Rights (both in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the
inordinate delay is violative of the petitioner's constitutional rights. A delay of close
to three (3) years can not be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the
circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. We are not impressed by the attempt of the
Sandiganbayan to sanitize the long delay by indulging in the speculative assumption
that "the delay may be due to a painstaking and gruelling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan
as to whether the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation merited
prosecution of a former high ranking government official." In the first place, such a
statement suggests a double standard of treatment, which must be emphatically
rejected. Secondly, three out of the five charges against the petitioner were for his
alleged failure to file his sworn statement of assets and liabilities required by
Republic Act No. 3019, which certainly did not involve complicated legal and factual
issues necessitating such "painstaking and gruelling scrutiny" as would justify a delay
of almost three years in terminating the preliminary investigation. The other two
charges relating to alleged bribery and alleged giving of unwarranted benefits to a
relative, while presenting more substantial legal and factual issues, certainly do not
warrant or justify the period of three years, which it took the Tanodbayan to resolve
the case.
It has been suggested that the long delay in terminating the preliminary investigation
should not be deemed fatal, for even the complete absence of a preliminary
investigation does not warrant dismissal of the information. True-but the absence of a
preliminary investigation can be corrected by giving the accused such investigation.
But an undue delay in the conduct of a preliminary investigation can not be corrected,
for until now, man has not yet invented a device for setting back time.
After a careful review of the facts and circumstances of this case, we are constrained
to hold that the inordinate delay in terminating the preliminary investigation and
filing the information in the instant case is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed
right of the petitioner to due process and to a speedy disposition of the cases against
him. Accordingly, the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 10499, 10500, 10501,
10502 and 10503 should be dismissed. In view of the foregoing, we find it
unnecessary to rule on the other issues raised by petitioner.
Accordingly, the Court Resolved to give due course to the petition and to grant the
same. The informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 10499, 10500, 10501, 10502 and
10503, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Francisco S. Tatad" are hereby
DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order issued on October 22, 1985 is made
permanent.
G.R. No. 72670 September 12, 1986
SATURNINA GALMAN, REYNALDO GALMAN ET AL, petitioners,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN,ET AL respondents.
RESOLUTION
TEEHANKEE, C.J.:
7
Last August 21st, our nation marked with solemnity and for the first time in freedom
the third anniversary of the treacherous assassination of foremost opposition leader
former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. imprisoned for almost eight years since
the imposition of martial law in September, 1972 by then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, he was sentenced to death by firing squad by a military tribunal for common
offenses alleged to have been committed long before the declaration of martial law
and whose jurisdiction over him as a civilian entitled to trial by judicial process by
civil courts he repudiated. Ninoy pleaded in vain that the military tribunals are
admittedly not courts but mere instruments and subject to the control of the President
as created by him under the General Orders issued by him as Commander-in-Chief of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and that he had already been publicly indicted
and adjudged guilty by the President of the charges in a nationwide press conference
held on August 24, 1971 when he declared the evidence against Ninoy "not only
strong but overwhelming ." 1 This followed the Plaza Miranda bombing of August
21, 1971 of the proclamation rally of the opposition Liberal Party candidates for the
November, 1971 elections (when eight persons were killed and practically all of the
opposition candidates headed by Senator Jovito Salonga and many more were
seriously injured), and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
under Proclamation No. 889 on August 23, 1971. The massacre was instantly
attributed to the communists but the truth has never been known. But the then
President never filed the said charges against Ninoy in the civil courts.
Ninoy Aquino was nevertheless thereafter allowed in May, 1980 to leave the country
to undergo successful heart surgery. After three years of exile and despite the
regime's refusal to give him a passport, he sought to return home "to strive for a
genuine national reconciliation founded on justice." He was to be cold-bloodedly
killed while under escort away by soldiers from his plane that had just landed at the
Manila International Airport on that fateful day at past 1 p.m. His brain was smashed
by a bullet fired point blank into the back of his head by a murderous assassin,
notwithstanding that the airport was ringed by airtight security of close to 2,000
soldiers and "from a military viewpoint, it (was) technically impossible to get inside
(such) a cordon." 2 The military investigators reported within a span of three hours
that the man who shot Aquino (whose identity was then supposed to be unknown and
was revealed only days later as Rolando Galman, although he was the personal friend
of accused Col. Arturo Custodio who picked him up from his house on August 17,
1983) was a communist-hired gunman, and that the military escorts gunned him
down in turn. The military later filmed a re-enactment of the killing scripted
according to this version and continuously replayed it on all TV channels as if it were
taken live on the spot. The then President instantly accepted the military version and
repeated it in a nationally televised press conference that he gave late in the evening
of August 22, 1983, wherein he said, in order to induce disbelief that the military had
a hand in the killing, that "if the purpose was to eliminate Aquino, this was not the
way to do it."
The national tragedy shocked the conscience of the entire nation and outraged the
free world. The large masses of people who joined in the ten-day period of national
mourning and came out in millions in the largest and most orderly public turnout for
Ninoy's funeral reflected their grief for his martyrdom and their yearning for the
truth, justice and freedom.
The then President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board 3 to investigate
"the treacherous and vicious assassination of former Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr.
on August 21, 1983 [which] has to all Filipinos become a national tragedy and
national shame specially because of the early distortions and exaggerations in both
foreign and local media 4 so that all right thinking and honest men desire to ventilate
the truth through fare, independent and dispassionate investigation by prestigious and
free investigators." After two false starts, 5 he finally constituted the Board 6 on
October 22, 1983 which held 125 hearing days commencing November 3, 1983
(including 3 hearings in Tokyo and 8 hearings in Los Angeles, California) and heard
the testimonies of 194 witnesses recorded in 20,377 pages of transcripts, until the
submission of their minority and majority reports to the President on October 23 and
24, 1984. This was to mark another first anywhere in the world wherein the minority
report was submitted one day ahead by the ponente thereof, the chairman, who was
received congenially and cordially by the then President who treated the report as if it
were the majority report instead of a minority report of one and forthwith referred it
to respondent Tanodbayan "for final resolution through the legal system" and for trial
in the Sandiganbayan which was better known as a graft court; and the majority
report of the four other members was submitted on the following day to the then
President who coldly received them and could scarcely conceal his instant rejection
of their report with the grim statement that "I hope you can live with your conscience
with what you have done."
8
The fact is that both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting the military
version as propounded by the chief investigator, respondent Gen. Olivas, that
Rolando Galman was the NPA-hired assassin, stating that "the evidence shows [to
the contrary] that Rolando Galman had no subversive affiliations." They were in
agreement that "only the soldiers in the staircase with Sen. Aquino could have shot
him;" that Galman, the military's "fall guy" was "not the assassin of Sen. Aquino and
that "the SWAT troopers who gunned down Galman and the soldiers who escorted
Sen. Aquino down the service stairs, deliberately and in conspiracy with one another,
gave a perjured story to us regarding the alleged shooting by Galman of Sen. Aquino
and the mowing down, in turn, of Galman himself;" in short, that Ninoy's
assassination was the product of a military conspiracy, not a communist plot The
only difference between the two reports is that the majority report found all the
twenty-six private respondents abovenamed in the title of the case headed by then
AFP Chief General Fabian C. Ver involved in the military conspiracy and therefore
"indictable for the premeditated killing of Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. and
Rolando Galman at the MIA on August 21, 1983;" while the chairman's minority
report would exclude nineteen of them and limit as plotters "the six persons who
were on the service stairs while Senator Aquino was descending" and "General
Luther Custodio . . . because the criminal plot could not have been planned and
implemented without his intervention."
The chairman wrote in her minority report (somewhat prophetically) that "The
epilogue to our work lies in what will transpire in accordance with the action that the
Office of the President may thereafter direct to be taken. "The four-member majority
report (also prophetically) wrote in the epilogue (after warning the forces who adhere
to an alien and intolerable political ideology against unscrupulously using the report
"to discredit our traditionally revered institutions"), that "the tragedy opened our eyes
and for the first time confirmed our worst fears of what unchecked evil would be
capable of doing." They wrote:
The task of the Board was clear and unequivocal. This task was not
only to determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the death
of the late former Senator. Of greater significance is the awesome
responsibility of the Board to uphold righteousness over evil, justice
over injustice, rationality over irrationality, humaneness over
inhumanity. The task was indeed a painful test, the inevitable result
of which will restore our country's honored place among the
sovereign nations of the free world where peace, law and order,
freedom, and justice are a way of life.
More than any other event in contemporary Philippine history, the
killing of the late former Senator Aquino has brought into sharper
focus, the ills pervading Philippine society. It was the concretization
of the horror that has been haunting this country for decades,
routinely manifested by the breakdown of peace and order, economic
instability, subversion, graft and corruption, and an increasing
number of abusive elements in what are otherwise noble institutions
in our country-the military and law enforcement agencies. We are,
however, convinced that, by and large, the great majority of the
officers and men of these institutions have remained decent and
honorable, dedicated to their noble mission in the service of our
country and people.
The tragedy opened our eyes and for the first time confirmed our
worst fears of what unchecked evil would be capable of doing. As
former Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban observes. "Nobody who
has great authority can be trusted not to go beyond its proper limits."
Social apathy, passivity and indifference and neglect have spawned
in secret a dark force that is bent on destroying the values held sacred
by freedom-loving people.
To assert our proper place in the civilized world, it is imperative that
public officials should regard public service as a reflection of human
Ideals in which the highest sense of moral values and integrity are
strictly required.
A tragedy like that which happened on August 21, 1983, and the
crisis that followed, would have normally caused the resignation of
the Chief of the Armed Forces in a country where public office is
viewed with highest esteem and respect and where the moral
responsibilities of public officials transcend all other considerations.
9
It is equally the fact that the then President through all his recorded public acts and
statements from the beginning disdained and rejected his own Board's above findings
and insisted on the military version of Galman being Ninoy's assassin. In upholding
this view that "there is no involvement of anyone in his government in the
assassination," he told David Briscoe (then AP Manila Bureau Chief in a Radio-TV
interview on September 9, 1983 that "I am convinced that if any member of my
government were involved, I would have known somehow ... Even at a fairly low
level, I would have known. I know how they think. I know what they are thinking
of." 7 He told CBS in another interview in May, 1984 (as his Fact Finding Board was
holding its hearings) the following:
CBS: But indeed there has been recent evidence that
seems to contradict earlier reports, namely, the
recent evidence seems to indicate that some of the
guards may have been responsible (for shooting
Ninoy).
MARCOS: Well, you are of course wrong. What
you have been reading are the newspapers and the
newspaper reports have been biased. The evidence
still proves that Galman was the killer. The evidence
also shows that there were intelligence reports
connecting the communist party to the killing. 8
In his reply of October 25, 1984 to General Ver's letter of the same date going on
leave of absence upon release of the Board's majority report implicating him, he
wrote that "(W)e are even more aware, general, that the circumstances under which
the board has chosen to implicate you in its findings are fraught with doubt and great
contradictions of opinion and testimony. And we are deeply disturbed that on the
basis of so-called evidence, you have been so accused by some members of the
Board," and extended "My very best wishes to you and your family for a speedy
resolution of your case," 9 even as he announced that he would return the general to
his position as AFP Chief "if he is acquitted by the Sandiganbayan." In an interview
on June 4, 1985 with the Gamma Photo Agency, as respondent court was hearing the
cases, he was quoted as saying that "as will probably be shown, those witnesses
(against the accused) are perjured witnesses." 10
It was against this setting that on November 11, 1985 petitioners Saturnina Galman
and Reynaldo Galman, mother and son, respectively, of the late Rolando Galman,
and twenty-nine (29) other petitioners, composed of three former Justices of this
Court, five incumbent and former university presidents, a former AFP Chief of Staff,
outstanding members of the Philippine Bar and solid citizens of the community, filed
the present action alleging that respondents Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan
committed serious irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of
justice and gross violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioners and the
sovereign people of the Philippines to due process of law. They asserted that the
Tanodbayan did not represent the interest of the people when he failed to exert
genuine and earnest efforts to present vital and important testimonial and
documentary evidence for the prosecution and that the Sandiganbayan Justices were
biased, prejudiced and partial in favor of the accused, and that their acts "clouded
with the gravest doubts the sincerity of government to find out the truth about the
Aquino assassination." Petitioners prayed for the immediate issuance of a temporary
restraining order restraining the respondent Sandiganbayan from rendering a decision
on the merits in the pending criminal cases which it had scheduled on November 20,
1985 and that judgment be rendered declaring a mistrial and nullifying the
proceedings before the Sandiganbayan and ordering a re-trial before an impartial
tribunal by an unbiased prosecutor. 10-a
At the hearing on November 18, 1985 of petitioners' prayer for issuance of a
temporary restraining order enjoining respondent court from rendering a decision in
the two criminal cases before it, the Court resolved by nine-to-two votes 11 to issue
the restraining order prayed for. The Court also granted petitioners a five-day period
to file a reply to respondents' separate comments and respondent Tanodbayan a three-
day period to submit a copy of his 84-page memorandum for the prosecution as filed
in the Sandiganbayan, the signature page of which alone had been submitted to the
Court as Annex 5 of his comment.
But ten days later on November 28, 1985, the Court by the same nine-to- two-vote
ratio in reverse, 12 resolved to dismiss the petition and to lift the temporary restraining
order issued ten days earlier enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its
decision. 13 The same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for a new 5-day
period counted from receipt of respondent Tanodbayan's memorandum for the
prosecution (which apparently was not served on them and which they alleged was
10
"very material to the question of his partiality, bias and prejudice" within which to
file a consolidated reply thereto and to respondents' separate comments, by an eight-
to-three vote, with Justice Gutierrez joining the dissenters. 14
On November 29, 1985, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that
the dismissal did not indicate the legal ground for such action and urging that the case
be set for a full hearing on the merits because if the charge of partiality and bias
against the respondents and suppression of vital evidence by the prosecution are
proven, the petitioners would be entitled to the reliefs demanded: The People are
entitled to due process which requires an impartial tribunal and an unbiased
prosecutor. If the State is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and convict
because certain material evidence is suppressed by the prosecution and the tribunal is
not impartial, then the entire proceedings would be null and void. Petitioners prayed
that the Sandiganbayan be restrained from promulgating their decision as scheduled
anew on December 2, 1985.
On December 5, 1985, the Court required the respondents to comment on the motion
for reconsideration but issued no restraining order. Thus, on December 2, 1985, as
scheduled, respondent Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting all the accused of
the crime charged, declaring them innocent and totally absolving them of any civil
liability. This marked another unusual first in that respondent Sandiganbayan in
effect convicted the very victim Rolando Galman (who was not on trial) as the
assassin of Ninoy contrary to the very information and evidence submitted by the
prosecution. In opposition, respondents submitted that with the Sandiganbayan's
verdict of acquittal, the instant case had become moot and academic. On February 4,
1986, the same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for lack
of merit, with the writer and Justice Abad Santos maintaining our dissent.
On March 20, 1986, petitioners filed their motion to admit their second motion for
reconsideration attached therewith. The thrust of the second motion for
reconsideration was the startling and theretofore unknown revelations of Deputy
Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera as reported in the March 6, 1986 issue of the Manila
Times entitled "Aquino Trial a Sham," that the then President had ordered the
respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan Bernardo Fernandez and the
prosecution panel headed by Herrera to whitewash the criminal cases against the 26
respondents accused and produce a verdict of acquittal.
On April 3, 1986, the Court granted the motion to admit the second motion for
reconsideration and ordered the respondents to comment thereon. 15
Respondent Tanodbayan Bernardo Fernandez stated in his Manifestation filed on
April 11, 1986 that he had ceased to hold office as Tanodbayan as of April 8, 1986
when he was replaced by the new Tanodbayan, Raul M. Gonzales, but reiterating his
position in his comment on the petition, he added "relative to the reported alleged
revelations of Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera, herein respondent never
succumbed to any alleged attempts to influence his actuations in the premises, having
instead successfully resisted perceived attempts to exert pressure to drop the case
after preliminary investigation, and actually ordered the filing and prosecution of the
two (2) murder cases below against herein private party respondents." He candidly
admitted also in his memorandum: "There is not much that need be said about the
existence of pressure. That there were pressures can hardly be denied; in fact, it has
never been denied." 15-a He submitted that "even as he vehemently denies
insinuations of any direct or indirect complicity or participation in any alleged
attempt to supposedly whitewash the cases below, . . . should this Honorable Court
find sufficient cause to justify the reopening and retrial of the cases below, he would
welcome such development so that any wrong that had been caused may be righted
and so that, at the very least the actuations of herein respondent in the premises may
be reviewed and reexamined, confident as he is that the end will show that he had
done nothing in the premises that violated his trust as Tanodbayan (Ombudsman)."
New Tanodbayan Raul M. Gonzales in his comment of April 14, 1986 "interposed no
objection to the reopening of the trial of the cases . . . as, in fact, he urged that the
said cases be reopened in order that justice could take its course."
Respondents Justices of the Sandiganbayan First Division in their collective
comment of April 9, 1986 stated that the trial of the criminal cases by them was valid
and regular and decided on the basis of evidence presented and the law applicable,
but manifested that "if it is true that the former Tanodbayan and the Deputy
Tanodbayan, Chief of the Prosecution Panel, were pressured into suppressing vital
evidence which would probably alter the result of the trial, Answering Respondents
would not interpose any objection to the reopening of those cases, if only to allow
justice to take its course." Respondent Sandiganbayan Justice Bienvenido C. Vera
Cruz, in a separate comment, asserted that he passed no note to anyone; the note
being bandied about is not in his handwriting; he had nothing to do with the writing
11
of the note or of any note of any kind intended for any lawyer of the defense or even
of the prosecution; and requested for an investigation by this Court to settle the note
passing issue once and for all.
Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera, in his comment of April 14, 1986 affirmed the
allegations in the second motion for reconsideration that he revealed that the
Sandiganbayan Justices and Tanodbayan prosecutors were ordered by Marcos to
whitewash the Aquino-Galman murder case. He amplified his revelations, as follows:
1. AB INITIO, A. VERDICT OF ACQUITTAL!
Incidents during the preliminary investigation showed ominous signs
that the fate of the criminal case on the death of Ex-Senator Benigno
Aquino and Rolando Galman on August 21, 1983 was doomed to an
ignominous end. Malacanang wanted dismissal-to the extent that a
prepared resolution was sent to the Investigating Panel (composed of
the undersigned, Fiscals Ernesto Bernabe and Leonardo Tamayo) for
signature. This, of course, was resisted by the panel, and a resolution
charging all the respondents as principals was forwarded to the
Tanodbayan on January 10, 1985.
2. MALACAÑANG CONFERENCE PLANNED SCENARIO OF
TRIAL
At 6:00 p.m. of said date (January 10) Mr. Ferdinand E. Marcos (the
former President) summoned to Malacañang Justice Bernardo
Fernandez (the Tanodbayan), Sandiganbayan Justice Manuel
Pamaran (the Presiding Justice) and an the members of the Panel
Also present at the meeting were Justice Manuel Lazaro (the
Coordinator) and Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, who left earlier, came back
and left again. The former President had a copy of the panel's signed
resolution (charging all accused as principals), evidently furnished
him in advance, and with prepared notes on the contents thereof.
The former President started by vehemently maintaining that Galman
shot Aquino at the tarmac. Albeit initially the undersigned argued
against the theory, to remain silent was the more discreet posture
when the former President became emotional (he was quite sick
then).
During a good part of the conference, the former President talked
about Aquino and the communists, lambasting the Agrava Board,
specially the Legal Panel. Shifting to the military he rumbled on such
statements as: "It will be bloody . . . Gen. Ramos, though close to
me, is getting ambitious and poor Johnny does not know what to do".
. . 'our understanding with Gen. Ramos is that his stint is only
temporary, but he is becoming ambitious "the boys were frantic
when they heard that they will be charged in court, and wig be
detained at city jail."
From outright dismissal, the sentiment veered towards a more
pragmatic approach. The former President more or less conceded
that for political and legal reasons all the respondents should be
charged in court, Politically, as it will become evident that the
government was serious in pursuing the case towards its logical
conclusion, and thereby ease public demonstrations; on the other
hand, legally, it was perceived that after (not IF) they are acquitted,
double jeopardy would inure. The former President ordered then that
the resolution be revised by categorizing the participation of each
respondent.
In the matter of custody of the accused pendente lite the Coordinator
was ordered to get in touch with Gen. Narciso Cabrera, Gen. Vicente
Eduardo and Director Jolly Bugarin to put on record that they had no
place in their respective institutions. The existence of PD No. 1950
(giving custody to commanding officers of members of AFP charged
in court) was never mentioned.
It was decided that the presiding justice (First Division) would
personally handle the trial, and assurance was made by him that it
12
 would be finished in four to six months, pointing out that, with the
recent effectivity of the New Rules on Criminal Procedure, the trial
could be expedited.
Towards the end of the two-hour meeting and after the script had
been tacitly mapped out, the former President uttered: "Mag moro-
moro na lang kayo."
The parting words of the former President were: "Thank you for your
cooperation. I know how to reciprocate."
While still in the palace grounds on the way out, the undersigned
manifested his desire to the Tanodbayan to resign from the panel, or
even the office. This, as well as other moves to this effect, had
always been refused. Hoping that with sufficient evidence sincerely
and efficiently presented by the prosecution, all involves in the trial
would be conscience-pricked and realize the futility and injustice of
proceeding in accordance with the script, the undersigned opted to
say on.
Herrera further added details on the "implementation of the script," such as the
holding of a "make-believe raffle" within 18 minutes of the filing of the Informations
with the Sandiganbayan at noon of January 23, 1985, while there were no members
of the media; the installation of TV monitors directly beamed to Malacanang; the
installation of a "war room" occupied by the military; attempts to direct and stifle
witnesses for the prosecution; the suppression of the evidence that could be given by
U.S. Airforce men about the "scrambling" of Ninoy's plane; the suppression of
rebuttal witnesses and the bias and partiality of the Sandiganbayan; its cavalier
disregard of his plea that it "should not decide these cases on the merits without first
making a final ruling on the Motion for Inhibition;" and the Presiding Justice's over-
kill with the declaration that "the Court finds all accused innocent of the crimes
charged in the two informations, and accordingly, they incur neither criminal nor
civil liability," adding that "in the almost twenty years that the undersigned has been
the prosecutor in the sala of the Presiding Justice this is the only occasion where civil
liability is pronounced in a decision of acquittal. " He "associated himself with the
motion for reconsideration and likewise prayed that the proceedings in the
Sandiganbayan and its decision be declared null and void."
New Solicitor General Sedfrey Ordoñez' comment of April 25, 1986 submitted that a
declaration of mistrial will depend on the veracity of the evidence supportive of
petitioners' claim of suppression of evidence and collusion. He submitted that this
would require reception of evidence by a Court-appointed or designated
commissioner or body of commissioners (as was done in G.R. No. 71316, Fr.
Romano case; and G.R. No. 61016, Morales case; and G.R. No. 70054, Banco
Filipino case); and that if petitioners' claim were substantiated, a reopening of the
double murder case is proper to avoid a miscarriage of justice since the verdict of
acquittal would no longer be a valid basis for a double jeopardy claim.
Respondents-accused opposed the second motion for reconsideration and prayed for
its denial. Respondent Olivas contended that the proper step for the government was
to file a direct action to annul the judgment of acquittal and at a regular trial present
its evidence of collusion and pressures.
As a whole, all the other respondents raised the issue of double jeopardy, and
invoked that the issues had become moot and academic because of the rendition of
the Sandiganbayan's judgment of acquittal of all respondents- accused on December
2, 1985, with counsels for respondents Ver and Tigas, as well as Olivas, further
arguing that assuming that the judgment of acquittal is void for any reason, the
remedy is a direct action to annul the judgment where the burden of proof falls upon
the plaintiff to establish by clear, competent and convincing evidence the cause of the
nullity.
After Petitioners had filed their consolidated reply, the Court resolved per its
resolution of June 5, 1986 to appoint a three-member commission composed of
retired Supreme Court Justice Conrado Vasquez, chairman, and retired Intermediate
Appellate Court Justices Milagros German and Eduardo Caguioa as members, to hear
and receive evidence, testimonial and documentary, of the charges of collusion and
pressures and relevant matters, upon prior notice to all parties, and to submit their
findings to this Court for proper disposition. The Commission conducted hearings on
19 days, starting on June 16, 1986 and ending on July 16, 1986, On the said last day,
respondents announced in open hearing that they decided to forego the taking of the
13
projected deposition of former President Marcos, as his testimony would be merely
corroborative of the testimonies of respondents Justice Pamaran and Tanodbayan
Fernandez. On July 31, 1986, it submitted its extensive 64-page Report 16wherein it
discussed fully the evidence received by it and made a recapitulation of its findings in
capsulized form, as follows:
1. The Office of the Tanodbayan, particularly Justice Fernandez and
the Special Investigating Panel composed of Justice Herrera, Fiscal
Bernabe and Special Prosecutor Tamayo, was originally of the view
that all of the twenty-six (26) respondents named in the Agrava
Board majority report should all be charged as principals of the
crime of double murder for the death of Senator Benigno Aquino and
Rolando Galman.
2. When Malacanang learned of the impending filing of the said
charge before the Sandiganbayan, the Special Investigating Panel
having already prepared a draft Resolution recommending such
course of action, President Marcos summoned Justice Fernandez, the
tree members of the Special Investigating Panel, and justice Pamaran
to a conference in Malacanang in the early evening of January 10,
1985.
3. In said conference, President Marcos initially expressed his
disagreement with the recommendation of the Special Investigating
Panel and disputed the findings of the Agrava Board that it was not
Galman who shot Benigno Aquino.
4. Later in the conference, however, President Marcos was
convinced of the advisability of filing the murder charge in court so
that, after being acquitted as planned, the accused may no longer be
prosecuted in view of the doctrine of double jeopardy.
5. Presumably in order to be assured that not all of the accused
would be denied bail during the trial, considering that they would be
charged with capital offenses, President Marcos directed that the
several accused be "categorized" so that some of them would merely
be charged as accomplices and accessories.
6. In addition to said directive, President Marcos ordered that the
case be handled personally by Justice Pamaran who should dispose
of it in the earliest possible time.
7. The instructions given in the Malacanang conference were
followed to the letter; and compliance therewith manifested itself in
several specific instances in the course of the proceedings, such as,
the changing of the resolution of the special investigating panel, the
filing of the case with the Sandiganbayan and its assignment to
Justice Pamaran, suppression of some vital evidence, harassment of
witnesses, recantation of witneses who gave adverse testimony
before the Agrava Board, coaching of defense counsels, the hasty
trial, monitoring of proceedings, and even in the very decision
rendered in the case.
8. That that expression of President Marcos' desire as to how he
wanted the Aquino-Galman case to be handled and disposed of
constituted sufficient pressure on those involved in said task to
comply with the same in the subsequent course of the proceedings.
9. That while Justice Pamaran and Justice Fernandez manifested no
revulsion against complying with the Malacañang directive, justice
Herrera played his role with manifestly ambivalent feelings.
10. Sufficient evidence has been ventilated to show a scripted and
pre-determined manner of handling and disposing of the Aquino-
Galman murder case, as stage-managed from Malacañang and
performed by willing dramatis personnae as well as by recalcitrant
ones whipped into line by the omnipresent influence of an
authoritarian ruler.
The Commission submitted the following recommendation.
14
 Considering the existence of adequate credible evidence showing
that the prosecution in the Aquino-Galman case and the Justices who
tried and decided the same acted under the compulsion of some
pressure which proved to be beyond their capacity to resist, and
which not only prevented the prosecution to fully ventilate its
position and to offer all the evidences which it could have otherwise
presented, but also predetermined the final outcome of the case, the
Commission is of the considered thinking and belief, subject to the
better opinion and judgment of this Honorable Court that the
proceedings in the said case have been vitiated by lack of due
process, and hereby respectfully recommends that the prayer in the
petition for a declaration of a mistrial in Sandiganbayan Cases Nos.
10010 and 10011 entitled "People vs. Luther Custodia et al.," be
granted.
The Court per its Resolution of July 31, 1986 furnished all the parties with copies of
the Report and required them to submit their objections thereto. It thereafter heard the
parties and their objections at the hearing of August 26, 1986 and the matter was
submitted for the Court's resolution.
The Court adopts and approves the Report and its findings and holds on the basis
thereof and of the evidence received and appreciated by the Commission and duly
supported by the facts of public record and knowledge set forth above and
hereinafter, that the then President (code named Olympus) had stage-managed in and
from Malacanang Palace "a scripted and pre-determined manner of handling and
disposing of the Aquino-Galman murder case;" and that "the prosecution in the
Aquino Galman case and the Justices who tried and decided the same acted under the
compulsion of some pressure which proved to be beyond their capacity to resist', and
which not only prevented the prosecution to fully ventilate its position and to offer all
the evidences which it could have otherwise presented, but also pre-determined the
final outcome of the case" of total absolution of the twenty-six respondents accused
of all criminal and civil liability.
The Court finds that the Commission's Report (incorporated herein by reference) and
findings and conclusions are duly substantiated by the evidence and facts of public
record. Composed of distinguished members of proven integrity with a combined
total of 141 years of experience in the practice of law (55 years) and in the
prosecutoral and judicial services (86 years in the trial and appellate courts), experts
at sifting the chaff from the grain, 17 the Commission properly appraised the
evidences presented and denials made by public respondents, thus:
The desire of President Marcos to have the Aquino-Galman case
disposed of in a manner suitable to his purposes was quite
understandable and was but to be expected. The case had stirred
unprecedented public outcry and wide international attention. Not
invariably, the finger of suspicion pointed to those then in power
who supposedly had the means and the most compelling motive to
eliminate Senator Aquino. A day or so after the assassination,
President Marcos came up with a public statement aired over
television that Senator Aquino was killed not by his military escorts,
but by a communist hired gun. It was, therefore, not a source of
wonder that President Marcos would want the case disposed of in a
manner consistent with his announced theory thereof which, at the
same time, would clear his name and his administration of any
suspected guilty participation in the assassination.
The calling of the conference was undoubtedly to accomplish this
purpose. . . .
President Marcos made no bones to conceal his purpose for calling
them. From the start, he expressed irritation and displeasure at the
recommendation of the investigating panel to charge all of the
twenty-six (26) respondents as principals of the crime of double
murder. He insisted that it was Galman who shot Senator Aquino,
and that the findings of the Agrava Board were not supported by
evidence that could stand in court. He discussed and argued with
Justice Herrera on this point. Midway in the course of the discussion,
mention was made that the filing of the charge in court would at least
mollify public demands and possibly prevent further street
demonstrations. It was further pointed out that such a procedure
would be a better arrangement because, if the accused are charged in
court and subsequently acquitted, they may claim the benefit of the
15
doctrine of double jeopardy and thereby avoid another prosecution if
some other witnesses shall appear when President Marcos is no
longer in office.
xxx xxx xxx
After an agreement was reached as to filing the case, instead of
dismissing it, but with some of the accused to be charged merely as
accomplices or accessories, and the question of preventive custody
of the accused having thereby received satisfactory solution,
President Marcos took up the matter of who would try the case and
how long it would take to be finished.
According to Justice Herrera, President Marcos told Justice Pamaran
'point blank' to personally handle the case. This was denied by
Justice Pamaran. No similar denial was voiced by Justice Fernandez
in the entire course of his two-day testimony. Justice Pamaran
explained that such order could not have been given inasmuch as it
was not yet certain then that the Sandiganbayan would try the case
and, besides, cases therein are assigned by raffle to a division and not
to a particular Justice thereof.
It was preposterous to expect Justice Pamaran to admit having
received such presidential directive. His denial, however, falls to
pieces in the light of the fact that the case was indeed handled by him
after being assigned to the division headed by him. A supposition of
mere coincidence is at once dispelled by the circumstance that he
was the only one from the Sandiganbayan called to the Malacanang
conference wherein the said directive was given. . . .
The giving of such directive to Justice Pamaran may also be inferred
from his admission that he gave President Marcos the possible time
frame when asked as to how long it would take him to finish the
case.
The testimony of Justice Herrera that, during the conference, and
after an agreement was reached on filing the case and subsequently
acquitting the accused, President Marcos told them "Okay, mag
moro-moro na lamang kayo;" and that on their way out of the room
President Marcos expressed his thanks to the group and uttered "I
know how to reciprocate," did not receive any denial or
contradiction either on the part of justice Fernandez or justice
Pamaran. (No other person present in the conference was presented
by the respondents. Despite an earlier manifestation by the
respondents of their intention to present Fiscal Bernabe and
Prosecutor Tamayo, such move was abandoned without any reason
having been given therefor.)
The facts set forth above are all supported by the evidence on record.
In the mind of the Commission, the only conclusion that may be
drawn therefrom is that pressure from Malacanang had indeed been
made to bear on both the court and the prosecution in the handling
and disposition of the Aquino-Galman case. The intensity of this
pressure is readily deductible from the personality of the one who
exerted it, his moral and official ascendancy over those to whom his
instructions were directed, the motivation behind such instructions,
and the nature of the government prevailing at that time which
enabled, the then head of state to exercise authoritarian powers.
That the conference called to script or stage-manage the prosecution
and trial of the Aquino-Galman case was considered as something
anomalous that should be kept away from the public eye is shown by
the effort to assure its secrecy.None but those directly involved were
caned to attend. The meeting was held in an inner room of the
Palace. Only the First Lady and Presidential Legal Assistant Justice
Lazaro were with the President. The conferees were told to take the
back door in going to the room where the meeting was held,
presumably to escape notice by the visitors in the reception hall
waiting to see the President. Actually, no public mention alas ever
made of this conference until Justice Herrera made his expose some
fifteen (15) months later when the former president was no longer
around.
16
 President Marcos undoubtedly realized the importance of the matter
he wanted to take up with the officials he asked to be summoned. He
had to do it personally, and not merely through trusted assistants.
The lack of will or determination on the part of Justice Fernandez
and Justice Pamaran to resist the presidential summons despite their
realization of its unwholesome implications on their handling of the
celebrated murder case may be easily inferred from their
unquestioned obedience thereto. No effort to resist was made, despite
the existence of a most valid reason to beg off, on the lame excuses
that they went there out of "curiosity," or "out of respect to the
Office of the President," or that it would be 'unbecoming to refuse a
summons from the President.' Such frame of mind only reveals their
susceptibility to presidential pressure and lack of capacity to resist
the same. The very acts of being summoned to Malacanang and their
ready acquiescence thereto under the circumstances then obtaining,
are in themselves pressure dramatized and exemplified Their abject
deference to President Marcos may likewise be inferred from the
admitted fact that, not having been given seats during the two-hour
conference (Justice Fernandez said it was not that long, but did not
say how long) in which President Marcos did the talking most of the
time, they listened to him on their feet. Verily, it can be said that any
avowal of independent action or resistance to presidential pressure
became illusory from the very moment they stepped inside
Malacanang Palace on January 10, 1985.18
The Commission pinpointed the crucial factual issue thus: "the more significant
inquiry is on whether the Sandiganbayan and the Office of the Tanodbayan actually
succumbed to such pressure, as may be gauged by their subsequent actuations in their
respective handling of the case." It duly concluded that "the pressure exerted by
President Marcos in the conference held on January 10, 1985 pervaded the entire
proceedings of the Aquino Galman [murder] cases" as manifested in several specific
incidents and instances it enumerated in the Report under the heading of
"Manifestations of Pressure and Manipulation."
Suffice it to give hereinbelow brief excerpts:—
1. The changing of the original Herrera panel draft Resolution charging all the
twenty-six accused as principals by conspiracy by categorizing and charging 17 as
principals, Generals Ver and Olivas and 6 others as accessories and the civilian as
accomplice, and recommending bail for the latter two categories: "The categorization
may not be completely justified by saying that, in the mind of Justice Fernandez,
there was no sufficient evidence to justify that all of the accused be charged as
principals. The majority of the Agrava Board found the existence of conspiracy and
recommended that all of the accused be charged accordingly. Without going into the
merit of such finding, it may hardly be disputed that, in case of doubt, and in
accordance with the standard practice of the prosecution to charge accused with the
most serious possible offense or in the highest category so as to prevent an incurable
injustice in the event that the evidence presented in the trial will show his guilt of the
graver charge, the most logical and practical course of action should have been, as
originally recommended by the Herrera panel, to charge all the accused as principals.
As it turned out, Justice Fernandez readily opted for categorization which, not
surprisingly, was in consonance with the Malacañang instruction." It is too much to
attribute to coincidence that such unusual categorization came only after the then
President's instruction at Malacanang when Gen. Ver's counsel, Atty. Coronel, had
been asking the same of Tanodbayan Fernandez since November, 1984; and "Justice
Fernandez himself, admit(ted) that, as of that time, [the Malacanang conference on
January 10, 1985], his own view was in conformity with that of the Special
Investigating Panel to charge all of the twenty-six (26) respondents as principals of
the crime of double murder." 19 As the Commission further noted, "Justice Fernandez
never denied the claim of Justice Herrera that the draft resolution of January 10, 1985
(Exhibit 'B-1') [charging all 26 accused as principals] was to have been the subject of
a press conference on the afternoon of said date which did not go through due to the
summons for them to go to Malacanang in the early evening of said date." 20
2. Suppression of vital evidence and harassment of witnesses:" Realizing, no doubt,
that a party's case is as strong as the evidence it can present, unmistakable and
persistent efforts were exerted in behalf of the accused to weaken the case of the
prosecution and thereby assure and justify [the accused's] eventual scripted acquittal.
Unfavorable evidences were sought to be suppressed, and some were indeed
prevented from being ventilated. Adverse witnesses were harassed, cajoled, perjured
or threatened either to refrain from testifying or to testify in a manner favorable to the
defense."
17
The Report specified the ordeals of the prosecution witnesses: 21 Cesar Loterina, PAL
employee, Roberta Masibay, Galman's step-daughter who recanted their testimonies
before the Fact Finding Board and had to be discarded as prosecution witnesses
before at the trial. Witnesses Viesca and Rañas who also testified before the Board
"disappeared all of a sudden and could not be located by the police. The Commission
narrated the efforts to stifle Kiyoshi Wakamiya eyewitness who accompanied Ninoy
on his fateful flight on August 21, 1983 and described them as "palpable, if crude and
display(ing) sheer abuse of power." Wakamiya was not even allowed to return to
Manila on August 20, 1984 to participate in the first death anniversary of Ninoy but
was deported as an undesirable alien and had to leave on the next plane for Tokyo.
The Board had to go to Tokyo to hear Wakamiya give his testimony before the
Japanese police in accordance with their law and Wakamiya claimed before the
Commission that the English transcription of his testimony, as prepared by an official
of the Philippine Embassy in Tokyo, was inaccurate and did not correctly reflect the
testimony he gave "although there was no clear showing of the discrepancy from the
original transcription which was in Nippongo. Upon his arrival at the MIA on August
21, 1985 on invitation of Justice Herrera to testify at the ongoing trial, "a shot was
fired and a soldier was seen running away by media men who sought to protect
Wakamiya from harm by surrounding him." Wakamiya was forced by immigration
officials to leave the country by Saturday (August 24th) notwithstanding Herrera's
request to let him stay until he could testify the following Monday (August 26th). In
the case of principal eyewitness Rebecca Quijano, the Commission reported that
... Undoubtedly in view of the considerable significance of her
proposed testimony and its unfavorable effect on the cause of the
defense, the efforts exerted to suppress the same was as much as, if
not more than those in the case of Wakamiya. ... She recounted that
she was in constant fear of her life, having been hunted by armed
men; that their house in Tabaco, Albay was ransacked, her family
harassed by the foreclosure of the mortgage on their house by the
local Rural Bank, and ejected therefrom when she ignored the
request of its manager to talk with her about her proposed testimony;
that a certain William Fariñas offered her plane tickets for a trip
abroad; that Mayor Rudy Fariñas of Laoag City kept on calling her
sister in the United States to warn her not to testify; that, later, Rudy
and William Fariñas offered her two million pesos supposedly
coming from Bongbong Marcos, a house and lot in Baguio, the
dropping of her estafa case in Hongkong, and the punishment of the
persons responsible for the death of her father, if she would refrain
from testifying.
It is a matter of record, however, that despite such cajolery and
harassments, or perhaps because of them, Ms. Quijano eventually
testified before the Sandiganbayan. Justice Herrera was told by
justice Fernandez of the displeasure expressed by Olympus at justice
Herrera's going out of his way to make Ms. Quijano to testify, and
for his refusal to honor the invitation to attend the birthday party of
the First Lady on May 1, 1985, as on the eve of Ms. Quijano's
testimony on May 2, 1985. The insiduous attempts to tamper with
her testimony, however, did not end with her taking the witness
stand. In the course of her testimony several notes were passed to
Atty. Rodolfo Jimenez, the defense counsel who cross-examined her,
one of which suggested that she be asked more questions about Dean
Narvasa who was suspected of having coached her as to what to
declare (Exhibit "D"); and on another occasion, at a crucial point in
her testimony, a power brownout occurred; which lasted for about
twenty minutes, throwing the courtroom into darkness, and making
most of those present to scamper for safety, and Ms. Quijano to pass
over the railing of the rostrum so as to be able to leave the
courtroom. It was verified that the brownout was limited to the
building housing the Sandiganbayan, it not having affected the
nearby Manila City Hall and the Finance Building. Justice Herrera
declared that the main switchboard of the Sandiganbayan electrical
system was located beside the room occupied by Malacañang people
who were keeping track of the proceedings.
Atty. Lupino Lazaro for petitioners further made of record at that August 26th
hearing that the two Olivas sisters, Ana and Catherine (hospitality girls) disappeared
on September 4, 1984, two weeks after Ninoy's assassination. And the informant, by
the name of Evelyn (also a hospitality girl) who jotted down the number of the car
that took them away, also disappeared. On January 29, 1984, during the proceedings
of the Board, Lina Galman, the common-law wife of Rolando Galman, was
18
kidnapped together with a neighbor named Rogelio Taruc, They have been missing
since then, despite his attempts to find any of them. According to him, "nobody was
looking for these five persons because they said Marcos was in Power [despite his
appeal to the Minister of National Defense to locate them]. Today, still no one is
looking for these people." And he appealed to the new leadership for its assistance in
learning their fate.
3. The discarding of the affidavits executed by U.S. airmen "While it is true that the
U.S. airmen's proposed testimonies would show an attempt of the Philippine Air
Force to divert the plane to Basa Airfield or some other place, such showing would
not necessarily contravene the theory of the prosecution, nor the actual fact that
Senator Aquino was killed at the Manila International Airport. Justice Herrera had
accurately pointed out that such attempt of scrambling Aquino's plane merely showed
a 'wider range of conspiracy,' it being possibly just one of two or three other plans
designed to accomplish the same purpose of liquidating Senator Aquino. In any
event, even assuming that the said piece of evidence could go either way, it may not
be successfully contended that it was prudent or wise on the part of the prosecution to
totally discard the said piece of evidence. Despite minor inconsistencies contained
therein, its introduction could have helped the cause of the prosecution. If it were not
so, or that it would even favor the defense, as averred by Justice Fernandez, the
determined effort to suppress the same would have been totally uncalled for."
4. Nine proposed rebuttal witnesses not presented.
5. The failure to exhaust available remedies against adverse developments: "When
the Supreme Court denied the petition of Justice Fernandez [against the exclusion of
the testimonies given by the military respondents headed by Gen. Ver before the Fact
Finding Board], the latter almost immediately announced to media that he was not
filing a motion for the reconsideration of said denial for the reason that it would be
futile to do so and foolhardy to expect a favorable action on the same. ... His posture
... is, in the least, indicative that he was living up to the instruction of finishing the
trial of the case as soon as possible, if not of something else."
6. The assignment of the case to Presiding Justice Pamaran: "Justice Herrera testified
that President Marcos ordered Justice Pamaran point-blank to handle the case. The
pro-forma denial by Justice Pamaran of such instruction crumbles under the actuality
of such directive having been complied with to the letter. ...
"Justice Pamaran sought to discredit the claim that he was ordered by President
Marcos to handle the case personally by explaining that cases in the Sandiganbayan
are assigned by raffle and not to a particular Justice, but to a division thereof. The
evidence before the Comission on how the case happened to be assigned to Justice
Pamaran evinces a strong indication that such assignment was not done fairly or
regularly.
"There was no evidence at all that the assignment was indeed by virtue of a regular
raffle, except the uncorroborated testimony of Justice Pamaran. ... Despite an
announcement that Justice Escareal would be presented by the respondents to testify
on the contents of his aforesaid Memorandum, such was not done. No reason was
given why Justice Escarel could not, or would not like to testify. Neither was any one
of the officials or employees of the Sandiganbayan who, according to Justice
Pamaran, were present during the supposed raffle, presented to corroborate the claim
of Justice
xxx xxx xxx
"It is also an admitted fact that the two Informations in the double murder case were
filed by Justice Herrera on January 23, 1985, at 12:02 p.m., and the members of the
Raffle Committee were summoned at 12:20 p.m. or only 18 minutes after the filing of
the two Informations. Such speed in the actual assignment of the case can truly be
categorized as unusual, if not extraordinary, considering that before a case filed may
be included in the raffle, there is need for a certain amount of paper work to be
undertaken. If such preliminary requirements were done in this case within the
limited time available therefor, the charge that the raffle was rushed to avoid the
presence of media people would ring with truth.
What is more intriguing is the fact that although a raffle might have been actually
conducted which resulted in the assignment of the case to the First Division of the
Sandiganbayan, the Commission did not receive any evidence on how or why it was
handled personally by Justice Pamaran who wrote the decision thereof, and not by
any one of the two other members of his division. . . .
19
7. The custody of the accused their confinement in a military camp, instead of in a
civilian jail: "When the question of custody came up after the case was filed in the
Sandiganbayan, the latter issued an order directing the confinement of the accused in
the City Jail of Manila. This order was not carried out in view of the information
given by the Warden of the City Jail that there was no space for the twenty-six
accused in said jail. The same information was given when the custody was proposed
to be given to the National Penitentiary in Muntinglupa and to the National Bureau of
Investigation. At that point, the defense came up with Presidential Decree No. 1950A
which authorizes the custody of the accused military personnel with their respective
Commanding Officers. Justice Herrera claimed that the said Presidential Decree was
not known even to the Tanodbayan Justice Fernandez who had to call up the then
Minister of Justice Estelito Mendoza to request a copy of the same, and was given
such copy only after sometime. ..."
8. The monitoring of proceedings and developments from Malacañang and by
Malacañang personnel: "There is an uncontradicted evidence that the progress of the
proceedings in the Sandiganbayan as well as the developments of the case outside the
Court had been monitored by Malacañang presumably for it to know what was
happening and to take remedial measures as may be necessary. Justice Pamaran had
candidly admitted that television cameras "boldly carrying the label of 'Office of the
President of the Philippines' " were installed in the courtroom for that purpose. There
was a room in the Sandiganbayan, mischievously caned 'war room', wherein military
and Malacañang personnel stayed to keep track of the proceedings." the close
monitoring by Malacañang showed its results on several occasions specified in the
Report. Malacañang was immediately aware of the Japanese witness Wakamiya's
presence injustice Herrera's office on August 21, 1985 and forestalled the giving of
his testimony by having the Japanese Embassy advise Wakamiya to leave the country
at once. Likewise, Col. Balbino Diego, Malacañang intelligence chief, suddenly
appeared at the National Bureau of Investigation office when the "crying
lady" Rebecca Quijano was brought there by NBI agents for interrogation and therein
sought to obtain custody of her. "It is likewise an undisputed fact," the Commission
noted "that several military personnel pretended to be deputy sheriffs of the
Sandiganbayan and attended the trials thereof in the prescribed deputy sheriffs'
uniforms." The Commission's inescapable finding. " It is abundantly clear that
President Marcos did not only give instructions as to how the case should be handled
He saw to it that he would know if his instructions will be complied with."
9. Partiality of Sandiganbayan betrayed by its decision: "That President Marcos had
wanted all of the twenty-six accused to be acquitted may not be denied. The disposal
of the case in said manner is an integral part of the scenario which was cleverly
designed to accomplish two principal objectives, seemingly conflicting in
themselves, but favorable both to then administration and to the accused; to wit, [1]
the satisfaction of the public clamor for the suspected killers of Senator Aquino to be
charged in court, and [2] the foreclosure of any possibility that they may again be
prosecuted for the same offense in the event that President Marcos shall no longer be
in power.
"In rendering its decision the Sandiganbayan overdid itself in favoring the
presidential directive. Its bias and partiality in favor of the accused was glaringly
obvious. The evidence presented by the prosecution was totally ignored and
disregarded. ... It was deemed not sufficient to simply acquit all of the twenty-six
accused on the standard ground that their guilt had not been proven beyond
reasonable doubt, as was the most logical and appropriate way of justifying the
acquittal in the case, there not being a total absence of evidence that could show guilt
on the part of the accused. The decision had to pronounce them 'innocent of the
crime charged on the two informations, and accordingly, they incur neither criminal
nor civil liability.' It is a rare phenomenon to see a person accused of a crime to be
favored with such total absolution. ...
Doubt on the soundness of the decision entertained by one of the two justices who
concurred with the majority decision penned by Justice Pamaran was revealed by
Justice Herrera who testified that in October, 1985, when the decision was being
prepared, Justice Agusto Amores told him that he was of the view that some of the
accused should be convicted he having found difficulty in acquitting all of them;
however, he confided to Justice Herrera that Justice Pamaran made it clear to him
and Justice Vera Cruz that Malacañang had instructions to acquit all of the twenty-
six accused (TSN, July 17, 1986, p. 49). Justice Amores also told Justice Herrera
that he would confirm this statement (which was mentioned in Justice Herrera's
comment to the Second Motion for Reconsideration) if asked about it (TSN, June 19,
1986, pp. 92-93). This testimony Justice Herrera remained unrebutted " (Emphasis
supplied)
20
The record shows suffocatingly that from beginning to end, the then President used,
or more precisely, misused the overwhelming resources of the government and his
authoritarian powers to corrupt and make a mockery of the judicial process in the
Aquino-Galman murder cases. As graphically depicted in the Report, supra, and
borne out by the happenings (res ipsa loquitur 22) since the resolution prepared by his
"Coordinator," Manuel Lazaro, his Presidential Assistant on Legal Affairs, for the
Tanodbayan's dismissal of the cases against all accused was unpalatable (it would
summon the demonstrators back to the streets 23 ) and at any rate was not acceptable
to the Herrera prosecution panel, the unholy scenario for acquittal of all 26 accused
after the rigged trial as ordered at the Malacanang conference, would accomplish the
two principal objectives of satisfaction of the public clamor for the suspected killers
to be charged in court and of giving them through their acquittal the legal shield of
double jeopardy. 24
Indeed, the secret Malacanang conference at which the authoritarian President called
together the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan Fernandez and
the entire prosecution panel headed by Deputy Tanodbayan Herrera and told them
how to handle and rig (moro-moro) the trial and the close monitoring of the entire
proceedings to assure the pre-determined ignominious final outcome are without
parallel and precedent in our annals and jurisprudence. To borrow a phrase from
Ninoy's April 14, 1975 letter withdrawing his petition for habeas corpus, 25 "This is
the evil of one-man rule at its very worst." Our Penal Code penalizes "any executive
officer who shall address any order or suggestion to any judicial authority with
respect to any case or business coming within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts
of justice." 26 His obsession for "the boys' " acquittal led to several first which would
otherwise be inexplicable:—
1. He turned his back on and repudiated the findings of the very Fact Finding Board
that he himself appointed to investigate the "national tragedy and national shame" of
the "treacherous and vicious assassination of Ninoy Aquino and "to ventilate the truth
through free, independent and dispassionate investigation by prestigious and free
investigators."
2. He cordially received the chairman with her minority report one day ahead of the
four majority members and instantly referred it to respondents "for final resolution
through the legal system" as if it were the majority and controlling report; and
rebuked the four majority members when they presented to him the next day their
report calling for the indictment of all 26 respondents headed by Gens. Ver and
Olivas (instead of the lesser seven under the chairman's minority report).
3. From the day after the Aquino assassination to the dictated verdict of acquittal, he
totally disregarded the Board's majority and minority findings of fact and publicly
insisted that the military's "fall guy" Rolando Galman was the killer of Ninoy Aquino
and sought futilely to justify the soldiers' incompetence and gross negligence to
provide any security for Ninoy in contrast to their alacrity in gunning down the
alleged assassin Galman and searing his lips.
4. The Sandiganbayan's decision (Pamaran, J. ponente) in effect convicted Rolando
Galman as Ninoy's assassin notwithstanding that he was not on trial but the victim
according to the very information filed, and evidence to the contrary submitted, by
the Herrera prosecution panel; and
5. Justice Pamaran's ponencia (despite reservations expressed by Justice Amores who
wanted to convict some of the accused) granted all 26 accused total absolution and
pronounced them "innocent of the crimes charged in the two informations, and
accordingly, they incur neither criminal nor civil liability," notwithstanding the
evidence on the basis of which the Fact Finding Board had unanimously declared the
soldiers' version of Galman being Aquino's killer a "perjured story, given
deliberately and in conspiracy with one another."
The fact of the secret Malacañang conference of January 10, 1985 at which the
authoritarian President discussed with the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan and
the entire prosecution panel the matter of the imminent filing of the criminal charges
against all the twenty-six accused (as admitted by respondent Justice Fernandez to
have been confirmed by him to the then President's "Coordinator" Manuel Lazaro on
the preceding day) is not denied. It is without precedent. This was illegal under our
penal laws, supra. This illegality vitiated from the very beginning all proceedings in
the Sandiganbayan court headed by the very Presiding Justice who attended. As the
Commission noted: "The very acts of being summoned to Malacañang and their
ready acquiescence thereto under the circumstances then obtaining, are in themselves
pressure dramatized and exemplified. ... Verily, it can be said that any avowal of
21
independent action or resistance to presidential pressure became illusory from the
very moment they stepped inside Malacanang Palace on January 10, 1985."
No court whose Presiding Justice has received "orders or suggestions" from the very
President who by an amendatory decree (disclosed only at the hearing of oral
arguments on November 8, 1984 on a petition challenging the referral of the Aquino-
Galman murder cases to the Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan instead of to a court
martial, as mandatory required by the known P.D. 1850 at the time providing for
exclusive jurisdiction of courts martial over criminal offenses committed by military
men 26-a) made it possible to refer the cases to the Sandiganbayan, can be an
impartial court, which is the very essence of due process of law. As the writer then
wrote, "jurisdiction over cases should be determined by law, and not
by preselection of the Executive, which could be much too easily transformed into a
means of predetermining the outcome of individual cases. 26-b "This criminal
collusion as to the handling and treatment of the cases by public respondents at the
secret Malacanang conference (and revealed only after fifteen months by Justice
Manuel Herrera) completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab
initio its verdict. This renders moot and irrelevant for now the extensive arguments of
respondents accused, particularly Generals Ver and Olivas and those categorized as
accessories, that there has been no evidence or witness suppressed against them, that
the erroneous conclusions of Olivas as police investigator do not make him an
accessory of the crimes he investigated and the appraisal and evaluation of the
testimonies of the witnesses presented and suppressed. There will be time and
opportunity to present all these arguments and considerations at the remand and
retrial of the cases herein ordered before a neutral and impartial court.
The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict and travesty of
justice to stand unrectified. The courts of the land under its aegis are courts of
law and justice and equity. They would have no reason to exist if they were allowed
to be used as mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress
the truth, instead of repositories of judicial power whose judges are sworn and
committed to render impartial justice to all alike who seek the enforcement or
protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong, without fear or favor and
removed from the pressures of politics and prejudice. More so, in the case at bar
where the people and the world are entitled to know the truth, and the integrity of our
judicial system is at stake. In life, as an accused before the military tribunal, Ninoy
had pleaded in vain that as a civilian he was entitled to due process of law and trial in
the regular civil courts before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. In
death, Ninoy, as the victim of the "treacherous and vicious assassination" and the
relatives and sovereign people as the aggrieved parties plead once more for due
process of law and a retrial before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor.
The Court is constrained to declare the sham trial a mock trial the non-trial of the
century-and that the pre-determined judgment of acquittal was unlawful and void ab
initio.
1. No double jeopardy.-It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be invoked
against this Court's setting aside of the trial courts' judgment of dismissal or acquittal
where the prosecution which represents the sovereign people in criminal cases is
denied due process. As the Court stressed in the 1985 case of People vs. Bocar, 27
Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute
and prove its case its right to due process is thereby violated. 27-a
The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic
constitutional rights, courts are ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the
violation of the State's right to due process raises a serious
jurisdictional issue (Gumabon vs. Director of the Bureau of Prisons,
L-30026, 37 SCRA 420 [Jan. 30, 1971]which cannot be glossed over
or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of
due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right
is void for lack of jurisdiction (Aducayen vs. Flores, L-30370 [May
25, 1973], 51 SCRA 78; Shell Co. vs. Enage, L-30111-12, 49 SCRA
416 [Feb. 27, 1973]). Any judgment or decision rendered
notwithstanding such violation may be regarded as a "lawless thing,
which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored
wherever it exhibits its head" (Aducayen vs. Flores, supra).
Respondent Judge's dismissal order dated July 7, 1967 being null and
void for lack of jurisdiction, the same does not constitute a proper
basis for a claim of double jeopardy (Serino vs. Zosa, supra).
xxx xxx xxx
22
 Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a
competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been
entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without the express consent of the accused (People vs. Ylagan, 58
Phil. 851). The lower court was not competent as it was ousted of its
jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to due
process.
In effect the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of
the criminal case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower
courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and
does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy.
More so does the rule against the invoking of double jeopardy hold in the cases at bar
where as we have held, the sham trial was but a mock trial where the authoritarian
president ordered respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan to rig the trial and
closely monitored the entire proceedings to assure the pre-determined final outcome
of acquittal and total absolution as innocent of an the respondents-accused.
Notwithstanding the laudable efforts of Justice Herrera which saw him near the end
"deactivating" himself from the case, as it was his belief that its eventual resolution
was already a foregone conclusion, they could not cope with the misuse and abuse of
the overwhelming powers of the authoritarian President to weaken the case of the
prosecution, to suppress its evidence, harass, intimidate and threaten its witnesses,
secure their recantation or prevent them from testifying. Fully aware of the
prosecution's difficulties in locating witnesses and overcoming their natural fear and
reluctance to appear and testify, respondent Sandiganbayan maintained a "dizzying
tempo" of the proceedings and announced its intention to terminate the proceedings
in about 6 months time or less than a year, pursuant to the scripted scenario. The
prosecution complained of "the Presiding Justice's seemingly hostile attitude towards
(it)" and their being the subject of warnings, reprimand and contempt proceedings as
compared to the nil situation for the defense. Herrera likewise complained of being
"cajoled into producing witnesses and pressed on making assurances that if given a
certain period, they will be able to produce their witnesses Herrera pleaded for "a
reasonable period of preparation of its evidence" and cited other pending cases before
respondent court that were pending trial for a much longer time where the "dizzying
tempo" and "fast pace" were not maintained by the court. 28 Manifestly, the
prosecution and the sovereign people were denied due process of law with a partial
court and biased Tanodbayan under the constant and pervasive monitoring and
pressure exerted by the authoritarian President to assure the carrying out of his
instructions. A dictated, coerced and scripted verdict of acquittal such as that in the
case at bar is a void judgment. In legal contemplation, it is no judgment at all. It
neither binds nor bars anyone. Such a judgment is "a lawless thing which can be
treated as an outlaw". It is a terrible and unspeakable affront to the society and the
people. To paraphrase Brandeis: 29 If the authoritarian head of the government
becomes the law-breaker, he breeds contempt for the law, he invites every man to
become a law unto himself, he invites anarchy.
Respondents-accused's contention that the Sandiganbayan judgment of acquittal ends
the case which cannot be appealed or re-opened, without being put in double
jeopardy was forcefully disposed of by the Court in People vs. Court of Appeals,
which is fully applicable here, as follows: "That is the general rule and presupposes a
valid judgment. As earlier pointed out, however, respondent Courts' Resolution of
acquittal was a void judgment for having been issued without jurisdiction. No double
jeopardy attaches, therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all
By it no rights are divested. Through it, no rights can be attained. Being worthless, all
proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars anyone.
All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void.
|lang1033 xxx xxx xxx
"Private respondent invoke 'justice for the innocent'. For justice to prevail the scales
must balance. It is not to be dispensed for the accused alone. The interests of the
society, which they have wronged must also be equally considered. A judgment of
conviction is not necessarily a denial of justice. A verdict of acquittal neither
necessarily spells a triumph of justice. To the party wronged, to the society offended,
it could also mean injustice. This is where the Courts play a vital role. They render
justice where justice is due. 30
2. Motion to Disqualify/Inhibit should have been resolved Ahead.-The private
prosecutors had filed a motion to disqualify and for inhibition of respondents Justices
of the Sandiganbayan on grounds of manifest bias and partiality to the defense and
arising from then Atty. (now Tanodbayan) Raul M. Gonzales' charge that Justice
23
Vera-Cruz had been passing coaching notes to defense counsel. Justice Herrera had
joined the motion and pleaded at the hearing of June 25, 1985 and in the prosecution
memorandum that respondent Sandiganbayan "should not decide the case on the
merits without first making a final ruling on the Motion for Inhibition." Herrera
quoted the exchange between him and the Presiding Justice to show the latter's
"following the script of Malacanang.
PJ PAMARAN
Well the court believes that we should proceed with
the trial and then deal later on with that. After all, the
most important thing here is, shall we say, the
decision of the case.
J. HERRERA
I think more important than the decision of the case,
Your Honor, is the capacity of the justices to sit in
judgment. That is more important than anything
else.(p. 13 TSN, June 25, 1985) (Emphasis supplied
by Herrera). 31
But the Sandiganbayan brushed aside Herrera's pleas and then wrongly blamed him,
in the decision, for supposedly not having joined the petition for inhibition, contrary
to the facts above-stated, as follows:
... the motion for inhibition above referred to related exclusively for
the contempt proceeding. Too, it must be remembered that the
prosecution neither joined that petition, nor did it at any time
manifest a desire to file a similar motion prior to the submission of
these cases for decision. To do it now is not alone out of season but
is also a confession of official insouciance (Page 22, Decision). 32
The action for prohibition was filed in the Court to seek the disqualification of
respondents Justices pursuant to the procedure recognized by the Court in the 1969
case of Paredes vs. Gopengco 33 since an adverse ruling by respondent court might
result in a verdict of acquittal, leaving the offended party without any remedy nor
appeal in view of the double jeopardy rule, not to mention the overiding and
transcendental public interest that would make out a case of denial of due process to
the People if the alleged failure on the part of the Tanodbayan to present the complete
evidence for the prosecution is substantiated. 34
In this case, petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the abrupt dismissal of their
petition and lifting of the temporary restraining order enjoining the Sandiganbayan
from rendering its decision had been taken cognizance of by the Court which had
required the respondents', including the Sandiganbayan's, comments. Although no
restraining order was issued anew, respondent Sandiganbayan should not have
precipitately issued its decision of total absolution of all the accused pending the final
action of this Court. This is the teaching of Valdez vs. Aquilizan35, Wherein the court
in setting aside the hasty convictions, ruled that "prudence dictated that (respondent
judge) refrain from deciding the cases or at the very least to hold in abeyance the
promulgation of his decision pending action by this Court. But prudence gave way to
imprudence; the respondent judge acted precipitately by deciding the cases [hastily
without awaiting this Court's action]. All of the acts of the respondent judge manifest
grave abuse of discretion on his part amounting to lack of jurisdiction which
substantively prejudiced the petitioner."
3. Re: Objections of respondents.-The other related objections of respondents'
counsels must be rejected in the face of the Court's declaration that the trial was a
mock trial and that the pre-determined judgment of acquittal was unlawful and
void ab initio.
(a) It follows that there is no need to resort to a direct action to annul the judgment,
instead of the present action which was timely filed initially to declare a mistrial and
to enjoin the rendition of the void judgment. And after the hasty rendition of such
judgment for the declaration of its nullity, following the presentation of competent
proof heard by the Commission and the Court's findings therefrom that the
proceedings were from the beginning vitiated not only by lack of due process but also
by the collusion between the public respondents (court and Tanodbayan) for the
rendition of a pre-determined verdict of acquitting all the twenty-six respondents-
accused.
24
(b) It is manifest that this does not involve a case of mere irregularities in the conduct
of the proceedings or errors of judgment which do not affect the integrity or validity
of the judgment or verdict.
(c) The contention of one of defense counsel that the State and the sovereign people
are not entitled to due process is clearly erroneous and contrary to the basic principles
and jurisprudence cited hereinabove.
(d) The submittal of respondents-accused that they had not exerted the pressure
applied by the authoritarian president on public respondents and that no evidence was
suppressed against them must be held to be untenable in the wake of the evil plot
now exposed for their preordained wholesale exoneration.
(e) Respondents' invocation of the writer's opinion in Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc. vs.
Maritime Bldg. Co., Inc. 36 is inappropriate. The writer therein held that a party
should be entitled to only one Supreme Court and may not speculate on vital changes
in the Court's membership for review of his lost case once more, since public policy
and sound practice demand that litigation be put to an end and no second pro
forma motion for reconsideration reiterating the same arguments should be kept
pending so long (for over six (6) years and one (1) month since the denial of the first
motion for reconsideration), This opinion cannot be properly invoked, because here,
petitioners' second motion for reconsideration was filed promptly on March 20, 1986
following the denial under date of February 4th of the first motion for reconsideration
and the same was admitted per the Court's Resolution of April 3, 1986 and is now
being resolved within five months of its filing after the Commission had received the
evidence of the parties who were heard by the Court only last August 26th. The
second motion for reconsideration is based on an entirely new material ground which
was not known at the time of the denial of the petition and filing of the first motion
for reconsideration, i.e, the secret Malacañang conference on January 10, 1985 which
came to light only fifteen months later in March, 1986 and showed beyond per
adventure (as proved in the Commission hearings) the merits of the petition and that
the authoritarian president had dictated and pre-determined the final outcome of
acquittal. Hence, the ten members of the Court (without any new appointees)
unanimously voted to admit the second motion for reconsideration. 37
4. With the declaration of nullity of the proceedings, the cases must now be tried
before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor.-There has been the long dark
night of authoritarian regime, since the fake ambush in September, 1972 of then
Defense Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile (as now admitted by Enrile himself was staged
to trigger the imposition of martial law and authoritarian one-man rule, with the
padlocking of Congress and the abolition of the office of the Vice-President.
As recently retired Senior Justice Vicente Abad Santos recalled in his valedictory to
the new members of the Bar last May, "In the past few years, the judiciary was under
heavy attack by an extremely powerful executive. During this state of judicial siege,
lawyers both in and outside the judiciary perceptively surrendered to the animus of
technicality. In the end, morality was overwhelmed by technicality, so that the latter
emerged ugly and naked in its true manifestation."
Now that the light is emerging, the Supreme Court faces the task of restoring public
faith and confidence in the courts. The Supreme Court enjoys neither the power of
the sword nor of the purse. Its strength lies mainly in public confidence, based on the
truth and moral force of its judgments. This has been built on its cherished traditions
of objectivity and impartiallity integrity and fairness and unswerving loyalty to the
Constitution and the rule of law which compels acceptance as well by the leadership
as by the people. The lower courts draw their bearings from the Supreme Court. With
this Court's judgment today declaring the nullity of the questioned judgment or
acquittal and directing a new trial, there must be a rejection of the temptation of
becoming instruments of injustice as vigorously as we rejected becoming its victims.
The end of one form of injustice should not become simply the beginning of another.
This simply means that the respondents accused must now face trial for the crimes
charged against them before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor with all
due process. What the past regime had denied the people and the aggrieved parties in
the sham trial must now be assured as much to the accused as to the aggrieved
parties. The people will assuredly have a way of knowing when justice has prevailed
as well as when it has failed.
The notion nurtured under the past regime that those appointed to public office owe
their primary allegiance to the appointing authority and are accountable to him alone
and not to the people or the Constitution must be discarded. The function of the
appointing authority with the mandate of the people, under our system of
25
government, is to fill the public posts. While the appointee may acknowledge with
gratitude the opportunity thus given of rendering public service, the appointing
authority becomes functus officio and the primary loyalty of the appointed must be
rendered to the Constitution and the sovereign people in accordance with his sacred
oath of office. To paraphrase the late Chief Justice Earl Warren of the United States
Supreme Court, the Justices and judges must ever realize that they have no
constituency, serve no majority nor minority but serve only the public interest as they
see it in accordance with their oath of office, guided only, the Constitution and their
own conscience and honor.
5. Note of Commendation.- The Court expresses its appreciation with thanks for the
invaluable services rendered by the Commission composed of retired Supreme Court
Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, chairman, and retired Court of Appeals Justices
Milagros German and Eduardo Caguioa as members. In the pure spirit of public
service, they rendered selflessly and without remuneration thorough competent and
dedicated service in discharging their tasks of hearing and receiving the evidence,
evaluating the same and submitting their Report and findings to the Court within the
scheduled period and greatly easing the Court's burden.
ACCORDINGLY, petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is granted. The
resolutions of November 28, 1985 dismissing the petition and of February 4, 1986
denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration are hereby set aside and in lieu
thereof, judgment is hereby rendered nullifying the proceedings in respondent
Sandiganbayan and its judgment of acquittal in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and
10011 entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Gen. Luther Custodia et al." and
ordering a re-trial of the said cases which should be conducted with deliberate
dispatch and with careful regard for the requirements of due process, so that the truth
may be finally known and justice done to an
This resolution is immediately executory
G.R. No. 131652 March 9, 1998
BAYANI M. ALONTE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MAXIMO A. SAVELLANO JR., NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. No. 131728 March 9, 1998
BUENAVENTURA CONCEPCION, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE MAXIMO SAVELLANO, JR., THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
and JUVIELYN Y. PUNONGBAYAN,respondents.
VITUG, J.:
Pending before this Court are two separate petitions, one filed by petitioner Bayani
M. Alonte, docketed G.R. No. 131652, and the other by petitioner Buenaventura
Concepcion, docketed G.R. No. 131728, that assail the decision of respondent Judge
Maximo A. Savellano, Jr., of the Regional Trial Court ("RTC"), Branch 53, of
Manila finding both petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.
The two petitions were consolidated.
On 05 December 1996, an information for rape was filed against petitioners Bayani
M. Alonte, an incumbent Mayor of Biñan, Laguna, and Buenaventura Concepcion
predicated on a complaint filed by Juvie-lyn Punongbayan. The information
contained the following averments; thus:
That on or about September 12, 1996, in Sto. Tomas, Biñan, Laguna, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable court, the above named accused,
who is the incumbent mayor of Biñan, Laguna after giving complainant-child
drinking water which made her dizzy and weak, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with said JUVIELYN
PUNONGBAYAN against her will and consent, to her damage and
prejudice.
26
 That accused Buenaventura "Wella" Concepcion without having participated
as principal or accessory assisted in the commission of the offense by
bringing said complainant child to the rest house of accused Bayani "Arthur"
Alonte at Sto. Tomas, Biñan, Laguna and after receiving the amount of
P1,000.00 left her alone with Bayani Alonte who subsequently raped her.
Contrary to Law.1
The case was docketed Criminal Case No. 9619-B and assigned by raffle to Branch
25 of the RTC of Biñan, Laguna, presided over by Judge Pablo B. Francisco.
On 13 December 1996, Juvie-lyn Punongbayan, through her counsel Attorney
Remedios C. Balbin, and Assistant Chief State Prosecutor ("ACSP") Leonardo
Guiyab, Jr., filed with the Office of the Court Administrator a Petition for a Change
of Venue (docketed Administrative Matter No. 97-1-12-RTC) to have the case
transferred and tried by any of the Regional Trial Courts in Metro Manila.
During the pendency of the petition for change of venue, or on 25 June 1997, Juvie-
lyn Punongbayan, assisted by her parents and counsel, executed an affidavit of
desistance, quoted herein in full, as follows:
AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE
I, JUVIE-LYN YAMBAO PUNONGBAYAN, 17 years of age, a resident of No. 5
Uranus Street, Congressional Avenue Subdivision, Quezon City, duly assisted by
private legal counsel and my parents, after having duly sworn in accordance with
law, depose and say:
1. That I am the Complainant in the rape case filed against Mayor
Bayani "Arthur" Alonte of Biñan, Laguna, with the RTC-Branch 25
of Biñan, Laguna;
2. That the case has been pending for some time, on preliminary
issues, specifically, (a) change of venue, filed with the Supreme
Court; (b) propriety of the appeal to the Court of Appeals, and after
its denial by said court, brought to the Office of the President, on the
veracity of the findings of the Five-Man Investigating Panel of the
State Prosecutor's Office, and the Secretary of Justice, and (c) a hold-
departure order filed with the Biñan Court.
3. That the legal process moves ever so slowly, and meanwhile, I
have already lost two (2) semesters of my college residence. And
when the actual trial is held after all the preliminary issues are finally
resolved, I anticipate a still indefinite suspension of my schooling to
attend the hearings;
4. That during the entire period since I filed the case, my family has
lived a most abnormal life: my father and mother had to give up their
jobs; my younger brother, who is in fourth grade, had to stop his
schooling, like myself;
5 That I do not blame anyone for the long, judicial process, I simply
wish to stop and live elsewhere with my family, where we can start
life anew, and live normally once again;
6. That I pray that I be allowed to withdraw my complaint for rape
and the other charge for child abuse wherein the Five-Man
Investigating Panel of the Office of the State Prosecutor found
aprima facie case although the information has not been filed, and
that I will not at any time revive this, and related cases or file new
cases, whether, criminal, civil, and/or administrative, here or
anywhere in the Philippines;
7 That I likewise realize that the execution of this Affidavit will put
to doubt my credibility as a witness-complainant;
8. That this is my final decision reached without fear or favor,
premised on a corresponding commitment that there will be no
reprisals in whatever form, against members of the police force or
any other official of officer, my relatives and friends who extended
assistance to me in whatever way, in my search for justice.
27
WHEREOF, I affix my signature this 25 day of June, 1997, in Quezon City. On 02 September 1997, this Court issued a Resolution (Administrative Matter No.
97-1-12-RTC), granting the petition for change of venue. The Court said:
(Sgd) JUVIE-LYN Y. PUNONGBAYAN
These affidavits give specific names, dates, and methods being used to abort,
Complainant by coercion or corruption, the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 9619-B. It is
thus incorrect for oppositors Alonte and Concepcion to contend that the fear
Assisted by: of the petitioner, her private counsel and her witnesses are too generalized if
not fabricated. Indeed, the probability that in desisting from pursuing her
(Sgd) ATTY. REMEDIOS C. BALBIN complaint for rape, petitioner, a minor, may have succumbed to some illicit
Private Prosecutor influence and undue pressure. To prevent possible miscarriage of justice is a
good excuse to grant the petition to transfer the venue of Criminal Case No.
In the presence of: 9619-B from Biñan, Laguna to the City of Manila.

(Sgd) PABLO PUNONGBAYAN
Father
(Sgd) JULIE Y. PUNONGBAYAN
Mother
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 25 day of June, 1997, in Quezon
City.
(Sgd) Illegible
Administering Officer2
On 28 June 1997, Atty. Ramon C. Casino, on behalf of petitioners, moved to have the
petition for change of venue dismissed on the ground that it had become moot in
view of complainant's affidavit of desistance. On 22 August 1997, ACSP Guiyab
filed his comment on the motion to dismiss. Guiyab asserted that he was not aware of
the desistance of private complainant and opined that the desistance, in any case,
would not produce any legal effect since it was the public prosecutor who had
direction and control of the prosecution of the criminal action. He prayed for the
denial of the motion to dismiss.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition for Change of Venue from Biñan, Laguna
to the City of Manila is granted. The Executive Judge of RTC Manila is
ordered to raffle Crim. Case No. 9619-B to any of its branches. The judge to
whom Crim. Case No. 9619-B shall be raffled shall resolve the petitioner's
Motion to Resume Proceedings filed in Br. XXV of the RTC of Biñan,
Laguna and determine the voluntariness and validity of petitioner's desistance
in light of the opposition of the public prosecutor, Asst. Chief State
Prosecutor Leonardo Guiyab. The branch clerk of court of Br. XXV of the
RTC of Biñan, Laguna is ordered to personally deliver to the Executive
Judge of Manila the complete records of Crim. Case No. 9619-B upon
receipt of this Resolution.3
On 17 September 1997, the case, now re-docketed Criminal Case No. 97-159955 by
the Clerk of Court of Manila, was assigned by raffle to Branch 53, RTC Manila, with
respondent Judge Maximo A. Savellano, Jr., presiding.
On 07 October 1997, Juvie-lyn Punongbayan, through Attorney Balbin, submitted to
the Manila court a "compliance" where she reiterated "her decision to abide by her
Affidavit of Desistance."
In an Order, dated 09 October 1997, Judge Savellano found probable cause for the
issuance of warrants for the arrest of petitioners Alonte and Concepcion "without
prejudice to, and independent of, this Court's separate determination as the trier of

28
facts, of the voluntariness and validity of the [private complainant's] desistance in the
light of the opposition of the public prosecutor, Asst. Chief State Prosecutor
Leonardo Guiyab."
On 02 November 1997, Alonte voluntarily surrendered himself to Director Santiago
Toledo of the National Bureau of Investigation ("NBI"), while Concepcion, in his
case, posted the recommended bail of P150,000.00.
On 07 November 1997, petitioners were arraigned and both pleaded "not guilty" to
the charge. The parties manifested that they were waiving pre-trial. The proceedings
forthwith went on. Per Judge Savellano, both parties agreed to proceed with the trial
of the case on the merits.4 According to Alonte, however, Judge Savellano allowed
the prosecution to present evidence relative only to the question of the voluntariness
and validity of the affidavit of desistance.5
It would appear that immediately following the arraignment, the prosecution
presented private complainant Juvielyn Punongbayan followed by her parents.
During this hearing, Punongbayan affirmed the validity and voluntariness of her
affidavit of desistance. She stated that she had no intention of giving positive
testimony in support of the charges against Alonte and had no interest in further
prosecuting the action. Punongbayan confirmed: (i) That she was compelled to desist
because of the harassment she was experiencing from the media, (ii) that no pressures
nor influence were exerted upon her to sign the affidavit of desistance, and (iii) that
neither she nor her parents received a single centavo from anybody to secure the
affidavit of desistance.
Assistant State Prosecutor Marilyn Campomanes then presented, in sequence: (i)
Punongbayan's parents, who affirmed their signatures on the affidavit of desistance
and their consent to their daughter's decision to desist from the case, and (ii)
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Alberto Nofuente, who attested that the affidavit of
desistance was signed by Punongbayan and her parents in his presence and that he
was satisfied that the same was executed freely and voluntarily. Finally,
Campomanes manifested that in light of the decision of private complainant and her
parents not to pursue the case, the State had no further evidence against the accused
to prove the guilt of the accused. She, then, moved for the "dismissal of the case"
against both Alonte and Concepcion.
Thereupon, respondent judge said that "the case was submitted for decision."6
On 10 November 1997, petitioner Alonte filed an "Urgent Motion to Admit to Bail."
Assistant State Prosecutor Campomanes, in a Comment filed on the same date, stated
that the State interposed "no objection to the granting of bail and in fact Justice and
Equity dictates that it joins the accused in his prayer for the granting of bail."
Respondent judge did not act on the application for bail.
On 17 November 1997, Alonte filed anew an Urgent Plea to Resolve the Motion for
Bail. On even date, ASP Campomanes filed a Manifestation deeming "it proper and
in accord with justice and fair play to join the aforestated motion."
Again, the respondent judge did not act on the urgent motion.
The records would indicate that on the 25th November 1997, 1st December 1997, 8th
December 1997 and 10th December 1997, petitioner Alonte filed a Second, Third,
Fourth and Fifth Motion for Early Resolution, respectively, in respect of his
application for bail. None of these motions were acted upon by Judge Savellano.
On 17 December 1997, Attorney Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun, the lead counsel for
petitioner Alonte received a notice from the RTC Manila. Branch 53, notifying him
of the schedule of promulgation, on 18 December 1997, of the decision on the case.
The counsel for accused Concepcion denied having received any notice of the
scheduled promulgation.
On 18 December 1997, after the case was called, Atty. Sigrid Fortun and Atty. Jose
Flaminiano manifested that Alonte could not attend the promulgation of the decision
because he was suffering from mild hypertension and was confined at the NBI clinic
and that, upon the other hand, petitioner Concepcion and his counsel would appear
not to have been notified of the proceedings. The promulgation, nevertheless, of the
decision proceeded in absentia; the reading concluded:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the two (2) accused
Mayor Bayani Alonte and Buenaventura "Wella" Concepcion guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the heinous crime of RAPE, as defined and penalized
29
 under Article 335(2) in relation to Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, for which each one of the them is
hereby sentenced to suffer the indivisible penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA or imprisonment for twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty
(40) years.
In view thereof, the bail bond put up by the accused Buenaventura "Wella'"
Concepcion for his provisional liberty is hereby cancelled and rendered
without any further force and effect.
SO ORDERED.7
On the same day of 18th December 1997, petitioner Alonte filed a motion for
reconsideration. Without waiting for its resolution, Alonte filed the instant "Ex
Abundante Ad Cautelam" for "Certiorari, Prohibition, Habeas Corpus, Bail,
Recusation of respondent Judge, and for Disciplinary Action against an RTC Judge."
Petitioner Concepcion later filed his own petition for certiorari and mandamus with
the Court.
Alonte submits the following grounds in support of his petition seeking to have the
decision nullified and the case remanded for new trial; thus:
The respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction when he rendered a Decision in the case a
quo (Annex A) without affording the petitioner his Constitutional right to due
process of law (Article III, §1, Constitution).
The respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction when he rendered a Decision in the case a quo in
violation of the mandatory provisions of the Rules on Criminal Procedure,
specifically, in the conduct and order of trial (Rule 119) prior to the
promulgation of a judgment (Rule 120; Annex A).
The respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction when, in total disregard of the Revised Rules on
Evidence and existing doctrinal jurisprudence, he rendered a Decision in the
case a quo (Annex A) on the basis of two (2) affidavits (Punongbayan's and
Balbin's) which were neither marked nor offered into evidence by the
prosecution, nor without giving the petitioner an opportunity to cross-
examine the affiants thereof, again in violation of petitioner's right to due
process (Article III, §1, Constitution).
The respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction when he rendered a Decision in the case a
quo without conducting a trial on the facts which would establish that
complainant was raped by petitioner (Rule 119, Article III, §1, Constitution),
thereby setting a dangerous precedent where heinous offenses can result in
conviction without trial (then with more reason that simpler offenses could
end up with the same result).8
On the other hand, Concepcion relies on the following grounds in support of his own
petition; thus:
1. The decision of the respondent Judge rendered in the course of resolving
the prosecution's motion to dismiss the case is a patent nullity for having
been rendered without jurisdiction, without the benefit of a trial and in total
violation of the petitioner's right to due process of law.
2. There had been no valid promulgation of judgment at least as far as
petitioner is concerned.
3. The decision had been rendered in gross violation of the right of the
accused to a fair trial by an impartial and neutral judge whose actuations and
outlook of the case had been motivated by a sinister desire to ride on the crest
of media hype that surrounded this case and use this case as a tool for his
ambition for promotion to a higher court.
4. The decision is patently contrary to law and the jurisprudence in so far as
it convicts the petitioner as a principal even though he has been charged only
as an accomplice in the information.9
30
The petitions deserve some merit; the Court will disregard, in view of the case
milieu, the prematurity of petitioners' invocation, i.e., even before the trial court
could resolve Alonte's motion for reconsideration.
The Court must admit that it is puzzled by the somewhat strange way the case has
proceeded below. Per Judge Savellano, after the waiver by the parties of the pre-trial
stage, the trial of the case did proceed on the merits but that —
The two (2) accused did not present any countervailing evidence during the
trial. They did not take the witness stand to refute or deny under oath the
truth of the contents of the private complainant's aforementioned affidavit
which she expressly affirmed and confirmed in Court, but, instead, thru their
respective lawyers, they rested and submitted the case for decision merely on
the basis of the private complainant's so called "desistance" which, to them,
was sufficient enough for their purposes. They left everything to the so-
called "desistance" of the private complainant.10
According to petitioners, however, there was no such trial for what was conducted on
07 November 1997, aside from the arraignment of the accused, was merely a
proceeding in conformity with the resolution of this Court in Administrative Case
No. 97-1-12-RTC to determine the validity and voluntariness of the affidavit of
desistance executed by Punongbayan.
It does seem to the Court that there has been undue precipitancy in the conduct of the
proceedings. Perhaps the problem could have well been avoided had not the basic
procedures been, to the Court's perception, taken lightly. And in this shortcoming,
looking at the records of the case, the trial court certainly is not alone to blame.
Section 14, paragraphs (1) and (2), of Article III, of the Constitution provides the
fundamentals.
(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due
process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until
the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him,
to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to
face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses
and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment,
trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that
he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
Jurisprudence11 acknowledges that due process in criminal proceedings, in particular,
require (a) that the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial
power to hear and determine the matter before it; (b) that jurisdiction is lawfully
acquired by it over the person of the accused; (c) that the accused is given an
opportunity to be heard; and (d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful
hearing.12
The above constitutional and jurisprudential postulates, by now elementary and
deeply imbedded in our own criminal justice system, are mandatory and
indispensable. The principles find universal acceptance and are tersely expressed in
the oft-quoted statement that procedural due process cannot possibly be met without
a "law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders
judgment only after trial." 13
The order of trial in criminal cases is clearly spelled out in Section 3, Rule 119, of the
Rules of Court; viz:
Sec. 3. Order of trial. — The trial shall proceed in the following order:
(a) The prosecution shall present evidence to prove the charge and, in the
proper case, the civil liability.
(b) The accused may present evidence to prove his defense, and damages, if
any, arising from the issuance of any provisional remedy in the case.
(c) The parties may then respectively present rebutting evidence only, unless
the court, in furtherance of justice, permits them to present additional
evidence bearing upon the main issue.
31
 (d) Upon admission of the evidence, the case shall be deemed submitted for
decision unless the court directs the parties to argue orally or to submit
memoranda.
(e) However, when the accused admits the act or omission charged in the
complaint or information but interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial
may be modified accordingly.
In Tabao vs. Espina,14 the Court has underscored the need to adhere strictly to the
above rules. It reminds that —
. . . each step in the trial process serves a specific purpose. In the trial of
criminal cases, the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of an
accused requires that an accused be given sufficient opportunity to present
his defense. So, with the prosecution as to its evidence.
Hence, any deviation from the regular course of trial should always take into
consideration the rights of all the parties to the case, whether in the
prosecution or defense. In the exercise of their discretion, judges are sworn
not only to uphold the law but also to do what is fair and just. The judicial
gavel should not be wielded by one who has an unsound and distorted sense
of justice and fairness.15
While Judge Savellano has claimed in his Comment that —
Petitioners-accused were each represented during the hearing on 07
November 1997 with their respective counsel of choice. None of their
counsel interposed an intention to cross-examine rape victim Juvielyn
Punongbayan, even after she attested, in answer to respondent judge's
clarificatory questions, the voluntariness and truth of her two affidavits —
one detailing the rape and the other detailing the attempts to buy her
desistance; the opportunity was missed/not used, hence waived. The rule of
case law is that the right to confront and cross-examine a witness "is a
personal one and may be waived." (emphasis supplied) —
it should be pointed out, however, that the existence of the waiver must be positively
demonstrated. The standard of waiver requires that it "not only must be voluntary,
but must be knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of the relevant
circumstances and likely consequences."16 Mere silence of the holder of the right
should not be so construed as a waiver of right, and the courts must indulge every
reasonable presumption against waiver.17 The Solicitor General has aptly discerned a
few of the deviations from what otherwise should have been the regular course of
trial: (1) Petitioners have not been directed to present evidence to prove their
defenses nor have dates therefor been scheduled for the purpose;18 (2) the parties
have not been given the opportunity to present rebutting evidence nor have dates
been set by respondent Judge for the purpose;19 and (3) petitioners have not admitted
the act charged in the Information so as to justify any modification in the order of
trial.20 There can be no short-cut to the legal process, and there can be no excuse for
not affording an accused his full day in court. Due process, rightly occupying the first
and foremost place of honor in our Bill of Rights, is an enshrined and invaluable right
that cannot be denied even to the most undeserving.
This case, in fine, must be remanded for further proceedings. And, since the case
would have to be sent back to the court a quo, this ponencia has carefully avoided
making any statement or reference that might be misconstrued as prejudgment or as
pre-empting the trial court in the proper disposition of the case. The Court likewise
deems it appropriate that all related proceedings therein, including the petition for
bail, should be subject to the proper disposition of the trial court.
Nevertheless, it is needful to stress a few observations on the affidavit of desistance
executed by the complainant.
Firstly, the affidavit of desistance of Juvie-Lyn Punongbayan, hereinbefore quoted,
does not contain any statement that disavows the veracity of her complaint against
petitioners but merely seeks to "be allowed to withdraw" her complaint and to
discontinue with the case for varied other reasons. On this subject, the case of People
vs. Junio,21 should be instructive. The Court has there explained:
The appellant's submission that the execution of an Affidavit of Desistance
by complainant who was assisted by her mother supported the "inherent
incredibility of prosecution's evidence" is specious. We have said in so many
32
 cases that retractions are generally unreliable and are looked upon with
considerable disfavor by the courts. The unreliable character of this
document is shown by the fact that it is quite incredible that after going
through the process of having accused-appellant arrested by the police,
positively identifying him as the person who raped her, enduring the
humiliation of a physical examination of her private parts, and then repeating
her accusations in open court by recounting her anguish, Maryjane would
suddenly turn around and declare that "[a]fter a careful deliberation over the
case, (she) find(s) that the same does not merit or warrant criminal
prosecution.
Thus, we have declared that at most the retraction is an afterthought which
should not be given probative value. It would be a dangerous rule to reject
the testimony taken before the court of justice simply because the witness
who has given it later on changed his mind for one reason or another. Such a
rule will make a solemn trial a mockery and place the investigation at the
mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. Because affidavits of retraction can easily
be secured from poor and ignorant witnesses, usually for monetary
consideration, the Court has invariably regarded such affidavits as
exceedingly unreliable [Flores vs. People, 211 SCRA 622, citing De Guzman
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 184 SCRA 128; People vs. Galicia, 123
SCRA 550.]22
The Junio rule is no different from ordinary criminal cases. For instance, in People
vs. Ballabare,23 a murder case, the Court has ruled:
The contention has no merit. To begin with, the Affidavit executed by
eyewitness Tessie Asenita is not a recantation. To recant a prior statement is
to renounce and withdraw it formally and publicly. [36 WORDS AND
PHRASES 683, citing Pradlik vs. State, 41-A 2nd, 906, 907.] In her affidavit,
Tessie Asenita did not really recant what she had said during the trial. She
only said she wanted to withdraw her testimony because her father, Leonardo
Tacadao, Sr., was no longer interested in prosecuting the case against
accused-appellant. Thus, her affidavit stated:
3. That inasmuch as my father, Leonardo Tacadao, Sr., the complainant
therein, was no longer interested to prosecute the case as manifested in the
Sworn Affidavit of Desistance before the Provincial Prosecutor, I do hereby
WITHDRAW and/or REVOKE my testimony of record to confirm (sic) with
my father's desire;
It is absurd to disregard a testimony that has undergone trial and scrutiny by
the court and the parties simply because an affidavit withdrawing the
testimony is subsequently presented by the defense. In the first place, any
recantation must be tested in a public trial with sufficient opportunity given
to the party adversely affected by it to cross-examine the recanting witness.
In this case, Tessie Asenita was not recalled to the witness stand to testify on
her affidavit. Her affidavit is thus hearsay. It was her husband, Roque
Asenita, who was presented and the matters he testified to did not even bear
on the substance of Tessie's affidavit. He testified that accused-appellant was
not involved in the perpetration of the crime.
In the second place, to accept the new evidence uncritically would be to
make a solemn trial a mockery and place the investigation at the mercy of
unscrupulous witnesses. [De Guzman vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 184
SCRA 128, 134, citing People vs. Morales, 113 SCRA 683.] For even
assuming that Tessie Asenita had made a retraction, this circumstance alone
does not require the court to disregard her original testimony. A retraction
does not necessarily negate an earlier declaration. [People vs. Davatos, 229
SCRA 647.] For this reason, courts look with disfavor upon retractions
because they can easily be obtained from witnesses usually through
intimidation or for monetary considerations. [People vs. Clamor, 198 SCRA
642.] Hence, when confronted with a situation where a witness recants his
testimony, courts must not automatically exclude the original testimony
solely on the basis of the recantation. They should determine which
testimony should be given credence through a comparison of the original
testimony and the new testimony, applying the general rules of evidence.
[Reano vs. Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA 525.] In this case we think the trial
court correctly ruled.24
33
It may not be amiss to state that courts have the inherent power to compel the
attendance of any person to testify in a case pending before it, and a party is not
precluded from invoking that authority.25
Secondly, an affidavit of desistance by itself, even when construed as a pardon in the
so-called "private crimes," is not a ground for the dismissal of the criminal case once
the action has been instituted. The affidavit, nevertheless, may, as so earlier
intimated, possibly constitute evidence whose weight or probative value, like any
other piece of evidence, would be up to the court for proper evaluation. The decision
in Junio went on to hold —
While "[t]he offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness,
shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint flied by the offended party
or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor in any case, if the offender has
been expressly pardoned by the above named persons, as the case may be,"
[Third par. of Art. 344, The Revised Penal Code.] the pardon to justify the
dismissal of the complaint should have been made prior to the institution of
the criminal action. [People vs. Entes, 103 SCRA 162, cited by People vs.
Soliao, 194 SCRA 250, which in turn is cited in People vs. Villorente, 210
SCRA 647.] Here, the motion to dismiss to which the affidavit of desistance
is attached was filed after the institution of the criminal case. And, affiant did
not appear to be serious in "signifying (her) intention to refrain from
testifying" since she still completed her testimony notwithstanding her earlier
affidavit of desistance. More, the affidavit is suspect considering that while it
was dated "April 1992," it was only submitted sometime in August 1992,
four (4) months after the Information was filed before the court a quo on 6
April 1992, perhaps dated as such to coincide with the actual filing of the
case.26
27
In People vs. Miranda, applying the pertinent provisions of Article 344 of the
Revised Penal Code which, in full, states —
Art. 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction,
abduction, rape, and acts of lasciviousness. The crimes of adultery and
concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the
offended spouse.
The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including
both the guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have
consented or pardoned the offenders.
The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not
be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her
parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been
expressly pardoned by the above named persons, as the case may be.
In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness and rape, the
marriage of the offender with the offended party shall extinguish the criminal
action or remit the penalty already imposed upon him. The provisions of this
paragraph shall also be applicable to the coprincipals, accomplices and
accessories after the fact of the above-mentioned crimes.
the Court said:
Paragraph 3 of the legal provision above quoted prohibits a prosecution for
seduction, abduction, rape, or acts of lasciviousness, except upon a complaint
made by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in
any case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by the above-named
persons, as the case may be. It does not prohibit the continuance of a
prosecution if the offended party pardons the offender after the cause has
been instituted, nor does it order the dismissal of said cause. The only act that
according to article 344 extinguishes the penal action and the penalty that
may have been imposed is the marriage between the offended and the
offended party.28
In People vs. Infante, 29 decided just a little over a month before Miranda, the Court
similarly held:
In this court, after the case had been submitted, a motion to dismiss was filed
on behalf of the appellant predicated on an affidavit executed by Manuel
Artigas, Jr., in which he pardoned his guilty spouse for her infidelity. But this
attempted pardon cannot prosper for two reasons. The second paragraph of
article 344 of the Revised Penal Code which is in question reads: "The
34
 offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both
the guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have
consented or pardoned the offenders." This provision means that the pardon
afforded the offenders must come before the institution of the criminal
prosecution, and means, further, that both the offenders must be pardoned by
the offended party. To elucidate further, article 435 of the old Penal Code
provided: "The husband may at any time remit the penalty imposed upon his
wife. In such case the penalty imposed upon the wife's paramour shall also be
deemed to be remitted." These provisions of the old Penal Code became
inoperative after the passage of Act No. 1773, section 2, which had the effect
of repealing the same. The Revised Penal Code thereafter expressly repealed
the old Penal Code, and in so doing did not have the effect of reviving any of
its provisions which were not in force. But with the incorporation of the
second paragraph of article 344, the pardon given by the offended party again
constitutes a bar to the prosecution for adultery. Once more, however, it must
be emphasized that this pardon must come before the institution of the
criminal prosecution and must be for both offenders to be effective —
circumstances which do not concur in this case.30
The decisions speak well for themselves, and the Court need not say more than what
it has heretofore already held.
Relative to the prayer for the disqualification of Judge Savellano from further hearing
the case, the Court is convinced that Judge Savellano should, given the
circumstances, the best excused from the case. Possible animosity between the
personalities here involved may not all be that unlikely. The pronouncement of this
Court in the old case of Luque vs. Kayanan31 could again be said: All suitors are
entitled to nothing short of the cold neutrality of an independent, wholly-free,
disinterested and unbiased tribunal. Second only to the duty of rendering a just
decision is the duty of doing it in a manner that will not arouse any suspicion as to
the fairness and integrity of the Judge.32 It is not enough that a court is impartial, it
must also be perceived as impartial.
The Court cannot end this ponencia without a simple reminder on the use of proper
language before the courts. While the lawyer in promoting the cause of his client or
defending his rights might do so with fervor, simple courtesy demands that it be done
within the bounds of propriety and decency. The use of intemperate language and
unkind ascriptions hardly can be justified nor can have a place in the dignity of
judicial forum. Civility among members of the legal profession is a treasured
tradition that must at no time be lost to it.
Finally, it may be opportune to say, once again, that prosecutors are expected not
merely to discharge their duties with the highest degree or excellence,
professionalism and skill but also to act each time with utmost devotion and
dedication to duty.33 The Court is hopeful that the zeal which has been exhibited
many times in the past, although regrettably a disappointment on few occasions, will
not be wanting in the proceedings yet to follow.
WHEREFORE, conformably with all the foregoing, the Court hereby RULES that —
(a) The submission of the "Affidavit of Desistance," executed by Juvie-Lyn
Y. Punongbayan on 25 June 1997, having been filed AFTER the institution
of Criminal Case No. 97-159935, DOES NOT WARRANT THE
DISMISSAL of said criminal case;
(b) For FAILURE OF DUE PROCESS, the assailed judgment, dated 12
December 1997, convicting petitioners is declared NULL AND VOID and
thereby SET ASIDE; accordingly, the case is REMANDED to the trial court
for further proceedings; and
(c) Judge Maximo A. Savellano, Jr., presiding Judge of Branch 53 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, is ENJOINED from further hearing Criminal
Case No. 97-159935; instead, the case shall immediately be scheduled for
raffle among the other branches of that court for proper disposition.
No special pronouncement on costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Kapunan, Martinez, Quisumbing and Purisima, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., took no part.
35

Separate Opinions
PUNO, J., separate opinion;
The facts are critical and need to be focused. Petitioners were charged with rape in
Criminal Case No. 15993 which was raffled to Br. 25 of the RTC of Biñan, Laguna.
The charge is principally based on the following affidavit dated October 31, 1996 of
Ms. Juvie-Lyn Punongbayan, a 16-year old minor, viz.:
REPLY-AFFIDAVIT
(TUGON SA MGA SALAYSAY NILA MAYOR BAYANI ALONTE, WELLA
CONCEPCION, RICARDO LACAYAN at JAIME MENDOZA)
Ako si JUVIE-LYN Y. PUNONGBAYAN, Filipino, walang asawa, 16 years old, at
kasalukuyang nasa pangangalaga ng Department of Social Welfare and
Development, matapos makapanumpa ayon sa batas, ay nagsasaad:
1. Wala pong katotohanan ang lahat nakasaad sa mga salaysay ni Mayor Bayani
Alonte at Buenaventura "Wella" Concepcion, ng kanilang mga testigo na sila Ricardo
(Ading) Lacayan y Aguilar at Jaime Bagtas Mendoza.
2. Ang totoo po ay inabuso ako ni Mayor nung September 12, 1996, katulad nga ng
naihayag ko na sa aking sinumpaang salaysay. Ayon sa driver ng tricycle na
nasakyan ko pagkatapos ng insidente, hindi lang po ako, kundi marami pa pong
babae ang inabuso ni Mayor. Sabi pa nga ng driver ay naaawa siya sa akin, at
lumaban daw ako. Tinawagan ko na rin po ang lahat ng mga babae na naging biktima
ni Mayor; wag silang matakot, lumabas at ilahad ang pangaabuso ni Mayor.
Ang detalya nung panggagahasa
ni Alonte at ang partisipasyon
ni Wella Concepcion
3. Nakalahad po sa sumusunod na talata ang detalya ng pang-aabuso sa akin ni
Mayor. Pinakikita rin dito kung paano nakipagsabwatan kay Wella Concepcion. Sa
pamamagitan nito ay mapapabulaanan na rin ang mga nakasaad sa salaysay nila at ng
mga testigo nila.
4. Nakilala ko si Wella Concepcion, dance instructor, nung bandang last week ng
August 1996. Noon ay naghahanda ako para sa "Miss Education" beauty contest sa
Perpetual Help College of Laguna. Doon ako nag-aaral. First year college ako, at
education ang kursong pinili ko. Ang nasabing contest ay ginanap nung Sept. 20,
1996. Kapag nagkikita kami ni Wella para sa ensayo, nagkukuwentuhan din kami, at
nabanggit niya na may kaibigan siyang bakla na nagdadala ng babae kay Mayor
Alonte. Waway daw ang pangalan ng bakla. Hindi ko pa kilala si Waway noon.
5. Nung Sept. 7, niyaya ako ni Wella na sumali sa dance contest sa "Sang Linggo
NAPO SILA" sa Channel 2, na itatanghal sa Sept. 11, 1996. Wala na daw po akong
aalalahanin. Siya daw ang bahala sa costume at transportation. Pumayag ang nanay
ko, dahil wala na kaming gagastusin. Hindi ko tinanong kay Wella kung saan galing
ang costume. Akala ko may ipapagamit lang siya sa akin.
6. Nung Sept. 8, pinakilala ni Wella si Waway sa akin. Si Waway ang nagturo sa
amin ng sayaw para sa TV contest. Mula nung araw na yon hanggang Sept. 10 ay
nagsanay kami sa bahay ng kapatid ni Waway sa St. Francis Subdivision, Biñan,
Laguna. Tatlo kami sa dance group: ako at ang dalawang lalaki na ipinakilala sa akin
ni Waway: si Melchor at Darius.
7. Nagpunta kami sa studio sa Delta nung Sept. 11. Bago kami magsayaw, habang
inaayos ni Wella yung damit ko, sinabi niya na dapat manalo kami dahil si Mayor
Alonte daw ang nag-sponsor ng costume namin. Noon ko lang ito nalaman. Hindi
kami nanalo sa contest, pero nagkaroon pa rin kami ng premyong P1,500.00 na
pinaghatian namin.
36
8. Pagkatapos ng contest, at nung nakapagpalit na ako ng damit, binabalik ko kay
Wella ang costume ko. Sabi niya iuwi ko daw ito dahil gagamitin ko ito sa Miss
Education contest, sa presentation ng mga candidates. Mula sa studio, nagpunta
kaming lahat sa isang kainan sa tapat ng Delta at, pagkatapos namin kumain,
humiwalay yung ibang kasama namin.
9. Dinala ako ni Wella sa isang department store at binili niya ako ng sandals. Inikot
niya ako sa lugar na yon at binili niya ako ng pagakain. Tapos ay sumakay kami ng
bus pauwi sa Laguna. Nung nasa bus kami, niyaya ako ni Wella na magpunta sa
bahay ni Mayor para magpasalamat ng personal para sa costume namin. Pumayag
ako at sabi ko kay Wella na sunduin niya ako sa bahay ng 10:00 a.m. sa susunod na
araw, Sept. 12. Nakarating ako sa bahay ng 5:00 p.m. ng araw na yon, Sept. 11.
10. Nung Sept. 12, hinintay ko si Wella ng 10:00 a.m. Nung hindi siya dumating
umalis kaming Tita ko dahil sinamahan ko siya sa health center. Sumundo pala si
Wella doon, pero hindi kami nagkita kasi saglit lang kami doon. Bumalik siya sa
bahay, at doon na kami nagkita. Tapos ay umalis kami ni Wella papunta kay Mayor.
Tumawid kami ng kalye, at pumara ako ng tricycle. Pero kahit marami na akong
pinara, ayaw ni Wella na sumakay doon. Maya-maya, may tricyle na dumating na
hindi naman pinara ni Wella. Basta huminto na lang sa harap namin. Doon kami
sumakay ni Wella. Si Wella ang nagturo sa driver kung saan kami pupunta. Nag-
uusap sila ng driver habang papunta kami kay Mayor.
11. Bumaba kami sa tapat ng bahay na bukas ang gate. May swimming pool sa loob,
alam na alam ni Wella and, pasikot-sikot nang bahay; tuloy-tuloy siya sa loob at
sumunod naman ako. Wala kaming taong nakita, pero bukas pati yung pintuan ng
bahay. Dinala ako ni Wella sa sala. Napakaganda ng loob ng bahay. Mayroong wall
paper na may design na leaves and flowers; may carpet sa sahig. May mahabang
hagdan patungo sa dalawang pintuan.
12. Tinanong ko kay Wella kung nasaan si Mayor. Sabi niya ay nasa munisipyo daw;
darating na daw maya-maya. Pagkaraan ng mga 15 minutes, dumating si Mayor na
nakasakay sa green na kotse. Lumabas siya sa kaliwang pintuan sa harap ng kotse.
Wala siyang kasama.
13. Pumasok si Mayor sa loob ng bahay. Naghubad siya ng sapatos. Sabi ni Wella:
"Mayor, si Juvie; Juvie si Mayor."
14. Umupo si Mayor sa tabi ko. Kinamayan niya ako at sinabi niya: "Hi, I'm Arthur"
sabay hinalikan niya sa ako sa lips. Hindi ako naka-react dahil nagulat at kinabahan
ako.
15. Nagmamadaling nagpaalam si Wella. Kinuha ni Mayor ang wallet sa bulsa sa
likod ng kanyang pantalon. Dumukot siya ng P1,000 na buo. Inabot niya ito kay
Wella. Patayo na ako pero hinawakan ni Mayor ang braso ko. Wag daw akong
sasama kay Wella. Sinabi ko kay Wella na wag niya akong iiwanan, pero parang
wala siyang narinig. Basta tuloy-tuloy siyang umalis.
16. Nung, kami na lang ni Mayor ang natira, pinainom niya ako ng mineral water.
Uminom ako dahil nauuhaw ako. Nanlabo ang paningin ko at nanghina ako.
17. Nawalan ako ng malay. Ang sumunod ko na lang na natatandaan ay nandoon na
ako sa kwarto. Wala akong damit. Nakadagan si Mayor sa akin. May malaking
salamin sa pader. Doon ko nakita na walang kadamit-damit si Mayor.
18. Hawak ako ni Mayor sa magkabilang braso. Pinipisil niya ito kaya nagkaroon ako
ng pasa sa kaliwang braso (at ito ay nawala lang pagkatapos ng tatlong araw).
19. Naramdaman ko na pilit na pinasok ni Mayor ang ari niya sa aking ari. Nasaktan
ako. Nagmakaawa ako. Umiiyak ako nung sinabi ko sa kanya na tigilan niya ako;
nasasaktan ako; may anak rin siyang babae. Sabi niya wag daw akong maingay at i-
embrace ko na lang daw siya. Lalo akong umiyak dahil nandidiri ako sa kanya, at sa
ginagawa niya sa akin. Naghalo ang galit, pandidiri at takot. Wala akong magawa
kundi magmakaawa. Hindi ko siya maitulak dahil nanghihina ako, nakadagan siya sa
akin, mataba siya, at hawak-hawak niya ang braso ko. Pero kahit nagmamakaawa
ako, tinuloy pa rin niya at pinasok niya ulit ang ari niya sa aking ari.
20. Maya-maya ay tumigil siya. Tumayo siya at sabi niya: "ang panty mo, nasa tabi
mo." Kinuha ko ang panty ko, tumayo ako at sinuot ko ito. Hinanap ko ang damit ko,
at nakita ko ang walking shorts, bra at t-shirt ko sa sahig. Pinulot ko ito at sinuot ko.
37
Habang sinusuot ko, umiiyak pa rin ako. Pagkatapos kong magbihis, umupo ako sa
mahabang upuan sa may gilid ng kama.
21. Samantala, paqkatapos sabihin ni Mayor na nasa tabi ko ang panty ko, nagpunta
siya sa banyo na transparent ang pinto. Wala siyang suot pagpunta niya doon.
Paglabas niya, nakasuot na siya ng checkered brief na kulay black and white.
Pumunta siya sa kabilang gilid ng kama. Kinuha niya ang damit niya na nakahanger
sa pader. Sinuot niya ito. Lumabas siya ng kwarto. Hindi nagtagal ay pumasok siya
ulit at sinabi niya na nandiyan na daw ang sundo ko.
22. Tumayo ako. Sinabi ko na aalis na ako. Nung papunta na ako sa pintuan, lumapit
si Mayor sa akin. May hawak-hawak siyang dalawang pirasong P1,000. Tiniklop
niya ito; binaba niya yung neckline ng t-shirt ko, at pinasok niya ang pera sa aking
bra. Nagalit ako. Kinuha ko ang pera at tinapon ko ito sa kanya. Sabi ko hindi ako
bayarang babae. Nagalit siya at pinagbantaan ako. Sabi niya: "Pag nagsalita ka, alam
mo na kung ano ang mangyayari sa iyo." Tiningnan ko siya, at umalis ako pababa.
23. Mayroon tricycle na nakaabang sa labas. Sumunod si Mayor. Lumapit siya sa
driver at binigyan niya ito ng P100. Tapos ay umalis na kami.
24. Umiiyak pa rin ako nung nasa tricycle. Sabi ko sa driver na ginahasa ako ni
Mayor. Sabi niya masuwerte daw ako at maaga akong pinauwi dahil yung mga ibang
babae daw na dinadala kay Mayor ay pinauwi ng madaling-araw o hating-gabi.
Minsan dalawa o tatlo pa nga daw ang dinadala doon, at yung iba ay naka-uniform
pa. Naawa daw siya sa akin, kaya magsumbong daw ako. Nakokonsensiya daw siya
dahil isa siya sa dalawang tricycle driver na naghahatid ng mga babae doon. Sabi pa
nga niya, babae din daw ang ina niya, kaya din siya nakokonsensiya. Dinagdag pa
niya na kung may kasiyahan kina Mayor, isang van ng mga babae ang nadoon.
Pagdating namin sa bahay ng Lola ko, sabi niya bago siya umalis: "Lumaban ka."
On December 13, 1996, the private complainant thru her counsel, Atty. Remedios C.
Balbin and Asst. Chief State Prosecutor Leonardo Guiab, Jr., of the Department of
Justice petitioned this Court for a change of venue. They cited as ground the "great
danger to the lives of both the private complainant, the immediate members of her
family, and their witnesses as they openly defy the principal accused, Mayor Alonte
who is acknowledged as a powerful political figure and almost an institution in
Biñan, Laguna . . ."
On March 31, 1997, the private complainant, thru the then Secretary of Justice, the
Honorable Teofisto Guingona and Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio Zuno filed a
Manifestation and Motion for the early resolution of the petition for change of venue.
They submitted the affidavits of the private complainant, her counsel Atty. Remedios
C. Balbin, Dolores Mercado-Yambao, Bienvenido Salandanan and Evelyn Celso to
prove their allegation that they "are exposed to kidnapping, harassment, veiled threats
and tempting offers of bribe money — all intended to extract an 'affidavit of
desistance' from the private complainant." Worth bright lining are the two (2)
affidavits of Atty. Remedios C. Balbin, counsel for the private complainant, relating
the fantastic amount of P10M bribe money allegedly offered to her. The first affidavit
dated February 24, 1997 states:
I, Remedios C. Balbin, of legal age, Filipino, married, with residence at #5 Uranus
Street, Congressional Avenue Subdivision, Quezon City, after having duly sworn in
accordance with law, depose and say:
1. That I am the Private Prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 96-19-B for
rape, filed with the Biñan RTC, Branch 25, entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Bayani Arthur Alonte, et al.;
2. That as Private Prosecutor, it is my avowed duty to be faithful to
the interests of my client, Ms. Juvie-lyn Punongbayan;
3. That on several occasions, I was visited at my Office at the
Quezon City Hall Compound, by a lawyer who introduced himself as
Atty. Leo C. Romero, representing the Accused Mayor Bayani
Arthur Alonte;
4. That my calendar at the People's Bureau, Quezon City Hall, shows
that he came to see me about eight (8) times, but we talked only
about three (3) times because I was always busy attending to the
problems of Quezon City's urban poor and the landowners of private
properties illegally occupied by them;
38
5. That in two (2) occasions, Atty. Romero conveyed to me the
message of Mayor Alonte, namely, to drop the rape case against him,
and that he would give a consideration of Ten Million Pesos (P10
Million) to be apportioned as follows:
Five Million Pesos (P5M) — for the Private Complainant
Three Million Pesos (P3M) — for me as Private Prosecutor
Two Million Pesos (P2M) — for him as the mediator
6. That I explained to Atty. Romero that money does not matter at all
to the Complainant and her family even if they have very modest
means; that they want justice, which means a conviction for the
charge of rape;
7. That I also explained to Atty. Romero that the money he was
offering me was of no consequence to me because I had access to the
resources of my two (2) daughters, both of whom are in the medical
field abroad, and of Mr. Filomeno Balbin, Labor Attached then
assigned in Riyadh;
8. That I told him that I cannot be tempted with his offer because
spiritual consideration are more important to me than the material.
Also, that I usually handle cases pro bono (at abunado pa) where the
litigant is in dire need of legal assistance but cannot afford to pay for
the lawyer's fees, as in Juvie-lyn's case;
9. That I gave Atty. Romero a copy of the decision of the Supreme
Court promulgated December 10 1996, entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Robert Cloud" (GR No. 119359: Crim. Case No. Q-
90-12660) for parricide involving the death of a 2 1/2 year old boy. I
wrote on page one of the xerox copy of the decision: "To Atty. Leo
Romero — so you will understand," and to which I affixed my
signature.
10. That I told him explicitly: "we cannot simplify the entire
proceedings. You advise Mayor Alonte to surrender (one mitigating
circumstance), plead guilty (another mitigating circumstance), get a
conviction and suffer the corresponding penalty. Otherwise, we have
nothing to talk about."
11. That I emphasized that his suggestion for Mayor Alonte to plead
guilty to "act of lasciviousness" merely was ridiculous;
12. That when the Complainant's Affidavit on the offer of Ms. Emily
Vasquez for a valuable consideration in exchange for an affidavit of
desistance in the rape was exposed by media, Atty. Romero came to
see me and thanked me for not exposing him in similar fashion. I
assured him that he will not be an exception and that I was just too
busy then to execute an affidavit on the matter, as I do now;
13. That I have not received other similar offers of valuable material
consideration from any other person, whether private party or
government official; However, I have been separately advised by
several concerned persons that I was placing my personal safety at
great risk. The victim's family will have great difficulty in finding
another lawyer to "adopt" them in the way I did, which gives them
strength to pursue their case with confidence and the accused Mayor
is aware that I am the obstacle to an out-of-court settlement of the
case. Also, that I had my hands full, as it is, as the Head of the QC
People's Bureau, Housing Development Center, and Special Task
Force an Squatting and Resettlement, and the numerous cases filed
by me or against me, connected with my performance of official
duties, and I should not add more legal problems despite my
authority to engage in private law practice.
14. That this affidavit is executed in order to put on record the
attempt to influence me directly, in exchange for valuable
consideration to drop the rape charge against Mayor Bayani Arthur
Alonte.
39
 February 24, 1997, City of Manila. I, REMEDIOS C. BALBIN, of legal age, Filipino, married, and with postal address at
No. 5 Uranus Street, Congressional Avenue Subdivision Quezon City, after having
SGD. REMEDIOS C. BALBIN duly sworn in accordance with law, depose and say:

REMEDIOS C. BALBIN 1. That I am the Private Prosecutor in the rape case filed by the "minor Juvie-
Lyn Punongbayan against Mayor Bayani Arthur Alonte of Biñan, Laguna.
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 26th day of March,
1997, Metro Manila. 2. That earlier, I reported to Secretary Teofisto Guingona, State Prosecutor
Jovencio R. Zuno, Asst. Chief State Prosecutor Leonardo Guiyab, Jr., and
Community Tax Certificate — 5208733 Director Jude Romano of the Witness Protection Program, the instances of
Date Issue 2-10-97 substantial amounts amounting to several millions, to my client, to her
Quezon City relatives, including her maternal grandmother, and to myself;

NOTARY PUBLIC 3. That despite the published declaration by the Department of Justice of its
SGD. JUANITO L. GARCIA determination to prosecute those who offered the bribes, new emissaries of
ATTY. JUANITO L. GARCIA Mayor Alonte persist in making offers, as follows:
NOTARY PUBLIC
UNTIL Dec. 31, 1997 a. On Thursday, March 6, 1997, at about 3:15 o'clock in the
PTR No. 63-T-033457 afternoon, Atty. Dionisio S. Daga came to see me at my office at the
ISSUED AT MLA. ON 1-2-97 People's Bureau, Office of the Mayor, of Squatting case which I filed
against his clients;
TAN—161-570-81
Doc. No. 950; b. That after a brief exchange on the status of the case, he confided to
Page No. 170; me his real purpose;
Series of 1997.
c. That he started off by saying that he was the legal counsel of the
In her second Affidavit dated March 26, 1997, Atty. Balbin declared in no uncertain gambling lords of Malabon for which he gets a monthly retainer of
language that the bribe offer for private complainant to make a desistance was fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00), exclusive of transportation
increased from P10,000.00 to P20,000.00, viz: expenses, etc.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES ) d. The he also stated that the network of gambling lords throughout
CITY OF MANILA ) s.s. the country is quite strong and unified;

AFFIDAVIT e. That I then asked him: "What do you mean — is Alonte into
gambling too? that he is part of the network you speak of?"

40
 f. That Atty. Daga did not reply but instead said: "they are prepared 5. That despite what I perceived as veiled threats of Atty. Daga, I will seek
to double the offer made to you by Atty. Romero which was justice in behalf of Juvie-Lyn Punongbayan, with the indispensable
published in the newspapers" at P10 Million; initiatives, participation and support of the Department of Justice under
Secretary Teofisto Guingona.
g. That I told him that all the money in the world will not make me
change my position against my client's executing a desistance, and FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.
that only Alonte's voluntary surrender, plea of guilty in rape,
conviction and the imposition of the corresponding penalty will SGD. REMEDIOS C. BALBIN
satisfy the ends of justice; ATTY. REMEDIOS C. BALBIN
Affiant
h. That I told him that my client's case is not isolated, there being
five (5) other minors similarly placed; and Alonte should be stopped REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES )
from doing more harm; CITY OF MANILA ) S.S.

i. That Atty. Daga then told me in Pilipino "if you do not accede to a SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this 26th day of March, 1997.
desistance, then, they will be forced to . . .".
Community Tax Certificate — 5208733
j. That because he did not complete his sentence, I asked him Date Issued 2-10-97
directly: "What do you mean? What do you intend to do? And he Quezon City
replied: Go on with the case Buy the Judge."
Notary Public
k. That unbelieving, I reacted, saying; "but they have already done
so, Judge Francisco at Binan suddenly changed his attitude towards SGD. JUANITO L. GARCIA
the Prosecution. Perhaps, you are referring to the next judge when ATTY. JUANITO L. GARCIA
the petition for change of venue is finally granted?" NOTARY PUBLIC
UNTIL DEC. 31, 1997
1. That Atty. Daga did not reply, and he reiterated that his principals, PTR NO. 63-T-033457
referring to them again as "gambling lords," want a desistance, after ISSUED AT MLA. ON 1-2-87
which he excused himself and left. TAN -161-570-81

4. That I execute this Affidavit to attest to the truth of the incident with Atty. Doc. No. 948;
Dionisio S. Daga which occurred in the afternoon of March 6, 1997, at my Book No. 190;
Office, stressing herein my surprise over his daring in making yet another Page No. XLIII;
monetary offer to me in exchange for my client's desistance and my feeling Series of 1997.
of fear for the first time since I started "handling" this case against Alonte;

41
After the alleged bribe money was increased from P10M to P20M the complexion of
the case changed swiftly.
On June 25, 1997, Atty. Balbin filed a Motion to Resume Proceedings in Br. 25 of
the RTC of Biñan, Laguna. Attached to the Motion was the Affidavit of Desistance
of the private complainant which states:
I, Juvie-lyn Yambao — Punongbayan, 17 years of age, a resident of No. 5 Uranus
Street, Congressional Avenue Subdivision, Quezon City, duly assisted by private
legal counsel and my parents, after having duly sworn in accordance with law,
depose and say:
1. That I am the Complainant in the rape case filed against Mayor Bayani
"Arthur" Alonte of Biñan, Laguna, with the RTC-Branch 25 of Binan,
Laguna;
2. That the case has been pending for some time, on preliminary issues,
specifically, (a) change of venue, filed with the Supreme Court; (b) propriety
of the appeal to the Court of Appeals, and after its denial by said court,
brought to the Office of the President, on the veracity of the findings of the
Five-Man Investigating Panel of the State Prosecutor's Office, and the
Secretary of Justice and (c) a hold-departure order filed with the Biñan
Court;
3. That the legal process moves ever so slowly, and meanwhile, I have
already lost two (2) semesters of my college residence. And when the actual
trial is held after all the preliminary issues are finally resolved, I anticipate a
still indefinite suspension of my schooling to attend the hearings;
4. That during the entire period since I filed the case, my family has lived a
most abnormal life: my father and mother had to give up their jobs; my
younger brother, who is in fourth grade, had to stop his schooling, like
myself;
5. That I do not blame anyone for the long, judicial process; I simply wish to
stop and live elsewhere with my family, where we can start life anew, and
live normally once again;
6. That I pray that I be allowed to withdraw my complaint for rape and the
other charge for child abuse wherein the Five-Man investigating Penal of the
Office of the State Prosecutor found a prima facie case although the
information has not been filed, and that I will not at any time revive this, and
related cases or file new cases whether, criminal, civil and/or administrative
here or anywhere in the Philippines;
7. That I likewise realize that the execution of this Affidavit will put to doubt
my credibility as a witness-complainant;
8. That this is my final decision reached without fear or favor, premised on a
corresponding commitment that there will be no reprisals in whatever form,
against members of the police force or any friends who extended assistance
to me in whatever way, in my search for justice.
WHEREOF, I affix my signature, this 25th day of June, 1997, in Quezon City.
SGD. JUVIE-LYN Y. PUNONGBAYAN
JUVIE-LYN Y. PUNONGBAYAN
Assisted by:
SGD. REMEDIOS C. BALBIN
ATTY. REMEDIOS C. BALBIN
Private Prosecutor
In the presence of:
42
SGD. PABLO PUNONGBAYAN incorrect for oppositors Alonte and Concepcion to contend that the fear of the
PABLO PUNONGBAYAN petitioner, her private counsel and her witnesses are too generalized if not fabricated.
Father Indeed, the probability that in desisting from pursuing her complaint for rape,
petitioner, a minor, may have succumbed to some illicit influence and undue
SGD. JULIE Y. PUNONGBAYAN pressure. To prevent possible miscarriage of justice is good excuse to grant the
petition to transfer the venue of Criminal Case No. 9619-B from Biñan, Laguna to
JULIE Y. PUNONGBAYAN the City of Manila.
Mother
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition for Change of Venue from Biñan, Laguna to the
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 25 the day of June, 1997, in Quezon City of Manila is granted. The Executive Judge of RTC Manila is ordered to raffle
City. Crim. Case No. 9619-B to any of its branches. The judge to whom Crim. Case No.
9619-B shall be raffled shall resolve the petitioner's Motion to Resume Proceedings
SGD. ILLEGIBLE filed in Br. XXV of the RTC of Biñan, Laguna and determine the voluntariness and
Administering Officer validity of petitioner's desistance in light of the opposition of the public prosecutor,
RTC Branch 94 Asst. Chief State Prosecutor Leonardo Guiyab. The branch clerk of court of Br. XXV
Quezon City of the RTC of Biñan, Laguna is ordered to personally deliver to the Executive Judge
of Manila the complete records of Crim. Case No. 9619-B upon receipt of this
Obviously, the Motion to Resume Proceedings was intended to get the trial court's Resolution.
approval for the dismissal of the rape case against the petitioners.
On September 17, 1997, Criminal Case No. 9619-B (re-docketed by the Clerk of
Indeed, three days thereafter or on June 28, 1997, Atty. Ramon C. Casino moved in Court of Manila as Crim. Case No. 97-159955) was raffled to Br. 53 of the RTC of
behalf of the petitioners to dismiss the petition for change of venue then pending in Manila, presided by the respondent judge, the Honorable Maximo A. Savellano.
this Court citing the affidavit of desistance of the private complainant. On August 22,
1997, however, Asst. Chief State Prosecutor Guiyab opposed the motion. He alleged On October 9, 1997, the respondent judge issued warrants of arrest against the
that he has control of the prosecution of the rape case and that he was not aware of petitioners after a finding of probable cause.
the desistance of the private complainant.
On October 28, 1997, an Administrative Order of the DOJ was issued empowering
The legal maneuvers to dismiss the rape case against the petitioners on the basis of First Assistant City Prosecutor Marilyn R. O. Campomanes to prosecute the case at
the alleged affidavit of desistance of the private complainant did not find the favor of bar. Asst. Chief State Prosecutor Leonardo Guiab, Jr., who opposed the affidavit of
this Court. On September 2, 1997, this Court unanimously granted the petition for desistance was relieved from the case. The reason given in the Administrative Order
change of venue, ruling among others, viz: was ". . . in the interest of public service." Prosecutor Campomanes was authorized
"to move for its (case) dismissal if the evidence on record so warrant . . ."1
xxx xxx xxx
The arraignment of the petitioners took place on November 7, 1997. The State was
These affidavits give specific names, dates and methods being used to abort, by represented by Prosecutor Marilyn Campomanes. Petitioner Alonte was represented
coercion or corruption, the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 9619-B. It is thus by Atty. Jose Flaminiano and Atty. Sigfrid A. Fortun. Petitioner Concepcion was

43
represented by Atty. Ramon C. Casano. Atty. Remedios Balbin who had previously
exposed under oath the threats to the life of the private complainant and her witnesses
and the repeated attempts to buy complainant's desistance was absent.2
Petitioners pled not guilty to the charge of rape upon their arraignment.3 Pre-trial was
then waived by both the prosecution and the defense. The proceedings continued and
Prosecutor Campomanes presented the private complainant, Ms. Punongbayan who
testified on her affidavit of desistance. She declared that her desistance was her
"personal" decision with the consent of her parents.4 She said she was neither paid
nor pressured to desist. On questions by the respondent judge, however, she affirmed
the truth of her affidavit dated October 31, 1996 that she was raped by petitioner
Alonte. Prosecutor Campomanes marked and offered her affidavit of desistance as
Exhibit "A".5 She called on other witnesses to testify on the voluntariness of the
affidavit of desistance. The parents of the complainant — Pablo6 and
Julie7 Punongbayan — declared that they did not receive any monetary consideration
for the desistance of their minor daughter. Neither were they pressured to give their
consent to the desistance. Fourth Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Alberto Nofuente
averred that the affidavit of desistance was signed and sworn to before him in the
presence of the complainant's parents and private counsel, Atty. Balbin. He said he
explained the affidavit to them and that the complainant voluntarily signed the same.8
After their testimonies, Prosecutor Campomanes made the manifestation that "with
the presentation of our witnesses and the marking of our documents (sic) we are now
closing the case and that we are praying for the dismissal of the case.9 The respondent
judge ruled "the case is submitted for decision."10 Atty. Flaminiano orally prayed that
petitioner Alonte be granted bail and Prosecutor Campomanes offered no
objection. 11
On November 10, 1997, petitioner Alonte filed an Urgent Motion to Admit to
Bai1.12 In her Comment, Prosecutor Campomanes agreed and averred, viz.:13
xxx xxx xxx
1. That she received a copy of the Petition for Bail.
2. That on the hearing of the instant case on November 7, 1997, the
Prosecution presented its witnesses who vehemently signified their intention
not to further prosecute the case in Court and there being no other witnesses
to present, the undersigned is left with no alternative but to seek the dismissal
of the considering that without the testimony of said witnesses this case has
nothing to stand on in Court.
3. That for the aforestated reason, the People interposes no objection to the
granting of Bail and in fact justice and equity dictate that it joins the accused
in his prayer for the granting of bail in the amount of P150,000 (ONE
HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS).
4. That for the aforementioned bases, the People hereby manifests its position
that the case be immediately dismissed or at least the accused be granted bail
since the record proves that there is no more evidence to sustain the charge
against him such that the granting of bail is proper and in order.
5. That as a general rule, a hearing on the petition for bail is necessary to
prove that the guilt is not strong but in this particular case there is no need for
hearing since the prosecution cannot prove its case against the accused as it
has no other evidence or witnesses to be presented.
On November 17, 1997, petitioner Alonte, thru counsel, filed an Urgent Plea to
Resolve the Motion for Bail.14 On the same date, Prosecutor Campomanes
manifested that "she deems it proper and in accord with justice and fair play to join
the aforestated motion."15
On November 25, 1997, December 1, 1997, December 8, 1997 and December 10,
1997, petitioner Alonte filed a Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Motion early for
resolution of his petition for bail.16 In all these motions, Atty. Fortun, counsel of
petitioner Alonte, alleged that copy of the motion . . . could not be served in person
upon the private prosecutor" (Atty. Balbin) in light of the distance between their
offices.17 He relied on section 13, Rule 11 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure. The
motions were not resolved by the respondent judge.
44
On December 18, 1997, the respondent judge promulgated his Decision convicting
the petitioners and sentencing them to reclusion perpetua. On whether of the affidavit
of desistance can be a ground for dismissal of the rape case against the petitioners,
the respondent judge held:
The first issue to be determined and resolved is the "voluntariness and validity of
petitioner's desistance in the light of the opposition of the public prosecutor Asst.
Chief State Prosecutor Leonardo Guiab." (p. 7, SC Resolution En Banc, dated
September 2, 199/.7; [Rollo, p. 253]) It is appropriate to quote again a portion of the
7-page Resolution En Banc of the highest tribunal, to wit; "Indeed, the probability
(exists) that in desisting from pursuing her complaint for rape, petitioner, a minor,
may have succumbed to some illicit influence and undue pressure. To prevent
possible miscarriage of justice is a good excuse to grant the petition for change of
venue . . ." (Rollo, p. 202).
The Court shall narrate the facts leading to the desistance of the private complainant
which are embodied in the two (2) affidavits of her lawyer, Atty. Remedios C.
Balbin, with whom the private complainant lives at No. 5 Uranus St., Congressional
Avenue Subdivision, Quezon City. One affidavit is dated May 24 1997, (sic) while
March 26, 1997. The said affidavits are attached as exhibits to the aforementioned
Manifestation and Motion for the Resolution of Petition for Change of Venue filed by
the private complainant Juvie-Lyn Y. Punongbayan. Exh. "C", dated May 24, 1997,
(Rollo, pp. 216-219) is hereby quoted as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
It clearly appears in the abovequoted affidavit that repeated bribe offers from a
lawyer representing the accused Mayor Bayani Arthur Alonte in the total amount of
Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) were made to Atty. Balbin, allocated as follows:
(1) Five Million Pesos (5,000,000.00) for the private complainant Juvie-lyn Y.
Punongbayan; (2) Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00) for her (Atty. Balbin); and
(3) Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) for the mediator.
In the subsequent affidavit, dated March 26, 1997, executed by Atty. Remedios C.
Balbin (Exh. F, Rollo, pp. 224-225) she narrated in detail the continuing veiled
threats and the very tempting and escalating offer to increase the amount of the bribe
money offered to her and the private complainant after her first affidavit, by doubling
the first offer of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) to Twenty Million Pesos
(P20,000,000.00), in exchange for her client's desistance, but also accompanied with
veiled threats, if refused. Said affidavit is quoted, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
The Court underscores paragraphs (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), (i), (j), (k), and (l),
particularly paragraphs (i), (j) and specially paragraph (k) of the abovequoted
affidavit of Atty. Balbin which insinuates that the presiding Judge of the RTC Biñan,
Laguna, had already been bought, and that accused Alonte thru his numerous
emissaries, will also buy or bribe the "the next judge when the petition for change of
venue is finally granted." In view of this insinuation, the undersigned presiding Judge
is very careful in deciding this case, lest he be placed under suspicion that he is also
receiving blood money that continues to flow. The Court wants to have internal peace
— the peace which money cannot buy. Money is the root of all evil. The Holy Holy
Scriptures also remind judges and jurists: "You shall not act dishonestly in rendering
judgment. Show neither partiality to the weak nor deterrence to the mighty, but judge
your fellow men justly," (Leviticus 19:15). The Scriptures further say: "What does it
profit a man if he gains the whole world but suffers the loss of his soul?" (Mt. 16:26)
and "No one can serve two (2) masters. . . You cannot serve God and mammon." (Mt.
6:24, Luke 16:13). It is not out of place to quote the Holy Scriptures because the
Honorable Supreme Court has been doing so in its quest for truth and justice.
Thus, People vs. Garcia, 209 SCRA 164, 174, the highest tribunal, in ruling that the
flight of an accused is evidence of guilt on his part, quoted the old Testament, as
follows:
It was written in the literature of Old Testament several centuries ago that:
The wicked man fleeth though no man pursueth, but the righteous are as bold
as a lion.
(Proverbs, 28:1)
Subsequently, on June 25, 1997, the private complainant and her lawyer suddenly
somersaulted or changed their common positions or attitudes in the prosecution of
45
this case. Evidently, veiled threats and money had replaced the "spiritual
consideration" which earlier, to them were "more important than the material" to
quote Atty. Balbin in her first affidavit (Rollo, p. 217), and her reply to Atty. Dionisio
S. Daga that "all the money in the world will not make me change my position
against my client's executing a desistance, and that only Alonte's voluntary surrender,
plea of guilty to rape, conviction and the imposition of the corresponding penalty will
satisfy the ends of justice.
On June 26, 1997, the private complainant thru her counsel, Atty. Remedios C.
Balbin, filed a Motion to Resume Proceedings, dated June 25, 1997, (Rollo, pp. 238-
244) praying therein that the RTC, Biñan, Laguna, where this case was still pending,
vacate its Order to Suspend Hearings, to enable it to act on all incidents including
private Complainant's Affidavit of Desistance attached thereto. (Rollo, pp. 240-241)
which affidavit of desistance is quoted hereunder as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
This Court, as the trier of facts, is tasked by the highest tribunal to find out if the
private complainant, a minor "may have succumbed to some illicit influence and
undue pressure, in order to prevent a possible miscarriage of justice." Evidently, the
veiled threats and acceptance of the bribe money in allocated amounts which was
subsequently raised to the irresistible amount of at least P20,000,000.00, compelled,
impelled and/or tempted the private complainant her father Pablo Punongbayan and
her mother Julie Y. Punongbayan, and her lawyer and private prosecutor Atty.
Remedios C. Balbin, who did not appear in Court on November 7, 1997, despite
notice, to execute the said "Affidavit of Desistance" which was the ultimate goal of
the accused. It is very obvious that the private complainant a minor, "succumbed to
some illicit influence and undue pressure," to borrow the language of the Honorable
Supreme Court En Banc. It would be the height of extreme naivete or gullibility for
any normal individual to conclude otherwise. The Court does not believe that the
private complainant, her lawyer, and her parents charged but in exchange for a plea
of guilty the charge is reduced to homicide and the accused is allowed to claim a
number of mitigating circumstances. It is not uncommon for estafa, libel, physical
injuries and even homicide cases to be dismissed because the complainant has lost
interest or alleged that the complaint was filed as a result of a misunderstanding. A
number of examples can be given and they can fill a book."
Again, in People vs. Evangelista, L-45089, April 27, 1982, 113 SCRA 713, 720, the
Supreme Court further declared:
It may be noted that the crimes in question (forcible abduction with rape) are among
those enumerated in Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, which crimes cannot be
prosecuted de officio. In other words, the crimes of abduction and rape are in the
nature of private offense, inasmuch as the law has reposed "the right to institute such
proceedings exclusively and successively in the offended person, her parents,
grandparents or guardian" . . . Accordingly, if after filing the case at face at bar
decided that she was unable to face the scandal of public trial, or, if for some private
reason she preferred to suffer the outraged in silence, then, corollary to her right
institute the proceedings, she should have been allowed to withdraw her complaint
and desist from prosecuting the case(Emphasis supplied).
Petitioner Concepcion did not submit any motion for reconsideration. Without
waiting for the resolution of his motion for reconsideration, petitioner Alonte
repaired to this Court. So did petitioner Concepcion.
Without doubt, the petitions at bar raise two (2) fulcrum issues: (1) the correctness of
the ruling of the respondent judge that the desistance of the complainant is not a
ground to dismiss the rape charge against the petitioners, and (2) the invalidity of
petitioners' conviction on the ground of denial of due process.
I agree with the learned disquisition of Mr. Justice Vitug that we should set aside the
conviction of the petitioners for patent violation of their right to due process of law. I
write this Separate Opinion to highlight the erroneousness of the shocking stance of
the State Prosecutor that the rape charge should be dismissed in view of the
desistance of the private complainant. But our ruling giving no effect on the affidavit
of desistance should not based on the reason that it was procured by threat or
intimidation or any payment of money as the respondent judge opined in his
Decision. The respondent judge arrived at this conclusion on the basis of the
affidavits of Atty. Balbin, the counsel of the private complainant. This is erroneous
for Atty. Balbin was never called to the witness stand to testify on the truth of her
affidavits. Her affidavits therefore are hearsay evidence and should not have been
relied upon by the respondent judge. The affidavit of desistance cannot abort the rape
charge against the petitioners on the simple ground that it did not state that the private
46
complainant-affiant was not raped by petitioner Alonte. In truth, the private
complainant affirmed her earlier Reply-Affidavit where she narrated in detail how
petitioner Alonte raped her. Moreover, the rape charge has been filed in Court and it
is not anymore the absolute privilege of the camplainant to desist from continuing
with the case.
This separate opinion unequivocably addresses the issue of whether the desistance of
the victim can stop the further prosecution of the petitioners.
I
In Philippine jurisprudence, desistance has been equated with recantation or
retraction.
To "recant" means to "withdraw or repudiate formally and publicly;"18 "to renounce
or withdraw prior statement."19To "retract" means to "take back;" "to retract an offer
is to withdraw it before acceptance."20 A recantation usually applies to a complainant
or witness, either for the prosecution or the defense, who has previously given an
extra-judicial statement21 or testimony in court.22 Repudiation may be made in
writing, i.e., by sworn statement,23 or by testifying on the witness stand.24
Mere retraction by a witness or by complainant of his or her testimony does not
necessarily vitiate the original testimony or statement, if credible.25 The general rule
is that courts look with disfavor upon retractions of testimonies previously given in
court.26 This rule applies to crimes,27 offenses28 as well as to administrative
offenses.29 The reason is because affidavits of retraction can easily be secured from
poor and ignorant witnesses, usually through intimidation or for monetary
consideration.30 Moreover, there is always the probability that they will later be
repudiated31 and there would never be an end to criminal litigation.32 It would also be
a dangerous rule for courts to reject testimonies solemnly taken before courts of
justice simply because the witnesses who had given them later on changed their
minds for one reason or another. This would make solemn trials a mockery and place
the investigation of the truth at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses.33
The general rule notwithstanding, the affidavit should not be peremptorily dismissed
as a useless scrap of paper. There are instances when a recantation may create serious
doubts as to the guilt of the accused.34 A retracted statement or testimony must be
subject to scrupulous examination. The previous statement or testimony and the
subsequent one must be carefully compared and the circumstances under which each
was given and the reasons and motives for the change carefully scrutinized. The
veracity of each statement or testimony must be tested by the credibility of the
witness which is left for the judge to decide.35 In short, only where there exists
special circumstances in the case which when coupled with the retraction raise doubts
as to the truth of the testimony or statement given, can a retraction be considered and
upheld.36
A survey of our jurisprudence reveals that the same rule has been applied to
affidavits of desistance.37 An affidavit of desistance is understood to be a sworn
statement executed by a complainant in a criminal or administrative case that he or
she is discontinuing the action filed upon his or her complaint for whatever reason he
or she may cite. The court attaches no persuasive value to a desistance especially
when executed as an afterthought.38However, a in retractions, an affidavit of
desistance calls for a reexamination of the records of the case.39
In private crimes, an affidavit of desistance filed by a private complainant is also
frowned upon by the courts. Although such affidavit may deserve a second look at
the case, there is hardly an instance when this Court upheld it in private crimes and
dismissed the case on the sole basis thereof. Indeed, a case is not dismissed upon
mere affidavit of desistance of the complainant, particularly where there exist special
circumstances that raise doubts as to the reliability of the affidavit.40
Usually in private crimes, an affidavit of desistance is executed by the private
complainant after pardoning and forgiving the offender. In this instance, the court
treats the affidavit as an express pardon.41 It does not ipso factodismiss the case but
determines the timeliness and validity thereof.
Private crimes are crimes against chastity such as adultery and concubinage,
seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness. Their institution, prosecution
and extinction are governed by Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, viz:
47
Art. 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction,
rape and acts of lasciviousness. — The crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not
be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended spouse.
The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the
guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor in any case, if he shall have consented or
pardoned the offenders.
The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape, acts of lasciviousness, shall not be
prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents, grand
parents, or guardian, nor in any case, the offender has been expressly pardoned by the
above-named persons, as the case may be.
In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness and rape, the marriage of the
offender with the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or remit the
penalty already imposed upon him. The provisions of this paragraph shall also be
applicable to the co-principals, accomplices and accessories after the fact of the
above-mentioned crimes.
Private crimes cannot be prosecuted except upon complaint filed by the offended
party. In adultery and concubinage, the offended party must implead both the guilty
parties and must not have consented or pardoned the offenders. In seduction,
abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, the complaint must be filed by the
offended party or her parents, grandparents or guardian. The complainant must not
have expressly pardoned the offender.
Article 344 also provides for the extinction of criminal liability in private crimes. It
mentions two modes: pardon and marriage, which when validly and timely made,
result in the total extinction of criminal liability of the offender.42 The pardon in
private crimes must be made before the institution of the criminal action.43 In
adultery and concubinage, the pardon may be express or implied while in seduction,
abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, the pardon must be express. In all cases,
the pardon must come prior to the institution of the criminal action. After the case has
been filed in court, any pardon made by the private complainant, whether by sworn
statement or on the witness stand, cannot extinguish criminal liability. The only act
that extinguishes the penal action and the penalty that may have been imposed is the
marriage between the offender and the offended party.44
As this Court declared in the case of Donio-Teves v. Vamenta, Jr.:45
The term "private crimes" in reference to felonies which cannot be prosecuted except
upon complaint filed by the aggrieved party, is misleading. Far from what it implies,
it is not only the aggrieved party who is offended in such crimes but also the State.
Every violation of penal laws results in the disturbance of public order and safety
which the State is committed to uphold and protect. If the law imposes the condition
that private crimes like adultery shall not be prosecuted except upon complaint filed
by the offended party, it is, as herein pointed earlier "out of consideration for the
aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go
through the scandal of a public trial." Once a complaint is filed, the will of the
offended party is ascertained and the action proceeds just as in any other crime. This
is shown by the fact that after filing a complaint, any pardon given by the
complainant to the offender would be unavailing. It is true, the institution of the
action in so called the private crimes is at the option of the action of the aggrieved
party. But it is equally true that once the choice is made manifest, the law will be
applied in full force beyond the control of, and inspite of the complainant, his death
notwithstanding.
The filing of a complaint in private crimes is merely a condition precedent to the
exercise by the proper authorities of the power to prosecute the guilty parties.46 It is
the complaint that starts the prosecutory proceeding without which the fiscal and the
court cannot exercise jurisdiction over the case.47 Once the complaint is filed, the
action proceeds just as in any other crime.
We follow the postulate that a criminal offense is an outrage to the sovereign
state48 and the right of prosecution for a crime is one of the attributes of the sovereign
power.49 Thus, criminal actions are usually commenced by the State, through the
People of the Philippines, and the offended party is merely a complaining
witness.50 In private crimes, however, or those which cannot be prosecuted de oficio,
the offended party assumes a more predominant role since the right to commence the
action or refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his power and option.51 The
sovereign state deems it the wiser policy, in private crimes, to let the aggrieved party
48
and her family decide whether to expose to public view the vices, faults and
disgraceful acts occurring in the family.52 But once the offended party files the
complaint, her will is ascertained and the action proceeds just as in any other crime.
The decision of the complainant to undergo the scandal of a public trial necessarily
witness connotes the willingness to face the scandal.53 The private complainant is
deemed to have shed off her privacy and the crime ceases to be "private" and
becomes "public." The State, through the fiscal, takes over the prosecution of the case
and the victim's change of heart and mind will not affect the State's right to vindicate
the outrage against the violation of its law.54
This is the reason why pardon in crimes of chastity must come before the institution
of the criminal action. Pardon by the offended party extinguishes criminal liability
when made while the crime is still "private" and within the control of the offended
party. But once the case is filed in court, the pardon cannot ipso facto operate to
dismiss the case. After the institution of the criminal action, any pardon given by the
complainant to the offender would be unavailing,55 except of course when the
offender validly marries the offended party.56 The offended party's pardon of the
offender in a seduction case after the criminal action had been instituted constitutes
no bar to said action.57A pardon given in a rape case after the filing of the action in
court "comes too late to hide the shameful occurrence from public notice."58
Even the death of the offended party cannot extinguish the case once it is filed in
court.59 If the offended party dies immediately after filing the complaint but before
the institution of the criminal action, his death is not a ground to dismiss the
case.60 Clearly, the will and participation of the offended party is necessary only to
determine whether to file the complaint or not. Thereafter, the will of the State
prevails.
Article 344 does not include desistance of the offended party from prosecuting the
case as a ground for extinction of criminal liability whether total61 or partial.62 Hence,
only when the desistance is grounded on forgiveness and pardon and is made before
the institution of the criminal action, can it extinguish criminal liability.
Desistance, per se, is not equivalent to pardon.
In the case at bar, the "Affidavit of Desistance" of Juvielyn is not an express pardon
of the accused and the crime committed. Private complainant desisted from
prosecuting the case against the petitioners because she wished "to start life anew and
live normally again." She reiterated this reason on the witness stand. She complained
that members of the media were bothering and harassing her and that she wanted to
go back to her normal life. She never said that she forgave the petitioners. She did not
absolve them from their culpability. She did not give any exculpatory fact that would
raise doubts about her rape. She did not say that she consented to petitioner Alonte's
acts. Moreover, the rape case is already in court and it is no longer her right to decide
whether or not the charge should be continued. As we held in Crespo v. Mogul:63
xxx xxx xxx
The rule in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in court
any disposition of the case as to its dismissal or conviction or acquittal of the accused
rests in the sound discretion of the court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and
control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in court he
cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The court is the best and sole judge on
what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its
exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the
fiscal should be addressed to the court who has the option to grant or deny the same.
It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that
the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of
Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.
II
The next issue is the validity of the conviction of petitioners. Petitioners contend that
they were convicted without undergoing any trial. Respondent judge insists
otherwise. He claims that petitioners submitted the case on the merits and relied
principally on the Affidavit of Desistance. He recounts the events that took place
before the presentation of private complainant as revealed by the transcripts of
November 7, 1997, viz:
Prosecutor Campomanes
Your Honor, the complaining witness/private complainant Juvielyn
Punongbayan is present here in Court, and a while ago, I was given a copy of
49
her Affidavit of Desistance so I would like to present her in order to attest to
the veracity of her Affidavit of Desistance, your Honor, and for the Court to
her testimony.
Court
We will have a separate trial, this involved a heinous offense and that there is
not even any plea-bargaining in this case.
Prosecutor Campomanes
Yes, your Honor, I understand that.
Court
So you have to mark now your documentary evidence in preparation for trial.
Prosecutor Campomanes
Yes, your Honor.
Court
There are many documentary evidence mentioned by the Supreme Court in
its seven (7) page . . . (may I see the record) seven(7) page resolution, dated
September 2, 1997, and that this case was assigned to this Court as the trial
Judge. This Court has already arraigned the accused and he pleaded not
guilty, and so the next step is pre-trial. The Order of the Supreme Court is to
direct this Court not only to determine the voluntariness but also the validity
of the Affidavit of Desistance mentioned by the Court which was also
brought to the attention of the Supreme Court.
Prosecutor Campomanes
And to the Department of Justice likewise your Honor.
Court
And that's why the Supreme Court instead of resolving it sent the records to
this Court to determine the voluntariness and the validity of the Desistance,
but they must be determined after trial on the merits.
Prosecutor Campomanes
Your Honor please, representing the people. Its events now will prove that
there is no more need for the prosecution to go on trial of this case,
considering that the private complainant herself had already furnished the
Department of Justice a copy of her Affidavit of Desistance.
Court
What does it say there?
Prosecutor Campomanes
That she is no longer interested in further prosecuting this case, and that she
is now desisting in going to full blown trial, and considering your Honor
further, that this is a private offense, then, the Department of Justice feels
that it can not be more popish than the Pope.
Court
That is the stand of the Department of Justice. But the Supreme Court
belongs to a different Department, I am governed by the Supreme Court,
because I am a Judge, I am not from the Department of Justice.
Prosecutor Campomanes
We are all aware your Honor, that we will just be prolonging the agony, in
fairness to everybody, considering that we are representing the people, but
we are not representing only . . . the Department of Justice is not only
50
representing the complainant in this case but we are also for justice to be Court
rendered to the respondent as well.
So, we will go to a trial on the merits you present that affidavit, that's a part
Court of your evidence.

I am rendering fair justice to everyone. That is the sense of this Court. That is Prosecutor Campomanes
the perception of this Court with respect to the Supreme Court resolution, in
the first place, that Affidavit does not negate the commission of the crime. The people is ready to present that . . . the complaining witness.
You want us to dismiss this case when the Affidavit does not negate the
commission of the crime? Court

Prosecutor Campomanes We will have a trial on the merits.

That's why we will be presenting her in Open Court, your Honor. Prosecutor Campomanes

Court Your Honor please, being a woman, I have extensively discussed this matter
with the complaining witness and she intimated to this representation that she
Just to affirm that? can not bear another day of coming here, with all these people staring at her
with everybody looking at her as if she is something . . . .
Prosecutor Campomanes
Court
No to prove . . .
On December 13, 1996, petitioner Punongbayan through private counsel,
Court Atty. Remedios C. Balbin and the Assistant State Prosecutor Guiab, Jr. who
is not here both were relieved and changed with a new lady prosecutor,
What happened . . . how about the Prosecution Department, they have control prayed that the case be tried by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, they cited
of the prosecution, and the offended party herself, has not negated the the following grounds: "THE GREAT DANGER TO THE LIVES OF BOTH
commission of the crime, is there anything there to show that she did not . . . PRIVATE COMPLAINANT AND THE IMMEDIATE MEMBERS OF
that the accused . . . did not commit the crime charged? HER FAMILY AND THEIR WITNESSES AS THEY OPENLY
IDENTIFIED THE PRINCIPAL ACCUSED MAYOR ALONTE WHO IS
Prosecutor Campomanes ACKNOWLEDGED AS A POWERFUL POLITICAL FIGURE AND
ALMOST AN INSTITUTION IN BIÑAN LAGUNA AND [THE] GREAT
That's why we will be presenting her in Open Court, whatever is not here will DANGERS TO THE LIVES OF WITNESSES WHO OTHERWISE WISH
be clarified. TO COME OUT IN THE OPEN AND TESTIFY ON THE MORAL AND
CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES OF BOTH ACCUSED PERPETRATED UPON
VERY YOUNG GIRLS STUDENTS OF BIÑAN LAGUNA THAT WILL

51
NOT DO SO IN THE TERMS OF THE ACCUSED MAYOR" that is why it
was the prayer of the offended party and the Supreme Court granted the
Motion for Change of Venue, and we are now on a new venue, where the
danger to the lives of the witness is no longer present, on January 7, 1997,
Alonte filed an Opposition thereto, and on April 23, 1997, the petitioner, the
offended party through the Honorable Secretary of Justice Teofisto Guingona
and Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuno filed a Manifestation and Motion
for Resolution of the Petition For Change of Venue. Attached to the motion
of the Honorable Secretary of Justice Guingona and Chief State Prosecutor
Jovencito Zuno were the affidavits of the petitioner, her lawyer, Atty.
Remedios Balbin, Dolores Yambao, Bienvenido Salandanan and Evelyn
Celso with their contention that the prosecution witnesses and the private
counsel of petitioner are exposed to kidnapping, harassment, grave threats
and tempting offers of bribe money, that was the stand of your department . .
. And then later on June 28, 1997 . . . we have to review this case because
this involves public interest . . . on June 23, 1997, Atty. Casano in behalf of
the oppositors, two (2) oppositors, filed a motion to dismiss the petition for
change of venue in the Supreme Court on the ground that it has become
moot, he alleges that the petitioner despite the motion to resume the
proceedings in criminal case no. 96-19-B in said motion, the petitioner
informed the Court that she is desisting . . . informed the Supreme Court that
she is desisting from proceeding with the case, it is the same affidavit she
prayed that the trial Court, on her affidavit of desistance . . . Atty. Casano
also submitted to this Court, to the Supreme Court the manifestation of the
petitioner joining the oppositors' prayer to dismiss her petition to a change of
venue, the manifestation was also signed by Atty. Remedios Balbin as
private prosecutor, the Supreme Court required Assistant Chief State
Prosecutor Leonardo Guiab to comment on the motion to dismiss filed by
Atty. Casano which involve the same affidavit that you have just read. On
August 22, 1997, assistant Chief State Prosecutor Guiab filed his comment,
he alleged that he is not aware of the desistance of the petitioner in criminal
case no. 96-19-B, and in said desistance there is two (2) legal effect, [that]
the public prosecutor has the control and direction of the prosecution in
criminal action, he prayed for the denial of the Motion to Dismiss and
reiterated his petition for change of venue, the Supreme Court granted the
change of venue and in granting the change of venue the highest tribunal
which we are all subordinates, says: for the record, in their manifestation and
motion for the resolution of petition to a change of venue the Secretary of
Justice and Chief State Prosecutor submitted various affidavits in support of
their allegations that prosecution witnesses and private legal counsel are
exposed to KIDNAPPING, HARASSMENT, GRAVE THREATS, AND
TEMPTING OFFERS OF BRIBE MONEY all intended to extract an
affidavit of desistance from the complainant, this is now the affidavit of
desistance in her affidavit dated December 16, 1996, the petitioner the
offended party, the herein offended party Juvielyn Punongbayan alleged etc .
. . etc . . . in support of her petition and then she alleged that during the last
week of Feb. 1997, she was visited by one Lourdes Salaysay, she stated that
Mrs. Salaysay told her that Mrs. Alonte, wife of Mayor Alonte requested her
to settle Alonte's case, she was informed that Mrs. Alonte was offering
P10,000,000.00, will send her to school and give her house and send her
parents abroad, Atty. Remedios C. Balbin is not here now, I am just quoting
the Supreme Court counsel, private counsel of petitioner also executed an
affidavit dated February 1997, quote: the Supreme Court quote to them: to
put on record the attempting, influence, directly, in exchange of valuable
consideration, that the Rape charge against Mayor Bayani Arthur Alone, she
alleged that in two (2) occasions Atty. Romero conveyed to me the message
of Mayor Alonte, namely: to drop the rape case against him and that he
would give a consideration of P10,000,000.00 to be apportioned as follows:
P5,000.00, for the private complainant, your client and the prosecutor
P3,000,000.00 for me, as private prosecutor, that is what Atty. Balbin said,
P4,000,000.00 for her, the mediator, so there seems to be a liberal flow of
blood money, that is why the Supreme Court ordered the Court to determine
the validity, and there is another, dated March 19, 1997. I have to remind
everybody about what happened, this thing did not come from me, I am not
fabricating anything this comes from the highest tribunal jurat, to whom I am
responsible another affidavit of Atty. Balbin, she narrated the continuing
attempts to bribe her and threatened her, so there were continuing events,
they alleged, the People's Bureau, Office of the Mayor of Quezon City,
extensively discuss the squatting case with against his client, that after a brief
exchange on the status of the case, they confided to me his real purpose, that
it started of by saying he was the legal counsel of the gambling lords of
Malabon for which he get a monthly retainer of P15,000.00 exclusive of
52
transportation expenses, but he also stated that he knows all the network of
the gambling lord throughout the country, which is quite strong and unified,
that I then ask him "what do you mean?" "Is Alonte into gambling too, that
he is part of the network you speak of?", that Atty. Daga did not reply, but
instead said, they are prepared to double the offer made to by Atty. Romero
which was published in the newspaper at P10,000,000.00, so, its double,
double your money, so its P20,000,000.00, that I told him, its Atty. Balbin,
that all the money in the world, all the money in the world will not make me
change my position against my client executing a desistance and that Alonte's
voluntary surrender plea of guilty to rape, conviction, and the imposition of
the corresponding penalty will satisfy the ends of justice, but I told him, that
my client's case is not isolated, there being five (5) other miners similarly
place and Alonte's will be stopped from doing more harm that Atty. Daga,
then told me in Filipino if you do not accede to a desistance, then they will be
force to but because he did not [complete] the sentence I asked him directly,
what do you mean, what do you intend to do, and he replied, go on with the
case, [buy] the judge, [buy] the judge, that I am believing, and I reacted
saying, but they have already done so, Judge Francisco Binan, Judge
Francisco Binan suddenly change his attitude towards the prosecution,
perhaps you are referring to the next judge when the petition for change of
venue is finally granted that Atty. Daga did not reply, and he reiterated that
his principal referring to them again as gambling lords, wanted desistance,
after which he excused himself and left, that I execute this affidavit, as Atty.
Balbin attests to the truth of the incident with Atty. Dionisio Daga which
occurred in the afternoon of March 6, 1997 at my office, stating . . . (JUDGE
READING THE RECORDS OF THE CASE)
Court
Then, the Supreme Court said, these affidavits, the one attached gave specific
names, dates and methods . . . a coercion of corruption, the prosecution of
Criminal Case No. 96-19-B (JUDGE CONTINUED READING THE
RECORDS OF THE CASE) that is desisting for pursuing her complaint for
Rape petitioner a minor, they have . . . illicit, influence and due pressure to
prevent . . . Criminal Case No. 96-19-B to any of its Branch, just to call the
Criminal Case No. 96-19-B shall be raffled, shall result the petitioner's
motion, to resume proceedings filed in Branch 26 in the RTC of Laguna, to
determine the voluntariness and validity of the petitioner's desistance in the
light of the position of the public prosecutor, Assistant Chief Prosecutor
Leonardo Guiab . . . I don't know what will be the outcome . . . you may
contend that because of that affidavit of the desistance there is reasonable
doubt . . .
etc . . . but still, that will be placing the cart before the horse . . . you have to
go a regular trial on the merits . . . because this is a heinous offense which
cannot . . . and during the pre-trial cannot be subject to a plea-bargaining, and
with respect to its new law which took effect in 1993, that is a new one, it
was placed to the category of a heinous offense . . .
Prosecutor Campomanes
So we go on trial your Honor, and we will present the complaining witness,
and let the Court decide on the basis of the complainants testimony . . .
private complainant's testimony, before this Honorable Court . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Prosecutor Campomanes
That's why we are presenting the private complainant, the principal witness,
the mother who is also a signatory to this affidavit of desistance, everybody
who have been a part and participant in the making and preparation of this
affidavit of desistance, they have already signed these affidavit of desistance.
Court
And we also have the affidavits mentioned by the Supreme Court, because I
was . . . all of those documents in the determination of whether that affidavit
is valid.
Prosecutor Campomanes
53
 Yes, your Honor.
Court
We . . . the Court cannot close his eyes to the other affidavits . . . because . . .
that's why precisely the Supreme Court ordered me to hear this case.
Prosecutor Campomanes
We understand that your Honor.
Court
There are may conflicting matters to be solve . . . conflicting matters to be
tackled in this case.
Prosecutor Campomanes
May we present the private complainant, your Honor . . . .64
The records show that the hearing of November 7, 1997 was set for arraignment of
the petitioners. 65 After the counsels made their respective appearances, Prosecutor
Campomanes presented her authority to appear as prosecutor in lieu of Asst. Chief
State Prosecutor Guiyab, Jr. Both petitioners pleaded not guilty to the charge.
Respondent judge then set the case for pretrial which the parties, however, waived.
The proceedings continued and Prosecutor Campomanes manifested there was no
need for the prosecution to go to trial in view of the Affidavit of Desistance of the
private complainant. Respondent judge, however, observed that private complainant
did not negate the commission of the crime in her Affidavit of Desistance.
Respondent judge expressed his misgivings on the validity of the Affidavit of
Desistance because of the September 2, 1997 Resolution of this Court citing
affidavits where allegations of bribery were made to extract said affidavit from
complainant. Prosecutor Campomanes then offered to present the private
complainant to attest to the voluntariness and veracity of her Affidavit of Desistance.
Respondent judge averred whether the court should proceed to a trial on the merits.
Prosecutor Campomanes declared that they could go on trial and let the court decide
the merits of the case on the basis of the testimony of private complainant and the
other witnesses. It was then that private complainant was presented as a witness.
From the garbled transcripts of the hearing on November 7, 1997, it is not clear what
both respondent judge and the public prosecutor intended the proceedings to be.
Respondent judge repeatedly declared that the proceedings before him was to be a
trial on the merits. The public prosecutor agreed to go to trial, but at the same time
moved to present private complainant and her witnesses to testify on the
voluntariness of her Affidavit of Desistance. Respondent judge and the public
prosecutor were, obviously, not tuned in to each other.
I agree with the majority that the November 7, 1997 proceedings could not have been
a trial on the merits. First of all, the proceedings did not conform with the procedure
for trial as provided in the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Section 3 of Rule 119
provides:
Sec. 3. Order of Trial. — The trial shall proceed in the following order:
(a) The prosecution shall present evidence to prove the charge and, in the
proper case, the civil liability.1âwphi1
(b) The accused may present evidence to prove his defense, and damages, if
any, arising from the issuance of any provisional remedy in the case.
(c) The parties may then respectively present rebutting evidence only, unless
the court, in furtherance of justice, permits them present additional evidence
bearing upon the main issue.
(d) Upon admission of the evidence, the case shall be deemed submitted for
decision unless the court directs the parties to argue orally or to submit
memoranda.
(e) However, when the accused admits the act charged or omission charged
in the complaint or information but interposes lawful defense, the order of
trial may be modified accordingly.
54
In the case at bar, petitioners were never instructed to present evidence to prove their
defenses. The parties were never given the opportunity to present their respective
evidence rebutting the testimony of private complainant. There was no admission by
petitioners of the charge in the information as to justify a change in the order of
trial. 66
Our criminal rules of procedure strictly provide the step by step procedure to be
followed by courts in cases punishable by death. 67 This rule also applies to all other
criminal cases, particularly where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua. The
reason for this is to assure that the State makes no mistake in taking life and liberty
except that of the guilty. 68 Thus:
process and all the other rights of an accused under the Bill of Rights and our Rules
in Criminal Procedure.
Indeed, following respondent judge's finding and assuming that the November 7,
1997 hearing was already a trial on the merits, petitioners were never afforded their
right to confront and cross-examine the witness. The court did not, at the very least,
inquire as to whether the petitioners wanted to cross-examine private complainant
with respect to her affidavit of October 21, 1996. No opportunity to cross-examine
was afforded petitioners and their counsels such that they cannot be deemed to have
waived said right by inaction. 75

Judges should be reminded that each step in the trial process serves a specific
purpose. In the trial of criminal cases, the constitutional presumption of innocence in
favor of the accused requires that an accused be given sufficient opportunity to
present his defense. So with the prosecution as to its evidence.

Hence, any deviation from the regular course of trial should always take into
consideration the rights of all the parties to the case, whether the prosecution or
defense. 69

Second, the admission of private complainant's affidavit of October 21, 1996 was
made solely in response to respondent judge's own questioning. 70 It was this affidavit
which respondent judge used to convict the petitioners. This affidavit, however, was
not marked nor was it formally offered before the court. The Revised rules on
Evidence clearly and expressly provide that "[t]he court shall consider no evidence
which has not been formally offered." 71Evidence not formally offered in court will
not be taken into consideration by the court in disposing of the issues of the case.
Any evidence which a party desires to submit for the consideration of the court must
formally be offered by him, 72 otherwise it is excluded and rejected.73

Third, where there is a doubt as to the nature of the criminal proceedings before the
court, this doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused who must be given the
widest latitude of action to prove his innocence. 74 It is in petitioners' favor that the
proceedings of November 7, 1997 be treated as a hearing on the motion to dismiss,
not a trial on the merits. To rule otherwise will effectively deny petitioners due

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