G.R. No.

100113 September 3, 1991

RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,

vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and
HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and
Management, respondents.

PARAS, J.:

Facts: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not
posses required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. The
1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections composed
of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the
time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not
have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a
majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Issue: Whether the respondent does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.

Held: In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The practice of law is not limited
to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers
incident to actions and special proceeding, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf
of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all
action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services, contemplating an appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law
practice. Practice of law means any activity, in or out court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience.

The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty. Monsod’s past work experience as a lawyer-
economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and
a lawyer-legislator of both rich and the poor – verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement
for the position of COMELEC chairman, The respondent has been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years does In the view of the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.
G.R. No. L-12426 February 16, 1959

PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION, petitioner,

vs.
CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office, respondent.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

FACTS:

On may 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled an
examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the
Philippines Patent Office. According to the circular, members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and other
persons with sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified to take the said examination.

The petitioner contends that one who has passed the bar examination sand is licensed by the Supreme
Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in good standing is duly qualified to practice before
the Philippines Patent Office and that the respondent Director’s holding an examination for the purpose
is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law.

The respondent, in reply, maintains the prosecution of patent cases “ does not involve entirely or purely
the practice of law but includes the application of scientific and technical knowledge and training as a
matter of actual practice so as to include engineers and other individuals who passed the examination
can practice before the Patent office. Furthermore, he stressed that for the long time he is holding tests,
this is the first time that his right has been questioned formally.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appearance before the patent Office and the preparation and the prosecution of
patent application, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of law.

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that the practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the
representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications
for patent, their opposition thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. Moreover, the
practice before the patent Office involves the interpretation and application of other laws and legal
principles, as well as the existence of facts to be established in accordance with the law of evidence and
procedure. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court but also
embraces all other matters connected with the law and any work involving the determination by the
legal mind of the legal effects of facts and conditions. Furthermore, the law provides that any party may
appeal to the Supreme Court from any final order or decision of the director. Thus, if the transactions of
business in the Patent Office involved exclusively or mostly technical and scientific knowledge and
training, then logically, the appeal should be taken not to a court or judicial body, but rather to a board
of scientists, engineers or technical men, which is not the case.
January 9, 1973

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.

R E S O L U T I O N 49 SCRA 22

PER CURIAM:

FACTS:

Republic Act. No. 6397 entitled “An Act Providing for the Integration of the Philippine Bar and
Appropriating Funds Therefore” was passed in September 1971, ordaining “Within two years from the
approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the
Philippine Bar.” The Supreme Court formed a Commission on Bar Integration and in December 1972, the
Commission earnestly recommended the integration of the bar. The Court accepted all comments on
the proposed integration.

ISSUES:

1. Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine bar?

2. Would the integration of the bar be constitutional?

3. Should the Court ordain the integration of the bar at this time?

RULING:

In ruling on the issues raised, the Court first adopted the definition given by the Commission to
“integration” in this wise: “Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire
lawyer population of the Philippines. This requires membership and financial support (in reasonable
amount) of every attorney as conditions sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his
name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.” The term “Bar” refers to the collectivity of all
persons whose names appear in the Roll of Attorneys. An Integrated Bar (or unified Bar) perforce must
include all lawyers.

Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an entity with power to do so; the State. Bar
integration therefore, signifies the setting up by government authority of a national organization of the
legal profession based on the recognition of the lawyer as an officer of the court.

Designed to improve the positions of the Bar as an instrumentality of justice and the rule of law,
integration fosters cohesion among lawyers, and ensures, through their own organized action and
participation, the promotion of the objectives of the legal profession, pursuant to the principle of
maximum Bar autonomy with minimum supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court.

On the first issue, the Court held that it may integrate the Bar in the exercise of its power “to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the
practice of law.” Indeed, the power to integrate is an inherent part of the Court’s constitutional
authority over the Bar.
The second issue hinges on the following constitutional rights: freedom of association and of speech, as
well as the nature of the dues exacted from the lawyer, i.e., whether or not the Court thus levies a tax.
The Court held:

1. Integration is not violative of freedom of association because it does not compel a lawyer to
become a member of any group of which he is not already a member. All that it does is “to
provide an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive
group of which every lawyer is already a member.” The lawyer too is not compelled to attend
meetings, participate of activities, etc. The only compulsion is the payment of annual dues.
Assuming, however, that it does compel a lawyer to be a member of an integrated bar, the court
held that “such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the state”

2. Integration is also not violative of the freedom of speech just because dues paid b the lawyer
may be used for projects or programs, which the lawyer opposes. To rule otherwise would make
every government exaction a “free speech issue.” Furthermore, the lawyer is free to voice out
his objections to positions taken by the integrated bar.

3. The dues exacted from lawyers is not in the nature of a levy but is purely for purposes of
regulation.

As to the third issue, the Court believes in the timeliness of the integration. Survey showed an
overwhelming majority of lawyers who favored integration.
Resolution March 18, 1954

In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1953;
ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners.

DIOKNO, J.:

Facts:

In the manner of the petitions for Admission to the Bar of unsuccessful candidates of 1946 to 1953;
Albino Cunanan et. al petitioners.

In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and concern as R.A. 972
popularly known as the “Bar Flunkers’ Act of 1953.” Generally a candidate is deemed passed if he
obtains a general ave of 75% in all subjects w/o falling below 50% in any subject, although for the past
few exams the passing grades were changed depending on the strictness of the correcting of the bar
examinations (1946- 72%, 1947- 69%, 1948- 70% 1949-74%, 1950-1953 – 75%).

Believing themselves to be fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by the S.C.,
and feeling that they have been discriminated against, unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages
of a few percentages lower than those admitted to the bar went to congress for, and secured in 1951
Senate Bill no. 12, but was vetoed by the president after he was given advise adverse to it. Not
overriding the veto, the senate then approved senate bill no. 372 embodying substantially the provisions
of the vetoed bill. The bill then became law on June 21, 1953

Republic Act 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar those candidates who
suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparations. By and large, the law is
contrary to public interest since it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who had inadequate preparation for the
practice of law profession, as evidenced by their failure in the exams.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Due to the far reaching effects that this law would have on the legal profession and the administration
of justice, the S.C. would seek to know if it is CONSTITUTIONAL.
 An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the practice of the law that should be
developed constantly and maintained firmly.
 The Judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of admitting, suspending, disbarring,
and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial.
 The Constitution, has not conferred on Congress and the S.C. equal responsibilities concerning the
admission to the practice of law. The primary power and responsibility which the constitution recognizes
continue to reside in this court.
 Its retroactivity is invalid in such a way, that what the law seeks to “cure” are not the rules set in place
by the S.C. but the lack of will or the defect in judgment of the court, and this power is not included in
the power granted by the Const. to Congress, it lies exclusively w/in the judiciary.
 Reasons for Unconstitutionality:
1. There was a manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court.
2. It is in effect a judgment revoking the resolution of the court, and only the S.C. may revise or alter
them, in attempting to do so R.A. 972 violated the Constitution.
3. That congress has exceeded its power to repeal, alter, and supplement the rules on admission to the
bar (since the rules made by congress must elevate the profession, and those rules promulgated are
considered the bare minimum.)
4. It is a class legislation
5. Art. 2 of R.A. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the constitution enjoins,
and being inseparable from the provisions of art. 1, the entire law is void.
HELD:

Under the authority of the court:

1. That the portion of art. 1 of R.A. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952 and all of art. 2 of
the said law are unconstitutional and therefore void and w/o force and effect.
2. The part of ART 1 that refers to the examinations subsequent to the approval of the law (1953- 1955)
is valid and shall continue in force. (those petitions by the candidates who failed the bar from 1946 to
1952 are denied, and all the candidates who in the examination of 1953 obtained a GEN Ave. of 71.5%
w/o getting a grade of below 50% in any subject are considered as having passed whether they have
filed petitions for admissions or not.)

VERSION 2

Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952. The title of the law
was, “An Act to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from 1946 up to and including 1955.”

Section 1 provided the following passing marks:

1946-1951………………70%

1952 …………………….71%

1953……………………..72%

1954……………………..73%

1955……………………..74%

Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower than 50%.

Section 2 of the Act provided that “A bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75% in any subject shall be
deemed to have already passed that subject and the grade/grades shall be included in the computation
of the general average in subsequent bar examinations.”

ISSUE:

Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.

RULING:

Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not being embraced in the title of the
Act. As per its title, the Act should affect only the bar flunkers of 1946 to 1955 Bar
examinations. Section2 establishes a permanent system for an indefinite time. It was also struck down
for allowing partial passing, thus failing to take account of the fact that laws and jurisprudence are not
stationary.

As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared unconstitutional, while that for 1953 to 1955
was declared in force and effect. The portion that was stricken down was based under the following
reasons:

1. The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who flunked the bar from 1946 to 1952
had inadequate preparation due to the fact that this was very close to the end of World War II;

2. The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the court on the petitions of the said
candidates;

3. The law is an encroachment on the Court’s primary prerogative to determine who may be
admitted to practice of law and, therefore, in excess of legislative power to repeal, alter and
supplement the Rules of Court. The rules laid down by Congress under this power are only
minimum norms, not designed to substitute the judgment of the court on who can practice law;
and

4. The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to class legislation.

As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court could not muster enough votes to declare it
void. Moreover, the law was passed in 1952, to take effect in 1953. Hence, it will not revoke existing
Supreme Court resolutions denying admission to the bar of an petitioner. The same may also rationally
fall within the power to Congress to alter, supplement or modify rules of admission to the practice of
law.
A.C. 1928 December 19, 1980

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILLION (IBP
Administrative Case No. MDD-1), petitioner,

FERNANDO, C.J.:

FACTS: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing Attorneyin the Philippines. The
IBP Board of Governors recommended to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from
its Roll of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues assailing the provisions of the Rule
of Court 139-A and the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the
organization of IBP, payment of membership fee and suspension for failure to pay the same.

Edillon contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense
that he is being compelled as a pre-condition to maintain his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a
member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled
financial support of the said organization to which he is admitted personally antagonistic, he is being
deprived of the rights to liberty and properly guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the
respondent concludes the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no
legal force and effect.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court may compel Atty. Edillion to pay his membership fee to the IBP.

HELD: The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must be a member of as
distinguished from bar associations in which membership is merely optional and voluntary. All
lawyers are subject to comply with the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar including payment
a reasonable annual fees as one of the requirements. The Rules of Court only compels him to pay his
annual dues and it is not in violation of his constitutional freedom to associate. Bar integration does not
compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not the meeting of his Integrated
Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its election as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is
subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court in order to further the State’s legitimate
interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require thet the cost of the regulatory
program – the lawyers.

Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. The right to practice law
before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And if the
power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize then a penalty designed to enforce its
payment is not void as unreasonable as arbitrary. Furthermore, the Court has jurisdiction over matters
of admission, suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation as part of its
inherent judicial functions and responsibilities thus the court may compel all members of the Integrated
Bar to pay their annual dues.
THIRD DIVISION

[ CBD Case No. 176, January 20, 1995 ]

SALLY D. BONGALONTA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. PABLITO M. CASTILLO AND ALFONSO M. MARTIJA,
RESPONDENTS.

RESOLUTION

MELO, J.:

Facts:

In a sworn letter-complaint dated February 15, 1995, addressed to the Commission on Bar Discipline,
National Grievance Investigation Office, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, complainant Sally Bongalonta
charged Pablito M. Castillo and Alfonso M. Martija, members of the Philippine Bar, with unjust and
unethical conduct, to wit: representing conflicting interests and abetting a scheme to frustrate the
execution or satisfaction of a judgment which complainant might obtain. The letter-complaint stated
that complainant filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, for estafa, against the Sps. Luisa and
Solomer Abuel. She also filed, a separate civil action, where she was able to obtain a writ of preliminary
attachment and by virtue thereof, a piece of real property situated in Pasig, Rizal and registered in the
name of the Sps. Abuel. Atty. Pablito Castillo was the counsel of the Sps. Abuel in the aforesaid criminal
and civil cases.

During the pendency of these cases, one Gregorio Lantin filed a civil case for collection of a sum of
money based on a promissory note, also with the Pasig Regional Trial Court, against the Sps. Abuel. In
the said case Gregorio Lantin was represented by Atty. Alfonso Martija. In this case, the Sps. Abuel were
declared in default for their failure to file the necessary responsive pleading andevidence ex-parte was
received against them followed by a judgment by defaultrendered in favor of Gregorio Lantin. A writ of
execution was, in due time, issued and the same property previously attached by complainant was
levied upon. It is further alleged that in all the pleadings filed in these three (3) aforementioned cases,
Atty. Pablito Castillo and Atty. Alfonso Martija placed the same address, the same PTR and the same IBP
receipt number. Thus, complainant concluded that the civil case filed by Gregorio Lantin was merely a
part of the scheme of the Sps. Abuel to frustrate the satisfaction of themoney judgment which
complainant might obtain in the civil case he filed.

After hearing, the IBP Board of Governors issued it Resolution with the followingfindings and
recommendations:Among the several documentary exhibits submitted by Bongalonta and attachedto
the records is a xerox copy of TCT No. 38374, which Bongalonta and the respondents admitted to be a
faithful reproduction of the original. And it clearly appears under the Memorandum of Encumbrances on
aid TCT that the Notice of Levy in favor of Bongalonta and her husband was registered and annotated in
said title of February 7, 1989, whereas, that in favor of Gregorio Lantin, on October 18, 1989. Needless
to state, the notice of levy in favor of Bongalonta and her husband is a superior lien on the said
registered property of the Abuel spouses over that of Gregorio Lantin.

Consequently, the charge against the two respondents (i.e. representing conflicting interests and
abetting a scheme to frustrate the execution or satisfaction of a judgment which Bongalonta and her
husband might obtain against the Abuel spouses) has no leg to stand on. However, as to the fact that
indeed the two respondents placed in their appearances and in their pleadings the same IBP No.,
respondent Atty. Pablito M. Castillo deserves to be SUSPENDED for using, apparently thru his
negligence, the IBP official receipt number of respondent Atty. Alfonso M. Martija. The explanation of
Atty. Castillo's Cashier-Secretary by the name of Ester Fraginal who alleged in her affidavit dated March
4, 1993, that it was all her fault in placing the IBP official receipt number pertaining to Atty. Alfonso
M. Martija in the appearance and pleadings Atty. Castillo and in failing to pay in due time the IBP
membership dues of her employer, deserves scant consideration, for it is the bounded duty and
obligation of every lawyer to see toit that he pays his IBP membership dues on time, especially when he
practices before the courts, as required by the Supreme Court. WHEREFORE, it is respectfully
recommended that Atty. Pablito M. Castillo be SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six
(6) months for using the IBP Official Receipt No. of his co-respondent Atty. Alfonso M. Martija.The
complaint against Atty. Martija is hereby DISMISSED for lack of evidence.

Held:

The Court agrees with the foregoing findings and recommendations. It is well to stress again that the
practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess,
and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. One of
theserequirements is the observance of honesty and candor. Courts are entitled toexpect only complete
candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them. A lawyer, on the other hand,
has the fundamental duty tosatisfy that expectation. for this reason, he is required to swear to do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court.WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Pablito M.
Castillo guilty committing a falsehood in violation of his lawyer's oath and of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND him from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months, with a warning that commission of the same or similar offense in the future will result in the
imposition of a more severe penalty.
A.C. No. L-1117 March 20, 1944

THE DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, complainant,

vs.
ESTANISLAO R. BAYOT, respondent.

OZAETA, J.:

Facts:

Estanislao Bayot caused the publication of an advertisement of his services in the Sunday Tribune,
in direct violation of the provision of Section 25, Rule 127 which imposes a prohibition on soliciting
cases at law for the purpose of gain either personally or through paid agents or brokers.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of malpractice

Held:
Yes. His act of causing the publication of an advertisement constitutes malpractice. Law is a
profession and not a trade. A member of the bar degrades himself or herself in adopting the
practices of mercantilism through advertising his or her services like a merchant advertising wares.
However, considering the fact that Bayot is a young lawyer and that he promises to refrain from
repeating the same misconduct, the Court exercised leniency. He was merely reprimanded for his
violation and he was reminded that the most effective advertisement possible is the
establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity as well as fidelity to
trust.
July 30, 1979

PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME "SYCIP, SALAZAR, FELICIANO,
HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO." LUCIANO E. SALAZAR, FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, BENILDO G. HERNANDEZ.
GREGORIO R. CASTILLO. ALBERTO P. SAN JUAN, JUAN C. REYES. JR., ANDRES G. GATMAITAN, JUSTINO
H. CACANINDIN, NOEL A. LAMAN, ETHELWOLDO E. FERNANDEZ, ANGELITO C. IMPERIO, EDUARDO R.
CENIZA, TRISTAN A. CATINDIG, ANCHETA K. TAN, and ALICE V. PESIGAN, petitioners.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME "OZAETA,
ROMULO, DE LEON, MABANTA & REYES." RICARDO J. ROMULO, BENJAMIN M. DE LEON, ROMAN
MABANTA, JR., JOSE MA, REYES, JESUS S. J. SAYOC, EDUARDO DE LOS ANGELES, and JOSE F.
BUENAVENTURA, petitioners.

RESOLUTION

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1

Facts:
Petitions were filed by the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip, who died on May 5, 1975 and by
the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, who died on February 14, 1976, praying that they be
allowed to continue using, in the names of their firms, the names of partners who had passed away.
Petitioners contend that the continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner when
permissible by local custom, is not unethical but care should be taken that no imposition or deception is
practiced through this use. They also contend that no local custom prohibits the continued use of a
deceased partner’s name in a professional firm’s name; there is no custom or usage in the Philippines,
or at least in the Greater Manila Area, which recognizes that the name of a law firm necessarily
identifies the individual members of the firm.
Issue:
WON the surviving partners may be allowed by the court to retain the name of the partners who already
passed away in the name of the firm? NO

Held:
In the case of Register of Deeds of Manila vs. China Banking Corporation, the SC said:
The Court believes that, in view of the personal and confidential nature of the relations between
attorney and client, and the high standards demanded in the canons of professional ethics, no practice
should be allowed which even in a remote degree could give rise to the possibility of deception. Said
attorneys are accordingly advised to drop the names of the deceased partners from their firm name.
The public relations value of the use of an old firm name can tend to create undue advantages and
disadvantages in the practice of the profession. An able lawyer without connections will have to make a
name for himself starting from scratch. Another able lawyer, who can join an old firm, can initially ride
on that old firm’s reputation established by deceased partners.
The court also made the difference from the law firms and business corporations:
A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a mere relationship or association for a
particular purpose. … It is not a partnership formed for the purpose of carrying on trade or business or
of holding property.” Thus, it has been stated that “the use of a nom de plume, assumed or trade name
in law practice is improper.
We find such proof of the existence of a local custom, and of the elements requisite to constitute the
same, wanting herein. Merely because something is done as a matter of practice does not mean that
Courts can rely on the same for purposes of adjudication as a juridical custom.
Petition suffers legal and ethical impediment.
Dacanay v. Baker & Mckenzie, May 10, 1985

FACTS: Atty. Dacanay sought to enjoin Juan Collas and nine other lawyers from practicing law under the
name Baker and McKenzie, a law firm organized in Illinois. In 1979 respondent Vicente A. Torres used
the letterhead of Baker & McKenzie which contains the names of the ten lawyers asking Rosie Clurman
for the release of 87 shares of Cathay Products International, Inc. to H.E. Gabriel, a client. Atty. Dacanay
replied denying any liability of Clurman and asking the lawyer his purpose of using the letterhead of
another law office.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondents should enjoin from practising law under the firm name Baker &
McKenzie.

HELD: YES. Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule
138, Rules of Court).

 Who may practice law. - Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or
hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this rule, and who is in good and
regular standing, is entitledto practice law.

Respondents' use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie constitutes a representation that being associated
with the firm they could "render legal services of the highest quality to multinational business
enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and investment" which the Court finds unethical
because Baker & McKenzie is not authorized to practise law here.

WHEREFORE, the respondents are enjoined from practising law under the firmname Baker & McKenzie.
BAR MATTER No. 914 October 1, 1999

RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR,

vs.

VICENTE D. CHING, applicant.

Facts:

Vicente D. Ching, a legitimate child of a Filipino mother and an alien Chinese father, was born on April
11, 1964 in Tubao La Union, under the 1935 Constitution. He has resided in the Philippines
He completed his Bachelor of Laws at SLU in Baguio on July 1998, filed an application to take the 1998
Bar Examination.
The Resolution in this Court, he was allowed to take the bar if he submit to the Court the following
documents as proof of his Philippine Citizenship:
1. Certification issued by the PRC Board of Accountancy that Ching is a certified accountant;
2. Voter Certification issued COMELEC in Tubao La Union showing that Ching is a registered voter of his
place; and
3. Certification showing that Ching was elected as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La
Union
On April 5, 1999, Ching was one of the bar passers. The oath taking ceremony was scheduled on May 5,
1999.
Because of his questionable status of Ching's citizenship, he was not allowed to take oath.
He was required to submit further proof of his citizenship.
The Office of the Solicitor General was required to file a comment on Ching's petition for admission to
the Philippine Bar.
In his report:
1. Ching, under the 1935 Constitution, was a Chinese citizen and continue to be so, unless upon reaching
the age of majority he elected Philippine citizenship, under the compliance with the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 265 "an act providing for the manner in which the option to elect Philippine
citizenship shall be declared by a person whose mother is a Filipino citizen"
2. He pointed out the Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship, and if ever he does, it would
already be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by the present jurisprudence.

Issue: Whether or not he has elected Philippine citizenship within "a reasonable time".

Rulings:

1. No. Ching, despite the special circumstances, failed to elect Philippine citizenship within a
reasonable time. The reasonable time means that the election should be made within 3 years
from "upon reaching the age of majority", which is 21 years old. Instead, he elected Philippine
citizenship 14 years after reaching the age of majority which the court considered not within the
reasonable time. Ching offered no reason why he delayed his election of Philippine citizenship,
as procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is
required is an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and file the same with the nearest
civil registry.
IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS MICHAEL A. MEDADO, PETITIONER. (DIGEST)

B.M. No. 2540

September 24, 2013

TOPIC: Admission to the Bar, Unauthorized Practice of Law, Canon 9, Signing of the Roll of Attorneys

FACTS:
Michael A. Medado passed the Philippine bar exams in 1979. On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorney’s
Oath at the PICC. He was scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on 13 May 1980, but failed to do so
allegedly because he had misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys. Several years later, while
rummaging through his things, he found said Notice. He then realized that he had not signed in the roll,
and that what he had signed at the entrance of the PICC was probably just an attendance record.

He thought that since he already took the oath, the signing of the Roll of Attorneys was not as
important. The matter of signing in the Roll of Attorneys was subsequently forgotten.

In 2005, when Medado attended MCLE seminars, he was required to provide his roll number for his
MCLE compliances to be credited. Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable to provide
his roll number.

About seven years later, in 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that he be allowed to sign in
the Roll of Attorneys. Medado justifies this lapse by characterizing his acts as “neither willful nor
intentional but based on a mistaken belief and an honest error of judgment.

The Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that the instant petition be denied for petitioner’s gross
negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of merit, saying that petitioner could offer no valid
justification for his negligence in signing in the Roll of Attorneys.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner may be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.

RULING:

Yes, the Supreme Court granted the petition subject to the payment of a fine and the imposition of a
penalty equivalent to suspension from the practice of law.

Not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys would be akin to imposing upon him the ultimate
penalty of disbarment, a penalty reserved for the most serious ethical transgressions. In this case, said
action is not warranted.

The Court considered Medado’s demonstration of good faith in filing the petition himself, albeit after
the passage of more than 30 years; that he has shown that he possesses the character required to be a
member of the Philippine Bar; and that he appears to have been a competent and able legal
practitioner, having held various positions at different firms and companies.

However, Medado is not free from all liability for his years of inaction.
A mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is presumed to know the
law and its consequences.

Medado may have at first operated under an honest mistake of fact when he thought that what he had
signed at the PICC entrance before the oath-taking was already the Roll of Attorneys. However, the
moment he realized that what he had signed was just an attendance record, he could no longer claim an
honest mistake of fact as a valid justification. At that point, he should have known that he was not a full-
fledged member of the Philippine Bar, as it was the act of signing therein that would have made him so.
When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose to continue practicing law, he willfully engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law.

Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. At the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer’s duty to prevent the unauthorized
practice of law. This duty likewise applies to law students and Bar candidates. As aspiring members of
the Bar, they are bound to conduct themselves in accordance with the ethical standards of the legal
profession.

Medado cannot be suspended as he is not yet a full-fledged lawyer. However, the Court imposed upon
him a penalty akin to suspension by allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one (1) year after
receipt of the Resolution. He was also made to pay a fine of P32,000. Also, during the one-year period,
petitioner was not allowed to engage in the practice of law.
[A.C. No. 3249. August 9, 2004]
CORDOVA vs. CORDOVA
https://www.coursehero.com/file/27655278/pale-batch-2pdf/

[BAR MATTER No. 712. March 19, 1997]

RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYER'S OATH
IN RE: ARGOSINO (270 SCRA 26, 03/19/1997)

FACTS: This is a matter for admission to the bar and oath taking of a successful bar applicant. Petitioner
Al Caparros Argosino was previously involved with hazing which caused the death of Raul Camaligan a
neophyte during fraternity initiation rites but he was convicted for Reckless Imprudence Resulting
in Homicide. He was sentenced with 2 years and 4 months of imprisonment where he applied a
probation thereafter which was approved and granted by the court. He took the bar exam and passed
but was not allowed to take the oath. He filed for a petition to allow him to take the lawyer’s oath of
office and to admit him to the practice of law averring that his probation was already terminated. The
court note that he spent only 10 months of the probation period before it was terminated.

ISSUE: Whether or not Al Argosino may take the lawyer’s oath office and admit him to the practice of
law.

HELD: The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the STRICT, INTELLECTUAL
and MORAL QUALIFICATIONS required of lawyers who are instruments in the effective and efficient
administration of justice. The court upheld the principle of maintaining the good moral character of all
Bar members, keeping in mind that such is of greater importance so far as the general public and the
proper administration of justice are concerned. Hence he was asked by the court to
produce evidence that would certify that he has reformed and has become a responsible member of the
community through sworn statements of individuals who have a good reputation for truth and who
have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time to certify that he is morally fit to the
admission of the law profession. The petitioner is then allowed to take the lawyer’s oath, sign the Roll of
Attorney’s and thereafter to practice the legal profession.
B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING OF SUCCESSFUL BAR APPLICANT
AL C. ARGOSINO, petitioner.

FACTS:

On February 4, 1992 ,Argosino, together with 13 others, was charged with the crime of homicide in
connection with the death of one Raul Camaligan. The death of Camaligan stemmed from the affliction
of severe physical injuries upon him in course of "hazing" conducted as part of the university fraternity
initiation rites. On February 11, 1993, the accused were consequently sentenced to suffer imprisonment
for a period ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.

Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application for probation with the lower
court. The application was granted on June 18 1993. The period of probation was set at two (2) years,
counted from the probationer's initial report to the probation officer assigned to supervise him.

Less than a month later, Argosino filed a petition to take the bar exam. He was allowed and he passed
the exam, but was not allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office.

On April 15, 1994, Argosino filed a petition to allow him to take the attorney's oath and be admitted to
the practice of law. He averred that his probation period had been terminated. It is noted that his
probation period did not last for more than 10 months.

ISSUE: Whether Argosino should be allowed to take the oath of attorney and be admitted to the practice
of law

HELD:

Mr. Argosino must submit to this Court evidence that he may now be regarded as complying with the
requirement of good moral character imposed upon those who are seeking admission to the bar. He
should show to the Court how he has tried to make up for the senseless killing of a helpless student to
the family of the deceased student and to the community at large. In short, he must show evidence that
he is a different person now, that he has become morally fit for admission to the profession of law.

He is already directed to inform the Court, by appropriate written manifestation, of the names of the
parents or brothers and sisters of Camaligan from notice.
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 154207, April 27, 2007 ]
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, PETITIONER,
VS.
ALBERTO MINA, HON. ELEUTERIO F GUERRERO AND HON. ZENAIDA LAGUILLES, RESPONDENTS

Facts:

Ferdinand A. Cruz filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of Appearance, as private prosecutor, where his
father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness.

The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student, justifies his appearance as private
prosecutor on the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the ruling of the Court En
Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr. that a non-lawyer may appear before the inferior courts as an
agent or friend of a party litigant. The petitioner furthermore avers that his appearance was with the
prior conformity of the public prosecutor and a written authority of Mariano Cruz appointing him to be
his agent in the prosecution of the said criminal case.

However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied permission for petitioner to appear as
private prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited law student practice in
conjunction with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice Rule) should take precedence
over the ruling of the Court laid down in Cantimbuhan; and set the case for continuation of trial.

Issue:

whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a
party litigant

Ruling:

The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the issues and
procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his personal capacity
without the supervision of a lawyer. Section 34, Rule 138 provides:

Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct
his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the
aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an
attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.

Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party without the
supervision of a member of the bar. (Emphasis supplied)
EN BANC[ B.M. No. 1678, December 17, 2007 ]

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW, BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, PETITIONER

Facts:

Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to
Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for
Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s free medical aid program. His application was approved and he
became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.

On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of
2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship. On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a
Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to
the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice.

Issue:

Whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up
his Philippine citizenship

Ruling:

The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to
Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law. Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission
to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to
engage in the practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the
privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners.

The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another
country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because “all Philippine citizens who
become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under
the conditions of [RA 9225].” Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is
deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225.
Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no
automatic right to resume law practice accrues.

Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he reacquires
his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions “(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license
or permit to engage in such practice.
G.R. No. L-51813-14 November 29, 1983

ROMULO CANTIMBUHAN, NELSON B. MALANA, and ROBERT V. LUCILA, petitioners,

vs.
HON. NICANOR J. CRUZ, JR., Presiding Judge of the Municipal Court of Parañaque, Metro Manila, and
FISCAL LEODEGARIO C. QUILATAN, respondents.

RELOVA, J.:

THIRD DIVISION
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, 332 Edang G.R. No. 154464
St., Pasay City,
Petitioner, Present:
- versus - TINGA, J.,*
JUDGE PRISCILLA MIJARES, Presiding Judge, CHICO-NAZARIO,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 108, Pasay
Acting Chairperson,
City, Metro Manila,
VELASCO, JR.,*
Public Respondent.
NACHURA, and
BENJAMIN MINA, JR., 332 Edang
St., Pasay City, REYES, JJ.

Private Respondent.
Promulgated:

September 11, 2008

Facts:

Petitioner Cruz sought permission to enter his appearance for and on his behalf, before the RTC in
a civil case for Abatement of Nuisance. Petitioner, a fourth year law student, anchors his claim on
Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court that a non-lawyer may appear before any court and
conduct his litigation personally.

During the pretrial, Judge Priscilla Mijares required the petitioner to secure a written permission from
the Court Administrator before he could be allowed to appear as counsel for himself, a party litigant.
Atty. Stanley Cabrera, counsel for Benjamin Mina, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss instead of a pretrial
brief to which petitioner Cruz vehemently objected alleging that a Motion to Dismiss is not allowed
after the Answer had been filed. Judge Mijares then remarked, “Hay naku, masama ‘yung
marunong pa sa Huwes. Ok?” and proceeded to hear the pending Motion to Dismiss and calendared
the nex thearing.

Petitioner Cruz filed a Manifestation and Motion to Inhibit, praying for the voluntary
inhibition of Judge Mijares. The Motion alleged that expected partiality on the part of the respondent
judge in the conduct of the trial could be inferred from the contumacious remarks of Judge Mijares
during the pretrial. It asserts that the judge, in uttering an uncalled for remark, reflects a
negative frame of mind, which engenders the belief that justice will not be served. In an Order, Judge
Mijares denied the motion for inhibition stating that throwing tenuous allegations of
partiality based on the said remark is not enough to warrant her voluntary inhibition,
considering that it was said even prior to the start of pretrial.

Petitioner filed a MR of the said order. Judge Mijares denied the motion with finality. In the
same Order, the trial court held that for the failure of petitioner Cruz to submit the promised
document and jurisprudence, and for his failure to satisfy the requirements or conditions under
Rule 138A of the Rules of Court, his appearance was denied. In MR, petitioner reiterated that the
basis of his appearance was not Rule 138A, but Section 34 of Rule138. He contended that the two
Rules were distinct and are applicable to different circumstances, but the respondent judge
denied the same, still invoking Rule138A. Petitioner filed this case with SC
[G.R. No. 126625. September 23, 1997]

KANLAON CONSTRUCTION ENTERPRISES CO., INC., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, 5TH DIVISION, and BENJAMIN RELUYA, JR., EDGARDO GENAYAS, ERNESTO CANETE,
PROTACIO ROSALES, NESTOR BENOYA, RODOLFO GONGOB, DARIO BINOYA, BENJAMIN BASMAYOR,
ABELARDO SACURA, FLORENCIO SACURA, ISABELO MIRA, NEMESIO LACAR, JOSEPH CABIGKIS,
RODRIGO CILLON, VIRGILIO QUIZON, GUARINO EVANGELISTA, ALEJANDRO GATA, BENEDICTO
CALAGO, NILO GATA, DIONISIO PERMACIO, JUANITOSALUD, ADOR RIMPO, FELIPE ORAEZ, JULIETO
TEJADA, TEOTIMO LACIO, ONOFRE QUIZON, RUDY ALVAREZ, CRESENCIO FLORES, ALFREDO
PERMACIO, CRESENCIO ALVIAR, HERNANI SURILA, DIOSDADO SOLON, CENON ALBURO, ZACARIAS
ORTIZ, EUSEBIO BUSTILLO, GREGORIO BAGO, JERRY VARGAS, EDUARDO BUENO, PASCUAL HUDAYA,
ROGELIO NIETES, and REYNALDO NIETES, respondents.

Facts:

Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the construction business nationwide with principal
office at No. 11 Yakan St., La Vista Subdivision, Quezon City. In 1988, petitioner was contracted by the
National Steel Corporation to construct residential houses for its plant employees in Steeltown, Sta.
Elena, Iligan City. Private respondents were hired by petitioner as laborers in the project and worked
under the supervision of Engineers Paulino Estacio and Mario Dulatre. In 1989, the project neared its
completion and petitioner started terminating the services of private respondents and its other
employees.

In 1990, private respondents filed separate complaints against petitioner before Sub-Regional
Arbitration Branch XII, Iligan City. Numbering forty-one (41) in all, they claimed that petitioner paid
them wages below the minimum and sought payment of their salary differentials and thirteenth-month
pay. Engineers Estacio and Dulatre were named co-respondents.

The preliminary conferences before the labor arbiters were attended by Engineers Estacio and Dulatre
and private respondents. At the conference of June 11, 1990 before Arbiter Siao, Engineer Estacio
admitted petitioner’s liability to private respondents and agreed to pay their wage differentials and
thirteenth-month pay on June 19, 1990. As a result of this agreement, Engineer Estacio allegedly waived
petitioner’s right to file its position paper. 1 Private respondents declared that they, too, were
dispensing with their position papers and were adopting their complaints as their position paper.

Extension was denied by the LA Siao and ordered the employer company to pay the employees.

Petitioner appealed to respondent National Labor Relations Commission. It alleged that it was denied
due process and that Engineers Estacio and Dulatre had no authority to represent and bind petitioner.

NLRC affirmed the decisions of the Labor Arbiters.

RULING: It has been established that petitioner is a private domestic corporation with principal address
in Quezon City. The complaints against petitioner were filed in Iligan City and summons served on
Engineer Estacio in Iligan City. The question now is whether Engineer Estacio was an agent and
authorized representative of petitioner.

Under the Revised Rules of Court, 7 service upon a private domestic corporation or partnership must be
made upon its officers, such as the president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its directors.
These persons are deemed so integrated with the corporation that they know their responsibilities and
immediately discern what to do with any legal papers served on them.

In the case at bar, Engineer Estacio, assisted by Engineer Dulatre, managed and supervised the
construction project. 9 According to the Solicitor General and private respondents, Engineer Estacio
attended to the project in Iligan City and supervised the work of the employees thereat. As manager, he
had sufficient responsibility and discretion to realize the importance of the legal papers served on him
and to relay the same to the president or other responsible officer of petitioner. Summons for petitioner
was therefore validly served on him.

Engineer Estacio’s appearance before the labor arbiters and his promise to settle the claims of private
respondents is another matter.

The general rule is that only lawyers are allowed to appear before the labor arbiter and respondent
Commission in cases before them. The Labor Code and the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC,
nonetheless, lists three (3) exceptions to the rule, viz:

Sec. 6. Appearances. — . . . .

A non-lawyer may appear before the Commission or any Labor Arbiter only if:
(a) he represents himself as party to the case;
(b) he represents the organization or its members, provided that he shall be made to present written
proof that he is properly authorized; or
(c) he is a duly-accredited member of any legal aid office duly recognized by the Department of Justice
or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines in cases referred thereto by the latter. . . . 10

A non-lawyer may appear before the labor arbiters and the NLRC only if: (a) he represents himself as a
party to the case; (b) he represents an organization or its members, with written authorization from
them: or (c) he is a duly-accredited member of any legal aid office duly recognized by the Department of
Justice or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines in cases referred to by the latter. 11

Engineers Estacio and Dulatre were not lawyers. Neither were they duly-accredited members of a legal
aid office. Their appearance before the labor arbiters in their capacity as parties to the cases was
authorized under the first exception to the rule. However, their appearance on behalf of petitioner
required written proof of authorization. It was incumbent upon the arbiters to ascertain this authority
especially since both engineers were named co-respondents in the cases before the arbiters. Absent this
authority, whatever statements and declarations Engineer Estacio made before the arbiters could not
bind petitioner.

Nevertheless, even assuming that Engineer Estacio and Atty. Abundiente were authorized to appear as
representatives of petitioner, they could bind the latter only in procedural matters before the arbiters
and respondent Commission. Petitioner’s liability arose from Engineer Estacio’s alleged promise to pay.
A promise to pay amounts to an offer to compromise and requires a special power of attorney or the
express consent of petitioner. The authority to compromise cannot be lightly presumed and should be
duly established by evidence.

Sec. 7. Authority to bind party. — Attorneys and other representatives of parties shall have authority to
bind their clients in all matters of procedure; but they cannot, without a special power of attorney or
express consent, enter into a compromise agreement with the opposing party in full or partial discharge
of a client’s claim.

After petitioner’s alleged representative failed to pay the workers’ claims as promised, Labor Arbiters
Siao and Palangan did not order the parties to file their respective position papers. The arbiters
forthwith rendered a decision on the merits without at least requiring private respondents to
substantiate their complaints. The parties may have earlier waived their right to file position papers but
petitioner’s waiver was made by Engineer Estacio on the premise that petitioner shall have paid and
settled the claims of private respondents at the scheduled conference. Since petitioner reneged on its
“promise,” there was a failure to settle the case amicably. This should have prompted the arbiters to
order the parties to file their position papers.

Sec. 3. Submission of Position Papers/Memorandum. — Should the parties fail to agree upon an
amicable settlement, in whole or in part, during the conferences, the Labor Arbiter shall issue an order
stating therein the matters taken up and agreed upon during the conferences and directing the parties
to simultaneously file their respective verified position papers.
G.R. No. 92349 November 9, 1990

MARIA LUISA ESTOESTA petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and GERRY R. GONZALES, Presiding Judge, MTC,
Br. 76, Marikina, respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:

Facts:

G.R. Nos. 79690-707 October 7, 1988

ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and HONORABLE RAUL M. GONZALEZ, claiming to be
and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution, respondents.

G.R. No. 80578 October 7, 1988

ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,

vs.
HON. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman
ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

Facts:

Petitioner Enrique Zaldivar, governor of Antique was one of the several defendants in Criminal Cases for
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act pending before the Sandiganbayan.

Petitioner filed a case against both the Sandiganbayan and Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez acting as Tanodbayan-
Ombudsman. Petitioner alleged that the latter, as Tanodbayan was no longer vested with power and
authority independently to investigate and to institute criminal cases for graft and corruption against
public officials and employees, under the 1987 Constitution, hence the cases filed were all null and void.

The Court then issued a TRO ordering respondents Gonzalez and Sandiganbayan to cease and desist
in further investigating and arrest of the petitioner.

However, Gonzales continued filing a case against Zaldivar and also issued an alleged contemptuous
statements to the media, the “Philippine Daily Globe:” stating that Tanod Scores SC for Quashing Graft
Case, and that SC is only favoring the rich and the influential persons. The latter also said, that while the
President had been prodding him to prosecute graft cases, even if they involve the high and mighty, the
SC had been restraining him to do his official duties. Thus, this prompted Zaldivar to file a motion for
contempt to Gonzales.

SC ordered Gonzales to explain himself. The principal defense of respondent Gonzalez is that he was
merely exercising his constitutional right of free speech. He also invokes the related doctrines of
qualified privileged communications and fair criticism in the public interest.

ISSUE:

Whether Gonzales is guilty of contempt of court.

HELD:

Yes, Gonzales is guilty of contempt.

Respondent Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. No one seeks to deny
him that right, least of all this Court. What respondent seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and
of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on
occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public
interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly
functioning of the administration of justice.

The Court is compelled to hold that the statements made by Gonzalez clearly constitute contempt and
call for the exercise of the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. Respondent’s statements,
especially the charge that the Court deliberately rendered an erroneous and unjust decision, necessarily
implying that the justices of the Court betrayed their oath of office, constitute the grossest kind of
disrespect for the Court. Such statements very clearly debase and degrade the Supreme Court and,
through the Court, the entire system of administration of justice in the country.

In re: Almacen, the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bonafide and shall not spill over
the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and
abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a
gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to
disciplinary action.

The Supreme Court suspended Gonzales indefinitely from the practice of law.

VERSION 2
FACTS:

Zaldivar was the governor of Antique and was charged before the Sandiganbayan for violations of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Gonzales was the then Tanodbayan who was investigating the
case. Zaldivar then filed with the Supreme Court a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
assailing the authority of the Tanodbayan to investigate graft cases under the 1987 Constitution. The
Supreme Court, acting on the petition issued a Cease and Desist Order against Gonzalez directing him to
temporarily restrain from investigating and filing informations against Zaldivar. Gonzales however
proceeded with the investigation and he filed criminal informations against Zaldivar. Respondent
Gonzalez has also asserted that the Court was preventing him from prosecuting "rich and powerful
persons," that the Court was in effect discrimination between the rich and powerful on the one hand
and the poor and defenseless upon the other, and allowing "rich and powerful" accused persons to go
"scot-free" while presumably allowing or affirming the conviction of poor and small offenders.

Zaldivar then filed a Motion for Contempt against Gonzalez. The Supreme Court then ordered Gonzalez
to explain his side. Gonzalez stated that the statements in the newspapers were true; that he was only
exercising his freedom of speech; that he is entitled to criticize the rulings of the Court, to point out
where he feels the Court may have lapsed into error.

ISSUE: Whether or not Gonzalez is guilty of contempt.

HELD: YES. The statements made by respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute contempt and call for the
exercise of the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. According to Canon 11: A lawyer shall
observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar
conduct by others. It is one of the bounded duties of an attorney to observe and maintain the respect
due to the courts of justice and judicial officer (Section 20 [b], Rule 138 of the Rules of Court).
His statements necessarily imply that the justices of the Supreme Court betrayed their oath of office.
Such statements very clearly debase anddegrade the Supreme Court and, through the Court, the entire
system of administration of justice in the country. Gonzalez is entitled to theconstitutional guarantee of
free speech. What Gonzalez seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of expression, like
all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be
adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interests. One of
these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of
the administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the
system of administering justice.

Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an officer of the court, is also a Special Prosecutor who owes
duties of fidelity and respect to the Republic and to the Supreme Court as the embodiment and the
repository of the judicial power in the government of the Republic. The responsibility of Gonzalez to
uphold the dignity and authority of the Supreme Court and not to promote distrust in
the administration of justice is heavier than that of a private practicing lawyer.

Gonzalez is also entitled to criticize the rulings of the court but his criticisms must be bona fide. In the
case at bar, his statements, particularly the one where he alleged that members of the Supreme Court
approached him, are of no relation to the Zaldivar case.

The Court concludes that respondent Gonzalez is guilty both of contempt of court in facie curiae and of
gross misconduct as an officer of the court and member of the Bar.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND Atty. Raul M. Gonzalez from the practice of law
indefinitely and until further orders from this Court, the suspension to take effect immediately.
MANUEL L. LEE, A.C. No. 5281
Complainant,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
AZCUNA and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.

ATTY. REGINO B. TAMBAGO,

Respondent. Promulgated:
February 12, 2008
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

CORONA, J.:
Facts:

Complainant, Manuel L. Lee, charged respondent, Atty. Regino B. Tambago, with violation of Notarial
Law and the Ethics of the legal profession for notarizing a will that is alleged to be spurious in nature in
containing forged signatures of his father, the decedent, Vicente Lee Sr. and two other witnesses, which
were also questioned for the unnotated Residence Certificates that are known to be a copy of their
respective voter's affidavit. In addition to such, the contested will was executed and acknowledged
before respondent on June 30, 1965 but bears a Residence Certificate by the Testator dated January 5,
1962, which was never submitted for filing to the Archives Division of the Records Management and
Archives Office of the National Commission for Culture and Arts (NCAA).

Respondent, on the other hand, claimed that all allegations are falsely given because he allegedly
exercised his duties as Notary Public with due care and with due regards to the provision of existing law
and had complied with elementary formalities in the performance of his duties and that the complaint
was filed simply to harass him based on the result of a criminal case against him in the Ombudsman that
did not prosper.

However, he did not deny the contention of non-filing a copy to the Archives Division of NCAA. In
resolution, the court referred the case to the IBP and the decision of which was affirmed with
modification against the respondent and in favor of the complainant.

Issue: Did Atty. Regino B. Tambago committed a violation in Notarial Law and the Ethics of Legal
Profession for notarizing a spurious last will and testament?

Held: Yes. As per Supreme Court, Atty. Regino B. Tambago is guilty of professional misconduct as he
violated the Lawyer's Oath, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, Canon 1 and Rule 1.01nof the Code of
Professional Responsibility, Article 806 of the Civil Code and provision of the Notarial Law. Thus, Atty.
Tambago is suspended from the practice of law for one year and his Notarial commission revoked. In
addition, because he has not lived up to the trustworthiness expected of him as a notary public and as
an officer of the court, he is perpetually disqualified from reappointments as a Notary Public.

ADDITIONAL RATIO:
Respondent, as notary public, evidently failed in the performance of the elementary duties of his office.
The Court finds that he acted very irresponsibly in notarizing the will in question. Such recklessness
warrants the less severe punishment of suspension from the practice of law. It is, as well, a sufficient
basis for the revocation of his commission and his perpetual disqualification to be commissioned as a
notary public.

The Civil Code requires that a will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
witnesses. The importance of this requirement is highlighted by the fact that it was segregated from the
other requirements under Article 805 and embodied in a distinct and separate provision.

An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent officer
or court and declaring it to be his act or deed. It involves an extra step undertaken whereby the
signatory actually declares to the notary public that the same is his or her own free act and deed. The
acknowledgment in a notarial will has a two-fold purpose: (1) to safeguard the testators wishes long
after his demise and (2) to assure that his estate is administered in the manner that he intends it to be
done.

A cursory examination of the acknowledgment of the will in question shows that this particular
requirement was neither strictly nor substantially complied with. For one, there was the conspicuous
absence of a notation of the residence certificates of the notarial witnesses Noynay and Grajo in the
acknowledgment. Similarly, the notation of the testators old residence certificate in the same
acknowledgment was a clear breach of the law. These omissions by respondent invalidated the will.

Notaries public must observe with utmost care and utmost fidelity the basic requirements in the
performance of their duties, otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of notarized deeds
will be undermined.

Defects in the observance of the solemnities prescribed by law render the entire will invalid. This
carelessness cannot be taken lightly in view of the importance and delicate nature of a will, considering
that the testator and the witnesses, as in this case, are no longer alive to identify the instrument and to
confirm its contents. Accordingly, respondent must be held accountable for his acts. The validity of the
will was seriously compromised as a consequence of his breach of duty.

These gross violations of the law also made respondent liable for violation of his oath as a lawyer and
constituted transgressions of Section 20 (a), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and Canon 1 and Rule 1.01of
the CPR.
G.R. No. 1203 May 15, 1903

In the matter of the suspension of HOWARD D. TERRELL from the practice of law.

PER CURIAM:

Facts:

Please see downloaded document

A.M. No. L-363 July 31, 1962

IN RE: DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ATTY. DIOSDADO Q. GUTIERREZ, respondent.

MAKALINTAL, J.:

PLEASE SEE DOWNLOADED DIGEST

A.C. No. 1109 April 27, 2005

MARIA ELENA MORENO, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ERNESTO ARANETA, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

MARIA ELENA MORENO VS. ATTY. ERNESTO ARANETA

A.C. No. 1109. April 27, 2005

Facts: Ernesto Araneta issued two checks to Elena Moreno for his indebtedness which amounts to P11,
000.00, the checks were dishonored. It was dishonored because the account against which is drawn is
closed. Thereafter the case was forwarded to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline pursuant to Rule
139-B of the Rules of Court. The Commission recommended the suspension from the practice of law for
three (3) months. On 15 October 2002, IBP Director for Bar Discipline Victor C. Fernandez, transmitted
the records of this case back to this Court pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 12(b) of the Rules of Court.
Thereafter, the Office of the Bar Confidant filed a Report regarding various aspects of the case. The
Report further made mention of a Resolution from this Court indefinitely suspending the respondent for
having been convicted by final judgment of estafa through falsification of a commercial document.

Issue: Whether or not Araneta should be disbarred due to the issuance of checks drawn against a closed
account.

Held: The Court held that the act of a person in issuing a check knowing at the time of the issuance that
he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the check
in full upon its presentment, is a manifestation of moral turpitude. In Co v. Bernardino and Lao v. Medel,
we held that for issuing worthless checks, a lawyer may be sanctioned with one year’s suspension from
the practice of law, or a suspension of six months upon partial payment of the obligation. In the instant
case, however, herein respondent has, apparently been found guilty by final judgment of estafa thru
falsification of a commercial document, a crime involving moral turpitude, for which he has been
indefinitely suspended. Considering that he had previously committed a similarly fraudulent act, and
that this case likewise involves moral turpitude, we are constrained to impose a more severe penalty. In
fact, we have long held that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment of a
crime involving moral turpitude. As we said in In The Matter of Disbarment Proceedings v. Narciso N.
Jaramillo, “the review of respondent's conviction no longer rests upon us. The judgment not only has
become final but has been executed. No elaborate argument is necessary to hold the respondent
unworthy of the privilege bestowed on him as a member of the bar. Suffice it to say that, by his
conviction, the respondent has proved himself unfit to protect the administration of justice.”
A.C. No. 5816

DR. ELMAR 0. PEREZ, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. TRISTAN A. CATINDIG and ATTY. KAREN E. BAYDO, Respondents.

PER CURIAM:

Facts:

Atty. Tristan A. Catindig admitted to Dr. Elmar Perez that he was already wed to Lily Corazon Gomez.
Atty. Catindig told Dr. Perez that he was in the process of obtaining a divorce in a foreign country to
dissolve his marriage to Gomez, and that he would eventually marry her once the divorce had been
decreed. Consequently, sometime in 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez obtained a divorce decree from
the Dominican Republic.

On July 14, 1984, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the State of Virginia in the United States of
America (USA).
Years later, Dr. Perez came to know that her marriage to Atty. Catindig is a nullity since the divorce
decree that was obtained from the Dominican Republic by the latter and Gomez is not recognized by
Philippine laws. Sometime in 1997, Dr. Perez reminded Atty. Catindig of his promise to legalize their
union by filing a petition to nullify his marriage to Gomez.
Sometime in 2001, Dr. Perez alleged that she received an anonymous letter in the mail informing her
of Atty. Catindig’s scandalous affair with Atty. Baydo, and that sometime later, she came upon a love
letter written and signed by Atty. Catindig for Atty. Baydo dated April 25, 2001. In the said letter, Atty.
Catindig professed his love to Atty. Baydo, promising to marry her once his “impediment is removed.”
On October 31, 2001, Atty. Catindig abandoned Dr. Perez and their son; he moved to an upscale
condominium in Salcedo Village, Makati City where Atty. Baydo was frequently seen.

Atty. Catindig, in his Comment, admitted that he married Gomez on May 18, 1968. He claimed,
however, that immediately after the wedding, Gomez showed signs that she was incapable of complying
with her marital obligations. Eventually, their irreconcilable differences led to their de facto separation
in 1984.
Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew of the foregoing, including the fact that the divorce decreed
by the Dominican Republic court does not have any effect in the Philippines.
Atty. Catindig claimed that his relationship with Dr. Perez turned sour. Eventually, he left their home in
October 2001 to prevent any acrimony from developing.

He denied that Atty. Baydo was the reason that he left Dr. Perez.
For her part, Atty. Baydo denied that she had an affair with Atty. Catindig.

IBP – recommended the disbarment of Atty. Catindig for gross immorality, violation of Rule 1.01, Canon
7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Complaint against Atty. Baydo – dismissed for
dearth of evidence.
ISSUE:
WON the respondents committed gross immorality, which would warrant their disbarment.

Ruling:

Yes.

Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Canon 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,
nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession.

In this regard, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawyer may be removed or
suspended from the practice of law, inter alia, for grossly immoral conduct.

“A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his
moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.” Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful,
flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable
members of the community. Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal
act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the community’s sense of decency. The Court makes
these distinctions, as the supreme penalty of disbarment arising from conduct requires grossly immoral,
not simply immoral,

Contracting a marriage during the subsistence of a previous one amounts to a grossly immoral
conduct.

The facts gathered from the evidence adduced by the parties and, ironically, from Atty. Catindig’s own
admission, indeed establish a pattern of conduct that is grossly immoral; it is not only corrupt and
unprincipled, but reprehensible to a high degree.

Moreover, assuming arguendo that Atty. Catindig’s claim is true, it matters not that Dr. Perez knew that
their marriage is a nullity. The fact still remains that he resorted to various legal strategies in order to
render a façade of validity to his otherwise invalid marriage to Dr. Perez. Such act is, at the very least, so
unprincipled that it is reprehensible to the highest degree.

Further, after 17 years of cohabiting with Dr. Perez, and despite the various legal actions he resorted to
in order to give their union a semblance of validity, Atty. Catindig left her and their son. It was only at
that time that he finally decided to properly seek the nullity of his first marriage to Gomez. Apparently,
he was then already entranced with the much younger Atty. Baydo, an associate lawyer employed by his
firm.
While the fact that Atty. Catindig decided to separate from Dr. Perez to pursue Atty. Baydo, in itself,
cannot be considered a grossly immoral conduct, such fact forms part of the pattern showing his
propensity towards immoral conduct. Lest it be misunderstood, the Court’s finding of gross immoral
conduct is hinged not on Atty. Catindig’s desertion of Dr. Perez, but on his contracting of a subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of his previous marriage to Gomez.
Atty. Catindig’s subsequent marriage during the subsistence of his previous one definitely manifests a
deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution
and affirmed by our laws. By his own admission, Atty. Catindig made a mockery out of the institution
of marriage, taking advantage of his legal skills in the process. He exhibited a deplorable lack of that
degree of morality required of him as a member of the bar, which thus warrant the penalty of
disbarment.

There is insufficient evidence to prove the affair between the respondents.

As it is, the evidence that was presented by Dr. Perez to prove her claim was mere allegation, an
anonymous letter informing her that the respondents were indeed having an affair and the purported
love letter to Atty. Baydo that was signed by Atty. Catindig.

The Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment proceedings against lawyers, the
lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to
prove the allegations in his complaint. The evidence required in suspension or disbarment proceedings
is preponderance of evidence.
A.C. No. 5581 January 14, 2014

ROSE BUNAGAN-BANSIG, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA, Respondent.

PER CURIAM:

Facts:

Bansig, sister of bunagan narrated that, respondent and Gracemarie R. Bunagan, entered into a contract
of marriage. However, notwithstanding respondent’s marriage with Bunagan, respondent contracted
another marriage with a certain Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba, as evidenced by a certified xerox copy of the
certificate of marriage Bansig stressed that the marriage between respondent and Bunagan was still
valid and in full legal existence when he contracted his second marriage with Alba, and that the first
marriage had never been annulled or rendered void by any lawful authority.

Bansig alleged that respondent’s act of contracting marriage with Alba, while his marriage is still
subsisting, constitutes grossly immoral and conduct unbecoming of a member of the Bar, which renders
him unfit to continue his membership in the Bar.

Issue:

whether respondent is still fit to continue to be an officer of the court in the dispensation of justice

Ruling:

For purposes of this disbarment proceeding, these Marriage Certificates bearing the name of
respondent are competent and convincing evidence to prove that he committed bigamy, which renders
him unfit to continue as a member of the Bar

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support
the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.

Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the
Bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His act of
contracting a second marriage while his first marriage is subsisting constituted grossly immoral conduct
and are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.
A.C. No. 9608 November 27, 2012

MARIA VICTORIA B. VENTURA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. DANILO S. SAMSON, Respondent.

PER CURIAM:


Adm. Case No. 4680 August 29, 2000

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., complainant,

vs.
ATTYS. ANTONIO M. LLORENTE and LIGAYA P. SALAYON, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

Facts: Attys. Antonio Llorente and Ligaya Salayon were election officers of the COMELEC and held the
position of Chairman and Vice-Chairman respectively for the Pasig City Board of Candidates. The
respondents helped conduct and oversee the 1995 elections. Then Senatorial candidate Aquilino
Pimentel, Jr. alleged that the respondents tampered with the votes received by them by either adding
more votes for particular candidates in their Statement of Votes (SoV) or reducing the number of votes
of particular candidates in their SoV. Pimentel filed an administrative complaint for their disbarment.
Respondents argued that the discrepancies were due to honest mistake, oversight and fatigue.
Respondents also argued that the IBP Board of Governors had already exonerated them from any
offense and that the motion for reconsideration filed by Pimentel was not filed in time.

Held: GUILTY. Respondents do not dispute the fact that massive irregularities attended the canvassing
of the Pasig City election returns. The only explanation they could offer for such irregularities is that the
same could be due to honest mistake, human error, and/or fatigue on the part of the members of the
canvassing committees who prepared the SoVs. There is a limit, we believe, to what can be construed as
an honest mistake or oversight due to fatigue, in the performance of official duty. The sheer magnitude
of the error renders the defense of honest mistake or oversight due to fatigue, as incredible and simply
unacceptable. Indeed, what is involved here is not just a case of mathematical error in the tabulation of
votes per precinct as reflected in the election returns and the subsequent entry of the erroneous figures
in one or two SoVs but a systematic scheme to pad the votes of certain senatorial candidates at the
expense of the petitioner in complete disregard of the tabulation in the election returns.

A lawyer who holds a government position may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for
misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. However, if the misconduct also
constitutes a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility or the lawyer’s oath or is of such
character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or shows moral delinquency on his part, such
individual may be disciplined as a member of the bar for such misconduct. Here, by certifying as true
and correct the SoVs in question, respondents committed a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code which
stipulates that a lawyer shall not engage in “unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.” By
express provision of Canon 6, this is made applicable to lawyers in the government service. In addition,
they likewise violated their oath of office as lawyers to “do no falsehood.” The Court found the
respondents guilty of misconduct and fined them PhP 10,000 each and issued a stern warning that
similar conduct in the future will be severely punished.
A.M. No. 491 October 6, 1989

IN THE MATTER OF THE INQUIRY INTO THE 1989 ELECTIONS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF
THE PHILIPPINES.

PER CURIAM:


 [Adm. Case No. 2417. February 6, 2002]

ALEX ONG, complainant, vs. ATTY. ELPIDIO D. UNTO, respondent.

PUNO, J.:


A. M. No. 2104 August 24, 1989

NARCISO MELENDREZ and ERLINDA DALMAN, complainants,

vs.
ATTY. REYNERIO I. DECENA, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

There was two charged filed against Atty. Decena. First was about a 4k loan obtained by the spouses sec
ured by a real estate mortgage. However, it appeared on the real estate mortgage document that the a
mount loaned to complainants was P5,000.00 instead of 4k. He said that the signing of the documents w
as just for formality. so, they did. The spouses religiously paid 10% or 500 as interest for only 3months b
ecause of financial reverses. Consequently, Atty. Decena made a second real estate mortgage document
and the loan extended to complainants had escalated to P10,000.00. Again, on the assurance that it wa
s only for formality, the spouses signed the new REM document.

After 3 years, they learned that their lot was already sold to someone. So they tried to raise the 10k and
went to Atty. Decena’s house but the latter did not accept the money and instead gave them a sheet of
paper indicating that the total indebtedness had soared to 20,400.

The second charge against respondent relates to acts done in his professional capacity, that is, done at a
time when he was counsel for the complainants in a criminal case for estafa against accused. It was alle
ged that Atty. Decena effected a compromise agreement concerning the civil liability of accused without
the consent and approval of the complainants and that he received the amount of P500.00 as an advan
ce payment and he did not inform the spouses about this. And even after he was confronted, he still did
not turn over the money.

Issue:

Ruling:

As to the first charge, the SC held that Atty. Decena indeed deceived the spouses.
From the facts obtaining in the case, it is clear that the complainants were induced to sign the Real Estat
e Mortgage documents by the false and fraudulent representations of respondent that each of the succe
ssive documents was a are formality.

While it may be true that complainants are not at all illiterate, respondent, being a lawyer, should have a
t least explained to complainants the legal implications of the provisions of the real estate mortgage, par
ticularly the provision appointing him as the complainants’ attorney-in-
fact in the event of default in payments on the part of complainants.

As to the second charge, repondent is presumed to be aware of Section 23 Rule 138 that lawyers cannot
“without special authority, compromise their clients’ litigation or receive anything in discharge of a clien
t’s claim, but the full amount in cash.” Respondent’s failure to turn over to spouses the partial payment
underscores his lack of honesty and candor in dealing with his clients.
The SC reiterated that good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practi
ce of law but a continuing requirement.

Atty. Decena was disbarred.

G.R. No. L-22304 July 30, 1968

SAMAR MINING CO., INC., petitioner-appellant,

vs.
FRANCISCO P. ARNADO, POMPEYO V. TAN and RUFINO ABUYEN, respondents-appellees.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:
G.R. No. L-35867 June 28, 1973

FRANCISCO A. ACHACOSO, in his own behalf and in behalf of Capital Insurance & Surety
Co., Inc.,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, COTRAM, S.A., CAPITAL LIFE ASSURANCE CORP.,
JOAQUIN G. GARRIDO, Respondents.

TEEHANKEE, J.:


Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993

MAURICIO C. ULEP, Petitioner, vs. THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., Respondent.

REGALADO, J.:

Facts: The petitioner contends that the advertisements reproduced by the respondents are
champertous, unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the
community in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, to which as a member of the legal
profession, he is ashamed and offended by the following advertisements:

Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE Please call:521-0767,
LEGAL 5217232,5222041
CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am-6:00 pm
7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.

Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning
Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. &
Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption.
Investment in the Phil. US/Force Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.

THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave.,

LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy
CLINIC, INC. Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251;
522-2041; 521-0767

In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisements at its
instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support
services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines.
Respondent further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of
advertising these services should be allowed supposedly in the light of the case of John R. Bates
and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona, reportedly decided by the United States Supreme Court
on June 7, 1977.

ISSUE: Whether or not, the advertised services offered by the Legal Clinic, Inc., constitutes practice
of law and whether the same are in violation of the Code of Professional responsibility

RULING: The advertisement of the respondent is covered in the term practice of law as defined in
the case of Cayetano vs. Monsod. There is a restricted concept and limited acceptance of paralegal
services in the Philippines. It is allowed that some persons not duly licensed to practice law are or
have been permitted with a limited representation in behalf of another or to render legal services, but
such allowable services are limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or regulations granting
permission therefore. Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in
making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information
or statement of facts. Canon 3.01 adds that he is not supposed to use or permit the use of any false,
fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding
his qualifications or legal services. Nor shall he pay or give something of value to representatives of
the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal business (Canon 3.04).
The Canons of Professional Ethics, before the adoption of the CPR, had also warned that lawyers
should not resort to indirect advertisements for professional employment, such as furnishing or
inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be published in connection with
causes in which the lawyer have been engaged of concerning the manner of the conduct, the
magnitude of the interest involved, the importance the lawyer's position, and all other like self-
laudation. There are existing exceptions under the law on the rule prohibiting the advertisement of a
lawyer’s services. However, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements
for which respondent is being taken to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by
said respondent corporation for services rendered, the court found and held that the same definitely
do not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the exceptions. The respondent’s defense with the
case of Bates vs. State Bar applies only when there is an exception to the prohibition against
advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees for an initial consultation or the
availability upon request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to be charged for the
specific services. No such exception is provided for, expressly or impliedly whether in our former
Canons of Professional Ethics or the present Code of Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the
disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a proviso that the exceptions stand therein are "not
applicable in any state unless and until it is implemented by such authority in that state.”

The Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN The Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the
publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form which is of the same or similar tenor
and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any
activity, operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated
herein.
SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 32329. March 23, 1929.]

In re LUIS B. TAGORDA


LEDESMA v. CLIMACO

G.R. No. No. L-23815, 28 June 1974

FERNANDO, J.:

FACTS:

On 13 October 1964, Adelino Ledesma was appointed Election Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz,
Province of Negros Occidental, thus discharged his duties. As he was counsel de parte for one of the
accused pending in the court, he filed a motion to withdraw, but was denied by the respondent Judge
Rafael Climaco. He was also appointed by the Judge as counsel de oficio for the two defendants. As a
result, he filed an urgent motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio, premised on the policy
of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to render full time service. The volume of work will also
prevent him from handling adequately the defense. However, the Judge still denied the said motion, as
well as the motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT Ledesma, a member of the bar, may withdraw as counsel de oficio, due to an
appointment as Election Registrar.

RULING:

NO, Ledesma may not withdraw as counsel de oficio for the sole reason of his appointment as Election
Registrar.

The provision in the Constitution states that, “Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force,
violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against them.
Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.”

This manifests the indispensable role of a member of the bar in the defense of an accused. What is
incumbent upon him as counsel de oficiomust be fully fulfilled. The ends of justice would be served by
allowing and requiring Ledesma to continue as counsel the officio, since the prosecution has already
rested its case—the case being postponed at least eight (8) times. It was also noted that there was no
incompatibility between his duty to the accused and to the court and the performance of his task as
Election Registrar.

Hence, because of these considerations, it is suffice for petitioner not being allowed to withdraw as
counsel de oficio.
AC. No. 1261 TAN TEK BENG v. DAVID

TAN TEK BENG v. DAVID

A.C. No. 1261

December 29, 1983

FACTS: Tan Tek Beng and Atty. Timoteo David entered an agreement. Where in the agreement lawyer
David did not only agreed to give one-half of his professional fees to an intermediary or commission
agent but he also bound himself not to deal directly with the clients.

However, mutual accusations of double-cross ended such.

Hence, Tan Tek Beng denounced David to the President Assistant, Office of the Civil Relation and to the
Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said agreement is tantamount to malpractice.

RULING: The Court held that the said agreement is void because it was tantamount to malpractice which
is "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents
or brokers”

The practice of law is a profession and not a business.

A lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or through others.

The Court censures David for entering such void and unethical agreement and discountenances his
conduct, not because of the complaints, but because David should have known better.

Respondent is reprimanded for being guilty of malpractice.

Khan vs. Simbillo, A.C No. 5299, August 19, 2003

FACTS:

A paid advertisement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer was published which reads:“Annulment of
Marriage Specialist [contact number]”. Espeleta, a staff of the Supreme Court, called up the number but
it was Mrs. Simbillo who answered. She claims that her husband, Atty. Simbillo was an expert in
handling annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree within 4-6mos provided thecase will not
involve separation of property and custody of children. It appears that similar advertisements were also
published.An administrative complaint was filed which was referred to the IBP for investigation and
recommendation. The IBP resolved to suspend Atty. Simbillo for 1year. Note that although the name of
Atty. Simbillo did not appear in the advertisement, he admitted the acts imputed against him but argued
that he should not be charged. He said that it was time to lift the absolute prohibition against
advertisement because the interest of the public isn’t served in any wayby the prohibition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Simbillo violated Rule2.03 & Rule3.01.

HELD:

Yes! The practice of law is not a business --- it is a profession in which the primary duty is public service
and money. Gaining livelihood is a secondary consideration while duty to public service and
administration of justice should be primary. Lawyers should subordinate their primary interest.Worse,
advertising himself as an “annulment of marriage specialist” he erodes and undermines the sanctity of
an institution still considered as sacrosanct --- he in fact encourages people otherwise disinclined to
dissolve their marriage bond. Solicitation of business is not altogether proscribed but for it to be proper
it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. Note that the law list where the lawyer’s
name appears must be a reputable law list only for that purpose --- a lawyer may not properly publish in
a daily paper, magazine…etc., nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published the contents of which
are likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar.

PCGG vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 151805 (2005)

FACTS:
In 1976 the General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties. GENBANK
had extended considerable financial support to Filcapital Development Corporation causing it to incur
daily overdrawings on its current account with Central Bank. Despite the mega loans GENBANK failed to
recover from its financial woes. The Central Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and
unable to resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public, and ordering
its liquidation. A public bidding of GENBANK’s assets was held where Lucio Tan group submitted the
winning bid. Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza filed a petition with the CFI praying for the assistance
and supervision of the court in GENBANK’s liquidation as mandated by RA 265. After EDSA Revolution I
Pres Aquino established the PCGG to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former Pres Marcos, his
family and cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for
reversion, reconveyance, restitution against respondents Lucio Tan, at.al. PCGG issued several writs of
sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by them by taking advantage of their close relationship
and influence with former Pres. Marcos. The abovementioned respondents Tan, et. al are represented
as their counsel, former Solicitor General Mendoza. PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent
Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan et. al. with Sandiganbayan. It was alleged that Mendoza as
then Sol Gen and counsel to Central Bank actively intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK which was
subsequently acquired by respondents Tan et. al., which subsequently became Allied Banking
Corporation. The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which prohibits former government lawyers from accepting “engagement” or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service. The Sandiganbayan
issued a resolution denyting PCGG’s motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza. It failed to prove the
existence of an inconsistency between respondent Mendoza’s former function as SolGen and his
present employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group. PCGGs recourse to this court assailing the
Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE:
Whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza. The
prohibition states: “A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service.”

HELD:
The case at bar does not involve the “adverse interest” aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent Mendoza, it is
conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he acted as SOlGen and later as counsel of
respondents et.al. before the Sandiganbayan. However there is still the issue of whether there exists a
“congruent-interest conflict” sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza from representing
respondents et. al. The key is unlocking the meaning of “matter” and the metes and bounds of
“intervention” that he made on the matter. Beyond doubt that the “matter” or the act of respondent
Mendoza as SolGen involved in the case at bar is “advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the
said bank’s liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation in CFI of Manila. The Court held that
the advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the “matter”
contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is
clear in stressing that “drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agencyprocedures, regulations
and laws, or briefing abstract principles of law are acts which do not fall within the scope of the term
“matter” and cannot disqualify. Respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the decision of the Central
Bank to liquidate GENBANK. He also did not participate in the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The
legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction
of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. Thus, the Code 6.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention
while SolGen is an intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in the Civil case of
sequestration. In the metes and boundsof the “intervention”. The applicable meaning as the term is
used in the Code of Professional Ethics is that it is an act of a person who has the power to influence the
subject proceedings. The evil sought to be remedied by the Code do not exist where the government
lawyer does not act which can be considered as innocuous such as “ drafting, enforcing, or interpreting
government or agencyprocedures, regulations or laws or briefing abstract principles of law.” The court
rules that the intervention of Mendoza is not significant and substantial. He merely petitions that the
court gives assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK. The role of court is not strictly as a court of justice
but as an agent to assist the Central Bank in determining the claims of creditors. In such a proceeding
the role of the SolGen is not that of the usual court litigator protecting the interest of government.
Petition assailing the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is denied.
Relevant Dissenting Opinion of Justice Callejo:
Rule 6.03 is a restatement of Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics: “ A lawyer, having once held
public office or having been in the public employ, should not after his retirement accept employment in
connection with any matter which he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ.”
Indeed, the restriction against a public official from using his public position as a vehicle to promote or
advance his private interests extends beyond his tenure on certain matters in which he intervened as a
public official. Rule 6.03 makes this restriction specifically applicable to lawyers who once held public
office.” A plain reading shows that the interdiction 1. applies to a lawyer who once served in the
government and 2. relates to his accepting “engagement or employment” in connection with any matter
in which he had intervened while in the service.

Anonuevo vs. Bercasio

https://www.scribd.com/document/254943905/Dia-Anonuevo-v-Bercasio

Cruz vs Salva

https://www.coursehero.com/file/21139288/273399002-15-Cruz-vs-Salva/ dgst

https://www.coursehero.com/file/11055821/Cruz-v-Salva/ for facts and issue lega ethics

[G.R. No. L-30894. March 25, 1970.]

Martelino vs. Alejandro

https://www.scribd.com/document/243332853/MARTELINO-vs-Alejandro-Digest

Pascual vs. Lim

https://www.scribd.com/document/312477042/006-Rivera-Pascual-v-Sps-Lim

Igoy vs. Soriano

https://www.scribd.com/document/365698531/Doroteo-Igoy-vs-Soriano
Reyes v. Gaa

A.M. No. 1048. July 14, 1995.

Per Curiam

FACTS:

Wellington Reyes, complainant, reported to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) that he had been
the victim of extortion by respondent Atty. Salvador Gaa, an Assistant City Fiscal of Manila, who was
investigating a complaint for estafa filed by complainant’s business rival. The NBI agents then
apprehended respondent in an entrapment operation set up by them.

ISSUE:

WON respondent should be disbarred on the grounds of malpractice and willful violation of lawyer’s
oath.

RULING:

Yes. The extortion committed by respondent constitutes misconduct as a public official, which also
constitutes as a violation of his oath as a lawyer. The lawyer’s oath is a source of his obligations and its
violation is a ground for his suspension, disbarment, or other disciplinary action (Agpalo, Legal Ethics 66-
67 [1983]).
Trieste vs Sandiganbayan

Generoso Trieste, Sr., the Municipal Mayor of Numancia, Aklan, was charged by the Tanodbayan with 12
counts of alleged violations of Section 3 (h) of the Anti-Graft Law for having financial or pecuniary
interest in a business, contract or transaction in connection with which said accused intervened or took
part in his official capacity and in which he is prohibited by law from having any interest, to wit the
purchases of construction materials by the municipality from Trigen Agro-Industrial Development
Corporation, of which the accused is the president, incorporator, director and major stockholder.

After trial, the Sandiganbayan rendered the challenged decision, convicting the petitioner in all the
twelve criminal cases.

After the petition for review was filed, petitioner filed an urgent petition to lift the order of the
Sandiganbayan. There having no objection coming from the Solicitor General, the petition was
granted, hence lifting the preventive suspension. A supplemental petition was also filed by petitioner.

The former Solicitor General filed a consolidated comment to the original petition and to the
supplemental petition filed by the petitioner. He argued the dismissal of the petition (the urgent petition
to lift the order of the Sandiganbayan) on the ground that the same raise factual issues which are,
therefore, non-reviewable.

In the briefs, however, the new Solicitor General, filed a “Manifestation For Acquittal,” concluding that:
(1) petitioner has divested his interest with Trigen; (2) Sales of stocks need not be reported to Sec; (3)
Prosecution failed to prove charges; (4) No evidence to prove petitioner approved payment; (5)
Testimonial and documentary evidence confirms that petitioner signed vouchers after payment; etc.

Issue: WON the Solicitor General made a conscientious study and thorough analysis in the case.

Held: Yes. Considering the correct facts now brought to the attention of the Court by the SolGen and in
view of the reassessment made by the Office of the issues and the evidence and the law involved, the
Court takes a similar view that the affirmance of the decision appealed from cannot be rightfully
sustained. The conscientious study and thorough ananlysis made by the Office of the Solicitor General in
this case truly reflects its consciousness of its role as the People’s Advocate in the administration of
justice to the end that the innocent be equally defended and set free just as it has the task of having the
guilty punished.

This court will do no less and, therefore, accepts the submitted recommendation that the decision and
resolution in question of the respondent Sandiganbayan be reversed and that as a matter of justice, the
herein petitioner be entitled to a judgment of acquittal.
Collantes vs. Renomeron

Collantes v. Renomeron (short version)

A.C. No. 3056. AUgust 16, 1991.

Per curiam

FACTS:

Complainant, house counsel for V&G, filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. Vincent Renomeron,
Register of Deeds of Tacloban City, for the latter’s irregular actuations with regards to the application of
V&G for registration of 163 pro forma. Deeds of Absolute Sale with Assignment of lots in its subdivision.

ISSUE:

WON respondent should be disbarred.

RULING:

Yes. The acts of dishonesty and oppression which respondent committed as a public official have
demonstrated his unfitness to practice the high and noble calling of the law.

Another version https://www.scribd.com/doc/306221364/Collantes-vs-Renomeron

PNB vs. Cedo

Facts: PNB filed a complaint against Atty. Cedo for violation of Rule 6.02 that states: A lawyer shall not,
after leaving gov’t. service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter which he
had intervened with in said service. Cedo was the former Asst. Vice-President of the Asset management
Group of PNB.

During Cedo’s stint with PNB, he became involved in 2 transactions: 1.) sale of steel
sheets to Ms. Ong and 2.) intervened in the handling of a loan of spouses Almeda. When a civil action
arose because of #1, Cedo, after leaving the bank appeared as one of the counsel of Ms. Ong. Also,
when #2 was involved in a civil action, the Almedas were represented by the law firmCedo, Ferrer,
Maynigo & Associates of which Cedo was a Senior Partner.

Cedo claims that he did not participate in the litigation of Ms. Ong’s case. He also
claims that even if it was his law firm handling the Almeda case, the case was being handled by Atty.
Ferrer.

Issue: W/N violated Rule 6.02.

Held: Cedo violated Rule 6.02.

In the complexity of what is said in the course of dealings between the atty. and the client,
inquiry of the nature suggested would lead to the revelation, in advance of the trial, of other matters
that might only further prejudice the complainant cause. Whatever may be said as to w/n the atty.
utilized against his former client information given to him in a professional capacity, the mere fact that
their previous relationship should have precluded him from appearing as counsel for the other side.

It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all the

parties concerned after the disclosure of facts. A lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in
behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him to
oppose.
EN BANC

[B.M. No. 1154. June 8, 2004]

IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING IN THE 2002 BAR
EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE SHARIA BAR,

ATTY. FROILAN R. MELENDREZ, petitioner,

FACTS:

1. MELENDREZ filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) a Petition to disqualify Haron S.
Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and to impose on him the appropriate
disciplinary penalty as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar.

1. Alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar Examinations
that he has three (3) pending criminal cases both for Grave Oral Defamation and for Less
Serious Physical Injuries.

i. Meling allegedly uttered defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife
in front of media practitioners and other people.

ii. Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face of Melendrez’ wife
causing the injuries to the latter.

2. Alleges that Meling has been using the title “Attorney” in his communications, as
Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a member of the
Bar.

2. MELING explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases because retired Judge Corocoy
Moson, their former professor, advised him to settle misunderstanding.

1. Believing in good faith that the case would be settled because the said Judge has moral
ascendancy over them, considered the three cases that arose from a single incident as
“closed and terminated.”

i. Denies the charges and added that the acts do not involve moral
turpitude.

2. Use of the title “Attorney,” Meling admits that some of his communications really
contained the word “Attorney” as they were typed by the office clerk.

3. Office of Bar Confidant disposed of the charge of non-disclosure against Meling:

1. Meling should have known that only the court of competent jurisdiction can dismiss
cases, not a retired judge nor a law professor. In fact, the cases filed against Meling are
still pending.

2. Even if these cases were already dismissed, he is still required to disclose the same for
the Court to ascertain his good moral character.
ISSUE:

WON Meling’s act of concealing cases constitutes dishonesty. YES.

HELD:

PETITION IS GRANTED. MEMBERSHIP IS SUSPENDED until further orders from the Court, the suspension
to take effect immediately. Insofar as the Petition seeks to prevent Haron S. Meling from taking the
Lawyer’s Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a member of the Philippine Bar, the same is
DISMISSED for having become moot and academic (Meling did not pass the bar).

1. Rule 7.01: “A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppressing
a material fact in connection with his application for admission to the bar.”

1. He is aware that he is not a member of the Bar, there was no valid reason why he signed
as “attorney” whoever may have typed the
letters. i. Unauthorized use of the appellation “attorney”
may render a person liable for indirect contempt of court.

2. PRACTICE OF LAW IS A HIGH PERSONAL PRIVILEGE.

1. Limited to citizens of good moral character, with special educational qualifications, duly
ascertained and certified.

2. Requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater importance so far as the
general public and the proper administration of justice are concerned, than the
possession of legal learning.

3. Application form of 2002 Bar Examinations requires the applicant that applicant to aver that he
or she “has not been charged with any act or omission punishable by law, rule or regulation
before a fiscal, judge, officer or administrative body, or indicted for, or accused or convicted by
any court or tribunal of, any offense or crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there any pending
case or charge against him/her.”

1. Meling did not reveal that he has three pending criminal cases. His deliberate silence
constitutes concealment, done under oath at that.
[A.C No. 4749. January 20, 2000]

SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., complainant, vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS, respondent.

FACTS: This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed against
respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who for a number of years has not indicated the proper PTR and
IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date & palce of issuance) in his pleadings. If at all, he only indicated “IBP Rizal
259060” but he has been using this for at least 3 years already, as shown by the following attached
sample pleadings in various courts in 1995, 1996 & 1997. Respondent’s last payment of his IBP dues was
in 1991. Since then he has not paid or remitted any amount to cover his membership fees up to the
present. He likewise admit that as appearing in the pleadings submitted by complainant to this Court, he
indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in the pleadings he filed in court, at least for the years 1995, 1996, and
1997, thus misrepresenting that such was his IBP chapter membership and receipt number for the years
in which those pleadings were filed. He claims, however, that he is only engaged in a "limited" practice
and that he believes in good faith that he is exempt from the payment of taxes, such as income tax,
under R.A. No. 7432, as a senior citizen since 1992.

ISSUES: Whether or not the respondent has misled the court about his standing in the IBP by using the
same IBP O.R. number in his pleadings of at least 6 years and therefore liable for his actions.

Whether or not the respondent is exempt from paying his membership dues owing to limited practice of
law and for being a senior citizen.

HELD: Yes. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the public
and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the
Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. His act is also a violation of Rule 10.01 which provides that: A
lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor mislead or allow the
court to be misled by any artifice.

No. Rule 139-A requires that every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay annual dues and default
thereof for six months shall warrant suspension ofmembership and if nonpayment covers a period of 1-
year, default shall be a ground for removal of the delinquent’s name from the Roll of Attorneys. It does
not matter whether or not respondent is only engaged in “limited” practice of law. Moreover, While it is
true that R.A. No. 7432, grants senior citizens "exemption from the payment of individual income taxes:
provided, that their annual taxable income does not exceed the poverty level as determined by the
National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption however does not
include payment of membershipor association dues.
Respondent's failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court
indeed merit the most severe penalty. However, in view of respondent's advanced age, his express
willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more temperate application of the law, we believe the penalty
of one year suspension from the practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is
appropriate. Respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1)
YEAR, or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later.
A.C. No. 2505 February 21, 1992

EVANGELINE LEDA, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. TREBONIAN TABANG, respondent.

PER CURIAM:


VILLASANTA April 30, 1957

In Re Charges of LILIAN F. VILLASANTA for Immorality,

vs.
HILARION M. PERALTA, respondent.

Ramon J. Diaz for respondent.

PARAS, C. J.:

Facts:

Respondent Hilarion, who was already married to Rizalina, courted Lilian who fell in love with him. To
have carnal knowledge of Lilian, Hilarion procured the preparation of a fake marriage contract which
was then a blank document and made Lilian sign it. A week after, Hilarion brought the document back to
Lilian with the signatures of the judge, the civil registrar and two witnesses. Since they lived together as
husband and wife. Sometime later, Lilian insisted on a religious ratification of their marriage. The two
went to a priest who, relying on the falsified marriage contract, solemnized the marriage. Lilian later
discovered that Hilarion was previously married; whereupon, she filed the criminal action for a violation
of Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code and a complaint for immorality before the Supreme Court,
seeking to disqualify Hilarion, a 1954 successful bar candidate, from being admitted to the bar.

Held:

Respondent is immoral. He made mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect
and dignity. His conviction in the criminal case involves moral turpitude. The act of respondent in
contracting the second marriage (even his act in making love to another woman while his first wife is
still alive and their marriage still valid and existing) is contrary to honesty, justice, decency, and morality.
Thus lacking the good moral character required by the Rules of Court, the respondent is hereby declared
disqualified from being admitted to the bar. (Villasanta v. Peralta, 101 Phil. 313)
A.C. No. 244 March 29, 1963

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISBARMENT OF TELESFORO A. DIAO,

vs.
SEVERINO G. MARTINEZ, petitioner.

BENGZON, C.J.:

FACTS:

DIAO was admitted to the Bar. 2 years later, Martinez charged him with having falsely represented in his
application for the Bar examination, that he had the requisite academic qualifications.

Solicitor General investigated and recommended that Diao's name be erased from the roll of attorneys

i. DIAO did not complete pre-law subjects:

1. Did not complete his high school training

2. Never attended Quisumbing College

3. Never obtained a diploma.

DIAO admitting first charge but claims that although he had left high school in his third year, he entered
the service of the U.S. Army, passed the General Classification Test given therein, which (according to
him) is equivalent to a high school diploma

Upon return to civilian life, the educational authorities considered his army service as the equivalent of
3rd and 4th year high school.

No certification. However, it is unnecessary to dwell on this, since the second charge is clearly
meritorious:

i. Never obtained his diploma. from Quisumbing College; and yet his
application for examination represented him as an A.A. graduate.

ii. Now, asserting he had obtained his A.A. title from the Arellano University
in April, 1949

1. He said erroneously certified, due to confusion, as a graduate of Quisumbing College, in his school
records.

ISSUE:

WON DIAO still continue admission to the Bar, for passing the Bar despite not completing pre-law
requirements? NO.

HELD:

STRIKE OUT NME OF DIAO IN ROLL OF ATTORNEYS. DIAO REQUIRED TO RETURN HIS LAWYER’S DIPLOMA
WITHIN 30 DAYS.

Explanation of error or confusion is not acceptable.

Had his application disclosed his having obtained A.A. from Arellano University, it would also have
disclosed that he got it in April, 1949, thereby showing that he began his law studies (2nd semester of
1948-1949) six months before obtaining his Associate in Arts degree.

He would not have been permitted to take the bar tests:

i. Bar applicant must affirm under oath, "That previous to the study of law,
he had successfully and satisfactorily completed the required pre-legal education (A.A.).

ii. Therefore, Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations

iii. Such admission having been obtained under false pretenses must be, and is
hereby revoked.

Passing such examinations is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking the
prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner is equally essential.
[A.C. No. 3910. August 14, 2000]

JOSE S. DUCAT, JR., complainant, vs. ATTYS. ARSENIO C. VILLALON, JR. and CRISPULO
DUCUSIN, respondents.

DECISION

DE LEON, JR., J.:

FACTS WTF THE FACTS ARE GIBBERISH HAHAHA

Villalon is the family lawyer of ducats. the original title of ducat sr was handed to villalon. The handing
over has two contradictory versions of reason, first because it is given as part of process to convey the
land because of the good services of villalon as villalon claimed, on the other hand, allegedly because
the latter

reasoned that he shall check the measurements of the land subject of title as alleged by ducat jr. Ducat
sr allegedly because of his want to give the land to villalon executed a deed of sale of the land in favor of
villalon. But because it was discovered that the land is registered in the name of ducat jr,a deed of sale
was forged to make it appear that there was one, ducusin was the notary public there

Issue:

Ruling: villalon is guilty of gross misconduct for being involved in fraudulent notarization and forgery of
signature. Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper
conduct of a member of the Bar. A lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for any misconduct, whether
in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, in
probity and good demeanor. 1 yr suspension
[A.C. No. 4539. May 14, 1997]

ROMANA R. MALIGSA, complainant, vs. ATTY. ARSENIO FER CABANTING, respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

https://docgo.net/viewdoc.html?utm_source=problem-areas-in-legal-ethics-CeW1uGE
March 3, 1923

In re suspension of VICENTE PELAEZ, attorney,

Juan Sumulong for respondent.

Attorney-General Villa-Real for the Government.

MALCOLM, J.:
PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, A.C. No. 6672
Complainant,
Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

CARPIO,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO and
BERSAMIN, JJ.
ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO,
Respondent. Promulgated:
September 4, 2009

x-----------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:
https://www.scribd.com/doc/115939692/Linsangan-vs-Tolentino
[A.C. No. 4807. March 22, 2000]

MANUEL N. CAMACHO, complainant, vs. ATTYS. LUIS MEINRADO C. PANGULAYAN, REGINA D.

BALMORES, CATHERINE V. LAUREL and HUBERT JOAQUIN P. BUSTOS of PANGULAYAN AND
ASSOCIATES LAW OFFICES, respondents.

D E C I S IO N

VITUG, J.: JVITUG

https://www.scribd.com/document/252955046/Camacho-vs-Pangulayan
G.R. No. L-14277 April 30, 1960

MANUEL L. FERNANDEZ, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ELOY B. BELLO, Judge Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, respondent.

Manuel L. Fernandez in his own behalf.

Office of the Solicitor General Edilberto Barot and Solicitor Jorge R. Coquia for respondent.

LABRADOR, J.:

https://www.scribd.com/document/57287564/Fernandez-v-Judge-Bello-Final
[G.R. No. 114732. August 1, 2000]

ESTRELLA TIONGCO YARED (now deceased) substituted by one of her heirs, CARMEN MATILDE M.
TIONGCO petitioner, vs. HON. RICARDO M. ILARDE, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Br.
26, JOSE B. TIONGCO and ANTONIO G. DORONILA, JR., respondents.

DECISION

DE LEON, JR., J.:

https://www.scribd.com/doc/302911031/Yared-vs-Ilarde
A.M. No. 219 September 29, 1962

CASIANO U. LAPUT, petitioner,

vs.
ATTY. FRANCISCO E.F. REMOTIGUE and ATTY. FORTUNATO P. PATALINGHUG, respondents.

LABRADOR, J.:

https://www.scribd.com/doc/56366899/Laput-v-Remotigue-Legal-Ethics-Digest
ATTY. EDITA NOE-LACSAMANA, A.C. No. 7269

Complainant,

Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

- versus - BRION,

PEREZ,

SERENO, and

REYES, JJ.

ATTY. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE, Promulgated:

Respondent. November 23, 2011

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

https://www.coursehero.com/file/22161959/PALE-COMPILED-DIGESTS/

A.C. No. 9604 March 20, 2013

RODRIGO E. TAPAY and ANTHONY J. RUSTIA, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. CHARLIE L. BANCOLO and ATTY. JANUS T. JARDER, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

https://edoc.site/1-and-2-digest-pdf-free.html
G.R. No. L-23959 November 29, 1971

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU), ENRIQUE ENTILA & VICTORIANO
TENAZAS petitioners,
vs.
BINALBAGAN ISABELA SUGAR COMPANY, COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, & QUINTIN
MUNING respondents.

Cipriano Cid & Associates for petitioners.

Ceferino Magat and Manuel C. Gonzales for respondent Quintin Muning.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

https://www.scribd.com/document/208275415/Legal-Ethics-Digest-Case-21-40
G.R. No. L-46537 July 29, 1977

JOSE GUBALLA, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. EDUARDO P. CAGUIOA, RICARDO G. CARLOS and DOMINGO FORTEZA,
JR., respondents.

SANTOS, J:

https://www.scribd.com/document/338836002/Anna-legal-Ethics-Digest
The alleged fact that the person who represented petitioner at the initial stage of the litigation, i.e.,
the filing of an Answer and the pretrial proceedings, turned out to be not a member of the Bar 8 did
not amount to a denial of petitioner's day in court. It should be noted that in the subsequent stages of the
proceedings, after the rendition of the judgment by default, petitioner was duly represented by bona
fide members of the Bar in seeking a reversal of the judgment for being contrary to law and jurisprudence
and the existence of valid, legal and justifiable defenses. In other words, petitioner's rights had been
amply protected in the proceedings before the trial and appellate courts as he was subsequently assisted
by counsel. Moreover, petitioner himself was at fault as the order of treatment as in default was
predicated, not only on the alleged counsel's failure to attend the pretrial conference on April 6, 1972, but
likewise on his own failure to attend the same, without justifiable reason. To allow this petition due course
is to countenance further delay in a proceeding which has already taken well over six years to resolve,
[A.C. No. 3066. December 3, 2001]

J.K. MERCADO AND SONS AGRICULTURAL ENTERPRISES, INC., and SPOUSES JESUS and ROSARIO K.
MERCADO, complainants, vs. ATTY. EDUARDO C. DE VERA and JOSE RONGKALES
BANDALAN, respondents.

RESOLUTION

VITUG, J.:


[G.R. No. 100138. August 5, 1992.]

FIVE J TAXI AND/OR JUAN S. ARMAMENTO, Petitioners, v. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, DOMINADOR SIBAYAN AND JOSE SALCEDO, Respondents.