Вы находитесь на странице: 1из 4

17.) Cabuay Jr. vs. Malvar, GR No.

123780, September 24, 2002

In 1936, Hermogenes Lopez filed his homestead application docketed as Homestead
application No. 138612 for the land in Barrio De La Paz, Antipolo City that he inherited from his
father, Fermin Lopez, upon knowing that the said application was not acted upon. Hermogenes
continued to occupy the land until he transferred his rights to Ambrosio Aguilar. Records show
though that the said land was registered in the name of Fernando Gorospe under Original
Certificate of Title 537. Gorospe, in turn, sold the land to spouses Salvador and Rosario De
Tagle. Tagle sold the land to Antonio Zuzuarregui Sr., who issued TCT 7357. When Antonio died,
the property was adjudicated to his widow, Beatriz. Beatriz Zuzuarregui sold the land to
Eduardo Santos.

Lopez filed a complaint for annulment of Oct 537. However this was dismissed on the
complaint that Lopez was not the real party-in-interest since he sold the property to Aguilar.
Aguilar was then prompted to file similar action against the defendants. The courts rendered
judgment in favor of Aguilar, declaring him the true and lawful owner of the land.

Lopez heirs on July, 16, 1984 filed a complaint of cancellation of the deed of sale
between Hermogenes and Aguilar over the land, alleging that Hemrogenes was “insufficiently
educated” when he made the sale. Court rendered its decision declaring void an initio the
Lopez-Aguilar deed of sale and restoring the Lopez heirs’ possession. Adia heris filed a separate
action for partial quashal of the writ of execution with application for preliminary injuction
against the Lopez heirs’. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. Adia heirs then filed filed
a protest with the Land Management Bureau hoping that the property be titled to their names.
LMB disregarded the final decision of SC and ordered the reconstruction of the homestead
application of Adia. Lopez heirs together with Dr. Potenciano Malvar, who bought a portion of
the land, filed a motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution of the decision. This
caused Col. Pedro Cabuay Jr. to file with the SC petition for clarification as to the validity and
forceful effect the final and executoy but conflicting decisions. Malvar then filed a motion for
reconsideration with alternative prayer for referral to the court en banc.

Who lawfully owns the subject property, between the Lopez heirs and Adia heirs?
The weight of evidence and jurisprudence shows that the Lopez heirs are the lawful owners
of the land in controversy. The First Division, through Justice Emilio A. Gancayco, recognizes the
right of ownership of Hermogenes Lopez over the property by reason of his continuous
possession since 1920 and his full compliance with the requirements by the Public Land Act for
the issuance of a homestead patent. Hermogenes Lopez complied with the requirements of the
Public Land Act.
In the early part of 1936, Hermogenes Lopez went to the Bureau of Lands and inquired
about his father’s homestead application. He was informed that said application was still
unacted upon and was advised to apply in his own name. He complied and his application was
docketed as homestead application No. 138612. Subsequently, he was able to prove
compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Act and, as a matter of course, the land
was surveyed by a government surveyor and on 7 February 1939 the resulting plan H-138612
was approved by the Director of Lands. The latter thereafter ordered the issuance of the
corresponding patent in the name of Hermogenes Lopez (page 33, Rollo). He has been in actual
and continuous possession thereof and was recognized as its owner until he transferred his
rights to Ambrosio Aguilar, private respondent herein, on 31 July 195.
With the ruling of this Court in G.R. No. 90380 that Hermogenes Lopez is the lawful owner,
LMB Director Abelardo Palad should have refrained from adjudicating the property to the Adia
heirs since it ceased to be of the public domain and beyond his authority to dispose of.
To be more precise, the property became the private property of Hermogenes Lopez as
early as 1950, or after the lapse of 30 years of continued possession by Hermogenes and his
father Fermin Lopez that began in 1920. This is so because jurisprudence consistently declares
that the mere lapse of the statutory period of 30 years of open, continuous and exclusive
possession of disposable public land automatically transforms the same into private property
and vests title on the possessor.
19.) Tomawis vs Balindong, GR No. 182434, March 5, 2010
Respondents Amma A. Pumbaya, Jaliliah A. Mangompia, and Ramila A. Musor, filed with
the Shari’a District Courts (SDCs) an action for quieting a title of a parcel of land in Banggolo,
Marawi City against petitioner Sultan Jerry Tomawis. Respondents allege that they are the
absolute owners of the land, being the legal heirs of Acraman Radia. Tomawis debunked the
sisters’ claims and raised a motion to dismiss SDCs lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the case. As argued that, the regular civil court have jurisdiction over the said case and not the
Whether or not the Shari’a District Courts has jurisdiction over the action for quieting
the title of a parcel of land.
Petitioners claim has no basis. The allegations, as well as the relief sought by private
respondents, the elimination of the cloud of doubts on the title of ownership on the subject
land, are within the SDCs jurisdiction to grant.
PD 1083 created the Shari’a Courts, classified as regular courts, in which Art 143 of PD
1083 vests in certain cases exclusive original jurisdiction over certain causes of action.
Subsequently BP 129, later amended by RA 7691, took effect which vests the RTC or the MTC
exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions that involve the title or possession of real
property. BP 129 was enacted to reorganize only existing civil courts and is a law of general
application to the judiciary. In contrast, PD 1083 is a special law that only applies to Sharia
It was held that a general law and a special law on the same subject are statutes in pari
materia and should be read together and harmonized, if possible, with a view to giving effect to
both. In the instant case, it applies the principle generalia specialibus non derogant. A general
law does not nullify a special law. The general law will yield to the special law in the specific and
particular subject embraced in the latter. BP 129 and PD 1083 must be read and construed
together, then by taking PD 1083 as an exception to the general law to reconcile the two laws.
This is so since the legislature has not made any express repeal or modification of PD 1083, and
it is well-settled that repeals of statutes by implication are not favored. Implied repeals will not
be declared unless the intent of the legislators is manifest. Laws are assumed to be passed only
after careful deliberation and with knowledge of all existing ones on the subject, and it follows
that the legislature did not intend to interfere with or abrogate a former law relating to the
same subject matter
SDC has exclusive original jurisdiction over all actions arising from contracts customary
to Muslims to the exclusion of the RTCs, as the exception under PD 1083, while both courts
have concurrent original jurisdiction over all other personal actions.
20.) Kabigting vs Acting Director of Prisons, GR No. L-1554, October 30, 1962


Petitioner Jose Kabigting for the third time filed a petition for Habeas Corpus. Since
January 5, 1938 he has been serving prison terms by virtue of final judgments of conviction in
nineteen criminal cases. His first two petitions were denied. On his third petition for Habeas
Corpus, petitioner alleges that he had overserved the total period of his prison terms.
Respondent Director of Prisons opposed this petition. On April 23, 1959 the court a
quo rendered its decision and held that petitioner had already served more than the maximum
period of his prison terms and consequently ordered the Director of Prisons to release him from
custody "unless held on charges other than those mentioned and covered in this Proceeding”.
The Solicitor General, representing the Director of Prisons, filed a notice of appeal from the
decision and an urgent motion for the re-arrest of petitioner. The Court of First Instance of Rizal
Judge Felix Domingo presiding, gave due course to the appeal and ordered petitioner's re-
arrest, but allowed him to post a bail bond in the amount of P5,000.00 for his temporary liberty
pending appeal.


Whether or not the respondent's appeal has been properly taken, considering first the
time element and secondly the fact that petitioner had already been released, which release,
he now contends, rendered the decision appealed from final and executor.


Yes, the respondent’s appeal was properly taken. The respondent, thru the office of the
Solicitor General, received a copy of the decision at 12:25 in the afternoon of Saturday, April 25,
1959, and since the next day, being Sunday, was not be included in the computation of the 24-
hour period, the appeal interposed by respondent at 9:45 in the morning of the following
Monday, April 271959, was timely.

With respect to the release of the petitioner, which was carried out by the
Superintendent of the Bureau of Prisons in Manila, in whose office petitioner was then detailed,
there can be no doubt that the same was premature and contrary to law, for according to
section 20 of Rule 41,"a judgment remanding the person detained to the custody of the officer
or person detaining him shall not be stayed by appeal (but) a judgment releasing the person
detained shall not be effective until the officer or person detaining has been given opportunity
to appeal; (and) an appeal taken by such officer or person shall stay the order of release unless
the person detained shall furnish a satisfactory bond in an amount fixed by the court or judge
rendering the judgment."