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Cyber war impossible – cyber attacks are less violent than traditional attacks

and aren’t acts of war


Rid ’13 Professor of Strategic Studies at Johns Hopkins University [Thomas Rid, 4 September
2013, accessed 14 April 2019, “Why a Cyber War won’t Happen”, New Scientist,
https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21929334-800-why-a-cyberwar-wont-happen/]//lex mr

EXACTLY two decades ago, the RAND Corporation, an influential think tank, proclaimed that “cyberwar is coming!” In 2005, the
US Air Force declared it would now “fly, fight, and win in cyberspace”. The future of war would surely play out in that fifth domain,
on top of land, sea, air and space. Dark warnings of “Cyber Pearl Harbor” soon became a staple of Washington discourse. Leaks
revealed last week that the US government spends a staggering $4.3 billion a year on cyber operations. In 2011, American intelligence
agencies reportedly mounted 231 offensive operations. The US, it seems, is gearing up for cyber combat. What would an act of
cyberwar look like? History suggests three features. To count as an armed attack, a computer breach would
need to be violent. If it can’t hurt or kill, it can’t be war. An act of cyberwar would also need to be
instrumental. In a military confrontation, one party generally uses force to compel the other party to do something they would
otherwise not do. Finally, it would need to be political, in the sense that one opponent says, “If you don’t do X, we’ll
strike you.” That’s the gist of two centuries of strategic thought. No past cyberattack meets these criteria. Very few
meet even a single one. Never has a human been injured or hurt as an immediate consequence of
a cyberattack. Never did a state coerce another state by cyberattack. Very rarely did state-sponsored offenders take credit for an
attack. So if we’re talking about war – the real thing, not a metaphor, as in the “war on drugs” – then cyberwar has never happened in
the past, is not taking place at present, and seems unlikely in the future. That is not to say that cyberattacks do not happen. In 2010, the
US and Israel attacked Iran’s nuclear enrichment programme with a computer worm called Stuxnet. A computer breach could cause an
electricity blackout or interrupt a city’s water supply, although that also has never happened. If that isn’t war, what is it? Such attacks
are better understood as either sabotage, espionage or subversion. Code-borne sabotage is a real risk. Industrial control systems run all
sorts of things that move fast and can burn: trains, gas pipelines, civilian aircraft, refineries, even elevators and medical devices. Many
of these are highly susceptible to breaches, and information about system vulnerabilities is easily available. Even so, the number
of violent computer-sabotage attacks against Western targets is zero. Why? Because causing havoc
through weaponised code is harder than it looks. Target intelligence is needed. Control systems are often configured
for specific tasks, limiting the possibility of generic attacks. Even if they happened, such attacks may not constitute a use of force. The
second threat is cyber espionage. Data breaches are not just a risk, but a real bleeding wound for the US, Europe and other advanced
economies. But espionage is not war, and cyber espionage is not cyberwar. Finally, there is subversion – using social media and other
internet services to undermine established authority. It is not a surprise that subversives, from Anonymous and Occupy to Arab
protesters, use new technologies. Twitter and Facebook have made organising non-violent protest easier than ever, often in the service
of liberty and freedom. But again, subversion is not war, and cyber subversion is not cyberwar. There are other problems with the
concept of cyberwar. First, it is misleading. Closer examination of the facts reveals that what is happening is the opposite of war:
computer breaches are less violent than old-style attacks. Violent sabotage is harder if it is done
through computers, while non-violent sabotage is now easier and is happening more often: crashing websites, deleting files and
so on. The same goes for espionage: infiltrating software and opening remote back doors is much less risky than sending in human
agents and clandestinely bugging embassy walls. Talk of cyberwar is also disrespectful. Last year, the US Department of Defense
considered creating a new Distinguished Warfare Medal for drone operators and developers of computer attacks. Real combat veterans
protested vehemently when they learned that the award would have ranked higher than the Purple Heart. Secretary of Defense Chuck
Hagel then scrapped the idea. Ending or saving the life of another human is an existential experience; deleting or modifying data is
not. Talk of cyberwar also kills nuance. Intelligence agencies have started to take “cyber” seriously. By doing so, signals-intelligence
agencies such as the US National Security Agency and the UK’s GCHQ, as well as human intelligence agencies, are updating their
tradecraft for the 21st century. The West is beginning to have an overdue debate about what kind of intelligence activity is legitimate
for a 21st century democracy, and where red lines should be drawn. Drawing these lines requires subtlety. It is time for this debate to
drop the prefix “cyber” and call a spade a spade: espionage is espionage. Finally, talk of cyberwar is in the interest of those with a
harsher vision of the web’s future. Many countries are tempted to take control of their “cyberspace”. Authoritarian states like to tweak
their technical infrastructure, their national laws and their firewalls to “protect sovereignty in cyberspace”, as they like to say – which
in practice means protecting intellectual property thieves from foreign pressure and rounding up dissidents at home. The armed forces
need to stay focused on fighting and winning the real wars of the future. That’s hard enough. Let us not militarise the struggle for the
free and liberal internet today.

No nuclear terror – states won’t hand over nukes to terrorists


Lieber and Press ’13 KEIR A. LIEBER is Associate Professor in the Security Studies Program at
Georgetown, DARYL G. PRESS is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College and
Coordinator of the War and Peace Studies Program at the John Sloan Dickey Center for International
Understanding. (Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, 9/13, accessed 4/14/19, “States will not give
nuclear weapons to terrorists”, Harvard Kennedy School,
https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/states-will-not-give-nuclear-weapons-terrorists)//lex mr
If a state were undeterrable—that is, if its leaders did not fear retaliation— it would presumably conduct a
nuclear strike itself rather than subcontract the job to a terrorist group, ensuring that the weapons were used against the
desired target at the desired time (not against a target ultimately chosen by terrorists). The calculated, “back-door”
approach of transferring weapons to terrorists makes sense only if a state fears retaliation. The
core of the nuclear- attack-by-proxy argument is that a state otherwise deterred by the threat of retaliation might conduct an
attack if it could do so surreptitiously by passing nuclear weapons to terrorists. Giving
nuclear capability to a
terrorist group with which the state enjoys close relations and substantial trust could allow the
state to conduct the attack while avoiding devastating punishment.

Some analysts are skeptical about such sponsored nuclear terrorism, arguing that a state may
not be willing to deplete its small nuclear arsenal or stock of precious nuclear materials. More
important, a state sponsor would fear that a terrorist organization might use the weapons or
materials in ways the state never intended, provoking retaliation that would destroy the
regime.14 Nuclear weapons are the most powerful weapons a state can acquire, and handing that
power to an actor over which the state has less than complete control would be an enormous,
epochal decision—one unlikely to be taken by regimes that are typically obsessed with power
and their own survival.

Perhaps the most important reason to doubt the nuclear-attack-by-proxy scenario is the
likelihood that the ultimate source of the weapon might be discovered.15 One means of
identifying the state source of a nuclear terrorist attack is through “nuclear forensics”—the use
of a bomb’s isotopic fingerprints to trace the missile material device back to the reactors, enrichment
facilities, or uranium mines from which it was derived. In theory, the material that remains after an
explosion can yield crucial information about its source: the ratio of uranium isotopes varies
according to where the raw uranium was mined and how it was processed, and the composition of
weapons-grade plutonium reveals clues about the particular reactor used to produce it and how long
the material spent in the reactor.16 The possibility that the covert plot could be discovered before
being carried out also acts as a deterrent. For these and other reasons, some analysts argue that
nuclear terrorism is unlikely.

Tech solves – precision farming increases yields and lowers costs


Kite-Powell ’18 --- Degree in political and government contributions, Forbes journalist (Jennifer Kite-
Powell, 4/30/18, accessed 4/14/19, “Why Precision Agriculture will Change How Food is Produces”,
Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/jenniferhicks/2018/04/30/why-precision-agriculture-will-change-
how-food-is-produced/#753d4cbc6c65)//lex mr
Food waste during the production process is costly to the environment and economically. According to a McKinsey &
Company report in 2016 on how big data will revolutionize the global food chain, about one-third of all food is lost during
production each year globally in developing and emerging countries, while at the same time, 795 million people go hungry.
Food loss and wastes cost about $940 Billion and have a carbon footprint of 4.4 Gt CO2-equivalent which is more than
eight percent of global greenhouse-gas emissions. Precision agriculture is predicted to target this problem, and by 2020,
this market is expected to grow from $730 Million to $2.42 Billion by 202o. Technology
like drones, radio
frequency (RF), autonomous tractors and IoT applications are playing a role in the
transformation of agriculture. In March 2018, the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) released a statement
indicating that the number of commercial drones and drone operators will quadruple over the next five years with almost
a half a million drones in action by 202o. Combined with the advancements in drone technology and the impact the
technology can have on farm production and irrigation, the commercial drone market is quickly expanding to cover new
industries and applications like agriculture. RF technology, invented in 1895, has seen consistent advances
over time and is now being applied to precision agriculture in drones, smart sensors, and autonomous tractors.
According to Kim Niederman, CEO, Freewave, RF tech provides the communications backbone for autonomous vehicle
Real-Time Kinematics (RTK), drone deployment and smart sensor ecosystems. "Real-Time Kinematics comes from the
combination of RF and GPS which allows autonomous tractors to navigate and course-correct throughout crops with up to
one-centimeter of accuracy. A wireless Machine-to-Machine (M2M) network with wireless RF devices installed has the
potential to solve major connectivity issues in autonomous agricultural settings," said Niederman. "An RF-powered
drone can help optimize resources such as fresh water, fertilizers, and pesticides as well as
identify healthy and unhealthy crops and irrigation problems." Niederman says that smart sensors can be
applied to soil monitoring to pivot irrigation but that RF is more efficient and affordable in remote sensor ecosystems that
need to transmit data beyond cellular or Wi-Fi range. "While automation isn’t new to the agriculture industry, the use of
drones to make farm production more precise is still in its infancy," said Niederman. "As human populations increase,
utilizing every centimeter of arable land and conserving resources is paramount to meet demand and for sustainable
agriculture systems." Niederman says that for agriculture, especially as it relates to irrigation, it makes sense for farmers
to begin leveraging RF to help boost production, lower costs and conserve precious resources like
water. "Farmers can deploy drones to get real-time data of their fields to identify issues such as irrigation problems or
poor performance areas," added Niederman. For example, if a sensor in the field detects crops are being over or under-
watered, or if the soil doesn’t have enough nutrients, it can automatically alert drones to be deployed to scope out if it’s an
issue with the irrigation system, what the soil condition looks like, or even if it’s a false-read. Or, when the drone flies over
farmland, it can also send back video and multispectral images that can observe the differences between healthy and
unhealthy crops and then notify resources to be deployed accordingly. This helps farmers see issues they may not be able
to see regularly, especially if they have survey hundreds of acres. Michael Chasen, CEO, PrecisionHawk, said that to
optimize farm management decisions, farmers continuously have to make trade-offs based on different parcels of land.
"For example, say a farmer can only collect data over half of their fields in one day using the ‘old’ method. The farmer
looks at half the fields and decides to fertilize field 14. Unfortunately, field 22, which the farmers didn’t get to that day, is
the field that needs to be fertilized immediately," said Chasen. "By
capturing data over your entire operation,
you can catch the most pressing issues early enough to make an adjustment. When you are flying in
visual line of sight, you just cannot acquire all that information in one day." Maxime Carre, a young farmer, connects his
tablet to a high-speed radio internet network (THD) before working in the fields on April 3, 2018, in Allerey-sur-Saone,
Burgundy, central France. (Photo credit: PHILIPPE DESMAZES/AFP/Getty Images) Chasen adds that a critical
agricultural trend to consider is the fact that farms are continuing to consolidate. "Farmers need technologies that can
provide impact at scale. But as farms get bigger they cannot trade growth for sub-optimal decision making, or they won’t
achieve the efficiencies or outputs expected through the consolidation," said Chasen. Niederman points out that accurate
positioning of equipment is essential to conserve resources and target needed areas of the field. Poor to non-existent
wireless coverage in rural areas has prevented the adoption of smart sensor networks and process control in irrigation and
other agricultural processes. "With smart device connectivity over long ranges and low power consumption, RF provides
reliable connectivity for pivot and smart irrigation systems," adds Niederman "In just a few years, drones have emerged as
a transformative force for business intelligence and operations—a 2017 study by Price Waterhouse Cooper found the value
of drone-powered solutions is more than $127 billion," said Chasen. "There is exceptional value for applications in
agriculture—these small unmanned aircraft had allowed us to see farther and gather information before that was too
expensive, dangerous or impractical to get. However, some of the most valuable applications of drone technology in
agriculture remain impossible to execute without with ability to fly drones Beyond the Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS)."
Flying drones over long distances, imperative for inspecting hundreds of acres of crops, has been difficult to-date because
the FAA requires very high safety standards from operators seeking to fly drones beyond where they can visually be seen
(BVLOS). Under the FAA-sponsored initiative, the Pathfinder Program, PrecisionHawk gathered data over a three year
period to better understand the expansion of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) operations and create recommendations
for BVLOS training and technology to maximize safety for the next wave of drone use. According to Chasen,
PrecisionHawk believes that expanding drone operations to BVLOS will change the game for farmers. "In agriculture
today, drones are being used on a field-by-field basis. This creates a logistical challenge for large farming operations.
Flying drones BVLOS allows the grower to gather data across his/her entire operation at one time," said Chasen. "Of
course, this saves time and money simply regarding how a grower gets around his field, but the real power lies in
collecting a one-to-one comparison of each field at the same point in time." Chasen hopes the blueprint provided through
the final Pathfinder Report will allow businesses to fly BVLOS so the sizeable sophisticated farm can achieve both scale
and consistency from an information-gathering perspective. "That being said, this isn’t just a technology development that
will help larger operations in their farm management decisions. This expansion of drone operations will equally support
the crop consultants who work for family farms and generally are paid by the acre," said Chasen. "The ability to fly drones
BVLOS will allow the crop consultant to scale their own operation." "Instead of reaching 10 farms a day, they can reach
100, thereby reaching more growers across more land, but at the same cost. This will allow them to then deliver those cost
savings back to the family farmer who is now getting better, more consistent data to manage their operation at a lower
cost," adds Chasen. As automation and connectivity continue to make their way into agriculture, and agriculture
companies like John Deere create technology ecosystems that combine unmanned tractors, drones,
and other precisions equipment, farmers will be making smarter production decisions,
increasing crop yields making farms more efficient.

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