Journal of Religious Ethics, Inc

The Confessing Animal in Foucault and Wittgenstein

Author(s): Bob Plant
Source: The Journal of Religious Ethics, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Dec., 2006), pp. 533-559
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 THE CONFESSING ANIMAL IN FOUCAULT
AND WITTGENSTEIN

BobPlant

ABSTRACT
In The HistoryofSexuality,Foucaultmaintainsthat"Westernman has
becomea confessing animal"(1990,59),thusimplying that"man"was not
alwayssuch a creature.On a relatedpoint,Wittgenstein suggeststhat
"manis a ceremonialanimal"(1996,67); herethe suggestionis thathu-
manbeingsare,bytheirverynature,ritualistically inclined.In thispaper
I examinethiscrucialdifference in emphasis,firstbyreconstructing Fou-
cault's"genealogy" ofconfession,and subsequently byexploring relevant
facetsofWittgenstein'slaterthinking.Whilethereare significant correla-
tionsbetweenFoucaultand Wittgenstein, an importantdisparityemerges
in relationto thequestionofthe"natural."By critically analyzingthis,I
showhowWittgenstein's minimalnaturalismprovidesan important cor-
rectiveto Foucault'smoreextravagant claims.Byimplication,we see why
and/orconstructivist
any radicalrelativist,historicist, positionbecomes
untenableon Wittgensteinian grounds,eventhoughWittgenstein himself
is oftenread as promotingsuchviews.
key words: Foucault,Wittgenstein, genealogy,confession, historicism,
naturalism

Iffleasdevelopeda rite,it wouldbe basedon thedog.

-Wittgenstein(1996,73).

Foucault'sGenealogyofConfession
1. Reconstructing
Foucaultdescribeshis laterworkas an attemptto disassemblethe
"philosophy ofthe subject"bymeansofa genealogyofthe modernsub-
- thatis, as "something
ject as a historicaland culturalreality thatcan
eventuallychange"(1997a, 176-7).Althoughhis projecttakesa number
ofthematicroutes,I will focuson his analysisofhowwe have cometo
see sexualdesireas a keyto revealingthe"deeplyburiedtruth. . . about
ourselves"(1990,69; see also 1982,208). For,accordingto Foucault,this
alleged"truthofsex" will (or so we have cometo believe)enable us to
answerthe question"Whoam I?" (1997a, 135; see also 1990,61, 64-8,
77; 1996,214), and therebyfacilitateour"liberation" (1990, 159).

JRE34.4:533-559.© 2006Journal
ofReligiousEthics,Inc.

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534 JournalofReligiousEthics

1.1 Sex,truth,and theobligationtospeak

At a timewhentheverbalizationofsexual practicesand desiresper-
meatescontemporary life,Foucault'sanalysesseemespeciallypertinent.
Although our mass-media confessional has displacedthetraditionalre-
ligious on
fixation guilt, it nevertheless bears witnessto our apparent
needtopass "everything having to do with sexthrough theendlessmillof
speech"(1990,21; see also 20, 23-5, 32-3). Still,theimplications ofFou-
cault'sgenealogy - notablyhis insistencethatthe subjectis fundamen-
tallymalleable- openshis workontobroaderphilosophicalhorizons.1
ForFoucaultthepresupposition that"thereis something hiddenin our-
selves"and thatwe are therefore "alwaysin a self-illusion thathides
thesecret"(1997a,247) constitutes a conceptualheritagewithprofound
ethical-political
significance (1990,34-5, 69). Indeed,in his attemptto
dismantlethispicture,2 Foucaulthopesto openthepossibility for"new
formsofsubjectivity" (1982,216).3Thushe dreamsofa futurewherewe
nolongerunderstand"therusesofsexuality," howwe be-
and specifically
cameso obsessedwithendlessly"forcing itssecret,ofexactingthetruest
ofconfessions froma shadow"(1990, 159). ForFoucaultthen,subjectiv-
ityis not"given,"(1997a, 262) buthistorically constructed (1998,462).
As such,whatultimately concernshimare thevariousways"discourses"
cometo "transform humanbeingsintosubjects"(1982,208).
In thisenterprise Foucaultdoesnot,however, depictthesimpleimpo-
sitionofanonymousdiscoursesupondocilebeings.Althoughoppression
obviouslyoccurs(1997a, 283, 288-9), he insiststhat powerrelations,
whenexaminedin theirparticularity (1980, 198-200; 1982,211; 1990,
83-5), are multidimensional. It is therefore insufficient
to characterize
powerunilaterally in termsofmaster/slave (1990,82, 90-1; 1997a,283).
Rather,Foucaultwants to emphasizethat "poweris always present"
(1997a,292; see also 1982,209; 1996,210).Althoughhe was temporarily
preoccupiedwithmethodsofdomination(and essentiallypassive sub-
jects),4in Foucault'slaterworkpoweris seen as beingproductive in our
to
coming "decipher"(1997a, 224) ourselves as subjects(1991, 11; see
also 1997a,290).5

1See Foucault's
(partially)positiveevaluationofSartre(Foucault1997a,262).
1Thoughthis
picturecannotcasuallybe dismissedas "confused ideas and illusions"
(Foucault1990,157;see also 1998,461-62).
The problem"is notto discoverin oneselfthetruthofone'ssex,but... to use one's
sexualityhenceforth to arriveat a multiplicity ofrelationships"
(Foucault1997a, 135;
see also 135-38,140,153,157-60,163-65,170-71,182).Foran accountofhowFoucault
enactedthisin his ownlife,see Miller1994.
4 See Rabinow'sremarksin Foucault
1991,11.Notealso Foucault'sacknowledgment of
thisshortcoming (1997a,225).
5Ofcentral hereis Foucault'sanalysisofhowbothasceticism(a processof
importance
"careoftheself [1997a,227]) and aestheticism (the"transformationofone'sself [131])

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 Animalin Foucaultand Wittgenstein 535
The Confessing

This "hermeneutics ofoneself"(1997a, 182) is mostpersuasivelyre-

constructed in the firstvolumeofTheHistoryofSexuality.ThereFou-
caultinvestigates howsexualityhas beendiscursively "managed"(1990,
24; see also Dreyfusand Rabinow1982,176);thatis,howthediscourses
aboutsexualityhave facilitatedcertainkindsofbehaviorand language
(1997a, 125-6). Foucault'scentralthesishereis thatourpictureofthe
(allegedly)"repressive" past (ofa societydetermined to "censor"[1990,
23] the discoursesofsex) is essentiallymistaken(1990, 17, 73; 1997a,
126),forthesediscourseshave in factmultiplied(1990,53). Contrary to
theorthodox picturethen,Foucaulttalksofa "discursive explosion"(17),
a "dispersion ofcentresfrom whichdiscoursesemanated"(34),anda "pro-
liferation ofdiscourses" which "gathered momentum fromtheeighteenth
century onward" (18; see also 23-4, 33-4, 69, 72). Here we are notdeal-
ing with a single discourse on sex,but with a "multiplicity ofdiscourses"
functioning in such diverse fieldsas "biology, medicine,psychiatry, psy-
chology, ethics.. .andpoliticalcriticism" (33). No doubtcertaindiscourses
wereheavilypoliced,butevenherewe donotfinda straightforward "im-
position of silence."Rather, sex came tobe talked about in numerous dif-
ferentways(27). Moreover, this"discursiveexplosion"was itselfdriven
byan "obligation," "imperative" (20-1), or "injunction to speak"(1997a,
224) (an "institutional incitement to speak about [sex],and todo so more
and more"[1990,18]).Forsuchincitements weresimilarly "orchestrated
fromall quarters,apparatuseseverywhere forlisteningand recording,
procedures forobserving, questioning, andformulating. In short,sexwas
drivenoutofhidingand constrained tolead a discursiveexistence"(33).
As such,Foucaultinsists,we mustgiveup thinkingofthe eighteenth
and nineteenth centuriesas eras ofunprecedented sexualinhibition and
repression (49).

silence,and thestruggling
1.2 Confession, soul
Whathas alreadybecomeapparentin ourreconstruction ofFoucault's
genealogyis his preoccupation withdiscourse. became
Sexuality centered
around"verbalization"6 insofaras an "imperativewas established"to
"transform. . . desire. . . intodiscourse";to pass "everything
havingto do
withsex throughtheendlessmillofspeech"(1990,21; see also 20, 23-5,
32-3).Accordingly, Foucaultturnshisattention toconfessional
practices,
and howthesecameto permeatesecularlife.In whatare,I believe,the
keypassages fromTheHistoryofSexuality,he thusdeclares:

figuredin thepassagefrompaganculture"through thewholeofChristianity, andperhaps

beyond"(1998,461; see also 1997a,191,195,224,261-62,269,271,279).
6 Indeed,an "immense verbosity"(Foucault1990,33; see also 1997a,126,175-76,243-
44, 249).

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536 JournalofReligiousEthics

Westernsocietieshave establishedtheconfession as one ofthemainritu-

als we relyonfortheproduction techniques. . . the
oftruth. . . confessional
development ofmethodsofinterrogation and inquest. . . the settingup of
tribunalsofInquisition:all thishelpedtogivetheconfession a centralrole
in the orderofciviland religiouspowers. . . [T]heconfession becameone
oftheWest'smosthighlyvaluedtechniquesforproducing truth.Wehave
sincebecomea singularlyconfessing society. . . Westernman has become
a confessinganimal[Foucault1990,58-9].

AlthoughFoucault'sprincipaltargethere is psychoanalysis - the most

obvioussecularbenefactor ofconfessional techniques(1980,216-9; Bok
1986,79)- he neverthelessstresseshowconfession came to encompass
suchdiversefieldsas "justice,medicine, education,familyrelationships,
and love relations. . . the mostordinaryaffairsofeverydaylife"(1990,
59).7 It is unsurprising thenthatFoucaultshouldfocuson thedevelop-
mentofChristianity's own"permanent hermeneutics" (1997a, 182)8of
the self.Indeed,he maintainsthat"Christianity is a confession"(178;
myemphasis)insofaras itsconcernwith"truth" doesnotmerelypertain
to the propositional truthsofdoctrine,but also the exhibitionofone's
secretinnerlife,where"everyone is obligedto tellthesethingsto other
people, and thus to bear witnessagainsthimself"(1997a, 178; see also
1982,214). For Christianity then the selfis neitherunproblematic nor
a merechimera.Rather,subjectivity is constitutedin termsofits prob-
lematicstatus,9therebycallingforthe urgent"task ofclearingup all
theillusions,temptations, and seductionsthatcan occurin themind"in
orderthatthe"realityofwhatis goingonwithinourselves"(1997a, 178)
can be regulated.10 Althoughthis"permanent verbal"was neverwholly

7Bok criticizesFoucault'sgenealogyon the groundsthat "the practiceof confes-

sion. . . [has]farmoreancientand extensiveanaloguesin worldcultures"(Bok 1986,79).
This accusationis unfairfortworeasons:(1) Foucaultis clearthathe wantsto focushis
attention onWestern cultureinparticular,and(2) havingthusfocusedhiswork,Foucault's
analysesdo indeedtracethedevelopment ofconfessional discoursesfromancienttimes,
through Christianityand intosecularsociety.
8Notealso Foucault1997a,183,189-91,193-95,221,227,237,242,246-47,264,270,
274-75.
9A themelaterdevelopedbythe"so-calledhumansciences"(Foucault1997a,249).
10Foucaultthussummarizes: "onemustgetfreefromanyattachment to thisself,not
becausetheselfis an illusionbutbecausetheselfis muchtooreal.The morewe discover
thetruthaboutourselves,themorewe mustrenounceourselves;and themorewe want
to renounceourselves,the morewe need to bringto lightthe realityofourselves."It is
thenthis"spiraloftruthformulation and realityrenouncement" thatlies "at the heart
ofChristiantechniquesofthe self (1997a, 178), and even Christian"duty"(242). The
confessional techniquesfacilitating suchself-transformation Foucaultvariouslydescribes
as a "matterofdislodging themosthiddenimpulsesfromtheinnerrecessesofthe soul,
thusenablingoneselftobreakfreeofthem"(221),a "struggle ofthesoul"(234) so thatone
might"discover his sins"(237),a tellingof"all thoughts toourdirector ... toengagein the
permanent verbalizationofall ourthoughts . . . thesmallestmovements ofconsciousness"

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 Animalin Foucaultand Wittgenstein 537
TheConfessing

achievable(the subjectcouldneverbecomecompletely ei-

transparent,
therto herselfor others),theresultwas a deep suspicionof"everything
thatcouldnotbe expressed"(1997a, 248; see also Rousseau 1953, 115,
152,169)- a tendencyFoucaultopenlylaments.11

1.3 Confessional
writing
Foucaultnextobserveshowtechniquesofthe "careofthe self soon
encompassedthe spokenand writtenwordinsofaras the selfbecame
"something towriteabout,a themeorobject(subject)ofwritingactivity."
However,this"constantwritingactivity"shouldnotbe construedas an
entirelynewphenomenon, butrather"oneofthemostancientWestern
traditions"
(1997a, 232):
[A]11the so-calledliteratureof the self- privatediaries,narrativesof
the self,and so on- cannot be understoodunless it is put into the
general. . . framework of these practicesof the self. People have been
writingabout themselvesfortwo thousandyears,but not in the same
way. . . [T]hereis a certaintendencyto presentthe relationship between
writingand thenarrativeoftheselfas a phenomenon particularto Euro-
pean modernity. Now,I wouldnotdenyit is modern, butit was also oneof
thefirstuses ofwriting[Foucault1997a,277].

Foucault'sadmissionthat"writing theself is bothmodernand ancient

is- as we will see later- indicativeofa moregeneralambiguity in his
work.But his main pointseems to be that while associationscan be
made between(forexample)Hellenisticand monasticpractices,"writ-
ingtheself predatesChristianconfessional practices.As suchwe must
be sensitiveto the subtlechangesoccurring once thosepracticeswere
assimilated,adapted, and utilizedbyChristianity. Thus,in referenceto
a letterbyAurelius,Foucaultobserveshow"inthelast linesthereis an
allusionto the examinationofconscienceat the end ofthe day":"Aure-
lius goestobed and looksin thenotebookto see whathe was goingto do
and howit corresponds towhathe did.The letteris thetranscription of

(248),andlikewiseas a "wholetechniqueforanalyzinganddiagnosing itsorigins,

thought,
itsqualities,itsdangers,itspotentialfortemptation, and all thedarkforcesthatcan lurk
behindthe maskit mayassume... a suspiciousnessdirected[atl everymomentagainst
one'sthought, an endlessself-questioningtoflushoutanysecretfornication lurkinginthe
inmostrecessesofthemind"(195).
11Againstthisadvancingdemonization ofsilence(a silencewhichis neitherhomoge-
nousnorwithoutfunction "alongsidethethingssaid" [Foucault1990,27; see also 1997a,
121]),Foucaultadvocatesa Stoic-Pythagorean "cultivationofsilence"(1997a,236)- thatis,
"developingsilence as a culturalethos"(something which "has unfortunatelybeendropped
from ourculture"[122,see also 121,130]).Regarding "theobligation ofspeaking,"Foucault
thusfinallyadmitshis failuretounderstand whypeoplehavetospeakwhensilence"may
be a muchmoreinteresting wayofhavinga relationship" (121-22).

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538 JournalofReligiousEthics

thatexaminationofconscience.It stresseswhattheindividualdid,not
whathe thought. Thatis thedifference betweenpracticein theHellenis-
ticand imperialperiodsand latermonasticpractice"(234).12Regarding
the transitionfromGreek"notebooks" to Christianconfessionaltexts,
Foucaultthusremarkshow"thewritingdownofinnermovements ap-
pears... as an armin spiritualcombat,"for"whilethe demonis a force
thatdeceivesand makes one be deceivedabout oneself.. .writingcon-
stitutesa testand something like a touchstone: in bringingto lightthe
movements ofthought," thus dissipating"theinnershadowwherethe
enemy'splotsare woven"(275; see also 208). Insofaras theactofwriting
dividestheselffromitself,13 thisselfis exposedbothtoitselfand others:
writing establishes an (albeitspectral)"face-to-face meeting"(216). As
such, the "constraint that the presence ofothers exerts in the domain
ofconduct,writingwillexertin thedomainoftheinnerimpulsesofthe
soul."Writing therefore "has a roleveryclosetothatofconfession tothe
director"(208).
Theseintrospective procedures becameincreasingly rigorous, and the
relationbetween"writingand vigilance"(232-3) is especiallynotable
here.Thus FoucaultcitesAthanasius'srecommendation that we each
"writedownouractionsand impulsesofthesoulas thoughwe weretore-
portthemtoeach other."The pointofsuchprocedures was clearenough;
that"from uttershameofbecomingknownwe shall stopsinningand en-
tertaining sinfulthoughts altogether" (207). QuotingEpictetus,Foucault
similarlyhighlights where the relationshipbetweenwriting, vigilance,
and riskis expresslyconnectedto death:"Maythesebe mythoughts,
thesemystudies,writingorreading,whendeathcomesuponme. . . Let
thesethoughts be at yourcommand\prokheiron] bynightand day:write
them,read them,talk ofthem,to yourselfand to yourneighbour ... if
someso-calledundesirableeventshouldbefallyou,thefirstimmediate
relieftoyouwillbe thatitwas notunexpected" (209; see also 195).What
is beingadvocatedhereis a certainwatchfulness necessitatedbythefact

12Likewise,in Seneca "thereare

onlydeeds,notthoughts; butit doesprefigure Chris-
tian confession. . . The examinationofconsciencebeginswiththisletter-writing. Diary-
writing comeslater.It datesfrom theChristianera andfocusesonthenotionofthestruggle
ofthesoul"(Foucault1997a,234). In a particularly passageFoucaultreflects
striking on
thefunctionof"correspondence" writinginrelationtotheGreekhupomnemata (definedas
"accountbooks,publicregisters, orindividualnotebooks servingas memory aids . . . books
oflife"[209]).Therehe warnsthat"despiteall thesepointsin common, correspondence
shouldnotbe regardedsimplyas an extension ofthepracticeofhupomnemata. It is some-
thingmorethana training ofoneselfbymeansofwriting, throughtheadviceand opinions
one givesto theother:it also constitutes a certainwayofmanifesting oneselfto oneself
and to others.The lattermakesthewriter'present'to theone to whomhe addressesit"
(216).
13The authoris, afterall,
alwaysherownfirstreader(Foucault1997a,214).

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 Animalin Foucaultand Wittgenstein 539
TheConfessing

thatdeathis, notmerelyinevitable,but capable ofbefallingone at any

moment(Derrida1993,4, 26, 49, 65). Althoughthe unpredictability of
death'sarrivalcannotbe evaded,Epictetussuggeststhat,bymeans of
writing(andreadingandverbalizing whatonehas written), oneneednot
be totallyunprepared.Vigilantself-regulationand "selfwriting"helps
managetheadventofdeath,thusrendering it butone (albeitterminal)
eventin thenarrativeofone'slife(Foucault1998,206).14

and rupture
1.4 Continuity
I previouslysuggestedthatFoucault'scentralclaimis that"Western
societieshave establishedthe confessionas one ofthe main ritualswe
relyon forthe production oftruth,"and as such "Westernman has be-
comea confessing animal"(1990,58-9). Now,althoughsomecommenta-
torswarnthatFoucaultis notseekingthehistoricalmoment"at which
the confessionemergedfull-blown" (Dreyfusand Rabinow1982, 174),
therenevertheless remainsa tensionbetweenhis emphasison thesin-
gularityofcertainconfessionalpractices - notablythose developedby
theChurch(Foucault1982,214; 1990,58)- and thecontinuity between
thesepracticesand theirpagan forebears.On thisreadingFoucaultis
notclaimingthatpriorto thishistoricalepochconfessionaldiscourses
wereinoperative, but thatonlyin thisperioddid confession becomeso
highlyregulatedand all-encompassing a "technique." Thus,accordingto
Dreyfusand Rabinow,it was notthatconfessionitselfwas realizedat
this time,but ratherthat "[s]ystemsofclassification were elaborated,
vast descriptions scrupulously collated,and a confessionalscience,one
dealingwithhiddenand unmentionable things,cameintobeing"(1982,
176).Still,Foucault'sallegationthat"Western man"becamea "confessing
animal"15raises the questionofhowgreata disparityexistedbetween
the old and new confessional technologies. It is hereworthnotinghow
Foucaulthimselfnegotiatesthisimportant question.
Regardinghistoricalcontinuitythen, Foucault claims that pagan
philosophers"proposeda sexual ethicsthat was verysimilarto the
alleged Christianethics"(1997a, 179). Indeed,"we mustconcedethat
Christianity didnotinventthiscodeofsexualbehaviour"butrather"ac-
ceptedit,reinforced it,and gave it a muchlargerand morewidespread
strength than it had before,"and that "Christianmoralityis nothing

14AlthoughI willnotdiscussithere,thereis a storytobe toldaboutFoucault'sanalysis

and Descartes'sMeditations(Foucault1997a,278). In particular,
ofconfession I have in
mindPopkin'sreconstructionofthelatterinthecontext ofthe1634trialofUrbanGrandier
(Popkin1979,180-81) and howthe questionoftestimonial truthfiguresat thebirthof
modernWesternphilosophy.
15Nottomention DreyfusandRabinow'sallusiontowhat"cameintobeing"(1982,176).

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540 JournalofReligiousEthics

morethana pieceofpagan ethicsinsertedintoChristianity" (180). Like-

wise,FoucaultmaintainsthatbeforeChristianity one can "findmany
oftheseelementsin embryonic formand sometimesfullyshapedin an-
cientphilosophy," and concludes:"ithardlymakessense to talk abouta
'Christiansexualethic',stillless abouta 'Judeo-Christian' one"(195-6).
ElsewheretheasceticismofbothChristianity and paganismare said to
fall"underthesame sign:thatofcare oftheself (227),whileChristian
confession is describedas "reminiscent oftheverbalizingexercises... of
the pagan philosophicalschools" - forhere one plainlysees a "borrow-
ing,""subsumation" (270-1), "integration,""reutilization"(277-8), "re-
activationofa certainnumberofancientStoicpractices"(276).16Ofsex-
ual codes,Foucaultsimilarlyremarksthatthese"didn'tchangea great
deal,"foralthoughsomeofthosecodesweremoresevereintheChristian
context, "thethemesare thesame"(265-6). In summationthen,we are
emphatically "nottalkingabouta moralrupturebetweentolerantantiq-
uity and austere Christianity" (271),for"mostofthethemesofChristian
austerity were veryclearlypresentnearlyfromthebeginning" (254).
Despite all this Foucault does occasionallyrefer to deephistorical dis-
continuities. for
Thus, example, he remarks ofthe Greek hupomnemata
thatno matterhow "personaltheymaybe,"they"oughtnotto be un-
derstoodas intimatejournals or as thoseaccountsofspiritualexperi-
ence. . . thatwillbe foundin laterChristianliterature" (210). Similarly,
regarding Christian confession, we are warned that the "organization of
monasticism . . . broughtwith[it]thedevelopment ofverycomplextech-
niques ofself-analysis" which,"in spiteofobviouscontinuities, showed
important differences withthepast"(194).FinallyFoucaultasserts:"Ata
certainmoment, theproblemofan aestheticsofexistenceis coveredover
bytheproblemofpurity, whichis something else,and requiresanother
kindoftechnique"(274; see also 213; 1980, 215, 217, and 226). High-
lighting boththebreakChristianconfession madewithitspast,and the
numerouswaysthistechnology was prefiguredin Greco-Roman culture
(1997a,234),Foucaultthusseeksto examine"thetransition frompagan
to Christianculture,in whichit is possibleto see clear-cutcontinuities
and discontinuities" (242; see also 274).
On reflection then,it is deeplyproblematic to characterizeFoucault
as havinga "predilection forthe analysis of discontinuities . . . rather
than, as one would expectin a historian,a tendencyto talk princi-
pallyaboutcontinuities" (Said 1996,149). DespiteFoucault'srhetoric of
the"singularrandomnessofevents"(1998,381) and his railingagainst
an "entirehistoricaltraditional" thatdissolves"thesingulareventinto

16And"thetransferofseveralStoictechniquesoftheselfto Christianspiritualtech-
niques"(Foucault1997a,245).

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 The Confessing
Animalin Foucaultand Wittgenstein 541

an ideal continuity" (380),17Foucault'semphasis(at least in his later

work)18leans moretowarda continuity thesisthan one ofradicalhis-
toricalrupture.As such,his ownallusionto "clear-cut continuitiesand
discontinuities"is ratherunhelpful.19 Notwithstanding Foucault's per-
sistentreference to the "development" (1990, 58), "dissemination" (61),
and "transformation" (63) of confessionaldiscourses,a closerreading
reveals that betweenthese technologiesthereexistsonlya veneerof
diversity coveringsomethingmoreprimordial;namely"power"and its
"hazardous,""endlesslyrepeatedplayofdominations" (1998,276-7).
GiventhatFoucaultseeks "to masterhistoryso as to turnit to ge-
nealogicaluses" (385), his preciseattitudetowardhistoricity remains
ambiguous(1996, 213, 301). Likewise,whetherFoucault'saforemen-
tionedshifting betweena continuity and discontinuity thesisprovesfatal
tohisprojectmust,forourpurposes,be setaside.Butwhatis significant
hereis thatsimilarquestionsemergefromWittgenstein's laterthinking.
As we haveseen,whatproblematizes readingFoucaultas a discontinuity
theoristis hisrepeatedemphasisonthedeveloping natureofconfessional
technologies frompagan culturethroughChristianity intosecularsoci-
ety.Justas Foucaultis oftenthought tobe a philosopher ofradicalhistor-
ical "rupture,"Wittgenstein is frequentlyperceivedto be a philosopher
ofradicallinguistic-conceptual But suchcharacterizations
"plurality."20
misrepresent bothphilosophers. We have alreadyseen whythisis the
case withFoucault,and laterI will showhowtheWittgensteinian nar-
rativerunscounterto such pluralisticreadings.But in bothcases it is
their(respective)suspicionofand appeal tothe"natural"thatis pivotal.
For whilebothWittgenstein and Foucaultexpressa certainreticence
towardsteppingoutsidetheirrespectiveareas of expertise(Wittgen-
stein 1958,230; 1996, 72; Foucault1997a, 142), the spiritofthis self-
restraintis ratherdifferent in each case. For Foucaultit spawnsfrom
the genealogicalconfineshe operateswithin.21 Due to the essentially
historical-cultural(constructivist)trajectoryofFoucault's workthevery
notionofthe "natural"mustitselfbe subjectedto the same sortofcon-
textualanalysisas (forexample)sexuality. Thiscan be clearlyseenwhen

17Thatis, ratherthan"liberating and marginalelements"(Foucault1998,

divergence
379).
18Concerning thequestionofdis/continuity
inTheOrderofThings,see Foucault'ssome-
whatcryptic remarksin 1998,279-95.
19On at least oneoccasionFoucaultimpliesthatit is confession
itselfthatbridgesthe
gap betweenthesehistoricaldiscontinuities(1980,211).
20See, forexample,Gier 1981, 117-33; Pitkin1993, 323-26; Scheman1996, 384;
Greisch1999,44-61;Trigg1999,176-79;Mouffe 2000.
Despitehis debtto Nietzsche,Foucaultneglectstheformer's naturalism.Likewise,
it is notclearthatNietzschethought"genealogy" and "history"tobe differentthings(Ni-
etzsche2000,Preface;Leiter2002,especiallychapters1 and 5).

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542 JournalofReligiousEthics

Foucaultcautionsthat"[n]othing in man- noteven his body- is suffi-

cientlystableas thebasis forself-recognition orforunderstanding other
men"(1998, 380). I will cast a criticaleye overthis passage later.For
the momentit is sufficient to notethat,forFoucault,the "natural"is
a constantlyshiftingnotionthat has servedspecificepistemological-
politicalendsduringdifferent historicalperiods.Andthisis whyhe ul-
timately"mistrust[s] thenotionofhumannature"(1997b,109; see also
131-2).
Ofcourse,Foucaultshouldnotbe condemned forrestricting thefocus
ofhis attention. Expressing his reluctance to trespassinto the realms of
naturalscience(specifically concerning naturalisticapproaches to sex-
uality)Foucaultthusinsists:"On thisquestionI have absolutelynoth-
ing to say.'No comment.' ... I just don'tbelievein talkingaboutthings
thatgo beyondmyexpertise.It's notmyproblem,and I don'tlike talk-
ing about thingsthat are not reallythe objectof my work.On this
questionI have onlyan opinion;sinceit is onlyan opinion,it is with-
out interest"(1997a, 142). In one sense this attitudeis refreshing, for
it subvertsthat lamentabletendencyofphilosophersforungrounded,
and oftendogmatic, speculation.Nevertheless, in thiscontextsuchdiffi-
dencesitsuncomfortably alongside the clear philosophical implications
ofFoucault'swork.Here one mustask whetherFoucaultloses the sig-
nificanceofthe continuity he traces (in, e.g.,his genealogyofconfes-
sion) amid all the "historically contingent" (139; see also 154, 261) de-
tail. Forthechoiceis notsimplybetweeneithergenealogicalsensitivity
tothe"marginal" orthegrand-narrative ofan oppressive, homogenizing
history.22WhileFoucaultrightlyinsistson the necessityofour under-
standing"thehistoricalconditionswhichmotivateour conceptualiza-
tion[s]"(1982, 209), this remainsphilosophically insufficient. For no
hermeneutics - orwhatFoucaultdescribesas a "systematic
ofsuspicion
skepticism towardall anthropological universals"(1998,461)- can defer
all ontological-epistemological-anthropological commitments. Neither
hermeneutic suspicionnorsystematic doubtcan function withouttaking
something as beingimmunetomistrust(Plant2003c).Afterall,without
Foucaultmakingan (albeittacit)appeal to historicity, therewouldbe
no reasonto even engagewithhis work.If Foucault'sanalyses aspire
to anything morethanmereanecdoteor "historical fiction" (1996,301),
thenthe varioustechnologies he describescannotbe "singular"in any
rigoroussense,butratherbetokena certaingenerality.23 Clearlythecon-
ceptofthe"natural"possessesa historyand therebyexposesitselftothe

22Foucaultwouldseemto
agreewiththis(1998,461-62).
26Concerningtherelationship
betweenthe"singular" in testimony
and "universal" see
Derrida2000c.

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 TheConfessing
Animalin Foucaultand Wittgenstein 543

ofgenealogicalanalysis.24
possibilities Likewise,invocationsofthe"nat-
ural"can be usedforinsidiousethical-political
purposes;racism,sexism,
andhomophobia arejust threeobviousexamples.Nevertheless, theques-
tionofour"naturalhistory" cannotsimplybejettisoned(as theproductof
whollycontingent historicalconditions)in favorofFoucauldian"geneal-
ogy."With specificreferenceto the laterWittgenstein,I thereforewant
to inquireintothe "primitive" underpinning ofthe moresophisticated
confessionaltechnologies Foucaultdescribes.Forwithoutan underlying
capacity,propensity,or inclinationto confess,upon whichthosemore
regulatedconfessional practicescouldbe deployed,howare we to make
senseoftheselatermanifestations? WithWittgenstein's helpI willthere-
foreargue,notthatwe became"confessing animals,"but thatin some
sensewe alwayswere.

onFrazerandthePrimitive
2. Wittgenstein
remarkson Foucaultand Wittgenstein
2.1 Preliminary
As we have seen,Foucaultallegesthatwe inhabita "singularly con-
fessingsociety"insofaras theconfession has become"oneofthemainrit-
uals we relyon fortheproduction oftruth."In short,"Western manhas
becomea confessing animal"(1990,58-9). Througha complexhistorical
development, the Christianconfession was appropriated bythe secular
scientiasexualis,whichhas subsequently founda place in suchdiverse
areas as "justice,medicine,education,familyrelationships, and lovere-
lations."From"themostordinaryaffairsofeverydaylife"to the "most
solemnrites"(59), confession has provedto be an exceptionally service-
able ritual.So muchso,Foucaultsuggests,that"weno longerperceiveit
as theeffect ofa powerthatconstrainsus." So accustomedto thishave
we becomethatit nowseemscommonsensical thatthe "truth. . . lodged
in ourmostsecretnature"(60) can onlybe mediated throughsomeform
ofconfessional outpouring. It is herethatI want to turntoWittgenstein,
in
and particular his "Remarks on Frazer'sGolden Bough."Foritis there
thatwe findtherudimentsofan alternativeto the Foucauldiannarra-
tive.WhileWittgenstein's critiqueofFrazer'santhropology cannotsim-
be
ply mapped onto Foucault's work,as their (Frazer's and Foucault's)
projectsare verydifferent, nevertheless, examiningWittgenstein's en-
gagement with Frazer raises a number of points worth developingfor
thepurposesofreflecting critically on Foucault.

24Foucaultobscuresa numberofissues whenhe refersto "theproduction oftruth"

oftruth"(1980, 118),"games"(1997a, 281), and
(1990, 58; see also 59, 60, 65), "effects
'"generalpolitics'oftruth"(1980,131; see also 1997a,289-90,296,298). Afterall, evenif
we concedeboththat"truthisn'toutsidepower"(1980,131)andthattheconceptof"truth"
has a history, constructed.
it doesnotfollowthattruthis historically-culturally

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544 JournalofReligiousEthics

Whilea lotseparatesFoucaultandFrazer,at leastonepreliminary cor-

relationcanbe made.Methodologically speakingtheirprojectsconstitute
what Wittgenstein wouldrepudiateas "explanatory" enterprises,25 as
opposedto his own(allegedly)"descriptive" approach(1958,§654; 1996,
61-3). Still,it is reasonableto assume thatthe absenceofFrazer'ssci-
entismfromthe Foucauldianaccountwouldbe morecompatiblewith
Wittgenstein's suggestionthatthe"historicalexplanation... is onlyone
way assemblingthedata- oftheirsynopsis.It is just as possibletosee
of
thedata in theirrelationto one anotherand to embracethemin a gen-
eral picturewithoutputtingit in theformofa hypothesis abouttempo-
ral development" (1996,69). Moreover, Wittgenstein's tendency toutilize
history forhis own ends
"therapeutic" (1958,230)26may wellbe relevant
whencomparing hisworktoFoucault's.Likewise,Wittgenstein's caution
thatthe"correct and interesting to
thing say is not: thishas arisenfrom
that, but: it could have arisen this way"(1996, 80),27 findsa parallel
in Foucault'semphasison historicalcontingency (1997a, 139, 154). Fi-
nally,Wittgenstein's ofhisnewmethodology
characterization as bringing
about"understanding" throughseeing the "connections" (1996,69) and
"interrelations" (1994b, 12) between phenomena - and even the corre-
spondence between conceptsand theirhistory(1958,§23-4,p. 230; 1990,
§387-8; 1999,§65)- wouldseemconducivetotheFoucauldianproject.It
liesbeyondthescopeofthispapertoanalyzeall thepossibleaffinities be-
tweenFoucaultandWittgenstein. Nevertheless, that Foucaultprovidesa
"generalpicture"(Wittgenstein 1996, 69) through genealogicalrecon-
his
struction seemsa fitting of
way characterizing his laterwork.Withthis
in mind,I nowwantto highlight somerelevantthemesfrom"Remarks
on Frazer'sGoldenBough."

2.2 Reason,ritual,language,and behavior

Despiteitsfragmentary nature,"RemarksonFrazer'sGoldenBough"
can be dividedintothreethematicparts:(1) thosepassages pertaining
to methodologicalissues (someofwhichI have alreadymentioned);(2)
thoseregarding "opinion,""reason,"and"ritual";and(3) thoseconcerning
the relationbetweenthe "primitive" and "modern."In this part ofmy
argumentI willdrawthemostimportant ofthesethemestogether.

25Foucaultseemsto thisin 1980,209.

acknowledge
NotleastWittgenstein'swantingto "imaginea historicaldevelopmentforourideas
differentfromwhatactuallyoccurred"in orderto"seetheproblemfroma completely new
angle"(1994b,37).
27The "insidiousthingaboutthe causal
pointofviewis thatit leads us to say: 'Of
course,ithad tohappenlikethat'.Whereaswe oughttothink:it mayhavehappenedlike
that- and also in manyotherways"(Wittgenstein1994b,37).

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 TheConfessing
Animalin Foucaultand Wittgenstein 545

As indicatedabove,Wittgenstein findsFrazer'stendencytowardin-
terpretation and explanation"wrong"(61). Indeed,he insiststhat"one
mustonlycorrectly piecetogether whatoneknows,withoutaddingany-
thing. . . Here one can onlydescribeand say: this is what humanlife
is like" (62-3). Echoingnumerouspassages fromhis later writings28
Wittgenstein here highlightsbothhis own ontological- methodological
commitment regardingthe "givenness"oflanguage-games(and corre-
sponding"forms oflife"),and howthisoughttoorientphilosophical prac-
tice.Having"putthequestionmarksdeepenoughdown,"orhavinggone
"rightdownto the foundations," (1994b,62) explanatoryand justifica-
torydiscourse"comesto an end" (1999, §204). For "all one can say is:
wherethatpracticeand theseviewsoccurtogether, thepracticedoesnot
the
springfrom view, they but are both just there"(1996,62).
That"thepracticedoesnotspringfromtheview"is a recurrent theme
in "Remarkson Frazer'sGoldenBought Wittgenstein thusperceives
Frazer'scardinaloffenseto be his treatmentof the magical-religious
"viewsofmankind"as pseudoscientific "errors"or "piecesofstupidity."
ForWittgenstein, religious magicalritualscan onlybe erroneousto
and
theextentthatthey"setfortha theory"(61) or putforward hypotheses
(68, 72-3; 1999,§477,538). But,he insists,"[n]oopinionservesas the
foundation fora religioussymbol.Andonlyan opinioncan involvean er-
ror"(1996,64).He continuestosaythat,contrary toFrazer,"I believethat
thecharacteristic featureofprimitive man is thathe does notact from
opinions"(71; see also 1999,§538).Ifwe resistthetemptation toexplain
suchphenomena,and insteadrestrictourselvesto description, Frazer's
hypothetical gloss becomes increasingly untenable. For the "primitive
man"towhomWittgenstein alludesdoes notmerelyreferto theforeign
OtherofFrazer'santhropology. Rather,Wittgenstein is referring to the
primitive in "man." We can see this clearly in On Certainty there
, for
Wittgenstein asks us to "bear in mind that the language-gameis ... not
basedongrounds.It is notreasonable(orunreasonable).It is there- like
ourlife"(1999,§559),and similarly, thathewantsto"regardmanhereas
an animal;as a primitive beingtowhichonegrantsinstinctbutnotrati-
ocination. As a creaturein a primitive state,"for"[a]nylogicgoodenough
fora primitive meansofcommunication needsno apologyfromus. Lan-
30
guagedidnotemergefromsomekindofratiocination" (§475). Herethen
a questionofprimacyseemsto arise: does reasongroundactionorvice
versa?AlthoughWittgenstein tendsto stressthesimultaneity ofreason

28See, forexample,Wittgenstein1958,§109,126,217,654,656,224; 1999,§204,559.

29This themeis also presentin "Lectureson ReligiousBelief (Wittgenstein
1994a,
53-72).
30ComparewithFoucault'sremarksonthought and action(1997a,117,200-201,243-
44, 264).

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546 JournalofReligiousEthics

and action(1958,§656;1996,62),onecan discerna certainprioritization

in his laterwritings.
So, forexample,in Cultureand Valuehe maintains
thatthe "originand the primitive formofthe languagegameis a reac-
tion;onlyfromthis can morecomplicatedformsdevelop.Language- I
wantto say- is a refinement, 'in the beginningwas the deed"'(1994b,
31).31Wittgenstein appeals to the "primitive" on numerousoccasions,
butwhatexactlyis thistermsupposedto pickout?In orderto answer
thisquestionwe needto lookbriefly at otherofhis laterwritings.
First,inPhilosophicalInvestigations, Wittgensteinspeculatesonhow
sensationwords(suchas "pain")are learned:

Here is one possibility:

wordsare connectedwiththeprimitive, thenatu-
ral,expressionsofthesensationand used in theirplace.A childhas hurt
himselfand he cries;and thenadultstalkto himand teachhimexclama-
tionsand,later,sentences.Theyteachthe childnew pain-behaviour. "So
you are sayingthat the word'pain' reallymeans crying?"- On the con-
trary:theverbalexpressionofpain replacescryingand does notdescribe
it [Wittgenstein1958,§244].

Althoughthis seems tentative("Here is one possibility . . . "), in Zettel

Wittgenstein developsthe same point as follows:"[R]emember thatit is
a primitive reactionto tend,to treat,thepartthathurtswhensomeone
else is in pain; and notmerelywhenoneselfis ... But whatis theword
'primitive' meantto say here?Presumablythatthissortofbehaviouris
pre-linguistic: thata language-gameis based on it,thatit is the proto-
typeofa wayofthinkingand nottheresultofthought"(1990, §540-1).
And likewise:"Beingsure that someoneis in pain, doubtingwhether
he is, and so on, are so manynatural,instinctive, kindsofbehaviour
towardsotherhumanbeings,and our languageis merelyan auxiliary
to,and further extensionof,thisrelation.Our language-gameis an ex-
tensionofprimitivebehaviour.(For our language- game is behaviour.)
(Instinct)"(§545). Accordingto Wittgenstein then,bothreasoningand
language have theirrootsin prelinguistic, instinctivebehaviors,and
can thus be understoodas a refinement of these naturalphenomena
(1994b,31; 1999,§505).Languagedoesnotmerelyreportsuchreactions,
but ratherdevelopsin an auxiliaryrole,eitheras an extensionofsuch
naturalbehaviorsor byreplacingthem.Whatsuch passages therefore
suggestis thatbehaviorprecedeslanguage.But Wittgenstein is reluc-
tanttospeakin suchclear-cutterms.Why?Because thereis noessential

31And "I reallywantto say thatscruplesin thinking

similarly: beginwith(havetheir
rootsin) instinct.Or again: a language-game does nothave its originin consideration.
Consideration is partofa language-game" (Wittgenstein1990,§391;see also 1958,§546;
1994b,46).

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 The Confessing
Animalin Foucaultand Wittgenstein 547

differencebetweennonlinguisticand linguisticbehavior.32 Weare there-

foreurgedto "[l]ookon thelanguage-gameas theprimarything"(1958,
§656),insofaras "[c]ommanding, questioning, recounting, chatting,are
as mucha partofournaturalhistoryas walking,eating,drinking, play-
33
ing"(§25). In thiswayWittgenstein haltsphilosophicalinquiryat the
sheer"givenness"oflanguage-gamesand theirencompassingformsof
life.Anyambiguity betweenhis claimsthat,on theone hand,language
and behavioroccursimultaneously and,on theother,thatthelatterpre-
figurestheformer, mustbe understoodas partofhis attemptto confine
philosophyto the therapeuticallyorienteddescriptionoflanguage-in-
use.34Thus Wittgenstein concedesthathe is certainlyinterestedin the
relationbetweenconceptsand "verygeneralfactsofnature,"but adds
thatthisinterestis notone ofsimplecausation.Afterall, he is noten-
gaged in naturalscienceor naturalhistory"sincewe can also invent
naturalhistoryforourpurposes"(230).35
fictitious
Wittgenstein'scautionwithregardto prioritizing behavioroverlan-
guage(orviceversa)is thereforetwofold:(1) suchprioritization
assumes
an essential divisionbetweenlinguisticand nonlinguisticbehavior;
and (2) this sortofhypothesizing belongsin the realm ofthe natural
sciences- a disciplinewhose boundarieshe has no aspirationto tra-
verse.Althoughon thisquestionWittgenstein is farfromtransparent,
the depthofthisambiguity need notconcernus unduly.Forhe is clear
that languageis not differentin kind fromthose primitivebehaviors
it replaces.What is importantforus is the essentialconnectedness of
and
linguistic prelinguistic behavior in Wittgenstein's writings a
later -
pointconveniently overlookedby radical"pluralist"interpreters.

and modern
2.3 Betweentheprimitive
According to Wittgensteinthe explanatorycharacterofFrazer'san-
thropologymisrepresents religiousrituals.Indeed,char-
the"primitive's"
acterizingsuch practicesin pseudoscientificgarb inevitablyrenders

32Thisis,ofcourse,whyWittgenstein coinstheterm"language-game," whichis "meant

tobringintoprominence thefactthatthespeakingoflanguageis partofan activity" (1958,
§23).
33It is incidentalthatWittgensteindoesnotinclude"confessing"in his briefinventory
of"themultiplicity oflanguage-games" - although,he does include"[ajsking,thanking,
cursing, greeting,praying"(1958,§23).
64Fora detailedanalysisofthissee Plant2004;2005,especiallychapter1.
35Wittgenstein proceeds:"ifanyonebelievesthatcertainconceptsare absolutelythe
correct ones,and thathavingdifferent oneswouldmeannotrealizingsomething thatwe
realize- thenlethimimaginecertainverygeneralfactsofnaturetobe different from what
we are used to,and theformation ofconceptsdifferentfromtheusual oneswillbecome
intelligibletohim"(1958,230).

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548 JournalofReligiousEthics

themas "piecesofstupidity" (1996,61). MindfulofWittgenstein's conti-

nuitythesisregarding "primitivebehaviours"and language,we beginto
see howhis ownworkavoidsdrawingFrazer'sconclusion. Thisbecomes
clearwhenWittgenstein speculates:"onecouldbegina bookon anthro-
pologybysaying:Whenoneexaminesthelifeand behaviourofmankind
throughout the world,one sees that,exceptforwhat mightbe called
animalactivities,suchas ingestion, etc.,etc.,etc.,menalso perform ac-
tionswhichbeara characteristic peculiartothemselves, and thesecould
be called ritualisticactions"(67). Here Wittgenstein effectively closes
the gap betweenthe so-called"primitive" and "modern"humanbeing.
Moreover, this fundamentalcommonality betweenthe "primitive" and
"modern" is something Frazermust(albeittacitly)presuppose,for"the
principleaccordingto whichthesepracticesare arranged... is a much
moregeneralone than in Frazer'sexplanationand it is presentin our
own minds,so that we ourselvescould thinkup all the possibilities"
(65-6). In otherwords,ifFrazer's"explanations" didnotin theend "ap-
peal to a tendency in ourselves"then they "would notreallybe explana-
tions"(66) at all.
Wittgenstein's continuity thesisthus highlightstwomethodological
points mentioned previously,buthereworthrecalling:(1) Wittgenstein's
characterization ofhis newphilosophical approachas consisting in "see-
ing the connections" (69) or"interrelations"
(1994b, 12) between phenom-
ena; and (2) his differentiation betweenthis approachand the natural
sciences(1958, 230). As he later comments:"Once... a phenomenon is
broughtintoconnection withan instinctwhichI myselfpossess,thisis
preciselythe explanationwishedfor;thatis, the explanationwhichre-
solvesthis particulardifficulty. And a further investigation about the
historyofmyinstinctmoveson anothertrack"(1996, 72). Frazerthus
failsto recognizethe "kinship"between"thosesavages'behaviour"(68)
and "any genuinelyreligiousactionof today"(64). This crucialpoint
'
Wittgenstein puts to workagainstFrazer as follows:"Frazer: . . . That
these observancesare dictatedby fearofthe ghostofthe slain seems
certain. . . ' But whythendoes Frazeruse theword'ghost'?He thusun-
derstandsthissuperstition verywell,sincehe explainsit tous witha su-
perstitious wordhe is familiarwith.Or rather,thismighthave enabled
himto see thatthereis also something in us whichspeaks in favourof
thosesavages'behaviour"(68; myemphasis).Andlikewise:"I shouldlike
to say: nothingshowsourkinshipto thosesavages betterthanthefact
thatFrazerhas on handa wordas familiartohimself and tous as 'ghost'
or 'shade'in orderto describetheviewsofthesepeople. . . and muchtoo
littleis made ofthe factthatwe countthe words'soul' and 'spirit'as
partofour educatedvocabulary"(70; myemphasis).Whattheseprac-
ticestherefore showis not"thederivationofone fromtheother,butofa
commonspirit"(80; see also 1958,§206).Thus ifonewantedto inventa

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 Animalin Foucaultand Wittgenstein 549
TheConfessing

religiousritual,it would"die outveryquicklyor be modifiedin such a

mannerthatit corresponds to a generalinclination ofthepeople"(1996,
78). Readingtheseallusionsto a "commonspirit"and "generalinclina-
tion"alongsideWittgenstein's remarkson"primitive behaviours" we can
therefore say thatboththe initiationand longevity ofreligiousrituals
(confession included)hingeson theirabilityto tap intothe mostbasic
tendenciesofhumanbeings.As suchtheseactivitiesare not- as Frazer
construesthem- rootedin quasiscientific (and mistaken)beliefsoropin-
ions(1999,§477). It is in thiscontext that Wittgenstein rightly reminds
us ofour own ritualisticbehaviors:as when,forexample,we beat the
groundin fury(surelynotbecause we thinkthatthe groundis blame-
worthy), orwhenwe kiss thephotograph ofan absentlover(again,not
becausewe believeitwill"effect theobjectwhichthepicturerepresents"
[1996,64; see also 66]). All these"rites"we can call "Instinct-actions,"
and,Wittgenstein insists,"anhistoricalexplanation, say,thatI ormyan-
cestorspreviously believedthatbeatingthegrounddoeshelpis shadow-
boxing,forit is a superfluousassumptionthatexplainsnothing"(72).
In short,we all (qua humanbeings)engagein ritualisticactivities.But
theseare nottobe sneeredat as remnantsofan unenlightened age,oras
"falsephysicsor... falsemedicine,technology, etc"(87; see also 1994b,
49). Tojudgethesepracticesaccording toscientific
criteriais "erroneous"
(1996, 65) and "foolish" (67)- if notalso unjust(1993, 181; 1996,71; 1999,
§609-12). After all, Frazer's "savages" understand only toowell where
the naturalboundariesoftheirritualsare to be found.For the "same
savage,who stabs the pictureofhis enemyapparentlyin orderto kill
him,reallybuildshis hutoutofwoodand carveshis arrowskilfully and
not in effigy" (1996, 64; see also 71-2). Thus Wittgenstein concludes:
"Thenonsensehereis thatFrazerrepresents thesepeopleas iftheyhad
a completely false (even insane) idea ofthe courseofnature,whereas
theyonlypossess a peculiarinterpretation ofthe phenomena."Indeed,
"iftheyweretowriteit down,theirknowledgeofnaturewouldnotdiffer
fundamentally fromours"(73-4).

3. ReadingFoucaultafterWittgenstein
In "Remarkson Frazer'sGoldenBough"Wittgenstein inquireshow
it is "thatin generalhumansacrificeis so deep and sinister."It seems
unlikelythatthisis due merelyto the victim'ssuffering, forthereare
"illnessesofall kindswhichare connectedwithjust as muchsuffering,
nevertheless theydo notcall forththisimpression."He thensurmises:
"No,the deep and the sinisterdo notbecomeapparentmerelyby our
comingto knowthe historyofthe externalaction,ratherit is we who
ascribethemfroman experienceofourown"(77). In otherwords,when
(forexample)Frazertellsus "thestoryoftheKingoftheWoodofNemi,

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550 JournalofReligiousEthics

he does thisin a tonewhichshowsthathe feels,and wantsus to feel,

thatsomething strangeand dreadfulis happening"(63). Wittgenstein's
cautionhere is, I believe,equally applicablewhen readingFoucault's
genealogyinsofaras the latter'sattitudetowardconfessional technolo-
gies is clearlynegative.This is notto say thatFoucault'sanalysesare
simplyfactuallyerroneous(which,ofcourse,theymaybe). Indeed,one
distinguishing featureofFoucault'sworkis his acknowledgment thathe
is not attempting to providea comprehensive historicalpicture(1980,
212; 1997a,202). Nevertheless, whenreadinghis"history ofthepresent"
(Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982, 174) it is important keep in mindthat
to
the sense of"something strange and dreadful" happeningmightnotbe
due to anything beyond Foucault's way selectingand "assemblingthe
of
data" (Wittgenstein 1996,69).
I have alreadynotedthe ambiguity betweenFoucault'semphasison
the historicalcontinuity ofconfessional practicesand the fundamental
discontinuities therein.But whatfirstlookslike a sensitiveaccountof
the "multiplicity" (1990, 33) ofconfessional discourses,ultimatelyonly
tracestherippleson thesurfaceofpower.Morepointedly, ifall relation-
ships are necessarily infused with power(1997a, 167,283, 291-2, 298);
namely,if"[p]oweris everywhere . . . becauseit comesfromeverywhere"
(1990,93; see also Said 1996,150) thenthispivotalFoucauldianconcept
is in dangerofbecomingsaturatedto thepointofvacuity(Wittgenstein
1994b,26; Said 1996, 151-2). Furthermore, thereare tangibleethical-
politicalconsequencesat stakehere.ForalthoughFoucaultmaybe right
thatit is "necessaryto expandthe dimensionsofa definition ofpower"
(1982,209) beyondthefamiliaropposition ofdomination/freedom, to ex-
pand the notiontoofarleads to obviousproblems.Thus,responding to
thequestionwhethertheconception of"careoftheself remainsessen-
tiallyegoistic(and evenpotentially leads to one'sdomination ofothers),
Foucaultretorts:"No,becausetheriskofdominating othersand exercis-
inga tyrannical poweroverthemarisespreciselyonlywhenonehas not
takencare oftheselfand has becomea slave ofone'sdesires.But ifyou
takepropercareofyourself . . . youcannotabuse yourpoweroverothers.
Thus,thereis no danger"(1997a,288). Thisrejoinderis notonlyuncon-
vincing, it sitsuncomfortably alongsideFoucault's"hypothesis" that"it's
all againstall ... Whofightsagainstwhom?We all fighteach other.And
thereis alwayswithineach ofus something thatfightssomething else"
(1980,208). Ofcourse,itis notdifficult tosee whatFoucaulthas in mind
whencharacterizing secularconfessional technologies as an extensionof
thesinister"tribunalsofInquisition," whichhad previously situatedthe
confessionat the heartof"civiland religiouspowers"(1990, 58). Nev-
ertheless,speakingof(forexample)the lover'sconfessionin the same
breathas these "tribunals"can onlylead to confusion. Afterall, those
confessions "wrungfroma personbyviolenceor threat"(59) are hardly

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 TheConfessing
Animalin Foucaultand Wittgenstein 551

archetypalformsofconfessional discourse.36It wouldbe moreappropri-

ate (thoughdoubtlessless usefulto Foucault)to simplysay thatconfes-
sionhas turnedoutto be a particularlyresilientand malleablepractice.
But thenan investigation into"theconditionsof [its]emergence"(73)
couldtake an altogether and muchless sinister,
different, trajectory.
Leavingthisaside,a morecriticalpointneedsto be madehere.In an
astonishingpassage Foucaultmaintainsthat"everysentiment, particu-
larlythenoblestand mostdisinterested, has a history."
We believein the dull constancyofinstinctuallifeand imaginethat it
in thepresentas it didin the
continuesto exertits forceindiscriminately
past.Buthistoricalknowledge easilydisintegratesthisunity. . . Webelieve,
in anyevent,thatthebodyobeystheexclusivelaws ofphysiology, and that
itescapestheinfluence ofhistory,butthistoois false.Thebodyis moulded
bya greatmanydistinctregimes. . . Nothingin man- notevenhis body-
stableas thebasis forself-recognition
is sufficiently orforunderstanding
othermen[Foucault1998,379-80].37

This, I believe,is what ultimatelyturns on Foucault'sgenealogical

project.38But can such extravagantclaims be sustained?In orderto
answerthisI would(again)liketoturntoWittgenstein, and specifically
a fewpassageswhichusefullysupplement "Remarkson Frazer'sGolden
Bough?
In PhilosophicalInvestigationsWittgenstein writes:"Suppose you
came as an explorerinto an unknowncountrywitha languagequite
strangeto you. In what circumstances wouldyou say that the people
theregaveorders,understood them,obeyedthem,rebelledagainstthem,
and so on? [ . . . ] The commonbehaviourofmankindis thesystemofref-
erenceby means ofwhichwe interpretan unknownlanguage"(1958,
§206). (Furtheron we are toldthat "[o]nlyofwhat behaveslike a hu-
man beingcan one say thatit has pains" [§283].)39As we saw earlier,
Wittgenstein likewisemaintainsthat"itis a primitive
reactionto tend,
totreat,thepartthathurtswhensomeoneelse is inpain;and notmerely
whenoneselfis." He is also clearthat"primitive" heremeansthat"this
sortofbehaviouris pre-linguistic: thata language-gameis based on it,

36On the(necessary)possibility ofoffering

a purelymechanicalconfession see Derrida
2002a,134-35,158.On thelover'sconfession see Barthes1990.
37A similarclaimconcerning pain is madebyCaputo(1993,208-209).Butler(1999,
308) also notesthispassagein Foucault.
38Foucaultis clearthathe does notbelievethereis "a universalformofsubjectthat
onecouldfindanywhere," and as suchremains"veryhostile"(1996,452) towardanysuch
universalistconception.
39Andlikewise:"onlyofa livinghumanbeingandwhatresembles(behaveslike)a living
humanbeingcan onesay:it has sensations;it sees; is blind;hears;is deaf;is consciousor
unconscious" (Wittgenstein1958,§281).

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552 JournalofReligiousEthics

thatitis theprototype ofa wayofthinking and nottheresultofthought"

(1990,§540-l).40According toWittgenstein then,culturaland historical
difference is notradical,butratherconstrained by"common" behaviors,
forit is "thewholehurlyburlyofhumanactions"thatconstitutes "the
background againstwhichwe see any action"(§567).41Withthesepas-
sages in mindFoucault'sinsistencethat"[n]othing in man- notevenhis
- is
body sufficiently stableas thebasis forself-recognition orforunder-
standing other men" (1998,380) must be questioned. While he is correct
thatourconceptualizations ofthehumanbodyhave been(and continue
tobe) "moulded" byhistorical-cultural"regimes," Foucault'sterminology
is revealing,forone can only"mould"whathas alreadybeen "given" -
namely,"natural,instinctive, kinds of behaviour" (Wittgenstein 1990,
§545). In otherwords,the conditionofpossibility forsuch "regimes"is
thefinite,vulnerablehumanbody.A "regime," no matterhowcruel,in-
or
genious, subtle, cannot make of thebodyanything itwishes.Thereare
naturalboundarieshere,or"verygeneralfactsofnature"which"mostly
donotstrikeus becauseoftheirgenerality" (Wittgenstein 1958,230) and
thusremain"hiddenbecause oftheirsimplicity and familiarity" (§129).
Indeed,as Wittgenstein rightlynotes,it is bothobviousand significant
that"thephenomenaofdeath,birth,and sexuallife,in short,everything
we observearoundus yearin and yearout,interconnected in so many
different will a
ways, play part in [our]thinking . . . and in [our]practices"
(1996,66-7).42Onlyfor"a livinghumanbeing"(1958,§281)couldtherebe
ethical-politicalquestionsandpractical-theoretical problemsassociated
withpunishment, confession,madness,and sexuality(toselectjust a few
prominent Foucauldianthemes).43 Whetheror notFoucaultwouldcon-
cedethisfact,his work(no less thanFrazer's)constantly bearswitness

40"Beingsurethatsomeoneis in whetherhe is, and so on,are so many

pain,doubting
kindsofbehaviourtowardsotherhumanbeings,and ourlanguageis
natural,instinctive,
merelyan auxiliaryto,and further extensionofprimitive behaviour" (Wittgenstein 1990,
§545).
41A similarargument can,ofcourse,be foundin Davidson1984.
4Z"Itwas nota trivialreason,for
reallytherecan havebeenno reason,thatprompted
certainracesofmankindtoveneratetheoak tree,butonlythefactthattheyand theoak
treewereunitedin a community oflife,and thereforeitwas notbychoicethattheyarose
together,butratherlikethefleaand thedog.(Iffleasdevelopeda rite,it wouldbe based
on thedog.)"(Wittgenstein1996,72-73).
43Offeringa confession is possibleonlyforthosewho can also keep a secretor,in
therealmofverbalconfession, keepsilent(Heidegger1999,§164-65).The humaninfant
cannotconfess,notso muchbecauseshecannotspeak,butbecauseshehas notyetlearned
howto dissimulate(Derrida2000c,27-30,72). As Wittgenstein notes:"Achildhas much
tolearnbeforeitcan pretend.(A dogcannotbe a hypocrite, butneithercanhe be sincere.)"
(1958,229),for"Q]yingis a language-game thatneedsto be learnedlike anyotherone"
(§249).Notealso Reid'sremarkson testimony and humannature(1997,193-94).On the
betweenReidand Wittgenstein,
relationship see Plant2003b.

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 The Confessing
Animalin Foucaultand Wittgenstein 553

toit.Forno matterwherehis genealogicalgaze comestorest- driven,of

course,byhis alleged"skepticism towardall anthropological universals"
(1998, 461)- Foucault'sconcernremainsfirmlyin the realmoffinite,
vulnerable,embodiedhumanbeings.Is this"anthropological universal"
merelyone "historicalconstruct" amongso manyotherswhichneedsto
be "circumvented" (462)? Or rather,is it notpreciselythistacitrecogni-
tionthatprovides"thebasis forself-recognition" and "forunderstanding
othermen"(380)?
Aswehaveseen,Foucaulttreatsconfessional practiceswithsuspicion.
That the discoursesofconfession have playeda formative rolein even
"themostordinaryaffairsofeverydaylife"(1990, 59) is not,forhim,a
merehistoricalfact.Like Nietzsche'sgenealogyofreligionand morality,
Foucault'sgenealogyofconfession possessesa normativedimension.Of
course,this does notin itself
warrant reproof.The problemarisesin the
way Foucault's suspicion distortsthe confessional technologieshe docu-
ments.One striking example ofthisappears in The HistoryofSexuality,
wherehe writes:
[C]onfession is a ritualofdiscourse. . . thatunfoldswithina powerrela-
tionship,forone does not confesswithoutthe presence(or virtualpres-
ence)ofa partnerwhois notsimplytheinterlocutor buttheauthoritywho
requiresthe confession, prescribesand appreciatesit, and intervenesin
orderto judge,punish,forgive, console,and reconcile;a ritualin which
the. . . expressionalone,independently ofits externalconsequences,pro-
duces intrinsicmodifications in the personwho articulatesit: it exoner-
ates,redeems,and purifieshim;it unburdenshimofhis wrongs,liberates
him,and promiseshimsalvation... Its veracityis notguaranteedbythe
loftyauthority ofthemagistery, norbythetraditionit transmits, butby
thebond,thebasicintimacy in discourse, betweentheonewhospeaksand
whathe is speakingabout.On the otherhand,the agencyofdomination
doesnotresideintheonewhospeaks(foritis he whois constrained), butin
theonewholistens. . . [a]ndthisdiscourseoftruthfinallytakeseffect, not
in theonewhoreceivesit,butin theonefromwhomitis wrested[Foucault
1990,61-2].

Withinspecificconfessionalscenariosthis may be a just representa-

tion,but it is inadequatebeyondthosenarrowconfines.Paradoxically,
givenhisemphasisonthemultidimensionality of"power,"regardingcon-
fessionaldiscoursesFoucaultoftenpresentsa markedlyunilateralpic-
ture.44Not onlyare thereinnumerablepossiblemotivesforconfessing,
howone confesses{to whomone confesses,where,when,and whatone
confesses)plays a part in determining
the "powerrelations"between

44Although I willnotdiscussthishere,onenotableexception
canbe foundinFoucault's
powerin Sadomasochism
positiveremarkson theuse of"strategic" (1997a,165-66,169).

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554 JournalofReligiousEthics

confessor and confessee.45 Whatis noteworthy hereis howtherecipient

can be implicatedbytheother'sconfession to offera confession (oftenof
greaterexposure)"inreturn."46 Therecipient ofa confession thuswalksa
treacherous pathbetween,ontheonehand,acknowledgment (evenrein-
forcement) oftheother'sguilt,47 and,on theotherhand,compassionate
reassurance.One must,as it were,permitthe otherthe rightto their
guiltwithouttherebyburdeningthemunnecessarily(Pascal 1996,45,
49-50). Arguablyit is the possibility ofbeingdrawnintoan escalating
confessional exchange - a sortofapologeticpotlatch - thatnecessitates
theimposition ofregulations, suchas we findin bothChristianand psy-
choanalytic confessionals. All ofthesefactors, I wouldargue,are crucial
forproperly understanding whatFoucaulthimselfreferred to aboveas
"thebasic intimacyofdiscourse"(1990, 62).48It is therefore question-
able that(forexample)the recipientofa confession oflove necessarily
constitutes"theauthority who requiresthe confession, prescribesand
appreciatesit, and intervenesin orderto judge, punish,forgive, con-
sole,and reconcile."
Indeed,itis notevenclearthatreligiousconfessions
need take thisform.We shouldlikewisebe mindfulthatnotall confes-
sionsare prompted bywhatwe have (actively, freely, intentionally)done
(Bok 1986,76; Derrida1999,6-7, 33-5, 56; 2002b,380-98). Neitheris
the confessionnecessarilylinkedto salvationor redemption(Derrida
2002a, 88, 101,104).49Foucault'scharacterizing all theaforementioned
discoursesas "confessional" overlooksthat a confessionneed not com-
municateinformation orknowledge. A confession is notmerereportage
a
concerning past event or "inner process"(Wittgenstein 1958,222; see
also Derrida1999,70; 2000c,38; 2002a, 108-9, 190),50but rathercon-
sistsofan apology(remorse, guilt,appeal forforgiveness, and so on),and
a
thereby promise to not repeat the transgression (Derrida1997a, 19-
51
20; 2000a, 110, 140). If there is aboutconfession
anythingrevelatory

45The confession can,afterall, merelywoundothers.Withthisin mindsee Derrida's

remarksonthe"poisonous" gift(1992,12,62-64).
4bSee, forexample,Rousseau1953,84, 114-15;Foucault1980,198-200;1990,44-45,
61-62,71.
47The recipient's blameontoanotherin [her]self (Derrida2002a,97).
"unloading
48"Peoplewhogiveus their
completetrustbelievethattheytherefore have a rightto
ourown.Thisconclusion is false:rightsare notwonbygifts"(Nietzsche1994,§311).Bok
refersto the"naturalimpulse"oftherecipient ofa confessionto "respondin kind"(1986,
80).
49On "extra-linguistic"confession see Derrida1999,98-99; 2001,47-48.
50ContrastthiswithFoucault1997a,182-83,223-24.
51Whenconfessing onemakesan implicitappealtotherecipient tobelievethesincer-
ityand veracityofthe confession (Wittgenstein1990,§558). Even if,like Rousseau,one
appeals"Believeme,I tellthewholetruth"(1953,31,65, 134,136,176)therelies
explicitly
a tacitappeal in thisveryavowalof truthfulness (Derrida1996,82; 1997b,22-23; 1998,
63; 2000a, 418; 2000b,67; 2000c,59, 75; 2002a, 111-12,140, 166, 173, 189). Foucault's

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 Animalin Foucaultand Wittgenstein 555
The Confessing

it concerns,not the act or offenseitself- ofwhichthe recipientofthe

confessionmaybe onlytooaware(Augustine1998,72)- butratherone's
remorseat havingactedin thatway,and one'sfuturecommitment tonot
reproduceit. This is why,as Wittgenstein notes,a "confession
has to be
partofyournew life"(1994b,18; see also 46; Bok 1986,75-6; Derrida
2005,23).52

4. Conclusion
Itis fashionable, at leastinsomeintellectual circles,toinsistthat"con-
tingency goes all theway down" (Dooley 2001, 43)53;thatthereis nothing
confining thedrama ofhistorical-
culturalforces.But Wittgenstein, who
is oftenchargedwithpromoting such ideas, countersthistendencyby
maintainingthat cultural-historical and individual"difference" is not
radical. Rather,as we have seen,humanlifeis circumscribed by"very
generalfactsofnature"(1958,230) pertaining to "thenaturalhistoryof
humanbeings"(§415).54In thispaperI havetherefore wantedtosuggest
thatit is onlyon the basis ofour sharednaturalhistoryand primitive
behaviorsthat"Western man"could"becomea confessing animal"(Fou-
cault 1990,59).55

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