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SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF 120281-83, October 1, 1999, citing

CASES
Speedy disposition of cases. [Sec. 16. Art.
Ill: “All persons shall have the right to a
speedy disposition of cases before all
judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative
bodies. ’]
Relate this to the right of accused to
speedy trial [Sec. 14, Art. Ill], and to
periods for decision for courts [Sec. 15, Art.
VIII] and for the Constitutional
Commissions [Sec. 7, Art. IX-A], However,
this right is not limited to the accused in
cirminal proceedings but extends to all
parties in all cases, including civil and
administrative cases, and in all
proceedings, including judicial and
quasijudicial hearings. Thus, any party to
a case may demand expeditious action on
all officials who are tasked with the
administration of justice [Cadalin v.
POEA Administrator, 238 SCRA 722].
However, like the right to a speedy trial,
this right is violated only when the
proceedings are attended by vexatious,
capricious and oppressive delays, or
when unjustified postponements of the
trial are asked for and secured, or when
without cause or justifiable motive a long
period of time is allowed to elapse
without the party having his case tried. A
mere mathematical reckoning of the time
involved, therefore, would not be
sufficient [Binay v. Sandiganbayan,
Socrates v. Sandiganbayan, supra].
Thus, in Sambang v. General Court
Martial PRO-Region 6, G.R. No. 140188,
August 3, 2000, the Supreme Court said
that although it was unfortunate that it
took about 8 years before the trial of the
case was resumed, there was no delay
amounting to a violation of the
petitioner’s right to speedy disposition of
cases, considering that the delay was not
attributable to the prosecution.
But, unlike the right to a speedy trial, this
constitutional privilege applies not only
during the trial stage but also when the
case has already been submitted for
decision [Licaros v. Sandiganbayan, G.R.
No. 145851, November 22, 2002].
In Tilendo v. Ombudsman, G.R. No.
165975, September 13, 2007, the
Supreme Court said that the concept of
speedy disposition of cases is relative or
flexible. A simple mathematical
computation of the time involved is
insufficient. In ascertaining whether the
right to speedy disposition of cases has
been violated, the following factors must
be considered:
(a) the length of the delay;
(b) the reasons for the delay;
(c) the assertion or failure to assert such
right by the accused; and
(d) the prejudice caused by the delay.

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after the trial, affording broader

In Roque v. Office of the Ombudsman,
G.R. No. 129978, May 12, 1999, the
Supreme Court held that consistent with
the rights of all persons to due process of
law and to speedy trial, the Constitution
commands the Office of the Ombudsman
to act promptly on complaints filed
against public officials. The failure of the
said office to resolve a complaint that has
been pending for six years is clearly
violative of this mandate and the public
officer’s right. In such event, the
aggrieved party is entitled to the
dismissal of the complaint. A similar
ruling was made in Abardo v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 13957172,
March 28, 2001; Cervantes v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 108595, May
18, 1999, and in Tatad v.
Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70.
In Guianiv. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos.
146897-917, August6,2002, it was held
that the period of time which elapsed in
the conduct of preliminary investigation
was warranted by the sequence of events.
Considering the complexity of the
transaction involved, the fact that the 41
respondents were required to file
counter-affidavits, that most respondents
moved for extension of time, it appears
that the petitioners impliedly acquiesced
in the delay.
In Abadia v. Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA
676, it was held that this right extends to
all citizens, including those in the military,
and covers the period before, during and
protection than Sec. 14 (2), Art. Ill, which
guarantees merely the right to a speedy
trial. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals
did not commit grave abuse of discretion
when it granted the writ of habeas corpus
and stated that the absence of a time limit
within which the Chief of Staff or
reviewing authority may approve or
disapprove the order of dismissal on the
ground of prescription may be subject to
abuse.
In Guerrero v. Court of Appeals, 257
SCRA 703, the Supreme Court said that
while this Court recognizes the right to
speedy disposition of cases quite
distinctly from the right to a speedy trial,
and although this Court has always
zealously espoused protection from
oppressive and vexatious delays not
attributable to the party involved, at the
same time, we hold that a party’s
individual rights should not work against
and preclude the people’s equally
important right to public justice.
In this case, the failure of the petitioner to
assert his right seasonably was
interpreted as a waiver of such right.
Thus, in Dimayacyac v. Judge Roxas, G.R.
No. 136264, May 28, 2004, and in
Bernat v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
158018, May 20, 2004, because the
petitioners had failed seasonably to assert
their constitutional right to speedy
disposition of their cases, the Court ruled
that they were deemed to have waived
their right.

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GABBY RECIT:
Q: State the difference between right to
speedy trial and speedy disposition of
cases.
ANS – In speedy disposition of cases, It
involves all proceedings and involve all
parties. It also pertains to all stages of
trial especially during trial proper. On the
other hand, speedy trial in Section 14
specifically involves criminal proceedings
and is only intended for the accused. It
only involves trial proceedings and those
anterior to it.
Q: During trial, how to determine
which would be applied?
ANS – It basically depends on whose right
was violated. If it is the right of the
prosecution that was violated, refer to the
right to speedy disposition of cases. But if
it is only the accused, resort to sec. 14.
Padua vs. Ericta [G.R. No. L-38570, May
24, 1988]
RIGHT TO A SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF
CASES. Courts should not brook undue
delays in the ventilation and
determination of causes. It should be their
constant effort to assure that litigations
are prosecuted and resolved with
dispatch. Postponements of trials and
hearings should not be allowed except on
meritorious grounds; and the grant or
refusal thereof rests entirely in the sound
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discretion of the Judge. It goes without
saying, however, that discretion must be
reasonably and wisely exercised, in the
light of the attendant circumstances.
Some reasonable deferment of the
proceedings may be allowed or tolerated
to the end that cases may be adjudged
only after full and free presentation of
evidence by all the parties, specially
where the deferment would cause no
substantial prejudice to any part.
The desideratum of a speedy disposition
of cases should not, if at all possible,
result in the precipitate loss of a party s
right to present evidence and either in
plaintiff's being non-suited or the
defendant's being pronounced liable
under an ex parte judgment.
". . . Trial courts have . . . the duty to
dispose of controversies after trial on the
merits whenever possible. It is deemed an
abuse of discretion for them, on their own
motion, 'to enter a dismissal which is not
warranted by the circumstances of the
case' (Municipality of Dingras v. Bonoan,
85 Phil. 458-59 [1950]). While it is true
that the dismissal of an action on grounds
specified under Section 3, Rule 17 of the
Revised Rules of Court is addressed to
their discretion (Flores v. Phil. Alien
Property Administrator, 107 Phil. 778
[1960]; Montelibano v. Benares, 103
Phil. 110 [1958]; Adorable v. Bonifacio,
105 Phil. 1269 [1959]; Inter-Island Gas
Service, Inc. v. De la Gerna, L-17631,
October 19, 1966, 18 SCRA 390), such
discretion must be exercised soundly with
a view to the circumstances surrounding
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each particular case (Vernus-Sanciangco
v. Sanciangco, L-12619, April 28, 1962,
4 SCRA 1209).
If facts obtain that serve as mitigating
circumstances for the delay, the same
should be considered and dismissal
denied or set aside (Rudd v. Rogerson, 15
ALR 2d 672; Cervi v. Greenwood, 147
Colo 190, 362 P. 2d 1050 [1961]),
especially where the suit appears to be
meritorious and the plaintiff was not
culpably negligent and no injury results to
defendant (27 C.J.S. 235-36; 15 ALR 3rd
680)." (Abinales vs. Court of First
Instance of Zamboanga City, Br. I, 70
SCRA 590, 595).
"It is true that the allowance or denial of
petitions for postponement and the
setting aside of orders previously issued,
rest principally upon the sound discretion
of the judge to whom they are addressed,
but a ways predicated on the
consideration that more than the mere
convenience of the courts or of the parties
of the case, the ends of justice and
fairness would be served thereby
(Camara Vda. de Zubiri v. Zubiri, et al.,
L-16745, December 17, 1966).
When no substantial rights are affected
and the intention to delay is not manifest,
the corresponding motion to transfer the
hearing having been filed accordingly, it is
sound judicial discretion to allow them
(Rexwell Corp. v. Canlas, L-16746,
December 30, 1961)." (Panganiban vs.
Vda. De Sta. Maria, 22 SCRA 708, 712).
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DOMINGO PADUA VS VICENTE ERICTA,
etc., RUNDIO ABJAETO, and ANTONIO
G. RAMOS, G.R. No. L-38570 May 24,
1988 NARVASA, J.:
DOCTRINE: Courts should not brook
undue delays in the ventilation and
determination of causes. It should be their
constant effort to assure that litigations
are prosecuted and resolved with
dispatch. Postponements of trials and
hearings should not be allowed except on
meritorious grounds; and the grant or
refusal thereof rests entirely in the sound
discretion of the Judge. It goes without
saying, however, that that discretion must
be reasonably and wisely exercised, in the
light of the attendant circumstances.
Some reasonable deferment of the
proceedings may be allowed or tolerated
to the end that cases may be adjudged
only after full and free presentation of
evidence by all the parties, specially
where the deferment would cause no
substantial prejudice to any part. The
desideratum of a speedy disposition of
cases should not, if at all possible, result
in the precipitate loss of a party's right to
present evidence and either in plaintiff's
being non-suited or the defendant's being
pronounced liable under an ex parte
judgment.
... (T)rial courts have ... the duty to dispose
of controversies after trial on the merits
whenever possible. It is deemed an abuse
of discretion for them, on their own
motion, to enter a dismissal which is not
warranted by the circumstances of the
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case' (Municipality of Dingras v. Bonoan, convenience of the courts or of the parties

85 Phil. 458-59 [1950]). While it is true
that the dismissal of an action on grounds
specified under Section 3, Rule 17 of the
Revised Rules of Court is addressed to
their discretion (Flores v. Phil. Alien
Property Administrator, 107 Phil. 778
(1960]; Montelibano v. Benares, 103
Phil. 110 [1958]; Adorable v. Bonifacio,
105 Phil. 1269 [1959]; Inter-Island Gas
Service, Inc. v. De la Gerna, L-17631,
October 19, 1966, 18 SCRA 390), such
discretion must be exercised soundly with
a view to the circumstances surrounding
each particular case (Vernus-Sanciangco
v. Sanciangco, L-12619, April 28, 1962,
4 SCRA 1209).
If facts obtain that serve as mitigating
circumstances for the delay, the same
should be considered and dismissal
denied or set aside ( Rudd v. Rogerson,
15 ALR 2d 672; Cervi v. Greenwood, 147
Coloma 190, 362 P. 2d 1050 [1961]),
especially where the suit appears to be
meritorious and the plaintiff was not
culpably negligent and no injury results to
defendant (27 C.J.S. 235-36; 15 ALR 3rd
680 (Abinales vs. Court of First Instance
of Zamboanga City, Br. I, 70 SCRA 590,
595).
It is true that the allowance or denial of
petitions for postponement and the
setting aside of orders previously issued,
rest principally upon the sound discretion
of the judge to whom they are addressed,
but always predicated on the
consideration that more than the mere
of the case, the ends of justice and
fairness would be served thereby
(Camara Vda. de Zubiri v. Zubiri, et al.,
L-16745, December 17, 1966). When no
substantial rights are affected and the
intention to delay is not manifest, the
corresponding motion to transfer the
hearing having been filed accordingly, it is
sound judicial discretion to allow them
(Rexwell Corp. v. Canlas, L-16746,
December 30, 1961). (Panganiban vs.
Vda. de Sta. Maria, 22 SCRA 708, 712).
FACTS:In the civil action at bar, the Trial
Court rejected the plaintiffs plea for
cancellation of one of three (3) hearing
dates, the very first such plea made by
that party, upon a ground not entirely
unmeritorious in the premises, and under
such circumstances as would not be
productive of any appreciable delay in the
proceedings or any substantial prejudice
to the defendants, and summarily
dismissed the complaint. Such a dismissal
was unwarranted and relief therefrom
must be accorded.
The action that was thus summarily
dismissed had been brought by Domingo
Padua (petitioner herein) in the Court of
First Instance at Quezon City. 1 In that
action Padua sought to recover damages
for the injures suffered by his eight-year
old daughter, Luzviminda, caused by her
being hit by a truck driven by Rundio
Abjaeto and owned by Antonio G. Ramos
(private respondents herein). Padua was
litigating in forma pauperis.

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Trial of the case having been set in due
course, Padua commenced presentation
of his evidence on December 6, 1973. He
gave testimony on direct exqmination in
the course of which reference was made
to numerous documents, marked Exhibits
B, B-1 to B-109. 2 At the close of his
examination, and on motion of
defendants' counsel, the previously
scheduled hearing of December 12,1973
was cancelled, and Padua's cross-
examination was reset on December 17,
1973. 3 However, the hearing of
December 17,1973 was also cancelled,
again at the instance of defendants'
counsel, who pleaded sickness as ground
therefor; and trial was once more slated
to "take place on March 6, March 7 and
13, 1974, all at 9:00 o'clock in the
morning." 4
"that the hearing on March 6, 1974 ... be
ordered cancelled." No opposition was
filed by the defendants to the motion,
whether on the ground that the motion
had not been properly set for hearing, the
clerk having merely been requested to
"submit the ... motion upon receipt ... for
the consideration of the Court," 7 or some
other ground. Apart from filing this
motion on March 1, 1974, plaintiffs
counsel took the additional step of
sending his client's wife to the Court on
the day of the trial, March 6,1974, to
verbally reiterate his application for
cancellation of the hearing on that day.
This, Mrs. Padua did. The respondent
Judge however denied the application and
dismissed the case. His Honor's Order,
dictated on that day, March 6, 1974, reads
as follows: 8

After defendants' attorney had twice When this case was called
sought and obtained cancellation of trial for hearing today, neither
settings, as above narrated, it was plaintiff plaintiff nor counsel
Padua's counsel who next moved for appeared. The plaintiffs
cancellation of a hearing date. In a motion wife, however, appeared in
dated and filed on March 1, 1974, 5 copy Court and informed the
of which was personally served on Court that the plaintiffs
defendants' lawyer 6 Padua's counsel counsel had to attend to a
alleged that he had "another hearing on very important case in the
March 6, 1974 in Tarlac Court of First provinces.
Instance entitled: Salud Dupitas vs.
Mariano Abella, Civil Case No. 4904 which The hearing for today was
is of 1966 stint, and said court in Tarlac is fixed by the plaintiff himself
anxious to terminate said case once and for in open court after
all," and that the cancellation would "at consulting his calendar and
any rate ... leave plaintiff and defendants hence the Court will not
two (2) hearing dates on March 7 and 13, grant the postponement on
1974;" and on these premises, he asked the ground that the

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plaintiffs counsel had a very
important case in the
provinces. Neither did the
plaintiff himself appear.
In view hereof, let this case
be dismissed.
Padua moved for reconsideration, but
this was denied. 10 Hence, this petition.
RULING: The Trial Court unaccountably
ignored the fact that defendants' counsel
had twice applied for and been granted
postponements of the trial; that plaintiffs
counsel had filed a written motion for
postponement five (5) days prior to the
hearing sought to be transferred, and this
was the very first such motion filed by
him; that although the motion for
postponement could have been objected
to, no opposition was presented by
defendants, which was not surprising
considering that their counsel had himself
already obtained two (2) postponements;
that the ground for cancellation was not
entirely without merit: the counsel had a
case in the Tarlac Court scheduled on the
same day, March 6, 1974, which had been
pending since 1964 and which the Tarlac
Court understandably was anxious to
terminate; that the Padua motion for
postponement sought cancellation of only
one (1) of three settings, leaving the case
to proceed on the two (2) subsequent
hearing dates; and the motion had been
verbally reiterated by plaintiffs wife on
the day of the hearing sought to be
cancelled, Under the circumstances, and
in the light of the precedents set out in the
opening paragraphs of this opinion, the
respondent Judge's action was
unreasonable, capricious and oppressive,
and should be as it is hereby annulled.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is
granted and the Order of the Court a quo
dated March 6, 1974, dismissing the
petitioner's complaint, and the Order
dated March 13, 1974 denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration,
are hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE;
Civil Case No. Q-17563 is hereby
REINSTATED and the Regional Trial Court
which has replaced Branch XVIII of the
Court of First Instance in which the action
was pending at the time of dismissal, is
DIRECTED to continue with the trial of
the petitioner's action and decide the
same on the merits in due course.
FLORES VS PEOPLE GR L-25769 |
December 10, 1974
FACTS: Petitioners, Francisco Flores and
Francisco Angel, were accused for
robbery. Information was filed in
December 1951. They were found guilty
of the crime charged in November 1955.
Notice of appeal was file in December
1955. It was until February 1958 that
action was taken by CA—a resolution
remanding the records of the case to the
lower court for a rehearing of the
testimony of a certain witness deemed
material for the disposition of the case.
Such resolution was amended dated

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August 1959 which granted the Constitutional right to a speedy trial

petitioners to set aside the decision so
that evidence for the defense on new facts
may be received and a new decision in
lieu of the old one may be rendered. The
case was returned to the lower court but
nothing was done for about a year
because the offended party failed to
appear despite the 6/7 dates set for such
hearing. Furthermore, when the offended
party took the witness stand, his
testimony was characterized as a mere
fiasco as he could no longer remember
the details of the alleged crime and even
failed to identify the 2 accused.
The trial court instead of rendering a
decision sent back the records to the
appellate tribunal. 5 more years elapsed
without anything being done, petitioners
sought dismissal of the case against them
due to inordinate delay in the disposition
(from December 1955- May 1965). CA
was unresponsive notwithstanding the
vigorous plea of the petitioners, its last
order being a denial of a second MR dated
January 1966. CA’s defense is that the
case was not properly captioned as
“People of the Philippines” and without
“Court of Appeals” being made a party to
the petition.
means one free from vexatious, capricious
and oppressive delays. An accused is
entitled to a trial at the earliest
opportunity. He cannot be oppressed by
delaying the commencement of the trial
for an unreasonable length of time. The
Constitution does not say that such right
may be availed only where the
prosecution of a crime is commenced and
undertaken by the fiscal. It does not
exclude from its operation cases
commenced by private individuals.
“Where a person is prosecuted criminally,
he is entitled to a speedy trial,
irrespective of the nature of the offense or
the manner in which it is authorized to be
commenced”.
Technicalities should give way to the
realities of the situation. There should
not be too much significance attached to
the procedural defect (refer to CA’s
defense). CA failed to accord respect to
this particular constitutional right
amounting at the very least to a grave
abuse of discretion.

ISSUE: WON constitutional right to a

speedy trial was violated.

HELD: YES. Petition for certiorari was

granted. Orders denying Motion to
dismiss as Motion to Reconsideration are
set aside and nullified. Criminal Case
against petitioners was dismissed.

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