Habitat International 35 (2011) 150e157

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Habitat International
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/habitatint

Objectives, success and failure factors of housing publiceprivate

partnerships in Malaysia
A.-R. Abdul-Aziz*, P.S. Jahn Kassim
Universiti Sains Malaysia, Penang, Malaysia

a b s t r a c t
Keywords: From time to time, various public agencies in Malaysia have developed houses using the publiceprivate
Housing development partnership (PPP) approach. The few failed housing PPP projects captured by National Audit point to the
Publiceprivate partnership
necessity for proper implementation. A study was conducted to examine the objectives of housing PPP,
Malaysia
Public agencies
the success and failure factors. All government agencies which had adopted housing PPP were targeted.
They ranged from state-owned companies to Islamic religious councils. Data were collected using the
mixed method of postal questionnaire survey supplemented by interviews and case studies. It was found
that the public agencies desired to fulfil an array of objectives when adopting PPP, the most important
being to enhance organisational reputation. The success factor which had the most impact was action
against errant developers. The failure factor which had the most influential was absence of robust and
clear agreement. Malaysian public agencies can use the findings to ensure that their housing PPP will
achieve their desired ends.
Ó 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Introduction PPP in Malaysia, Jamaluddin and Agus (1997), Singaravelloo (2001),

Although not as commonly adopted for infrastructure provision,
publiceprivate partnerships (PPP) in the delivery of homes have
been practised in Egypt, India, Pakistan, South Africa, Bulgaria,
Mexico, Russia, Thailand and the United Kingdom (Payne, 2000). In
1992, the United States’ Congress, for example, created the HOPE VI
programme to promote PPP between public housing agencies and
private for-profit residential developers to produce affordable
housing (Zhang, 1996). In 2000, Canada launched the Let’s Build
programme to stimulate partnership between the various disparate
parties for social housing development (Griffin, 2004). Malaysia too
adopted the housing PPP concept without explicitly labelling it as
such.
Housing PPP in Malaysia can be traced to the broader national
privatisation policy launched in 1983. Kuala Lumpur City Hall
became the first government agency to implement housing PPP to
complete 80,000 low-cost housing units in 3 years (Jamaluddin &
Agus, 1997), which in retrospect was highly ambitious. While
Kuala Lumpur City Hall has acknowledged that many squatters had
been properly housed through this fast-track programme, it
projects that 158,571 low-cost houses are still required by 2020
(KLCH, 2004). There have been very limited past studies on housing
* Corresponding author. Fax: þ010 604 6576523.
E-mail address: abdulrashid.abdulaziz@gmail.com (A.-R. Abdul-Aziz).
Ong and Lenard (2002), and Wan Abdul Aziz and Hanif (2005)
being the notable few. In fact, worldwide, housing PPP have very
much eluded scholastic scrutiny (Payne, 2000). It was against this
backdrop that a study was conducted to explore housing PPP in
Malaysia. Even though the study examined various aspects of PPP,
this paper only dwells on two of the achieved objectives, which
were:
1. To identify the objectives of housing PPP
2. To determine the success and failure factors of housing PPP.
Malaysia’s housing PPP model is broadly similar to that adopted
by Bulgaria (Claggett, Doukov, & Feiden, 1994), Australia (Thomas,
2009), South Korea (Choe, 2002) and India (Awil & Abdul-Aziz,
2006) in that the private developer assumes all development
responsibilities including designing, constructing and financing.
Additionally, the developer is also expected to provide internal
infrastructure, social and public amenities and houses for the
various income groups (Bardhan & Barua, 2005). The public sector
on the other hand provides output specification (e.g. number for
various housing types, size of open space areas, types of communal
facilities), sets initial commercial parameters (such as selling prices
for various housing type, phasing of development, profit-sharing
arrangements) and allocates risks (i.e. delay in development
approval, poor sales performance, fluctuation in construction
material prices) (Gilbertson, 2005). Crucially, it also contributes

0197-3975/$ e see front matter Ó 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.habitatint.2010.06.005
 A.-R. Abdul-Aziz, P.S. Jahn Kassim / Habitat International 35 (2011) 150e157
lands to the partnership (Bardhan & Barua, 2005; Choe, 2002;
Claggett et al., 1994) for free or at discounted rate, either on
a freehold (Awil & Abdul-Aziz, 2006) or leasehold basis (Pint,
Bondanella, Cave, & Keyser, 2001). The public sector may play the
facilitative role (Bardhan & Barua, 2005; Sengupta, 2005) by
accelerating the approval process for example (Agus, 1989). Virtu-
ally all the housing PPP in Malaysia require the private developer to
provide low-cost housing as part of the social obligation. All
dwellings, even the low-cost units, are sold rather than rented out
to occupants.
The present study took on heightened importance when the
National Audit of Malaysia highlighted a few housing PPP which
under-performed. One project took 8 years longer to complete
because the developer concentrated on completing the high-end
portion of the development first (National Audit Chief, 2003).
Another in Selangor under-achieved its sale quota to targeted
buyers as the developer focussed on a more lucrative house-buyer
segment (National Audit Chief, 2000). Yet another brought financial
loss to a public agency as the developer under-valued the granted
land for the development (National Audit Chief, 2001).
The obvious question to pose is that in situations when public
agencies have been unable to develop lands on their own and
therefore have had to co-opt private developers, would it not have
been better to abandon public initiatives altogether? Such an act
would have been construed as forsaking social obligations for quick
profit. Also, it would have brought into question the rationale of
maintaining sizeable technical resources which some public
agencies possessed.
Literature review
According to Savas (2000), private partnership is a particularly
malleable form of privatisation. Any act to reduce the role of the
government or increase the role of the private institutions in
satisfying people’s needs tantamount to privatisation. He points out
that privatisation can involve delegation (i.e. the government
retains responsibility and oversight but uses the private sector for
service delivery), divestment (i.e. the government relinquishes
responsibility) and displacement (i.e. private sector grows and
displaces a government activity). Housing PPP certainly qualify for
the first category.
Even though the private developer is expected to perform all
development tasks under PPP, the public agencies may take on the
role of the ‘regulator’ (Leung & Hui, 2005), ‘enabler’ by providing
the enabling environment for the private partner to step in
(Sengupta, 2005), ‘moderator’ by balancing market incentives with
community interests (Sengupta, 2005) and ‘facilitator’ by assisting
in project completion and reducing the developer’s risks (Lynch,
Brown, & Baker, 1999). In South Africa (Dewar, 1999), Bulgaria
and Russia (Lynch et al., 1999), various forms of facilitation are
included in their housing PPP. Under India’s Participatory Devel-
opment Schemes, the public agency provides grounds of legal base,
beneficial policy environment, development guidelines and even
loans (Adusumilli, 1999). In Canada, the facilitation is by way of
permitting design flexibility in terms of, for example, permitted
height, density, site configuration and open space, in addition to
streamlining the approval process (Griffin, 2004).
Housing PPP in different countries were borne out of different
circumstances. Their objectives may therefore differ. In the USA,
budgetary constraint was the driving force, which prompted
community-based-non-profit housing developers to forge creative
alliances with various parties to finance affordable housing
(Pomeroy, Lampert, Wallace, & Sheehan, 1998). The same was true
in the UK (Webb & Pulle, 2002), India (Adusumilli, 1999), Canada
(Pomeroy et al., 1998) and Australia (Maguire & Malinovitch, 2004).
151
Public agencies in those countries turned to the private sector to
provide capital for housing development. Innovation was listed by
Partnership Victoria as among the objectives for PPP (Webb & Pulle,
2002). In India, the Andhra Pradesh Housing Board looked for
freshness in design and construction practices in housing devel-
opment (The Times of India Online, 2004). PPP enable the public
agencies to tap the expertise of the private developers (Dewar,
1999; Susilawati & Armitage, 2004), which can be managerial,
technical, financial and marketing in nature (Singaravelloo, 2001).
Another attraction of PPP is the ability to transfer risks to the
private sector (Dixon, Pottinger, & Jordan, 2005; Gallimore,
Williams, & Woodward, 1997; Maguire & Malinovitch, 2004;
Sengupta, 2005; Susilawati, Armitage, & Skitmore, 2005). The
main risk in housing is the change in demand which, if it dips below
expectation, could delay loan repayments, causing additional
interest and debt to developers (Hussin, 2001). Other risks pertain
to design, construction, completion and approval (Dixon et al.,
2005; Grimsey & Lewis, 2005). Risk transfer is beneficial in that it
heightens the level of commitment of the private sector (Dixon
et al., 2005; Grimsey & Lewis, 2005).
Often, public agencies have multiple objectives when adopting
PPP. For Australia’s first housing PPP, the objectives were to obtain
private sector finance, innovation and expertise, risk transfer and cost
savings (Coates, 2008). Webb and Pulle (2002) also note that in the
UK, housing PPP provided potential for value for money, early project
delivery and gains from innovation, among others. Value for money is
also noted by Maguire and Malinovitch (2004) as the key driver for
adopting PPP in Australia. Value for money can take the form of lower
construction costs, lower operating costs and even more efficient
maintenance in the long run. Risk transfer also contributes to value
for money (Maguire & Malinovitch, 2004). The European Commission
(2003) considers value for money as ‘more gains’ for the given price,
e.g. reduced life cycle costs, better allocation of risks, faster imple-
mentation, improved service quality and generation of additional
revenue. Quality however is not limited to service, but also relates to
the materials used and the level of construction workmanship
(Raman, 1997). Finally, awards and recognitions may stimulate public
agencies into adopting housing PPP (Alexandrou & Colpus, 2001;
Singaravelloo, 2001; Susilawati et al., 2005).
Past studies inclined towards identifying success factors, not
failure factors. The success of particular housing PPP programme is
highly influenced by the country’s economic, political and cultural
circumstances (Brown, Orr, & Luo, 2006). Put simply, the success
and failures may be country-specific.
Selecting the right partner is crucial, as is consistent monitoring
(Cuorato, 2002). Dixon et al. (2005) and Cuorato (2002) point to
transparent and consistent communication between parties as
critical to the success of housing PPP. According to Susilawati and
Armitage (2004), trust and information have positive associa-
tions: without trust the parties do not share information and
without further sharing of information, trust cannot increase. There
must be compatibility between the private developer and the
public agency, which is not easy as the former seeks to make profit
while the latter to fulfil social and electoral responsibilities
(Susilawati et al., 2005). Incompatibility has resulted in lengthy
negotiations (Asenova, Beck, Akintoye, Hardcastle, & Chinyio,
2002). A few sources recommend that the public sector should
not solely rely on the private sector to conduct feasibility studies
because of their inclination to make overly optimistic projections
simply to secure housing PPP contracts (Leung & Hui, 2005;
National Audit Cheif, 2003). Payne (2000) notes that even with
incentives offered by the government, the poorest group might not
benefit when the private developer has a strong bias towards
meeting the housing demand of the rich. Developers with a social
sense of obligation therefore can ensure housing PPP success.
152 A.-R. Abdul-Aziz, P.S. Jahn Kassim / Habitat International 35 (2011) 150e157
Still on success factors, for Australia’s first housing PPP,
competitive tendering was adopted (Coates, 2008). Likewise
Andhra Pradesh Housing Board invited local and foreign housing
developers for a township PPP in Hyderabad, India (The Times of
India Online, 2004). There has been criticism, however, that
competition leads to high bidding costs (Asenova et al., 2002). Good
negotiations have been found to lead to better value for money
(Asenova et al., 2002) and quality of overall project (Hanif, Wan
Abdul Aziz, & Mohd. Aini, 2006). The skills of the public agency
must match its private partner’s as the latter has greater expertise
in commercial negotiations and usually achieve more favourable
contractual outcomes in many PPP projects (Australian
Procurement and Construction Council, 2002). Lack of expertise
increases costs to the public sector as it has to engage external
consultants. A good contract should clearly describe the responsi-
bilities of both private and public partners, and clearly define the
methodology of dispute resolution (Cuorato, 2002). Insufficient
details in the contract have at least caused one housing PPP to be
delayed in Malaysia (National Audit Chief, 2000).
As for failure factor, one was detected from past literature.
According to Ong and Lenard (2002), housing PPP can do without
political intervention especially when an incorrupt and honest
political regime is absent. They however did not articulate what
specific form political intervention might take. Corruption inherent
in political influence risks undermining public trust and
hence project outcome (Rondinelli, 2003). Realistically though,
public agencies in Malaysia tend attract political interference
(Singaravelloo, 2001).
Research method
The present research was exploratory in nature. It was moti-
vated by the desire to better understand housing PPP in Malaysia.
To achieve this end, it was decided right from the beginning that
the mixed method was best suited for the purpose: a postal ques-
tionnaire survey sequentially followed by interviews and case
studies. The qualitative methods were used to confirm and clarify
the quantitative data, and also to seek elaboration. Past studies on
housing PPP (Griffin, 2004; Payne, 2000; Singaravelloo, 2001; Wan
Abdul Aziz & Hanif, 2005) favoured the case studies approach.
Susilawati et al. (2005) were different in that it too adopted the
survey-interview combination.
While mixing the qualitative and quantitative approaches is
anathema to purists who believe the two have radically different
philosophical assumptions, others like Greene (2008) promote the
mixed method for its ability to complement strengths (the weak-
ness of one method is compensated by the strength of another),
triangulate (establish construct validity through convergence in
findings from multiples studies), develop (one method to inform
the development of another) and expand (to obtain a fuller picture
by expanding the scope and breadth of a study). Others before her
too had also broadly pointed to these same strengths (Firestone,
1993; Sieber, 1973).
The distributed questionnaires were based on past literature
and a pilot test. Five individuals were approached to give their
comments about the draft questionnaire e a project executive who
later recommended his colleague project manager also from the
same housing cooperative, an engineer attached with an engi-
neering consultancy firm, an ex-project executive of a state-owned
enterprise and a project executive of a state-owned enterprise. All
of them have dealt with housing PPP projects before. From their
feedback, one variable was added for objectives of housing PPP (i.e.
project reputation) and 3 for success/failure factors (i.e. action
against errant developer, developer’s profit-sharing accountability
and developer’s social accountability). Different from past studies
which just identified critical success factors, this study examined
the impact of certain factors if they were absent, the rationale being
the absence of certain success factors cannot be presumed to lead to
failure. Neither can the absence of failure factors presumed to lead
to success. Also it cannot be presumed that the degree of impact of
a success factor when present is the same as the degree of the
opposite effect when absent. Most of the questions contained in the
questionnaire adopted the 5-point Likert Scale.
Which public agencies from among the many in Malaysia should
be included in the present study took careful deliberation.
Borrowing Asaha’s (2004) criterion that they must all have access
to public lands for housing development, the agencies initially
approached were the 135 local authorities, 25 state-owned enter-
prises, 12 regional authorities, 14 state Islamic councils, 7 govern-
ment-linked companies, 2 ministry-owned organisations.
Telephone calls were made to all of them to enquire whether they
had ever teamed up with private developers in housing develop-
ment. From this exercise, the number of the agencies was reduced
to 184 from the original 195 e three state-owned enterprises, five
regional authorities and three government-linked companies were
removed from the postal list. The questionnaires were sent to all of
them. 19 usable questionnaires (i.e. 10.4%) were returned despite
follow-up calls 4 weeks later. The poor response from the targeted
government agencies can be attributed to the sulit (confidential)
syndrome, even when baseless (Lee & Ahmad, 2000). The ques-
tionnaires were all completed by those intimately familiar with
their organisations’ housing PPP projects.
11 Respondents indicated in the returned questionnaires their
willingness to be interviewed. Prior to each interview, desk
research was conducted to obtain as much additional information
as possible about the organisation and its housing PPP projects.
Secondary sources of information included organisation website
and online newspaper articles. All except one interviewee allowed
for the interviews to be tape-recorded. The data obtained from the
postal questionnaire and interviews were then analysed. Upon
completion of the analysis, 10 out of the 11 interviewed agencies
were again approached so that in-depth case studies on specific
housing PPP projects (one for every organisation) could be con-
ducted. These were scrutinised more intensely to further grasp the
intricacies of housing PPP. Although the case studies served to
produce best practices which are not presented in this paper,
relevant data were nonetheless incorporated in the present paper.
For analysis, the quantitative data obtained from the postal
questionnaire survey were ‘qualitised’ (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998)
so that they could be interpreted together with the qualitative data.
The data obtained from the interviews, secondary sources and case
studies were content analysed.
Despite adopting the mixed method research design which
enabled a fuller picture to be obtained, the fairly small sample
population renders the quantitative and qualitative observations
indicative rather than representative. In terms of bias, of the 19
agencies that returned the questionnaires, seven were state-owned
enterprises, six were local authorities and two each were Islamic
councils, government-linked companies and regional authorities.
The data were therefore skewed towards state-owned enterprises
and local authorities (68% of the sample population), which was
acceptable as these two categories of agencies dominated the
population (85%). These state-owned enterprises had technical
departments devoted to real estate development as opposed to the
smaller Islamic councils and local authorities did not even have
a single staff that could be devoted to property development. The
distribution of the participating agencies throughout the country
did not result in geographical bias. There may however have been
bias towards agencies whose responding officials were at ease with
the disclosure of information solicited for the research. Despite the
 A.-R. Abdul-Aziz, P.S. Jahn Kassim / Habitat International 35 (2011) 150e157 153

limitation of the findings, exploratory studies such as the present Table 1

one do play a vital role in being the basis for further in-depth Objectives of housing PPP.

subsequent studies. Objective Mean S.D. Rank Remark

Organisation reputation 4.74 0.56 1 H. Impor.
Findings and discussion Project reputation 4.63 0.68 2 H. Impor.
Early completion 4.63 0.60 2 H. Impor.
On-time completion 4.63 0.60 2 H. Impor.
The present study found that given the choice, public agencies
Value for money 4.50 0.71 5 H. Impor.
would rather develop lands on their own. But because of certain Cost certainty 4.33 0.59 6 Impor.
inherent limitations such as unavailable (in the case of some state Quality workmanship 4.28 0.84 7 Impor.
Islamic councils, for example) or limited (in the case of some local Transfer of financial risks 4.12 0.86 8 Impor.
authorities) technical and financial resources, they had to turn to Transfer of delay risk 4.06 0.75 10 Impor.
Innovation in design 4.06 0.80 10 Impor.
the private sector for assistance. External factors which prompted Obtaining lowest development cost 4.06 0.87 10 Impor.
them to do likewise included prohibition to engage in commercial Obtaining technical expertise 4.06 1.00 10 Impor.
activities (for state Islamic councils), political pressure to suddenly Transfer of defect risks 4.00 0.75 14 Impor.
increase volume of mass housing (e.g. zero squatter policy by 2005 Obtaining marketing expertise 3.89 0.96 15 Impor.
Transfer of cost overrun risk 3.88 0.86 16 Impor.
for Selangor State) or even difficult land conditions (e.g. hilly or
Transfer of sales risk 3.82 1.13 17 Impor.
marshy areas). Several interviewees pointed out those housing PPP Obtaining capital for development 3.72 1.13 18 Impor.
developments often appreciate the land value of the surrounding
Note: 1.00e1.49 ¼ highly unimportant, 1.50e2.49 ¼ unimportant 2.50e3.49 ¼
area, hence unlocking the economic value to the benefit of private neutral, 3.50e4.49 ¼ important, 4.50e5.00 ¼ highly important.
landowners. They regarded this outcome as fulfilling part of their
social duties.
While Malaysia’s housing PPP exhibit certain unifying features organisational and project reputation as being underpinned by
with housing PPP elsewhere, the present study also found that they other variables (e.g. completion dates, quality of workmanship,
have certain peculiar features. Even though lands are provided to etc.) which were also tested in the present study.
the private developer, prudent public agencies prohibit them from The respondents scored equal means to early completion and
being charged to the bank to raise finance for development. This is on-time completion (just as with project reputation). If early
because once land is charged to the banks, the public agency completion cannot be achieved, then the surveyed public agencies
relinquishes ownership. The banks could auction them off if the were equally contented with on-time completion. Interestingly,
private developer defaulted on his loan repayments. Another these two variables were given the highest means compared to all
unique feature of Malaysia’s housing PPP is that the public agency the other technical variables, a reflection of how the Malaysian
still expects the private sector to ‘cross-subsidise’ the low-cost public gauged housing development success. Abandoned housing
houses in the developments with profits made from the other projects have become staple news e the statistics from the Ministry
housing types. The Malaysian government implemented a policy in of Housing and Local Government as of 31st December 2009 indi-
1981 which transferred the responsibility of housing low-income cated that nationwide, 148 projects were abandoned involving
earners to private developers by requiring them to provide at least 49,913 dwellings. Irate house-buyers burdened with loans for
30% low-cost housing unit within their housing schemes (Idrus & incomplete houses make bad publicity for the housing developers
Ho, 2008; Salleh, 1997). The cost of low-cost dwellings often concerned as they freely air their grievance to anyone willing to
exceeds the government-set ceiling prices especially in major lend their ears. The interviewees clarified that abandoned housing
urban centres, hence the ‘cross-subsidisation’ argument which the projects are a malaise of the private sector, which the public may
government consistently use against dissatisfied housing devel- not be aware of. Public agencies may deliver houses late, but they
opers. Returning back to the present study, public agencies main- never abandon development projects. The interviewees explained
tain this policy under housing PPP arrangements with the private that private developers are better able to complete houses on or
sector. Also as part of affirmative action policy, housing developers ahead of schedule due to different work values (i.e. highly profit
are required to sell 30% of their newly constructed houses to driven and tenacity in resolving challenges) and work practices (i.e.
bumiputera (or Malays). Again, public agencies maintain this ruling fewer internal procedures, regulations and meetings). To highlight
on their housing PPP partners as well, some even expecting them to this point, one interviewee narrated of two separate housing
exceed this quota to cater for Malay-dominated communities. developments which his organisation developed. Contiguously
Table 1 shows that of all the objectives tested, 5 were deemed located, one used the PPP format and the other self-developed.
highly important, the rest important. The surveyed public agencies, Even though both began at approximately the same time, the
just like all public organisations in Malaysia, were associated with former was completed well ahead of the schedule compared to the
poor service delivery performance and inefficiency (Abdul-Aziz, latter. Date of completion is also emphasised by others as an
Jaafar, & Hussin, 2007; Ho, 2006). The interviewees only made objective of housing PPP (European Commission, 2003; Webb &
oblique references to such imagery, most likely to avoid self- Pulle, 2002). Value for money was the last highly important vari-
implication. The public agencies expected their organisational able. The sampled public agencies did not aspire to make huge
reputation to be enhanced by adopting the PPP concept, especially profits from their housing PPP projects, they merely hoped the
when confronted with challenging situations. This observation house-buyers would get value for money. The agencies were
coheres with that of Singaravelloo (2001), Alexandrou and Colpus satisfied as long as their returns were equivalent to the land value
(2001) and Susilawati et al. (2005). Scored slightly lower by the as assessed by the Valuation Department. In this sense, Malaysia’s
respondents was project reputation. The PPP arrangement prom- housing PPP ideals cohere with that of other countries (European
ised to enhance project reputation, even from the outset as private Commission, 2003; Maguire & Malinovitch, 2004; Webb & Pulle,
developers are generally regarded as more efficient house-builders 2002).
(Agus, 2002). The mere act of partnering with private developers The rest of the variables can be clustered under finance, private
attracted those who ordinarily shunned buying public agency developers’ expertise and risk transfer. Under the finance cluster,
housing, noted a few interviewees. Incidentally, project reputation cost certainty recorded higher mean than obtaining lowest devel-
was not highlighted by past scholars. The interviewees alluded to opment cost, which in turn was higher than obtaining capital (in
154 A.-R. Abdul-Aziz, P.S. Jahn Kassim / Habitat International 35 (2011) 150e157

fact obtaining capital was the lowest ranked variable). Hence, possession. The surveyed public agencies pushed the defect risk to
budgetary pressure was not the major driver for housing PPP in their private partners. Private partners were also made to absorb
Malaysia, in contrast to the observation by Adusumilli (1999), cost overrun risk to motivate them to keep within budget. Inter-
Pomeroy et al. (1998), Webb and Pulle (2002) and Maguire and estingly sales risk had the lowest mean compared to the other types
Malinovitch (2004). Cost certainty was stressed because cost of risk, which challenges the viewpoint of Hussin (2001) that it was
overrun was likely to detrimentally affect project cash flow and a main risk item. The interviews revealed that sales were always
certainly profit margin. The potential for project abandonment assured no matter how remote the developments were, provided
looms with serious cost overrun. The public agencies were not the prices of the housing units were affordable to local communi-
fixated on achieving lowest development cost, which does not ties. Such was the demand for formal housing in Malaysia that sales
resonate with Coates (2008). While several interviewees pointed were almost assured regardless of location. Even so, the surveyed
out that PPP helped their cash-strapped organisations obtained public agencies required their partners to absorb sales risk by
capital for development, the questionnaire response suggests that stating in their agreements that regardless of the sales outcome,
this objective was the least of their concerns. Seasoned public they were still entitled to their stipulated returns, be it in cash, in
agencies were especially wary of private developers full of promises kind, or both. Having examined all the objectives for housing PPP, it
of easy access to funds but fall short on how to meet other can be summarised that just like in other countries, housing PPP in
objectives. Malaysia served to meet multiple objectives.
The returned questionnaires indicate that the sampled public Tables 2 and 3 must be interpreted in combination. The factor
agencies harnessed the expertise of private developers, hence which contributed most to the success of PPP projects when it
concurring with past observations by Dewar (1999), Singaravelloo prevailed was action against errant developers (see Table 2). When
(2001), Susilawati and Armitage (2004) and Coates (2008). Of the action was not taken, the impact was negative (see Table 3).
expertise that was tapped, quality of workmanship recorded the Following the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, one private developer
highest mean followed by innovation in design, technical expertise failed to complete the last phase of a 750-acre development.
and finally marketing expertise. The interviewees conceded that Sympathetic to its plight, the public agency extended the date for
private developers were more attentive to workmanship quality; completion a few times. More than ten years on and 352 dwellings
monitoring concreting works late into the night and inspecting roof still had to be completed. During the intervening period, houses
spaces for example were normal routines for them, but not for were being competed, but exceedingly slowly. In retrospect, the
salaried executives of public agencies and the consultants they interviewee confided that prompt stern action should have been
engaged. The observation on quality workmanship supports Raman taken. Then, his organisation would not have to confront irate
(1997). Being in a competitive industry, private developers house-buyers’ fury. Action against errant developer as a success or
constantly strive to produce innovative housing designs. The failure factor had never been identified by past scholars and
architects and designers the public agencies engaged might not observers of housing PPP before. When timely actions were hesi-
have even been as creative as them, complained a few interviewees. tated, problems risked festering beyond remedy. Not only that,
The finding on innovative design coheres with past observations taking the cue, subsequent PPP partners then took the dim view
(The Times of India Online, 2004; Webb & Pulle, 2002). Being that the public agencies were pliant. The interviews identified
hands-on, private developers are also technically-minded and more inaction against errant developers mainly arose from frontline
creative in marketing their houses. One private partner did not personnel with weak command of PPP contracts. Consequently
undertake any major sales promotion at all. There was no on-site they were daunted to confront astute errant developers just as they
sale-board and showhouse for his housing PPP project, only pho- were with unsympathetic top management.
tocopied flyers. As he anticipated, curiosity among the locals drove The only variable deemed to produce highly negative outcome
housing sales. when absent was robust and clear agreement (see Table 3). When
In terms of risk transfer (Coates, 2008; Dixon et al., 2005; existed, it led to positive outcome (see Table 2). This finding echoes
Gallimore et al., 1997; Maguire & Malinovitch, 2004; Sengupta, the observation by the National Audit Chief (2000) and Cuorato
2005; Susilawati et al., 2005), all the interviewees pointed out (2002). Some of the interviewees admitted that sharp developers,
that their organisations did not deliberately set out to over-burden not necessarily unscrupulous, had exploited loopholes in their PPP
their partners. As found from the field study, some public agencies contracts. Not many consultant lawyers in Malaysia had dealt with
were moved to re-engage themselves in the development process
to aid their partners when needed, but still made it known that
whatever risks remained with their partners. In the same spirit of Table 2
partnership, these organisations refrained from exercising the Effect on housing PPP when factors exist.
contract stringently, unless really forced to. Nonetheless they N Mean S.D. Remark
conceded that risks still had to be transferred to ensure the private
Action against errant developer 14 4.50 0.52 Highly positive
developers took their responsibilities seriously, which echoes the Consistent monitoring 19 4.47 0.51 Positive
point by Dixon et al. (2005) and Grimsey and Lewis (2005). The House-buyers’ demand 17 4.41 0.62 Positive
public agencies did not assume any risk at all arising from the Reputable developer 17 4.41 0.62 Positive
housing PPP development process. Financial risk ranked the high- Robust and clear agreement 16 4.31 0.60 Positive
Constant communication 17 4.24 0.44 Positive
est, followed by delay risk, defect risk, cost overrun risk and sales Developer’s profit-sharing accountability 13 4.23 0.44 Positive
risk. The greatest financial risk for the public agencies was the loss Developer’s social accountability 15 4.13 0.35 Positive
of lands they committed to the housing PPP. Prudent public PSO negotiation skills 17 4.12 0.49 Positive
agencies did not give full power of attorney to their partners. If full PSO’s adequate negotiation staff 17 4.12 0.49 Positive
Compatibility between partners 19 4.11 0.46 Positive
power of attorney was given, then they demanded bank guarantees
Realistic projection 18 4.06 0.80 Positive
equivalent to the land value. Transferring the delay risk to the Competition 16 4.00 0.52 Positive
private partners spurred them to complete on time, better still Ample time to evaluate proposal 17 3.88 0.78 Positive
earlier than schedule. It was the national requirement that all Political influence 12 3.33 0.866 Neutral
housing developers must make good any defects detected by house Note: 1.00e1.49 ¼ highly negative, 1.50e2.49 ¼ negative, 2.50e3.49 ¼ neutral,
purchasers within 18 months from the date of delivery of vacant 3.50e4.49 ¼ positive, 4.50e5.00 ¼ highly positive.
 A.-R. Abdul-Aziz, P.S. Jahn Kassim / Habitat International 35 (2011) 150e157 155

Table 3 earlier, if informed early, some agencies would intervene to resolve

Effect on housing PPP when factors do not exist. development impediments even though not obligated to do so.
N Mean S.D. Remark However this could only happen if they were made aware of their
Robust and clear agreement 3 1.33 0.58 Highly negative partners’ difficulties. One interviewee used his personal contacts
Reputable developer 2 1.50 0.71 Negative with utility companies to expedite utility connections for a housing
Action against errant developer 5 1.80 0.84 Negative PPP project. Thus the communication had to be regular as well as
Developer’s social accountability 4 2.00 0.00 Negative
transparent (Cuorato, 2002; Dixon et al., 2005).
Constant communication 2 2.00 0.82 Negative
Developer’s profit-sharing accountability 6 2.17 0.41 Negative All of the interviews admitted that their organisations had made
PSO negotiation skills 2 2.50 0.71 Neutral oversights in the past and incurred losses because profit-sharing
PSO’s adequate negotiation staff 2 2.50 0.71 Neutral accountability was lacking. There were cases of private developers
Realistic projection 1 3.00 0.00 Neutral who reneged on paying their dues as scheduled. Or when required
Ample time to evaluate proposal 2 3.00 1.41 Neutral
Political influence 7 3.29 0.866 Neutral
to compensate the agencies with completed houses, unscrupulous
Competition 3 3.33 1.15 Neutral partners had handed over units with lower quality finishings (e.g.
House-buyers’ demand 2 3.49 2.12 Neutral cement rendered instead of tiled flooring), unlike those put up for
Consistent monitoring e e e e sale. Developer’s profit-sharing accountability had not been iden-
Compatibility between partners e e e e
tified by past scholars or observers as a success or failure factor for
Note: 1.00e1.49 ¼ highly negative, 1.50e2.49 ¼ negative, 2.50e3.49 ¼ neutral, housing PPP. Virtually all the housing PPP examined had low-cost
3.50e4.49 ¼ positive, 4.50e5.00 ¼ highly positive. housing included as part of the public agencies’ social obligation,
but as expected, disliked by the private partners. Given the chance,
they procrastinated or even absconded from this obligation. Such
housing PPP before, and so, engaging them did not necessarily was the case with one developer who constructed low-cost houses
result in water-tight PPP contracts. The interviewees divulged that well after the rest of the development was completed. The field
eventually effective PPP contracts evolved from trials and errors study found that non-compliance to the bumiputera quota was
which were at times costly. lesser of an issue than non-fulfilment of the low-cost housing
Apart from the two above-mentioned variables which led to quota. The identification of developer’s social accountability as
extreme outcomes when either present (i.e. action against errant a success factor concurs with Payne (2000).
developer) or absent (i.e. robust and clear agreement), other vari- There was a set of factors which, when present brought positive
ables produced no less interesting outcomes. All of them are effects but, when absent produced no effect at all (see Table 4).
summarised in Table 4. House-buyers’ demand and realistic projections were inter-related.
Factors which resulted in positive effect when they existed and Defying the advice by Leung and Hui (2005) that the private
negative effect when absent were reputable developer, consistent developers should not be left entirely to conduct feasibility studies,
communication, developer’s profit-sharing accountability and the sampled public agencies expected them to project house-
developer’s social accountability. To minimise failure, the sampled buyers’ demand. If the private developer’s assessment of
public agencies only engaged reputable developers. This finding house-buyers demand was accurate, all housing units in the PPP
resonates with Cuorato (2002). Unfortunately doing so was not development would be taken up by the market as anticipated,
always fail-proof. One public-listed company deliberately stalled thereby aiding the private developer’s cash flow. Interestingly, if the
a housing PPP project (for more than a decade) by exploiting assessment and projection was off-target, the impact on the
a loophole in the contract after making huge publicity gains from its housing PPP was neutral, since all the houses would eventually be
launching. The finding on the importance of communication to the bought (provided the prices are reasonable), revealed the inter-
success of housing PPP in Malaysia coheres with Cuorato (2002) viewees. Also, prudent public agencies clearly stipulated in the PPP
and Dixon et al. (2005). As found from interviews, the public contracts that their returns were not tied to sales performance,
agencies put the onus on their private partners to constantly therefore they would not have suffered at all from their partners’
update them on the development progress as they were the ones miscalculations.
who performed the actual work. Prudent public agencies stipulated The public agencies’ negotiation skills and adequacy of negoti-
in their PPP contracts that their partners must submit monthly ation staff were also inter-related. The findings that both these
progress reports followed by oral presentations to top manage- factors can contribute to project success echo the works of Asenova
ment. Some developers ignored this requirement either because of et al. (2002). Both factors certainly came into importance when
little progress (which was acceptable to the surveyed public negotiating and re-negotiating of the agreement. Curiously when
agencies) or problems encountered (which was not). As mentioned absent, the effect was neutral. The interview revealed that when

Table 4
Success and failure factors of housing PPP in Malaysia.

Present ¼ highly positive,
absent ¼ negative, or
present ¼ positive,
absent ¼ highly negative
Action against errant developer
Robust & clear agreement
Present ¼ positive effect,
absent ¼ negative effect
Reputable developer
Constant communication
Developer’s profit-sharing
accountability
Developer’s social
accountability
Present ¼ positive effect, Present ¼ no effect, Present ¼ positive effect,
absent ¼ no effect absent ¼ no effect absent ¼ unknown effect
House-buyers’ demand Political influence Consistent monitoring
PSO negotiation skills Compatibility between
partners
PSO’s adequate negotiation staff
Realistic projection
Competition
Ample time to evaluate proposal
156 A.-R. Abdul-Aziz, P.S. Jahn Kassim / Habitat International 35 (2011) 150e157
these variables were missing, their organisations solicited the help
of various technical approving bodies to act vicariously on their
behalf in addition to the consultants they engaged. This recourse to
approving authorities did not lead to increase in cost, defying the
prediction by Australian Procurement and Construction Council
(2002).
Competition and ample time to evaluate proposal were also
inter-linked. The majority of the surveyed agencies did not rely on
competition to select the rightful partner, preferring instead to
adopt the first-come, first-served approach. While acknowledging
the benefits of competition, the interviewees explained that eval-
uating development proposals from competing tenderers was
arduous as they varied in term of development layout, housing
types, public amenities and such like. Selection solely based on the
greatest monetary returns would have been easy, but as pointed
out in Table 1, these agencies had to balance a whole range of
objectives when adopting the PPP approach. While some agencies
had suffered from poor performing housing PPP projects, none of
their interviewees attributed them to absence of competition.
Hence in contrast to Coates (2008), the present study does not lend
credence to the view that competitive tendering is a critical success
factor. The interviewees however concurred with Asenova et al.
(2002) that competition increased bidding cost. Interestingly, the
field study revealed that ample time to evaluate proposal was
another variable which led to positive effect when present but no
effect when absent. One experienced interviewee remarked that by
focusing on certain key aspects, he could vet a proposal overnight.
Besides, developers’ proposals tended to be succinct. Of course,
ample time rendered better scrutiny. It was found from the field
work that actual evaluation did not in fact consume much time; it
was the waiting period for the various committees to convene that
protracted the entire vetting cycle. The larger the organisation, the
more committees there were to vet the developer’s proposal.
Ample time allowed the entire vetting cycle to be properly
completed. Ample evaluation had not been identified by any
previous scholar as a success factor.
Being in the public domain, the interviewees conceded that
their organisations attracted political influence, the most common
form being ‘recommendation’ of certain developers supposedly
deserving of housing PPP projects. However when dealt with
discreetly, political influence brought neutral effect when present
as well as when absent (see Table 4). This finding contrasts with
Singaravelloo (2001), Ong and Lenard (2002) and Rondinelli
(2003). The most sensible approach to address politicians’ request
was to oblige by engaging their developer friends but still to
manage them like any others as political patronage did not extend
beyond the initial appointment stage. Distressed developers were
left to fend for themselves.
None of the respondents indicated the effects of two variables
when they were absent e consistent monitoring and compatibility
between partners e suggesting that they had never faced such
situations before. They exerted positive effect when present
though, thus supporting Cuorato (2002) and Susilawati et al.
(2005) respectively. Apart from technical committees designated
to monitor the performance of private developers, one very
effective monitoring mechanism was the joint management
committee comprising of senior managers from both sides whose
view of PPP projects were more strategic than operational. The
power the members of this committee wielded in their respective
organisations enabled decisions to be made fairly rapidly. When
both sides were compatible, the entire development process
became less disputatious. The interviewees explained that the
frontline technical and managerial personalities were most influ-
ential in shaping the relationship between the two sides at the
operational level.
Conclusion and recommendation
The study found that some Malaysian public agencies involved
in housing development adopted the PPP formula from time to
time, as a last resort rather than first choice preference. Just like
their counterparts elsewhere, they had an array of objectives to
balance when implementing it, the highly important ones relating
to organisational reputation, project reputation, early completion,
on-time completion and value for money. The present study
identified success and failure factors of housing PPP in Malaysia,
which were found not to be identical. For example, while compe-
tition was a success factor, it was not a failure factor. Success factor
which had the greatest impact was action against errant developers
and failure factor with the greatest impact was robust and clear
agreement.
The findings of the present study have pragmatic value. Housing
PPP will still be adopted in Malaysia in years to come. Government
agencies in Malaysia can take note of the success factors and fail-
ures factors so as to ensure that the lands they invest in housing PPP
projects are not squandered. Their objectives of employing this
approach should also be realistic; otherwise their expectations
would not be met.
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