K 2 Outline Road Map

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Folz v. State
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August 8, 1990
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61 N.Y.2d 219
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Court of Appeals of New York.
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Jack E. BOVSUN et al., Appellants,
\par
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v.
\par
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Gary T. SANPERI et al., Respondents.
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Lawrence E. KUGEL, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Stephanie
Kugel, an Infant, Deceased, et al., Appellants,
\par
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}
{\li100 \f3 \b0 \ri100 \fs20 \cf19 \qc \i0
v.
\par
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{\li100 \f3 \b0 \ri100 \fs20 \cf19 \qc \i0
MID\u8211\'3fWESTCHESTER INDUSTRIAL PARK, INC., et al., Respondents.
\par
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Feb. 23, 1984.
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Parents and sister of child injured as result of negligence brought action on their
own behalf to recover for injuries inflicted directly upon them and to recover for
emotional trauma suffered a result of their child\rquote s injuries and death. The
Supreme Court, Westchester County, Matthew F. Coppola, J., dismissed causes of
action relating to child, and parents appealed. The Supreme Court, Appellate
Division,
}
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90 A.D.2d 496, 454 N.Y.S.2d 750,
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affirmed. In unrelated action, mother and daughter, who had received only minor
injuries in accident, sought to recover for emotional injuries sustained when
father was seriously injured in same accident. The Supreme Court, Queens County,
Aaron F. Goldstein, J., precluded mother and daughter from voir dire on issue of
psychic injuries and sustained motion to dismiss causes of action predicated upon
claims for damages for psychic injuries, and appeal was taken. The Supreme Court,
Appellate Division,
}
94 A.D.2d 711, 462 N.Y.S.2d 611,
}}}
affirmed. On grant of leave to appeal, the Court of Appeals, Jones, J., held that:
(1) where defendant\rquote s conduct is negligent as creating unreasonable risk of
bodily harm to plaintiff and such conduct is substantial factor in bringing about
injuries to plaintiff in consequence of shock or fright resulting from his or her
contemporaneous observation of serious physical injury or death inflicted by
defendant\rquote s conduct on member of plaintiff\rquote s immediate family in his
or her presence, plaintiff may recover damages for such injuries, and (2)
allegations in both actions stated claim for emotional distress.
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Orders reversed.
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Kaye, J., voted to affirm in separate opinion in which Wachtler and Simons, JJ.,
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Wachtler, J., dissented in memorandum in which Simons, J., concurred.
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Injury or Threat to Another; \u8201\'3fBystanders
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Where defendant\rquote s conduct is negligent as creating unreasonable risk of
bodily harm to plaintiff, and such conduct is substantial factor in bringing about
injuries to plaintiff in consequence of shock or fright resulting from his or her
contemporaneous observation of serious physical injury or death inflicted by
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191 Cases that cite this headnote
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Other particular cases
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Allegation that driver drove automobile in reckless manner and at excessive speed,
struck automobile in which mother and father were riding with their two infant
daughters, one of whom died as result of injuries sustained in collision witnessed
by mother, father and other daughter, was sufficient to state cause of action for
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Allegations that car struck rear of disabled station wagon in which wife and
daughter were seated, seriously injuring their husband and father as he leaned into
open tailgate window and that mother and daughter were instantaneously aware that
father had been injured, was sufficient to state cause of action for emotional
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***358
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**844
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Edgar T. Schleider, New York City, for appellants in the first above-entitled
action.
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*221
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Michael Wolpinsky and Bernard Pizzitola, Lake Ronkonkoma, for respondents in the
first above-entitled action.
\par
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Donald H. Zuckerman, New York City, for appellants in the second above-entitled
action.
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*222
}
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Lawrence T. D\rquote Aloise, Jr., White Plains, for Mid-Westchester Industrial
Park, Inc., respondent in the second above-entitled action.
\par
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Emanuel Thebner, White Plains, for Barbara B. Rooney, respondent in the second
above-entitled action.
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{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
*223
}
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R. Christopher Owen, Albany, for Lawrence E. Kugel, as respondent on the
counterclaim in the second above-entitled action.
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OPINION OF THE COURT
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JONES, Judge.
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Where a defendant\rquote s conduct is negligent as creating an unreasonable risk
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}
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*224
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from his or her contemporaneous observation of serious physical injury or death
inflicted by the defendant\rquote s conduct on a member of the plaintiff\rquote s
immediate family in his or her presence, the plaintiff may recover damages for such
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These two appeals pose the same question of law\u8212\'3fwhether in addition to or
apart from other damages to which a plaintiff may be entitled in consequence of the
negligence of the defendant, he may recover for emotional distress occasioned by
his witnessing injury or death caused by the defendant\rquote s conduct to a member
of the plaintiff\rquote s immediate family. The courts below have answered this
question in the negative. We now reverse in each case.
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\par
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \qc \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Bovsun v. Sanperi
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
In Bovsun, a father, mother and daughter commenced an action for personal injuries
sustained by them in a two-car collision. The father, who had been driving the
station wagon in which his wife and daughter were passengers, settled before trial.
The mother and daughter are now appellant plaintiffs before us.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
On May 24, 1975, due to mechanical difficulties the station wagon in which the
members of the Bovsun family were riding had stopped at the side of the Southern
State Parkway in Nassau County. Jack Bovsun, father and driver, alighted from the
vehicle, went around to the rear, and leaned inside the open tailgate window. Selma
Bovsun, his wife, remained seated in the front passenger seat, and Mara Beth
Bovsun, their daughter, was in the rear seat. At this point the Bovsun station
wagon was struck in the rear by an automobile owned by defendant Rosario Sanperi
and driven by defendant Gary T. Sanperi. Jack Bovsun was seriously injured when he
was pinned between the two vehicles. The mother and daughter were thrown about the
station wagon by the force of the impact but suffered less serious physical
injuries than Jack Bovsun. Although neither mother nor daughter actually saw the
Sanperi car strike their station wagon (they were facing forward or to the side),
both were instantly aware of the impact and the fact that Jack Bovsun must have
been
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
*225
}
}
injured and each thereafter immediately observed their seriously injured husband
and father.
}
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\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
***359
}
}
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
**845
}
}
At the start of the trial as jurors were being selected, defendants\rquote
attorney objected to any reference being made to emotional distress plaintiffs
might have suffered as a result of observing Jack Bovsun\rquote s injuries. After
hearing arguments from counsel and with an awareness of the significant factual
elements of plaintiffs\rquote case, the trial court ruled that the proof would be
limited to plaintiffs\rquote own direct physical injuries and that no mention
could be made during the
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
voir dire
}
}
of any injuries attributable to emotional distress. To expedite appellate review,
defendants\rquote motion to preclude plaintiffs from examining the prospective
jurors as to plaintiffs\rquote emotional distress was deemed a motion to dismiss
plaintiffs\rquote claims for damages with respect thereto, and that relief was
granted.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
On plaintiffs\rquote appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed, citing
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Kugel v. Mid-Westchester Ind. Park,
}
}
90 A.D.2d 496, 454 N.Y.S.2d 750.
}}}
Thereafter, the Appellate Division granted plaintiffs leave to appeal to our
court.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
}
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\par
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \qc \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Kugel v. Westchester Industrial Park, Inc.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
In Kugel, plaintiffs, a father and mother, were riding with their two infant
daughters in the family car along a roadway in the Mid-Westchester Mall in
Cortlandt, New York, on June 3, 1978. As alleged in their verified complaint and
bill of particulars, plaintiff Lawrence Kugel was driving the vehicle, his wife,
plaintiff Lydia Kugel, was in the front passenger seat with their one-year-old
daughter Stephanie in her lap, and their other daughter Karen, four years old, was
also seated in the car. The Kugel car was struck by an automobile owned by
defendant Barbara B. Rooney and driven by defendant Thomas Rooney, allegedly
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
*226
}
}
in a reckless manner and at an excessive speed. Lydia Kugel suffered a
}
entityType=injury&entityId=Iad56714b475411db9765f9243f53508a&originationContext=doc
ument&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0" }
{\fldrslt
fractured clavicle
}}}
in the collision, Lawrence sustained a
}
entityType=injury&entityId=Ib80ff4e7475411db9765f9243f53508a&originationContext=doc
{\fldrslt
broken finger
}}}
, and Karen suffered
}
entityType=injury&entityId=Ib56c4cb6475411db9765f9243f53508a&originationContext=doc
{\fldrslt
abdominal injuries
}}}
. Stephanie Kugel died a few hours after the accident as a result of her various,
severe injuries, alleged in the complaint to have been observed by plaintiffs.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
2
}}}
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Plaintiffs served a summons and complaint to commence this action, seeking,
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
inter alia,
}
}
in their fourth cause of action damages for \u8220\'3fthe immediate severe
emotional trauma of seeing Stephanie Kugel suffer extreme physical injury within
their close proximity.\u8221\'3f By notice of motion, defendant Mid-Westchester
Industrial Park, Inc., which owns and operates the Mid-Westchester Mall, moved for
partial summary judgment dismissing the fourth cause of action (along with the
fifth and sixth causes of action), contending that it did not allege a legally
cognizable claim. Defendants Thomas and Barbara Rooney thereafter also moved for
summary judgment dismissing those causes of action. Special Term granted the
motions and dismissed the causes of action, ruling that New York does not permit a
cause of action to be maintained for the emotional distress suffered by the parents
of an infant child who is killed in an accident.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Plaintiffs appealed the Special Term order to the Appellate Division. While that
appeal was pending, plaintiffs settled or discontinued all causes of action other
than those for emotional trauma attributable to the injury and death of their
daughter Stephanie, which were expressly reserved.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
3
}}}
}
The Appellate Division,
}
94 A.D.2d 711,
}}}
462 N.E.2d 611, thereafter affirmed, holding that Special Term had correctly
concluded that there is no cause of action in New York for emotional trauma
suffered by the
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
***360
}
}
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
**846
}
}
parents of a child injured or killed as the result of negligence. According to the
court, plaintiffs\rquote direct involvement in the accident is only relevant
insofar
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
*227
}
}
as it creates a cause of action on their own behalf for injuries directly
inflicted on them. The court reasoned that the inability to circumscribe liability
in a reasonable fashion and the possibility of unlimited liability would require
dismissal of plaintiffs\rquote emotional distress claims regardless of whether
plaintiffs were directly involved in the accident.
}
The Appellate Division thereafter granted plaintiffs\rquote motion for leave to
appeal to our court.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
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\par
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \qc \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Analysis of Legal Issues
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Traditionally, courts have been reluctant to recognize any liability for the mental
distress which may result from the observation of a third person\rquote s peril or
harm. The law in California relating to bystander recovery was greatly altered,
however, by that State\rquote s Supreme Court ruling in
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Dillon v. Legg,
}
}
68 Cal.2d 728, 69 Cal.Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912
}}}
that damages may be recovered for the emotional trauma caused when a plaintiff
witnesses the injury or death of a close relative even though the plaintiff is not
himself within the zone of danger of physical injury, provided that the emotional
injury is reasonably foreseeable.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
4
}}}
}
Soon after the
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Dillon
}
}
decision, our court in
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Tobin v. Grossman,
}
}
24 N.Y.2d 609, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 249 N.E.2d 419
}}}
rejected this foreseeability approach to bystander recovery. In
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Tobin,
}
}
a mother, who had been in no danger of bodily harm herself, sought damages for the
mental distress that she suffered in viewing the serious injuries sustained by her
child when the child was struck by an automobile. We recognized in that case that
foreseeability is not the sole test of whether a legally cognizable duty is owed.
In reliance on rationale grounded in public policy\u8212\'3fthat liability to the
foreseeable bystander could not be limited in any rational way and could lead to
unlimited liability for negligent conduct\u8212\'3fwe declined to recognize a cause
of action for the emotional distress suffered by the foreseeableobserver
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
*228
}
}
of an accident.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
5
}}}
}
In so doing, in
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
***361
}
}
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
**847
}
}
obiter dictum we questioned the zone-of-danger analysis.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
In disposing of the appeal in
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Tobin
}
}
we were not, however, required to confront the precise issue presented to us for
the first time in the two appeals now before us inasmuch as the plaintiff in
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Tobin
}
}
had not been within the zone of danger of bodily harm. We there phrased the legal
question posed as \u8220\'3fwhether the concept of duty in tort should be extended
to third persons, who do not sustain any physical impact in the accident or fear
for their own safety\u8221\'3f (
}
24 N.Y.2d, p. 613, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 249 N.E.2d 419).
}}}
We did note that the approach of permitting recovery \u8220\'3ffor the inseparable
consequences of fear for\u8221\'3f a relative\rquote s safety, as well as
one\rquote s own safety, where the plaintiff is in the zone of danger \u8220\'3fhas
been said to be a rather arbitrary limiting rule\u8221\'3f (
}
24 N.Y.2d, p. 616, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 249 N.E.2d 419).
}}}
We have also elsewhere recognized, however, that arbitrary distinctions are an
inevitable result of the drawing of lines which circumscribe legal duties (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Kennedy v. McKesson Co.,
}
}
58 N.Y.2d 500, 507, 462 N.Y.S.2d 421, 448 N.E.2d 1332),
}}}
and that delineation of limits of liability in tort actions is usually determined
on the basis of considerations of public policy (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
De Angelis v. Lutheran Med. Center,
}
}
58 N.Y.2d 1053, 1055, 462 N.Y.S.2d 626,
}}}
449 N.E.2d 626;
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Pulka v. Edelman,
}
}
40 N.Y.2d 781, 390 N.Y.S.2d 393, 358 N.E.2d 1019;
}}}
see Prosser, Torts [4th ed], \u167\'3f 3, pp. 14\u8211\'3f16).
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
The zone-of-danger rule, which allows one who is himself or herself threatened with
bodily harm in consequence of the defendant\rquote s negligence to recover for
emotional distress resulting from viewing the death or serious physical injury of a
member of his or her immediate family, is said to have
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
*229
}
}
become the majority rule in this country.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
6
}}}
}
It is premised on the traditional negligence concept that by unreasonably
endangering the plaintiff\rquote s physical safety the defendant has breached a
duty owed to him or her for which he or she should recover all damages sustained
including those occasioned by witnessing the suffering of an immediate family
member who is also injured by the defendant\rquote s conduct.
}
Recognition of this right to recover for emotional distress attributable to
observation of injuries suffered by a member of the immediate family involves a
broadening of the duty concept but\u8212\'3funlike the
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Dillon
}
}
approach\u8212\'3fnot the creation of a duty to a plaintiff to whom the defendant
is not already recognized as owing a duty to avoid bodily harm. In so doing it
permits recovery for an element of damages not heretofore allowed. Use of the zone-
of-danger rule thus mitigates the possibility of unlimited recovery, an overriding
apprehension expressed in
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Tobin,
}
}
by restricting liability in a much narrower fashion than does the
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Dillon
}
}
rule. Additionally, the circumstances in which a plaintiff who is within the zone
of danger suffers serious emotional distress from observing severe physical injury
or death of a member of the immediate family may not be altogether common.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
7
}}}
}
The zone-of-danger rule has also been adopted in the Restatement of Torts, Second,
as it had been at the time of our
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
***362
}
}
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
**848
}
}
decision in
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Tobin.
}
}
Subdivision (2) of section 436 provides that \u8220\'3fIf the actor\rquote s
conduct is negligent as creating an unreasonable risk of causing bodily harm to
another otherwise than by subjecting him to fright, shock, or other similar and
immediate emotional disturbance, the fact that such harm results solely from the
internal operation
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
*230
}
}
of fright or other emotional disturbance does not protect the actor from
liability.\u8221\'3f Subdivision (3) of that section further provides that
\u8220\'3fThe rule stated in Subsection (2) applies where the bodily harm to the
other results from his shock or fright at harm or peril to a member of his
immediate family occurring in his presence.\u8221\'3f Thus, section 436 would
subject a defendant to liability for a plaintiff\rquote s immediate emotional
distress from viewing bodily harm to an immediate family member where the
defendant\rquote s negligent conduct also threatens bodily harm to the plaintiff.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
8
}}}
}
The American Law Institute explains that the rationale for \u8220\'3fthis
exception to the general rule that there cannot be recovery for emotional
disturbance, or its consequences, arising from the peril of a third person lies in
the fact that the defendant, by his negligence, has endangered the plaintiff\rquote
s own safety and threatened him with bodily harm so that the defendant is in breach
of an original duty to the plaintiff to exercise care for his protection.\u8221\'3f
(
}
findType=Y&serNum=0294806334&pubNum=0101577&originatingDoc=I2ced5302d94211d9bf60c1d
57ebc853e&refType=TS&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=D
ocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)" }{\fldrslt
Restatement, Torts 2d, \u167\'3f 436
}}}
, subd [3], Comment
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
f.
}
}
)
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Inasmuch as the zone-of-danger rule provides a circumscribed alternative to the
apparently sweeping liability recognized in
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Dillon v. Legg,
}
}
68 Cal.2d 728, 69 Cal.Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912,
}}}
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
supra
}
}
and does so within the framework of traditional and accepted negligence principles
by using an objective test of whether the plaintiff was unreasonably threatened
with bodily harm by the conduct of the defendant, we view it as comporting with the
requirements set out in
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Tobin
}
}
of a \u8220\'3freasonably objective\u8221\'3f standard which will \u8220\'3fserve
the purpose of holding strict rein on liability\u8221\'3f (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Tobin v. Grossman,
}
}
24 N.Y.2d 609, 618, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 249 N.E.2d 419,
}}}
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
supra
}
}
).
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
9
}}}
}
We therefore hold that where a defendant
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
*231
}
}
negligently exposes a plaintiff to an unreasonable risk of bodily injury or death,
the plaintiff may recover, as a proper element of his or her damages, damages for
injuries suffered in consequence of the observation of the serious injury or death
of a member of his or her immediate family\u8212\'3fassuming, of course, that it is
established that the defendant\rquote s conduct was a substantial factor bringing
about such injury or death.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_B010101984117604_ID}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_B010101984117604_ID}
10
}}}
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
***363
}
}
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
**849
}
}
In so holding, we reject any suggestion that the zone-of-danger rule is overly
susceptible to fraudulent claims or that the emotional injuries claimed here are
incapable of acceptable proof. We previously disposed of these arguments in
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Battalla v. State of New York,
}
}
10 N.Y.2d 237, 240\u8211\'3f242, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34, 176 N.E.2d 729;
}}}
\u8220\'3fAlthough fraud, extra litigation and a measure of speculation are, of
course, possibilities, it is no reason for a court to eschew a measure of its
jurisdiction. \u8216\'3fThe argument from mere expediency cannot commend itself to
a Court of justice, resulting in the denial of a logical legal right and remedy in
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
all
}
}
cases because in
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
some
}
}
a fictitious injury may be urged as a real one.\u8217\'3f * * * The only
substantial policy argument * * * is that the damages or injuries are somewhat
speculative and difficult to prove. However, the question of proof in individual
situations should not be the arbitrary basis upon which to bar all actions * * * In
the difficult cases, we must look to the quality and genuineness of proof, and rely
to an extent on the contemporary sophistication of the medical profession and the
ability of the court and jury to weed out the dishonest claims.\u8221\'3f
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
We are not suggesting that any trifling distress would be sufficient to support
recovery of damages under the zone-of-danger rule. Rather, the emotional
disturbance suffered must be serious and verifiable (see
}
Restatement, Torts 2d, \u167\'3f 436
}}}
, subd [3], Comment
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
g
}
}
). Additionally, the compensableemotional
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
*232
}
}
distress must be tied, as a matter of proximate causation, to the observation of
the serious injury or death of the family member and such injury or death must have
been caused by the conduct of the defendant.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
The zone-of-danger rule that we adopt here is not inconsistent with the past
decisions of our court that have denied recovery for emotional distress
attributable to a family member\rquote s death or injury (e.g.,
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Lafferty v. Manhasset Med. Center Hosp.,
}
}
54 N.Y.2d 277, 445 N.Y.S.2d 111, 429 N.E.2d 789;
}}}
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Vaccaro v. Squibb Corp.,
}
}
52 N.Y.2d 809, 436 N.Y.S.2d 871, 418 N.E.2d 386;
}}}
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Becker v. Schwartz,
}
}
46 N.Y.2d 401, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 386 N.E.2d 807;
}}}
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Howard v. Lecher,
}
}
42 N.Y.2d 109, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363, 366 N.E.2d 64).
}}}
None of those cases involved plaintiffs who had themselves been subjected to a
danger of bodily harm, although some of the plaintiffs had been present during, had
observed, and even had participated in the negligent conduct. In
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Becker v. Schwartz,
}
}
46 N.Y.2d 401,
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
supra,
}
}
413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 386 N.E.2d 807
}}}
, in which the plaintiffs were not exposed to bodily harm, it is significant that
although no recovery was allowed for emotional distress, the plaintiffs were
allowed to seek recovery for pecuniary losses sustained in consequence of the
defendant\rquote s breach of due care owed them in that regard. Similarly, in our
most recent decision in this area,
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
58 N.Y.2d 500, 462 N.Y.S.2d 421, 448 N.E.2d 1332,
}}}
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
supra,
}
}
although the plaintiff there was also allowed to seek recovery for his pecuniary
losses, recovery of damages for emotional disturbance was denied\u8212\'3fhe had
not been exposed to a risk of bodily harm by the negligence of the defendant.
Moreover, in
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Kennedy
}
}
the person whose death the plaintiff witnessed was not a member of his immediate
family. In none of these cases would the result have been different under the rule
that we apply in this case.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
We recognize that our decision in these two appeals may be perceived as overruling,
or at least as rejecting in a significant respect, the rationale on which our
decision in
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Tobin
}
}
was predicated, notwithstanding that the precise issue presented in the appeals
now before us was not presented in
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Tobin.
}
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
11
}}}
}
In the factual situation posed in
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Tobin
}
}
we would today reach the same conclusion that was reached in that case inasmuch as
the plaintiff mother there
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
*233
}
}
was not within the zone of danger and the defendant
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
***364
}
}
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
**850
}
}
breached no duty of reasonable care owed to her. We are not today creating a new
cause of action which has not heretofore existed under the tort law of New York;
rather we are recognizing the right of a plaintiff to whom the defendant has owed
but breached a duty of reasonable care (as determined under traditional tort
principles) to recover as an element of his or her damages, those damages
attributable to emotional distress caused by contemporaneous observation of injury
or death of a member of the immediate family caused by the same conduct of the
defendant.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
12
}}}
}
There may be an enlargement of the scope of recoverable damages; there is no
recognition of a new cause of action or of a cause of action in favor of a party
not previously recognized as entitled thereto. In conformity with traditional tort
principles, the touchstone of liability in these cases is the breach by the
defendant of a duty of due care owed the plaintiff.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_anchor_I4271766d0fb311e18b05fdf15589d}{\*\bkmkend
co_anchor_I4271766d0fb311e18b05fdf15589d}
\par
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_anchor_I4271766d0fb311e18b05fdf15589d}{\*\bkmkend
co_anchor_I4271766d0fb311e18b05fdf15589d}
\par
{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \qc \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Application of the Law to These Appeals
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2]
}}}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i0
}
}
[3]
}}}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i0
}
Turning, then, to the appeals before us, the factual situations claimed bring both
cases within the zone-of-danger rule. In each case plaintiffs assert that they were
subjected to an unreasonable risk of bodily injury by negligent conduct on the part
of defendants. In each, the seriously injured or deceased person was a member of
the immediate family of plaintiffs, each of whom alleges serious emotional trauma
as a result of observing the injury or death.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
13
}}}
}
Although plaintiffs in Bovsun did not actually see their husband and father being
injured, they do assert their instantaneous awareness that he had been injured as
well as their observation of him immediately after he was struck by
defendants\rquote automobile. Plaintiffs in Kugel claim similar observations.
Thus, the claims in both cases are sufficient, if substantiated by the evidence, to
entitle plaintiffs
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
*234
}
}
to recover for their asserted emotional distress damages.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
For the reasons stated, in Bovsun, the order of the Appellate Division should be
reversed, with costs, defendants\rquote motion to dismiss denied and the causes of
action dismissed, reinstated. In Kugel, the order of the Appellate Division should
be reversed, with costs, and defendants\rquote motions for summary judgment
denied.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
}
}
}
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf20 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_dissent_opinion_1}{\*\bkmkend co_dissent_opinion_1}
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
KAYE, Judge (dissenting).
\par
}
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Permitting recovery for emotional distress from observing physical injury to
another is a departure from precedent and recognition of a new duty. Because sound
policy considerations supported this court\rquote s decisions consistently denying
such recovery, because no reason is given for a change, and because the limitations
now imposed are artificial and arbitrary, and must in fairness give way to far-
reaching liability affecting the public generally, I respectfully dissent.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
On no less than six occasions during the last 15 years, this court has considered,
and rejected, claims for emotional distress allegedly resulting from observing
injury negligently inflicted upon another.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
1
}}}
}
Those decisions reflect a recognition that to allow recovery for such injuries
would require the creation of a new duty and therefore an
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
***365
}
}
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
**851
}
}
entirely new cause of action (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Tobin v. Grossman,
}
}
24 N.Y.2d 609, 613, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 249 N.E.2d 419),
}}}
because \u8220\'3fthere is no duty to protect from emotional injury a bystander to
whom there is otherwise owed no duty, and, even as to a participant to whom a duty
is owed, such injury is compensable only when a direct, rather than a consequential
result of the breach.\u8221\'3f (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
58 N.Y.2d 500, 506, 462 N.Y.S.2d 421, 448 N.E.2d 1332.)
}}}
This is so even where a single negligent act concurrently injures both the
plaintiff and the third person. Each may recover for personal pecuniary, bodily and
psychic injury, but not for the trauma of seeing the other harmed. (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
58 N.Y.2d 500, 462 N.Y.S.2d 421, 448 N.E.2d 1332,
}}}
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
supra;
}
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Becker v. Schwartz,
}
}
46 N.Y.2d 401, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 386 N.E.2d 807.)
}}}
\par
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
To suggest, as the majority does, that it is neither creating a new duty nor
overruling those decisions because we are today presented with different facts, is
merely to
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
*235
}
}
sidestep the issue. Our decisions, from
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Tobin
}
}
to
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Kennedy,
}
}
were not unrelated factual determinations. They rested on sound policy
considerations.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
A review of those decisions reveals the significance of the step taken today. In
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Tobin v. Grossman,
}
}
24 N.Y.2d 609, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 249 N.E.2d 419,
}}}
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
supra
}
}
we denied recovery for psychic injuries suffered by a mother whose child was
struck by an automobile. The Restatement \u8220\'3fzone-of-danger\u8221\'3f rule
was rejected. \u8220\'3fThis has been said to be a rather arbitrary limiting rule
which has the unpalatable consequence that a mother who fears for herself may
recover while, if she does not or has no such similar opportunity, she may not
recover.\u8221\'3f (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Id.,
}
}
p. 616, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 249 N.E.2d 419.)
}}}
A broader rule, allowing recovery by witnesses to an accident, was also rejected
because such a limitation \u8220\'3fcould stand only until the first case came
along in which the parent is in the immediate vicinity but did not see the
accident.\u8221\'3f (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Id.,
}
}
p. 617, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 249 N.E.2d 419.)
}}}
\par
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
The
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Tobin
}
}
court focused on the real issue presented, which is whether recovery for all
emotional trauma caused by injuries to others should be compensable. In
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Tobin
}
}
it was recognized that \u8220\'3f[t]here are too many factors and each too
relative to permit creation of only a limited scope of liability or duty\u8221\'3f
(
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
id.,
}
}
p. 619, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 249 N.E.2d 419)
}}}
and that there was no \u8220\'3freasonable circumscription, within tolerable
limits required by public policy, of a rule creating liability\u8221\'3f (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
id.,
}
}
p. 617, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 249 N.E.2d 419).
}}}
The court then determined, as a matter of policy, that \u8220\'3fno cause of
action lies for unintended harm sustained by one, solely as a result of injuries
inflicted directly upon another, regardless of the relationship and whether the one
was an eyewitness to the incident which resulted in the direct injuries\u8221\'3f (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
id.,
}
}
p. 611, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 249 N.E.2d 419)
}}}
because the recognition of such a cause of action would inevitably lead, through
compulsory insurance, to an undue burden on the public (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
id.,
}
}
p. 617, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 249 N.E.2d 419),
}}}
and the nature of this harm is such that the cost should not be borne by
society: \u8220\'3fBeyond practical difficulties there is a limit to attaining
essential justice in this area. While it may seem that there should be a remedy for
every wrong, this is an ideal limited perforce by the realities of this world.
Every injury has ramifying consequences, like the ripplings of the waters, without
end. The problem for the law is to limit the legal consequences of wrongs to a
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
*236
}
}
controllable degree. The risks of indirect harm from the loss or injury of loved
ones is pervasive and inevitably realized at one time or another.
}
Only a very small part of that risk is brought about by the culpable acts of
others. This is the risk of living and bearing children. It is enough that the law
establishes liability in favor of those directly or intentionally harmed.\u8221\'3f
(
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Id.,
}
}
p. 619, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 249 N.E.2d 419.)
}}}
\par
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
In
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Howard v. Lecher,
}
}
42 N.Y.2d 109, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363, 366 N.E.2d 64
}}}
the issue presented was whether parents could recover from a doctor, who
negligently failed to advise them of the risk, for the mental
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
***366
}
}
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
**852
}
}
distress they suffered as a result of their infant daughter having been born with
a genetic degenerative disease. Recovery for such psychic injury was again denied
because \u8220\'3fto afford the parents relief as against the doctor would require
the extension of traditional tort concepts beyond manageable bounds\u8221\'3f. (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Id.,
}
}
p. 111, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363, 366 N.E.2d 64.)
}}}
There was no question that the parents\rquote suffering was genuine and provable.
Recovery was denied on policy grounds: \u8220\'3f[T]he law has repeatedly denied
recovery for mental and emotional injuries suffered by a third party as a result of
physical injuries sustained by another (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Tobin v. Grossman,
}
}
24 N.Y.2d 609, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 249 N.E.2d 419,
}}}
and cases cited therein;
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Shaner v. Greece Cent. School Dist. No. 1,
}
}
51 A.D.2d 662, 378 N.Y.S.2d 185;
}}}
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Bessette v. St. Peter\rquote s Hosp.,
}
}
51 A.D.2d 286, 381 N.Y.S.2d 339;
}}}
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Roher v. State of New York,
}
}
279 App.Div. 1116, 112 N.Y.S.2d 603).
}}}
No cause of action exists, irrespective of the relationship between the parties or
whether one was a witness to the event giving rise to the direct injury of another,
for the unintentional infliction of harm to a person solely by reason of that
person\rquote s mental and emotional reaction to a direct injury suffered by
another. Thus, in
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Tobin v. Grossman
}
}
(
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
supra
}
}
), we denied recovery to a mother traumatized by the injuries suffered by her
child as the result of the negligent operation of an automobile by another. Our
court there recognized, as we now do, that the plaintiff parent suffered as
genuinely as if she herself were the object of the injury which resulted from the
impact suffered by the child. However, we also recognized then, as now, that the
law must establish, circumscribe and limit the rules ascribing liability in a
manner which accords with reason and practicality.\u8221\'3f (
}
42 N.Y.2d, p. 112, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363, 366 N.E.2d 64.)
}}}
\par
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
When the
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Howard
}
}
dissenters contended that
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Tobin
}
}
did not apply on its facts and that the mother should recover
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
*237
}
}
because, as the patient of the defendant doctor, she was in the \u8220\'3fsphere
of duty,\u8221\'3f but the father should not, the court simply saw this as an
example of the wisdom of applying the
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Tobin
}
}
rule that, as a matter of policy, no duty exists: \u8220\'3fSound policy reasons
and unlimited hypothesis present themselves. To now extend the perimeter of
liability would inevitably lead to the drawing of artificial and arbitrary
boundaries. Indeed, the dissenting opinion illustrates the arbitrary nature of such
a holding, for it would allow the mother of the deformed child to recover while the
father is entitled to no relief. Yet, both parents contend that the injury to them
stemmed from the trauma occasioned by viewing the degeneration of their daughter.
Can it be said that the mother\rquote s injury was more direct or of a greater
magnitude? The law of liability should not turn on hypertechnical and fortuitous
considerations of this type.\u8221\'3f
}
findType=Y&serNum=1977128240&originatingDoc=I2ced5302d94211d9bf60c1d57ebc853e&refTy
pe=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&con
textData=(sc.Default)" }{\fldrslt
(
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Id.,
}
}
p. 113,
}}}
}
397 N.Y.S.2d 363, 366 N.E.2d 64.)
}}}
\par
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
One year later in the companion cases of
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Becker v. Schwartz
}
}
and
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Park v. Chessin,
}
}
46 N.Y.2d 401, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 386 N.E.2d 807,
}}}
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
supra
}
}
parents again asserted causes of action for emotional distress caused by
doctors\rquote failure to advise them of the risk that their child would be born
with a serious impairment. In
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Becker
}
}
the mother gave birth to a brain-damaged infant who would suffer her entire life
from
}
entityType=disease&entityId=Ibc288ad2475411db9765f9243f53508a&originationContext=do
cument&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0" }
{\fldrslt
Downs\rquote syndrome
}}}
, and in
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Park
}
}
the child had a hereditary
}
entityType=disease&entityId=Ibb0344d4475411db9765f9243f53508a&originationContext=do
cument&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0" }
{\fldrslt
polycystic kidney disease
}}}
, from which the child suffered and eventually died. The causes of action by the
parents for psychic injury due to observing the injuries to their children were
dismissed, again for the policy reason that such a duty, once recognized, could not
be limited within acceptable boundaries, even though the court recognized a
concurrent duty to the parents had been breached by the doctors, entitling the
parents to recover the pecuniary expenses of the necessary care furnished to their
impaired children: \u8220\'3fOf course, this is not to say that plaintiffs may
recover for psychic or emotional harm alleged to have occurred as a consequence of
the birth of their infants in an impaired state. The recovery of damages for such
injuries must of necessity be circumscribed. Controlling on this point is
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Howard v.
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
***367
}
}
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
**853
}
}
Lecher
}
}
* * * While sympathetic to the plight of these parents, this court declined for
policy reasons to sanction the recovery
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
*238
}
}
of damages for their psychic or emotional harm occasioned by the birth and gradual
death of their child. To have permitted recovery in
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Howard,
}
}
we observed, would have \u8216\'3finevitably led to the drawing of artificial and
arbitrary boundaries.\u8217\'3f \u8221\'3f (
}
46 N.Y.2d, pp. 413\u8211\'3f414, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 386 N.E.2d 807.)
}}}
Two years later, a cause of action by parents for psychic harm due to the birth of
a daughter without limbs allegedly caused by ingestion of a drug during pregnancy
was dismissed in
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
52 N.Y.2d 809,
}}}
}
372 N.Y.S.2d 638, 334 N.E.2d 590
}}}
for the reasons set forth in
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Howard
}
}
and
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Becker.
\par
}
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
In
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
54 N.Y.2d 277, 445 N.Y.S.2d 111, 429 N.E.2d 789
}}}
a unanimous court denied recovery to a plaintiff for psychic injury she suffered
by observing her mother-in-law receive a transfusion of mismatched blood and
thereafter participating in the effort to save her. Once again, the basis for the
denial was the policy set forth in
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Tobin
}
}
that such a duty running to persons who observe injuries to others cannot be
recognized because, once it is, it cannot reasonably be contained: \u8220\'3fIn
essence the case merely represents another effort to extend existing principles of
law so as to expand the liability of the negligent actor to include third parties
who suffer shock as a result of direct injury to others (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Tobin v Grossman,
}
}
24 NY2d 609 [301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 249 N.E.2d 419];
}}}
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Howard v Lecher,
}
}
42 NY2d 109 [397 N.Y.S.2d 363, 366 N.E.2d 64];
}}}
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Becker v Schwartz,
}
}
46 NY2d 401 [413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 386 N.E.2d 807];
}}}
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Vaccaro v Squibb Corp.,
}
}
52 NY2d 809 [436 N.Y.S.2d 871, 418 N.E.2d 386] ).
}}}
As we noted in the
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Tobin
}
}
case, the major obstacle to recognizing this theory of recovery is that
\u8216\'3fthere appears to be no rational way to limit the scope of
liability\u8217\'3f (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Tobin v Grossman, supra,
}
}
p. 618 [301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 249 N.E.2d 419] ).
}}}
\u8221\'3f (
}
54 N.Y.2d, p. 279, 445 N.Y.S.2d 111, 429 N.E.2d 789.)
}}}
The court in
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Lafferty
}
}
also explained that
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Johnson v. State of New York,
}
}
37 N.Y.2d 378, 372 N.Y.S.2d 638, 334 N.E.2d 590,
}}}
which allowed recovery for mental trauma without the threat of physical injury,
did not require a different result, as that was not, as here, a claim for psychic
injury based upon a breach of duty causing physical injury to another:
}
\u8220\'3fOur recent decision in
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Johnson v State of New York
}
}
(37 NY2d 378) [372 N.Y.S.2d 638, 334 N.E.2d 590
}}}
] holding the defendant liable for erroneously informing the plaintiff of her
mother\rquote s death, does not represent an abandonment of these concerns. That
case did not involve an extension of the defendant\rquote s liability for
negligently injuring or causing the death of the plaintiff\rquote s mother, who had
not been injured by the defendant and
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
*239
}
}
was not in fact dead. Liability was based entirely on a duty the defendant had
undertaken to inform the plaintiff of her mother\rquote s status. That duty was
owed directly to the plaintiff and was breached when the defendant erroneously
informed the plaintiff that her mother had died. Although it was also noted in that
case that injury to the plaintiff was foreseeable, that alone is not sufficient to
establish liability when, as here, there is no showing of any duty owed to the
plaintiff (see, e.g.,
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Tobin v Grossman, supra,
}
}
p 615 [301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 249 N.E.2d 419];
}}}
cf.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Pulka v Edelman,
}
}
40 NY2d 781, 785 [390 N.Y.S.2d 393, 358 N.E.2d 1019] ).
}}}
\u8221\'3f (
}
54 N.Y.2d, p. 280, 445 N.Y.S.2d 111, 429 N.E.2d 789.)
}}}
\par
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Only last term, in
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
58 N.Y.2d 500, 462 N.Y.S.2d 421, 448 N.E.2d 1332,
}}}
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
supra,
}
}
recovery for psychic injury was denied to a dentist who, due to defendants\rquote
negligent repair and labeling of an instrument, unknowingly administered nitrous
oxide instead of oxygen, resulting in his patient\rquote s death. Recovery was
denied even though there was a contemporaneous breach by defendants of a duty to
plaintiff, for which he would be able to recover his own pecuniary losses. Once
again, this result flowed from the reasons expressed in the prior cases, from
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Tobin
}
}
to
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Lafferty:
}
}
\u8220\'3fThe rule to be distilled from those cases is that there is no duty to
protect from emotional injury a bystander
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
***368
}
}
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
**854
}
}
to whom there is otherwise owed no duty, and even as to a participant to whom a
duty is owed, such injury is compensable only when a direct, rather than a
consequential, result of the breach.\u8221\'3f (
}
58 N.Y.2d, p. 506, 462 N.Y.S.2d 421, 448 N.E.2d 1332.)
}}}
\par
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
The
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Kennedy
}
}
court expressly rejected the contention of the Appellate Division dissenters (
}
88 A.D.2d 785)
}}}
that the concurrent breach of duty to plaintiff made the psychic injuries caused
by viewing the physical injuries to another more \u8220\'3fdirect\u8221\'3f or
that, in effect, to permit recovery of such psychic injuries would not require the
establishment of a new duty because such injuries would just be another item of
damages flowing from the breach of a duty to plaintiff. That contention is indeed
very close to the view adopted by the majority today.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
The
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Kennedy
}
}
dissenters in this court urged that the psychic injury suffered by the plaintiff
was not \u8220\'3fvicarious injury, that is one sustained by virtue of observing an
injury to another\u8221\'3f but was instead a direct injury \u8220\'3fas a
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
*240
}
}
result of being made, by virtue of the defendants\rquote negligence, an active
participant in his patient\rquote s death.\u8221\'3f (
}
58 N.Y.2d, p. 511, 462 N.Y.S.2d 421, 448 N.E.2d 1332
}}}
[Jasen, J., dissenting].) It was acknowledged that the \u8220\'3fpolicy
concern\u8221\'3f expressed in
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Tobin
}
}
limited liability \u8220\'3fat the point of the third party observer\u8212\'3fthat
being a person who suffered solely by virtue of the emotional trauma of observing
another being injured as a result of defendant\rquote s breach of duty
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
owed that other person\u8221\'3f
}
}
and that, even though a duty to plaintiff was breached as well, \u8220\'3f[h]ad he
alleged that his trauma resulted from observing a patient die, rather than causing
her death * * *
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Tobin
}
}
would bar the cause of action\u8221\'3f. (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Id.,
}
}
p. 518,
}
462 N.Y.S.2d 421, 448 N.E.2d 1332
}}}
[emphasis added].)
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Thus, there can be no doubt that this court\rquote s denial of recovery for
emotional distress caused by observing physical injury negligently inflicted upon
another has not been grounded on particular factual nuances but instead reflects
both a limitation of the concept of duty to that which is personal and direct, even
when injury to the plaintiff and the third person is caused by a single negligent
act, and a consistent policy determination to circumscribe liability in the public
interest.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
What then has changed? The imposition of a new duty of course requires
\u8220\'3fextreme care, for legal duty imposes legal liability.\u8221\'3f (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Pulka v. Edelman,
}
}
40 N.Y.2d 781, 786, 390 N.Y.S.2d 393, 358 N.E.2d 1019.)
}}}
In declining to recognize the very duty established today, this court explained
almost 15 years ago that: \u8220\'3fUnlike the factors which have brought about
most expanding tort concepts, here there are no new technological, economic, or
social developments which have changed social and economic relationships and
therefore no impetus for a corresponding legal recognition of such changes. Hence,
a radical change in policy is required before one may recognize a cause of action
in this case.\u8221\'3f (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Tobin v. Grossman,
}
}
24 N.Y.2d 609, 615, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 249 N.E.2d 419,
}}}
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
supra.
}
}
) With no impetus in new technological, economic or social developments, and no
other explanation, the majority today allows recovery where a plaintiff in the
\u8220\'3fzone of danger\u8221\'3f experiences \u8220\'3fserious and
verifiable\u8221\'3f emotional distress resulting from witnessing serious physical
injury inflicted by defendant on a member of plaintiff\rquote s immediate family.
Just such boundaries were previously recognized
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
*241
}
}
as \u8220\'3fartificial and arbitrary,\u8221\'3f and \u8220\'3fhypertechnical and
fortuitous.\u8221\'3f
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
To suggest that even these limitations can contain liability, once the duty to
compensate for observing injury to another is recognized, is to ignore this
court\rquote s own teachings. At the least, limitations such as \u8220\'3fzone of
danger\u8221\'3f and \u8220\'3fserious and verifiable\u8221\'3f emotional
disturbance present jury questions that will make it difficult ever to have claims
for such injuries dismissed prior to trial.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
2
}}}
}
The apparent dearth of appellate
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
***369
}
}
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
**855
}
}
opinions on this topic (majority opn., p. 229, n. 7, 473 N.Y.S.2d 361, n. 7, 461
N.E.2d p. 847, n. 7) is not a reliable signal that recoveries will be few. What is
overlooked is the universe of litigation that stops short of appellate review and
the practice among insurance carriers to pass along added costs to their
consumers\u8212\'3fthe very danger recognized in
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Tobin.
\par
}
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
The
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Tobin
}
}
rule is defensible, in that for articulated policy reasons recovery has been
uniformly denied. This is a recognition of two principles firmly rooted in our law:
first, that in the interest of the public generally, which must eventually bear the
cost, not every injury can be compensable, even when suffered as a consequence of
another\rquote s negligence. (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
De Angelis v. Lutheran Med. Center,
}
}
58 N.Y.2d 1053, 1055, 462 N.Y.S.2d 626, 449 N.E.2d 406;
}}}
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Albala v. City of New York,
}
}
54 N.Y.2d 269, 274, 445 N.Y.S.2d 108, 429 N.E.2d 786.)
}}}
Second, in a negligence action a \u8220\'3fplaintiff sues in her own right for a
wrong personal to her, and not as the vicarious beneficiary of a breach of duty to
another.\u8221\'3f (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Palsgraf v. Long Is. R.R. Co.,
}
}
248 N.Y. 339, 343, 162 N.E. 99.)
}}}
\par
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
The rule articulated today both lacks certainty and imposes limitations that are
not fair.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
3
}}}
}
The central limiting
}
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
*242
}
}
factor is that plaintiff be in the \u8220\'3fzone of danger,\u8221\'3f described
as the majority rule in this country.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
4
}}}
}
But there is no rational relation between the \u8220\'3fzone of danger\u8221\'3f
and the recovery allowed today. The \u8220\'3fzone of danger\u8221\'3f is a concept
tied to a breach of duty to a person subjecting him to risk of personal physical
injury. The recovery allowed today, however, is not for a breach of that duty but
rather for observing the effect of a defendant\rquote s breach of duty to another
that in fact causes serious physical injury to that other person. Any duty not to
subject a person to emotional distress from observing physical injuries to another
would be breached when the other person is injured, whether or not the observer is
within the \u8220\'3fzone of danger.\u8221\'3f (See
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Tobin v. Grossman,
}
}
24 N.Y.2d 609, 617, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 249 N.E.2d 419,
}}}
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
supra.
}
}
) Moreover, as a matter of fairness, one parent is no more entitled to recover for
mental distress from observing a child\rquote s injury than another who suffered
the same anguish though not technically within the \u8220\'3fzone of
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
**856
}
}
danger.\u8221\'3f It is perhaps for these reasons that so many other jurisdictions
have, like
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
***370
}
}
this court in the past, sharply criticized the \u8220\'3fzone-of-danger\u8221\'3f
rule.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs16 \cf1 \i0
5
}}}
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
The other barriers erected today similarly are not rationally related to the new
cause of action but are, like the
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
*243
}
}
\u8220\'3fzone-of-danger\u8221\'3f rule, simply responses to the court\rquote s
well-founded fears about massive verdicts, the cost of which will ultimately be
borne by the public. Given the absence of any demonstrated reason to change the
rule in this jurisdiction, these concerns would be better addressed by adherence to
the
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Tobin
}
}
rule.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
WACHTLER, Judge (dissenting).
\par
}
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
I concur completely in Judge Kaye\rquote s dissenting opinion. Even if this court
were not comfortable with the limitation of liability and broad-based rationale
first announced in
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Tobin v. Grossman,
}
}
24 N.Y.2d 609, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 249 N.E.2d 419
}}}
and consistently applied in our decisions until today, it should nevertheless
resist the temptation to abandon or depart from that rule. The institutional
stability of a court is more important than any desire to remedy what may be
perceived as a harsh application of the rule in a given case.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
COOKE, C.J., and JASEN and MEYER, JJ., concur with JONES, J.
\par
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
KAYE, J., dissents and votes to affirm in a separate opinion in which WACHTLER and
SIMONS, JJ., concur.
\par
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
WACHTLER, J., dissents in a dissenting memorandum in which SIMONS, J., also
concurs.
\par
}
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
In
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Bovsun v. Sanperi:
}
}
Order reversed, with costs, defendants\rquote motion to dismiss denied and the
dismissed causes of action reinstated.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
In
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Kugel v. Mid-Westchester Ind. Park:
}
}
Order reversed, with costs, and defendants\rquote motions for summary judgment
denied. Question certified not answered as unnecessary.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
}
}
}
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf20 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_allCitations_1}{\*\bkmkend co_allCitations_1}
All Citations
\par
}
}
61 N.Y.2d 219, 461 N.E.2d 843, 473 N.Y.S.2d 357
\par
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li0 \f4 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs24 \cf1 \par}\sect\sbknone\pgncont\cols1{\ids0 \i0 {
\clpadl200 \clpadfl3 \clbrdrt \clbrdrl \trql \clwWidth10080 \cellx10080
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f4 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Footnotes
\par
}
}
}\f4 \li0 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \ql \sb0 \fs20 \ri0 \cf1 \i0 \intbl \cell \row }
\clbrdrl \trql \clvertalt \clwWidth600 \cellx600
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f4 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs24 \cf1 \i0
{\f4 \b0 \fs24 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnote_B00111984117604_1}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnote_B00111984117604_1}
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_B00111984117604_ID0" }
{\fldrslt
1
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f4 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f4 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f4 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
In neither of these cases does the record contain a particularized description of
precisely what occurred or the detailed sequence of events. Each case has been
disposed of by the courts below on procedural applications in the nature of motions
to dismiss based on a general description of the evidence that plaintiffs asserted
would be offered. Inasmuch as plaintiffs\rquote claims have been denied in each
case on the broad proposition that our courts do not allow recovery for emotional
distress caused by observation of injuries to another, no careful attention has
been paid to whether the particular facts in either case would meet any one of the
several tests under which recovery has elsewhere been allowed. Accordingly, we do
not now address the sufficiency of the evidence to meet the standard we hold
applicable. Our present decision is only that in both cases it was error to
foreclose plaintiffs from proceeding to trial.
\par
}
}
}
}
}\f4 \li0 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \qj \sa0 \sb0 \fs18 \ri0 \cf1 \i0 \intbl \cell \row }
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f4 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs24 \cf1 \i0
{\f4 \b0 \fs24 \cf1 \i0
co_footnote_B00221984117604_1}
{\fldrslt
2
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f4 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f4 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f4 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
(See n. 1,
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf1 \i1
supra,
}
}
p. 225, 473 N.Y.S.2d p. 358, 461 N.E.2d p. 844.)
\par
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f4 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs24 \cf1 \i0
{\f4 \b0 \fs24 \cf1 \i0
co_footnote_B00331984117604_1}
{\fldrslt
3
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f4 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f4 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f4 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
Plaintiffs had also sought in their fifth cause of action to recover damages for
the emotional distress they suffered between the time of the accident and Stephanie
Kugel\rquote s death, including the trauma of her funeral and their subsequent
mourning for her, and had sought recovery in their sixth cause of action for the
ongoing trauma caused by the loss of their daughter and the resulting change in
their family. Plaintiffs have withdrawn those causes of action in our court.
\par
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f4 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs24 \cf1 \i0
{\f4 \b0 \fs24 \cf1 \i0
co_footnote_B00441984117604_1}
{\fldrslt
4
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f4 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f4 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f4 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
Courts in 14 other States have chosen to adopt the
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Dillon v. Legg
}
}
68 Cal.2d 728, 69 Cal.Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912
rule and allow a bystander who is outside the zone of danger to sue for the
emotional distress of observing a relative\rquote s injury or death. (
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Leong v. Takasaki,
}
}
55 Haw. 398, 520 P.2d 758;
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Barnhill v. Davis,
}
}
300 N.W.2d 104 [Iowa];
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Dziokonski v. Babineau,
}
}
375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295;
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Culbert v. Sampson\rquote s Supermarkets,
}
}
444 A.2d 433 [Me.];
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Toms v. McConnell,
}
}
45 Mich.App. 647, 207 N.W.2d 140;
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Entex, Inc. v. McGuire,
}
}
414 So.2d 437, 444 [Miss.];
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Corso v. Merrill,
}
}
119 N.H. 647, 406 A.2d 300;
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Portee v. Jaffee,
}
}
84 N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 521;
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Ramirez v. Armstrong,
}
}
100 N.M. 538, 673 P.2d 822;
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Paugh v. Hanks,
}
}
6 Ohio St 3d 72, 451 N.E.2d 759;
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Sinn v. Burd,
}
}
486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672;
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
D\rquote Ambra v. United States,
}
}
114 R.I. 643, 338 A.2d 524;
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Apache Ready Mix Co. v. Creed,
}
}
653 S.W.2d 79 [Tex];
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Bedgood v. Madalin,
}
}
589 S.W.2d 797 [Tex.Civ.App.],
revd. in part on other grounds
}
600 S.W.2d 773;
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Landreth v. Reed,
}
}
570 S.W.2d 486 [Tex.Civ.App.].)
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f4 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs24 \cf1 \i0
{\f4 \b0 \fs24 \cf1 \i0
co_footnote_B00551984117604_1}
{\fldrslt
5
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f4 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f4 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f4 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
Courts in many jurisdictions have also rejected the
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf1 \i1
Dillon v. Legg
}
}
rule of liability to the foreseeable observer of an accident. (
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Tyler v. Brown-Service Funeral Homes Co.,
}
}
250 Ala. 295, 34 So.2d 203;
}
c853e&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_735_477&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&
transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)#co_pp_sp_735_477" }{\fldrslt
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Slovensky v. Birmingham News Co.,
}
}
358 So.2d 474, 477 [Ala.Civ.App.];
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Keck v. Jackson,
}
}
122 Ariz. 114, 593 P.2d 668
[en banc];
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Howard v. Bloodworth,
}
}
137 Ga.App. 478, 224 S.E.2d 122;
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Strickland v. Hodges,
}
}
134 Ga.App. 909, 216 S.E.2d 706;
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Hayward v. Yost,
}
}
72 Idaho 415, 427, 242 P.2d 971;
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Rickey v. Chicago Tr. Auth.,
}
}
98 Ill.2d 546, 75 Ill.Dec. 211, 457 N.E.2d 1;
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Smith v. Manchester Ins. & Ind. Co.,
}
}
299 So.2d 517, 524 [La.App.],
cert. den.
}
302 So.2d 617;
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Cambrice v. Fern Supply Co.,
}
}
285 So.2d 863 [La.App.];
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Dupuy v. Pierce,
}
}
285 So.2d 321 [La.App.];
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Stadler v. Cross,
}
}
295 N.W.2d 552 [Minn.];
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Welsh v. Davis,
}
}
307 F.Supp. 416
[D Mont.\u8212\'3fapplying Montana law];
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Fournell v. Usher Pest Control Co.,
}
}
208 Neb. 684, 305 N.W.2d 605;
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Owens v. Childrens Mem. Hosp.,
}
}
480 F.2d 465 [8
th Cir\u8212\'3fapplying Nebraska law];
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Whetham v. Bismarck Hosp.,
}
}
197 N.W.2d 678 [N.D.];
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Shelton v. Russell Pipe & Foundry Co.,
}
}
570 S.W.2d 861 [Tenn.];
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Guilmette v. Alexander,
}
}
128 Vt. 116, 259 A.2d 12;
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Hughes v. Moore,
}
}
214 Va. 27, 34\u8211\'3f35, 197 S.E.2d 214;
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Grimsby v. Sampson,
}
}
85 Wash.2d 52, 530 P.2d 291;
see, also,
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Williamson v. Bennett,
}
}
251 N.C. 498, 112 S.E.2d 48).
Three states\rquote highest courts have left open the issue of whether to adopt
the
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf1 \i1
Dillon
}
}
rule (
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Towns v. Anderson,
}
}
195 Colo. 517, 520, 579 P.2d 1163;
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Amodio v. Cunningham,
}
}
182 Conn. 80, 438 A.2d 6;
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Norwest v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hosp.,
}
}
293 Or. 543, 559, n. 18, 652 P.2d 318;
see, also,
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Robb v. Pennsylvania R.R.,
}
}
58 Del. 454, 458, 210 A.2d 709;
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Bedgood v. Madalin,
}
}
600 S.W.2d 773, 776 [Tex.] )
.
\par
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f4 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs24 \cf1 \i0
{\f4 \b0 \fs24 \cf1 \i0
co_footnote_B00661984117604_1}
{\fldrslt
6
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f4 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f4 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f4 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
(Note
}
findType=Y&serNum=0102797977&originatingDoc=I2ced5302d94211d9bf60c1d57ebc853e&refTy
pe=LR&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&con
textData=(sc.Default)" }{\fldrslt
33 Me.L.Rev. 303, 305;
Note 25 Hast.L.Rev. 1248, 1252; see
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Keck v. Jackson,
}
}
122 Ariz. 114, 116, 593 P.2d 668
[en banc];
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Hopper v. United States,
}
}
244 F.Supp. 314
[D.Colo.\u8212\'3fapplying Colorado law];
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Farrall v. Armstrong Cork Co.,
}
}
457 A.2d 763, 771 [Del.Super.];
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf1 \i1
Mancino v. Webb,
}
}
274 A.2d 771, 713\u8211\'3f714 [Del.Super.];
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Rickey v. Chicago Tr. Auth.,
}
}
98 Ill.2d 546, 75 Ill.Dec. 211, 457 N.E.2d 1;
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Resavage v. Davies,
}
}
199 Md. 479, 86 A.2d 879;
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Stadler v. Cross,
}
}
295 N.W.2d 552, 555 [Minn.];
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Fournell v. Usher Pest Control Co.,
}
}
208 Neb. 684, 687, 305 N.W.2d 605;
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Owens v. Childrens Mem. Hosp.,
}
}
480 F.2d 465, 467 [8
th Cir.];
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Whetham v. Bismarck Hosp.,
}
}
197 N.W.2d 678, 684 [ND];
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Shelton v. Russell Pipe & Foundry Co.,
}
}
570 S.W.2d 861, 864 [Tenn.];
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Vaillancourt v. Medical Center Hosp.,
}
}
139 Vt. 138, 143, 425 A.2d 92;
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Guilmette v. Alexander,
}
}
128 Vt. 116, 119, 259 A.2d 12;
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Klassa v. Milwaukee Gas Light Co.,
}
}
273 Wis. 176, 181\u8211\'3f185, 77 N.W.2d 397;
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Waube v. Warrington,
}
}
216 Wis. 603, 608\u8211\'3f615, 258 N.W. 497.)
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f4 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs24 \cf1 \i0
{\f4 \b0 \fs24 \cf1 \i0
co_footnote_B00771984117604_1}
{\fldrslt
7
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f4 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f4 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f4 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
It is somewhat surprising that our research reveals only two reported appellate
decisions actually upholding recovery in those jurisdictions that apply the zone-
of-danger approach. (
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Bowman v. Williams,
}
}
164 Md. 397, 165 A. 182;
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Vinicky v. Midland Mut. Cas. Ins. Co.,
}
}
35 Wis.2d 246, 252\u8211\'3f253, 151 N.W.2d 77.)
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f4 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs24 \cf1 \i0
{\f4 \b0 \fs24 \cf1 \i0
co_footnote_B00881984117604_1}
{\fldrslt
8
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f4 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f4 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f4 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
Comment
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf1 \i1
f
}
}
to subdivision (3) of
}
section 436
explains that this rule \u8220\'3fapplies where the defendant\rquote s negligent
conduct threatens bodily harm to the plaintiff through direct impact upon his
person, or in some other way than through emotional disturbance, and the bodily
harm is brought about instead by the plaintiff\rquote s emotional disturbance at
the peril or harm of a third person. In such a case the defendant is subject to
liability if the third person is a member of the plaintiff\rquote s immediate
family, and the peril or harm to such a person occurs in the plaintiff\rquote s
presence. In other words, the rule stated in Subsection (2) applies in such cases,
even though the plaintiff\rquote s shock or fright is not due to any fear for his
own safety, but to fear for the safety of his wife or child.\u8221\'3f
\par
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f4 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs24 \cf1 \i0
{\f4 \b0 \fs24 \cf1 \i0
co_footnote_B00991984117604_1}
{\fldrslt
9
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f4 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f4 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f4 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
Another alternative to the
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf1 \i1
Dillon
}
}
rule adopted by some courts allows recovery for the emotional distress of viewing
the death or injury of a member of the immediate family where the plaintiff was
struck by the same force that caused the death or injury of the family member. (
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Beaty v. Buckeye Fabric Finishing Co.,
}
}
179 F.Supp. 688, 697\u8211\'3f698
[ED Ark.\u8212\'3fapplying Arkansas law];
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Cadillac Motor Car Div. v. Brown,
}
}
428 So.2d 301 [Fla.],
app pending;
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
National Car Rental System v. Bostic,
}
}
423 So.2d 915 [Fla.],
pet. for rev. den.
}
c853e&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_735_99&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&t
ransitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)#co_pp_sp_735_99" }{\fldrslt
436 So.2d 97, 99;
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Champion v. Gray,
}
}
420 So.2d 348 [Fla.],
app pending;
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Howard v. Bloodworth,
}
}
137 Ga.App. 478, 224 S.E.2d 122;
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Strickland v. Hodges,
}
}
134 Ga.App. 909, 216 S.E.2d 706;
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Preece v. Baur,
}
}
143 F.Supp. 804
[D Idaho\u8212\'3fapplying Idaho law];
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Kaiserman v. Bright,
}
}
61 Ill.App.3d 67, 18 Ill.Dec. 108, 377 N.E.2d 261.)
We decline to adopt this impact rule (although there was such impact in each of
the two appeals now before us) inasmuch as it is conceptually inconsistent with our
holding in
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Battalla v. State of New York,
}
}
10 N.Y.2d 237, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34, 176 N.E.2d 729,
where we abolished the impact requirement in negligent infliction of emotional
distress cases.
\par
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f4 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs24 \cf1 \i0
{\f4 \b0 \fs24 \cf1 \i0
co_footnote_B010101984117604_1}
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_B010101984117604_ID" }
{\fldrslt
10
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f4 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f4 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f4 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
Incidentally, the application of the zone-of-danger principle in cases such as
these will obviate the practical difficulties that juries otherwise have to face in
seeking to separate the emotional distress suffered by a plaintiff attributable to
his own physical injuries or fear thereof from the plaintiff\rquote s emotional
distress in consequence of observing an injured or dying family member.
\par
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f4 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs24 \cf1 \i0
{\f4 \b0 \fs24 \cf1 \i0
co_footnote_B011111984117604_1}
{\fldrslt
11
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f4 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f4 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f4 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
With respect to claims under the Workers\rquote Compensation Law, we have rejected
the underlying rationale of
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf1 \i1
Tobin
}
}
(
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Matter of Wolfe v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co.,
}
}
36 N.Y.2d 505, 369 N.Y.S.2d 637, 330 N.E.2d 603;
see
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
}
}
54 N.Y.2d 277, 280, 445 N.Y.S.2d 111, 429 N.E.2d 789)
.
\par
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f4 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs24 \cf1 \i0
{\f4 \b0 \fs24 \cf1 \i0
co_footnote_B012121984117604_1}
{\fldrslt
12
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f4 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f4 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f4 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
That the recovery allowed in these cases is not conceptualized as a new, discrete
cause of action but as an element of damages cognizable in a familiar action in
negligence for personal injuries may raise problems of impermissible splitting of a
single cause of action. Such might have been the situation in the present instance
in Kugel had not the settlement of plaintiffs\rquote causes of action for direct
bodily injury been accompanied, by stipulation of the parties, by an express
reservation of the claims now allowed.
\par
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f4 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs24 \cf1 \i0
{\f4 \b0 \fs24 \cf1 \i0
co_footnote_B013131984117604_1}
{\fldrslt
13
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f4 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f4 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f4 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
Inasmuch as all plaintiffs in these cases were married or related in the first
degree of consanguinity to the injured or deceased person, we need not now decide
where lie the outer limits of \u8220\'3fthe immediate family\u8221\'3f.
\par
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f4 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs24 \cf1 \i0
{\f4 \b0 \fs24 \cf1 \i0
co_footnote_B01411984117604_1}
{\fldrslt
1
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f4 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f4 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f4 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
(
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
}
}
58 N.Y.2d 500, 462 N.Y.S.2d 421, 448 N.E.2d 1332;
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
}
}
54 N.Y.2d 277, 445 N.Y.S.2d 111, 429 N.E.2d 789;
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
}
}
52 N.Y.2d 809, 436 N.Y.S.2d 871, 418 N.E.2d 386;
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Becker v. Schwartz,
}
}
46 N.Y.2d 401, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 386 N.E.2d 807;
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Howard v. Lecher,
}
}
42 N.Y.2d 109, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363, 366 N.E.2d 64;
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Tobin v. Grossman,
}
}
24 N.Y.2d 609, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 249 N.E.2d 419.)
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f4 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs24 \cf1 \i0
{\f4 \b0 \fs24 \cf1 \i0
co_footnote_B01521984117604_1}
{\fldrslt
2
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f4 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f4 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f4 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
The majority\rquote s treatment of the actual cases before this court itself
illustrates the point. In the Bovsun case, the injury to Jack Bovsun did not take
place in plaintiffs\rquote presence. While on the one hand requiring that the
injury to an immediate family member take place in plaintiff\rquote s
\u8220\'3fcontemporaneous observation,\u8221\'3f the majority reverses a dismissal
of the complaint because plaintiffs became \u8220\'3finstantly aware of * * * the
fact that Jack Bovsun must have been injured\u8221\'3f. (Majority opn., pp.
224\u8211\'3f225, 473 N.Y.S.2d p. 358, 461 N.E.2d p. 844.) Thus, for purposes of
legal sufficiency of a complaint, the requirement that injury take place in
plaintiff\rquote s presence has not even survived the articulation of the new rule.
Similarly, in Kugel, it appears that the injuries from which the infant Stephanie
Kugel succumbed at some time after the accident were internal. There is no
allegation or showing that \u8220\'3fserious physical injury\u8221\'3f
ascertainable by \u8220\'3fcontemporaneous observation,\u8221\'3f under the
majority\rquote s test, occurred. Nonetheless both complaints are sustained.
Although essential elements of the new formula are absent in both cases, the
majority concludes that \u8220\'3fit was error to foreclose plaintiffs from
proceeding to trial\u8221\'3f (majority opn., p. 225, n. 1, 473 N.Y.S.2d p. 358, n.
1, 461 N.E.2d p. 844, n. 1.).
\par
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f4 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs24 \cf1 \i0
{\f4 \b0 \fs24 \cf1 \i0
co_footnote_B01631984117604_1}
{\fldrslt
3
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f4 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f4 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f4 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
The new rule is marked by inconsistencies and uncertainties. The actual
\u8220\'3fzone of danger\u8221\'3f is necessarily different for every case. From
the treatment of the cases before the court today it is apparent that
contemporaneous observation and contemporaneous injury are inexact concepts. The
requirement of \u8220\'3fserious and verifiable\u8221\'3f emotional disturbance,
which may be shown by lay testimony, will not deter persons from pressing claims
for more indirect and tenuous psychic injuries before juries. The court\rquote s
failure to define \u8220\'3fthe outer limits of \u8216\'3fthe immediate
family\u8217\'3f \u8221\'3f (majority opn., p. 233, n. 13, 473 N.Y.S.2d p. 364, n.
13, 461 N.E.2d p. 850, n. 13) similarly leaves open a host of questions. The
complexity of such questions for juries will plainly far exceed any difficulties
being obviated by the new rule (majority opn., p. 231, n. 10, 473 N.Y.S.2d p. 362,
n. 10, 461 N.E.2d p. 848, n. 10).
\par
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f4 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs24 \cf1 \i0
{\f4 \b0 \fs24 \cf1 \i0
co_footnote_B01741984117604_1}
{\fldrslt
4
\par
}
}
{\li0 \ri0
{\li0 \f4 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f4 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
{\li0 \f4 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
Under the court\rquote s articulation of the new rule, one can recover for psychic
injuries caused by witnessing a third person\rquote s physical injury even without
fear for one\rquote s safety. The only requirement is that, as an objective matter,
the plaintiff was threatened. It is far from clear that a majority of States would
allow recovery in the absence of the plaintiff\rquote s fear for his or her own
safety (see, e.g.,
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Strazza v. McKittrick,
}
}
146 Conn. 714, 156 A.2d 149;
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Klassa v. Milwaukee Gas Light Co.,
}
}
273 Wis. 176, 77 N.W.2d 397;
but see
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Bowman v. Williams,
}
}
164 Md. 397, 165 A. 182)
.
\par
}
}
}
}
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co_footnote_B01851984117604_1}
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5
\par
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}
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{\li0 \f4 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0
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The zone-of-danger rule has been repeatedly criticized in other jurisdictions as
hopelessly artificial (
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Dillon v. Legg,
}
}
68 Cal.2d 728, 733, 69 Cal.Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912);
harsh and artificial (
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Barnhill v. Davis,
}
}
300 N.W.2d 104, 107 [Iowa] );
lacking \u8220\'3fstrong logical support\u8221\'3f because it inadequately
measures foreseeability of plaintiff\rquote s mental distress (
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Dziokonski v. Babineau,
}
}
375 Mass. 555, 564, 380 N.E.2d 1295);
representing \u8220\'3fan unnecessarily narrow and rigid limit on
liability\u8221\'3f (
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Culbert v. Sampson\rquote s Supermarkets,
}
}
444 A.2d 433, 436 [Me] );
\u8220\'3fbased upon a fact now deemed irrelevant\u8221\'3f in light of the
abandonment of the impact rule (
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Toms v. McConnell,
}
}
45 Mich.App. 647, 653, 207 N.W.2d 140);
\u8220\'3fimpos[ing] unjust limitations on recovery\u8221\'3f (
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Corso v. Merrill,
}
}
119 N.H. 647, 658, 406 A.2d 300);
an \u8220\'3farbitrary formality\u8221\'3f (
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Portee v. Jaffee,
}
}
84 N.J. 88, 96, 417 A.2d 521);
\u8220\'3funduly restrictive\u8221\'3f (
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Paugh v. Hanks,
}
}
6 Ohio.St.3d 72, 451 N.E.2d 759);
\u8220\'3fignor[ing] that the emotional impact was most probably influenced by the
event witnessed\u8212\'3fserious injury to or death of the child\u8212\'3frather
than the plaintiff\rquote s awareness of personal exposure to danger\u8221\'3f (
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
Sinn v. Burd,
}
}
486 Pa. 146, 157\u8211\'3f158, 404 A.2d 672);
and \u8220\'3fdeny[ing] psychological reality\u8221\'3f (
}
{\f4 \b0 \fs18 \cf5 \i1
D\rquote Ambra v. United States,
}
}
114 R.I. 643, 657, 338 A.2d 524)
.
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