1
LIMITLESS POTENTIAL v. CA
PRINCIPLES:
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
WHAT: A preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy that a party
may resort to in order to preserve and protect certain rights and
interests during the pendency of an action.
WHEN: It is an order granted at any stage of an action, prior to the
judgment or final order,
CONTENTS: It requires a party, court, agency or person to perform
or to refrain from performing a particular act or acts.
NATURE: A preliminary injunction, as the term itself suggests, is
merely temporary, subject to the final disposition of the principal
action.20
PURPOSE:
1. It is issued to preserve the status quo ante, in order to protect the
rights of the plaintiff during the pendency of the suit. Otherwise, if
no preliminary injunction is issued, the defendant may, before final
judgment, do the act which the plaintiff is seeking the court to
restrain. This will make ineffectual the final judgment that the court
may afterwards render in granting relief to the plaintiff.22
2. The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to prevent threatened
or continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before their
claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated.
STATUS QUO ANTE, DEFINITION - the last actual, peaceful, and
uncontested status that preceded the actual controversy. The status
quo should be existing ante litem motam, or at the time of the filing
of the case. For this reason, a preliminary injunction should not
establish new relations between the parties, but merely maintain or
re-establish the pre-existing relationship between them.
REQUISITES FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION TO ISSUE:
(1) a right in esse or a clear and unmistakable right to be protected;
(2) a violation of that right;
(3) that there is an urgent and permanent act and urgent necessity
for the writ to prevent serious damage.24
HOW: Granted only when, among other things, the applicant, not
explicitly exempted, files with the court, where the action or
proceeding is pending, a bond executed to the party or person
enjoined, in an amount to be fixed by the court, to the effect that
the applicant will pay such party or person all damages which he
may sustain by reason of the injunction or temporary restraining
order if the court should finally decide that the applicant was not
entitled thereto. Upon approval of the requisite bond, a writ of
preliminary injunction shall be issued. Thus, the posting of a bond is
a condition sine qua non for a writ of preliminary injunction to be
issued.
INJUNCTION BOND, PURPOSE - The injunction bond is intended as a
security for damages in case it is finally decided that the injunction
ought not to have been granted. Its principal purpose is to protect
the enjoined party against loss or damage by reason of the
injunction,26 and the bond is usually conditioned accordingly.
CLAIM FOR DAMAGES AGAINST BOND, SAME WITH PRELIMINARY
ATTACHMENT - Rule 57, Section 20, of the 1997 Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure, which is similarly applicable to preliminary
injunction,28 has outlined the procedure for the filing of a claim for
damages against an injunction bond
MALICE, LACK OF GOOD FAITH NOT AN ELEMENT OF RECOVERY ON
THE BOND - Malice or lack of good faith is not an element of
recovery on the bond. This must be so, because to require malice as
a prerequisite would make the filing of a bond a useless formality.
The dissolution of the injunction, even if the injunction was obtained
in good faith, amounts to a determination that the injunction was
wrongfully obtained and a right of action on the injunction bond
immediately accrues. Thus, for the purpose of recovery upon the
injunction bond, the dissolution of the injunction because of
petitioner’s main cause of action provides the actionable wrong for
the purpose of recovery upon the bond.
INJUNCTION BOND ANSWERABLE FOR ALL DAMAGES - The bond
insures with all practicable certainty that the defendant may sustain
no ultimate loss in the event that the injunction could finally be
dissolved.32 Consequently, the bond may obligate the bondsmen to
account to the defendant in the injunction suit for all damages, or
costs and reasonable counsel’s fees, incurred or sustained by the
latter in case it is determined that the injunction was wrongfully
issued.
CASE DIGEST
2 SENTENCE RULING: Malice and lack of good faith is not required to
recover on the bond. The dissolution of the injunction, even if the
injunction was obtained in good faith, amounts to a determination
that the injunction was wrongfully obtained and a right of action on
the injunction bond immediately accrues.
FACTS:
Limitless Potentials, Inc. (LPI) constructed one billboard
advertisement for Digital Networks Communications and Computers
which Digital would rent at P60,000 per month.
The billboard, however, was destroyed by unknown persons so the
contract was considered terminated but Limitless refused to return
Digital’s rental deposit for two months claiming that the loss of the
billboard was due to force majeure.
Digital sued Limitless for the return of the deposit. Limitless filed a
third-
party complaint against Macgraphics and herein respondents Bishop
Yalung and Atty. Villasor who were representatives of the Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Manila (RCAM). Digital alleged that Yalung
and Villasor destroyed the billboard they constructed over the land
they leased from RCAM so that Macragraphics could erect their own
billboard on the land.
Respondents moved to dismiss the third-party complaint but the
same was denied by the MeTC.
Respondents then filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for
Preliminary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction
with the RTC.

The RTC granted the injunction after the respondents posted a bond
of P10,000 to preserve the status quo because the said court was
informed that the MeTC had continued to try the case despite the
pendency of the certiorari petition. However, the RTC later denied
the certiorari and dissolved the injunction.
Limitless claimed damages for attorney’s fees, litigation costs, and
cost of delay and thus filed a Motion for Judgment Against the Bond
but the RTC denied the motion ruling that the injunction was
properly issued.
Limitless filed for certiorari with the CA but this was dismissed for
lack of merit.
Limitless argues that the mere dismissal of respondent’s certiorari
and the dissolution of the writ amounts to a determination that the
injunction was wrongfully or improvidently obtained and that there
was damage caused by the mere issuance of the injunction. Limitless
asserts that malice or lack of good faith was not an element of
recovery on the bond.
Respondents on the other hand contends that Limitless did not
suffer any damage because they were not restrained from doing any
act, rather, the injunction was directed to the MeTC.
ISSUES: I. Does mere dissolution of the injunction amount to a
determination that it was wrongfully of improperly issued? Does
malice or lack of good faith need to be proven to recover on the
bond?
II. Can petitioner recover damages from the injunction bond?
III. Was petitioner able to substantiate the damages?
HELD:
Malice or lack of good faith is not an element of recovery on the
bond. This must be so, because to require malice as a prerequisite
would make the filing of a bond a useless formality. The dissolution
of the injunction, even if the injunction was obtained in good faith,
amounts to a determination that the injunction was wrongfully
obtained and a right of action on the injunction bond immediately
accrues. Thus, for the purpose of recovery upon the injunction bond,
the dissolution of the injunction because of petitioner’s main cause
of action provides the actionable wrong for the purpose of recovery
upon the bond.
The injunction bond is answerable for all damages. The bond insures
with all practicable certainty that the defendant may sustain no
ultimate loss in the event that the injunction could finally be
dissolved. Consequently, the bond may obligate the bondsmen to
account to the defendant in the injunction suit for all damages, or
costs and reasonable counsel’s fees, incurred or sustained by the
latter in case it is determined that the injunction was wrongfully
issued.
It is erroneous for the appellate court to rule that petitioner is not
entitled to claim damages from the injunction bond simply because
the preliminary injunction was directed against the MeTC and not
against the petitioner. The MeTC does not stand to suffer damages
from the injunction because it has no interest or stake in the Petition
pending before it. Damage or loss is suffered by the party whose
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right to pursue its case is suspended or delayed, which in this case, is
the petitioner.
However, Limitless was not able to prove it’s entitlement to
damages.
Petition denied.
QUICK DIGEST:
DIGITAL rented a billboard built by LIMITLESS. The billboard was
destroyed so DIGITAL demanded a refund but LIMITLESS refused
reasoning that the loss was due to force majeure.
Hence, DIGITAL sued LIMITLESS in the MeTC. However, LIMITLESS
filed a third-party complaint against MACRAGRAPHICS and
ARCHBISHOP who allegedly caused the destruction of the billboard.
ARCHBISHOP filed a motion to dismiss the third-party complaint but
the MeTC denied it.
ARCHBISHOP filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC with a prayer
for writ of preliminary injunction. After ARCHBISHOP filed an
injunction bond, the RTC granted the injunction ordering the MeTC
to stop hearing the case while the certiorari was pending. But the
RTC later dismissed the certiorari petition and dissolved the writ.
LIMITLESS filed a motion for judgment against the bond but the RTC
denied the same because the injunction was properly issued.
LIMITLESS argues that the mere dissolution of the writ amounts to
wrongful or improvident issuance which entitles it to recover
damages from the bond and that malice and lack of good faith is not
required.
ISSUE: WON the malice and lack of good faith is required to recover
on the injunction bond?
HELD: No.
Malice or lack of good faith is not an element of recovery on the
bond. The dissolution of the injunction, even if the injunction was
obtained in good faith, amounts to a determination that the
injunction was wrongfully obtained and a right of action on the
injunction bond immediately accrues. Thus, for the purpose of
recovery upon the injunction bond, the dissolution of the injunction
because of petitioner’s main cause of action provides the actionable
wrong for the purpose of recovery upon the bond.
III.A.5 DEFINITION OF MANDATORY INJUNCTION
III.I WHEN ISSUED... supra
HOLDING:
a writ of mandatory injunction is granted UPON SHOWING THAT:
(1) The invasion of the right is material and substantial
(2) The right of the complainant is clear and unmistakable
(3) There is an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to
prevent serious damage.
SEMIRARA COAL CORP. V. HGL DEVELOPMENT CORP

FACTS:
Semirara Mining Corp (petitioner) is a grantee by DOE of a Coal
Operating Contract under PD 972 over the entire island of Semirara
Antique containing an area of 5500 hectares while HGL Devt Corp is
a grantee of Forest Land Grazing Lease Agreement by the Ministry of
Environment and Natural Resources over 367 hectares in Bobog and
Pontod Semirara Antique. Since the grant HGL has been grazing
cattle on the subject property. With HGL’s permission and on
condition that it will not violate the FLGLA, the trucks and
equipment of petitioner were allowed to pass through the property.
Subsequently, without permission of HGL, petitioner erected several
buildings as their admin office and employees residence, they also
conducted blasting and excavation, constructed access roads,
maintained a stockyard for the coal all to the damaged of land
causing decimation of the cattle. A letter was sent to petitioner
demanding full disclosure of the activities however it was ignored.
The DENR unilaterally cancelled the FLGLA and ordered HGL to
vacate the premises on account of its failure to pay its annual rental
and non submission of grazing reports.
HGL filed the following actions simultaneously:
Against DENR for specific performance and damages with prayer for
temporary restraining order and/writ of preliminary injunction with
the RTC Caloocan
Against petitioner for Recovery of Possession and Damages with
Prayer for TRO and/Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction
The RTC granted HGL’s prayer which was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether HGL is entitled to Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction.
HELD:
YES.
Being a holder of a pasture lease agreement, HGL has a clear and
unmistakable right to the possession of the subject property. As
lawful possessor of the property, he is therefore entitled to
protection of its possession and any disturbance of its possession is
a valid ground for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction. Considering that petitioner’s continued occupation of the
property results in deprivation of HGL’s right to use and possess
subject property, the urgency and necessity for the issuance of the
writ cannot be denied. The unilateral act of DENR in cancelling the
agreement does not automatically render the FLGLA invalid since it
is still a subject of a separate pending case. Notably, in the pending
case the court has issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining
DENR from its order of cancellation of FLGLA No. 184.
III.A.5
DEFINITION
Based on Rule 58 Section 1, a writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction is an order which requires the performance of a particular
act or acts.
In the instant case, the writ requires the following to be done:
1. Restraint petitioner or its agents from encroaching on the subject
land or conducting any activities in it
2. Commanded petitioner to restore possession of the subject land
to HGL or its agents
3
III. I (WHEN ISSUED) supra.
Aside from Section 3 of Rule 58 enumerating the grounds for
issuance of preliminary injunction, the instant case established
jurisprudential ruling when a writ of mandatory injunction is
granted:
(1) The invasion of the right is material and substantial
(2) The right of the complainant is clear and unmistakable
(3) There is an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to
prevent serious damage.
“MANDATORY INJUNCTION”
 It is settled that the grant of a preliminary mandatory
injunction rests on the sound discretion of the court, and
the exercise of sound judicial discretion by the lower court
should not be interfered with except in cases of manifest
abuse.
 It is likewise settled that a court should avoid issuing a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction which would
effectively dispose of the main case without trial.
 To be entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction, however,
the petitioners must establish the following requisites:
a) the invasion of the right sought to be protected
is material and substantial;
b) the right of the complainant is clear and
unmistakable; and
c) there is an urgent and permanent necessity for
the writ to prevent serious damage.
 Since a preliminary mandatory injunction commands the
performance of an act, it does not preserve the status
quo and is thus more cautiously regarded than a mere
prohibitive injunction. Accordingly, the issuance of a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction is justified only in a
clear case, free from doubt or dispute. When the
complainant's right is thus doubtful or disputed, he does
not have a clear legal right and, therefore, the issuance of
injunctive relief is improper.
CHINA BANKING CORP VS CO
FACTS:
Petitioner China Banking Corporation sold a lot located at St.
Benedict Subdivision, Sindalan, San Fernando, Pampanga, to
petitioner-spouses Castro. It sold two other lots also located in the
same place to petitioner-spouses Nogoy. The lots of the Castro
spouses and the Nogoy spouses are commonly bound on their
south-eastern side by Lot No. 3783-E in the name of respondent
Benjamin Co (Co) and his siblings.
Co and his siblings entered into a joint venture with respondent
Three Kings Construction and Realty Corporation for the
development of a subdivision project covering Lot No. 3783-E and
adjacent lots.
In 2003, respondents started constructing a perimeter wall on Lot
No. 3783-E.

On November 28, 2003, petitioners wrote to respondents asking
them to stop constructing the wall, and remove all installed
construction materials and restore the former condition of Lot No.
3783-E which the petitioners claimed to be a road lot. They also
claimed that the construction obstructed and closed the only means
of ingress and egress of the Nogoy spouses and their family, and at
the same time, caved in and impeded the ventilation and clearance
due the Castro spouses’ residential house.
Petitioners’ demand remained unheeded, prompting them to file
before the RTC a complaint for injunction, restoration of road
lot/right of way and damages with prayer for temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
Before respondents filed their Answer, petitioners filed an Amended
Complaint, alleging that the construction of the perimeter wall was
almost finished and thus modifying their prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction to a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction.
The RTC denied the application for a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction on the following grounds:
a) Plaintiffs have not clearly shown that their rights have
been violated and that they are entitled to the relief
prayed for and that irreparable damage would be suffered
by them if an injunction is not issued.
b) Whether lot 3783-E is a road lot or not is a factual issue
which should be resolved after the presentation of
evidence.
c) Plaintiffs failed to prove that they will be prejudiced by the
construction of the wall. The perimeter wall of the
defendants is situated on the left side of the garage and its
front entrance is still open and freely accessible.
This is indeed an issue of fact which should be ventilated in a full
blown trial, determinable through further presentation of evidence
by the parties.
Their Motion for Reconsideration having been denied, petitioners
filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals which
dismissed the same and denied their subsequent Motion for
Reconsideration. Hence, the petitioners filed the present petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are entitled for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.
RULING:
NO.
It is settled that the grant of a preliminary mandatory injunction
rests on the sound discretion of the court, and the exercise of sound
judicial discretion by the lower court should not be interfered with
except in cases of manifest abuse.
It is likewise settled that a court should avoid issuing a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction which would effectively dispose of
the main case without trial.
4
In the case at bar, petitioners base their prayer for preliminary
mandatory injunction on Section 44 of Act No. 496 (as amended by
Republic Act No. 440), Section 50 of Presidential Decree 1529, and
their claim that Lot No. 3783-E is a road lot.
To be entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction, however, the
petitioners must establish the following requisites: (a) the invasion
of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial; (b)
the right of the complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (c)
there is an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent
serious damage.
Since a preliminary mandatory injunction commands the
performance of an act, it does not preserve the status quo and is
thus more cautiously regarded than a mere prohibitive injunction.
Accordingly, the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction is justified only in a clear case, free from doubt or dispute.
When the complainant’s right is thus doubtful or disputed, he does
not have a clear legal right and, therefore, the issuance of injunctive
relief is improper.
The ocular inspection showed that petitioners will not lose access to
their residences. As a matter of fact, lot 3783-E is not being used as
an access road to their residences and there is an existing secondary
road within St. Benedict Subdivision that serves as the main access
road to the highway. With respect to the blocking of ventilation and
light of the residence of the Sps. Castro, suffice it to state that they
are not deprived of light and ventilation. The perimeter wall of the
defendants is situated on the left side of the garage and its front
entrance is still open and freely accessible,30and the absence of a
showing that petitioners have an urgent and paramount need for a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to prevent irreparable
damage, they are not entitled to such writ.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SOFIA DEVESA V. CRISPIN ARBES
13 Phil 273
LONG DIGEST
Principles:
INJUNCTIONS; SPECIAL REMEDY OF THE CODE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE DISTINGUISHED FROM THE OLD SPANISH WRITS. —
Injunctions or interdictos prohibitorios, for the issuance of which
provision is made in the new Code of Civil Procedure, while they
resemble the interdictal actions of the Spanish procedural law in
some respects, are wholly distinct therefrom and, as a rule, the
circumstances under which, in accordance with the Spanish law,
interdictos de adquirir, de retener, de recobrar or de despojo
properly issued would not justify nor sustain the issuance of an
injunction, interdicto prohibitorio, as defined and provided in the
new Code of Civil Procedure.

ID.; LIMITATION UPON USE OF WRITS OF INJUNCTION. — An
injunction is a special remedy contained in the new Code of Civil
Procedure and adopted from American and English law of
procedure, and the accepted American doctrine limiting its use to
cases where there is no other adequate remedy, and otherwise
controlling the issue thereof, must be deemed to limit its use in like
manner in this jurisdiction.
ID.; WRITS NOT AVAILABLE FOR RECOVERY OF PROPERTY WHEN
TITLE IS NOT ESTABLISHED. — Injunctions, as a rule, will not be
granted to take property out of the possession or control of one
party and place it into that of another whose title has not clearly
been established by law.
Facts:
Plaintiff alleged that defendant had unlawfully taken
possession of certain rice lands and coconut groves and prayed for
an injunction restraining him from continuing in possession and
enjoying the fruits of the land in question until and unless he
obtained a final judgment in a proper action declaring these lands to
be the property of the estate.
The complaint alleges that the property in question was
assigned to plaintiff's deceased husband under the terms of an extra
judicial partition contract executed by the heirs of Gregoria Arbes
(plaintiff's husband's first wife) and that plaintiff and her husband
had continued in the quiet, peaceable, and exclusive possession
thereof.
The trial court granted the preliminary injunction prayed
for, conditioned upon the execution of a bond for costs and
damages.
Defendant presented a motion which may fairly be
regarded as a demurrer to the complaint on the ground that the
facts alleged do not constitute a cause of action, and prayed that the
preliminary injunction be dissolved.
The trial court overruled the demurrer and declined to
dissolve the preliminary injunction.
Defendant withdrew his motion and filed his answer. In his
answer, he admitted having taken possession of the land but denied
plaintiff's allegation as to their exclusive possession thereof. He
alleged that the land was the property of Gregoria Arbes, deceased,
of whose estate he is the administrator, and that after the death of
Gregoria Arbes, it passed pro indiviso to her heirs, who from the
time of her death continued in joint possession thereof, until he
took possession upon his appointment as administrator; he also
alleged that one of the heirs, Vicente Sola, widower of Gregoria
Arbes, married the plaintiff; that plaintiff's claim to an interest in the
property in question is or should be strictly limited to the interest
which she is entitled to take from her husband.
During trial, plaintiff introduced evidence to prove that the
land was originally the property of her husband acquired by him
through purchase, in part prior to, and in part after his marriage
with his first wife; she also introduced in evidence a document,
purporting to be a partition agreement between her husband and
the other heirs of Gregoria Arbes.
5
Defendant did not deny the execution of the partition
agreement, and wholly failed to proved that the land in question
was or is a part of the estate of Gregoria Arbes. He insisted that the
agreement was not binding upon the heirs of Gregoria Arbes,
because at the date of its execution two of them were minors and
incapable of executing such a document.
The trial court on the pleadings and proof submitted found
that the plaintiff was entitled to the possession of the land in
question, and rendered final judgment in accordance with the
prayer of the complaint, granting a final injunction perpetually
restraining the defendant administrator from continuing in
possession of the land in question or enjoying the fruits thereof.
Issue:
Whether or not the preliminary injunction sought by the
plaintiff is the proper remedy.
Ruling:
No. We are in entire accord with the trial judge as to his
findings of fact, and agree with him that the evidence of record
establishes plaintiff's right of possession in and to the lands in
question.
We are of opinion, however, that the remedy by injunction
sought by the plaintiff and allowed the trial court was not the proper
remedy for the cause of action set out in the pleadings and
established by the evidence, and that, in accordance with the
provisions of section 126 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the court
should have granted "relief consistent with the case made by the
complaint and supported by the evidence and embraced within the
issue," and to that end should have required an amendment of the
complaint by striking out the prayer for an injunction and
substituting therefor a prayer for a judgment for possession of the
land described in the complaint, and upon the complaint thus
amended, judgment should have been rendered in favor of the
plaintiff.
Both the parties to this action appear to have labored under a
misapprehension as to the purpose, scope, and limitations of the
special remedy, known as an injunction, and defined in section 162
of the Code of Civil Procedure. The records in many cases in this
court disclose a considerable degree of doubt and uncertainty in the
minds of counsel as to the function of this remedy, and in some
cases a wholly erroneous concept of the purpose and object for
which it is provided. This erroneous concept may, perhaps, be due
to the fact that in the Spanish version of the new Code of Civil
Procedure, the term injunction is translated interdicto prohibitorio,
which may thus have given rise to the impression that the remedy
by injunction is similar in character to the summary interdictal
actions of the Spanish procedural law; but while the injunction
resembles in many respects the interdicto of the Roman law,
especially the decretal (decretale, quod praetor re nata
implorantibus decrevit), and while it also resembles to a certain
degree in its operation and effect, the interdictos de adquirir, de
retener, and de recobrar or de despojo of the Spanish procedural
law; nevertheless, it is wholly distinct therefrom, and, as a rule, the
circumstances under which, in accordance with the former
procedural law, these interdictos properly issued, would not justify

nor sustain the issuance of an injunction, as defined and provided in
the new Code of Civil Procedure. An injunction is a "special
remedy" adopted in that code from American practice, and
originally borrowed from English legal procedure, which was there
issued by the authority and under the seal of a court of equity, and
limited, as in other cases where equitable relief is sought, to cases
where there is no "plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law"
(30 Barb., 549; 5 R. I., 472; 121 N. Y., 46; 31 Pa., 387; 32 Ala., N. S.,
723; 37 N. H., 254; 61 Hun., 140; 145 U. S., 459; 141 Ill., 572; 49 Fed.
Rep., 517; 37 id., 357; 129 Md., 464; 109 N. C., 21; 83 Wis., 426; 115
Mo., 613), which "will not be granted while the rights between the
parties are undetermined, except in extraordinary cases where
material and irreparable injury will done," which cannot be
compensated in damages, and where there will be no adequate
remedy (3 Bosw., 607; 1 Beasl., 247, 542; 15 Md., 22; 13 Cal., 156,
190; 6 Wis., 680; 16 Tex., 410; 28 Mo., 210; 24 Fla., 542; 39 N. H.,
182; 12 Cush., 410; 27 Ga., 499; 1 McAll., 271; 54 Fed. Rep., 1005; 64
Vt., 643), and which will not, as a rule, be granted, to take property
out of the possession of one party and put it into that of another
whose title has not been established by law. (144 U. S., 119; 40 W.
N. C. Pa., 121.)
This court has frequently held, when treating of the special remedies
by injunction, mandamus and prohibition, which are provided in the
new Code of Procedure in Civil Cases, that the accepted American
doctrine limiting the use of these remedies to cases where there is
no other adequate remedy, and otherwise controlling the issuance
of these writs, and must be deemed to limit their use in like manner
in this jurisdiction, when not otherwise provided by law: to hold
otherwise would be to render practically of no effect the various
provisions of the code touching many if not most of the ordinary
actions, and the enforcement of judgment in such actions; for it may
well be supposed that if a complainant could secure relief by
injunction in every case where "the defendant is doing or threatens
or is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act
probably in violation of the plaintiff's rights" and could enforce the
judgment granting the injunction by the summary contempt
proceedings authorized in section 172 of the code to punish
violations of injunctions, he would seldom elect to enforce his rights
in such cases by the ordinary remedies, involving as they do the
difficult and of times fruitless labor of enforcing judgments obtained
therein by execution. But so many cases have come before us where
preliminary injunctions have been issued apparently without regard
to this rule, that we are satisfied that the erroneous impression still
prevails, in some quarters, that a preliminary injunction must issue
where a prima facie showing is made of the existence of the
circumstances under which such injunctions may be granted as set
out in section 164 of the Code of Civil Procedure, without keeping in
mind the fact that applications for injunctions are made to the
sound discretion of the court, and the exercise of that discretion is
controlled by the accepted doctrines touching the granting of
injunctions in such cases; and we may add that the records also
disclose a dangerous tendency to grant permanent injunctions on
insufficient grounds, as a result of a similar erroneous construction
of the provisions of the code in that regard.
No brief was filed by plaintiff on appeal, and the contentions of the
parties in the court below are not very clearly set out in the very
short brief of the defendant and appellant. It appears, however, that
defendant challenged the jurisdiction of the trial court, on the
ground that the summary interdictal actions of the Spanish
procedural law have been done away with by the provisions of the
6
new Code of Procedure in Civil Cases, the interdicto de
recobrar or de despojo having been expressly displaced by the
summary remedies prescribed in section 80 of the new code, for the
recovery of lands or buildings of which one is deprived by force,
intimidation, fraud, or strategy within a year prior to the institution
of the action; and defendant insists that the action instituted by
plaintiff, while in form a proceeding praying for an injunction under
the new code, assimilated to the former proceeding praying for
an interdicto de recobrar or de despojo, is in fact an action which
could only be maintained under the provisions of section 80 of the
new code, of which original jurisdiction is conferred upon the courts
of the justice of the peace, exclusive of the Court of First Instance.
Plaintiff and appellee on the other hand seems to have insisted that
the injunction proceedings instituted by her were assimilated rather
to the summary action known as the interdicto de retener and that
the facts alleged and proven establishing her right to an interdicto
de retener, under the old law, she is entitled to an injunction under
the new code, that remedy being the equivalent provided by the
new code for the interdicto of the old law.
But while we agree with defendant and appellant that the summary
remedies provided in section 80 may be said to replace and perhaps
abrogate the old interdicto de recobrar or de despojo, and that if the
facts alleged and proven made out a cause of action under that
section and, therefore, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the court
of the justice of the peace, it would be necessary to hold that the
trial court was wholly without original jurisdiction; and while we
cannot agree with the plaintiff and appellee that the facts set out in
the pleadings and evidence would support the issuance of
an interdicto de retener, even under the former procedure, because
possession of the land and buildings had been actually lost to
plaintiff when the action was instituted, nor can we agree with her
that even if a proper case for the granting of an interdicto de
retener under the old procedure had been established, it necessarily
follows that an injunction should issue under the new procedure;
and without deciding whether all the summary interdictal remedies
of the Spanish law have been wholly and in all cases abolished under
the provisions of the new code, it is sufficient for the purpose of this
decision to hold that since there is nothing in the allegations or
proof to show that defendant obtained possession of the land in
question by force, intimidation, fraud, or strategy, the action is not
in the nature of the summary remedy known to the old law as
an interdicto de recobrar or de despojo, nor is it the summary
remedy of forcible entry and wrongful detainer provided in section
80 of the new code, and therefore it does not fall within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the court of the justice of the peace, to the
exclusion of the Court of First Instance, which tried the case.
What has been said disposes of all the errors assigned by appellant,
except his assignment of error based on his contention that the
administrator having taken possession as an officer of the court
wherein the estate was being administered, his conduct in that
regard should not be questioned, except in the course of the
administration proceedings.
We have frequently held that a contested claim of an administrator
that certain rights of possession and ownership are the property of
the estate which he represents must be determined in a separate
action, and not in the course of the administration proceedings; and
it should be necessary to add that the mere fact that an
administrator holds letters of appointment from some court, in no
wise authorizes him to take possession of property held by another

under a claim of a right to possession until and unless he successfully
establishes his right to possession of such property in a proper
proceeding in a competent court.
QUICK DIGEST
FACTS:
Plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant for unlawful possession
of land with prayer for injunction. The trial court granted the
preliminary injunction upon the execution of a bond. Defendant filed
a demurrer to the complaint with prayer for the dissolution of
preliminary injunction, to which the trial court overruled. Defendant
withdrew his motion and filed his answer, admitting that he took
possession of the land but denying plaintiff’s allegation as to their
exclusive possession thereof. He also alleged that the land was the
property of Gregoria Arbes, deceased, of whose estate he is the
administrator. During trial, plaintiff introduced evidence to prove
that the land was originally the property of her husband and that
there was a partition agreement between her husband and the
other heirs of Gregoria Arbes. Defendant did not deny the execution
of the partition agreement, and wholly failed to proved that the land
in question was a part of the estate of Gregoria Arbes. The trial court
ruled that the plaintiff was entitled to the possession of the land in
question, and rendered final judgment in accordance with the
prayer of the complaint, granting a final injunction perpetually
restraining the defendant administrator from continuing in
possession of the land in question or enjoying the fruits thereof.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the preliminary injunction sought by the plaintiff is
the proper remedy.
RULING:
NO.
An injunction is a special remedy contained in the new Code of Civil
Procedure and adopted from American and English law of
procedure, and the accepted American doctrine limiting its use to
cases where there is no other adequate remedy, and otherwise
controlling the issue thereof, must be deemed to limit its use in like
manner in this jurisdiction.
Injunctions, as a rule, will not be granted to take property out of the
possession or control of one party and place it into that of another
whose title has not clearly been established by law.
Contested claims of an administrator, that certain rights of
possession and ownership are the property of the estate which he
represents, must be determined in a separate action, and not in the
course of the administration proceedings.
PREYSLER V. COURT OF APPEALS
7
PRINCIPLE: The objective of a writ of preliminary injunction is to
preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be fully
heard. Status quo is the last actual, peaceable and uncontested
situation which precedes a controversy.
FACTS:
Private respondent Far East Enterprises, Inc., owns Tali Beach
Subdivision. Petitioner Fausto Preysler, Jr. and his wife owned lots
therein and also two parcels of land adjacent to the subdivision. To
gain access to their lot petitioner has to pass through private
respondent's subdivision. Petitioner offered P10,000 for the
easement of right of way but private respondent refused it for being
grossly inadequate. Private respondent then barricaded the front
gate of petitioner's property to prevent petitioner and his family
from using the subdivision roads to access said parcels.
The petitioner filed, with the Regional Trial Court of Nasugbu,
Batangas, a Complaint for Right of Way with prayer for preliminary
prohibitive injunction against private respondent. The RTC granted
the writ of injunction. The petitioner moved to clarify the December
12, 1996 writ and asked the court to clearly define the action
required of private respondent to avert further damage and
inconvenience to petitioner. RTC issued an amended writ.
Private respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals, which set aside the writ dated December 29, 1998 and
reinstated the original writ dated December 12, 1996 with
modification as to the amount of the bond. The petitioner moved for
reconsideration, but the same was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a legal basis for the issuance of the
amended writ of injunction.
RULING:
Prefatorily, we note that what was granted by the trial court was the
preliminary injunction, and that the main case for right of way has
not yet been settled. We have in previous cases 9 said that the
objective of a writ of preliminary injunction is to preserve the status
quo until the merits of the case can be fully heard. Status quo is the
last actual, peaceable and uncontested situation which precedes a
controversy. The Court of Appeals was correct in its findings that the
last actual, peaceful and uncontested situation that preceded the
controversy was solely the access of petitioner and his household to
his property outside the subdivision for visits and inspections. At the
time the writ was applied for in 1995, there was still no construction
going on in the property. It was merely raw land. The use of the
subdivision roads for ingress and egress of construction workers,
heavy equipment, delivery of construction materials, and installation
of power lines, are clearly not part of the status quo in the original
writ. Along this line, the Court of Appeals properly set aside the
amended writ and reinstated the original writ.
QUICK DIGEST:

X Inc., owns a Subdivision adjacent to two parcels of land owner by Y
and his wife. To gain access to their lot, Y has to pass through X's
subdivision. Y offered P10,000 for the easement of right of way but X
refused it for being grossly inadequate. X then barricaded the front
gate of petitioner's property to prevent Y and his family from using
the subdivision roads to access said parcels.
Y filed a Complaint for Right of Way with prayer for preliminary
prohibitive injunction against X. The RTC granted the writ of
injunction. Y moved to clarify the December 12, 1996 writ and asked
the court to clearly define the action required of X to avert further
damage and inconvenience to petitioner. RTC issued an amended
writ.
X filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which set
aside the writ dated December 29, 1998 and reinstated the original
writ dated December 12, 1996 with modification as to the amount
of the bond. Y moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied.
MANTILE VS. CAJUCOM
TWO SENTENCE RULING:
A thing that has already been done cannot be prohibited, by the
mere fact of there not having been done what was not ordered in
the writ it cannot be held that a judicial order was disobeyed and
willfully disregarded.
FACTS: (All dates pertain to 1908)
Petitioners filed a WPI against the respondents to restrain them
from continuing to close the canals and obstructing the flow of
water which irrigated the petitioner’s rice fields.
In its complaint filed on June 22, petitioners aver that the
respondents started to obstruct the flow of water on June 1, and
that since then the water which it ordinarily carried had ceased to
flow through it, the plaintiff's lands thereby being deprived of
irrigation.
On June 26 a WPI was issued wherein respondents were enjoined
from performing any act whatever that might tend to close and
obstruct the canal and to cease to obstruct or hinder the course of
the water.
On July 6 petitioners filed a motion to site the defendants in
contempt because they continue to obstruct and hinder the passage
of the water in utter disobedience of the WPI.
The defendants argue that since the 3rd of July, the date when they
were notified by the deputy sheriff, they had complied with the
prohibitory order and had not done anything whatever, by
themselves or through others in their representation, to the stream
or ditch in question, which was closed by two tenants of one of the
8
defendants, Alejandro Cajucom, on June 1, 1908; as acknowledged
by said tenants.
ISSUE:
WON the respondents disobeyed the WPI and therefore was
properly cited in contempt.
HELD:
NO!
The writ issued by the court contained no order instructing the
defendants to raise or remove the obstructions that prevented the
water from flowing through the said canal or ditch.
Section 162 of the Code of Civil Procedure prescribes:
“An injunction is a writ or order requiring a person to refrain from
particular act.”
The canal was obstructed and closed on June 1st, and when the
persons who closed it were notified on July 3 that they should
abstain from performing any act whatever tending to obstruct and
prevent the flow of water, the canal or ditch still remained closed,
and the record shows no proof that it was afterwards opened to the
passage of water, nor that, after the defendants had been notified
of the injunction, they again closed it.
The act of the closing of the canal occurred prior to the issuance of
the writ, and, since a thing that has already been done cannot be
prohibited, by the mere fact of there not having been done what
was not ordered in the writ it cannot be held that a judicial order
was disobeyed and willfully disregarded.
The said writ prohibited the performance of any act that would
obstruct, close, or hinder the course of the water through the canal
or creek, when it was already obstructed and closed; and as the
removal of the impediment or obstruction was not ordered, the
defendants were not obliged to perform any particular act, and their
inaction in leaving the canal closed does not constitute contempt of
court, as they did not violate any judicial prohibition.
BAR TYPE QUESTION:
X filed a WPI against Y on June 22, to enjoin the latter from
obstructing the flow of water which commenced on June 1.
Writ was issued on June 26.
The writ issued by the court contained no order instructing the
defendants to raise or remove the obstructions that prevented the
water from flowing through the said canal or ditch.
Notice was received by defendants on July 3, from which date it
started complying with the order of prohibition. And that it was their
tenants that obstructed the flow of water beginning June 1.

Respondent was cited in contempt.
Is the order of the court citing respondent in contempt proper?
(99%) (Bar 2017)
YES!
FELICIANO V. ALIPIO
PRINCIPLE: Issuance of a permanent injunction, which is equivalent
to an action for prohibition against public officers.
Distinctions between injunction and prohibition
.Injunction is generally directed against a party in the action while
prohibition is directed against a court, tribunal or person exercising
judicial powers;
.Injunction does not involve the jurisdiction of the court, whereas
prohibition may be on the ground that the court against whom the
writ is sought acted without or in excess of jurisdiction;
.Injunction may be the main action itself, or just a provisional
remedy in the main action, whereas prohibition is always a main
action. Hence, for temporary restraint in a proceeding for
prohibition, preliminary injunction must be sought therein.
FACTS:
On September 21, 1951, the Director of Public Schools issued
Circular No. 20, series of 1951, which reads as follows:
PUBLIC SCHOOL PUPILS AND STUDENTS MAY BE REQUIRED TO
SALUTE THE FLAG
To Division Superintendents:
1. Quoted in the inclosure to this Circular for the information and
guidance of school officials and teachers, is Opinion No. 370, series
of 1951, of the Honorable, the Secretary of Justice, "regarding the
power of the Director of Public Schools to require all pupils and
students in public schools to salute the flag, on pain of being barred
from admission to, or expelled from, such schools."
The petitioners filed before the Court of First Instance of Tarlac a
petition for declaratory relief and mandatory injunction, praying that
the above circular be declared null and void, that preliminary
injunction be issued prohibiting the respondents Mariano Alipio and
other teachers of the Malacampa Elementary School, and the
Director of Public Schools, from carrying out the provisions of said
circular, and that, after trial, the preliminary injunction be made
permanent.
The Provincial Fiscal of Tarlac filed a motion to dismiss the petition
on the ground that under section 2, Rule 66, it was not a case in
which a declaratory judgment could be rendered. The court
dismissed the case. Hence, the petitioners have appealed to this
Court.
9
ISSUE:
WON the MD is validly dismiss?
RULING:
It is not necessary to decide whether the petition for declaratory
judgment be granted in this case, because in the petition presented
in the court below, in addition to the declaratory judgment, the
petitioners prayed for the issuance of a permanent injunction, which
is equivalent to an action for prohibition against public officers, and
as such we consider it, without passing at this stage of the
proceedings on the merits of said action.
In the present case, we cannot consider the question as to the
constitutionality of the circular as this will be decided after the
regular hearing.
In view of the foregoing, the order of the court dismissing the
petition is reversed, and the case returned to the Court of First
Instance of Tarlac for further proceedings as in an action for
prohibition, without costs.
PETRONILO J. BARAYUGA vs. ADVENTIST UNIVERSITY OF THE
PHILIPPINES
Principle:
The injunctive relief protects only a right in esse. Where the plaintiff
does not demonstrate that he has an existing right to be protected
by injunction, his suit for injunction must be dismissed for lack of a
cause of action.
Facts:
AUP, a non-stock and non-profit domestic educational institution
incorporated under Philippine laws on March 3, 1932, was directly
under the North Philippine Union Mission (NPUM) of the Southern
Asia Pacific Division of the Seventh Day Adventists. During the 3rd
Quinquennial Session of the General Conference of Seventh Day
Adventists held from November 27, 2000 to December 1, 2000, the
NPUM Executive Committee elected the members of the Board of
Trustees of AUP, including the Chairman and the Secretary.
Respondent Nestor D. Dayson was elected Chairman while the
petitioner was chosen Secretary.
A group from the NPUM conducted an external performance audit.
The audit revealed the petitioners autocratic management style, like
making major decisions without the approval or recommendation of
the proper committees, including the Finance Committee; and that
he had himself done the canvassing and purchasing of materials and
made withdrawals and reimbursements for expenses without valid
supporting receipts and without the approval of the Finance
Committee. The audit concluded that he had committed serious
violations of fundamental rules and procedure in the disbursement
and use of funds.
On January 15, 2003, Chairman Dayson and the NPUM Treasurer
likewise informed the petitioner inside the NPUM office on the

findings of the auditors in the presence of the AUP Vice-President
for Financial Affairs, and reminded him of the possible consequences
should he fail to satisfactorily explain the irregularities cited in the
report. He replied that he had already prepared his written
explanation.
In the January 27, 2003 special meeting, the petitioner sent a letter
to the Board of Trustees. The members, by secret ballot, voted to
remove him as President because of his serious violations of
fundamental rules and procedures in the disbursement and use of
funds as revealed by the special audit; to appoint an interim
committee consisting of three members to assume the powers and
functions of the President; and to recommend him to the NPUM for
consideration as Associate Director for Secondary Education.
On February 4, 2003, the petitioner brought his suit for injunction
and damages in the RTC, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO), impleading AUP and its Board of Trustees,
represented by Chairman Dayson, and the interim committee. His
complaint alleged that the Board of Trustees had relieved him as
President without valid grounds despite his five-year term; that the
Board of Trustees had thereby acted in bad faith; and that his being
denied ample and reasonable time to present his evidence deprived
him of his right to due process.
In their answer with counterclaim, the respondents denied the
allegations of the petitioner, and averred that he had been validly
removed for cause; and that he had been granted ample
opportunity to be heard in his defense.
On March 21, 2003, after summary hearing, the RTC issued the TRO
enjoining the respondents and persons acting for and in their behalf
from implementing the resolution removing him as President issued
by the Board of Trustees during the January 27, 2003 special
meeting, and enjoining the interim committee from performing the
functions of President of AUP. The RTC did not require a bond.
Proceedings in the CA
With the Interim Rules for Intra-Corporate Controversies prohibiting
a motion for reconsideration, the respondents forthwith filed a
petition for certiorari in the CA, contending that the petitioners
complaint did not meet the requirement that an injunctive writ
should be anchored on a legal right; and that he had been merely
appointed, not elected, as President for a term of office of only two
years, not five years, based on AUPs amended By-Laws.
The respondents filed in the CA a verified urgent motion for a TRO
and to set a hearing on the application for preliminary injunction to
enjoin the RTC from implementing the assailed order granting a writ
of preliminary injunction and from further proceeding in the case.
The petitioner opposed the motion for TRO, but did not object to
the scheduling of preliminary injunctive hearings.
On February 24, 2004, the CA issued a TRO to enjoin the RTC from
proceeding for a period of 60 days, and declared that the prayer for
injunctive relief would be resolved along with the merits of the main
case.
On August 5, 2004, the CA rendered its decision nullifying the RTCs
writ of preliminary injunction. It rejected the petitioners argument
that Article IV, Section 3 of AUPs Constitution and By-Laws and
10
Working Policy of the Conference provided a five-year term for him,
because the provision was inexistent. It ruled that the petitioners
term of office had expired on January 22, 2003, or two years from
his appointment, based on AUPs amended By-Laws; that,
consequently, he had been a mere de facto officer appointed by the
members of the Board of Trustees; and that he held no legal right
warranting the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.
Issues
Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the petitioner had no
legal right to the position of President of AUP that could be
protected by the injunctive writ issued by the RTC.
Ruling:
Yes, the CA correctly ruled that the petitioner had no legal right to
the position of President of AUP that could be protected by the
injunctive writ issued by the RTC
Petition is already moot
The injunctive writ issued by the RTC was meant to protect the
petitioners right to stay in office as President. Given that the lifetime
of the writ of preliminary injunction was co-extensive with the
duration of the act sought to be prohibited, this injunctive relief
already became moot in the face of the admission by the petitioner
himself, through his affidavit, that his term of office premised on his
alleged five-year tenure as President had lasted only until December
2005. In short, the injunctive writ granted by the RTC had expired
upon the end of the term of office (as posited by him).
A valid writ of preliminary injunction rests on the weight of evidence
submitted by the plaintiff establishing:
(a) a present and unmistakable right to be protected;
(b) the acts against which the injunction is directed violate such
right; and
(c) a special and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious
damages. In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the
injunctive writ constitutes grave abuse of discretion and will result
to nullification thereof. Where the complainants right is doubtful or
disputed, injunction is not proper. The possibility of irreparable
damage sans proof of an actual existing right is not a ground for a
preliminary injunction.
For the RTC to base its issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction
on the mere photocopies of the document, especially that such
document was designed to play a crucial part in the resolution of the
decisive issue on the length of the term of office of the petitioner,
was gross error.
Naturally, the officers, including the President, were to exercise the
powers vested by Section 2 of the amended By-Laws for a term of
only two years, not five years.
Ineluctably, the petitioner, having assumed as President of AUP on
January 23, 2001, could serve for only two years, or until January 22,
2003. By the time of his removal for cause as President on January
27, 2003, he was already occupying the office in a hold-over

capacity, and could be removed at any time, without cause, upon
the election or appointment of his successor.
The removal of the petitioner as President of AUP, being made in
accordance with the AUP Amended By-Laws, was valid. We conclude
that the order of the RTC granting his application for the writ of
preliminary injunction was tainted with manifestly grave abuse of
discretion; that the CA correctly nullified and set aside the order;
and that his claim for damages, being bereft of factual and legal
warrant, should be dismissed.
PETRONILO J. BARAYUGA vs. ADVENTIST UNIVERSITY OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
The injunctive relief protects only a right in esse. Where the plaintiff
does not demonstrate that he has an existing right to be protected
by injunction, his suit for injunction must be dismissed for lack of a
cause of action.
Facts:
AUP, a non-stock and non-profit domestic educational under the
North Philippine Union Mission (NPUM) of the Southern Asia Pacific
Division of the Seventh Day Adventists.
A group from the NPUM conducted an external performance audit.
The audit revealed the petitioners autocratic management style, like
making major decisions without the approval or recommendation of
the proper committees, including the Finance Committee;
The audit concluded that he had committed serious violations of
fundamental rules and procedure in the disbursement and use of
funds.
The members, by secret ballot, voted to remove him as President
because of his serious violations of fundamental rules and
procedures in the disbursement and use of funds as revealed by the
special audit; to appoint an interim committee consisting of three
members to assume the powers and functions of the President; and
to recommend him to the NPUM for consideration as Associate
Director for Secondary Education.
Petitioner brought his suit for injunction and damages in the RTC,
with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order.
His complaint alleged that the Board of Trustees had relieved him as
President without valid grounds despite his five-year term.
After summary hearing, the RTC issued the TRO enjoining the
respondents
Proceedings in the CA
The respondents forthwith filed a petition for certiorari in the CA,
contending that the petitioners complaint did not meet the
requirement that an injunctive writ should be anchored on a legal
right; and that he had been merely appointed, not elected, as
President for a term of office of only two years, not five years, based
on AUPs amended By-Laws.
11
The respondents filed in the CA a verified urgent motion for a TRO
and to set a hearing on the application for preliminary injunction to
enjoin the RTC from implementing the assailed order granting a writ
of preliminary injunction and from further proceeding in the case.
The CA issued a TRO to enjoin the RTC from proceeding for a period
of 60 days, and declared that the prayer for injunctive relief would
be resolved along with the merits of the main case.
The CA rendered its decision nullifying the RTCs writ of preliminary
injunction.
Issues
Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the petitioner had no
legal right to the position of President of AUP that could be
protected by the injunctive writ issued by the RTC.
Ruling:
Yes, the CA correctly ruled that the petitioner had no legal right to
the position of President of AUP that could be protected by the
injunctive writ issued by the RTC
The Supreme Court ruled that a valid writ of preliminary injunction
rests on the weight of evidence submitted by the plaintiff
establishing:
(a) a present and unmistakable right to be protected;
(b) the acts against which the injunction is directed violate such
right; and
(c) a special and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious
damages.
In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive
writ constitutes grave abuse of discretion and will result to
nullification thereof. Where the complainants right is doubtful or
disputed, injunction is not proper. The possibility of irreparable
damage sans proof of an actual existing right is not a ground for a
preliminary injunction.
In the case at bar the petitioner, the AUP’s By-Laws provides that
the term of the president already expired and he was already
occupying the office in a hold-over capacity, and could be removed
at any time, without cause, upon the election or appointment of his
successor.
We conclude that the order of the RTC granting his application for
the writ of preliminary injunction was tainted with manifestly grave
abuse of discretion; that the CA correctly nullified and set aside the
order; and that his claim for damages, being bereft of factual and
legal warrant, should be dismissed.
AUSTRALIAN PROFESSIONAL REALTY VS. MUN. OF PADRE GARCIA
BALAGTAS
INJUCTION WHEN ISSUED?

A TRO may be issued only if it appears from the facts shown by
affidavits or by the verified application that great or irreparable
injury would be inflicted on the applicant before the writ of
preliminary injunction could be heard.
Thus, to be entitled to the injunctive writ, petitioners must show
that (1) there exists a clear and unmistakable right to be protected;
(2) this right is directly threatened by an act sought to be enjoined;
(3) the invasion of the right is material and substantial; and (4) there
is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious
and irreparable damage
Irreparable injury:
Damages are irreparable where there is no standard by which their
amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy.
Australian Professional Realty, Inc. v. Municipality of Padre Garcia
Batangas, G.R. No. 183367, March 14 2012
FACTS:
In 1993, fire razed to the ground the old public market of
respondent Municipality of Padre Garcia, Batangas. The municipal
government, through its then Municipal Mayor Eugenio Gutierrez,
invited petitioner Australian Professional Realty, Inc. (APRI) to
rebuild the public market and construct a shopping center.
A Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)1[2] was executed
between petitioner APRI and respondent, represented by Mayor
Gutierrez and the members of the Sangguniang Bayan. Under the
MOA, APRI undertook to construct a shopping complex in the
5,000-square-meter area. In return, APRI acquired the exclusive
right to operate, manage, and lease stall spaces for a period of 25
years.
In May 1995, Victor Reyes was elected as municipal
mayor of respondent. On 6 February 2003, respondent, through
Mayor Reyes, initiated a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Memorandum of Agreement with Damages before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Rosario, Batangas,
The RTC issued summons to petitioners, requiring them to
file their Answer to the Complaint. However, the summons was
returned unserved, as petitioners were no longer holding office in
the given address.
Later, the RTC issued an Order declaring petitioners in
default and allowing respondent to present evidence ex parte.
12
A decision was rendered by the RTC,
WHEREFORE, judgement (sic) is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiff as against the
respondents.
There having been no timely appeal made, respondent
filed a Motion for Execution of Judgment, which was granted by
the RTC. A Writ of Execution was thus issued.
After learning of the adverse judgment, petitioners filed a
Petition for Relief from Judgment. This Petition was denied by the
RTC. The trial court denied the Motion for Reconsideration.
Petitioners later filed before the CA a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition petitioners filed before the CA a Motion
for the Issuance of Status Quo Order and Motion for Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction. The motion prayed for an order to restrain the RTC
from further proceeding and issuing any further Order, Resolution,
Writ of Execution, and any other court processes in the case before
it.
The CA issued a Resolution denying the said motion.The
CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioners filed the
instant Petition for Review on Certiorari. Petitioners claim that the
amount of APRIs investment in the Padre Garcia Shopping Center is
estimated at ₱30,000,000, the entirety of which the RTC declared
forfeited to respondent without just compensation. The execution
of the allegedly void judgment of the RTC during the pendency of
the Petition before the CA would probably work injustice to the
applicant, as the execution would result in an arbitrary declaration
of nullity of the MOA without due process of law.
ISSUE: whether the CA committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying petitioners Motion for the Issuance of Status
Quo Order and Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction?
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is denied for failure to show any grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the CA.
A writ of preliminary injunction and a TRO are injunctive
reliefs and preservative remedies for the protection of substantive
rights and interests. An application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or TRO may be granted upon the filing
of a verified application showing facts entitling the applicant to the
relief demanded.
Essential to granting the injunctive relief is the existence
of an urgent necessity for the writ in order to prevent serious

damage. A TRO issues only if the matter is of such extreme urgency
that grave injustice and irreparable injury would arise unless it is
issued immediately. Under Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rule of Court, a
TRO may be issued only if it appears from the facts shown by
affidavits or by the verified application that great or irreparable
injury would be inflicted on the applicant before the writ of
preliminary injunction could be heard.
Thus, to be entitled to the injunctive writ, petitioners
must show that (1) there exists a clear and unmistakable right to be
protected; (2) this right is directly threatened by an act sought to be
enjoined; (3) the invasion of the right is material and substantial;
and (4) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to
prevent serious and irreparable damage
In this case, no grave abuse of discretion can be imputed
to the CA. It did not exercise judgment in a capricious and
whimsical manner or exercise power in an arbitrary or despotic
manner.
No irreparable injury
Damages are irreparable where there is no standard by
which their amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy.
Clearly, the injuries alleged by petitioners are capable of pecuniary
estimation. Any loss petitioners may suffer is easily subject to
mathematical computation and, if proven, is fully compensable by
damages. Thus, a preliminary injunction is not warranted.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED
Philippine National Bank v. RJ Ventures, BITANGJOL
Ermita v. Aldecoa-Delorino (irreparable injury)
PRINCIPLE:
Irreparable injury--- An injury is considered irreparable if it is of such
constant and frequent recurrence that no fair and reasonable
redress can be had therefor in a court of law, or where there is no
standard by which their amount can be measured with reasonable
accuracy, that is, it is not susceptible of mathematical computation.
13
It is considered irreparable injury when it cannot be adequately
compensated in damages due to the nature of the injury itself or the
nature of the right or property injured or when there exists no
certain pecuniary standard for the measurement of damages.
FACTS:
Then Executive Secretary petitioner Eduardo Ermita
assailed via certiorari the writ of preliminary injunction granted by
public respondent Judge Jenny Lind R. Aldecoa Delorino, then
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City in favor of
private respondent Association of Petrochemical Manufacturers of
the Philippines (APMP or private respondent) denying petitioner’s
Motion to Dismiss and enjoining the government from implementing
Executive Order No. 486.
E.O. 486 was issued on 2006 by then President Arroyo. It
provides for the reduction of protective tariff rates from 10% to 5%
on the entry of inexpensive products, particularly plastic food
packaging, from ASEAN Free Trade (AFTA) member countries into
the Philippines.
APMP, an organization composed of manufacturers of
petrochemical and resin products, opposed the implementation of
E.O. 486. Contending that the E.O. would affect local manufacturers,
it filed a petition before the RTC of Makati, seeking the declaration
of its unconstitutionality for being violative of Sec. 4 of Republic Act
No. 6647 which prohibits the President from increasing or reducing
taxes while Congress is in session. It thereupon prayed for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin its
implementation.
Petitioner contends that public respondent gravely abused
her discretion in assuming jurisdiction over the petition for
prohibition and granting the writ of preliminary injunction as the
exercise of the quasi-legislative functions of the President cannot be
enjoined. He avers that writs of prohibition lie only against those
persons exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.
By granting injunctive relief, petitioner contends that
public respondent effectively preempted the trial of and pre-judged
the case, given that what private respondent seeks is to stop the
implementation of E.O. 486. Further, petitioner contends that the
grant of injunctive relief was not supported by fact and law, for what
APMP sought to be protected was "future economic benefits" which
may be affected by the implementation of the E.O. – benefits which
its members have no right to since protective tariff rates are
government privileges wherein no one can claim any vested right to.
On the merits, petitioner maintains that E.O. 486 is not
constitutionally infirm, it having been issued under the authority of
Secs. 401 and 402 of the Tariff and Customs Code which set no
limitations on the President’s power to adjust tariff rate and serve as
the government’s response to its AFTA commitment. Since it is only
the Omnibus Order denying the Motion to Dismiss and granting a
writ of preliminary injunction that is being assailed, the Court will
not pass on the constitutionality of E.O. 486 which is still pending
before the trial court.

Private respondent prays in its Comment for the denial of
the present petition, alleging that, among other things, the petition
is premature as petitioner failed to file a Motion for Reconsideration
of the assailed Omnibus Order of public respondent, and
maintaining the propriety of the remedy of prohibition which it filed
to assail the E.O.
ISSUE: (just focus on the 3rd issue)
1. Whether public respondent erred in assuming
jurisdiction over the petition for prohibition and not
granting petitioner’s motion to dismiss the petition;
2. Whether a motion for reconsideration should have been
filed by petitioner; and
3. Whether public respondent erred in granting the writ of
preliminary injunction in favor of APMP.
SC RULING:
1. Public respondent did not err in assuming jurisdiction over
the petition for prohibition and not granting petitioner’s
motion to dismiss the petition;
A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to assail
an IRR issued in the exercise of a quasi-legislative function…
Generally, the purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower
court within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the
administration of justice in orderly channels. Prohibition is the
proper remedy to afford relief against usurpation of jurisdiction or
power by an inferior court, or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in
handling matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior court
transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where there
is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law by
which such relief can be obtained. Where the principal relief sought
is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners’ remedy is an ordinary action for
its nullification, an action which properly falls under the jurisdiction
of the Regional Trial Court. In any case, petitioners’ allegation that
"respondents are performing or threatening to perform functions
without or in excess of their jurisdiction" may appropriately be
enjoined by the trial court through a writ of injunction or a
temporary restraining order.
Petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate
remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit
or nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive
officials.6 Thus, even if the petition was denominated as one for
prohibition, public respondent did not err in treating it also as one
for certiorari and taking cognizance of the controversy.
2. No need to file motion for reconsideration.
As a general rule, certiorari as a special civil action will not lie
unless a motion for reconsideration is first filed before the
respondent tribunal, to allow it an opportunity to correct its
assigned errors. However there are exceptions. (I will not discuss the
exceptions)
14
The present case involves the constitutionality and
implementation of an executive issuance involving tariff rates and,
as alleged by petitioner, the Government’s commitments under the
AFTA. Clearly, the filing of a motion for reconsideration may be
dispensed with following exceptions.
3. Yes. The respondent erred in granting the preliminary
injunction. ( a good discussion on the issuance of
preliminary injunction in relation to the government)
It is well to emphasize that the grant or denial of a writ of
preliminary injunction in a pending case rests on the sound
discretion of the court taking cognizance thereof. In the present
case, however, where it is the Government which is being enjoined
from implementing an issuance which enjoys the presumption of
validity, such discretion must be exercised with utmost caution. The
suspension of the operation of the law is a matter of extreme
delicacy because it is an interference with the official acts not only
of the duly elected representatives of the people but also of the
highest magistrate of the land.
The possible unconstitutionality of a statute, on its face, does
not of itself justify an injunction against good faith attempts to
enforce it, unless there is a showing of bad faith, harassment, or any
other unusual circumstance that would call for equitable relief. The
"on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as
"manifestly strong medicine," to be employed "sparingly and only as
a last resort," and is generally disfavored.
To be entitled to a preliminary injunction to enjoin the
enforcement of a law assailed to be unconstitutional, the party must
establish that it will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
injunctive relief and must demonstrate that it is likely to succeed on
the merits, or that there are sufficiently serious questions going to
the merits and the balance of hardships tips decidedly in its favor.
The higher standard reflects judicial deference toward "legislation or
regulations developed through presumptively reasoned democratic
processes." Moreover, an injunction will alter, rather than maintain,
the status quo, or will provide the movant with substantially all the
relief sought and that relief cannot be undone even if the defendant
prevails at a trial on the merits.
Considering that injunction is an exercise of equitable
relief and authority, in assessing whether to issue a preliminary
injunction, the courts must sensitively assess all the equities of the
situation, including the public interest. In litigations between
governmental and private parties, courts go much further both to
give and withhold relief in furtherance of public interest than they
are accustomed to go when only private interests are involved.
Before the plaintiff may be entitled to injunction against future
enforcement, he is burdened to show some substantial hardship.
Indeed, a writ of preliminary injunction is issued precisely
to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of
the parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied or
adjudicated – to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case
can be heard fully. Still, even if it is a temporary and ancillary
remedy, its issuance should not be trifled with, and an applicant
must convincingly show its entitlement to the relief.

It is thus ineluctable that for it to be entitled to the writ,
the APMP must show that it has a clear and unmistakable right that
is violated and that there is an urgent necessity for its
issuance. That APMP had cause of action and the standing to
interpose the action for prohibition did not ipso facto call for the
grant of injunctive relief in its favor without it proving its
entitlement thereto.
Contrary to public respondent’s ruling, APMP failed to
adduce any evidence to prove that it had a clear and unmistakable
right which was or would be violated by the enforcement of E.O.
486. The filing of the petition at the court a quo was anchored on
APMP and its members’ fear of loss or reduction of their income
once E.O. 486 is implemented and imported plastic and similar
products flood the domestic market due to reduced tariff rates. As
correctly posited by petitioner, APMP was seeking protection over
"future economic benefits" which, at best, it had an inchoate right
to.
More importantly, tariff protection is not a right, but a
privilege granted by the government and, therefore, APMP cannot
claim redress for alleged violation thereof.
The distinction between statutory privileges and vested
rights must be borne in mind for persons have no vested rights in
statutory privileges. The state may change or take away rights,
which were created by the law of the state, although it may not take
away property, which was vested by virtue of such rights.
Damages are irreparable within the meaning of the rule
relative to the issuance of injunction where there is no standard by
which their amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy. "An
irreparable injury which a court of equity will enjoin includes that
degree of wrong of a repeated and continuing kind which produce
hurt, inconvenience, or damage that can be estimated only by
conjecture, and not by any accurate standard of measurement". An
irreparable injury to authorize an injunction consists of "a serious
charge of, or is destructive to, the property it affects, either
physically or in the character in which it has been held and enjoined,
or when the property has some peculiar quality or use, so that its
pecuniary value will not fairly recompense the owner of the loss
thereof".
In the present case, aside from APMP’s allegations that the
reduced tariff rates will adversely affect its members’ business and
may lead to closure, there is no showing what "irreparable injury" it
stood to suffer with the implementation of E.O. 486.
There no showing of a clear right on the part of APMP
which was violated; the injury sought to be protected is prospective
in nature, hence, the injunctive relief should not have been granted.
QUICK DIGEST: (You will not understand this if you will not read the
long digest.)
FACTS:
The president issued EO 1 which has the effect of the
reduction of protective tariff rates from 10% to 5% on the entry of
inexpensive products, particularly plastic food packaging. APMP, an
15
organization composed of manufacturers of petrochemical and resin
products opposed its implementation. It prayed for preliminary
injunction alleging that the implementation of the said E.O will
affect their "future economic benefits". The filing of the petition at
the court was anchored on APMP and its members’ fear of loss or
reduction of their income once E.O. 1 is implemented and imported
plastic and similar products flood the domestic market due to
reduced tariff rates. RTC granted it. CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether preliminary injunction can be issued on the basis of
irreparable damages.
SC RULING:
No. Preliminary injunction should not be issued.
Jurisprudence provides that the applicant must show clear
and unmistakable right that is violated and that there is an urgent
necessity for its issuance.
In this case, APMP failed to adduce any evidence to prove
that it had a clear and unmistakable right which was or would be
violated by the enforcement of E.O. 1. The filing of the petition at
the court a quo was anchored on APMP and its members’ fear of
loss or reduction of their income once E.O. 1 is implemented. APMP
was seeking protection over "future economic benefits" which, at
best, it had an inchoate right to.
Damages are irreparable within the meaning of the rule
relative to the issuance of injunction where there is no standard by
which their amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy… In
the present case, aside from APMP’s allegations that the reduced
tariff rates will adversely affect its members’ business and may lead
to closure, there is no showing what "irreparable injury" it stood to
suffer with the implementation of E.O.1.
There no showing of a clear right on the part of APMP
which was violated; the injury sought to be protected is prospective
in nature, hence, the injunctive relief should not have been granted.
Overseas Workers Welfare Administration v. Chavez, G.R. No.
169802, June 8, 2007 SITOY
Dungog v. CA, G.R. No. 139767. August 5, 2003

PRINCIPLES:
 A preliminary injunction is merely temporary, subject to
the final disposition of the principal action. Its purpose is
to preserve the status quo of the matter subject of the
action to protect the rights of the plaintiff during the
pendency of the suit.
 The status quo is the last actual peaceable uncontested
status that preceded the controversy.
 The issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction rests
entirely within the discretion of the court and is generally
not interfered with except in cases of manifest abuse.
DUNGOG vs. CA
G.R. 139767
FACTS:
Felipe alleges that he and his sister, Fortune, agreed to sell their lots
in Canjulao, Cebu, through their parents, Spouses Dungog.
The Spouses Dungog convinced other lot owners in Canjulao to sell
their lots either directly to them or to Felipe and his sister.
Later on, the Spouses Dungog entered into a Contract to Sell with
private respondent Carlos A. Gothong Lines, Inc. covering several
lots in Canjulao including Felipe’s lot (Lot 1031-F).
Under the Contract, Gothong Lines was to pay on installment basis.
Gothong Lines issued 15 postdated checks as payment for 15 equal
monthly installments except the last 4 checks which bounced due to
Gothong Lines’ stop payment order.
There happened to be an overpayment in the hands of spouses
Dungog. Felipe claims, however, that despite Gothong Lines’ stop
payment order of its last four checks, the Spouses Dungog still
delivered parcels of land. Among those delivered is the parcel of
land owned by him.
The Spouses Dungog demanded payment for these 8 parcels of land,
but Gothong Lines refused to pay. Thus, the Spouses Dungog
informed Gothong Lines that they would no longer push through
with their offer to sell the remaining lots.
Gothong Lines then filed a complaint for Specific Performance,
Damages with Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against the
Spouses Dungog from the cancellation of the contract and from
preventing its representatives and vehicles from passing through
the properties subject of the Contract. Gothong Lines claimed that
it also paid an excess of what have been actually delivered by
Spouses Dungog.
16
On the other hand, spouses Dungog contended that it was Gothong
Lines who breached their contract by stopping payment on the last 4
checks.
RTC ruled in favor of Gothong Lines.
ISSUE:
Is the RTC correct. (What is a “status quo”?)
RULING:
Yes.
A preliminary injunction, as the term itself suggests, is merely
temporary, subject to the final disposition of the principal action.
Its purpose is to preserve the status quo of the matter subject of
the action to protect the rights of the plaintiff during the pendency
of the suit. Otherwise, if no preliminary injunction is issued, the
defendant may, before final judgment, do the act which the plaintiff
is seeking the court to restrain.
The issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction rests entirely within
the discretion of the court and is generally not interfered with
except in cases of manifest abuse.
The status quo, which is the last actual peaceable uncontested
status that preceded the controversy, was that Gothong Lines had
access to the lots subject of the Contract through the entrance gate
in Lot 1031-F. That is why Gothong Lines commenced construction
of its pier and the development of the roads within the parcels of
land covered by the Contract. The issuance of the Writ would no
doubt preserve the status quo between the Spouses Dungog and
Gothong Lines that existed prior to the filing of the case.
Clearly, in issuing the Writ, the trial court did not forthwith deprive
Felipe of his ownership of Lot 1031-F. Neither did the Writ have the
effect of ousting Felipe from possession of the lot. The trial court did
not rule on the merits of the case so as to amount to a deprivation
or confiscation of property without due process of law or just
compensation. There was no adjudication on the rightful possession
or ownership of the contested parcels of land subject of the
Contract. The trial court issued the injunction only as a preventive
remedy to protect during the pendency of the action Gothong
Lines’ right to a final and effective relief.

2017 BAR EXAM QUESTION:
X agreed to sell his property through Y. Y entered into a Contract to
Sell with Z on various lots which included the property of X.
Under the contract, Z was to pay on installment basis. 15 post-dated
checks were issued by Z for 15 equal monthly installments except
the last 4 checks which bounced due to Z’s stop payment order.
Y demanded for the payment but to no avail. Thus, Y informed Z that
they would no longer push through with their offer to sell the
remaining lots. They also closed in ingress and egress on the
remaining lots including X’s property from which the representatives
and vehicles of Z would pass slowing the development of the subject
properties.
Z filed in the RTC a writ of preliminary injunction against Y to stop
the cancellation of the contract to sell and from preventing its
representatives and vehicles from passing through the properties
subject of the contract.
RTC ruled in favor of Z granting the writ of preliminary injunction
against Y.
X, as a result, contended that he was deprived of his property.
1. Is the RTC correct? Explain your answer.
2. Define status quo.
Executive Secretary v. CA, G.R. No. 131719, 25 May 1994
PRINCIPLE:
To be entitled to a preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement
of a law assailed to be unconstitutional, the party must establish
that:
1. It will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of an
injuctive relief;
2. Must demonstrate that it is likely to succeed on the
merits; and
3. That there are sufficient serious questions going to the
merits and the balance of hardships tips decidedly in its
favor
Before the plaintiff may be entitled to injunction against future
enforcement, he is burdened to show some substantial hardships.
Therefore, writ of injunction shall not issue to enjoin the
enforcement of a law unless it can be established with substantial
hardship on the part of the plaintiff that the law assailed is
unconstitutional.
FACTS:
17
RA 8042 otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995, took effect July 15, 1995 and its IRR were
published April 7, 1996.However, before the law took effect, on July
17, 1995, ARCO filed a petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63
of the ROC with the RTC to declare as unconstitutional the following
of RA 8042:
- Section 2, paragraph (g)
- Section 6, paragraphs (a) to (j), (l) and (m),
- Section 7, paragraphs (a) and (b), and
- Sections 9 and 10
with a plea for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the respondents therein
from enforcing the assailed provisions of the law. Also, that RA 8042
is self-executory and no need for implementing Rules.
There appears to be urgent an imperative need for this Honorable
Court to maintain the status quo by enjoining the implementation or
effectivity of the questioned provisions of RA 8042, by way of a
restraining order otherwise, the member recruitment agencies of
the petitioner will suffer grave or irreparable damage or injury. With
the effectivity of RA 8042, a great majority of the duly licensed
recruitment agencies have stopped or suspended their operations
for fear of being prosecuted under the provisions of a law that are
unjust and unconstitutional. This Honorable Court may take judicial
notice of the fact that processing of deployment papers of overseas
workers for the past weeks have come to a standstill at the POEA
and this has affected thousands of workers everyday just because of
the enactment of RA 8042.Indeed, this has far reaching effects not
only to survival of the overseas manpower supply industry and the
active participating recruitment agencies, the country’s economy
which has survived mainly due to the dollar remittances of the
overseas workers but more importantly, to the poor and the needy
who are in dire need of income-generating jobs which can only be
obtained from abroad. The loss or injury that the recruitment
agencies will suffer will then be immeasurable and irreparable. As of
now, even foreign employers have already reduced their manpower
requirements from the Philippines due to their knowledge that RA
8042 prejudiced and adversely affected the local recruitment
agencies.
On August 1, 1995, the trial court issued a TRO for 20 days
therefrom.
Herein respondents alleges the following:
- That the aforequoted provisions violated Section 1, Article
II; Article II, Section 126 and Article XV, Sections 17 and
3(3) of the Constitution that Section 6(g) and (i)
discriminated against unskilled workers and their families
and, as such, violated the equal protection clause; and that
the law encouraged the deployment of skilled Filipino
workers, only overseas skilled workers are granted rights.

The respondent stressed that unskilled workers also have
the right to seek employment abroad
- The grant of incentives to service contractors and manning
agencies to the exclusion of all other licensed and
authorized recruiters is an invalid classification. Licensed
and authorized recruiters are thus deprived of their right
to property and due process and to the equality of the
person. It is understandable for the law to prohibit illegal
recruiters, but to discriminate against licensed and
registered recruiters is unconstitutional.
- That Section 6, subsections (a) to (m) is unconstitutional
because licensed and authorized recruitment agencies are
placed on equal footing with illegal recruiters.It contended
that while the Labor Code distinguished between
recruiters who are holders of licenses and non-holders
thereof in the imposition of penalties, Rep. Act No. 8042
does not make any distinction. The penalties in Section
7(a) and (b) being based on an invalid classification are,
therefore, repugnant to the equal protection clause,
besides being excessive; hence, such penalties are
violative of Section 19(1), Article III of the Constitution
- That the penalty imposed by law, being disproportionate
to the prohibited acts, discourages the business of licensed
and registered recruitment agencies.
- That Section 6(m) and paragraphs (15) and (16), Sections
8, 9 and 10, paragraph 2 of the law violate Section 22,
Article III of the Constitution prohibiting ex-post facto laws
and bills of attainder.
- that the 90-day period in Section 10, paragraph (1) within
which a labor arbiter should decide a money claim is
relatively short, and could deprive licensed and registered
recruiters of their right to due process
Petitioner alleged that:
- the respondent has no cause of action for a declaratory
relief;
- the petition was premature as the rules implementing
Rep. Act No. 8042 not having been released as yet;
- the assailed provisions do not violate any provisions of the
Constitution; and,
- the law was approved by Congress in the exercise of the
police power of the State.
The trial court issued on August 21, 1995, an order granting the
petitioners plea for a writ of preliminary injunction upon a bond of
P50,000. They posted the requisite bond and on August 24, 1995,
the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the
enforcement of the following provisions of Rep. Act No. 8042
pending the termination of the proceedings:
- Section 2, subsections (g) and (i, 2nd par.);
- Section 6, subsections (a) to (m), and pars. 15 & 16
- Section 7, subsections (a) & (b);
- Section 8;
- Section 9;
- Section 10; pars. 1 & 2;
18
- Section 11; and
- Section 40
Herein Petitioner filed Petition for Certiorari with CA on the
following grounds:
1. Respondent ARCO-PHIL. had utterly failed to show its clear right/s
or that of its member-agencies to be protected by the injunctive
relief and/or violation of said rights by the enforcement of the
assailed sections of R.A. 8042
2. Respondent Judge fixed a P50,000 injunction bond which is
grossly inadequate to answer for the damage which petitioner-
officials may sustain, should respondent ARCO-PHIL. be finally
adjudged as not being entitled thereto
3. The respondent, as petitioner in the trial court, was burdened to
adduce preponderant evidence of such irreparable injury, but failed
to do so.
4.The petitioners further insisted that the petition a quo was
premature since the rules and regulations implementing the law had
yet to be promulgated when such petition was filed
5. That respondents failed to establish the requisites for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the
law and the rules and regulations issued implementing the same.
The CA denied the Petition and likewise denied the motion for
reconsideration.
Thus, this petition.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not ARCO has locus standi
2. Whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of its
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the
assailed order and the writ of preliminary injunction on a bond of
only P50,000
HELD
The Petition is meritoriuous.
1. Respondent filed the petition for declaratory relief under Rule 64
of the Rules of Court for and in behalf of its eleven (11) licensed and
registered recruitment agencies which are its members, and which
approved separate resolutions expressly authorizing the respondent
to file the said suit for and in their behalf. We note that, under its
Articles of Incorporation, the respondent was organized for the
purposes inter alia of promoting and supporting the growth and
development of the manpower recruitment industry, both in the
local and international levels; providing, creating and exploring
employment opportunities for the exclusive benefit of its general

membership; enhancing and promoting the general welfare and
protection of Filipino workers; and, to act as the representative of
any individual, company, entity or association on matters related to
the manpower recruitment industry, and to perform other acts and
activities necessary to accomplish the purposes embodied therein.
The respondent is, thus, the appropriate party to assert the rights of
its members, because it and its members are in every practical sense
identical. The respondent asserts that the assailed provisions violate
the constitutional rights of its members and the officers and
employees thereof. The respondent is but the medium through
which its individual members seek to make more effective the
expression of their voices and the redress of their grievances.
However, the respondent has no locus standi to file the petition for
and in behalf of unskilled workers. We note that it even failed to
implead any unskilled workers in its petition. Furthermore, in failing
to implead, as parties-Petitioners, the eleven licensed and registered
recruitment agencies it claimed to represent, the respondent failed
to comply with Section 2 of Rule of the Rules of Court. Nevertheless,
since the eleven licensed and registered recruitment agencies for
which the respondent filed the suit are specifically named in the
petition, the amended petition is deemed amended to avoid
multiplicity of suits
2. The trial court committed a grave abuse of its discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed
order and writ of preliminary injunction.
To be entitled to a preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement
of a law assailed to be unconstitutional, the party must establish
that it will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief
and must demonstrate that it is likely to succeed on the merits, or
that there are sufficiently serious questions going to the merits and
the balance of hardships tips decidedly in its favor. It does not
appear from the record that petitioners have been threatened with
any injury other than that incidental to every criminal proceeding
brought lawfully and in good faith. The possible unconstitutionality
of a statute, on its face, does not of itself justify an injunction against
good faith attempts to enforce it, unless there is a showing of bad
faith, harassment, or any other unusual circumstance that would call
for equitable relief. The higher standard reflects judicial deference
toward legislation or regulations developed through presumptively
reasoned democratic processes. Moreover, an injunction will alter,
rather than maintain, the status quo, or will provide the movant
with substantially all the relief sought and that relief cannot be
undone even if the defendant prevails at a trial on the merits.
Considering that injunction is an exercise of equitable relief and
authority, in assessing whether to issue a preliminary injunction, the
courts must sensitively assess all the equities of the situation,
including the public interest. In litigations between governmental
and private parties, courts go much further both to give and
withhold relief in furtherance of public interest than they are
accustomed to go when only private interests are involved. Before
19
the plaintiff may be entitled to injunction against future
enforcement, he is burdened to show some substantial hardship.
The possibility that the officers and employees of the recruitment
agencies, which are members of the respondent, and their relatives
who are employed in the government agencies charged in the
enforcement of the law, would be indicted for illegal recruitment
and, if convicted sentenced to life imprisonment for large scale
illegal recruitment, absent proof of irreparable injury, is not
sufficient on which to base the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction to suspend the enforcement of the penal provisions of
Rep. Act No. 8042 and avert any indictments under the law
There is no allegation in the amended petition or evidence adduced
by the respondent that the officers and/or employees of its
members had been threatened with any indictments for violations
of the penal provisions of Rep. Act No. 8042. Neither is there any
allegation therein that any of its members and/or their officers and
employees committed any of the acts enumerated in Section 6(a) to
(m) of the law for which they could be indicted. Neither did the
respondent adduce any evidence in the RTC that any or all of its
members or a great number of other duly licensed and registered
recruitment agencies had to stop their business operations because
of fear of indictments under Sections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 8042.
The respondent merely speculated and surmised that licensed and
registered recruitment agencies would close shop and stop business
operations because of the assailed penal provisions of the law.A writ
of preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of penal laws
cannot be based on such conjectures or speculations. The Court
cannot take judicial notice that the processing of deployment papers
of overseas workers have come to a virtual standstill at the POEA
because of the assailed provisions of Rep. Act No. 8042. The
respondent must adduce evidence to prove its allegation, and the
petitioners accorded a chance to adduce controverting evidence. By
issuing the writ of preliminary injunction against the petitioners sans
any evidence, the trial court frustrated, albeit temporarily, the
prosecution of illegal recruiters and allowed them to continue
victimizing hapless and innocent people desiring to obtain
employment abroad as overseas workers, and blocked the
attainment of the salutary policies. In issuing the writ of preliminary
injunction, the trial court considered paramount the interests of the
eleven licensed and registered recruitment agencies represented by
the respondent, and capriciously overturned the presumption of the
constitutionality of the assailed provisions on the barefaced claim of
the respondent that the assailed provisions of Rep. Act No. 8042 are
unconstitutional.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY VS CA
SHORT CASE DIGEST:
FACTS:

Before the IRR of RA 8042 otherwise known as the Migrant Workers
and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 was published, ARCO filed a
Declaratory Relief under Rule 63 of the ROC with a plea of a writ of
preliminary Injunction assailing the constitutionality of some
sections of such Act with the RTC of Quezon City. ARCO was
organized for the purposes, inter alia, of promoting and supporting
the growth and development of the manpower recruitment
industry; and, to act as the representative of any individual,
company, entity or association on matters related to the manpower
recruitment industry, and to perform other acts and activities
necessary to accomplish the purposes embodied therein.
The RTC issued an order granting the Petitioners plea for the writ of
preliminary injunction. Herein Petitioner filed a Petition for
Certiorari with the Court of Appeals assailing the Order and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction issued by the Court. CA dismissed the Petition
and likewise denied the Motion for Reconsideration. Thus, this
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of its
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the
assailed order and the writ of preliminary injunction
HELD.
The trial court committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting
to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed order and writ
of preliminary injunction .
To be entitled to a preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement
of a law assailed to be unconstitutional, the party must establish
that it will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive
relief and must demonstrate that it is likely to succeed on the
merits, or that there are sufficiently serious questions going to the
merits and the balance of hardships tips decidedly in its favor. It
does not appear from the record that petitioners (in the trial court)
have been threatened with any injury other than that incidental to
every criminal proceeding brought lawfully and in good faith. The
possible unconstitutionality of a statute, on its face, does not of
itself justify an injunction against good faith attempts to enforce it,
unless there is a showing of bad faith, harassment, or any other
unusual circumstance that would call for equitable relief. The higher
standard reflects judicial deference toward legislation or regulations
developed through presumptively reasoned democratic processes.
Moreover, an injunction will alter, rather than maintain, the status
quo, or will provide the movant with substantially all the relief
sought and that relief cannot be undone even if the defendant
prevails at a trial on the merits. Considering that injunction is an
exercise of equitable relief and authority, in assessing whether to
issue a preliminary injunction, the courts must sensitively assess all
20
the equities of the situation, including the public interest. In
litigations between governmental and private parties, courts go
much further both to give and withhold relief in furtherance of
public interest than they are accustomed to go when only private
interests are involved. Before the plaintiff may be entitled to
injunction against future enforcement, he is burdened to show some
substantial hardship.
The possibility that the officers and employees of the recruitment
agencies, which are members of the respondent, and their relatives
who are employed in the government agencies charged in the
enforcement of the law, would be indicted for illegal recruitment
and, if convicted sentenced to life imprisonment for large scale
illegal recruitment, absent proof of irreparable injury, is not
sufficient on which to base the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction to suspend the enforcement of the penal provisions of
Rep. Act No. 8042 and avert any indictments under the law
There is no allegation in the amended petition or evidence adduced
by the respondent that the officers and/or employees of its
members had been threatened with any indictments for violations
of the penal provisions of Rep. Act No. 8042. Neither is there any
allegation therein that any of its members and/or their officers and
employees committed any of the acts enumerated in Section 6(a) to
(m) of the law for which they could be indicted. Neither did the
respondent adduce any evidence in the RTC that any or all of its
members or a great number of other duly licensed and registered
recruitment agencies had to stop their business operations because
of fear of indictments under Sections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 8042.
The respondent merely speculated and surmised that licensed and
registered recruitment agencies would close shop and stop business
operations because of the assailed penal provisions of the law.A writ
of preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of penal laws
cannot be based on such conjectures or speculations. The Court
cannot take judicial notice that the processing of deployment papers
of overseas workers have come to a virtual standstill at the POEA
because of the assailed provisions of Rep. Act No. 8042. The
respondent must adduce evidence to prove its allegation, and the
petitioners accorded a chance to adduce controverting evidence. By
issuing the writ of preliminary injunction against the petitioners sans
any evidence, the trial court frustrated, albeit temporarily, the
prosecution of illegal recruiters and allowed them to continue
victimizing hapless and innocent people desiring to obtain
employment abroad as overseas workers, and blocked the
attainment of the salutary policies. In issuing the writ of preliminary
injunction, the trial court considered paramount the interests of the
eleven licensed and registered recruitment agencies represented by
the respondent, and capriciously overturned the presumption of the
constitutionality of the assailed provisions on the barefaced claim of
the respondent that the assailed provisions of Rep. Act No. 8042 are
unconstitutional.

MABAYO FARMS VS. CA
PRINCIPLE:
A preliminary injunction is an ancillary or preventive remedy, an
adjunct to a main suit.i Thus, a person who is not a party in the main
suit cannot be bound by an ancillary writ, such as the writ of
preliminary injunction.
FACTS:
Petitioner (Mabayo Farm) bought Lot 1379 located in
Morong, Bataan Cadastre and filed an application for land
registration. The application was contested by several oppositors,
among them the heirs of one Toribio Alejandro.
Trial court decided the land registration case in petitioners
favor. The losing parties appealed to the Court of Appeals.
A group of occupants entered the land, destroyed the
fences and drove away livestock owned by petitioner. Petitioner
filed a complaint for injunction with damages, with a prayer for a
temporary restraining order, docketed as Civil Case No. 6695.
Named as defendants were Juanito Infante, Domingo Infante, Lito
Mangalidan, Jaime Aquino, John Doe, Peter Doe, and Richard Doe.
the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the
defendants or persons acting on their behalf from entering and
cultivating the disputed property.
The sheriff in enforcing the writ found 5 persons other
than the defendants cultivating the land. The latter refused to give
their names or receive copies of the TRO. They claimed that they
were only farm workers of a certain Antonio Santos (private
respondent) who allegedly owned the land. ii
Private respondent filed a special civil action for certiorari.
He claimed that he was an innocent purchaser for value of the
property alleged that he was not a party to Civil Case No. 6695 and
that it was grave abuse of discretion for the trial court to enforce
the injunctive writ against him since it did not have jurisdiction
over him.
ISSUE:
WON private respondent bound by the writ of preliminary injunction
issued by the trial court?
RULING:
We have minutely scrutinized the order granting the writ of
preliminary injunction and are unable to say that the writ applied to
private respondent. The order merely stated [L]et a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued enjoining and restraining the
defendants or any person or persons acting in their place or stead
from further entering and cultivating the said land of the plaintiff
subject matter of this case until further order from the Court.iii The
persons specifically enjoined in the order were the defendants in
Civil Case No. 6695 or persons acting in their stead. Petitioner itself
21
admitted that private respondent was not a defendant in Civil Case
No. 6695 since at the institution of the case in 1997, he (private
respondent) did not have a right over any portion of petitioners lot.iv
Neither was he a trespasser then.v Also, nothing in the records
indicate that private respondent was acting on behalf of any of the
defendants. Taking all these into consideration, we must hold that
the writ of preliminary injunction thus cannot be made to apply to
private respondent.
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of
an action prior to final judgment, requiring a person to refrain from
a particular act.vi As an ancillary or preventive remedy, a writ of
preliminary injunction may therefore be resorted to by a party to
protect or preserve his rights and for no other purpose during the
pendency of the principal action. vii Its object is to preserve the
status quo until the merits of the case can be heard. viii It is not a
cause of action in itself but merely a provisional remedy, an
adjunct to a main suit.ix Thus, a person who is not a party in the
main suit, like private respondent in the instant case, cannot be
bound by an ancillary writ, such as the writ of preliminary
injunction issued against the defendants in Civil Case No. 6695. He
cannot be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger.
QUICK DIGEST- MABAYO FARM VS CA
MABAYO FARMS VS. CA
FACTS:
Petitioner X was able to buy land and registered it. Defendants Y et
al. oppose it and entered the premises destroyed the fences and
drove away livestock owned by X.
Thus, X applied for a writ of preliminary injunction against
defendants Y et al. Which was granted by the trial court. Upon
implementation by the sheriff of the writ, it was found that Z also
cultivated the land and he was not covered by the main action.
Z contested that since he is not named as defendant in the main
action, he cannot be covered by the writ of injunction.
ISSUE:
WON Z is bound by the writ issued by the trial court?
RULING:
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action
prior to final judgment, requiring a person to refrain from a
particular act. As an ancillary or preventive remedy, a writ of
preliminary injunction may therefore be resorted to by a party to
protect or preserve his rights and for no other purpose during the
pendency of the principal action. Its object is to preserve the status
quo until the merits of the case can be heard. It is not a cause of
action in itself but merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main
suit. Thus, a person who is not a party in the main suit, like private
respondent in the instant case, cannot be bound by an ancillary writ,
such as the writ of preliminary injunction issued against the
defendants in Civil Case No. 6695. He cannot be affected by any
proceeding to which he is a stranger.
 22

On 7 July 2003, Southern Cross filed with the Court a Very Urgent Application
for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or A Writ of Preliminary Injunction
Senate Blue RibboN v. Majuducon, G.R. No. 13378, BELLEZA (TRO Application), seeking to enjoin the DTI Secretary from enforcing his
Decision of 25 June 2003 in view of the pending petition before this Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the Temporary Restraining Order is warranted.

Ruling:

No. The Court did not grant the provisional relief for it would be tantamount
Southern Cross Cement vs Phil Cement Manufacturers to enjoining the collection of taxes, a peremptory judicial act which is

Principle:
Section 218 of the Tax Reform Act of 1997 prohibits any court from granting
an injunction to restrain the collection of any national internal revenue tax,
fee or charge imposed by the internal revenue code.[
Facts:
traditionally frowned upon, unless there is a clear statutory basis for it. In
that regard, Section 218 of the Tax Reform Act of 1997 prohibits any court
from granting an injunction to restrain the collection of any national internal
revenue tax, fee or charge imposed by the internal revenue code. A similar
philosophy is expressed by Section 29 of the SMA, which states that the filing
of a petition for review before the CTA does not stop, suspend, or otherwise
toll the imposition or collection of the appropriate tariff duties or the
adoption of other appropriate safeguard measures. This evinces a clear
legislative intent that the imposition of safeguard measures, despite the
availability of judicial review, should not be enjoined notwithstanding any
timely appeal of the imposition.

Petitioner Southern Cross Cement Corporation (Southern Cross) is a domestic

corporation engaged in the business of cement manufacturing, production,
importation and exportation. Its principal stockholders are Taiheiyo Cement Quick Digest
Corporation and Tokuyama Corporation, purportedly the largest cement
manufacturers in Japan.
 Facts:

X Company applied for the imposition of provisional safeguard measures on

import of cement pursuant to a Safeguard Measures Act (SMA). This was
On 22 May 2001, respondent Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) granted by the DTI Secretary in its June 25, 2003 decision. Subsequently, Y
accepted an Company filed a very urgent application for a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the DTI Secretary
application from Philcemcor, alleging that the importation of gray Portland from enforcing his decision in view of the pending petition before the court.
cement in increased quantities has caused declines in domestic production,
capacity utilization, market share, sales and employment; as well as caused
depressed local prices. Accordingly, Philcemcor sought the imposition at first
of provisional, then later, definitive safeguard measures on the import of
cement pursuant to the Safeguard Measures Act (SMA). Philcemcor filed the
application in behalf of twelve (12) of its member-companies.
 . Delta Ventures v. Cabato, March 9, 2000 REALINO

On 13 March 2002, the Tariff Commission issued its Formal Investigation

Report (Report). The elements of serious injury and imminent threat of
serious injury not having been established, it is hereby recommended that no
definitive general safeguard measure be imposed on the importation of gray
Portland cement.

Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary BRAGAT

on 25 June 2003, the DTI Secretary issued a new Decision, ruling that there
was no longer any legal impediment to his deciding Philcemcors application
for definitive safeguard measures. He made a determination that, contrary to
the findings of the Tariff Commission, the local cement industry had suffered
serious injury as a result of the import surges.
 23

claim to property levied upon cannot operate to bar a

subsequent independent action by the claimant to establish
Traders Royal Bank v. IAC,
his right to the property even if he failed to appeal from the
Traders Royal Bank v. IAC order denying his original third-party claim.

Facts:
Traders Royal Bank (TRB) filed a compliant before the
Pasay court against Remco Alcohol Distillery, Inc with
application for writ of attachment. RCBC Capital Corporation v. Banco TIU
La Tondeña Inc (LTI) filed a compliant-in-intervention
claiming ownership over said attached properties but later
manifest its withdrawal.
Subsequently, LTI instituted a complaint before the Bulacan
court claiming ownership over the properties attached with
prayer for preliminary injunction. TRB filed its opposition.
The Bulacan court ruled in favor of LTI.
Now, the Bulacan court ordered the execution of the writ of
pre injunction in favor of LTI.
This followed by the Pasay court enforcing the writ of pre
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EMILIANO R. NOLASCO
attachment in favor of TRB. (note that TRB file a case with
G.R. No. 155108
prayer for attachment in Pasay court, so nag conflict na ang
April 27, 2005
duha ka court).
This prompted TRB to file a petition with the IAC arguing PRINCIPLES:
that Bulacan Court constitutes undue interference with the R.A. 8975 definitively enjoins all courts, except the Supreme Court, from
exercise by the Pasay Court. Petition denied. issuing any temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, or
Issue: preliminary mandatory injunction against the government, or any of its
whether or not a third-party claimant may file a separate subdivisions, officials or any person or entity to restrain, prohibit or compel
action before another court to assert his right over an the bidding or awarding of a contract or project of the national government,
attached property and the only exception would be if the matter is of extreme urgency
involving a constitutional issue, such that unless the temporary restraining
Ruling:
order is issued, grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise.
Yes, a third-party claimant may file a separate action before
another court to assert his right over an attached property. FACTS:
The Rules provide under sec. 14 Rule 57 . . . Nothing Nolasco (taxpayer) filed a Petition seeking a TRO and/or preliminary
herein contained shall prevent such claimant or any third injunction with the RTC and prayed that the DPWH and BAC be restrained
person from vindicating his claim to the property, or prevent from awarding the contract (Agno River Flood Control Project) to Daewoo
the attaching party from claiming damages against a third- and Daewoo be disqualified as a bidder. Since based on the confidential
party claimant who filed a frivolous or plainly spurious claim, reports it was apparent that Daewoo’s bid was unacceptable and the
in the same or a separate action. putative award to Daewoo is illegal.
The foregoing rule explicitly sets forth the remedy that may
RTC issued an Order directing the issuance of a TRO. The term of the TRO
be availed of by a person who claims to be the owner of
was for a period of twenty (20) days.
property levied upon by attachment, viz: to lodge a third-
party claim with the sheriff, and if the attaching creditor The OSG filed a Motion to Dismiss Petition with Motion for Dissolution of

posts an indemnity bond in favor of the sheriff, to file a TRO. They pointed out that Republic Act No. 8975 precisely prohibited the

separate and independent action to vindicate his claim. issuance by any court, save the Supreme Court, of a TRO or preliminary

In the case at bar, this precisely was the remedy resorted to injunction which restrains or prohibits the bidding for or awarding of a

by private respondent La Tondeña when it filed the contract/project of the national government. RTC issued an order dismissing

vindicatory action before the Bulacan Court. Nolasco’s petition.

Further; (principle) ISSUE:

The intervention as a means of protecting the third-party 1. Whether or not the trial court may issue a TRO with regards to projects of
claimant's right in an attachment proceeding is not the National Govt.
exclusive but cumulative and suppletory to the right to bring 2. Whether or not the trial court may dismiss the case outright based on RA
an independent suit. The denial or dismissal of a third-party 8975.

HELD:
1. No.
Republic Act No. 8975 definitively enjoins all courts, except the Supreme
Court, from issuing any temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction,
or preliminary mandatory injunction against the government, or any of its
subdivisions, officials or any person or entity to restrain, prohibit or compel
the bidding or awarding of a contract or project of the national government.
The only exception would be if the matter is of extreme urgency involving a
constitutional issue, such that unless the temporary restraining order is
issued, grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise.
The TRO issued by the RTC failed to take into consideration said law. Neither
did it advert to any extreme urgency involving a constitutional issue, as
required by the statute. The law ordains that such TRO is void, and the judge
who issues such order should suffer the penalty of suspension of at least
sixty (60) days without pay.
2. No.
Republic Act No. 8975 does not ordinarily warrant the outright dismissal of
any complaint or petition before the lower courts seeking permanent
injunctive relief from the implementation of national government
infrastructure projects. What is expressly prohibited by the statute is the
issuance of the provisional reliefs of temporary restraining orders,
preliminary injunctions, and preliminary mandatory injunctions. It does not
preclude the lower courts from assuming jurisdiction over complaints or
petitions that seek as ultimate relief the nullification or implementation of a
national government infrastructure project.
Thus, when a court is called upon to rule on an initiatory pleading assailing
any material aspect pertinent to a national government infrastructure
project, the court ordinarily may not dismiss the action based solely on
Republic Act No. 8975 but is merely enjoined from granting provisional
reliefs. If no other ground obtains to dismiss the action, the court should
decide the case on the merits.
G.R. No. 145328 March 23, 2006
EDUARDO F. HERNANDEZ, MA. ENCARBACION R. LEGASPI, JAIME BLANCO,
JR., ENRIQUE BELO, CARLOS VIAPLANA, CARL FURER, VIVENCIO TINIO,
MICHAEL BRIGGS, ROSA CARAM, FAUSTO PREYSLER, ROBERT KUA, GEORGE
LEE, GUILLERMO LUCHANGCO, PETER DEE, LUISA MARQUEZ, ANGELITA
LILLES, JUAN CARLOS, HOMER GO, AMADEO VALENZUELA, EMILIO CHING,
ANTONIO CHAN, MURLI SABNANI, MARCOS ROCES, RAYMUNDO
FELICIANO, NORMA GAFFUD, ALF HOLST, LOURDES P. ROQUE, MANUEL DY,
RAUL FERNANDEZ, VICTORIA TENGCO, CHI MO CHENG, BARANGAY
DASMARIÑAS, and HON. FRANCISCO B. IBAY, petitioners
vs.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, respondent
PRINCIPLE/S:
Presidential Decree No. 1818 prohibits any court from issuing injunctions in
cases involving infrastructure projects, the prohibition extends only to the
24
issuance of injunctions or restraining orders against administrative acts in
controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical cases.
On issues clearly outside this dimension and involving questions of law, this
Court declared that courts could not be prevented from exercising their
power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts.
For a writ of preliminary injunction to be issued, the Rules do not require
that the act complained of be in violation of the rights of the applicant.
Indeed, what the Rules require is that the act complained of be probably in
violation of the rights of the applicant.
Facts:
Although Presidential Decree No. 1818 prohibits any court from issuing
injunctions in cases involving infrastructure projects, the prohibition extends
only to the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders against
administrative acts in controversies involving facts or the exercise of
discretion in technical cases. On issues clearly outside this dimension and
involving questions of law, this Court declared that courts could not be
prevented from exercising their power to restrain or prohibit administrative
acts.1 In such cases, let the hammer fall and let it fall hard.
With health risks linked to exposure to electromagnetic radiation as their
battle cry, petitioners, all residents of Dasmariñas Village, are clamoring for
the reversal of the decision2 dated 3 May 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 57849 as well as the resolution dated 27 September 2000,
denying their motion for reconsideration.
The assailed decision3 of the Court of Appeals reversed the order of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, issuing a writ of preliminary injunction against
respondent National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) to stay the latter from
energizing and transmitting high voltage electric current through its cables
erected from Sucat, Parañaque to Araneta Ave., Quezon City.
Sometime in 1996, NAPOCOR began the construction of 29 decagon-shaped
steel poles or towers with a height of 53.4 meters to support overhead high
tension cables in connection with its 230 Kilovolt Sucat-Araneta-Balintawak
Power Transmission Project. Said transmission line passes through the Sergio
Osmeña, Sr. Highway (South Superhighway), the perimeter of Fort Bonifacio,
and Dasmariñas Village proximate to Tamarind Road, where petitioners’
homes are.
Sometime in 1996, NAPOCOR began the construction of 29 decagon-shaped
steel poles or towers with a height of 53.4 meters to support overhead high
tension cables in connection with its 230 Kilovolt Sucat-Araneta-Balintawak
Power Transmission Project. Said transmission line passes through the Sergio
Osmeña, Sr. Highway (South Superhighway), the perimeter of Fort Bonifacio,
and Dasmariñas Village proximate to Tamarind Road, where petitioners’
homes are.
Alarmed by the sight of the towering steel towers, petitioners got hold of
published articles and studies linking the incidence of a fecund of illnesses to
exposure to electromagnetic fields. These illnesses range from cancer to
leukemia.
Petitioners left no stones unturned to address their malady. They aired this
growing concern to the NAPOCOR, which conducted a series of meetings
with them.

Negotiations between petitioners and the NAPOCOR reached an impassé,
with petitioners vying for the relocation of the transmission lines to Fort
Bonifacio on one hand, and the NAPOCOR insisting on a 12-meter easement
widening, on the other.6
Thus, petitioners, on 9 March 2000 filed a Complaint7 for Damages with
Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction against NAPOCOR. Harping on the hazardous effects of
exposure to electromagnetic radiation to the health and safety to themselves
and their families, petitioners, through the instant case, sought what they
had failed to achieve through amicable means with NAPOCOR and prayed,
inter alia, for damages and the relocation of the transmission lines to Lawton
Avenue, Fort Bonifacio.
On 13 March 2000, Judge Francisco B. Ibay issued an order8 in Civil Case No.
00-352, which temporarily restrained the respondent from energizing and
transmitting high voltage electric current through the said project.
NAPOCOR filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction with the Court of Appeals
assailing the above order by the trial court. Alluding to Presidential Decree
No. 1818 (1981), "Prohibiting Courts from Issuing Restraining Orders or
Preliminary Injunctions in Cases Involving Infrastructure and Natural Resource
Development Projects of, and Public Utilities Operated by, the Government,"
particularly Sec. 1, NAPOCOR stalwartly sought the dismissal of the case on
the ground of lack jurisdiction.
In light of the foregoing order of the trial court, the petition which NAPOCOR
filed with the Court of Appeals was later amended to include the prayer for
the nullification and injunction of the Order dated 3 April 2000 of the trial
court.
In the challenged decision of 3 May 2000, the Court of Appeals reversed the
trial court’s order
Issue/s:
Whether or not the trial court may issue a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction to enjoin the construction and operation of the 29
decagon-shaped steel poles or towers by the NAPOCOR, notwithstanding
Presidential Decree No. 1818.
Held:
Yes, the trial court may issue a temporary restraining and preliminary
injunction.
Presidential Decree No. 181816 prohibits courts from issuing injunctions
against government infrastructure projects. In Garcia v. Burgos,17 Presidential
Decree No. 1818 was held to prohibit courts from issuing an injunction
against any infrastructure project in order not to disrupt or hamper the
pursuit of essential government projects or frustrate the economic
development effort of the nation.
While its sole provision would appear to encompass all cases involving the
implementation of projects and contracts on infrastructure, natural resource
25
development and public utilities, this rule, however, is not absolute as there
are actually instances when Presidential Decree No. 1818 should not find
application. In a spate of cases, this Court declared that although Presidential
Decree No. 1818 prohibits any court from issuing injunctions in cases
involving infrastructure projects, the prohibition extends only to the issuance
of injunctions or restraining orders against administrative acts in
controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical cases.
On issues clearly outside this dimension and involving questions of law, this
Court declared that courts could not be prevented from exercising their
power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts.18
After all, for a writ of preliminary injunction to be issued, the Rules do not
require that the act complained of be in violation of the rights of the
applicant. Indeed, what the Rules require is that the act complained of
be probably in violation of the rights of the applicant. Under the Rules of
Court, probability is enough basis for injunction to issue as a provisional
remedy, which is different from injunction as a main action where one needs
to establish absolute certainty as basis for a final and permanent injunction.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The decision dated 3 May 2000 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 57849 is REVERSED as well as the
resolution dated 27 September 2000. The Order dated 3 April 2000 of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati in Civil Case No. 00-352 is hereby REINSTATED.
No pronouncement as to costs
QUICK DIGEST:
Facts:
Sometime in 1996, NAPOCOR began the construction of 29 decagon-shaped
steel poles or towers with a height of 53.4 meters to support overhead high
tension cables in connection with its 230 Kilovolt Sucat-Araneta-Balintawak
Power Transmission Project. Said transmission line passes through the Sergio
Osmeña, Sr. Highway (South Superhighway), the perimeter of Fort Bonifacio,
and Dasmariñas Village proximate to Tamarind Road, where petitioners’
homes are.
Alarmed by the sight of the towering steel towers, petitioners got hold of
published articles and studies linking the incidence of a fecund of illnesses to
exposure to electromagnetic fields. These illnesses range from cancer to
leukemia.
Thus, petitioners, on 9 March 2000 filed a Complaint7 for Damages with
Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction against NAPOCOR.
NAPOCOR filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction with the Court of Appeals
assailing the above order by the trial court. Alluding to Presidential Decree
No. 1818 (1981) and sought the dismissal of the case on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the trial court may issue a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction to enjoin the construction and operation of the 29
decagon-shaped steel poles or towers by the NAPOCOR, notwithstanding
Presidential Decree No. 1818.
Held:
Yes, the trial court may issue a temporary restraining and preliminary
injunction.

Presidential Decree No. 181816 prohibits courts from issuing injunctions
against government infrastructure projects. In Garcia v. Burgos,17 Presidential
Decree No. 1818 was held to prohibit courts from issuing an injunction
against any infrastructure project in order not to disrupt or hamper the
pursuit of essential government projects or frustrate the economic
development effort of the nation.
While its sole provision would appear to encompass all cases involving the
implementation of projects and contracts on infrastructure, natural resource
development and public utilities, this rule, however, is not absolute as there
are actually instances when Presidential Decree No. 1818 should not find
application. In a spate of cases, this Court declared that although Presidential
Decree No. 1818 prohibits any court from issuing injunctions in cases
involving infrastructure projects, the prohibition extends only to the issuance
of injunctions or restraining orders against administrative acts in
controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical cases.
On issues clearly outside this dimension and involving questions of law, this
Court declared that courts could not be prevented from exercising their
power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts.18
After all, for a writ of preliminary injunction to be issued, the Rules do not
require that the act complained of be in violation of the rights of the
applicant. Indeed, what the Rules require is that the act complained of
be probably in violation of the rights of the applicant. Under the Rules of
Court, probability is enough basis for injunction to issue as a provisional
remedy, which is different from injunction as a main action where one needs
to establish absolute certainty as basis for a final and permanent injunction.
DFA VS FALCON GR 176657
Doctrine: Before a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued, there must
be a clear showing by the complaint that there exists a right to be protected
and that the acts against which the writ is to be directed are violative of the
said right. It must be shown that the invasion of the right sought to be
protected is material and substantial, that the right of complainant is clear
and unmistakable and that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for
the writ to prevent serious damage. Moreover, an injunctive remedy may
only be resorted to when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious
consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard compensation.
A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary or preventive remedy that may
only be resorted to by a litigant to protect or preserve his rights or interests
and for no other purpose during the pendency of the principal action. The
dismissal of the principal action thus results in the denial of the prayer for
the issuance of the writ.
26
FACTS: DFA secured the approval of the president of the implementation of
machine reading passport and visa project. The award of the project was
given to BCA on a build operate and transfer agreement. Assignment
Agreement was executed by BCA and PPC, whereby BCA assigned and ceded
its rights, title, interest and benefits arising from the Amended BOT
Agreement to PPC. Both DFA and BCA imputed breach on the said
agreement. DFA then sent a Notice of Termination to BCA and PPC due to
their alleged failure to submit proof of financial capability to complete the
entire MRP/V Project in accordance with the financial warranty under
Section 5.02(A) of the Amended BOT Agreement. BCA’s request for mutual
discussion under Section 19.01 of the Amended BOT Agreement was
purportedly ignored by the DFA and left the dispute unresolved through
amicable means within 90 days. Consequently, BCA filed its Request for
Arbitration dated April 7, 2006 with the Philippine Dispute Resolution Center,
Inc. (PDRCI), pursuant to Section 19.02 of the Amended BOT Agreement.
While arbitration proceeding is pending DFA and the BSP entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement for the latter to provide the former passports
compliant with international standards. The BSP then solicited bids for the
supply, delivery, installation and commissioning of a system for the
production of Electronic Passport Booklets or e-Passports. With this BCA filed
a Petition for Interim Relief under Section 28 of the Alternative Dispute
Resolution Act of 2004 (R.A. No. 9285), with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasig City, presided over by respondent Judge Falcon. BCA alleged, in support
for its application for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), that unless the
DFA and the BSP were immediately restrained, they would proceed to
undertake the project together with a third party to defeat the reliefs BCA
sought in its Request for Arbitration, thus causing BCA to suffer grave and
irreparable injury from the loss of substantial investments in connection with
the implementation of the MRP/V Project. trial court ordered the issuance of
a TRO restraining the DFA and the BSP, their agents, representatives,
awardees, suppliers and assigns from awarding a new contract to implement
the Project or any similar electronic passport or visa project, or if such
contract has been awarded, from implementing such or similar projects. trial
court issued an Order granting BCA’s application for preliminary injunction
after the latter posted a bond of P10M. DFA and the BSP questioned the
validity of the order of the respondent. DFA and the BSP argue that
respondent Judge Falcon gravely abused his discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when he issued the assailed orders, which effectively
enjoined the bidding and/or implementation of the e-Passport Project.
According to petitioners, this violated the clear prohibition under Republic
Act No. 8975 regarding the issuance of TROs and preliminary injunctions
against national government projects, such as the e-Passport Project.
Section 3. Prohibition on the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Orders,
Preliminary Injunctions and Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions. – No court,
except the Supreme Court, shall issue any temporary restraining order,
preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction against the
government, or any of its subdivisions, officials or any person or entity,
whether public or private, acting under the government’s direction, to
restrain, prohibit or compel the following acts:
(a) Acquisition, clearance and development of the right-of-way and/or site or
location of any national government project;
(b) Bidding or awarding of contract/project of the national government as
defined under Section 2 hereof;

(c) Commencement, prosecution, execution, implementation, operation of
any such contract or project;
(d) Termination or rescission of any such contract/project; and
(e) The undertaking or authorization of any other lawful activity necessary for
such contract/project.
ISSUE: WON the preliminary injunction issued by respondent was valid.
RULING: no, the same was not valid. There is no doubt that the MRP/V
Project is a project covered by the BOT Law and, in turn, considered a
"national government project" under Republic Act No. 8795. Under Section
3(d) of that statute, trial courts are prohibited from issuing a TRO or writ of
preliminary injunction against the government to restrain or prohibit the
termination or rescission of any such national government project/contract.
The rationale for this provision is easy to understand. For if a project
proponent – that the government believes to be in default – is allowed to
enjoin the termination of its contract on the ground that it is contesting the
validity of said termination, then the government will be unable to enter into
a new contract with any other party while the controversy is pending
litigation. Obviously, a court’s grant of injunctive relief in such an instance is
prejudicial to public interest since government would be indefinitely
hampered in its duty to provide vital public goods and services in order to
preserve the private proprietary rights of the project proponent. Verily, there
is valid reason for the law to deny preliminary injunctive relief to those who
seek to contest the government’s termination of a national government
contract. The only circumstance under which a court may grant injunctive
relief is the existence of a matter of extreme urgency involving a
constitutional issue, such that unless a TRO or injunctive writ is issued, grave
injustice and irreparable injury will result.
TOPIC: III. N. INJUNCTION ON GOVERMENT PROJECTS OR CONTRACTS
CASE TITLE: NERWIN INSDUSTRIES CORPORATION vs. PNOC-ENERGY
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, and ESTER R. GUEEZON, Chairman, bids and
awards committee.
PRINCIPLE: Republic Act No. 8975 expressly prohibits any court, except the
Supreme Court, from issuing any temporary restraining order (TRO),
preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction to restrain,
prohibit or compel the Government, or any of its subdivisions or officials, or
any person or entity, whether public or private, acting under the
Governments direction, from: (a) acquiring, clearing, and developing the
right-of-way, site or location of any National Government project; (b) bidding
or awarding of a contract or project of the National Government; (c)
27
commencing, prosecuting, executing, implementing, or operating any such
contract or project; (d) terminating or rescinding any such contract or
project; and (e) undertaking or authorizing any other lawful activity
necessary for such contract or project.
CASE DIGEST (for quick digest see below)
FACTS
In 1999, the National Electrification Administration ( NEA ) published an
invitation to pre-qualify and to bid for a contract, otherwise known as IPB No.
80, for the supply and delivery of about sixty thousand (60,000) pieces of
woodpoles and twenty thousand (20,000) pieces of crossarms needed in the
country’s Rural Electrification Project. Thereafter, the qualified bidders
submitted their financial bids where private respondent [Nerwin] emerged as
the lowest bidder for all schedules/components of the contract..
However, on Decmeber 19, 2000, NEA’s BOD passed a resolution reducing by
50% the material requirement of IBP No. 80, given the time limitation of the
delivery of materials and the loan closing date is fast approaching. NEA
allegedly held negotiations with other bidders relative to the IBP 80 while
PNOC-Energy Development Corporation purporting to be under the
Department of Energy, issued a resolution for the invitation to pre-qualify
and to bid for wooden poles needed for its Samar Rural Electrification
Project.
NERWIN filed a complaint with injunctive application.
RTC: GRANTED the motion for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction,
issued against NEA and PNOC-EDC
Respondents filed a special action for certiorari before the CA, that the
issuance is a blatant violation of the Rules of Court and express prohibition
from the law and SC.
CA: GRANTED the petition and annulled and set aside the decision of RTC-
complaint for issuance of TRO/WPI before RTC is DISMISSED. Hence this
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court Judge acted in GADALEJ by issuing a
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against the
Government or any of its subdivision or officials or any person or entity?
SC RULING:
The RTC Judge gravely abused its discretion, firstly, when it
entertained the complaint of Nerwin against respondents notwithstanding
that Nerwin was thereby contravening the express provisions of Section 3
and Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8975 for its seeking to enjoin the bidding
out by respondents of the O-ILAW Project; and, secondly, when it issued the
TRO and the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction.
Section 3 of RA 8975 states in no uncertain terms, thus:

Prohibition on the Issuance of temporary
Restraining Order, Preliminary
Injunctions and Preliminary Mandatory
Injunctions. No court, except the
Supreme Court, shall issue any
temporary restraining order, preliminary
injunction or preliminary mandatory
injunction against the government, or
any of its subdivisions, officials, or any
person or entity, whether public or
private, acting under the governments
direction, to restrain, prohibit or compel
the following acts:
xxx
(b) Bidding or awarding of
contract/project of the national
government as defined under Section 2
hereof;
xxx
This prohibition shall apply in all cases,
disputes or controversies instituted by a
private party, including but not limited to
cases filed by bidders or those claiming
to have rights through such bidders
involving such contract/project. This
prohibition shall not apply when the
matter is of extreme urgency involving a
constitutional issue, such that unless a
temporary restraining order is issued,
grave injustice and irreparable injury will
arise. xxx
Section 4. Nullity of Writs and Orders.
- Any temporary restraining order,
preliminary injunction or preliminary
mandatory injunction issued in violation of
Section 3 hereof is void and of no force and
effect.
The text and tenor of the provisions being clear and unambiguous, nothing
was left for the RTC to do except to enforce them and to exact upon Nerwin
obedience to them. The RTC could not have been unaware of the prohibition
under Republic Act No. 8975 considering that the Court had itself instructed
all judges and justices of the lower courts, through Administrative Circular
No. 11-2000, to comply with and respect the prohibition against the issuance
of TROs or writs of preliminary prohibitory or mandatory injunction involving
contracts and projects of the Government.
The respondent Judge did not even endeavour to show that the instant case
falls under the single exception where the said proscription may not apply,
i.e. when the matter is of extreme urgency involving a constitutional issue,
such that unless a temporary restraining order is issued, grave injustice and
irreparable injury will arise.
QUICK DIGEST
X, a government subdivision, awarded a government contract in favour of Y
for the supply and delivery of woodpoles and crossarms required for the
28
Rural Electrification Project. However, X passed a resolution decreasing the
material requirement to 50% and allegedly held negotiations with other
bidders relative to the contract. While PNOC-Energy Department Corp issued
a resolution for the invitation to bid for wooden poles covered under Y’s
contract. Y filed a complaint with the RTC for specific performance and
injunctive application which the latter court granted. CA annulled and set
aside RTC’s ruling, hence this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the RTC judge is correct in granting the issuance of writ
of preliminary injunction?
Held:
No. SC agrees with CA’s ruling since RA 8975 expressly prohibits ANY court,
EXCEPT the Supreme Court, from issuing any temporary restraining order
(TRO), preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction to
RESTRAIN, PROHIBIT or COMPEL the Government, or any of its subdivisions
or officials or any person or entity whether public or private, acting under the
Government’s discretion from bidding or awarding of a contract or project of
the National Government or terminating, rescinding any such contract or
project or undertaking or authorizing any other lawful activity necessary for
such contract or project. Furthermore, AC no. 11-2000 likewise instructs
judges and justices of the lower courts to comply with and respect the
prohibition against the issuance of TROs or writs of preliminary prohibitory
or mandatory injunction involving contracts and projects of the Government.
The respondent Judge did not even show that the instant case falls under the
single exception where the said proscription may not apply, i.e. when the
matter is of extreme urgency involving a constitutional issue, such that
unless a temporary restraining order is issued, grave injustice and irreparable
injury will arise. Judge is fined with P 40,000 for gross misconduct and gross
ignorance of the law.
BAGUIO REGREENING MOVEMENT, INC. V. MASWENG,
Principle/s:
1. It is required before the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction that claimants show the
existence of a right to be protected.
2. The prohibited acts in Section 3 of Republic Act No.
8975 regarding the issuance of TROs and preliminary
injunctions against national government projects
shall not apply when the matter is of extreme
urgency involving a constitutional issue, such that
unless a temporary restraining order is issued, grave
injustice and irreparable injury will arise.

Case Digest:
Facts:
Private Respondents filed before the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) a Petition for Injunction, with an
application for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), and
thereafter a Writ of Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin
the petitioners et. al from fencing the Busol Watershed
Reservation. They claimed that they are members of the
Ibaloi and Kankanaey tribes of Baguio City and that their
ancestors own the Busol Watershed Reservation expressly
recognized in Proclamation No. 15 issued by Governor
General Leonard Wood. Petitioners alleged that the fencing
project of petitioners would impede their access to and from
their residences, farmlands and water sources, and
dispossess them of their yard where tribal rituals and
ceremonies are usually held.
NCIP Regional Hearing Officer Brain S. Masweng issued a 20-
day TRO ordering petitioners to refrain, stop, cease and desist
from fencing and/or constructing fences around and between
the areas and premises of private respondent’s ancestral land
claims. Motion to dissolve TRO was denied dismissed on the
ground that it may be issued motu proprio where the matter
is of extreme urgency and the applicant will suffer grave
injustice and irreparable injury. Atty. Masweng then issued an
Order for the writ of Preliminary Injunction and denied the
Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that it was filed
out of time. CA also affirmed the Order and dismissed the
petition for Certiorari of Petitioners upholding the conclusion
of Atty. Masweng that the NCIP can issue injunctive writs as a
principal relief against acts adversely affecting or infringing
on the rights of ICCs or IPs, because "(t)o rule otherwise
would render NCIP inutile in preventing acts committed in
violation of the IPRA.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the writ of preliminary injunction was proper
SC Ruling:
No, the Court ruled that the NCIP may issue temporary
restraining orders and writs of injunction without any
prohibition against the issuance of the writ when the main
action is for injunction on the basis of Section 69(d)18 of the
IPRA and Section 82, Rule XV19 of NCIP Administrative
Circular No. 103. On petitioners’ argument that the City of
Baguio is exempt from the provisions of the IPRA and,
consequently, the jurisdiction of the NCIP, this Court ruled in
G.R. No. 180206 that said exemption cannot ipso facto be
deduced from Section 7821 of the IPRA because the law
concedes the validity of prior land rights recognized or
acquired through any process before its effectivity.
29
Lastly, however, this Court ruled that although the NCIP has
the authority to issue temporary restraining orders and writs
of injunction, it was not convinced that private respondents
were entitled to the relief granted by the Commission.
Proclamation No. 15 does not appear to be a definitive
recognition of private respondents’ ancestral land claim, as it
merely identifies the Molintas and Gumangan families as
claimants of a portion of the Busol Forest Reservation, but
does not acknowledge vested rights over the same. Since it is
required before the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction that claimants show the existence of a right to be
protected, this Court, in G.R. No. 180206, ultimately granted
the petition of the City Government of Baguio and set aside
the writ of preliminary injunction issued therein.
Quick Digest:
Respondent filed a Petition for Injunction, with an application
for a TRO, and thereafter a Writ of Preliminary Injunction on a
government project before the NCIP. They claimed that they
are the owners of the ancestral land as expressly granted to
them by a proclamation. NCIP granted the TRO. Petitioner
moved to dissolve the TRO to which the NCIP dismissed on
the ground that it may be issued motu proprio where the
matter is of extreme urgency and the applicant will suffer
grave injustice and irreparable injury. The Writ of Preliminary
Injunction was then issued. Motion for Reconsideration was
denied as well as the Petition for Certiorari to the CA. CA
affirmed the decision of NCIP.
Question:
Was the CA correct in affirming the writ?
Answer:
No. In the case of Baguio Regreening Movement, Inc. v.
Masweng, the SC ruled that although the NCIP has
jurisdiction over cases involving the protection of rights to
ancestral domains, it is required before the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction that claimants show the existence of
a right to be protected. Since, the proclamation does not
appear to be a definitive recognition of the ancestral land
claimed, as it merely identifies the claimants of a portion of
theland but does not acknowledge vested rights over the
same, the writ of preliminary injunction can’t be validly
issued.
REPUBLIC VS EVANGELISTA, G.R. NO. 156015, AUG. 11, 2005

HOLDING:
It is not required that the applicant should conclusively show that there was
a violation of his rights as this issue will still be fully litigated in the main case.
Thus, an applicant for a writ is required only to show that he has an
ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in his complaint.
FACTS:
The case at bar stems from a complaint for damages, with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, filed by private respondent
Dante Legaspi, through his attorney-in-fact Paul Gutierrez, against petitioners
Gen. Jose M. Calimlim.
The Complaint alleged that private respondent Legaspi is the owner of a land
located in Bigte, Norzagaray, Bulacan. Petitioner Calimlim, representing the
Republic of the Philippines, and as then head of the Intelligence Service of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Presidential Security Group,
entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with one Ciriaco Reyes.
The MOA granted Reyes a permit to hunt for treasure in a land in Bigte,
Norzagaray, Bulacan. Petitioner Diciano signed the MOA as a witness.It was
further alleged that thereafter, Reyes, together with petitioners, started,
digging, tunneling and blasting works on the said land of Legaspi. The
complaint also alleged that petitioner Calimlim assigned about 80 military
personnel to guard the area and encamp thereon to intimidate Legaspi and
other occupants of the area from going near the subject land.
Legaspi executed a special power of attorney (SPA) appointing his nephew,
private respondent Gutierrez, as his attorney-in-fact. Gutierrez was given the
power to deal with the treasure hunting activities on Legaspis land and to file
charges against those who may enter it without the latters authority.
Gutierrez filed a case for damages and injunction against petitioners for
illegally entering Legaspis land. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss
contending: first, there is no real party-in-interest as the SPA of Gutierrez to
bring the suit was already revoked by Legaspi on March 7, 2000, as
evidenced by a Deed of Revocation, and, second, Gutierrez failed to establish
that the alleged armed men guarding the area were acting on orders of
petitioners.
The trial court granted private respondents application for a writ of
preliminary injunction on the following grounds: (1) the diggings and
blastings appear to have been made on the land of Legaspi, hence, there is
an urgent need to maintain the status quo to prevent serious damage to
Legaspis land; and, (2) the SPA granted to Gutierrez continues to be valid.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction was
justfied.
HELD:
The issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction is justified. A writ of
preliminary injunction is an ancilliary or preventive remedy that is resorted to
by a litigant to protect or preserve his rights or interests and for no other
purpose during the pendency of the principal action. It is issued by the court
to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable injury to the applicant
before his claim can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated. Its aim is to
preserve the status quo ante until the merits of the case can be heard fully,
upon the applicants showing of two important conditions, viz.:
30
(1) the right to be protected prima facieexists; and, (2) the acts sought to be
enjoined are violative of that right.
Section 3, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a writ of
preliminary injunction may be issued when it is established:
(a) that the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, the whole or part of
such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or
acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either
for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) that the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts
complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the
applicant; or
(c) that a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is
attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts
probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of
the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
It is crystal clear that at the hearing for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction, mere prima facie evidence is needed to establish the applicants
rights or interests in the subject matter of the main action. It is not required
that the applicant should conclusively show that there was a violation of his
rights as this issue will still be fully litigated in the main case. Thus, an
applicant for a writ is required only to show that he has an ostensible right to
the final relief prayed for in his complaint.
In the case at bar, we find that respondent judge had sufficient basis to issue
the writ of preliminary injunction. It was established,prima facie, that Legaspi
has a right to peaceful possession of his land, pendente lite. Legaspi had title
to the subject land. It was likewise established that the diggings were
conducted by petitioners in the enclosed area of Legaspis land. Whether the
land fenced by Gutierrez and claimed to be included in the land of Legaspi
covered an area beyond that which is included in the title of Legaspi is a
factual issue still subject to litigation and proof by the parties in the main
case for damages. It was necessary for the trial court to issue the writ of
preliminary injunction during the pendency of the main case in order to
preserve the rights and interests of private respondents Legaspi and
Gutierrez.
III. Q. Sufficiency of Complaint, Application and other Requisites (S4, 5)
Landbank of the Philippines v. Continental Watchman, G.R. No. 136114,
January 22, 2004
PRINCIPLES:
The exercise of sound judicial discretion by the trial court in injunctive
matters must not be interfered with except when there is manifest abuse.
The sole object of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo
until the merits of the case can be heard.
Special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 cannot be used as a substitute
for a lost appeal.
CASE DIGEST

FACTS:
Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) petitioner published in the Philippine Daily
an "Invitation to Pre-Qualify," inviting reputable security agencies to pre-
qualify for security guard services in the different LBP offices, properties and
installations nationwide. Continental Watchmen Agency Incorporated (CWAI)
respondent responded to the invitation and participated in the public
bidding. All the pre-qualified security agencies, including respondent,
submitted their individual sealed bid proposals to petitioner's Special
Committee for the Selection of Security Agencies (Bid Committee). Private
respondent submitted a bid for three (3) areas, namely, Area I, Area III, and
Area V, all in Luzon.
After all the bids were opened and evaluated, it turned out that private
respondent was the lowest bidder for those three areas. However, the Bid
Committee declared private respondent disqualified because (1) its bid price
was below the monthly salary of a guard prescribed by the Philippine
Association of Detective and Protective Agency Operators, Inc.; and (2) it
violated petitioner's Bid Bulletin No. 1 requiring that the bid price should
include night differential pay for all the guards. Private respondent asked for
reconsideration but was denied by the Bid Committee. Hence, private
respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Manila, a petition
for injunction and damages with a prayer for a preliminary mandatory
injunction against petitioner LBP.
On August 1, 1997, after the hearing wherein both parties presented their
respective evidence, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order
(TRO) effective for twenty (20) days. At the same time, the trial court set for
hearing private respondent's application for preliminary injunction which is
granted by the court – August 22, 1997).
Petitioner filed its "Answer with Special and/or Affirmative Defenses and
Compulsory Counterclaim" but was denied by the court – January 12, 1998.
Thus, petitioner filed with respondent Court of Appeals a "Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and Temporary
Restraining Order" under Rules 58 and 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, alleging that the two Orders of the trial court dated
August 22, 1997 and January 12, 1998 were issued without jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion.
On July 31, 1999, the Court of Appeals issued a Decision dismissing the
petition and ruled as follows:
1. that the respondent court did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the preliminary injunction. Grave abuse of
discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction here the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion
or personal hostility and it must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
The record does not show such kind of actuation on the part of
the respondent judge.
2. that a petition for certiorari is not a remedy for the special civil
action for certiorari (Rule 65) is a remedy designed for the
correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment and
not even issue for simple abuse of discretion.
31
3. that he grant or denial of an injunction rests on the sound
discretion of the trial court and will not be interfered with by
appellate courts except on a clear abuse of discretion. The
respondent court conducted hearings before issuing a writ of
preliminary injunction and the private respondent was even
required to put a bond to answer for possible damages which may
arise from the issuance of said writ of preliminary injunction.
Supreme Court rulings showed that erroneous conclusions or
errors of judgment or of procedure, not relating to the court's
jurisdiction or involving grave abuse of discretion, are
not reviewable by certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
for such errors are reviewable by timely appeal.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Appellate
Court in its Resolution dated September 22, 1998. Hence; petitioner filed a
certiorari.
ISSUES:
1. WON preliminary injunction was properly issued
2. WON petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy
HELD:
1. Preliminary injunction was properly issued.
The issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction rests upon the
sound discretion of the trial court. Section 4 of Rule 58 gives
generous latitude to the trial courts in this regard for the reason
that conflicting claims in an application for a provisional writ more
often than not involve a factual determination which is not the
function of the appellate courts. Hence, the exercise of sound
judicial discretion by the trial court in injunctive matters must not
be interfered with except when there is manifest abuse. Also, the
sole object of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status
quo until the merits of the case can be heard. Here, after
evaluating the evidence presented by both contending parties,
the trial court held that justice would be better served if the
status quo is preserved until the final determination of the merits
of the case. We find nothing whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious in
such ruling.
2. Petition for certiorari is not the proper remedy.
Petitioner's remedy is an appeal to this Court from the Court of
Appeals' Decision dated July 31, 1998 by way of a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45. Instead, it filed this petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 only on November 18, 1998 or forty
three (43) days after it received the Appellate Court's Decision
denying its motion for reconsideration. Apparently, petitioner
resorted to certiorari because it failed to interpose an appeal
seasonably. The special civil action of certiorari cannot be used as
a substitute for a lost appeal. However the Court, in accordance
with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the
interest of justice, has the discretion to treat a petition for
certiorari as a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45,
especially if filed within the reglementary period for filing a
petition for review which petitioner failed to do so.
QUICK DIGEST

FACTS:
Continental Watchmen Agency Incorporated (CWAI) is the lowest bidder in
the bid invitation done by Land Bank but the Bid Committee rendered CWAI
as disqualified. Thus; CWAI filed a petition for injunction and damages with a
prayer for a preliminary mandatory injunction against petitioner LBP which
was granted by the court. LBP on the other hand filed its "Answer with
Special and/or Affirmative Defenses and Compulsory Counterclaim" but
denied by the court. Thus, petitioner filed a "Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order"
under Rules 58 and 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, on
the grounds that granting of preliminary injunction and the court’s resolution
denying the "Answer with Special and/or Affirmative Defenses and
Compulsory Counterclaim" were issued without jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion but denied by the court.
ISSUE:
1. WON the preliminary injunction was properly issue.
2. WON petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy
HELD:
1. The PI was properly issued for the court’s acted without grave
abuse of discretion and upon its sound discretion. Section 4 of
Rule 58 gives opportunity to the court to render decision based on
discretion for the reason that conflicting claims in an application
for a provisional writ involve a factual determination which is not
the function of the appellate courts. Hence, the exercise of sound
judicial discretion by the trial court in injunctive matters must
not be interfered with except when there is manifest abuse.
Also, the sole object of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the
status quo until the merits of the case can be heard. The trial
court held that justice would be better served if the status quo is
preserved until the final determination of the merits of the case
2. Petitioner's proper remedy should be an appeal by way of a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 within 15 days
after receiving the court’s decision but because the petitioner was
not able to file an appeal within the reglementary period thus;
resorted to certiorari under Rule 65 but special civil action of
certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for a lost appeal.
However the Court, in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading
the Rules of Court and in the interest of justice, has the discretion
to treat a petition for certiorari as a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45, especially if filed within
the reglementary period for filing a petition for review which
petitioner failed to do so.
Spouses Yap vs International Exchange Bank
Two sentence ruling:
Grounds for objections of preliminary injunction:
Under the afore-quoted section (section 6 rule 58) a preliminary injunction
32
may be dissolved if it appears after hearing that although the applicant is
entitled to the injunction or restraining order, the issuance or continuance
thereof, as the case may be, would cause irreparable damage to the party or
person enjoined while the applicant can be fully compensated for such
damages as he may suffer, and the former files a bond in an amount fixed by
the court on condition that he will pay all damages which the applicant may
suffer by the denial or the dissolution of the injunction or restraining order.
Two conditions must concur:first, the court in the exercise of its discretion,
finds that the continuance of the injunction would cause great damage to
the defendant, while the plaintiff can be fully compensated for such
damages as he may suffer; second, the defendant files a counter-bond.
Facts:
Respondent International Exchange Bank (iBank, for brevity) filed
a collection suit with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment against Alberto Looyuko and Jimmy T. Go in the RTC of Makati
which rendered a Decision in favor of respondent iBank and found Alberto
Looyuko and Jimmy T. Go liable, ordering them to pay the amount of ninety-
six million pesos (P96,000,000.00), plus penalty. Thereupon, respondent
Renato C. Flora, Sheriff of Branch 150 of the RTC of Makati City, issued a
Notice of Sheriffs Sale notifying all the parties concerned, as well as the
public in general, to which properties allegedly owned by Mr. Go will be sold
at public auction. To this petitioner-spouses Alfredo and Shirley Yap filed a
Complaint for Injunction with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Preliminary Injunction with the RTC of Pasig City seeking to stop the auction
sale alleging that the properties are already owned by them by virtue of
Deeds of Absolute Sale executed by Jimmy Go in their favor. They further
alleged that respondent sheriff disregarded their right over the properties
despite their execution of an Affidavit of Adverse Claim to prove their claim
over the properties and the publication of a Notice to the Public warning that
various deeds had already been issued in their favor evidencing their right
over the same.
on 22 August 2000 respondent sheriff issued a Certificate of Sale
stating that the subject properties had been sold at public auction in favor of
respondent iBank, subject to the third-party claims of petitioners.
Petitioners filed with the RTC of Pasig City the instant case for
Annulment of Sheriffs Auction Sale Proceedings and Certificate of Sale
 33

against iBank, the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of RTC Makati City, Procedure while the grounds for its dissolution are contained in Section 6,

and Sheriff Flora. The amended complaint included a prayer for the issuance Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. As long as the party seeking the

of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. On dissolution of the preliminary injunction can prove the presence of any of the

13 August 2001, upon posting a bond in the amount of three million pesos grounds for its dissolution, same may be dissolved notwithstanding that this

(P3,000,000.00), Judge Janolo issued the Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Court previously ruled that its issuance was not tainted with grave abuse of

Respondents iBank and Sheriff Flora filed on 29 August 2001 a Motion for discretion.

Reconsideration of the order granting the Writ of Preliminary Injunction

which the trial court denied. Subsequently, respondents iBank and Sheriff a preliminary injunction may be dissolved if it appears after hearing that

Flora filed with the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 264, an Omnibus Motion (To although the applicant is entitled to the injunction or restraining order, the

Resolve Motion to Dismiss Complaint and/or Dissolve Injunction) dated 31 issuance or continuance thereof, as the case may be, would cause irreparable

January 2006 praying that their pending Motion for Reconsideration dated damage to the party or person enjoined while the applicant can be fully

26 February 2001 which seeks for the dismissal of the case be resolved compensated for such damages as he may suffer, and the former files a bond

and/or the Writ of Preliminary Injunction previously issued be dissolved. in an amount fixed by the court on condition that he will pay all damages

Petitioners filed their Comment thereon with Motion to Cite in Contempt the which the applicant may suffer by the denial or the dissolution of the

counsel of respondents. They pray that the pending Motion for injunction or restraining order. Two conditions must concur:first, the court in

Reconsideration be denied for being devoid of merit, and that the Motion to the exercise of its discretion, finds that the continuance of the injunction

Dissolve Writ of Preliminary Injunction be also denied, it being a clear would cause great damage to the defendant, while the plaintiff can be fully

defiance of the directive of the Supreme Court which ruled with finality that compensated for such damages as he may suffer; second, the defendant files

the injunction issued by the trial court was providently issued and was not a counter-bond.

tainted with grave abuse of discretion. They further ask that respondents
In the case at bar, the trial court, after hearing, found that
counsel be cited in contempt of court and be meted out the appropriate
respondents duly showed that they would suffer great and irreparable injury
penalty.
if the injunction shall continue to exist. As to the second condition, the trial
Issue:
court likewise found that respondents were willing to post a counter-bond
Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, may the trial court
which could cover the damages that petitioners may suffer in case the
recall and dissolve the preliminary injunction it issued despite the rulings of
judgment turns out to be adverse to them. The Order of the trial court to
the Court of Appeals and by this Court that its issuance was not tainted with
recall and dissolve the preliminary injunction is subject to the filing and
grave abuse of discretion?
approval of the counter-bond that it ordered. Failure to post the required

Held: counter-bond will necessarily lead to the non-dissolution of the preliminary

injunction. The Order of Dissolution cannot be implemented until and unless

Affirmative. trial court may still order the dissolution of the preliminary
the required counter-bond has been posted.
injunction it previously issued.

The issuance of a preliminary injunction is different from its dissolution. Its

The well-known rule is that the matter of issuance of a writ of
issuance is governed by Section 3,[38] Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
preliminary injunction is addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the trial
 34

court, and its action shall not be disturbed on appeal unless it is

demonstrated that it acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or,

otherwise, in grave abuse of discretion. By the same token, the court that

issued such a preliminary relief may recall or dissolve the writ as the

circumstances may warrant.[40] In the case on hand, the trial court issued

the order of dissolution on a ground provided for by the Rules of Court. The

same being in accordance with the rules, we find no reason to disturb the

same.