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Unpacking democracy:
Presidentialism,
parliamentarism, and theories
of democratic peace
a b
Miriam Fendius Elman
a
Assistant professor of political science , Arizona
State University
b
International security fellow at the Belfer Center
for Science and International Affairs , Harvard
University
Published online: 24 Dec 2007.
To cite this article: Miriam Fendius Elman (2000) Unpacking democracy:

Presidentialism, parliamentarism, and theories of democratic peace, Security Studies,
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UNPACKING DEMOCRACY:
PRESIDENTIALISM, PARLIAMENTARISM, AND THEORIES
OF DEMOCRATIC PEACE
MIRIAM FENDIUS ELMAN

AKEN AS A body, the pervasiveness and popularity of literature on the
T democratic peace is fast approaching Microsoft-like proportions. Despite this

remarkable growth, however, proponents continue to make a variety of
different and sometimes conflicting causal claims about relationships between
domestic political arrangements and a medley of conflict related variables, chief
among them involvement in war. Notwithstanding the extraordinary expansion and
variety of works debating these relationships, some surprisingly widespread lacunae
persist. This article addresses one such gap: almost all advocates of democratic
peace hypotheses treat democracy as a single undifferentiated category. This failure
to break democracy down into different majoritarian and nonmajoritarian subtypes
results in underspecified causal models, and an overstatement of the ambit of a
variety of democratic peace phenomena.
International relations scholars who argue that there is a connection between
democracy and conflict related behavior have yet to reach consensus on the nature
of the relationship, the specific causal pathways that underlie it, or the classes of
behavior that are covered. One well-known division arises from disagreements
about the comparative validity of dyadic and monadic democratic peace claims.
According to the more popular dyadic version of the democratic peace theory,
democracies are peaceful when interacting with each other, and they identify
Miriam Fendius Elman is assistant professor of political science at Arizona State University, and an
international security fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard
University.
I thank Deborah Avant, Roxanne Doty, Colin Elman, Ken Goldstein, Arie Kacowicz, Alexander
Kozhemiakin, Christopher Nevitt, Susan Peterson, Norrin Ripsman, Stephen Rock, Scott Silverstone,
Stephen Walker, and two anonymous Security Studies reviewers for helpful comments and criticisms on
earlier drafts. I also thank BCSIA for its generous financial support. Previous versions of this article were
presented at the 1996 annual meeting of the International Studies Association and the 1997 annual
meeting of the American Political Science Association, where it won the award for the best paper on
the domestic sources of foreign policy.
SECURITY STUDIES 9, no. 4 (summer 2000): 91-126

Published by Frank Cass, London.
92 SECURITY STUDIES 9, no. 4
allies and enemies on the basis of regime type.1 The dyadic claim is that
democracies create a separate and joint peace—they do not fight wars against each
other, but in general they are no less war-prone than nondemocracies.2
Recently, however, a growing number of scholars have restated and refined
monadic variants of democratic peace theory, challenging the dyadic view that joint
democracy is a prerequisite for experiencing democracy's benign effects. According
to monadic theorists, democracy exerts a pacifying influence regardless of the
regime type of the opponent: democratically elected leaders do not base their
foreign policy decisions on the nature of other states' domestic institutions.
Democratic culture and factors internal to the democratic decision-making process

determine the foreign policies of democratic states irrespective of whether the
opponent is a democracy or a nondemocracy. Supporters of this monadic claim
argue, inter alia, that democracies: do not view war as a legitimate tool of foreign
policy, and use force only as an option of last resort; do not pursue risky foreign
policies that promise high overall costs; are reluctant to wage wars that they do not
expect to win; are quicker to abandon, and are less likely to take on, strategic
commitments; do not fight preventive wars; are less likely to initiate crises; and are
more likely to employ reciprocating bargaining strategies.3
1. The controversy about the comparative validity of dyadic and monadic democratic peace claims is
only one among several continuing disagreements. Another is the dispute about whether the main
causal mechanisms underlying the phenomena are normative or structural. See, for example, Zeev Maoz
and Bruce Russett, "Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986," American
Political Science Review 87, no. 3 (September 1993): 624—38; James Lee Ray, Democracy and International
Conflict: An Evaluation of the Democratic Peace Proposition (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press,
1995), 33-41; John M. Owen IV, Liberal Peace, Liberal War American Politics and International Security
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 10; Spencer R. Weart, Kever at War. Why Democracies Will Not
Fight One Another (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 5-6; Colin H. Kahl, "Constructing a Sepa-
rate Peace: Constructivism, Collective Liberal Identity', and Democratic Peace," Security Studies 8, no.
2/3 (winter 1998/99-spring 1999): 96-101; and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow,
Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith, "An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace,"
American Political Science Review 93, no. 4 (December 1999): 791-93, 804—5. Some of these debates are
related. For example, most monadic theorists advance institutional/structural explanations.
2. See, for example, Weart, Never at War, especially chap. 1; Michael W. Doyle, "liberalism and
World Politics," American Political Science Review 80, no. 4 (December 1986): 1151-69; Alex Mintz and
Nehemia Geva, "Why Don't Democracies Fight Each Other? An Experimental Assessment of the
'Political Incentive' Explanation," Journal of Conflict Resolution 37, no. 3 (September 1992): 484-503; Nils
Petter Gleditsch, "Democracy and Peace," Journal of Peace Research 29, no. 4 (November 1992): 369-70;
John M. Owen IV, "How Liberalism Produces the Democratic Peace," International Security 19, no. 2 (fall
1994): 87-125; and Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Democratic Peace—Warlike Democracies? A Social Con-
structivist Interpretation of the Liberal Argument," European Journal of International Relations 1, no. 4
(December 1995): 491.
3. See, for example, Ray, Democracy and International Conflict, esp. 10-31;Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire:
Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca: Cornell University- Press, 1991); Randall L. Schweller,
"Domestic Structure and Preventive War: Are Democracies More Pacific?" World Politics AA, no. 2
(January 1992): 235-69; T. Clifton Morgan and Valerie L. Schwebach, "Take Two Democracies and Call
Me in the Morning: A Prescription for Peace?" International Interactions 17, no. 4 (summer 1992): 305-20;
R. J. Rummel, "Democracies ARE Less Warlike Than Other Regimes," European Journal of International
Relations 1, no. 4 (December 1995): 457-79; Randolf M. Siverson, "Democracies and War Participation:
In Defense of the Institutional Constraints Argument," European Journal of International Relations 1, no. 4
Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Theories of Democratic Peace 93
Proponents of both monadic and dyadic democratic peace claims have largely
neglected to differentiate between different kinds of democratic subtypes. Although
this failing has implications for both groups of theories, in this article I concentrate
on the implications of this oversight for various monadic findings.4 Proponents of
the monadic democratic peace usually subscribe to structural/institutional
explanations, arguing that democratically elected leaders are moderate and
constrained while nondemocratic leaders are hard-line and unconstrained.
Democratic states, however, differ in the extent to which they constrain the
executive, and in the degree to which their foreign policymakers view war as a
legitimate foreign policy tool. This article shows that democratic states can act
belligerently when democratic structures allow skewed foreign policy-making access
to groups who favor the use of force. Specifically, I show how presidential,
coalitional parliamentary, Westminster parliamentary, and semipresidential
democratic systems—which David Collier and Steven Levitsky have recently
termed the classical subtypes of democracy—influence the autonomy of foreign
policymakers, and pose different sets of constraints and opportunities for foreign
security policy making.5 In particular, the article demonstrates how executive
autonomy (or the lack of it) may lead to war initiation, depending on the
preferences of the executive, and on the nature of societal interests reflected in the
legislature. If the executive is dovish and the legislature is hawkish, executive
autonomy will prolong peace. If the executive is belligerent and the legislature is
more moderate, executive autonomy will increase the likelihood of war. In short, I
argue that the democratic peace research program suffers from a faulty
(December 1995): 481-9; David L. Rousseau, Christopher Gelpi, Dan Reiter, and Paul K. Huth, "As-
sessing the Dyadic Nature of the Democratic Peace, 1918-88," American Political Science Review 90, no. 3
(September 1996): 512-33; Kenneth Benoit, "Democracies Really Are More Pacific (in General): Reex-
amining Regime Type and War Involvement," Journal of Conflict Resolution 40, no. 4 (December 1996):
636-57; and Brett Ashley Leeds and David R. Davis, "Beneath the Surface: Regime Type and Interna-
tional Interaction," Journal of Peace Research 36, no. 1 (January 1999): 5-21. For overviews of the dyadic
and monadic findings, and the democratic peace debate in general, see Steve Chan, "In Search of
Democratic Peace: Problems and Promise," Mershon International Studies Renew 41, no. 1 (May 1997): 59—
91; James Lee Ray, "Does Democracy Cause Peace?" Annual Review of Political Science 1 (June 1998): 27-
46; and Miriam Fendius Elman, "Introduction: The Need for a Qualitative Test of the Democratic
Peace Theory," in Miriam Fendius Elman, ed., Paths to Peace: Is Democracy the Answer? (Cambridge: MIT
Press, 1997), 1-57.
4. Although the article also includes several examples of dyadic democratic peace theorists who fail
to make distinctions among subtypes, the main focus is on the monadic group. This is partly the result
of division of labor considerations, and partly because the oversight is particularly debilitating for mo-
nadic claims, which are based entirely on factors internal to the state. It should be noted, however, that
the paper's conclusions would also apply, mutatis mutandis, to dyadic arguments that rely on institu-
tional/structural mechanisms.
5. David Collier and Steven Levitsky, "Democracy With Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Com-
parative Research," World Politics 49, no. 3 (April 1997): 430-51. Collier and Levitsky note that this
conceptual differentiation involves "moving down the ladder of generality to concepts that have more
defining attributes and fit a narrower range of cases." Parliamentary, presidential and semipresidential
democracies are all fully democratic at the same time that each is treated as a particular type of democ-
racy.
conceptualization of one of its key concepts—democracy. I suggest that

respecifying democratic peace claims with an eye toward democratic heterogeneity
will contribute to better explanations of historical cases, a number of which offer
evidence that is inconsistent with what democratic peace propositions lead us to
expect.
The article is divided into three parts. The first section specifies the different
democratic subtypes, and discusses the consequences of their incorporation for
monadic democratic peace theory. These implications are illustrated with a review
of recent monadic studies, and an account of how the additional variation—an
"unpacked" concept of democracy—leads to qualifications in those studies'

conclusions. The section concludes with a brief review of the dyadic version of the
democratic peace that has similarly neglected to distinguish among different kinds
of democracy.
In the second section of the essay the impact of institutional variation on
democracies' preparedness to risk the costs of war is illustrated with an analysis of
the decision-making process in two controversial cases involving democratic-
nondemocratic dyads: the U.S. decision to declare war on Great Britain in 1812; and
Finland's alliance with Nazi Germany and its decision to risk war with the Soviet
Union in 1940. These two cases were not chosen because of their previous
prominence in arguments about dyadic claims (that is, whether they are cases of
warring democracies), but because they are most different with regard to the key
independent variable: democratic subtype. They are also cases where my
institutional argument and the monadic democratic peace proposition make
opposite predictions regarding outcomes. The cases show that institutional
constraints make war more likely when the legislature is the hawkish side (the U.S.
case), while fewer institutional constraints make war more likely when the executive
is more hard-line (the Finnish case).
The empirical section of the essay concludes with a brief examination of two
additional cases—Britain's decision to pursue a policy of appeasement toward
Germany prior to the Second World War; and Israel's decision to adopt a limited
military response to Lebanese terrorism from 1977 to 1981.6 In the British case, a
dovish executive restrained a more hawkish legislature—majoritarian democracy
contributed to the decision to negotiate rather than risk the costs of war. In the
Israeli case, by contrast, a moderate legislature restrained a more bellicose
executive—nonmajoritarian democracy prevented a full-scale invasion of Lebanon.
Taken together, these cases show how adding institutional variation can account for
pacific outcomes among democratic—nondemocratic dyads: greater institutional
constraint on the executive makes war less likely in cases where the executive is
6. Since these cases had the same outcome that we would expect from the monadic democratic
peace proposition, I devote less attention to them than to the more controversial Finnish and American
more hawkish (the Israeli case), but fewer institutional constraints makes war less
likely where the executive is on the dovish side (the British case). Table 1 provides a
summary of my argument, and shows how the four case studies are coded.7
Table 1
DEMOCRATIC SUBTYPES AND FOREIGN POLICY OUTCOMES
More majoritarian Less majoritarian

(Westminster parliamentary (coalitional parliamentary

and semipresidential) and presidential)
Executive more War and risky foreign Peace and moderate

hawkish than policies more likely foreign policies more likely
legislature
(Finland in the Second World {Israel, 1977-81)
War)
Executive more Peace and moderate War and risky foreign

dovish than foreign policies more likely policies more likely
legislature
(British appeasementpolig, (U.S. in 1812)
1930s)
The last section of the article assesses the implications of a more differentiated
conception of democracy for IR and comparative politics theory, and for U.S.
policies of democracy promotion. The essay concludes that democracies should not
be lumped together into a catch-all category. Democratic peace theorists need to
distinguish among types of democratic systems rather than treat them as idendcal in
their effects on foreign policy. It is also clear that one need not be a neorealist to be
a critic of democratic peace arguments. Skeptics of the democratic peace theory
typically argue that the international environment drives war and peace decision
making, arguing that domestic politics matters little.8 By contrast, unpacking the
concept of democracy subjects democratic peace propositions to a much stronger
challenge. By showing that the crude democracy/nondemocracy dichotomy does
not capture the nature of foreign policy making in democratic settings, critics can
7. I am grateful to an anonymous Security Studies reviewer for suggesting this Table.

8. See, for example, John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold
War," in The Cold War and After. Prospects for Peace, ed. Sean M. Lynn-Jones (Cambridge: MIT Press,
1991), 141-92; Raymond Cohen, "Pacific Unions: A Reappraisal of the Theory that 'Democracies Do
Not Go to War With Each Other'," Review of International Studies 20, no. 3 (July 1994): 207-23; Christo-
pher Layne, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace," International Security 19, no. 2 (fall
1994): 5-49; and Henry S. Farber and Joanne Gowa, "Polities and Peace," International Security 20, no. 2
(fall 1995): 123-46.
challenge democratic peace theories on their own home court: the domestic level of
analysis. Finally, the article suggests that U.S. attempts to promote democracy
abroad will be misguided unless policymakers begin to better appreciate the variety
of democratic governance, and how they effect decisions to use force.
DEMOCRATIC PEACE AND DEMOCRATIC SUBTYPES

HILE DEMOCRACIES can be organized and analyzed in various ways, probably

W the most important difference among them is the relationship between the
executive and legislative branches. Comparative Politics research that focuses on
the balance of power between these branches of government demonstrates how
executive accountability to the legislature, legislative involvement in policy making,
and the capacity for executive discretion vary from one subtype of democracy to
the next. This literature recognizes at least four subtypes, listed from least to most
majoritarian:
• Coalitional parliamentary democracy is characterized by a head of government
(usually termed the prime minister) and cabinet selected by the legislature, and
dependent on the confidence of the legislature, which can dismiss the cabinet
from office. Since voting procedures are based on proportional representation,
these systems have collective or collégial executives, with the prime minister's
position in the cabinet varying from preeminence to virtual equality with other
members, who are not only ministers but are also often members of
parliament.
• Presidential democracy is characterized by a head of government (usually
termed the president) selected through popular election for a fixed term of
office and independent of the legislature for his or her political authority.
These systems have one-person, non-collegial executives—members of the
cabinet are advisors and subordinates of the head of government.
• Semipresidential democracy is characterized by a head of government (usually
termed the president) that is popularly elected for a fixed term and selects a
prime minister who heads the cabinet. While the president is not subject to the
confidence of the legislature, both the prime minister and the cabinet are.
• Westminster parliamentary democracy is characterized by a head of
government (usually termed the prime minister) who is chosen by the
legislature for a variable term of office and whose political authority is
dependent on maintaining legislative confidence. Plurality elections or a first-
past-the-post system ensures that the cabinet will be chosen from the ranks of
a legislative majority.9
These different democratic structures alter the capacity for executives and
legislatures to affect the decision to use force. In more majoritarian democracies,
such as Westminster parliamentary and semipresidential systems, war initiation is
unlikely if the executive prefers moderation because the executive sets policy.
Moderate leaders will be less constrained because there are few ex-ante veto points
to executive discretion. In these majoritarian democracies, however, the executive
will also find it easier to implement a hard-line foreign policy because the legislature
does not usually block executive decisions (in the case of Westminster
parliamentary systems), and leaders can often adopt belligerent foreign policies
before consulting legislative representatives (in the case of semipresidential
systems). By contrast, in less majoritarian democracies, such as presidential and
coalitional parliamentary systems, groups in favor of war will be better situated to
push the state down that road, even if the executive favors a more moderate
approach. In presidential democracies, for example, pragmatic, risk-averse
executives may find themselves swimming upstream because legislators—some of
whom may not agree with the executive's moderate views—also have access to the
foreign-policy making arena. Yet, in these democratic subtypes, war-prone leaders
are also more constrained because war powers are usually shared by the executive
and legislative branches (in the case of presidential democracy) and by competing
political parties who make up the cabinet (in the case of coalitional parliamentary
democracy).
Most democratic peace theories do not distinguish between democratic subtypes.
Democratically elected foreign policymakers are assumed to face the same sets of
domestic constraints, and all democracies are treated as weak states in which leaders
cannot act autonomously. This underspecification leads to at least two ways in
which both the monadic and dyadic variants of the democratic peace theory
9. For more on these different institutions see, for example, Arend Lijphart, ed., Parliamentary versus
Presidential Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992); Matthew Soberg Shugart and John M.
Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (New York: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1992); Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, eds., The Failure of Presidential Democrag: Comparative
Perspectives, vol. 1 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994); and Giovanni Sartori, Comparative
Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry Into Structures, Incentives, and Outcomes (New York: New York Univer-
sity Press, 1994). On the need to bridge the boundaries between the subfields of international relations
and comparative politics, see Ronald Rogowski, "Comparative Politics," in Political Science: The State of the
Discipline II, ed. Ada W. Finifter (Washington, U.C.: American Political Science Association, 1993); Atul
Kohli, Peter Evans, Peter J. Katzenstein, Adam Przeworski, Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, James C. Scott,
and Theda Skocpol, "The Role of Theory in Comparative Politics: A Symposium," World Politics 48, no.
1 (October 1995), esp. 10-11, 15; Karen L. Remmer, "New Theoretical Perspectives on Democratiza-
tion," Comparative Politics 28, no. 1 (October 1995): 103-22; James A. Caporaso, "Across the Great Di-
vide: Integrating Comparative and International Politics," International Studies Quarterly 41, no. 4 (De-
cember 1997): 563-92; and Margaret G. Hermann, "One Field, Many Perspectives: Building the Foun-
dations for Dialogue," International Studies Quarterly 42, no. 4 (December 1998): 606, 608.
overstate the case for democracy's pacifying effect: they mistakenly suggest that
democratically elected leaders are less likely to choose risky and belligerent foreign
policies, and they ignore that particular democratic features may generate military
strategies which run contrary to international conditions, thus putting the state at
risk.
First, both monadic and dyadic versions erroneously posit that democratically
elected leaders are less susceptible to risky ventures and war policies, either across
the board or only among each other. Democratic structures, however, do not
equally constrain executive risk propensity. The most majoritarian democracies—
governments in which a single party dominates the executive and retains a

parliamentary majority—pose the risk of sudden and radical shifts in foreign policy.
Furthermore, in such democratic subtypes the executive usually can count on an
automatic approval for its foreign policy positions. Despite the fact that the
executive is chosen by the legislature and is dependent on its confidence, there are
no institutional veto points to thwart the "will of a determined government backed
by a majority in the commons."10 The executive can count on legislative approval
for its foreign policy positions largely because voting against the government
implies handing it over to the opposition. This facilitates the executive's capacity to
initiate new policies, while at the same time increasing the leadership's ability to
back down from old commitments and adopt extremist policies. Indeed, a new
government can easily repeal large amounts of its predecessor's legislation. As Terry
Moe and Michael Caldwell point out:
A parliamentary system, by concentrating all power in the governing

party, creates a commitment problem of profound importance...The
party needs political support to gain office and govern effectively, but its
supreme authority undermines its ability to cement mutually beneficial
deals [because] the party has the power to renege on any deals it
makes.11
Second, both variants of democratic peace theory obscure the fact that particular
democratic structures and rules may generate military strategies which should be
precluded by international conditions. Again, this stems from a failure to distinguish
between alternative democratic subtypes. The institutional explanation for
10. Leon D. Epstein, "Changing Perceptions of the British System," Political Science Quarterly 109, no.
3 (1994): 487. See also Shugart and Carey, Presidents and Assemblies, 132; R. Kent Weaver and Bert A.
Rockman, "Assessing the Effects of Institutions," in Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the
United States and Abroad, ed. R. Kent Weaver and Bert A. Rockman (Washington, D.C.: Brookings,
1993), 15, 17; and Terry M. Moe and Michael Caldwell, "Institutional Foundations of Democratic Gov-
ernment: A Comparison of Presidential and Parliamentary Systems," JournalofInstitutionalana'Theoretical
Economics 150, no. 1 (March 1994): 177.
11. Moe and Caldwell, "Institutional Foundations of Democratic Government," 178. See also Peter
F. Cowhey, "Domestic Institutions and the Credibility of International Commitments: Japan and the
United States," International Organization 47, no. 2 (spring 1993): 302.
democratic peace is based on the premise that the executive is thwarted by a

peaceful public that has access to the foreign policy making process. Foreign
security policy making in presidential democracies renders this argument suspect.
Presidential systems require that one branch of government check the actions of
the other, thereby mandating legislative involvement in the foreign policy making
process. At the same time, this separation of powers, and the separate electoral
origins of the executive and legislative branches, means that legislators need not tie
their political fortunes to the success of a national policy. Their chances for
reelection are not dependent on their commitment to a national policy position, so

they can spend a great deal of time "courting personal followings in their own
district."12 Because legislators play an integral role in foreign policy making,
however, and need not submerge parochial interests beneath the executive's
security agenda, belligerent military strategies may result from the convergence of
parochial societal interests. A hawkish public can pressure the executive into
pursuing more hard-line policies than it would otherwise prefer. If public opinion
or the legislative majority is more hawkish than the executive, war can occur in
cases where a more autonomous executive would have been able to keep the peace.
In presidential democracies, for example, while the executive may not favor
aggression, the logrolling of powerful societal groups in Congress may nevertheless
lead the state down that road.13
By failing to differentiate among democracies, both the monadic and dyadic
versions of democratic peace theory also ignore the fact that certain democratic
features can prevent foreign policy responses that are dictated by the international
environment. In coalitional or consensual parliamentary systems based on
proportional representation, for instance, foreign policy strategies are likely to be
diluted in order to command the support of various parties. Since the cabinet must
please a large number of parliamentary groups in order to retain legislative
confidence, foreign security policies are likely to be tailored toward maintaining
consensus. Coalitional governments will often seek middle-of-the-road positions
and compromises designed to secure legislative approval.
Very few scholars studying the relationship between domestic political
arrangements and international conflict behavior incorporate these distinctions
between different democratic subtypes. Three notable exceptions are Susan
Peterson's study of crisis decision making, Norrin Ripsman's analysis of negotiating
12. See Shugart and Carey, Presidents and Assemblies, 170-73, 227; Weaver and Rockman, "Assessing
the Effects of Institutions," 17, 33; Moe and Caldwell, "Institutional Foundations of Democratic Gov-
ernment," 175; and Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering, 89-91.
13. Legislative input need not be malign and negative, however. The legislature can increase the
number of policy options debated and can pose a veto to the otherwise unchecked foreign policy pre-
rogative of a war-prone executive. On this point, see Matthew Evangelista, "Democracies, Authoritarian
States, and International Conflict," in Hegemonic Rivalry: From Thucydides to the Nuclear Age, ed. Richard
Ned Lebow and Barry S. Strauss (Boulder: Westview, 1991), 213-34; and Howard H. Harriot, "The
Dilemmas of Democracy and Foreign Policy," Journal of Peace Research 30, no. 2 (May 1993): 223.
peace agreements, and David Auerswald's investigation of democratic states in

militai}' conflicts.14 Peterson, Ripsman, and Auerswald persuasively argue that
democratic peace theorists should devote more attention to democratic differences.
Peterson, however, focuses less on democratic subtypes—presidentialism versus
parliamentarism—and more on the features that both democracies and
nondemocracies can share, such as a decentralized executive. This article builds on
Peterson's work, but takes her argument a step further by incorporating subtype
distinctions into leading democratic peace claims, and applying these distinctions to
several controversial cases in the literature. Ripsman acknowledges the importance

of democratic subtypes, but his research focuses more on prevailing legislative
norms and practices, and less on institutional constraints—the main focus of the
essay. Finally, Auerswald argues, like I do, that different types of democracy can be
coded as to how much autonomy they grant the executive. Auerswald, however,
focuses only on great power foreign policies—cases that are not hard tests of a
domestic institutional argument—and he suggests that executive and legislative
preferences do not affect the outcomes predicted by a structural model. By
contrast, I focus primarily on small state foreign policy making—instances where
domestic political explanations should not prove very persuasive—and I argue that
both institutions and preferences matter.15
These three important exceptions notwithstanding, most research on the
democratic peace continues to treat democracy as a unified class. James Lee Ray's
provocative explanation for why democracies are "more often inclined to avoid
wars in general" offers a case in point. According to Ray, democratic states may be
more pacific because democratically elected leaders anticipate the negative
consequences that fighting wars can have on their own political fortunes. Since
costly and unsuccessful wars can increase a leader's chances of losing his or her
position, leaders in democracies are less likely to initiate wars that are expected to
be severely violent, or that are likely to have high overall costs.16 The problem with
14. See Susan Peterson, Crisis Bargaining and the State: The Domestic Politics of International Conflict (Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996); and "How Democracies Differ: Public Opinion, State
Structure, and the Lessons of the Fashoda Crisis," Security Studies 5, no. 1 (autumn 1995): 3-37; Norrin
M. Ripsman, "Democratic Institutions and the Governance of Foreign Security Policy: Peacemaking
After Two World Wars" (Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1997); and David P. Auerswald, "In-
ward Bound: Domestic Institutions and Military Conflicts," International Organization 53, no. 3 (summer
1999): 469-504.
15. Although very few scholars engaged in the democratic peace debate have incorporated demo-
cratic subtypes into their arguments, the same cannot be said for other research areas in security- studies.
See, for example, Cowhey, "Domestic Institutions and the Credibility- of International Commitments";
Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democra-
cies," World Politics 43, no. 4 (July 1991): 479-512; Deborah D. Avant, Political Institutions and Military
Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994); and Juliet Kaarbo, "Power
and Influence in Foreign Policy Decision Making: The Role of Junior Coalition Partners in German and
Israeli Foreign Policy," International Studies Quarterly 40, no. 4 (December 1996): 501-30.
16. Ray, Democracy and International Conflict, 40-41. See also Siverson, "Democracies and War Partici-
pation"; Rummel, "Democracies ARE Less Warlike Than Other Regimes." For extensions of this ar-
Ray's argument, however, is that foreign policy blunders cannot always be easily
traced back to democratically elected leaders. It is difficult for the public to
determine who is responsible for foreign policy failures in a presidential system, for
example, where the executive can pin responsibility on other political actors, and
where the executive and legislative branches often forge deals in order to share the
blame. The same holds true for coalitional parliamentary systems, where
responsibility is obscured in "smoke-shrouded deals" among cabinet members.
Once foreign policy mistakes are made, responsibility for them is not easily
assigned.17 By contrast, voters can clearly blame the governing party for foreign
policy mistakes in a Westminster parliamentary democracy. In this democratic

subtype responsibility is fixed because a party majority leads the legislature and
directs the executive. Accountability is thus more clear cut—policy failure can easily
be traced back to the ruling party.
Jack Snyder's Myths of Empire deftly expands the democratic peace argument
beyond the narrow domain of war initiation, but again fails to incorporate different
democratic subtypes. Snyder suggests that democracies act more prudently
regardless of the regime type of their opponents: all democracies pose similar
constraints and opportunities for imperialist coalitions. Snyder argues that
democratic government makes it more difficult for these expansionists to hijack the
state and pursue strategies of self-destructive empire-building. Numerous access
points into the decision-making arena give groups opposed to expansionism the
chance to veto such policies. Yet, the intensity of imperial myth-making should vary
from presidential to parliamentary systems, and across types of parliamentary
democracy. Self-serving imperialist groups are less likely to be successful in
hijacking state policy in a coalitional parliamentary system where proportional
representation requires parties to cooperate in order to form a government. In such
cases, the demands of a narrow class or sectoral interest group will be diluted in
favor of policies that command the support of all the parties in the ruling coalition.
By contrast, expansionist coalitions will have an advantage in a Westminster
parliamentary system where plurality rule ensures that one party can gain a majority
in both the cabinet and the legislature. Since the cabinet can be assured of
legislative support for its policies, self-serving imperialist groups need only convince
a few key political actors of the wisdom of expansion. Finally, in presidential
systems, the most profitable strategy for imperialist groups will be to capture the
legislature, and by extension, the state. In many presidential democracies—
particularly those fashioned on the U.S. model—the legislature has assured access
gument to explain dyadic findings, see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, War and Reason:
Domestic and International Imperatives (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992); and Bruce Bueno de
Mesquita et al., "An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace."
17. Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering, 61, 71, 89; Rockman and Weaver, "Assessing the
Effects of Institutions," 16; and Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Govern-
ment in Twenty-One Countries (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 110.
into the foreign policy arena in order to check and balance the executive. Thus
imperialists in the legislature can lead the state down an overexpansionist road, even
if the executive has limited foreign policy goals.
Randall Schweller, another proponent of monadic democratic peace arguments,
likewise overlooks the fact that foreign policy may play out differently across
democratic states. In a key study, Schweller rejects the notion that declining great
powers will respond similarly by waging preventive wars against rising challengers.
He argues that while nondemocracies are prone to such aggressive strategies,
declining great power democracies consistently adopt foreign policies short of war
regardless of the regime type of the rising challenger.18 While France, Great Britain,
and the United States did not choose preventive war against Hitler's Germany,
however, their military strategies cannot be explained by the same set of
institutional constraints. In France, it was the Third Republic's coalitional
parliamentary system that generated middle-of-the-road policies instead of the
prompt, decisive action called for by external exigencies. Lack of agreement
between the various coalitional members lead to immobilism.19 In Britain, a
Westminster parliamentary system meant that the foreign policy vision of Neville
Chamberlain (and later Winston Churchill) would contribute substantially to initial
British appeasement and to subsequent dramatic reversals in policy.20 In the U.S.
presidential system, legislative involvement in foreign policy meant that an
isolationist Congress could force the executive's hand against large-scale military
action: "Even after President Roosevelt accurately assessed the Nazi threat,
Congress and public opinion continued to mute the vigor and effectiveness of
balancing behavior."21 In short, while France, Britain, and the United States were all
democracies, democracy itself does not tell us much. Each of these states chose
policies short of war, but because they were different kinds of democracies the
reasons for eschewing preventive war were different.
Finally, Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, who argue that democratizing states
are war-prone regardless of whether they interact with democracies or
nondemocracies, also sidestep the issue of democratic subtype.22 For instance, they
argue that newly established democracies are belligerent in part because it is
difficult for elites to form stable coalitions. The creation of governing coalitions
that integrate a wide spectrum of interests, however, is always difficult in
parliamentary democracies. Political stalemates are characteristic of coalitional
18. Schwellet, "Domestic Structure and Preventive War," 240-43, 248.

19. Robert G. Kaufman, "To Balance or to Bandwagon?' Alignment Decisions in 1930s Europe,"
Security Studies 1, no. 3 (spring 1992): 423, see also 438.
20. Ibid., 430-32.
21. Ibid., 438; see also 436-37; and Arthur A. Stein, "Domestic Constraints, Extended Deterrence,
and the Incoherence of Grand Strategy: the United States, 1938-1950," in The Domestic hases of Grand
Strategy, ed. Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 96-123.
22. Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," International
Security 20, no. 1 (summer 1995): 5-38.
parliamentary governments in general. In mature democracies, as well as in newly

democratizing states, attempts to "square the circle" are fairly common.23 Tough
foreign policy trade-offs must be swept under the table in order to maintain fragile
coalitions made up of diverse and contradictory bases of support. Since coalitional
governments can be easily dismissed by legislative censure, there is an institutional
incentive for cabinets to choose the foreign policy path of least resistance. New
democracies do not have a monopoly on the kinds of foreign policy behavior that
can result from these political impasses and "makeshift cabinets."24
Similarly, Mansfield and Snyder suggest that democratizing states may use force
because leaders will often control political agendas. While this may be the case in
Westminster or semipresidential democracies, which grant considerable foreign
policy making autonomy to the executive, leaders in nonmajoritarian democracies
will be unable to take unilateral actions that run against prevailing public opinion
represented in the legislature. Moreover, while Mansfield and Snyder argue that
leaders in newly democratic states will resort to nationalistic appeals in order to
shore up their power, this is more likely to be the case in presidential democracies,
where they have structural incentives to work around an intransigent legislature. As
a consequence of executive-legislative deadlock, executives in presidential systems
often manipulate constitutional and extraconstitutional features in order to bypass
congressional opposition.25 Such activism on the part of the executive is likely
because presidents hold a popular mandate and are thus convinced that they
possess independent authority. Opposition to their foreign policies will therefore be
more irksome to presidents than to prime ministers, who realize that political power
is part of a temporary coalition.26 By contrast, in majoritarian democracies, leaders
will have little need for diversionary behavior because the executive is already quite
powerful. Provided that the executive has a wide margin of support in the
legislature, it can enact foreign policies without worrying about legislative censure.
23. Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering, 113; see also Weaver and Rockman, "Assessing the
Effects of Institutions," 27.
24. See Joe D. Hagan, "Regimes, Political Oppositions, and the Comparative Analysis of Foreign
Policy," in New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy, ed. Charles F. Hermann, Charles W. Kegley Jr., and
James N. Rosenau (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1987), 344, 348-49; and Joe D. Hagan, Political Opposition
and Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993), 28—30.
25. Linz, "The Virtues of Parliamentarism," in Parliamentary versus Presidential Government, 214; Scott
Mainwaring, "Presidentialism in Latin America," Latin American Research Review 25, no. 1 (1990): 168;
Richard Gunther and Anthony Mughan, "Political Institutions and Cleavage Management," in Do Insti-
tutions Matter? 290; and Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach, "Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic
Consolidation: Parliamentarism versus Presidentialism," World Politics 46, no. 1 (October 1993): 19. For
example, presidents may use covert operations, secret diplomatic missions and overclassification of
documents in order to exclude Congress. In addition, a president may manipulate the procedural rules
by which an initiative is presented to Congress, thereby neutralizing groups opposed to the executive's
plan. U.S. presidents have often presented international commitments as executive agreements rather
than treaties, which require approval from two-thirds of the Senate.
26. Juan Linz, "The Perils of Presidentialism," in Parliamentary versus Presidential Government, 123.
As Scott Mainwaring and Matthew J. Shugart claim, "As a norm, a disciplined

majority party leaves the executive virtually unconstrained between elections."27
While most monadic democratic peace arguments do not incorporate democratic
subtypes, dyadic democratic peace work also fails to include democratic
differentiation. John Owen's innovative explanation of the democratic peace
phenomenon is a case in point. According to Owen, peace among democracies is
ensured because liberal elites can prevent illiberal leaders from deciding on war
against fellow democracies.28 Owen's argument is right as far as it goes, but his
description of the decision-making process is more typical of presidential
democracies—like the United States—where the legislature plays a central role, and
thus invites liberal elites to force the executive's hand. Such opportunities are
absent in majoritarian democracies. In these democratic subtypes, even if liberals
agitate for or against war, the relative autonomy of the executive in the decision-
making process means that the executive's views are bound to matter more because
"parliamentary systems with disciplined parties and a majority party offer the fewest
checks on executive power."29 In parliamentary subtypes based on the Westminster
model, the political fortunes of the majority party in parliament is tied up with the
executive's success. Consequently, the cabinet has very strong leverage over the
process of legislation and will have wide latitude to enact its preferred foreign
policy agenda:
The incentive not to jeopardize the survival of the government pressures

members of parliament whose parties hold executive office not to buck
cabinet directives. The opposition will unlikely be able to solicit any
defectors from among the majority to oppose the cabinet.30
27. "Juan Linz, Presidentialism, and Democracy: A Critical Appraisal," Comparative Politics 29, no. 4
(July 1997): 453.
28. Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace," 124.
29. Mainwaring and Shugart, "Juan Linz, Presidentialism, and Democracy," 453. This is most likely
to be the case when the executive commands a wide margin of support for its party in the legislative
branch. When the margin between the governing party and the opposition is smaller, however, the
cabinet has incentives to anticipate the reactions of legislators, lest they defect to the opposing party and
cause the government to fall. For more on executive power in Westminster parliamentary systems, see
Ibid., 453-44.
30. Shugart and Carey, Presidents and Assemblies, 47; see also Mainwaring and Shugart, "Juan Linz,
Presidentialism, and Democracy," 453, 463, 466; Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., "Leave the Constitution
Alone," in Parliamentary Versus Presidential Government, 91-92; Weaver and Rockman, "Assessing the
Effects of Institutions," 14—15; Epstein, "Changing Perceptions of the British System," 486; Arend
Lijphart, "Presidentialism and Majoritarian Democracy," in The Failure of Presidential Democracy, 96; and
James L. Sundquist, "Response to Theodore J. Lowi's 'Presidential Democracy in America: Toward the
Homogenized Regime'," Political Science Quarterly 109, no. 3 (1994): 423. The requirement of legislative
confidence results in an ironic paradox. In theory this feature should make the executive dependent on
the legislature, but in practice it increases executive power because legislators must vote not only on the
merits of a particular issue but also with regard to keeping the cabinet in office.
Vresidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Theories of Democratie Peace 105
Owen is in good company with other dyadic democratic peace theorists who
gloss over the fact that different democratic regimes present incentives for
legislators to act in certain ways. Majoritarian democracy promotes party discipline
because legislators know that voting against the cabinet can bring the government
down and result in new elections. Rewards are earned by toeing the line. By
contrast, when the executive and legislative branches have different electoral
constituencies, legislators do not earn brownie points if they support the executive,
and can vote against him or her without penalty.31
Consider how incorporating these distinctions into the recent influential studies
by Douglass North and Barry Weingast, James Fearon and Kurt Taylor Gaubatz,
for instance, qualifies the explanatory scope of these theories accounting for dyadic
democratic peace. These studies reach a common conclusion that democracies are
able to make durable commitments, and will therefore acquire reputations as
predictable partners. According to North and Weingast, democracy limits state
discretion and thus provides an environment conducive to investment. Because the
democratic state is monitored and can be punished for default, creditors can rest
assured that their loans will be repaid. Consequently, democracies can finance wars
and defeat their rivals on the cheap by relying on access to credit and credibly
committing to repayment. Fearon and Gaubatz similarly argue that by tying the
executive's hands, democratic states have an edge in international negotiations.
Fearon notes that democratically elected leaders can make believable foreign policy
commitments because they face penalties for backing down from their negotiating
positions. These high domestic audience costs make deterrent threats more credible
and ensure that opponents will not expect last minute concessions. Gaubatz also
argues that democracies are generally favored in international crisis management
and are likely to have more durable alliances. Current leaders can commit future
leaders to past international agreements; groups with vested interests in maintaining
old arrangements have a strong voice and can block future leaders' attempts to
renege on previous commitments; and reneging on commitments entails electoral
punishment. In short, democratic dyads operate under conditions of strong mutual
credibility.32
The problem with these arguments is that the political dynamics of particular
democracies get overlooked. Democratically elected leaders are not equally capable
of credibly committing future governments to current guarantees. Some democratic
31. See Juan Linz, "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?," in The
Failure of Presidential Democracy, 15, 64.
32. Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast, "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of
Institutions Governing Public Choice in 17th Century England," Journal of Economic History 49, no. 4
(December 1989): 803-32; James D. Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of
International Disputes," American Political Science Renew 88, no. 3 (September 1994): 577-92; Kurt Taylor
Gaubatz, "Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations," International Organization 50,
no. 1 (winter 1996): 109-39.
regimes (for example, presidential systems) will do better at convincing others that
commitments made today will be kept tomorrow; others will be less successful (for
example, Westminster and semipresidential systems). The public's ability to prevent
executives from defaulting on their agreements is easier in a presidential
democracy, where societal interest groups can block executive initiatives by
petitioning legislators.33 These societal actors have a stronger voice because the
legislature plays a larger role in the foreign policy-making process. Executives in
presidential democracies will thus find it much harder to break or renegotiate
commitments once ratification has occurred. By contrast, a Westminster
parliamentary system does not provide such a low-cost mechanism for stopping an
executive that wants to renege. Indeed, these democracies are especially prone to
great shifts in preferences when a ruling coalition replaces the incumbent.
CASE STUDIES
N THIS SECTION, I examine the effects of democratic institutional differences by

Ito focusing on two cases of democratic-nondemocratic interaction: the U.S. decision
declare war on Great Britain in 1812, and Finland's alliance with Nazi Germany
and its decision to risk war with the Soviet Union in 1940. As shown in Table 2, the
cases demonstrate the explanatory leverage to be gained from differentiating
between democratic subtypes. The cases also show the relative weakness of the
monadic democratic peace claim. They demonstrate that under some conditions,
democratic features can encourage the use of force, even when such behavior
should be precluded by international constraints. This finding is contrary to
monadic variants of the democratic peace proposition. Depending on the subtype
in place, democratic institutions may not prevent the choice of war over peaceful
methods of conflict resolution, and may instead generate the selection of risky
foreign policies despite the fact that more prudent options are available. The cases
illustrate that democracy—conceptualized as a unified, undifferentiated category—
does not prevent states from resorting to large-scale violence or selecting policies
that risk the costs of war, even when the prospects for peaceful resolution are high.
33. Ironically, the likelihood of executive-presidential deadlock in presidential systems has received
the greatest attention among Comparativists, and has been the main reason for criticizing presidential-
ism. See, for example, Arend Lijphart, "Introduction," in Parliamentary versus Presidential Government, 15;
Shugart and Carey, Presidents and Assemblies, 22; and Mainwaring, "Presidentialism in Latin America,"
164-71.
Table 2
CASE SUMMARY
U.S.—1812 Finland—1940
DIFFERENTIATED
DEMOCRATIC SUBTYPE MODEL
Government type presidential semipresidential

Executive orientation moderate/risk averse radical/risk prone
Legislature orientation radical/risk prone moderate/risk averse
Prediction declaration of war very risky foreign policies

likely very likely
MONADIC PREDICTION negotiation and com- negotiation and com-

promise preferred to promise preferred to
war initiation policies that risk war
Outcome U.S. declares war Finland initiates risky

foreign policy that
results in war
These two cases also pose fairly hard tests for my institutional explanation, and
the explanation's success in passing these tests provides a convincing
demonstration of its strengths. Since Finland in 1940 and the United States in 1812
can be considered small states rather than great powers, foreign policymakers
should have been highly attuned to the constraints of the international
environment. Because a small state's limited capabilities do not buffer it from the
consequences of policy mistakes, small state behavior is likely to be very susceptible
to international constraints. Consequently, these cases do not privilege a domestic
political argument—we should expect international pressures to outweigh domestic
ones in the calculations of national leaders. Small state foreign policy should be
least likely to support a domestic institutional argument as an alternative hypothesis
to structural realism. That domestic politics matters even in these unlikely instances
where we would expect that it should not gives us greater reason to accept the
validity of my institutional argument because the argument succeeds in an area in
which it should be weak.34 While democratic decision making mattered, however,
34. For more on why small state foreign policy is a difficult test of domestic political arguments, see
Miriam Fendius Elman, "The Foreign Policies of Small States: Challenging Neorealism in Its Own
Backyard," British Journal of Political Science 25, no. 2 (April 1995): 171-217. For more on hard versus easy
this is not a concession that automatically forfeits the game to democratic peace
theorists. In each case we must focus on which domestic actors advocated war, and
on whether democratic features were biased in their favor.35
By explicitly coding these cases as democratic-nondemocratic dyads, my analysis
avoids involvement in the separate dispute in the literature on whether these cases
support or undermine dyadic democratic peace claims. Critics insist that the War of
1812 is an instance of warring democracies. Similarly, opponents of the dyadic
version of the democratic peace theory argue that democratic Finland went to war
with fellow democracies by siding with Germany.36 Supporters of the dyadic
proposition disagree, arguing that at least one of the countries in question was not a
true democracy, or that the conflict was not a true war. Proponents argue, for
example, that Britain cannot be defined as democratic in the first part of the
nineteenth century, or that U.S. policymakers did not perceive Britain as democratic,
and thus were quite willing to contemplate force as a legitimate foreign policy
option. In a like manner, proponents of the dyadic proposition argue that
democratic Finland did not go to war with the democratic Allies, but rather
pursued a separate conflict with a nondemocratic Soviet Union.37 My analysis of
these cases does not engage the debate over whether the cases support or
undermine the dyadic variant, since it is primarily intended to demonstrate the
effect of different democratic subtypes on monadic democratic peace arguments.
Accordingly, my use of the cases to question the validity of monadic democratic
peace claims does not rely on my taking sides in the preexisting debate over
whether these are cases of democratic dyads at war. As I argue below, however, this
is not to say that the article's findings have no implications for the dyadic
democratic peace argument.
tests of a theory, see Stephen Van Evera, Guide toMethodologyfor Students of Political Science (Cambridge:
MIT Defense and Arms Control Studies program, 1996), 17-18, 40-41; and Timothy J. McKeown,
"Case Studies and the Statistical Worldview," International Organization 53, no. 1 (winter 1999): 180.
35. For a review of leading domestic theories of foreign policy, see James D. Fearon, "Domestic
Politics, Foreign Policy, and Theories of International Relations," Annual Review of Political Science 1
(1998): 289-313.
36. On 1812, see for example, Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Poli-
tics," International Security 18, no. 2 (fall 1993): 78; on Finland, see for example, David Spiro, "The Insig-
nificance of the Liberal Peace," International Security 19 (fall 1994): 61, 73-74.
37. On 1812, see for example, Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace," 108-10; Ray,
Democracy and International Conflict, 106-7; and Bruce M. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Prinriples for
a Post-Cold War World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 16. On Finland, see for example,
Ray, Democracy and International Conflict, 119-120; Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace, 18; James Lee Ray,
"Wars Between Democracies: Rare, or Nonexistent?" International Interactions 18, no. 3 (February 1993):
271; and Nils Petter Gleditsch, "Democracy and the Future of European Peace," European Journal of
International Relations 1, no. 4 (December 1995): 552.
THE WAR OF 1812: PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY AND THE USE OF FORCE
When France and Great Britain resumed warfare in 1803, restrictions on American
trade became a favored weapon. The American merchant marine was caught in the
middle of the British-French war of attrition, with both restricting neutral trade.38
War became a pretext for looting neutral commerce—the British seized neutral
ships on the high seas, while the French confiscated neutral goods in continental
ports. The United States tried to protect its trade and seamen by a series of
economic sanctions that were either rejected by American merchants or had little
effect on British and French policymakers. President Thomas Jefferson's (1801—09)

preferred policy was to counteract interference with U.S. trade by imposing an
embargo on all foreign commerce. The embargo was essentially a nonexportation
law, prohibiting U.S. ships and goods from leaving port. As this policy drove the
nation into deep depression, however, it became increasingly unpopular and was
replaced with nonintercourse policies aimed at Britain and France. Finally in April
1810, during James Madison's administration (1809-17), the United States passed
Macon's Bill No. 2 which allowed trade to resume with both Britain and France
until one of these nations agreed to respect American neutral rights. In that event,
the United States would initiate an embargo of the other. When France agreed to
the offer, trade with Britain was placed under sharp restrictions. A declaration of
war was approved by both the U.S. House and Senate shortly thereafter.
With Napoleon's defeat in Europe, America's war with Britain became a war for
survival. France's defeat made it possible for Britain to focus all of its war-fighting
capability on the North American front. Although stopping short of recolonization,
the British tightened the blockade of the U.S. coast, and invaded the capital, sacking
the city and burning the White House to the ground. In the Ghent treaty that ended
the war, the United States failed to get any trade concessions from the British.
Insofar as it failed to meet any of its goals, the war was a resounding defeat for the
United States. As Mlada Bukovansky notes, "The war...made clear that the material
and organizational ability of the United States to directly pursue its aspirations
against the wishes of a powerful opponent was depressingly limited."39
An institutional approach. A domestic politics approach that differentiates among
different democratic subtypes provides a compelling explanation for why the
United States did not go to war against Britain until 1812. British threats to the
young republic were quite significant in earlier periods, particularly during the
38. For a discussion of the French continental system and Britain's maritime policy, see Samuel
Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States, 3rd ed. (New York: Holt, 1950), 138-50; and Don-
ald R. Hickey, The War of 1812: a Forgotten Conflict (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 17-19.
39. Mlada Bukovansky, "American Identity and Neutral Rights From Independence to the War of
1812," International Organization 51, no. 2 (spring 1997): 237.
Chesapeake crisis of 1807, yet the United States did not declare war.40 War was
averted because of the balance of executive and legislative war powers in the
American presidential system. Jefferson was cautious in retaliating against the
British, arguing that only Congress could decide whether the British attack justified
war.41 Although Congress had approved a series of emergency measures, including
the purchase of military equipment and ammunition, Jefferson ordered the release
of any British prisoners captured and refused to attack British vessels which
remained in U.S. waters. Jefferson would "do nothing to commit" the legislature
into deciding for war.42 According to Jefferson, Congress had to be consulted
before the executive took any action, and thereby deprive the legislature of its right
to decide between peace and war. Since there was little Republican unity in
Congress as to whether war was the appropriate policy response, the earlier crisis
did not result in a U.S. call to arms. In short, the fact that the American founders
divided war-making authority between the legislature and the executive, removing
the power to declare war from the hands of the executive and vesting it in the
"branch of the central government closest to the people," goes far in explaining
executive restraint in the early American period.43
Even more important than accounting for the war's timing, a focus on U.S.
presidentialism also accounts for the intensification of the Anglo-American conflict.
U.S. military strategy prior to the War of 1812 is linked to earlier domestic events,
namely the shift in power from the Federalist to the Republican party, and the
victory of Thomas Jefferson over John Adams—a series of events often termed the
"Revolution of 1800." Unlike the Federalists, who tried to increase U.S. power and
security by joining with a stronger Britain, Republicans believed that America's
national interest would best be served by balancing Britain and extracting
commercial concessions.44 Once the Republicans gained control of the executive
and Congress, this commercial retaliation program became a viable foreign policy
option. A new foreign policy emerged because new groups with different ideas
gained power—the system was now biased in the Republicans' favor. In Abraham
D. Sofaer's words:
40. In June 1807, a British armed vessel attacked the Chesapeake, after the latter refused to allow a
search for British deserters. The Chesapeake was disabled, three Americans were killed, nineteen
wounded and four crew members were impressed.
41. Abraham D. Sofaer, War, Foreign Affairs and Constitutional Power the Origins (Cambridge: Ballinger,
1976), 199.
42. Jefferson to Vice President George Clinton, 6 July 1807, quoted in Ibid., 200.
43. See Daniel H. Deudney, "The Philadelphian System: Sovereignty, Arms Control, and Balance of
Power in the American States-union, Circa 1787-1861," International Organization 49, no. 2 (spring 1995):
203.
44. Ronald L. Hatzenbuehler and Robert L. Ivie, Congress Declares War: Rhetoric, Leadership, and Parti-
sanship in the Early Republic (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1983), 133; see also Stephen Skow-
ronek, The Politics Presidents Make: LeadershipfromJohn Adams to GeorgeBush(Cambridge: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1993), 78; and J. C. A. Stagg, Mr. Madison's War: Politics, Diplomacy, and Warfare in the Early
American Republic, 1783-1830 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 13-14.
The principal reason Jefferson was able to conduct foreign and military
affairs with...more independence than his predecessors is that Congress
let him. The Republican-dominated legislature largely supported his
objectives, and granted him broad discretion over such concerns
as... enforcement of the embargo.45
In particular, the old Republican resolutions for discriminating against British
navigation and commerce, which were impossible to implement when the
Federalists were in control of the executive and Senate, now found greater favor in
a legislature dominated by the opposing party.46 Jefferson was able to test the
Republican alternative of protecting U.S. independence by applying economic
sanctions as a substitute to war. As Stephen Skowronek notes, this was "an open-
ended experiment to explore the potential of economic coercion as an alternative to
war... [Jefferson] ventured to find out whether Britain could be forced to recognize
American interests..."47
A focus on democratic subtype also helps explain the emergence of a national
consensus for war. Although maritime issues, and the protection of neutral rights
and U.S. commerce are the reasons most often cited for the U.S. declaration of war,
the conquest of British-held Canada was also a significant factor. During the
congressional debate on war preparations, John Randolf insisted that "Agrarian
cupidity, not maritime right, urges the war... [in] the House, we have heard but one
word—like the whip-poor-will, but one eternal monotonous tone—Canada!
Canada! Canada!"48 Yet, expansion into Canada could only be contemplated in light
of democratic presidentialism. Despite the fact that Republicans held congressional
majorities, factionalism made it increasingly difficult for the president to get
congressional support. Typical of politics in presidential systems, legislators from
the president's party did not have strong incentives to follow the executive's lead,
even while the country faced severe external threats. Federalists, who normally
opposed the administration and voted as a bloc, were often joined by dissident
Republicans. These included "Old Republicans" (a small group of southern
agrarians who believed that the administration had diverged from Republican
ethics) and "Clintonians" (a group of northern Republicans from commercial areas
who opposed economic restrictions). Between 1809—11 "Old Republicans" were
reluctant to support measures to arm U.S. merchant vessels because of their
aversion to large navies and increased taxes. "Clintonians" also defected from the
45. Sofaer, War, Foreign Affairs and Constitutional Power, 205; see also Skowronek, The Politics Presidents
Make, 73.
46. In the Twelfth Congress, which convened in November 1811, Republicans held 75 percent of
the seats in the House and 82 percent in the Senate.
47. Skowronek, The Politics Presidents Make, 82.
48. Speech of John Randolf, 16 December 1811, quoted in Annals of Congress: Debates and Proceedings
in the Congress of the United States, 1789-1824, Twelfth Congress, Session 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Con-
gress, 1834-56), 533.
Republican majority, seeking relief for their merchantmen. Moreover, Northern and
Southern Republicans disagreed over the use of the navy and whether warlike
measures or commercial restrictions should be used to assert U.S. rights to trade.49
Casting their votes with Federalists, these dissidents in the Eleventh Congress
enjoyed virtual veto power over administration policies. Finally, the administration
also had to contend with a group of Republican congressmen who demanded a
more aggressive policy. Thus, for example, in December 1811 these "malcontents"
in the Senate set aside the administration's army bill, calling for fifteen thousand
more men than the administration had proposed in order to "force the Executive
into war."50
Given these divisions, war offered the prospect of shoring up Republican
political power prior to the upcoming elections in 1812. According to a number of
Republican congressmen, only a "war machine" could "save the character of the
Democratic party" and unify its diverse factions.51 While unifying the Republican
party and silencing Federalist opposition to its restrictive commercial system were
compelling reasons for going to war, however, it depended on achieving Republican
consensus. The U.S. declaration of war can be considered the product of a sectional
bargain between the West and the South, each attempting to strengthen regional
power in Congress by acquiring new territory.52 This bargain was facilitated by the
U.S. presidential system. With only nine votes in the House of Representatives, the
Western states could not get a vote of war without the support of Southern
congressmen. As Reginald Horsman explains: "it was a voting impossibility for the
West to take America into war for grievances peculiarly its own. Clay had sounded
the clarion call on behalf of the West, but for voting strength he was to depend on
the intimate alliance and joint leadership of the South."53 The annexation of
Canadian territory would result in the addition of several Northern states into the
Union, thereby increasing the power of the antislavery movement in Congress. As a
result, Southerners would only agree if Florida, which would presumably enter the
Union as a slave state, would also be added to the national domain. Since Spain and
Britain were allies at the time, war with Britain would facilitate both the conquest of
Canada and Florida. Thus, it is not Western and Southern interests per se that is the
49. See Hatzenbuehler and Ivie, Congress Declares War, 106-10. Evidence suggests that Madison
considered Macon's Bill no. 2 as the only policy around which Republicans could unite. See letter from
Madison to William Pinckney, 1 January 1810, quoted in Ralph Ketcham, James Madison: a Biography
(New York: Macmillan, 1971), 498.
50. See Stagg, Mr. Madison's War, 54, 85-87.
51. Ibid., 78-79; and Hickey, The War of 1812, 27.
52. Julius W. Pratt, "The Bargain Between the South and West," in The Causes of the War of 1812:
National Honor or National Interest?, ed. Bradford Perkins (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston,
1962), 66-67.
53. Reginald Horsman, The Causes of the War of 1812 (New York: Octagon, 1972), 183.
Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Theories ofDemocrath Peace 113
most interesting fact, but rather this "remarkable [regional] unity."54 This united
front facilitated a prowar majority in Congress. Since the new presidential system of
separation of powers authori2ed Congress to declare war, it was only when this pro-
war majority was secured that war with Britain became a viable foreign policy
option.
In sum, U.S. foreign policy in 1812 can be considered a "triumph of
Constitutional orthodoxy. ..it reveals the irreversibility of the American
commitment to the form of government decided upon in 1787-88."55 Prior to the
war, control over national security could be seized by sectional factions in Congress
because presidentialism granted Congress a significant role in foreign policy
making, and because President Madison felt the decision was not his to make.
Indeed, according to both Donald Hickey and J. C. A. Stagg, President Madison did
not really want a confrontation, but attempted to use the declaration of war in the
same way as he had used commercial retaliation—as a bluff designed to persuade
the British to make concessions. That Madison quickly sought peace in the early
days of the war lends support to the view that the president was more moderate
than the war-hawk Congress.56
The War of 1812: Critique or confirmation of monadic democratic peace? This case study
shows that an institutional argument that differentiates among democratic subtypes
fares better than monadic democratic peace arguments. Contrary to the main
monadic democratic peace finding, the case suggests that democratic states may
choose to engage in severe wars that promise huge costs. While the executive may
adequately assess the risks involved and favor moderation, belligerent foreign
policies may nevertheless be selected. Much will depend on the degree of autonomy
granted to the executive. Since in presidential subtypes the legislature plays an
integral role in foreign policy making, risky strategies may result from the
convergence of parochial societal interests. While the executive may view the use of
force only as an option of last resort, the logrolling of powerful societal groups in
the legislature may nevertheless lead the state down the road to war.
54. Hatzenbuehler and Ivie, Congress Declares War, 35. See also Alexander DeConde, A History of
American Foreign Policy, vol. 1, Growth to World Power (1700-1914), 3rd ed. (New York: Scribner's, 1978),
94-95, 97-98; and T. Harry Williams, The History ofAmerican Wars From 1745-1918 (New York: Knopf,
1981), 94-96, 107.
55. James Sterling Young, The Washington Community, 1800-1828 (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1966), 251.
56. See Hickey, The War of 1812, 281; and Stagg, Mr. Madison's War, 23-24. For an alternative view
see Hatzenbuehler and Ivie, Congress Declares War. The authors argue that Madison was not pressured
into war by a belligerent Congress. Rather, the president, Secretary of State James Monroe, and Speaker
of the House, Henry Clay, shared a leadership role and shaped the war movement. Executive-legislative
cooperation, particularly James Monroe's involvement with the House Foreign Relations Committee,
ensured a vote for war. See Congress Declares War, especially 20-21, 39. Despite the author's detailed
discussion of how Monroe acted as a liaison between Congress and the executive, however, Madison
nevertheless expected military strategy to originate in Congress.
In this case, the legislative-executive balance influenced military strategy by

enabling societal groups within Congress to affect policy decisions. In relying on
Congress for a declaration of war, Madison adhered to the constitution's division of
executive-legislative war powers. As a member of the Republican party, which
believed in legislative supremacy in formulating national policies, Madison was
dedicated to the notion that military strategy should come from the legislature, and
be put into effect by the executive. The executive, in Madison's view, had no right
to decide whether there was a cause for war. The president could only convene
Congress whenever circumstances seemed to call for a decision: "Madison
attempted] to conduct policy strictly according to the letter and spirit of the
Constitution...what he actually did was to exhibit...an executive conduct which
was almost precisely that which the Constitution contemplated."57 According to
Arthur Schlesinger:
In 1798 Madison had argued that, since the Ex. [sic] was the branch of
government most prone to war, the Constitution had solved the war
problem by giving the war-making power to the Legisl. [sic]. In 1812 he
may well have reflected ruefully on that argument as he sat in the White
House and War Hawks on Capitol Hill demanded hostilities with
Britain. Madison soon acceded to their demands, and the War of 1812
represented a suitable exercise of concurrent authority—at least in the
eyes of all save for the embatded Federalists of New England.58
The Republican interpretation of domestic institutions meant an executive
abdication of power to a belligerent Congress that would then play the decisive role
in determining U.S. military strategy'. War emerged because presidential democracy
grants the legislative branch a decisive say in the foreign policy process, and the
early Republican presidents adhered to this institutional reality.59
The above discussion sidesteps the debate about whether Britain was a
democracy in 1812, and accordingly is agnostic as to whether the case supports or
undermines dyadic propositions. Nevertheless, my reading of U.S. decision making
differs considerably from explanations of the case offered by leading proponents of
the dyadic democratic peace, John Owen and Spencer Weart. According to Owen,
the United States went to war because the Republican administration did not
57. Abbot Smith, "Mr. Madison's War: An Unsuccessful Experiment in the Conduct of National
Poliq'," Political Science Quarterly 57, no. 2 (June 1942): 240-421.
58. Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., The Imperial Presidency, 2nd ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1989), 26.
59. In the early American period, there was little legitimacy for presidential prerogative in foreign
affairs. The notion that the president has the constitutional authority to preempt Congress in deciding
on issues of war and peace has gained credence only in the modern era. See Walter LaFeber, "The
Constitution and United States Foreign Policy: An Interpretation," Journal ofAmerican History 74, no. 3.
(December 1987): 695-717; Thomas E. Mann, "Making Foreign Policy: President and Congress," in A
Question of Balance: the President, the Congress, and Foreign Policy, ed. Thomas E. Mann (Washington: Brook-
ings, 1990), 7; and Schlesinger, The Imperial Presidency, 443.
perceive Britain to be a true democratic state: "the Republican conception of the

national interest ultimately required war because Britain was a monarchy." Similarly,
Weart suggests that the United States and Britain went to war because they did not
perceive each other to be the same type of regime—only a little more "feeling of
republican fellowship could have prevented the war."60 This, however, fails to
explain why the war was fought in 1812. After all, the Republicans had gained
control of the national government long before 1812, and had long considered
Britain a tyrannical monarchy. According to my alternative argument, Congress
decided on war in 1812 because of a complex set of bargains between groups who
wanted war for different parochial reasons, none of which had to do with hatred
for British institutions. Indeed, Britain's type of government was rarely cited as a
justification for war. Depredations on U.S. commerce, the rights and honor of the
nation, and the threat of recolonization were the principal themes in the war
rhetoric of 1812. Characterizing Britain as despotic was a useful way of rallying
support for a war effort, but it was not the source of the pro-war vote. 61 In
addition, the fact that Republicans viewed British institutions as dangerous and
inappropriate for the United States, and thus were perhaps more willing to go to
war with Britain than their Federalist predecessors had been, does not explain how
the Republicans were able to translate their views into viable foreign policy options.
By ignoring the particular features of democratic presidentialism, Owen and Weart
gloss over the issue of how the Republicans won out. Their accounts do not cover
how Republican foreign policy shifted from a policy of commercial restrictions to a
pro-war strategy.
FINLAND IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR:

SEMIPRESIDENTIALISM AND THE USE OF FORCE
In the aftermath of the Russo-Finnish Winter War, the Finnish government insisted
on its neutrality during the Second World War. Yet, ample evidence confirms
German-Finnish military collusion and the government's tacit consent for a
German base of operations in northern Finland.62 Finland not only expected to be
60. See Owen, "How liberalism Produces Democratic Peace," 110 (emphasis added); and Weart,
Never at War, 186, see also 121-22, 179, 306.
61. See Hatzenbuehler and Ivie, Congress Declares War, chap. 4, 131-32; see also Robert H. Brown,
The Republic in Peril, 1812 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964); and Norman K. Risjord, "1812:
Conservatives, War Hawks, and the Nation's Honor," William and Mary Quarterly 18, no. 2 (April 1961):
200. For more on how the issue of neutral rights led to the war of 1812, see Bukovansky, "American
Identity and Neutral Rights." For an extended discussion of how institutional affinities fail to explain
the preferences of those who opposed or supported the war effort, see William Mabe Jr. and Jack S.
Levy, "Opposing War for Political Gain: A Comparative Study of the U.S. in the Quasi-War and the War
of 1812" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston,
September 1998), 25-28.
62. See C. Leonard Lundin, Finland in the Second World War (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1957),
95-104; Anthony F. Upton, Finland in Crisis, 1940-1941: A Study in Small-Power Politics (London: Faber
involved in the war, but Finnish leaders made collusion with Germany inevitable,
merely leaving the Soviet Union with the responsibility for initiating the hostilities.
The decision to allow German troops and war-fighting material to pass through
Finnish territor)' opened the door to greater Finnish involvement in the German
campaign against the Soviet Union. On 22 June 1941 the Germans crossed the
demarcation line and Hitler declared that German and Finnish troops stood side by
side for the defense of Finnish soil. With German troops poised for attack in the
Finnish Lapland, the Soviet Union opened hostilities with extensive air attacks of
Finnish territory. Initially, the Finnish counter attack was successful. As the war
began to turn against Germany, however, the Finns sought a peace treaty.
Moscow's terms for peace were harsh. Finland was required to lease an area on the
Porkalla peninsula, only a few miles from Helsinki, free communication by rail,
road, and water between Finland and the Soviet Union was to be guaranteed, air
fields near the southern coast of Finland were to be placed at Russian disposal, the
Finnish merchant marine had to be placed at the disposal of the Allied powers, and
Finland had to cede the Petsamo area to the Soviet Union.63 On 2 September 1944,
roughly two-thirds of parliament voted to accept the government's decision to
arrange an armistice with the Soviet Union.
An institutional approach. Finland's form of democratic government played an
important role in the decision to invite Soviet retaliation by siding with Germany
during the Second World War. In this case, democratic checks and balances did not
prevent Finnish President Ryti from allying with nondemocracies and hindering the
Allied war effort. Finland's pro-German policy was subject to dispute and ran
contrary to the preferences of a majority in parliament. Finland ultimately chose
this course of action over other viable alternatives because its democratic structure
made it easier for the executive to win the foreign policy debate.
Finnish political parties favored different foreign policy options. The
conservatives supported a pro-German policy, the Progressives advocated a pro-
British policy, the Swedish Peoples Party supported a policy of joint Finnish-
Swedish defense of Scandinavia, and the radical left favored cooperation with the
Soviet Union.64 The Social Democrats and the Swedish speaking Finns were willing
to fight to win back those areas lost in the Winter War, but they were reluctant to
annex Eastern Karelia and build a "greater" Finnish society which would stand for
the values and institutionalist arrangements of the Finnish right. By contrast, right-
and Faber, 1964), 218, 275; H. Peter Krosby, Finland, Germany, and the Soviet Union, 1940-1941: the Pet-
samo Dispute (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1968), 157-58, 172-76; D. G. Kirby, Finland in the
Twentieth Century (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1979), 132-33; and Ohto Manninen,
"Operation Barbarossa and the Nordic Countries," in Scandinavia During the Second World War, ed. Hen-
rik S. Nissen (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), 144-45.
63. In addition to these territorial losses, fifty-five thousand Finnish citizens lost their lives in the
Continuation War.
64. R. Michael Berry, American Foreign Policy and the Finnish Exception: Ideological Preferences and Wartime
Realities (Helsinki: Suomen Historiallinen Seura, 1987), 53.
wing groups, including the military, wanted to annex Eastern Karelia for strategic,
economic, and cultural reasons. Thus, "differences over foreign policy stemmed
from divergent views about how Finnish society should be organized and
governed." 65 Foreign policy was influenced by institutional rules that biased
outcomes in favor of some of these parties. The foreign policy preferences of the
right-wing parties won out, largely because they came to dominate the inner circle
of the cabinet. The right-wing bias in the composition of the Finnish government
led to the suppression of a neutrality option. As Henrik Nissen notes, "The Finnish
government...was, to be sure, a national government, but it did not reflect
proportionately the balance of strength in the Finnish parliament. The Right was
clearly overrepresented." 66
Semipresidentialism goes far in explaining the country's drift toward Germany.
When the Germans approached Mannerheim to ask permission to move German
supplies and troops across Finnish territory to the German post in northern
Norway, Mannerheim replied that only the civil authorities could negotiate such an
agreement. Yet, the only civilians that needed to be consulted were Prime Minister
J. W. Rangell and acting President Ryti, both of whom advocated a pro-German
policy and approved the proposal for transit traffic. The Finnish parliament was not
aware of the negotiations and most members of the cabinet did not learn of the
agreement until the first German transports began. On 13 June, as Finnish troops
partially mobilized, Foreign Minister Rolf Witting finally informed parliament's
Committee on Foreign Affairs that "war is at the door." The committee chairman
protested that Finland sided with Germany without parliament's approval.
Although most of the committee members agreed with the government's policy,
Witting only presented the Finnish military preparations as defensive measures
against Soviet aggression. The committee was therefore unable to judge the
government's policy of risking the costs of war by collaborating with the Germans
for an offensive attack.
Because of the structure of Finland's democratic system, parliament could
exercise little direct, ex-ante influence over the executive. Members of the foreign
affairs committee did not have to be consulted in advance with regard to foreign
security policy making and thus could not suggest alternative courses of action. The
foreign affairs committee of the Finnish parliament was informed of developments
long after decisions had been reached and policies implemented. The important
point here is that if parliament had been more involved in the policy-making
process, a pro-German policy might not have emerged. Parliament might have
opposed the pro-German drift in Finnish foreign policy. Although there was a
sizable portion of the electorate that favored a pro-German course, it did not
represent an overwhelming majority. The Social Democratic party, which insisted
65. Ibid., 152; see also Nissen, "The Nordic Societies," in Scandinavia During the Second World War, 43.
66. Nissen, "Adjusting to German Domination," in Scandinavia During the Second World War, 102.
that Finland retain strict neutrality, was the largest single party and represented over
40 percent of the electorate.67 If the Finnish government had wanted to reverse the
drift toward a German military alliance, it would not have lacked internal support.
According to C. Leonard Lundin, the fact that Finnish military strategy could be
decided by a "handful of military leaders" demonstrates that "Finland's democracy
was not functioning on this occasion."68 To the contrary, I would argue that
Finland's semipresidential democracy was operating consistently with its design. In
the Finnish semipresidential system, only the president had the constitutional power
to call the commander in chief to account in the making of military policy. Neither
Kallio nor Ryti, however, showed willingness to exercise this constitutional power.
The military did not take power away from civilian authorities prior to the
Continuation War. Instead, civilian authorities ceded responsibility to a tiny group
of soldiers, and allowed them to take decisions which would have important
consequences for Finnish national security. As president, Ryti was able to give the
military a free hand: "If anything was considered to be a military matter then it was
the Marshall's affair, and it was not for anyone else to raise doubts or ask
questions The situation amounted to an abdication of lawful, constitutional
authority by the President..."69 Military control of the decision-making process was
only possible with presidential approval of this expanded role: "soldiers are now
important policy makers, [and] they are strongly oriented towards Germany. But
this direction is followed with the understanding of the president."70 That Ryti,
Rangall, and Mannerheim were able to make the decision to let German troops into
the country is indicative of foreign policy making in a semipresidential system,
where the president has wide-ranging foreign policy powers, the military can set
foreign policy insofar as the head of state concurs with its views, and the president
and prime minister often share common foreign policy preferences.
The executive's ability to set the foreign policy agenda, thereby limiting the
options for parliament, also made it difficult for legislators to change course. The
Finnish government made it clear that Finland would only fight if first attacked by
the Soviet Union. Its concern was that Finland "not appear the aggressor state, but
that...she should be 'drawn in' to the conflict after it had started."71 Finnish foreign
security policy was crucially linked to anticipated domestic reactions in parliament.
Ryti insisted that the German forces start operations before the main Finnish army
began a general mobilization: "In this way it would be much easier to carry the
67. Upton, Finland in Crisis, 248.

68. Lundin, Finland in the Second World War, 90. Lundin's interpretation is based on the fact that the
Finnish General Staff signed the transit agreement. Yet, the stationing and passage of German troops
was decided by the cabinet, acting through the consent of the president. The military derived its author-
it)' from the consent that Ryti had previously given—the Finnish General Staff was merely authorized
to work out the details. See Upton, Finland in Crisis, 146, 244.
69. Ibid., 80, 148.
70. The Finnish minister of interior, quoted in ibid., 245.
71. Ibid., 264; see also 220, 263.
[parliament] and the general public along with the government's policy."72 Indeed,
the strength of the Social Democrats in parliament made it imperative that the
executive not initiative the attack. The Finnish army could not begin hostilities, nor
could Finnish territory be used to launch the initial attacks.
As it turned out, the executive had good reason to anticipate the reactions of the
Socialists in parliament. On 17 June the party told other members of parliament
that it would not support an offensive war and believed that Finland should remain
neutral. As Anthony Upton argues, "the opposition to an offensive war was
sufficiently strong and well organized to make it understandable why Ryti was so
anxious that Finland should not appear to take the initiative against the USSR. If
serious internal discontent was to be avoided, the USSR must somehow be made to
seem the aggressor."73 Thus, by inviting a Russian attack, the Finnish executive
created the circumstances under which the Finnish parliament would have no
recourse but to vote in favor of war. Once Soviet airstrikes began, the Finnish
executive had an appropriate casus belli.74 With the Soviet initiation of hostilities,
the Finnish parliament had to accept collusion with Germany, and vote for war.
Finland in 1940—41: Critique or confirmation of monadic democratic peace? Finland's
foreign policy choices directly contradict the central monadic democratic peace
finding because they entailed high prospective costs: war with a great power.
Ironically, Finnish democracy did influence its military strategy during the Second
World War, but not in the ways assumed by monadic democratic peace proponents.
Finnish democratic institutions did not prevent war, but instead made it more
likely. The features of semipresidential democracy helped get the Finns into a war
that they could have avoided.
That Finnish decisionmakers chose a course of cobelligerency with Germany
(and did so without much reluctance, and without a search for alternative foreign
policy options) can only be explained by looking at who advocated such a foreign
policy agenda, and at how these actors came to dominate the decision-making
process. Because it allowed the president to direct foreign security policy, Finland's
semipresidential democracy increased the likelihood that alternative foreign policy
options would be neglected in the decision-making process. Foreign policies that
risked the cost of war were pursued because there were few veto points to
executive discretion. Thus, prior to the Continuation War, Finnish military strategy
reflected President Ryti's views. During the war, Finnish foreign policy also began
to change as Ryti realized the need to reorient Finland's foreign policy in light of
Germany's losses. By privileging an executive that favored a pro-German policy
and undermining the bargaining power of more moderate forces represented in
72. Ibid., 274.

73. Ibid., 277-78.
74. See Krosby, Finland, Germany, and the Soviet Union, 182-83; Manninen, "Operation Barbarossa and
the Nordic Countries," 151-52.
parliament, semipresidential democracy decreased the chances of a Russo-Finnish

peace in the aftermath of the Winter War.75
DEMOCRATIC DIFFERENCES AND MODERATE FOREIGN POLICIES

Although cases of risky foreign policy choice are the most telling problem for the
structural explanation of monadic democratic peace, my institutional argument also
accounts for instances of peace, avoidance of risk, moderation, and negotiated
settlement—all cases where the monadic variant of democratic peace would make
the same prediction. Here, the importance of an "unpacked" concept of democracy

is not in the expectation of outcomes inconsistent with the democratic peace thesis,
but in offering a competing explanation of the policymaking process. Two cases in
points are Britain's policy of appeasement during the late 1930s, and Israel's foreign
policy toward Lebanon from 1977—81.
The British case shows how fewer institutional constraints on executive
discretion makes war less likely in cases where the executive is dovish. While British
prime minister Neville Chamberlain considered Hitler a nationalist with limited
aims—"a man with whom Great Britain could do business and reach a satisfactory
compromise"—opposition parties in parliament demanded a firmer course.76
Moreover, although British public opinion did not initially support war or massive
rearmament, the "public increasingly demanded that a line be drawn that Hitler
would not be allowed to cross."77 Chamberlain's preference for inaction and a
negotiated settlement, however, continued to determine British foreign policy
despite the fact that a policy of concessions to Germany did not command large
support. As Robert Kaufman notes, "Chamberlain was reluctant to abandon
appeasement or accelerate the moderate pace of rearmament even after British
public opinion had shifted."78
By winter 1938—39, British public opinion had turned against appeasement, and
yet Chamberlain continued to oppose an alliance with the Soviet Union, to believe
that war was not inevitable, to pursue a "weak deterrent strategy," and to buck the
75. My argument is different from David Spiro's explanation for the Continuation War. Spiro argues
that "democratic checks and balances" did not prevent President Ryti from siding with Nazi Germany,
and declaring war on democracies—domestic politics in general, and democratic institutional con-
straints in particular, had litde effect. In Spiro's view, the Continuation War proves that a "conflict of
interest may be so deep" that "nations fight despite the fact that they are...liberal democracies" ("The
Insignificance of the liberal Peace," 61, 73-74). By contrast, I suggest that democratic rules and struc-
tures did influence Finnish military strategy. The absence of the kinds of checks and balances on presi-
dential foreign policy making found in nonmajoritarian democracies made it easier for President Ryti to
direct Finland's foreign policy course.
76. Kaufman, "To Balance or to Bandwagon?" 427; see also 431-33.
77. Richard Rosecrance and Zara Steiner, "British Grand Strategy and the Origins of World War II,"
in The Domestic hases of Grand Strategy, 126.
78. Kaufman, "To Balance or to Bandwagon?" 431.
shift in public attitude.79 Chamberlain, the beneficiary of a parliamentary majority,

could delay action and direct Britain's response to Germany according to his own
vision of foreign policy. To be sure, after Germany's occupation of Prague in
March 1939, British public opinion made it more difficult for Chamberlain to
continue a policy of appeasement. Yet a convincing counterfactual case can be
made that Britain's majoritarian institutions would have facilitated a stronger
response to Nazi Germany earlier—in 1934, 1936, or 1938—had Winston
Churchill led Britain during this period.80
Like the British cabinet led by Chamberlain, the first Begin government avoided
policies that would risk the costs of a full-scale war. In the Israeli case, however, the
executive did not believe that war was avoidable, and was less committed to
peaceful methods of conflict resolution. In addition, it faced greater institutional
constraint.81
Following the 1977 Israeli elections, the Likud party, and its dominant Herut
faction, had to share power with more moderate minority parties in a coalition
government—a development that stymied the Likud's foreign policy extremism.82
The fragile nature of Prime Minister Menachem Begin's ruling coalition stemmed
from the fact that the Likud did not command a clear majority of votes. This
granted small coalition partners, who did not agree with the Likud's preference for
militarily imposed solutions, the ability to impose their views because of their value
to the coalition. Begin and other Herut supporters had to bow to their coalition
partners in order to maintain legislative confidence, and the positions of defense
minister (Ezer Weizman), foreign minister (Moshe Dayan), and chief of staff
79. Rosecrance and Steiner, "British Grand Strategy and the Origins of World War II," 150.
80. On how the belief systems of individual statesmen influence British foreign policymaking see
Kaufman, "To Balance or to Bandwagon?" 439. See also Rosecrance and Steiner, "British Grand Strat-
egy and the Origins of World War II," 145-46; and Robert G. Kaufman, "The Lessons of the 1930s,
Affiance Theory, and U.S. Grand Strategy: a Reply to Stephen Walt," Security Studies 1, no. 4 (summer
1992): 690-91.
81. For overviews of Israel's policy toward Lebanon and the 1982 invasion, see Shai Feldman and
Heda Rechnitz-Kijner, Deception, Consensus, and War. Israel in Lebanon(TelAviv: Jaffee Center for Strate-
gic Studies, October 1984); Itamar Rabinovich, The War for Lebanon, 1970-1983 (Ithaca: Cornell Univer-
sity Press, 1984); Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, Israel's Lebanon War (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1984); Yair Evron, War and Intervention in Lebanon: the Israeli-Syrian Deterrence Dialogue (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1987); Avner Yaniv, Dilemmas of Security: Politics, Strategy, and the Israeli Experi-
ence in Lebanon (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), chap. 2; Gad Barzilai, Wars, Internal Conflicts,
and Political Order: A Jewish Democracy in the Middle East (Albany: State University of New York Press,
1996), chap. 6; and Yaacov Y. I. Vertzberger, Risk Taking and Decisionmaking: Foreign Military Intervention
Decisions (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), chap. 7.
82. Prior to 1977, all Israeli governments had been Labor-led. In 1977 the Likud party (forty-five
seats) formed a government with Moshe Dayan's party (one seat), the religious Mafdal party (twelve
seats), the religious Aguda party (four seats), and the Democratic Movement for Change (fifteen seats).
The new ruling coalition thus had the support of seventy-seven Knesset members out of one hundred
and twenty. For more on the reasons behind the 1977 electoral realignment, see Efraim Torgovnik,
"Likud 1977-81: The Consolidation of Power," in Israel in the Begin Era, ed. Robert O. Freedman (New
York: Praeger, 1982), 7-27.
(Mordechai Gur) were each filled by "individuals with worldviews either rooted in,
or close to, Labor ideology and conceptions of national security."83
Despite the fact that Begin and other Herut coalition members had long favored a
large-scale military initiative in Lebanon, and were willing to use force to resolve the
Israeli-Palestinian dispute and to change the strategic status quo, the first Begin
government adopted a cautious policy toward Lebanese terrorism. Nor did it support
an IDF move against either Syrian positions in Lebanon or the pro-Israeli Christian
Maronites' domestic opponents—policies that were later adopted in the 1982 Peace
for Galilee operation.84 The Iitani Operation of March 1978, for example, was
confined to only a ten kilometer radius, had the limited goal of reducing terrorist
infiltration by extending the territory under the control of Major Sa'ad Haddad of the
Lebanese army, and prohibited any engagement with Syrian armed forces. Instead,
Israel's primary aim was to punish the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) for
recent terrorist attacks, and create a terrorist-free buffer zone which could then be
patrolled by United Nations peacekeepers.85
Between 1977 and 1981 moderate foreign policies persisted because moderate
parties were essential for the maintenance of legislative confidence. Israel's foreign
policies toward Lebanon became less modest only after the 1981 elections gave the
Likud a dominant position, and minimized the ideological space between coalition
members. After 1981, the Likud was freed from its dependence on parties that did not
share its inclination for direct military action—Begin faced no opposition regarding
defense and ideological matters from his new coalition partners. Consequently, Begin
could form what amounted to a war cabinet—without the moderates of the first
Begin cabinet; hawkish ministers (Ariel Sharon, Yitzhak Shamir, and Rafael Eitan)
took their place.86 Thus, from an institutional perspective, it is not surprising that
Israel's invasion of Lebanon occurred in June of 1982. The 1981 elections increased
the cohesiveness of the Likud-led coalition and this explains why war emerged as a
solution to Israel's security problems. Israel's foreign policy did not change simply
83. Vertzberger, Risk Taking and Dedsionmaking, 335; see also David Pollock, "Likud in Power: Di-
vided We Stand," in Israel in the Begin Era, 31-32; and Rabinovich, The Warfor Lebanon, 127. For more
on Labor versus Likud approaches to the use of force, see Efraim Inbar, War and Peace in Israeli Politics:
Labor Party Positions on National Security (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991); and I. Peleg, Begin's Foreign Policy,
1977-1983: Israel's Move to the Right (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1987).
84. Schiff and Ya'ari, Israel's Lebanon War, 23-24. For more on the ambitious war aims of the 1982
invasion, see Feldman and Rechnitz-Kijner, Deception, Consensus and War, 3, 10-25; and Shlomo Aron-
son, "Israel's Leaders, Domestic Order and Foreign Policy, June 1981-June 1983," Jerusalem Journal of
International Relations 6, no. 4 (1982-1983): 21-22.
85. Evron, War and Intervention, 71-82; and Barzilai, Wars, Internal Conflicts, and Political Order, 131.
86. Aronson, "Israel's Leaders, Domestic Order and Foreign Policy," 17-18. The second Begin
government consisted of Likud (forty-eight seats), Mafdal (six seats), Tami (three seats), and Aguda
(four seats). With only sixty-one Knesset seats and a one vote majority, the Likud had a strong incentive
not to antagonize their minority coalition partners by pursuing moderate policies toward Lebanon.
Concerns regarding possible defection from within the coalition continued to dominate the Likud's
decision-making calculus. See Vertzberger, Risk Taking and Dedsionmaking, 345-46, 348-49, 374, 376-77,
385-86.
because the Likud had different ideas regarding national security and the use of force,
and the 1982 Lebanon invasion was not merely a product of the Likud's preferences
or changes in Israel's external environment. Rather, the Likud, which had long
advocated the use of force to generate changes in the status quo, was finally in a
position to make its views count.87
MIRROR, M I R R O R O N T H E W A L L . . .
-» jt-ONADIC DEMOCRATIC peace proponents argue that a state's form of

J_Vxgovernment provides the best explanation for its foreign security policies.
Their most prominent critics argue that even democratically elected leaders will
take their cues more from the international security environment than from the
nature of domestic politics. In this article, I have suggested that while neorealists
are right that the monadic proposition is problematic, turning the analysis of war
and peace decisionmaking back to the international level of analysis is not the
only—nor the best—way of challenging democratic peace theory. A more telling
critique of the democratic peace proposition is that it fails to consider the
differences among democratic subtypes. This critique challenges the democratic
peace theory on its own home court. The question is not whether international
pressures trump domestic politics, but whether democratic peace theory adequately
depicts the nature of domestic politics in democratic states.
Because democratic peace theorists—particularly those who hold by the
monadic proposition—fail to differentiate between alternative democratic subtypes,
they overestimate the extent to which democracy will prevent international conflict.
Democracies are not all characterized by tight constraints on executive autonomy.
Certain democratic subtypes create a more permissive environment for an
executive that prefers war. Other democratic subtypes constrain a leader's ability to
choose war as a policy option. It is thus best to think of democracy in terms of
variable constraints imposed on leaders by different executive-legislative balances
of power.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY AND FUTURE RESEARCH

This article suggests that, in addition to developing hypotheses about the
differences between democratic and nondemocratic regimes, institutional variance
among democracies is also an important line of research inquiry. In majoritarian
87. For alternative explanations of Israel's Lebanon policy that emphasize external constraints, see
Avner Yaniv and Robert J. Lieber, "Personal Whim or Strategic Imperative? The Israeli Invasion of
Lebanon," International Security 8, no. 2 (fall 1983): 117-42; and David Rodman, "War Initiation: The
Case of Israel," Journal of Strategic Studies 20, no. 4 (December 1997): 9-10.
democracies, groups that favor war will not win out if the executive opposes the
use of force. At the same time, war-prone leaders will be less constrained because
they face fewer opportunity costs. Parliamentary systems have few ex-ante
institutional safeguards that restrain a homogenous executive commanding majority
support in the legislature. By contrast, in nonmajoritarian democracies groups that
favor war will be able to push the state down that road even if the executive is more
moderate. Yet, in these democracies, war-prone leaders will be more constrained
precisely because there are numerous veto points to executive discretion. The
upshot is that the link between democracy and peace will not prove very robust in
cases where the executive enjoys substantial autonomy in foreign policy making and
favors the use of force to manage security threats. The few historical examples
discussed here do not provide decisive support for this conclusion's
generalizability—the next step is to identify comparable cases and bolster the
illustrative case studies discussed in this essay with a quantitative component. In
addition, future work on the democratic peace phenomenon should continue to
unpack the concept of democracy in order to identify more boundaries or
contingent generalizations, like the one suggested here.88
This article also shows that, at least with respect to war and peace
decisionmaking, no particular democratic subtype is superior, and its conclusions
question the common tendency to pick regime favorites. Within the debate over
presidential versus parliamentary democracies, most Comparativists enthusiastically
endorse parliamentarism.89 The current wisdom is that parliamentarism is best
because it fosters power sharing and flexibility, features that prevent dissatisfaction
with the democratic process. According to this view, parliamentarism is beneficial
because it allows for a continuous readjustment to changes of political majorities,
and ensures that losers will share power with the winners.90 By contrast, this article
88. According to Stephen Walt, a problemshift that limits the domain of a prior theory by showing
that it only operates under circumscribed conditions should be considered equally, if not more, progres-
sive than one which predicts novel facts. See "The Progressive Power of Realism," American Political
Science Renew 91, no. 4 (December 1997): 932. For more on the criteria for determining whether prob-
lemshifts are progressive, see for example, John A. Vasquez, "The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative
Versus Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz's Balancing
Proposition," American Political Science Remit' 91, no. 4 (December 1997): 899-912; and Colin Elman and
Miriam Fendius Elman, "Lakatos and Neorealism: A Reply to Vasquez," American Political Science Review
91, no. 4 (December 1997): 923-26. For a discussion specific to the democratic peace, see James Lee
Ray, "A Lakatosian View of the Democratic Peace Research Programme: Does It Falsify Realism (Or
Neorealism)?" (paper presented at the annual convention of the International Studies Association,
Washington, D.C., 16-20 February 1999).
89. See in particular the contributions to The Failure of Presidential Democracy, Linz, "The Perils of
Presidentialisme Linz, "The Virtues of Parliamentarism"; Stepan and Skach, "Constitutional Frame-
works and Democratic Consolidation"; and Arend Lijphart, "Democratization and Constitutional
Choices in Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland, 1989-1991," Journal of Theoretical Politics 4, no. 2
(April 1992): 207-23. For a recent critique, see Mainwaring and Shugart, "Juan Linz, Presidentialism,
and Democracy."
90. Linz, "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy," 9; Stepan and Skach, "Constitutional Frame-
works and Democratic Consolidation," 16-22.
cautions against claiming that any particular democratic subtype is optimal. Since
each subtype has predictable costs and benefits, it makes little sense to speak of
either parliamentarism or presidentialism as inherently superior.91 It is especially
misleading to claim that either parliamentary or presidential subtypes—or states
with coalitional or unitary executives—are more war-prone without first
determining foreign policy preferences. Structure alone does not account for war
propensities—we need to specify actors' preferences before structure can tell us
anything.92
IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY

The contingent validity of the democratic peace theory is not merely of concern to
academics. Democratic peace arguments have been embraced by U.S. policymakers,
and the export of democracy has replaced containment as the cornerstone of U.S.
foreign policy in the post—cold war era.93 While democracy promotion may have
beneficial effects, expanding the zone of democracy will not necessarily enlarge the
zone of peace if democracy is exported in an indiscriminate manner. If the rationale
for democracy promotion remains linked to expanding democratic peace, then the
type of democracy that the United States should try to promote will depend in part
on who the aggressor is likely to be. If newly democratic states are likely to be
aggressors, then a parliamentary democracy with proportional representation may
be the safest bet. Since such a coalitional system is likely to force belligerent, hard-
line groups to share power with more moderate forces, this type of regime will help
to prevent regional conflict. At the very least, the United States should prefer
weaker democratic subtypes that decrease the capacity and the opportunity for
aggression from a unified executive. By contrast, if democratizing states are likely to
be the victims of aggression, then semipresidential systems or parliamentary
regimes that ensure majoritarian rule should be encouraged. These democratic
subtypes grant greater autonomy and discretion to the executive by decreasing the
number of veto points it faces. As a result, such democratic systems should enable
the state to more effectively mobilize national power resources to deter aggression.
If new democracies are not likely to be conflict initiators, then U.S. policymakers
should promote stronger democratic subtypes in order to raise the costs that
regional powers would face by attacking them.
91. Maoz and Russett, and more recently Auerswald, suggest that presidential democracies will be
more war-prone than parliamentary democracies, and that coalitional parliamentary regimes will be less
war-prone than parliamentary systems governed by a single party. See "Normative and Structural
Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986," 626; and Auerswald, "Inward Bound," especially 470-71,
498.
92. I thank Susan Peterson for this apt way of putting the point (Personal correspondence, 1996).
93. See, for example, "Excerpts from Clinton's State of the Union Message," New York Times, 26
January 1994.
The types of democracies the United States should encourage also depends on
preferences—are leaders or the voting public likely to be more moderate? If
national leaders are likely to view the use of force as a legitimate foreign policy tool,
then U.S. policymakers should prefer democratic subtypes that curtail the power of
the executive branch through checks and balances. The less centralized the political
system, the less likely it is that hard-line leaders will be able to initiate war. We
should prefer, for example, a more majoritarian system for Russia as long as status
quo, risk-averse leaders win office. A democratically elected president with almost
czar-like power over the legislature, however, would be the least preferred
institutional choice if an ultranationalist like Vladimir Zhirinovsky became

president. Indeed, the fact that he would find himself with expanded decision
making authority under the 1993 constitution is why Zhirinovsky has long thought
that the Russian "Constitution is so wonderful."94 Conversely, legislative supremacy
should be avoided if moderate leaders face illiberal, nationalistic publics. In these
circumstances, we should want politics to stop at the water's edge. The less the
legislature is involved in the foreign policy-making process, the better. In the post-
cold war era it is possible that diverse domestic factions will unite behind
expansionist foreign policies, thereby combining their separate agendas in a classic
logroll.95 In newly established democracies where log rolling is likely, institutional
designers should work to limit the legislature's war powers, and the extent to which
a radicalized society acting through the legislature can influence foreign security
policies.
94. Steven Erlanger, "A New Terror Stalks Russians: The Weak Ruler," New York Times, 25 June
1995.
95. Stephen M. VX'alt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies," International Studies Quarterly 35, no. 2
(June 1991): 226.

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To cite this article: Miriam Fendius Elman (2000) Unpacking democracy:

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PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

MIRIAM FENDIUS ELMAN

AKEN AS A body, the pervasiveness and popularity of literature on the

T democratic peace is fast approaching Microsoft-like proportions. Despite this

SECURITY STUDIES 9, no. 4 (summer 2000): 91-126

Democratic culture and factors internal to the democratic decision-making process

conceptualization of one of its key concepts—democracy. I suggest that

"unpacked" concept of democracy—leads to qualifications in those studies'

More majoritarian Less majoritarian

(Westminster parliamentary (coalitional parliamentary

Executive more War and risky foreign Peace and moderate

Executive more Peace and moderate War and risky foreign

7. I am grateful to an anonymous Security Studies reviewer for suggesting this Table.

DEMOCRATIC PEACE AND DEMOCRATIC SUBTYPES

HILE DEMOCRACIES can be organized and analyzed in various ways, probably

governments in which a single party dominates the executive and retains a

A parliamentary system, by concentrating all power in the governing

democratic peace is based on the premise that the executive is thwarted by a

reelection are not dependent on their commitment to a national policy position, so

peace agreements, and David Auerswald's investigation of democratic states in

several controversial cases in the literature. Ripsman acknowledges the importance

policy mistakes in a Westminster parliamentary democracy. In this democratic

18. Schwellet, "Domestic Structure and Preventive War," 240-43, 248.

parliamentary governments in general. In mature democracies, as well as in newly

As Scott Mainwaring and Matthew J. Shugart claim, "As a norm, a disciplined

The incentive not to jeopardize the survival of the government pressures

N THIS SECTION, I examine the effects of democratic institutional differences by

Government type presidential semipresidential

Executive orientation moderate/risk averse radical/risk prone

Legislature orientation radical/risk prone moderate/risk averse

Prediction declaration of war very risky foreign policies

MONADIC PREDICTION negotiation and com- negotiation and com-

Outcome U.S. declares war Finland initiates risky

THE WAR OF 1812: PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY AND THE USE OF FORCE

effect on British and French policymakers. President Thomas Jefferson's (1801—09)

In this case, the legislative-executive balance influenced military strategy by

perceive Britain to be a true democratic state: "the Republican conception of the

FINLAND IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR:

67. Upton, Finland in Crisis, 248.

72. Ibid., 274.

parliament, semipresidential democracy decreased the chances of a Russo-Finnish

DEMOCRATIC DIFFERENCES AND MODERATE FOREIGN POLICIES

the same prediction. Here, the importance of an "unpacked" concept of democracy

shift in public attitude.79 Chamberlain, the beneficiary of a parliamentary majority,

-» jt-ONADIC DEMOCRATIC peace proponents argue that a state's form of

IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY AND FUTURE RESEARCH

IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY

institutional choice if an ultranationalist like Vladimir Zhirinovsky became

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