Language, Ethics, and the Other between Athens and Jerusalem: A Comparative Study of

Plato and Rosenzweig

Author(s): L. Anckaert
Source: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 45, No. 4, Comparative Philosophy in the Low
Countries (Oct., 1995), pp. 545-567
Published by: University of Hawai'i Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1399793 .
Accessed: 24/01/2011 13:02

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at .
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=uhp. .

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

University of Hawai'i Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Philosophy
East and West.

http://www.jstor.org
LANGUAGE, ETHICS, AND THE OTHER BETWEEN L.Anckaert
ATHENS AND JERUSALEM: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY OF PLATO AND ROSENZWEIG

The initial hypothesisof this comparativestudy of a moment in Greek KatholiekeUniversiteit

and Jewish philosophy states that the way of speaking determinesthe Leuven
way in which realitycan be narrated,which realitycan be narrated,and
which type of relationalitybecomes possible. The perceptionof reality
formsthe basis of the possible types of relationalityand is constitutivefor
its (ethical)patterns.The culturalworld is formedby the way in which it
can be narratedby humanity.
This hypothesis is elaborated by investigatingtwo types of reality
perceptionfor theirrespective(implicit)understandingsof literarygenres
as modes of narratingrealityand, more formally,for the relationalityin
which these texts function. The firstaspect is inspiredby the studies of
Auerbachand Wertheimer,'the second by literarycriticismand those
new strategiesof reading that consider the text in its relation to the
authorand the reader2and which examine how the meaningof the text
is produced.3
Platoand Rosenzweigas DialogicalThinkers
Dialogical thinkingis markedby a long, rich, and changing history.
The dialogues of Platoare generallyconsidered its originwhile the Jew-
ish dialogicalthinkingof the beginningof this centurycan be interpreted
as its Nachgeschichte.4Butthe differencesbetween these two stages of
dialogical thinkingare noteworthy.Plato uses the literarygenre of the
dialogue in which the partnerssearchtogetherfor true knowledge,while
someone like Rosenzweig, who wrote undoubtedly one of the most
importanttexts of dialogicalthinking,abandonsthe formof dialogue for
a narrative(epic) philosophy closer to the later Schelling. Nonetheless,
Rosenzweig pays more attentionto the dialogical characterof reality
than does Plato,whose dialogues are, froma Jewish-philosophicalpoint
of view, often understoodas monologues in which 'the same' is liberated
from forgetfulnessby a maieutic discourse.5The text of Plato can be
considered an immanentdialogue, while Rosenzweig'sdiscursiveman-
ner of speaking presupposes instead a dialogue with the reader. This
PhilosophyEast& West
formal paradoxhas much to do with the place and the meaning of the Volume 45, Number4
'third'.The thirdcan appear as an instance of exteriorityor alterityand October 1995
take the formof an irreduciblepartnerin the dialogue. A deeper studyof 545-567
Plato shows that this thirdis excluded or repressed.This repressionis in
? 1995
a certain sense constitutive for the texts of Plato. It manifests itself
by Universityof
in the study of the differentliterarygenres or genres de discours that Hawai'i Press
are allowed in the discourse of Plato. On the other hand, Rosenzweig

545
 reflectson the place and the meaning of this thirdparty.This thirdap-
pearsas the second grammaticalpronoun,the You, in a metaphoricaldis-
course of the trial.At the same time, his work is a challenge to the reader,
who also formsan aspect of thisthirdparty.Inotherwords,the immanent
characterof Plato's dialogue sets aside real intersubjectivitywhile the
more objective characterof Rosenzweig'stext permitsthese relations.
Plato'sLogomachyof Language
In literarycriticism one distinguishesthree literarygenres: lyrics,
epics, and drama (cf. Goethe). According to the Redeverteilungskrite-
rium,the questionof who speaks, the genres can be connected with the
three grammaticalpronouns.One of the possible structuresconsists in
binding lyrics with the monological enactment of a situation(firstper-
son), epics with the monological narrationof an action (thirdperson),
and drama/rhetoricwith the dialogical enactmentof an action (second
person).This division can be connected with the fundamentaltimes of
present,past, and future.
TheBattleof Rhetoric.Inthe famousopening book of the Republic,Plato
refusesto situate his discourse in the field of rhetoric.6Platogave much
attentionto the opening and the setting of the Republic. Dionysius of
Hallicarnassusrelatesthat in the heritageof Platoa tablet was found on
which the first period of the dialogue was written down in different
forms.7It is also agreed thatthe firstbook circulatedfor a long time as a
separatedialogue and that Plato himself integratedit as the opening of
the Republic.These remarksshow the difficultiesconnected with the act
of writingon Justice.Seemingly,it is necessaryto take certaindecisions
on languageand the structuresof speech beforebeing able to speak of a
determinedaspect of reality.Languagehas to go througha crisisbefore it
can be spoken.
The firstbook of the Republicis a battlewith rhetoric.Togetherwith
drama, rhetoricis the expressed genre of the second grammaticalper-
son. Rhetorictries to seduce the other with beautifulwords in a well-
formulated discourse. This discourse is connected with power. The
spoken word is a dynastes, which can presentthe ugly as beautiful,the
bad as good, and the detestable as honorable.8Rhetoricis the word of
the democratic city with its agora and its trial. The opening of the
Republicnarrateson Socrates,who is outside Athens.In returningto the
city, a boy catches hold of his himationfrom behind and forces him to
go back to Polemarchus(327b). Afterthis physical encounter, Socrates
again wants to go back to the city, but differentargumentsretain him:
physical power, the seduction of a torchlightrace on horseback,a night
festival,and young boys with whom Socratescan converse (327c-328a).
This rhetoricalscene of seduction opens the discussion on justice: the
PhilosophyEast& West ethical reflectionstartswith rhetoricand language.

546
 Outside the city, a conversation about justice takes place. Three
people open the conversation. Old Cephalus, metaphor for the epi-
thumia,9considers justice to be truth-tellingand recompense for what
one has received. His son Polemarchussees justice as renderingeach his
due. He understandsjustice to begin from the strivingpartof the soul.
The young rhetoricianTrasymachusrushesin like a wild beast to tear his
discussion partnersto pieces. In a forcefulact, rhetorictries to turnthat
serene conversationinto a direct confrontationin which justice is deter-
mined by the interestsof the strong.This form of justice is situated in a
political context, regulated by the idea of the formulationof society
throughthe nomos.10The sphere of the nomos, or conventions, is fam-
iliar with the sphere of the doxa, the shadow of true reality. Rhetoric
thereforebelongs among the ambivalentformsof art.
The action of Trasymachusintroducesa rupturein the dialogue, a
crisis in language. Two texts are importanthere. Section 336d narrates
how Socratesdefuses rhetoricalpower by turningfirstto look at Trasy-
machus.Thisfirstlook makes it possible for Socratesto give an adequate
answerwithout loosing his language.The visual positionsof the partners
in the dialogue groundsthe possibilityof speaking in rhetoric.The rhet-
orician always speaks from a well-circumscribedlocation. His place is
relatedto and made possible by the others. Socratesis able to develop
his discoursefromthe fact that his own language(irony)comes to a cri-
sis, and from the fact that he takes the first initiative in this crisis: "I
glanced at him first,so that I became capable of answeringhim." The
possibilityof aphasia,the fall of language, is interruptedby the initiative
of the firstgrammaticalpronoun. The first person resiststhe disturbing
power of the meetingwith the other,who is picturedas an animal(336b
and 341 c). Here, the look is of centralimportance.
The second text is situatedbetween the two discussionsof Socrates
and Trasymachus(348a-b). Earlierthere were alreadysome allusionsto
the metaphorof trial.Penalty,ransom(337d), and witnesses (340a) were
all mentioned. These rhetoricalmetaphorsare reflected in 348a-b. A
fundamentalchoice is made concerningthe way in which conversation
can take place. A firstrhetoricalpossibilityis the agonistics in which a
discussion between equals is decided by putting aside the different
arguments(eris). A third person makes the final decision. The eris is
parallelto warfare,but with the violence interior.A judge (krites)can
decide which of the two partiesis right.But Socratesproposesto be at
the same time judge and advocate, and this in a kind of immanentdia-
logue of an ideal community, an enlargementof the firstgrammatical
pronoun, in which the investigationcan be perpetuated.The critical
judgementof a thirdinstance is hereby excluded and an immanentpat-
tern of communicationbecomes possible. This patternseems to be the
presuppositionfor a discussionof justice. L.Anckaert

547
 TheOrganizationof the Genres.The firstbook of the Republicdescribes
a crisis of languagethat leads to an unambiguouschoice. The thirdcrit-
ical instance of the judge is excluded. The result is an immanentcom-
munity in which communication is directed by the ideas. The triadic
structureof the two opponents who debate before a jury is replaced by
a binary structurein which every judge becomes a participantin the
dialogue. Thisexclusion was aimed at rhetoric.
A reading of the succeeding books shows that the classic literary
genres are excluded in the same way.11Platostructuresthe formsof art
according to the still dominant epics-lyrics-dramatriad: "And now I
think I can make plain to you what I was unable to before, that there is
one kind of poetry and tale-telling which works wholly through imi-
tation, as you remarked,tragedy and comedy; and another which
employs the recitalof the poet himself, best exemplified, I presume, in
dithyramb;and there is again that which employs both, in epic poetry
and in many other places, if you apprehend me" (394b-c). Drama
(tragedy and comedy), epics, and lyrics (dithyrambsbut also more
implicit didactics) show a descending grade of mimesis. At two points
these formsof artare evaluatedand/or excluded.
In the firsttext, the literarygenres are discussed in the frameof the
education of the guardians of the republic (376c-403c). The good
guardian has to fulfill a double condition: he has to be gentle to the
friendlyand harshto the hostile. The meaning of this distinction,which
is a formof philosophy(376b), can be fosteredby gymnasticsand music,
on the condition that they are attuned to each other harmoniously.
Concerningmusic, a distinctionis made between its true and false forms
(376e). Epics and dramaseem especially mendacious to Plato and are
therefore rejected for education. Their muthos puts a stamp or tupos
(377b) on the student. Plato formulatesa double criticism and hands
down a double criterionfor judgmenton theirplace in the republic.The
first materialcriticism is theological. As tupoi, the tales have to cor-
respondto a higher tupos that is a nomos. The first norm or canon of
narrativespeaking consists in assertingthat God is not the cause of all
things, but only of the good (380c). The second canon is the tupos that
the gods neitherare wizards in shape-shiftingnor mislead men by false-
hoods in words or deeds (383a). The second criticism has to do with
moral life. Mendacious tales can pervert the heart by, for example,
wrong representationsof the hereafter.The virtuousnessof the guardians
consists in the fact that underall conditionsthey preservethe true sense
of what is to be feared,that is, that the thingsto be feared are those that
the legislatorconveyed in his education and that they are as he con-
veyed them. Such education occurs accordingto the law (429c). Those
tales that do not fulfill these conditions are to be banned from the
East&West republicaccordingto the law.
Philosophy

548
 These two criticisms open up the following consideration. Plato
excludes two importantliterarygenres:the epic and tragedy.The mate-
rial reason is that these narrativewholes cannot function in the ideal
republicand can even be harmful.They are thereforeto be censored and
exposed to judgment on their ontotypological value.12 This judgment
can be passed by the philosophicalclass. All autonomyof arts is ruled
out. Moreover,this interpretationleads to the problematicof the neces-
sary lie. Plato linksthe formsof artwith the false or mendaciousand the
false with ignorance. Butas a pharmakon(382c), the lie is necessaryto
keep out certain dangers. A close reading of the Republic shows that
certain necessary lies or forms of art are to be introducedas legitimate
fundamentaloptions. In the firstplace, there is the mythof autochthony
(414d-e) and the myth of the metals (415a-d). These are epic tales that
instate the fundamentaldistinction between mine and yours. Besides
this, there is the lie that regulatesgenetic selection and organizes the
patternsof relation or the structureof desire (459c-e). These lies are
unavoidable. As a crisis of the truth they direct the guardiansto the
common good.
Two genres are eliminatedon the basis of materialreasons. Epicsor
tales about the origins are excluded as being subversivefor the estab-
lished order. Tragedy,as the direct confrontationof the dramatisper-
sonae, is also moved from the scene of platonic dialogue. Nevertheless
they can be replacedby ideologicaltexts. Butthere is also a more severe
reasonto exclude them. Tragedyand the epic are modes of an extremely
dangerousform of mimesis.This criticismis aimed at the way of speak-
ing (lexis).Tragedyis markedby the fact that the actor and authoriden-
tify themselves with the role of the character(393b). Speakingin direct
discourse makes it possible for the actor to imitatehis character.Owing
to this it becomes difficultto discernwho in fact speaks. The veracityof
the speaker is discredited because the content of the message is un-
coupled fromthe speaker.Inthis respect,tragedyis the most mimeticart.
The mimetic dimension of tragedy rendersit unfit as a medium of the
truth. In the currencyof the present there is a kind of dionysiac trans-
substantiationin which a person takes over the role of the other.13Indi-
rect discourse creates, on the contrary,a distance between the narrator
and the characters.14In other words, mimetic identificationbecomes a
threatbecause one becomes equal to the other. The originalnarratoris
absentfromthe text that is recitedand his place is takenover by another.
Mightnot this mimetic identificationbe the backgroundfor Plato's log-
ophobia;that is, mighthe not be respondingto the possible perversionof
a text in its parodyby another?
There remainsonly the pure style of dithyrambicpoetry.As directly
writtendown, the dithyrambdisplaysthe tracesof the authenticwriteror
speaker. But the music is also subject to certain conditions. The most L.Anckaert

549
 importantcomponent of music is the word, the logos (400a). This logos
has to be directedto the alreadymentionedtupoi.Only the panegyricto
the gods and the heroescan have a place in the republic.Concerningthe
melody, lamentationis to be avoided. Thereremainonly two tunes:the
tune of imposed obligation and the tune of free acceptance (399c).
Music remainsimportantbecause of the fact that "rhythmand harmony
findtheirway to the inmostsoul and take strongesthold upon it, bringing
with them an impartinggrace" (401d). The ultimatecondition for the
acceptance of music is knowledge of the eide (402c-d). Music is the
only form of art that leads to the realm of beauty (403c). It makes the
soul gentle to its own people. In this sense, it is to be combined with
gymnastics.
Because of this decision, dialogue appearsas the preeminentphilo-
sophical genre. The partnersin the dialogue are one another'switnesses
instead of judges. A witness as an external or third instance is of no
worth for the truth(Gorgias471e-472b, 474a-b, 475d-476a, and, the
Republic,454a-b). The mere fact that two people agree on a sentence
(homologia)is a sign of the truth.Outside those people who themselves
speak of the referent(the truth),no witnesses are admitted.This is in
extremecontrastwith rhetoricas the artof discussion in which the sub-
ject cannot be simply contemplatedbut is ensnared in a disputeand an
eris. Accordingto Plato,true rhetoricor dialogue is the artthat leads the
soul by means of the logos and that comes to the truth by means of
conversation.Submissionto the commonly desiredtruthexcludes every
third instance. In the Republica choice is made for the anhomologia
insteadof the diakrinein(348a-b).

The Exclusionof Art throughthe Ideal of Philosophy.Afterthe decisive

structurationof language, Socrates, in the course of the ensuing dia-
logue, develops justice as consistingin the fact thatevery class of people
does its own business accordingto naturalinclination.The principleof
justice opens up the possibilitythat intelligence,courage, and soberness
have a place in the republic,and it ensurestheirexistence (433a).Justice
in an individualperson consists in orderingthe three partsof the soul
such that they restrainone another. Plato pursues harmony between
society and individual life. His startingpoint is the principle of non-
contradiction:"It is obvious that the same thing will never do or suffer
opposites in the same respectand at the same time" (436b). This princi-
ple functionsas a hypothesis(437a) structuringthe whole dialogue.
This interpretationof justice is attained by an art of conversation
seeking the fundamentalnatureor the essence. Insightinto justice and
personal harmony are conditions stipulated for the candidate to rule
society. Only the philosopherfulfillsthis double condition. In the main
East&West part of the Republic, the education of the philosopher-guardianis
Philosophy

550
exploredfurther.The comparisonwith the sun, the image of the line, the
allegoryof the cave and its explanationdeepen the insightof justice and
the communityin which the philosophercan reign.
The possibly hierarchicalinterpretation of society, in which concrete
political action is deduced from a tupos of justice-and which is in this
sense a form of poiesis or ontotypology-is opened up and even made
possible by the idea of the Good. The Good is an exterioritythat tran-
scends being and makesknowledgepossible.The idea of the Good gives
to the object of knowledge its characterof truth and to the knowing
subject its power and capacity for knowledge. The Good makes it pos-
sible to climb by the force of dialogue to the highest principles. But
above all, this Good asks for a conversion (518d: periagoge)from the
world of shadows and doxa to the ideas. The candidate-philosopheror
politicianthereforemustendure a decisive crisis in his education,which
is thus described as the art of conversion. The firstcrisis in determining
justice consisted in criticismof the mimeticformsof languagesituatedin
the world of theatricalopinion. The second crisis consists in leaving the
visible world in order to transcend it by contemplatingthe ideas. This
momentof crisisexhibitsthe true meaningof philosophy.Philosophyis a
case of conversion,of crisisand decisive choice. The philosopherhas to
die from the world of opinions. Dying and being dead is the main pur-
pose of philosophy (Phaedo 64a). Dying means leaving the supposed
truthsthat are only the shadow of the true reality.Thus understood,phi-
losophy is an ars moriendias well as a conversion.15A certain percep-
tion of realityis left behindthat impliesthe death of a worldview in favor
of anotherperception.This means that philosophy consists of an option
that breakswith common opinion insofaras it is present in dominating
tales. Philosophy is oriented by the dazzling power of the Good that
makesthese tales possible. The condemnationof art is a consequence of
a life-option,ratherthan of a concrete theme in Plato'sphilosophy.16
This option transcendsthe world of opinion and breaks with epic
and drama.17These seem to be only shadow. In a firstcritique,the epic
and dramaticartswere rejectedas an inferiorform of speech about the
gods and human beings because the speakerformallyimitatesthe char-
acter or the other person. After insight into necessary conversion and
death in philosophy, these same arts appear as avoidable because the
objects they presentare themselves mimetic.
In the last book of the Republic, Plato speaks of poetry a second
time. His appreciationof poetryis totally negative.Thisjudgementis the
consequence of his conception of the right(orthoos)republic. Mimetic
poetry is banned because it lacks knowledge that could function as a
pharmakonagainst its own fallacies.
As in the firsttexts on art, poetry is banned because it is mimetic.
Nevertheless,mimesishas anothermeaninghere. Inbooks 2 and 3 of the L.Anckaert

551
 Republic,mimesis indicatedthe ambiguous relationbetween the actor
and the spoken message. This ambivalentrelationaffectsthe veracityof
the message. There were also materialtypological criteria.Book 10 of
the Republicfocuses on the veracityof the work of art and its influence
on the recipient.
The argument,which becomes possible throughthe insightinto true
dialectics ascending to the sunlightand descending into the shadows of
the cave-a dynamic that is markedby dying or metabole and commit-
ment in life-takes place in four waves. The work of art has only a
doubtfulontological status.The paintedcouch is a shadow of the many
couches which are themselves made according to the idea of a couch
(596b: pros ten idean [blepoon]). The painted couch is not even the
imitationof a truth,but only of a phantasm(598b: mimesisphantasma-
tos). The illusionarycouch stands to the many couches, which are a
realizationof the phusis or the eide, as the mimetesstandsto the demi-
ourgosor poietes, who imitatesthe phutourgos.Consequently,poetry is
an imitation of little ontological value. In the field of the relations
between the idea and the multiple realitiesthat markthe fundamental
relationsof political reality(the king-philosopher),there is no place for a
third order doubling the truth of the binary ontological structurein a
mirror.
This firstelement of criticismis linked to the epistemologicalstatus
of the artist.The poet, and Homeris the privilegedexample, pretendsto
have knowledge of everything.This is a travestyand mockery of the
ideal of justice that says how everyone has to fulfill his or her own task
by naturein harmony.The poets are nothingbut imitatorsof illusionand
shadows of virtuewithoutknowledge of the truth(600e). They represent
a disordered techne not focused on one object but on everything.
Because of this, theirpoems have no true content formedby a typology,
and theirensemble of rhythm,metre,and harmonysignifiesa dangerous
and fascinatingmagic (601b). The imitatordoes not possess knowledge
or a rightopinion (602a).The epic and tragedyin particularare criticized
here.
Thirdly,the artsare also anthropologicallysituated.Mimeticart is at
three levels away fromthe truth.Concupiscence,or the lower partof the
soul, is very open to shades, conjuring,the trickeryof poetry. By using
the above-mentionedprincipleof noncontradiction,the rationalpartof
the soul can penetratephantomswith the true logos and nomos of the
republic.The cheating of poetry,therefore,has its influence, especially
on the nonrationalpartof the soul, the pathos, with the primacyof con-
cupiscence. Artdestroysthe rationaljust as democracydestroysthe ideal
of politics.
Beginningfromthis last point, the ethical influence of a work of art
Philosophy &
East West can be demonstrated.The most severe charge against poetry is that it

552
can harm even honorable people. The ethical harmonyof humanityis
achieved by the logos and the nomos. When the pathosof poetic mimesis
gets the upper hand, there arises a dangerous perversionin which the
lower feelings of humanityare stimulated.Art thus affects virtue at its
very core. For the dikaiosuneexists in an inner harmonywhere every
part of the soul does its own business under the guidance of reason.
Justicein the republicconsists in the fulfillmentof propertasks.The poet,
who pretendsto be able to speak about everything,places these truths
before a mirrorthat changes every right relation and proportion.Art
thereforesignifiesfor the republicand for the individuala perverseand
diabolic rupture.Consequently, the poet has to be banned from the
republic.A single exception is made for panegyricson the gods and on
virtuouspersons. Forthis could be helpfulto the governmentand to the
life of humanity.Plato'stext on poetry closes by repeatingthe central
place of justice: "so that not the lure of honouror wealth or any office,
no, nor of poetryeither, should incite us to be careless of righteousness
and all excellence" (608b).

The Readeras Judge?In a final moment of reflectionon Plato, we will

investigatewhat all of this means for the reader.Plato'sworks are pre-
sented as dramaticdialogues: an ensemble of inscriptionsthat can be
read. The recipient brings these inscriptionsto life. Only in the act of
readingthe dialogue can this take place. But in this act of reading,the
readertakes the positionof judge, a thirdcriticalinstancethat can judge
who is right.Plato evades this triadicstructurethat is typical of drama.
This happens in a twofold manner.
At the level of the structureof the text, the internalpatternof the
organizationof languagefinds its correlatein the use of metalepsis.18As
a literarygenre, dialogue excludes every third instance. At the same
time, the thirdis irreduciblypresentin the formof the reader.Thismeans
that there exist two linguisticuniversesin which the dialogue is situated:
properimmanenceand the theatronof which the scene is a part.Despite
the thematicexclusion of the third,dialogue remainsa formof eris. But
at the momentthatthe public can judge, it mustbecome a participantin
the dialogue. The positionof the judge is exchanged for the positionof a
participantin the dialogue. This happensthroughthe use of the trope of
metalepsis.With metalepsisone steps from one linguisticuniverse into
another.The relationbetween the readerand Plato is substitutedfor the
relation between Plato and Socrates and ultimately for the relation
between Socratesand the participantsin the dialogue.
The prologueas mise en scene accomplishes an importantfunction.
At the beginning of the second book, Socratessays that the oration of
Trasymachusis taken up again and that the firstversion (in book 1) was
properly a prooimion (357a). The dangerous character of rhetoric is L.Anckaert

553
 repeated in an objective discourse, which incorporatesthe position of
the judge into the discourse(358b: "This,then, is what I propose to do,
with your concurrence. I will renew the argumentof Trasymachus").
With this differenceof levels, curtainsrise between the refractoryreader
and the text. The readeris thereby excluded as a deceptive third.One
who does not want to make the step to the text is kept at a distance as
someone who refusesconversionto the lightof the common truth.
Togetherwith the thematicexclusion of rhetoric,this stylisticproce-
duredisturbsthe dramaticstructureof the dialogue. Inwardly,dramaand
rhetoricare reducedto a maieuticmonologue in which the same is born;
outwardly,the Platonic text becomes a sacrosanct unit in which the
reader is excluded by the written characterof the text and the rise of
objectivizingcurtains.
This problematicis intimatelyrelatedto an evaluationof the written
word. The fascinatingand well-known analysis by Derridastates that
since Platothere exists a fear of the writtenword.19The writtenword is
markedby a tripleabsence. The author,the recipient,and the referential
world are absent. This results in repressionand logophobia. Once the
text exists as text, it is dead. The text has become a stone monument.20
This alienation is banned in the philosophy that wants to be presentat
original signification.Thus is the materialityof the text repressed,and
thus does logophobia arise. The materialityof script means a threatfor
the ideal community of communicationsince that materialitygrounds
the position of the judge. Perhapsthere exists an even more radical
threat in the written word. As written down, the text is prey to the
judgement of every possible other readerwho is not the intended re-
cipient. The materialityof the text implies that the text can be read in
other places and at other times. Everytext is exposed to a thirdpartyas
judge and advocate. The presence of this reader means a continuous
threatto the purityof the text that wants not to be materialbut only an
expressionof the highest ideas. The possibilityof parody,as a mirrorin
the third-rank,contains the greatestthreatto languageand to the ethics
that wants to be safe fromevery directconfrontationwith the other.

Language,Ethics,and the Other in Plato.Justas the demiourgosstruc-

turesthe cosmos, the enlightenedphilosophergives formto the political
and ethical order out of his knowledge of the idea of the Good.21This
ontotypologicalstructure,in which concrete life is an acceptableformof
(immediate)mimesis of the ideal life,22presupposes several decisions
concerning language. Languageis broughtto a certaincrisis where fun-
damentaldecisions are taken. The choice is twofold and reciprocal:the
primacyof the firstgrammaticalperson and the exclusion of every third
party.
East&West
Philosophy Plato's high ideal of ethics is possible throughthe exclusion of the

554
other, who, in rhetoric,appears as a possible dangerous rival. But the
reality of tragedy is also banned. In the tragic relation, one identifies
oneself with the other (mimesis1) and looks at a third-ratereality.In this
speculative movement,the diabolic ruptureof contact with the other is
banned. Besides, a historyis created in which change and becoming are
experiencedas threatening.The contaminationof desire (epithumia)and
honor (tim) disturbs ideal harmony. Nevertheless, these two modes
groundintersubjectivity. Butaccordingto Platothey are a perversionthat
affects the republic at its root and causes it to degenerate into the
rejectable democracy ruled by the tales. This crisis of language has
manifest consequences for the evaluation of the intersubjectiveand
ethical relations that always take place in time. The choice for ideal
existence implies an aversion to alterity and time. The enlightened
guardiancan structurethe republic only according to the principlesof
justice, enlightenedby the idea of the Good.
Many people contend that Plato's philosophy is a philosophy in
crisis. In that crisis a sentence is passed. When a common standpoint
mediating the differentpositions becomes possible-this is an aim of
rhetoric-the crisis is solved. Butperhapsthere is more at stake in Plato.
The problem may be a differend,23an unsurmountablecrisis in which
Plato tries to purify language from contaminationsthat could alienate
it from its own sources. Crisis therefore means a metanoia, a turning
away from language that hides the phusis in favor of the conventional
nomos.
of Language
Rosenzweigand the Multidimensionality
The Inversionof Plato's Ontological Relation.Afterthe deep cataclysm
of the FirstWorldWar, the dialogical thinkerF. Rosenzweig broke radi-
cally with the Platonic conception of reality.24The attitude of Plato
toward drama (and, mutatismutandis,rhetoric)was determinedby his
conception of truth.Temporalrealityis a shadow of ideal reality,which,
in turn, is made possible by the transcendentideal of the Good. Rosen-
zweig invertsthe image of Plato.The atemporaland autonomousfigures
of humanbeing, God, and the world, as they exist in theirarchaeological
depth, are a shadow of relationaland temporalreality:"Inother words,
forms [Schatten]that do not occupy the same space with what we call
our reality,our truth,our life, and yet hover over everythingthatgoes on
withinthatspace."25Where Platowanted to directthe prisoners'gaze to
the fire that articulatesessence and unity, Rosenzweig thinks that one
can peal visible realities like onions without finding anything on a
deeper level.
According to Rosenzweig reality exists in the multiple relations
between God, humanity,and the world. Truthis always a futureevent
that does not coincide with the actual time of reality.The fundamental L.Anckaert

555
 futuresuppliesa claim of truth.Beforeit is possibleto thinkthe relational
experience of reality,it is necessaryto thinkthe junctionsof this texture
as autonomous points. They form the shadows or the basement of the
buildingof reality.These mirrorrealitiesare no illusionarydeduction of
eternal reality but form the hidden matricesof existence, or the dark
womb from which relationallife can arise. Inspiredby the Spatphiloso-
phie of Schelling, Rosenzweig discovers these irreduciblegrounds in
mythical speech. In myths, temporaland relationalreality is solidified
into an eternal and unchangingfigure. Realityappears in petrifiedtime
and mute language.Mythabstractsfromthe actualityof reality.Realityis
shown in its most rudimentarystructureon this side of concrete exis-
tence. Myth expresses substances in the thin intervalsof atomic uni-
verses (cf. Democritus). It tears apart language and petrifies fluent
grammaticalconnections. This datum is not an insurpassableprimitive
stage but the unavoidablepresence of mythicaldarknessprojectingitself
again and again in realityand thereforein a certainsense constitutingit.
Mythprecedes lived reality.
Out of these ontological presumptionsit is possible for Rosenzweig
to understandcertainaspects of artas the presupposedexperience of the
autonomous ground of reality.This autonomy implies that represented
realityis irreducibleto somethingelse.

The Ontological Meaning of the Mythical Forms of Art. As shadow-

realties,the mythicalgroundsare representedin the formsof art (myth,
tragedy,and the plastic arts).26Artis autonomousand ontotypologically
independant.It is the representationof mere reality in its opacity and
materiality.Art shows realityas it is, on its own. This metaphoricalor
centripetalcharacterof art,in which realityis representedin an image, is
contraryto the metonymicalstructure,in which the representedimage
is a displacementor camouflage of idea, reality.27As a symbolic and
unconsciousorder,the metaphoricalsignifierscreate the differencesthat
make significationsof God, human beings, and world possible. Thus
they ground a pluralisticuniverse that is radicallyopposed to the Pla-
tonic worldview.
Althoughartis autonomous,it standsin a mirroringrelationto reality
(Star,p. 38). Thatautonomy impliesthat art, as a condensed shadow of
reality,presentsthe dark ground of that realityas well as the Olympic
lightnessof being. The mimetic relationof art must not be understood
in a Platonic way. As a mirror,the reign of beauty is the visual con-
densation or representationthat gives depth to reality. This archaeo-
logical structureis as originalas realityitself.The shadow realityof art is
the foundationof reality.Art is a world of mute understanding,a world
without real coherence or relation.Yet the differentcontents of art can
PhilosophyEast& West be broughtto life. Beforeevery real language,artas the languageof the

556
ineffable originates the first and mute understandingof the archaeo-
logical depths of spoken existence.
Myth, Tragedy,and the PlasticArtsas AutonomousPerceptionsof Real-
ity. Myth, the plastic arts, and tragedy are, according to Rosenzweig,
expressionsof the experience of the autonomy of God, the world, and
humanity.Artis governed by three laws. The firstlaw, with regardto the
external form, expresses the divine character of art (Star, p. 38). It
demandsthat the work of art be closed fromeverythingthat is not itself.
The reign of beauty is an autonomous reign. The work of art is closed
from the world by a crystallinewall: visible to the world but separated
from it.
Besides the formal demand of beauty, art is also governed by the
plastic law of innercoherence (Star,pp. 60-61). The partsof the workof
artexhibita necessarycoherence between the whole and the partsof the
whole. This coherence is immediatelygiven and not broughtabout by
an entity situatedoutside the work of art, for example the realitythat is
mirroredor imitated.This inner coherence forms the structureof the
work of art. It is the groundof the beautifulfigureof art.Coherence rep-
resents an autonomous sphere of meaning. This sphere is in the first
place meaningful,proceedingfrom its own structureand not as a repre-
sentationof somethingelse. Meaning is an independentgame of signif-
icance parallel to the reality of the world. Art properlyrepresentsthe
originaland irreduciblecharacterof reality.
Thirdly,there is the question of the content of art (Star,pp. 80-81).
This content is staged preeminentlyby Greek tragedy. Tragedy is the
languageof the ineffablemysteryof the solitude of finite man. The silent
and mutepresence in the archaeologicaldepthof existenceformsthe real
content of art.On the stage, the existentialcondition of humanity,oscil-
latingbetween fate and freedom, is made comprehensiblebut unspeak-
able. Such a representationof the humancondition is the presupposition
of real language. The visualizationof mute art is the plastic dimension
that precedes the existence of language.In silence, the tragichero burns
all bridges with God and the world and retreatsinto his or her own
silence.28 Greek tragedy is markedby the paradoxicalthematizationof
silence.
It is not surprisingthat death is the truthof the tragichero. In death,
the hero is shown in his or her ultimatesolitude and irreducibility.The
idea of immortalityis the consequence of this tragic option: heroes do
not die. The ancient doctrineof metempsychosisis the answer here.
The Epic, the Lyric,and Drama as Formsof Relationality.Rosenzweig
presentshis work explicitly as a drama. In StarI, the dramatispersonae
are presented in metaphoricaldensity before entering the scene (Das
neue Denken, p. 147). Star II, which deals with the relationsbetween L.Anckaert

557
 God, humanity,and the world, sketchesthe dramaticevent of relational
reality. Seemingly in parentheses, Rosenzweig also handles his con-
ception of the three literarygenres.29Nevertheless,this marginaltext is
the royal road to Rosenzweig'striadicthinkingof reality.The different
possibilities of language are explored starting from the structureof
grammaticalpronounsand the modes of time.
The epic, lyrical,and dramaticcomponentsof every work of art are
generatedfrom the combinationof the three laws that govern art. The
narrative-epiccomponent groundsthe content of the event. The combi-
nationof the beautyof the whole with the individualspheresof meaning
resultsin a spatialframeworkfor the content of the narration.The epic
component is the fruitof the work of the artistor author. It opens the
space for the time of narration.This impliesthatthe artistcould be pres-
ent at the work of art. But as a genius, the artistcan relate with great
effortthe autonomyof beauty with respectto possible spheresof mean-
ing. In this act, the artistgathers heaven and earth. Fromhis own nar-
rative tradition, Rosenzweig interpretsthis act as the biblical epic of
creation. By relating God and world, Genesis 1 creates the space
wherein the things can appearas work. This concept of creation is con-
trasted with the Timaeusof Plato, where the demiourgos presses his
tuposon realityand createsa hierarchicalontology of unity,where every
being receives its value fromthe mimesisof the tupos. Epic,on the con-
trary,realizesa relationas the resultof a fundamentalsymbolic Differenz
that precedes every meaningand even makesevery meaningpossible.
The dialogical-lyricalcomponent generatesthe formaldepth of the
work of art. The lyrics consists in the oblivion of solipsism and of the
multiplicityof things.Thisoblivion of the plasticspatialdimensionsof art
makes possible the aestheticizationof the most personal human exis-
tence. The concentrationof autonomous beauty on the individualistic
time of the humanbeing, which formsthe content of art, makes it possi-
ble for an individualwork of art to representa universalvalue. The lyr-
ical dimensionof art moves at the limitof oblivion and the transcending
of individualtime. This structureof unhiddennessmarksthe work of art
as such. It is the realityof art itself. Forthis reason,art has its own onto-
logical place. The formof art'signifies'the openness of the humanbeing
(tragicfigure)to exteriority(mythicfigure).The workof artis the irruption
of the other into the immanence of solipsistic existence. The lyrical
structuregroundsthe dialogical concept that arises from the confront-
ation between the first and second grammaticalpersons. The Song of
Songs, which is writtenin the modalityof intersubjectivity,is the narra-
tive expression.The dialogue in the Song of Songs is supportedby only
one objective phrase,namelythat love is as strongas death (8:6).
The properdramaticcomponent, that is, the poetic, representsthe
&
East
Philosophy West relation between God, humanity,and the world and links the material

558
possibilitiesof the epic space with the personaltime of lyric depth. This
symbiosis of interiorityand exterioritytakes place in reception. It is the
functionof the recipient.The poetical force of artsariseswhen the work
of art reaches its recipient. Art changes the world insofar as art is
received. Poetryfinds its origin in representingthinking.Thoughtis the
element of poetry,as space and time are the elementsof epics and lyrics.
In dramaticpoetry,the tonalitythat colors the poem and the vocabulary
of the poet are gatheredand broughtto life in the content of the poem.
The thought representedin drama is no representationor mimesis of a
tupos situated outside the work of art, but an autonomous whole of
meaning that manifests itself in the tonality and the materialityof the
words. Rosenzweig is far from Plato'sconception of music. Plato could
claim that in music the melody and the rhythmhad to correspondwith
the logos that was standarizedontotypologically.Accordingto Rosen-
zweig, in poetry there arises an original way of thinking that brings
tonality (as the equivalentof melody) and the word together in a repre-
sentation.Inthis combination,dramaticand poetic artdoes not represent
a deeper or higheridea, but bringsthe recipientto real life as it is lived in
the personal sphere of existence. Life is representedin poetic art as a
drama, a relationalgame with differentdimensions of existence. This
drama is not a third-raterepresentationof a timeless idea, but the ex-
pression of life situated in the multidimensionalrealityof time. Drama
is thereforenot the most detestableformof art,but that artwhich brings
the recipientto life.

Language,Time,and Alterity.Accordingto Rosenzweig,dramaticpoetry

is the highestformof art.As a play between the divine, the human,and
the world, dramaimplies a radicalrehabilitationof the alteritythat Pla-
to's Republicexperiencedas a threatof the symmetricaland hierarchical
order. The represseddimension of the second grammaticalpronoun is
lifted up to its properdimensions. This movement implies an intersub-
jective interpretationof the whole of reality. Rosenzweig recognizes
anothertopographyof the linguisticfield than does Plato, the eminent
representativeand founderof the Greektradition.
Rosenzweig's structure of linguistic possibilities, as brought in
through the literarygenres, is linked with the triadic structureof pro-
nouns and the modalities of time. A rereadingof the Grammar(Star,
pp. 124-131, 173-185, 227-238), augmentedby Rosenzweig'scritique
on Buber's Ich und Du,30 makes it possible to describe the relation
between linguisticforms,pronominalforms,and temporalmodes.
As the language of creation, the epic is governed by the deictic
functions by which an object is defined against others. The privileged
verbalform is the thirdperson indicative.This means that things are put
side by side in an objective space. This objective and past dimension L.Anckaert

559
 expressesthe presence of the perceptibleworld. As the languageof rev-
elation, the lyric is generated from the original first person. The I is
appealed to in the vocative. Throughshame, openness to the second
person arises.The verbal modalityis that of the imperative,the mode of
the first and the second person in actual time. As the language of
redemption,drama is grounded in the sentence "Erist gut." This sen-
tence is spoken in the optative,the mode of futuretime, and in the first-
person plural,the mode of community.

The Epic The Lyric Drama

1/3? person 1/2? person 1?/2 /3? person
indicative imperative optative
past present future
creation revelation redemption

Rosenzweig's critique of Buber'sIch und Du makes it possible to

nuance this first scheme. A first aspect of Rosenzweig'scriticismcon-
cerns Buber'sunderestimationof the Ich-Esrelation.Fromthe firstpages
on, Bubermakes an importantdistinctionbetween the two fundamental
words Ich-Duand Ich-Es.This distinctionconverges with the distinction
experience-relation.The world of relationscontainsthe communitywith
nature (das Leben mit der Natur),with humanity(das Leben mit den
Menschen), and with ideal values (das Leben mit den geistigen We-
senheiten).These relationsare exclusive and assume the whole of real-
ity. Relationswith the objective world are reduced by labeling them as
objective and past (Gegenstand).True reality is a matterof presence
(Gegenwart).This implies a monopolizationof presence and an under-
estimation of the Ich-Esrelation.31Rosenzweig places the spoken Es
againstthe thought Es. The Es is markedby its own autonomy, in con-
trast with the Du in Buber's Ich-Du relation. It representsthe objec-
tivity of the narratedpast. The third person expresses this past inde-
pendence of reality.This dimension is linked with the Ich-Du relation
and must not be disconnected. The three grammaticalpronouns are
interrelatedand not isolated entities. The isolation of dialogical lyrics
from epics, accordingto Rosenzweig, makes every dramaticinteraction
impossible.
In the second point of his critique, Rosenzweig investigates the
temporalityof fundamentalwords. In contrast to Buber, Rosenzweig
distinguishesan Er-Es,an Ich-Du, and a Wir-Esrelation-respectively,
creation,revelation,and redemption.AgainstBuber,Rosenzweigdenies
the primacyof the Gegenwartand thinks the relationstemporally.The
conclusion is that the multiple manifestationof the other, in the pro-
nouns, implies a multiplicityof times that is possible only throughthe
East
Philosophy & West multiplicityof language.

560
EthicalDynamics and the Formsof Art. The rehabilitationof the three
literarygenres makes it possible to set up a triadicway of thinkingthat
transcendsthe binary oppositions predominantin Western philosophy
since Plato.
Rosenzweigdevelops a vision of the dynamicsof the ethical subject
that leaves behindthe autarkeiaof the Greek-Westernculture.According
to Plato,justice exists in the realizationof propertaskswithinthe ordered
republic.This order is markedby a strongparallelismbetween the parts
of the soul, with their virtues, and the classes of society. Conversely,
Rosenzweig comprehends the ethical dynamic in a triadic way. As a
solipsisticand autonomousfigure,the human being is characterizedby
an unconditionedbut finite freedomand a potentialfor human possibil-
ities. Freedomis originallydirectedtowardthe realizationof the intrinsic
humanity.As a perceptionof the firstpronoun,the I, freedom meets its
limitsand is confrontedwith what transcendsit, the word and the law,
which interrogatesfreedom in a personalconfrontationof its legitimacy.
In this feeling of metaphysicalshame, freedom is reoriented.The per-
sonal transcendenceof alterityconfrontsthe self-satisfiedfreedom with
its finitudeand impotencebut reachesat the same time a new space and
time. Freedom is freed from its solipsism in assuming an ethical task.
Afterthis experience of conversion,the other person appeals as a repre-
sentative of an objective but finite world (the third person) awaiting
completion.The irreducibleappearanceof the other person introducesa
structuralalterity into existence. Attention to this alterity is possible
because freedom is convertedfrom itself.The answer of freedom exists
in the realizationof an intrinsichumanityin favorof the unaccomplished
world. The objective world is the structuralfield of action wherein free-
dom can be exteriorized in the humanization of the world. Ethical
redemptionconsists in the fact that the I meets the objectivity of the
world as a second person. This ethical relation is not the immediate
realizationof freedom in the world or a subject-objectrelation,but is
made possible by metaphysicalalterity.The distinctionbetween the ori-
gin (freedom),the presuppositions(alterity),and the concrete field of
action (world) is, in Rosenzweig's thought, reflected as the relation
between the three grammaticalpronouns.The binary relationbetween
freedom and world is left behind to interpretthe ethical relationfrom a
transethicalpoint of view that makes ethical actuality in the present
possible but also transcendsit.
This multidimensionalthinkingof the ethical relationwith the other
as transcendenceand the other as an appeal for commitmentis, in the
text of Rosenzweig, made possible by takingseriouslythe ambiguitiesof
language and by avoiding a repressionof its rich possibilities.The dif-
ferent literarygenres form a frameworkin which it is possible to inter-
relatethe rich meaningsof the divine, the human, and the world. These L.Anckaert

561
 archaeologicalsignifierswere instauredin the mythicalformsof art.Epic
space and lyricdepth open a sphere of meaning in which humanitycan
be confrontedwith a realitythat appearsin the second person.The val-
uation of this thirddimension implies the end of the binarysymmetries
that markWesternethical thinking.In his studyon Hegel32and in some
remarkson the Star, Rosenzweig shows how the irreducibilityof the
human person who exists outside world history implies a permanent
critiqueof the flow of history.It is not that historyjudges, but that the
alterityof the second person makesthe anonymousobjectivityof history
impossible.Inspiredby this, C. Chalierspeaks of a promisedhistorythat
is a radical critiqueof the bloody revolutionsand evolutions in world
history.33

Thinkingout of Conversion.As in Plato, Rosenzweig'sthinking is the

fruitof a conversion. Underthe influence of Meinecke and Rickert,the
young Rosenzweigconsideredthe world a sequence of relativestages. A
fixed point of truththat can orient reality was not possible. The year
1913 was very importantfor Rosenzweig'sbiography.It is seen as the
year of his conversion. His conversationswith Rosenstock-Huessy,who
convertedfromJudaismto Christianity,and his perceptionof Jewish lit-
urgy should have pointed Rosenzweig toward the absoluteness of the
loving God. This conversionwas strengthenedby the experience of the
FirstWorld War. Throughthis experience he no longer saw the world
fromthe standpointof a spectatorsurveyingits passingepisodes but as a
scene in which God, humanity,and the world are the actors.This con-
version signifieda step fromthe position of spectatorto that of actor. In
this sense, it can be comparedwith the incorporationof the spectatorin
Plato'stext. Butthe conversion is not merely a hagiographicalor anec-
dotal datum.As in Plato, it is the heartbeatof thinking.Where the Pla-
tonic traditionfinds in death or in crisisthe way out of the illusionsof the
temporalworld (philosophyas ars moriendi),the shock of death means
for Rosenzweig the conversion from the binary discourse of Western
philosophythat dies to concrete realityin orderto find a higher level of
reality.The firstpages of the Starcan be read as a critiqueof Socrates'
swan song in the Phaedoand as an aversionto the stoic ideal of aphobia
and amor fati.The frighteningrealityof death is the cry of Nietzsche to
remainfaithfulto the earth.The traumaof death places man before the
horribleabyss of nothingness. Existentialdoubt about the existence of
God, the realityof the world, and the freedomof humanityundermines
the pillars of Western-idealisticthought. Humanitycannot escape this
anxiety by moving in a paralleldiscoursethat would transcendthe cor-
ruptionof time by postulatingan ideal and eternal reality. But in this
anxiety, humanityis converted from the otherwordlyspeculationsthat
PhilosophyEast& West tear it away fromthe concrete world.As Platointerpretedthe conversion

562
in the cave as therapy,34so does Rosenzweig interpretthe conversion
from idealisticphilosophyas the healing of sick thinking.35Rosenzweig
pleas for a therapyfrom Platonicconversion.

The Readerand the Metaphorof the Trial.It is remarkablethat in Rosen-

zweig's discoursethe metaphorof the trial received new attention.Kant
and Hegel show that this metaphornever left Westernphilosophy. But
the judge remained immanent.Accordingto Rosenzweig, human free-
dom has to be justifiedbefore a transcendentjudge. Afterthe crisis in
personal confrontationwith the law, freedom is turned into an ethical-
redemptivedynamic focused on the world. This process of conversion,
which is made possible throughthe presence of the judge, culminatesin
the dramaticinteractionsof the humanbeing in the world.The liturgy,as
religiousdrama,expresses this future-orientedand dynamic interaction.
Afterthe confrontationwith the law as a second person,the firstperson
is opened to a common we. As hymn, it formsthe culminatingpoint of
the community.The first-personpluralincludes everyone but also finds
an irrecuperablelimit. Because the community is the answer to a tran-
scendent call directedat freedom, it is always situated.Butopenness for
the future implies that the community cannot be the end point or a
closed totality.In its dynamic of being an answer, the communityrefers
to an external instance that can criticize. The ethical dynamic of re-
demptionstandsunderthe judgmentof absolutetranscendence.
This twofold rehabilitationof the juridic metaphoris linked to the
way in which Rosenzweig presents his text to the reader. In contrast
to Plato, Rosenzweig presents a narrative(epic) philosophy. The Star
unfolds, in an architectonicway, God, humanity,and the world, and
subsequentlycreation, revelation,and redemption,and finallyJudaism,
Christianity,and truth.This systematic concept is nevertheless broken
open by an existentialway of thinking.Anxietybeforedeath, the twilight
of the gods, and the relativizationof the world cross the systemof StarI;
the dialogical relationsand the topics of guilt, reconciliation,and ethical
appeal limitthe structureof StarII.Systematicdiscourse is continuously
disturbedby an existential way of speaking. Nevertheless,this way of
speaking remains within the limits of the epic genre. But in the final
sentence, the readeris directlyaddressed.Afterthe objective, analytical,
and synthetic lecture of the speculative story, the reader is invited to
contemplatethe whole as a second person and to enter into a dialogue.
Justas the lyricalrelationin the Song of Songswas groundedin only one
objective sentence, epic philosophyis by only one sentence transformed
into a dialogical and dramaticlinguisticgame that at the same time fas-
cinates and keeps the readerat distance:"Whither,then, do the wings of
the gate open? Thou knowest it not?Intolife" (Star,p. 424). Afterending
the Star, Rosenzweig wrote numerous letters,short commentaries,and L.Anckaert

563
 manytranslations.His conversionto the dramaticstructureof life made it
impossible to think only in an objective way. This has to do with the
interpretationof script. Accordingto Plato, writingwas a deduction of
the spoken word. Logophobiaarose out of this. But,accordingto Rosen-
zweig, the writtenword, especially Hebrew as a holy language, has a
materialalteritythat questions the spoken word. Writtenlanguage pre-
cedes humanfreedomandcriticizesit.Thus,scriptureis nota degeneration
or corruptionof the presence that characterizesspeech and Western
thinking,but its alterityis, as judge, the critiqueof acting and thinking.
Conclusion
Ethicaldiscourse is not autonomous, but is made possible by the
linguisticfield in which it is expressed. Languageis not only an instru-
ment of communicationbut the possibilityof thinking.Plato'stext illus-
tratesthat languagehas to be broughtto a crisisbefore ethical reflection
can be developed. Rosenzweigshows the ambiguityof this judgement.
When certain linguistic possibilities are excluded, certain dimensions
of reality cannot be articulated.Censure is both formative(Plato)and
dangerous(Rosenzweig).

NOTES

1 - This text is based on a lecture, "Taal, ethiek en de andere: Een

comparatieve studie van Plato and Rosenzweig," given on the
occasion of The FirstInternationalConferenceon the Possibilities
and Applicationof ComparativePhilosophy, Antwerp (Belguim),
16-18 September 1994. Some of its ideas are the result of an
intense dialogue with Drs. P. Thoen and Drs. G. van Coillie, whom
I cordiallythank.
2 - E. Auerbach, Mimesis: Dargestellte Wirklichkeitin der abend-
landischen Literatur(Bern, 1946); J. Wertheimer, "Der Guter
Gefahrlichste,die Sprache," in Zur Krise des Dialogs zwischen
Aufklarungund Romantik(MOnchen,1990).
3 - S. Rimmon-Kenan,NarrativeFiction:ContemporaryPoetics (Lon-
don/New York, 1984); R. Jakobson,"Linguisticsand Poetics," in
T. A. Serbeok,ed., Style in Language(Cambridge,Massachusetts,
1960, pp. 350-358), and U. Eco, Lectorin fabula:Le role du lec-
teurou la Cooperationinterpretativedans les textes narratifs,Biblio
Essais, 4098 (Paris, 1993).
4 - The deconstructioniststrategyof readingis inspiredby Nietzsche's
East&West
Philosophy texts on rhetoric:FriedrichNietzsche on Rhetoricand Language,

564
 ed. and trans.by S. Gilman, C. Blair,and D. J. Parent(New York/
Oxford, 1989); F. Nietzsche, "On Rhetoric:Descriptionof Ancient
Rhetoric:Lecture,Summer, 1874, 3 Hours," in C. Blair, "Nietz-
sche's Lectureon Rhetoric,"Philosophyand Rhetoric16, (1983):
94-129. See also S. Ijsseling,Rhetoricand Philosophyin Conflict:
An HistoricalSurvey(The Hague, 1976); the variouscontributions
to S. Ijsselingand G. Vervaecke, eds., Renaissancesof Rhetoric,
(Symbolae, FacultatisLitterarumLovaniensis,Series D: Litteraria,
vol. 7, (Louvain, 1994); and A. Tebartz-VanElst, Asthetik der
Metapher: Zum Streit zwischen Philosophie und Rhetorik bei
FriedrichNietzsche (Freiburg/MOnchen, 1994).
5 - Wertheimer,Der GuterGefahrlichste,p. 16.
6 - E. Levinas, who, after the holocaust, takes over Rosenzweig's
thinkingin a sublime manner,is ambivalentregardingthe Socratic
maieutic.The least one can say is thatthe Levinasianinterpretation
of being taughtby the idea of the Infiniteis far more than Socrates'
pedagogy of recollection.Cf. E. Levinas,Totalit6et Infini:Essaisur
I'exteriorite(The Hague, 1968), pp. 52, 211, 236, 256.
7 - Citing Plato in Twelve Volumes,with an Englishtranslationby O.
Shorey,LoebClassicalLibrary,(London/Cambridge, Massachusetts,
1969). See also J. Annas, An Introductionto Plato's Republic
(Oxford,1981).
8 - Diogenes Laertius, De vitis, dogmatibus et apophthegmatibus
clarorumphilosophorum,III,37.
9 - Gorgias,EncomionHelenae, par.8. Cf. S. Ijsseling,Rhetoric,13-25
and idem., Apollo, Dionysios, Aphroditeen de anderen Griekse
goden in de hedendaagsefilosofie(Baarn,1994, 84-126).
10 - Cf. K. Dorter,"Socrates'Refutationof Trasymachusand Treatment
of Virtue,"Philosophyand Rhetoric7 (1974): pp. 26-27.
11 - Cf. C. Verhoeven, "Sofisten:Natuuren conventie," in Verhoeven,
Een velijnen blad: Essays over aandacht en achterdocht (Baarn,
1989, 163-173).
12 - In Gorgias510e-502b, Plato indicatesan explicit parallelbetween
rhetoricand the other literaryarts.
13 - This"onto-typo-logical"interpretationof the artsis based on D. De
Schutter'slecture, "Lacoue-Labarthe over politiek als fictie," given
at the Werkgroepfranse politieke filosofie, at the K. U. Leuven
CampusKortrijk, on 25 May 1994.
14 - Cf. Euripides,The Bacchanals, in Works,vol. 3, ed. A. S. Way,
LoebClassicalLibrary,(London,1962), vv. 775-861. L.Anckaert

565
 15 - C. Verhoeven,Het medium van de waarheid:Beschouwingenover
Plato'shouding tegenoverde poezie (Baarn,1988, 132-136).
16 - Cf. K. Bormann,Platon(Freiburg/M0nchen, 1993, 37-44).
17 - This is the thesis of Verhoeven,ibid.
18 - Diogenes Laertius,De vitisIII,5-6, arguesthat Plato'smeetingwith
Socratesmeanta rupturewith his past as tragedian.
19 - Cf.J.-F.Lyotard,Le differend(Paris,1983).
20 - J. Derrida,"Lapharmaciede Platon"and "Ladouble seance," in
La dissemination,Collection Points, Essays265, (Paris,1993, 77-
213, 214-347).
21 - Cf. D. Thiel, PlatonsHypomnemata:Die Genese des Platonismus
aus dem Geda'chtnisder Schrift(Freiburg/Munchen, 1993).
22 - Cf. L. Schafer,"Herrschaftder Vernunftund Naturordnungin Pla-
tons Timaios,"in L.Schaferand E. Stroker,eds., Naturauffassungen
in Philosophie, Wissenschaft,Technik,band 1, Antike und Mittel-
alter(Freiburg/Munchen, 1993), 49-83.
23 - J. Derridadistinguishesdifferentshiftsin the concept of mimesis("La
double seance," n. 8). The 'good' form reproducesthe pregiven
idea, the 'bad' form-in our reading, the third-rankmimesis-
appearsas a mad play.
24 - J.-F. Lyotard, Le diff6rend.
25 - F. Rosenzweig, "Der Sternder Erlisung,"in Der Mensch und sein
Werk:GesammelteSchriften,band 2, ed. R. Mayer (The Hague,
1976) (translation:TheStarof Redemption,trans.R. Hallo [London,
1970]); L. Anckaertand B. Casper, FranzRosenzweig:A Primary
and Secondary Bibliography,InstrumentaTheologica 7 (Louvain,
1990).
26 - "Das neue Denken", in GesammelteSchriften,band 3, ed. R. and
A. Mayer, p. 146 (translationtaken from N. N. Glatzer, Franz
Rosenzweig:His Lifeand Thought[New York,1953], p. 194).
27 - Cf. Z. Levy,"Uber FranzRosenzweigsAuffassungdes Mythos,"in
W. Schmied-Kowarzik,ed., Der Philosoph Franz Rosenzweig
(Freiburg/M0nchen, 1988), 987-996.
28 - Cf. L. Anckaert,"FranzRosenzweigs Sternder Erldsung:Een her-
meneutischeen retorischebenadering,"in R. Munkand F. J. Hoo-
gewoud, eds., Joodse filosofie tussen rede en traditie:FestschriftH.
J. Heering(Kampen,1993), 223-241.
29 - Cf. J. P. Vernant,"Tensionset ambigute'sdans la tragedie grec-
East&West
Philosophy que," in J. P. Vernantand P. Vidal-Naquet,Mythe et tragedieen

566
 Grece ancienne, tome 1 (Paris,1986), p. 25: "La tragedie prend
naissance quand on commence a regarderle mythe avec I'oeil du
citoyen. Maisce n'est pas seulement I'universdu mythequi sous ce
regard perd sa consistance et se dissoud. Le monde de la cite
se trouve du meme coup mis en question et, a traversle debat,
conteste dans ses valeursfondamentales."
30 - Star,pp. 145-150; 188-198; 242-248. Star.p. 191: "Artremains
piecework.... And thus art is an essential episode, albeit only an
episode, for us in all the books of this Part."Besidesthis statement
Rosenzweigclaims that "amongeverythingSpoken,it is thatwhich
not should remainunspoken."Artnot only must be interpretedas
objective datum, but becomes a revelationwhen it is taken up in
language.Rosenzweigconcludes his treatiseon the artsby stressing
the importanceof aesthetics: "There [at the end of Star II] it will
also become clear that this whole doctrine of arts is, in the final
analysis,more afterall than a mereepisode as which, admittedly,it
figures here" (Star,p. 198). Rosenzweig explicitly links his aes-
thetics of the literarygenres with his considerationson art,in StarI.
Star,p. 191: "In the previousbook we began to describe its basic
concepts; now we continue this descriptionon the basis of reve-
lation,the 'category'which has been added in this book."
31 - M. Buber,"Ich und Du," in Buber, Das dialogische Prinzip(Hei-
delberg, 1954; 1984), 5-136. Rosenzweig wrote his critique in a
letter to Buber:"Briefe und Tagebucher,"GesammelteSchriften,
band 1, pp. 824-827. The most importantarticle on this topic is
B. Casper,"FranzRosenzweig'sCriticismof Buber's'I and Thou',
in H. Gordon and J. Bloch, eds., MartinBuber:A CentenaryVol-
ume (New York,1984), 139-159.
32 - "Briefe und Tagebucher,"p. 824 [undated letter to Buber]:"Sie
geben dem Ich-Du im Ich-Eseinen Kruppelzum Gegner. Dag die-
ser Kruppeldie moderne Welt regiert,andertnichts daran, daB es
ein Kruppelist. Dieses Eshaben Sie freilich leicht abfuhren."
33 - Hegel und der Staat(Munchen/Berlin,1920).
34 - C. Chalier,L'histoirepromise (Paris,1992).
35 - Cf. C. Verhoeven, "De bekeringvan Socrates,"in Verhoeven, De
letterals beeld (Baarn,1987), 91-106.

L.Anckaert

567