HON.

JUSTICE PERLAS-BERNABE DECISIONS

(2012 to 2018)
CRIMINAL LAW

2012 DECISIONS

PEOPLE v. MATIAS
G.R. No. 186469, 13 June 2012
"Rape" under Article III, Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610

Facts: In the evening of 6 June 2004, AAA, a minor, having been born on 23 April 1991, was on
her way to the vegetable stall of a certain “Manuela.” Suddenly, accused pulled her towards a
house that was under construction. There, he forced her to lie on a bamboo bed, removed her
shorts and underwear, and inserted his finger and then his penis into her vagina. Accused
threatened to kill her if she reported the incident to anyone.

When AAA arrived home, she narrated to her mother and aunt what happened.
Thereafter, they reported the incident to the barangay and then the Baler District Police Station.
After trial, the RTC, convicted accused of “rape” under Article III, Sec. 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610.
The CA affirmed the RTC Decision in toto.

Issue: Whether or not accused was correctly convicted of “rape” under Article III, Sec. 5(b)
of R.A. No. 7610.

Held: Yes. Under Article III, Sec. 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 in relation to R.A. No. 8353, if the victim
of sexual abuse is below 12 years of age, the offender should not be prosecuted for sexual abuse,
but for statutory rape under Article 266-A(1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and penalized
with reclusion perpetua. On the other hand, if the victim is 12 years or older, the offender should
be charged with either sexual abuse under Article III, Sec. 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 or rape under
Article 266-A (except paragraph 1[d]) of the RPC. However, the offender cannot be accused of
both crimes for the same act because his right against double jeopardy will be prejudiced. A
person cannot be subjected twice to criminal liability for a single criminal act. Likewise, rape
cannot be complexed with a violation of Article III, Sec. 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610. Under Section 48
of the RPC, a felony under the Revised Penal Code (such as rape) cannot be complexed with an
offense penalized by a special law.

In this case, the lower courts erred in convicting accused of “rape” under Article III, Sec.
5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua based on their finding that AAA
was a minor below 12 years old at the time of the commission of the offense on 6 June 2004.
However, a scrutiny of the records shows that AAA was born on 23 April 1991, which would
make her 13 years old at the time of the commission of the offense on 3 June 2004. Thus, accused
can be prosecuted and convicted either under Sec. 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 for sexual
abuse, or under Article 266-A of the RPC, except for rape under paragraph 1(d). It bears pointing
out that the penalties under these two laws differ: the penalty for sexual abuse under Sec. 5(b),
Article III of R.A. No. 7610 is reclusion temporal medium to reclusion perpetua, while rape under
Article 266-A of the RPC is penalized with reclusion perpetua.

CRISOLOGO v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 199481, 3 December 2012
Debts incurred by corporate agents are not their
direct liability but of the corporation they represent,
except if they contractually agree/stipulate or assume
to be personally liable for the same.
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Facts: Petitioner Crisologo, as President of Novachemical Industries, Inc. (“Novachem”),

applied for commercial letters of credit from China Banking Corporation (“Chinabank”) to
finance the purchase of 1,600 kgs. of amoxicillin trihydrate micronized from Hyundai Chemical
Company based in Seoul, South Korea and glass containers from San Miguel Corporation
(SMC).

Chinabank issued Letters of Credit. After petitioner received the goods, he executed, on
behalf of Novachem, the corresponding trust receipt agreements dated 24 May 1989 and 31
August 1989 in favor of Chinabank. On 28 January 2004, Chinabank, through its Staff Assistant,
Ms. Maria Rosario De Mesa (Ms. De Mesa), filed a Complaint, charging petitioner with violation
of P.D. No. 115 in relation to Article 315 par. 1(b) of the RPC, for his purported failure to turn-
over the goods or the proceeds from the sale thereof despite repeated demands. It averred that
accused, with intent to defraud, and with unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence, misapplied,
misappropriated and converted the goods subject of the trust agreements, to Chinabank’s
damage and prejudice.

The RTC acquitted accused for the prosecution’s failure to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, but found him civilly liable to Chinabank, without need of a separate civil
action. The CA affirmed the RTC Decision holding petitioner civilly liable. It noted that
petitioner signed the "Guarantee Clause" of the trust receipt agreements in his personal capacity
and even waived the benefit of excussion against Novachem. Thus, he is personally and
solidarily liable with Novachem.

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in finding accused personally and solidarily liable with
Novachem for the amounts in the letters of credit.

Held: No. Accused was acquitted of the charge for violation of the Trust Receipts Law in
relation to Article 315 par. 1(b) of the RPC. As such, he is relieved of the corporate criminal
liability as well as the corresponding civil liability arising therefrom. Settled is the rule that
debts incurred by directors, officers, and employees acting as corporate agents are not their
direct liability but of the corporation they represent, except if they contractually agree/stipulate
or assume to be personally liable for the corporation's debts, as in this case. However, the
Supreme Court still held accused liable for the trust receipts and letters of credit transactions
where he signed as guarantor in his personal capacity.

**Other 2012 case:

1. GO v. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 185527, 18 July 2012 – Criminal Procedure – The examination
of prosecution witnesses must be done orally before a judge in open court.

2013 DECISIONS

PEOPLE v. VILLAREAL
G.R. No. 201363, 18 March 2013

There must be an overt act to rouse suspicion that the accused

had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a
crime to justify his warrantless arrest.

Facts: Accused Nazareno Villareal y Lualhati (“Villareal”) was convicted before the trial court
for the violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, for the possession of dangerous drugs.
 3

Villareal contends that the dangerous drugs (0.03 gram of shabu) purportedly found in
his possession were merely planted and what transpired was a frame-up as he was merely
walking along the street when he was arrested. The prosecution, on the other hand, argues that
what transpired was an in flagrante delicto arrest. The arresting officer, PO3 de Leon, while
riding his motorcycle, allegedly saw accused in possession of the dangerous substance eight (8)
to ten (10) meters away.

Issue: Whether accused’s arrest was in flagrante delicto despite the absence of any showing that
accused was committing an offense prior to the arrest.

Held: No. The Court finds it inconceivable how PO3 de Leon, even with his presumably
perfect vision, would be able to identify with reasonable accuracy, from a distance of about 8 to
10 meters and while simultaneously driving a motorcycle, a negligible and minuscule amount
of powdery substance (0.03 gram) inside the plastic sachet allegedly held by Villareal. That he
had previously effected numerous arrests, all involving shabu, is insufficient to create a
conclusion that what he purportedly saw in appellant’s hands was indeed shabu.

In the absence of an overt act to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO3 de Leon that
Villareal had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime, PO3 de Leon
had no justification to arrest Villareal without any warrant. Walking along the street and
examining something in one’s hand, cannot in any way be considered criminal acts.

N.B. J. Perlas-Bernabe’s ponencia in Ramon Martinez v. People, G.R. No. 201363, 18 March 2013
has the same doctrine with respect to in flagrante delicto arrest as in People v. Villareal.

PEOPLE v. P/SUPT. LAMSEN, ET AL.

G.R. No. 198338, 13 November 2013
Recantations of prosecution witnesses do not necessarily result
into an accused’s acquittal.

Facts: Appellants Artemio E. Lamsen (“Lamsen”), PO2 Anthony D. Abulencia (“Abulencia”),

and SPO1 Wilfredo L. Ramos (“Ramos”) were convicted of the crime of robbery with homicide,
which was affirmed by the Supreme Court.

Appellants moved for reconsideration considering that the prosecution’s witnesses

executed affidavits stating that their testimonies were made under duress. Allegedly, they were
forced by personalities from the Philippine National Police(PNP), the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) and the former mayor of San Carlos City, Pangasinan to implicate the
appellants.

Issue: Whether the recantation of the prosecution’s witnesses calls for the acquittal of
appellants.

Held: No, the Supreme Court held that recantations do not necessarily result into the acquittal
of the appellants. Recantations are viewed with suspicion and reservation. The Court looks with
disfavor upon retractions of testimonies previously given in court. It is settled that an affidavit
of desistance made by a witness after conviction of the accused is not reliable, and deserves only
scant attention.

The rationale for the rule is obvious: affidavits of retraction can easily be secured from
witnesses, usually through intimidation or for a monetary consideration. Recanted testimony is
exceedingly unreliable. There is always the probability that it will later be repudiated. Only
when there exists special circumstances in the case which when coupled with the retraction
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raise doubts as to the truth of the testimony or statement given, can retractions be considered
and upheld.

Mere retraction by a prosecution witness does not necessarily vitiate the original
testimony if credible. The rule is settled that in cases where previous testimony is retracted and
a subsequent different, if not contrary, testimony is made by the same witness, the test to decide
which testimony to believe is one of comparison coupled with the application of the general
rules of evidence. A testimony solemnly given in court should not be set aside and disregarded
lightly, and before this can be done, both the previous testimony and the subsequent one should
be carefully compared and juxtaposed, the circumstances under which each was made, carefully
and keenly scrutinized, and the reasons or motives for the change, discriminatingly analyzed.

PEOPLE v. LARA
G.R. No. 199938, 28 January 2013
The prosecution’s failure to present the forensic chemist who
conducted to the qualitative examination on the seized illegal
substance will not necessarily result in the accused’s acquittal.

Facts: Accused Camalouing Lara (“Lara”) was convicted by the trial court of violation of
Article II, Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165 for transporting dangerous drugs.

Lara was accosted in the check-in area of the Manila Domestic Airport, while he was
about to board his flight going to Davao. Lara argued that he was not transporting the
purported dangerous drugs found in his possession because had not yet boarded his flight. Lara
also contended that the forensic chemist, who conducted the laboratory examination, was never
presented during trial.

Issues:
Whether or not Lara was already transporting dangerous drugs despite him not having
boarded his flight.

Whether or not the prosecution’s failure to present the forensic chemist is fatal to its
cause.

Held: Yes. “Transport" as used under the Dangerous Drugs Act is defined to mean "to carry or
convey from one place to another." The essential element of the charge is the movement of the
dangerous drug from one place to another.

In this case, Lara was apprehended inside the airport, as he was intending to board his
flight bound for Davao City with a substantial amount or 196.63 grams of methylamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu in his possession, concealed in separate plastic bags inside his oversized
Spicer rubber shoes. While it may be argued that Lara has yet to boarded the aircraft or
travelled some distance with the illegal drugs in his possession, it cannot be denied that his
presence at the airport at that particular instance was for the purpose of transporting or moving
the dangerous drugs from one place to another.

No. The prosecution’s failure to present the forensic chemist who conducted the
laboratory examination on the confiscated substance will not result to Lara’s acquittal. It ruled
that corpus delicti has nothing to do with the testimony of the chemical analyst, and the report of
an official forensic chemist regarding a recovered prohibited drug enjoys the presumption of
regularity in its preparation. Corollarily, under Sec. 44 of Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court,
entries in official records made in the performance of official duty are prima facie evidence of the
facts they state.
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DABALOS v. RTC, BRANCH 59, ANGELES CITY

G.R. No. 193960, 7 January 2013
To be charged for violation of R.A. No. 9262, it is immaterial
whether the relationship had ceased for as long as there is
sufficient evidence showing the past or present existence of such
relationship between the offender and the victim when the
physical harm was committed.

Facts: Petitioner Karlo Angelo Dabalos (“Dabalos”) was charged before the trial court with
violation of Section 5(a) of R.A. No. 9262, or the “Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children
Act of 2004.”Dabalos filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause with Motion to
Quash the Information. Petitioner averred that at the time of the alleged incident on July 13,
2009, he was no longer in a dating relationship with private respondent; hence, R.A. No. 9262
was inapplicable.

The trial court held that since the parties had admitted a prior dating relationship, the
infliction of slight physical injuries constituted an act of violence against women and their
children as defined in Sec. 5(a) of R.A. No. 9262.

Issue: Whether or not Dabalos may be charged for violation of R.A. No. 9262 despite the
cessation of his dating relationship with the private complainant.

Held: Yes. Dabalos may still be charged for R.A. No. 9262 despite the cessation of his dating
relationship with the private complainant.

Notably, while it is required that the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship
with the offended woman, for R.A. No. 9262 to be applicable, it is not indispensable that the act
of violence be a consequence of such relationship. Nowhere in the law can such limitation be
inferred. Hence, applying the rule on statutory construction that when the law does not
distinguish, neither should the courts, then, clearly, the punishable acts refer to all acts of
violence against women with whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship. As
correctly ruled by the RTC, it is immaterial whether the relationship had ceased for as long as
there is sufficient evidence showing the past or present existence of such relationship between
the offender and the victim when the physical harm was committed.

2014 DECISIONS

PEOPLE v. UMAWID
G.R. No. 208719, 9 June 2014
Anyone who pleads insanity bears the burden of proving it with
clear and convincing evidence.

Facts: The accused armed with a panabas attacked Vicente. Vicente was able to evade the blows
but Maureen was stabbed twice resulting in her death. Thereafter, the accused went to a nearby
house where he found Jeffrey, his nephew, whom he attacked with fatal blows but survived due
to timely medical assistance. The accused was charged with Murder and Frustrated Murder. In
his defense, the accused raised insanity. The RTC found accused guilty. The CA affirmed said
finding of guilt on appeal.

Issue: Whether or not accused’s convictions should be upheld.

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Held: Yes. The defense of insanity is in the nature of confession and avoidance because an
accused invoking the same admits to have committed the crime but claims that he or she is not
guilty because of such insanity. As there is a presumption in favor of sanity, anyone who pleads
the said defense bears the burden of proving it with clear and convincing evidence.

Insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence while committing the
act. In this case, Umawid solely relied on the testimonies of Dr. Quincina and Dr. Juliana to
substantiate his plea of insanity. Records, however, reveal that Dr. Quincina's testimony only
showed that he evaluated Umawid's mental condition six (6) months before the latter
committed the crimes and three (3) months and four (4) months thereafter. Notably, he
admitted that his findings did not include Umawid's mental disposition immediately before or
at the very moment when he committed such crimes. As such, Dr. Quincina's testimony cannot
prove Umawid's insanity.

PEOPLE v. VITERBO
G.R. No. 203434, 23 July 2014
Non-compliance with the prescribed procedural requirements
will not automatically render the seizure and custody of the
items void and invalid only when (a) there is a justifiable ground
for such non-compliance, and (b) the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved.

Facts: Accused-appellants Ronald and Marcelino are brothers who were arrested in a buy-bust
operation for selling shabu. Acting as poseur-buyer SPO4 Cardona expressed interest in buying
shabu worth P500.00. As SPO4 Cardona handed the marked money to Marcelino, the latter told
his brother, Ronald, who was standing beside him, to give the shabu to SPO4 Cardona. Ronald
then reached inside his pocket and produced 2 transparent plastic sachets allegedly containing
shabu which he gave to SPO4 Cardona. Upon receipt thereof, SPO4 Cardona executed the pre-
arranged signal by scratching his head. Thereupon, PO2 Garcia and PO2 Zamora immediately
rushed in, apprehended the brothers and apprised them of their constitutional rights. SPO4
Cardona kept the 2 sachets in his possession and, together with the rest of the buy-bust team,
brought the brothers, the marked money, and the plastic sachets to the PDEA Office at Camp
General Simeon A. Ola, Legazpi City.

At the PDEA Office, SPO4 Cardona marked the plastic sachets while PS/Insp. Vargas
prepared the request for laboratory examination of the substances found in the plastic sachets.
SPO4 Cardona and another policeman brought the laboratory request and the plastic sachets to
the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory Office, but since no chemist was available that evening,
they returned to the PDEA Office. The next day, 5 March 2003, the plastic sachets together with
the laboratory request were brought by another policeman to the same crime laboratory for
examination.

Upon qualitative examination, Police Inspector Josephine Macura Clemen (P/Insp.

Clemen), a forensic chemist, found that the contents of the two (2) plastic sachets submitted for
analysis, which weighed 0.0932 gram and 0.0869 gram, respectively, yielded positive results for
methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu. Her findings were contained in
Chemistry Report No. D-089-03 dated March 5, 2003.

The RTC convicted the brothers for violation of Article II, Section 5, in relation to Section
26(b), of R.A. No. 9165. The CA affirmed the conviction.

Issue: Is the guilt of the accused proven beyond reasonable doubt?

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Held: No. In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must be
able to account for each link in the chain of custody over the dangerous drug, from the moment
it was seized from accused up to the time it was presented in court as proof of the corpus delicti.

Article II, Section 21(1) of R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR outline the procedure on the chain of
custody of confiscated, seized, or surrendered dangerous drugs. While non-compliance with the
prescribed procedural requirements will not automatically render the seizure and custody of
the items void and invalid, this is true only when (a) there is a justifiable ground for such non-
compliance, and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved. Hence, any divergence from the prescribed procedure must be justified and should
not affect the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated items.

In this case, P/Insp. Clemen received the plastic sachets from their clerk, Ofelia Garcia
(Garcia), who, in turn, accepted it together with the laboratory request from a representative of
the PDEA. However, the records are devoid of evidence to indicate the PDEA member/agent
who specifically delivered the items to her.

Hence, there were substantial gaps in the chain of custody of the seized items,
particularly the events that transpired from the time the items left the hands of SPO4 Cardona
on the night of the arrest and turned over to the possession of "Captain Vargas," as well as the
identity of the PDEA agent who brought them together with the laboratory request to Garcia,
the receiving clerk of the crime laboratory, in the morning of the following day. While the
laboratory request was prepared and signed by PS/Insp. Vargas, whom the Court reasonably
presumes to be the same "Captain Vargas" referred to in SPO4 Cardona's testimony, there is
dearth of evidence showing that he was the same person who brought the items to Garcia,
taking into consideration the fact that the laboratory request accompanying the items was
signed/delivered by "PO2 Zamora." These are crucial missing links in this case which should
have been clearly accounted for in order to establish the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized items.

The prosecution's case is further weakened by the fact that the seized items were
delivered not on the same day of the buy-bust operation, but only the following day. The
considerable amount of time that had transpired from the conduct of the buy-bust operation
until the same were brought for laboratory examination, especially when viewed together with
the above-mentioned considerations, figures into a gaping hiatus in the chain of custody of the
said items, which is extremely fatal to the cause of the prosecution.

ATIENZA v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 188694, 12 February 2014
The test to determine whether or not the circumstantial evidence
on record is sufficient to convict the accused is that the series of
circumstances duly proven must be consistent with each other
and that each and every circumstance must be consistent with
the accused's guilt and inconsistent with his innocence.

Facts: The accused, Atienza and Castro, worked at the Court of Appeals as Budget Officer I and
Utility Worker I, respectively. After an investigation, the accused were found to have conspired
with each other in altering some volumes of the Original CA Decision. The accused gained
entry to the office of the CA Reporter's Division by passing through the hole on the concrete
wall after removing the air conditioning unit. Thus, the accused were charged with Robbery
and Falsification of Public Document. The RTC found the accused guilty for both charges,
which decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
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Issue: Whether the accused’s conviction should be upheld on account of the circumstantial
evidence purportedly proving their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Held: No. Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from
which the main fact in issue may be inferred based on reason and common experience. It is
sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. To uphold a conviction based on circumstantial
evidence, it is essential that the circumstantial evidence presented must constitute an unbroken
chain which leads one to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the
exclusion of the others, as the guilty person.

While records show that Atienza was positively identified by Atibula as having
attempted to bribe him to take out Volume 260 of the CA Original Decisions from the Reporter’s
Division, the fact is that the alleged intercalation actually occurred in a different document, that
is Volume 266.

Discrepancy of accounts on the very subject matter of the crimes charged dilutes the
strength of the evidence required to produce a conviction. At best, the bribery attempt may be
deemed as a demonstration of interest on the part of Atienza over said subject matter and in this
regard, constitutes proof of motive. However, it is well-established that mere proof of motive,
no matter how strong, is not sufficient to support a conviction, most especially if there is no
other reliable evidence from which it may reasonably be deduced that the accused was the
malefactor.

Further, even if Atienza’s bribery attempt is taken together with the other circumstance,
i.e. that on 11 May 1995, or 2 days after the discovery of the loss of Volume 266, wherein Atibula
uttered to Atienza, "[p]utang ina mo, Juaning, pinahirapan mo kami," said evidence is still lacking.
This allegation, even if proven as true, does not indicate that Atienza confirmed that he took or
even the falsified Volume 266.

As regards accused Castro, there is no evidence to link him to the crimes charged,
notwithstanding Castro’s failure to refute it. Castro’s purported possession and eventual return
of Volume 266 was only premised upon the statement of one Nelson de Castro (Nelson), i.e., the
Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 9 August 1995, who averred that on May 18, 1995, at around 11:50
a.m., Castro told him to pass by his office and there handed him a bag which, as it turned out,
contained the missing Volume 266. However, Nelson was not presented during trial, hence, was
not subjected to any in-court examination. Thus, the prosecution’s evidence on the matter
should be treated as hearsay and, thus, inadmissible to establish the truth or falsity of the
relevant claims. Consequently, there exists no sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove
Castro’s guilt.

PEOPLE v. MAURICIO HALLARTE

G.R. No. 205382, 2 April 2014
Minority, even if stipulated upon by the parties,
should be proved to be considered an aggravating
circumstance.

Facts: Accused approached AAA, then 7 years old, and inserted his penis into the AAA’s
vagina. AAA screamed which made the accused stop. On a different occasion, accused forced
his penis into the mouth of BBB, who was then 8 years old. Thus, the accused, in separate
informations, was charged with Simple Rape and Rape by Sexual Assault.
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During trial, BBB testified as to her age. The parties likewise stipulated on BBB’s
minority during the pre-trial conference.

Accused was convicted of both crimes. The CA affirmed accused’s conviction. However,
as regards the crime against BBB, the CA modified the penalty imposed for Rape by Sexual
Assault to reclusion temporal in its medium period as prescribed under Section 5(b) of R.A. No.
7610, upon appreciating the aggravating circumstance of minority.

Issue: Is the penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period for Rape by Sexual Assault
proper?

Held: No. There is a need to modify the penalty imposed in Criminal Case No. Q-00-93226 for
Rape by Sexual Assault in view of the failure of the prosecution to satisfactorily prove the age of
BBB. While the information alleged that BBB was "8 years of age, a minor," and the parties
stipulated on her minority during the pre-trial conference, the same are insufficient evidence of
her age which must be proved conclusively and indubitably as the crime itself.

Apart from BBB’s testimony and the aforesaid stipulation, records are bereft of sufficient
evidence to prove BBB’s age. Thus, the penalty prescribed in Article 266-B of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, for Rape by Sexual Assault must be imposed in this case, i.e., prision mayor,
which ranges from 6 years and 1 day to 12 years. Applying the ISLAW, the penalty next lower in
degree is prision correccional, which ranges from 6 months and 1 day to 6 years. Hence, a
penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years of prision
mayor, as maximum, is imposed upon appellant for the crime of Rape by Sexual Assault.

CANDELARIA v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 209386, 8 December 2014
Qualified theft; circumstantial evidence sufficient to convict

Facts: Accused was employed as a driver of Unioil. One day, accused was tasked to deliver
14,000 liters of diesel to Viron Transport. However, at around 5:00 p.m. of the same day, Viron
informed Unioil that it had not yet received its order. Upon inquiry, Unioil discovered that
Candelaria, together with his helper Mario Romano (Romano), also an employee of Unioil, left
the company premises at 12:50 p.m. of the same day on board a lorry truck with plate number
PTA-945 to deliver Viron’s diesel fuel order. Thereafter, or at around 6:00 p.m. of the same day,
Romano returned alone to Unioil’s office and reported that Candelaria poked a balisong at him,
prompting Unioil to report the incident to the Anti-Carnapping Section of the Manila Police
District (MPD), as well as to Camp Crame. After a few days, the truck which contained the liters
of diesel was found abandoned in Calamba, Laguna empty. Thus, accused was charged with
Qualified Theft.

The accused demurred to the prosecution’s evidence arguing that there is no direct
testimony pointing to him as the perpetrator given that Romano’s statements are considered
hearsay due to the latter’s untimely demise. The RTC and the CA found the accused guilty.

Issue: Did the CA correctly find Candelaria guilty of the crime of Qualified Theft on the basis of
circumstantial evidence?

Held: Yes. The elements of Qualified Theft, punishable under Article 310 in relation to Article
309 of the RPC, as amended, are: (a) the taking of personal property; (b) the said property
belongs to another; (c) the said taking be done with intent to gain; (d) it be done without the
owner's consent; (e) it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against
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persons, nor of force upon things; and (f) it be done under any of the circumstances enumerated
in Article 310 of the RPC, i.e., with grave abuse of confidence.

Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt. Circumstantial evidence suffices to convict an accused only if the circumstances proven
constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the
accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.

Here, the RTC, as correctly affirmed by the CA, found that the attendant circumstances,
as established by the prosecution's evidence, justify the conviction of Candelaria: (a) on 23
August 2006, Viron ordered 14,000 liters of diesel fuel from Lao's Unioil; (b) as driver of Unioil,
Candelaria was given the task of delivering the same to Viron in Laon Laan, Manila; (c)
Candelaria and his helper Romano left the company premises on the same day on board the
lorry truck bearing plate number PTA-945 containing the diesel fuel; (d) at around 5:00 p.m of
the same day, Viron informed Unioil that its order had not yet been delivered; (e) Candelaria
failed to reply to Unioil’s phone calls; (f) later in the day, Romano returned to the Unioil office
sans Candelaria and reported that the latter threatened him with a weapon; (g) Unioil reported
the incident to the MPD and Camp Crame; (h) the missing lorry truck was subsequently found
in Laguna, devoid of its contents; and (i) Candelaria had not reported back to Unioil since then.

These circumstances together show a congruent picture that the crime of Qualified Theft
had been committed and that Candelaria had perpetrated it. This determination is not sullied by
the fact that Candelaria's companion, Romano, had died before he could testify as to the truth of
his allegation. It is a gaping hole in the defense that the diesel fuel was admittedly placed under
Candelaria's custody and remains unaccounted for. Candelaria did not proffer any persuasive
reason to explain the loss of said goods and merely banked on a general denial, which, as case
law holds, is an inherently weak defense due to the ease by which it can be concocted. With
these, and, moreover, the tell-tale fact that Candelaria has not returned or reported back to work
at Unioil since the incident, the Court draws no other reasonable inference other than that
which points to his guilt.

**Other 2014 case:

1. PEOPLE v. GO, G.R. No. 201644, 24 September 2014 – Criminal Procedure – The failure
to implead the People of the Philippines as party-respondent in a Petition for Certiorari
renders all subsequent actions of the appellate court null and void for want of
jurisdiction.

2015 DECISIONS

PEOPLE v. PALMY TIBAYAN and RICO PUERTO

G.R. Nos. 209655-60, 14 January 2015
Syndicated estafa; Ponzi scheme

Facts: Accused were incorporators and directors of Tibayan Group Investment Company
(TGICI), an open-end investment company registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). In 2002, the SEC investigated and discovered that TGICI was selling
securities to the public without a registration statement in violation of Republic Act No. 8799,
otherwise known as "The Securities Regulation Code," and that TGICI submitted a fraudulent
Treasurer’s Affidavit before the SEC.
 11

Private complainants were enticed to invest in TGICI due to the offer of high interest
rates, as well as the assurance that they will recover their investments. After giving their money
to TGICI, private complainants received a Certificate of Share and post-dated checks,
representing the amount of the principal investment and the monthly interest earnings,
respectively. Upon encashment, the checks were dishonored, as the account was already closed,
prompting private complainants to bring the bounced checks to the TGICI office to demand
payment. TGICI office closed down without private complainants having been paid and, thus,
they were constrained to file criminal complaints against the incorporators and directors of
TGICI.

The RTC convicted the accused of Estafa under Item 2 (a), par. 4, Article 315 of the RPC
in relation to P.D. No. 1689. The CA modified accused’s conviction to that of Syndicated Estafa.

Issue: Whether or not the accused’s conviction for syndicated estafa is proper.

Held: Yes.
Syndicated Estafa

The elements of Syndicated Estafa are: (a) Estafa or other forms of swindling, as defined
in Articles 315 and 316 of the RPC, is committed; (b) the Estafa or swindling is committed by a
syndicate of five (5) or more persons; and (c) defraudation results in the misappropriation of
moneys contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperative, "samahang
nayon(s)," or farmers’ associations, or of funds solicited by corporations/associations from the
general public.

Here, a judicious review of the records reveals TGICI’s modus operandi of inducing the
public to invest in it on the undertaking that their investment would be returned with a very
high monthly interest rate ranging from three to five and a half percent (3%-5.5%). Under such
lucrative promise, the investing public are enticed to infuse funds into TGICI. However, as the
directors/incorporators of TGICI knew from the start that TGICI is operating without any paid-
up capital and has no clear trade by which it can pay the assured profits to its investors, they
cannot comply with their guarantee and had to simply abscond with their investors’ money.
Thus, the CA correctly held that accused-appellants, along with the other accused who are still
at large, used TGICI to engage in a Ponzi scheme, resulting in the defraudation of the TGICI
investors.

Ponzi scheme
A Ponzi scheme is a type of investment fraud that involves the payment of purported
returns to existing investors from funds contributed by new investors. Its organizers often
solicit new investors by promising to invest funds in opportunities claimed to generate high
returns with little or no risk. In many Ponzi schemes, the perpetrators focus on attracting new
money to make promised payments to earlier-stage investors to create the false appearance that
investors are profiting from a legitimate business. It is not an investment strategy but a
gullibility scheme, which works only as long as there is an ever increasing number of new
investors joining the scheme. It is difficult to sustain the scheme over a long period of time
because the operator needs an ever larger pool of later investors to continue paying the
promised profits to early investors. The idea behind this type of swindle is that the "con-man"
collects his money from his second or third round of investors and then absconds before anyone
else shows up to collect. Necessarily, Ponzi schemes only last weeks, or months at the most.

It is clear that all the elements of Syndicated Estafa, committed through a Ponzi scheme,
are present in this case, considering that: (a) the incorporators/directors of TGICI comprising
more than 5 people, including herein accused-appellants, made false pretenses and
 12

representations to the investing public - in this case, the private complainants - regarding a
supposed lucrative investment opportunity with TGICI in order to solicit money from them; (b)
the said false pretenses and representations were made prior to or simultaneous with the
commission of fraud; (c) relying on the same, private complainants invested their hard earned
money into TGICI; and (d) the incorporators/directors of TGICI ended up running away with
the private complainants' investments, obviously to the latter's prejudice.

ROGELIO GONZAGA v. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 195671, 21 January 2015
Reckless imprudence resulting in homicide; “Failure
to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as
may be in this hand to give” in crimes under Article
365 of the Revised Penal Code

Facts: Dionesio Sr. was driving his motorcycle with his two (2) children, Dionesio Jr. and
Cherry. While they were ascending the curving road going to Bocboc on their proper lane on
the right side of the road, a Toyota Land Cruiser driven by accused was swiftly descending the
same lane from the opposite direction. In order to avoid collision, Dionesio, Sr. tried to swerve
to the left, but the Land Cruiser suddenly swerved towards the same direction and collided
head-on with the motorcycle. As a result of the accident, Dionesio, Sr. was pinned underneath
the Land Cruiser. When brought to the hospital, Dionesio, Sr. died, while his children were
confined therein.

The Information charged accused with Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide

with Double Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property “with the aggravating
circumstance that accused failed to lend on the spot to the injured party such help that was in
his hands to give.”

Accused alleged that he was driving in the proper lane, and it was Dionesio, Sr. who was
driving his motorcycle in a zigzag manner. Accused likewise argued that with the use of a jack
handle and the assistance of 2 persons, who arrived at the scene, he was able to retrieve both
Dionesio, Sr. and the motorcycle from beneath the Land Cruiser. Thereafter, they loaded the
victims on board the Land Cruiser so they may be brought to the hospital, but the vehicle
turned out to have defective brakes, so he asked other persons to secure another vehicle instead.

The RTC found accused guilty of the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to
Homicide with Double Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property punishable under
Article 365 in relation to Article 263 of the RPC, and considered the circumstance that accused
failed to lend on the spot to the injured party.

On reconsideration, the RTC modified the penalty and reduced it to 4 months and 1 day
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, as maximum,
after recognizing that holding that the jack handle that was used to get the body of Dionesio, Sr.
beneath the Land Cruiser could have been considered as accused’s act of rendering assistance to
Dionesio, Sr., accordingly, reduced the penalty.

On appeal, the CA reinstated the original Decision wherein he was imposed the penalty
of 4 years, 2 months of prision correccional maximum, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of
prision mayor medium, as maximum.

Issue: Whether or not the CA correctly reinstated the RTC’s original Decision?
 13

Held: No. The limiting element in the last paragraph of Article 365 of the RPC circumstance that
accused purportedly “failed to lend on the spot to the injured party” should not be considered
in imposing the penalty against him.

Reckless imprudence
Reckless imprudence, as defined in Article 365 of the RPC, consists in voluntarily, but
without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of
inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such
act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical
condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.

Here, accused’s act of driving very fast on the wrong side of the road was the proximate
cause of the collision, resulting to the death of Dionesio, Sr. and serious physical injuries to his
children. Notably, the road where the incident occurred was a curve sloping upwards towards
Brgy. Bocboc where the victims were bound, and descending towards the opposite direction
where accused was going. The very fact of speeding, under such circumstances, is indicative of
imprudent behavior. As a motorist, accused was bound to exercise ordinary care in such affair
by driving at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate with the conditions encountered, as this
would enable him to keep the vehicle under control and avoid injury to others using the
highway. Hence, excessive speed, combined with other circumstances such as the occurrence of
the accident on or near a curve, as in this case, constitutes negligence.

Rogelio acted recklessly and imprudently in driving at a fast speed on the wrong side of
the road while approaching the curve where the incident happened, thereby rendering him
criminally liable, as well as civilly accountable for the material damages resulting therefrom.

Failure to lend on the spot to the injured parties such

help as may be in his hands to give
The limiting element in the last paragraph of Article 365 of the RPC imposes the penalty
next higher in degree upon the offender who “fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties
such help as may be in his hands to give.” The obligation under this paragraph: (a) is dependent
on the means in the hands of the offender, i.e., the type and degree of assistance that he/she, at
the time and place of the incident, is capable of giving; and (b) requires adequate proof.

One of the victims admitted during trial that they were first loaded on the Land Cruiser
before they were transferred to other vehicle. Hence, in imposing the proper penalty on the
accused, the qualifying circumstance under the last paragraph of Article 365 of the RPC should
not be considered. Hence, there is no basis to impose a higher penalty against accused.

PEOPLE v. BALUTE Y VILLANUEVA

G.R. No. 212932, 21 January 2015
Robbery with homicide

Facts: SPO1 Manaois was on board his jeepney with his wife and daughter. While the vehicle
was on a stop position at a lighted area due to heavy traffic, accused suddenly appeared on
either side of the jeepney, with Balute poking a gun at the side of SPO1 Manaois and saying
"putang ina, ilabas mo!" Thereafter, Balute grabbed SPO1 Manaois’s mobile phone from the
latter’s chest pocket and shot him at the left side of his torso. SPO1 Manaois reacted by drawing
his own firearm and alighting from his vehicle, but he was unable to fire at the assailants as he
fell to the ground. He was taken to Mary Johnston Hospital where he died.

An Information for Robbery with Homicide was filed against accused. Balute presented
an alibi as his defense. Balute was convicted of Robbery with Homicide with the aggravating
 14

circumstance of treachery, and accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, without eligibility for parole. The CA affirmed Balute’s conviction.

Issue: Whether or not the CA correctly upheld Balute’s conviction for Robbery with Homicide.

Held: Yes. A special complex crime of robbery with homicide takes place when a homicide is
committed either by reason, or on the occasion, of the robbery. To sustain a conviction for
robbery with homicide, the prosecution must prove the following elements: (a) the taking of
personal property belonging to another; (b) with intent to gain; (c) with the use of violence or
intimidation against a person; and (d) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of
homicide, as used in its generic sense, was committed.

A conviction requires certitude that the robbery is the main purpose, and [the] objective
of the malefactor and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must
precede the taking of human life but the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery.
Homicide is said to have been committed by reason or on occasion of robbery if, for instance, it
was committed: (a) to facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve the
possession by the culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent discovery of the commission of the robbery;
or (d) to eliminate witnesses in the commission of the crime. Here, the prosecution was able to
establish that Balute poked his gun at SPO1 Manaois, took the latter’s mobile phone, and
thereafter, shot him, resulting in his death.

PEOPLE v. SUMILI
G.R. No. 212160, 4 February 2015
Violation of R.A. No. 9165; Chain of custody rule

Facts: PDEA received a report from a confidential informant that Sumili was selling shabu.
Acting on the same, SPO2 Edgardo Englatiera (SPO2 Englatiera) dispatched SPO2 Diosdado
Cabahug (SPO2 Cabahug) to conduct surveillance on Sumili, which confirmed the truth and
veracity of the aforesaid report. The buy-bust team headed to the target area. Upon arrival, the
poseur-buyer approached Sumili’s house to buy shabu. After Sumili let the poseur-buyer in, the
latter gave the pre-arranged signal that the sale has been consummated. Almost immediately,
the buy-bust team stormed the house but Sumili escaped by jumping through the window,
throwing the marked money at the roof beside his house. The poseur-buyer turned over the
sachet of suspected shabu to SPO2 Englatiera, who marked the same with "DC-1," representing
the initials of SPO2 Cabahug. SPO2 Englatiera then prepared a request for laboratory
examination and instructed Non-Uniform Personnel Carlito Ong (NUP Ong) to bring the sachet
together with the request to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. However, NUP Ong
failed to do so on the same day as the PNP Crime Laboratory was already closed. It was only 2
days after the buy-bust operation, that NUP Ong was able to bring and turn-over the seized
sachet to the PNP Crime Laboratory. Upon examination, it was confirmed that said sachet
contained 0.32 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu.

In his defense, Sumili denied selling shabu. He and his daughter claimed that he was a
fishball vendor, and that on the date and time of the incident, he was at the market buying
ingredients. RTC found Sumili guilty of violating Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.

Issue: Whether or not Sumili’s conviction for violation of Article II, Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165 is
proper.

Held: No. The prosecution failed to establish the chain of custody of the subject drugs required
under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165.
 15

Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 provides the "chain of custody rule" outlining the procedure
that the apprehending officers should follow in handling the seized drugs, in order to preserve
its integrity and evidentiary value. While the "chain of custody rule" demands utmost
compliance from said officers, Section 21 of IRR of R.A. No. 9165, and jurisprudence
nevertheless provide that noncompliance with the requirements of this rule will not
automatically render the seizure and custody of the items void and invalid, so long as: (a) there
is a justifiable ground for such non-compliance; and (b) the evidentiary value of the seized items
are properly preserved. Hence, any divergence from the prescribed procedure must be justified
and should not affect the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated items.

In this case, NUP Ong failed to bring the sachet to PNP Crime Laboratory within 24
hours after the buy-bust operation as he only delivered the sachet to the PNP Crime Laboratory
2 days after the buy-bust operation. To justify the delay in the turn-over of the corpus delicti,
SPO2 Englatiera and NUP Ong insist that the PNP Crime Laboratory was already closed on 7
June 2006, and since it was a Friday, the delivery of the seized sachet was only done on 9 June
2006. However, contrary to their claims, 7 June 2006 is not a Friday, but a Wednesday. Thus, if
the PNP Crime Laboratory was indeed closed on 7 June 2006, the delivery of the seized sachet
could have easily been done on the next day, or on 8 June 2006, instead of doing it 2 days after
the buy-bust operation.

The prosecution failed to establish the identity of the substance allegedly confiscated
from Sumili due to unjustified gaps in the chain of custody, thus, militating against a finding of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Corpus delicti
It must be emphasized that in criminal prosecutions involving illegal drugs, the
presentation of the drugs which constitute the corpus delicti of the crime calls for the necessity of
proving with moral certainty that they are the same seized items. Failing in which, the acquittal
of the accused on the ground of reasonable doubt becomes a matter of right, as in this case.

PEOPLE v. PALMA Y VARCAS

G.R. No. 212151, 18 February 2015
Robbery with Homicide; conspiracy

Facts: Serido informed Hinlo, Palma, Senido, Pedroso and Dumagat of the plan to rob the house
of Spouses Clavel. Palma, Senido, and Hinlo were tasked to enter the house, Dumagat would
act as a look-out at the back of the house, and Pedroso would wait at the highway with a
tricycle. As they entered the compound of the house, they destroyed the knob of the kitchen
door and gained entry where they took certain valuable items including video compact discs, a
microphone and two leather bags. Mr. Clavel woke up to go to the bathroom which was located
outside his bedroom and as he opened the bathroom door, Senido, who was hiding inside,
assaulted him and the two wrestled. Then, Hinlo approached Mr. Clavel and with the use of a
bladed weapon, stabbed the latter on his abdomen which led to his untimely demise.
Thereafter, Palma, Senido, Pedroso, Hinlo and Dumagat hurriedly escaped and left behind part
of the items they took on the railroad located behind the property. Shortly thereafter, the police
arrived and recovered the two leather bags where the compact discs and microphone were
placed.

The RTC convicted accused as charged. The CA affirmed accused’s conviction and
ordered the immediate arrest of Hinlo.

Issue: Whether or not the CA correctly upheld the conviction of accused-appellants for Robbery
with Homicide.
 16

Held: Yes. The elements for the crime of robbery with homicide are: (a) the taking of personal
property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons; (b) the property belongs to
another; (c) the taking is animo lucrandi or with intent to gain; and (d) on the occasion or by
reason of the robbery, homicide was committed. A conviction requires that the robbery is the
main purpose and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must precede
the taking of human life, but the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery.

Accused were all armed with knives when they broke into the house of the Sps. Clavel,
took certain personal properties, and, in the course thereof, stabbed Freddie, resulting to his
death. Moreover, conspiracy having been established, when a homicide takes place by reason of
or on occasion of the robbery, all those who took part shall be guilty of the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide whether they actually participated in the killing, unless there is
proof that there was an endeavour to prevent the killing.

PEOPLE v. CASAS Y VINTULAN

G.R. No. 212565, 25 February 2015
Murder; self-defense; lack of treachery

Facts: Casas, accompanied by a certain Ron-Ron, went to a certain taho factory looking for a
certain Jesus. Failing to find the person he was looking for, Casas brandished a knife and stuck
it into a pail used for making taho. Consequently, Eligio, an employee of the taho factory,
confronted Casas, saying to the latter, "Benjie [(referring to Casas)], bakit ang yabang mo? Kung
hindi mo makita ang kalaban mo, dapat hanapin mo na lang." Casas replied "Gusto mo ito? (referring
to his knife)." Eligio told Casas to get rid of the knife, which the latter gave to Ron-Ron. Eligio
and Casas then had a fistfight. During the ensuing melee, Casas took the knife from Ron-Ron
and stabbed Eligio twice while the latter was fleeing. Casas, during his continued pursuit of
Eligio, then ran into Joel, who, for his part, tried to help Eligio with the use of a bamboo pole.
However, Joel slipped, fell face first on the floor, and was prostrate. There and then, Casas
stabbed him twice, the first blow entering his back and exiting at the front of his torso, and the
second blow hitting the left side of his abdomen. Casas managed to overtake Eligio, and stabbed
him again on the stomach. Fearing that Casas would kill him, Eligio grabbed a plastic stool and
hit Casas on the head with it, forcing the latter to drop the knife and cease the attack.

PO1 Fuentes claimed that he was riding his motorcycle on the date of the incident when
he met PO3 Fronda who asked for assistance as the latter saw a bloodied male. The two
immediately proceeded towards the victim, who turned out to be Casas, and asked him what
happened. The latter replied that he had just stabbed someone. After confirming that there was
indeed a stabbing incident nearby, PO1 Fuentes and PO3 Fronda arrested Casas. After trial,
Casas was convicted of the crimes of murder and attempted homicide.

Issue: Whether or not Casas’s conviction for the crimes of Murder and Attempted Homicide
should be upheld.

Held: In view of the absence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, Casas is guilty of
Homicide, not murder, for the death of Joel.

Self-defense
The elements of self-defense are as follows: (a) unlawful aggression; (b) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on
the part of the person defending himself. These requirements are absent in this case.

Casas failed to prove any unlawful aggression on the part of either Joel or Eligio, which
 17

is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance of self-defense to obtain. There can be
no self-defense unless the victim committed unlawful aggression against the person who
resorted to self-defense. Being the party initiating the attack, and overbearing with a deadly
weapon, Casas cannot successfully claim that there was unlawful aggression. Verily, for
unlawful aggression to be appreciated, there must be an actual, sudden and unexpected attack
or imminent danger thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude, as against the
one claiming self-defense. Evidently, the contrary happened in this case.

Murder; Lack of treachery

Casas is guilty of Homicide, not Murder considering the prosecution’s failure to prove
the existence of treachery. The Court expounds. The elements of Murder that the prosecution
must establish are: (a) that a person was killed; (b) that the accused killed him or her; (c) that the
killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the
RPC; and (d) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide.

To appreciate treachery, it must be shown that: (a) the means of execution employed
gives the victim no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (b) the methods of execution
were deliberately or consciously adopted; indeed, treachery cannot be presumed, it must be
proven by clear and convincing evidence.

A fistfight ensued between Eligio and Casas. Joel, seeing that Casas had stabbed Eligio,
wanted to help the latter by using a bamboo pole but slipped and fell. As he was lying prostrate
on the floor, Casas delivered the blows that ended Joel’s life. Under these circumstances, Joel
was fully aware of the danger posed in assisting Eligio. Further, it does not equally appear that
Casas deliberately adopted means in order to ensure that Joel had no opportunity to defend
himself or retaliate. This lack of deliberation on the part of Casas, as well as Joel’s obvious
awareness of the danger to his life, prompts this Court to discount treachery as a qualifying
circumstance.

N.B. The Supreme Court’s pronouncement in People v. Samuya (G.R. No. 213214, 20 April 2015),
People v. Palanas (G.R. No. 214453, June 17, 2015) and People v. Inciong (G.R. No. 213383, 22 June
2015) regarding the crime of murder, the appreciation of treachery as a qualifying circumstance
and the requisites for self-defense is the same as this case.

BENABAYE v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 203466, 25 February 2015
Estafa

Facts: Accused was the Loans Bookkeeper of Siam Bank Inc. As such, she was authorized to
accept loan payments of Siam Bank's clients and issue provisional receipts therefor, and remit
such payments to her supervisor.

Siam Bank conducted an audit investigation of its loan transactions and discovered that
loan payments received from its clients, and which were issued provisional receipts, were not
remitted to the bank. Benabaye issued 853 provisional receipts in the aggregate amount of
P470,768.00 were unremitted to the bank.

After trial, Benabaye was convicted of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the
RPC. The CA sustained Benabaye’s conviction.

Issue: Whether or not the Benabaye was correctly convicted of the crime of Estafa through
misappropriation.
 18

Held: No. The elements of Estafa under this provision are: (a) the offender's receipt of money,
goods, or other personal property in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under
any other obligation involving the duty to deliver, or to return, the same; (b) misappropriation
or conversion by the offender of the money or property received, or denial of receipt of the
money or property; (c) the misappropriation, conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another;
and (d) demand by the offended party that the offender return the money or property received.

In this case, the first element of is absent since Benabaye was merely a collector of loan
payments from Siam Bank's clients. At the end of every banking day, she was required to remit
all cash payments received together with the corresponding cash transfer slips to her
supervisor, Tupag. As such, the money merely passes into her hands and she takes custody
thereof only for the duration of the banking day. Hence, as an employee of Siam Bank,
specifically, its temporary cash custodian whose tasks are akin to a bank teller, she had no
juridical possession over the missing funds but only their physical or material possession.

PEOPLE v. SORIN
G.R. No. 212635, 25 March 2015
R.A. No. 9165; Chain of custody rule

Facts: After receiving a report that Sorin was selling illegal drugs at his residence, the PNP
formed a buy-bust team and, with the assistance of a poseur-buyer, went to Sorin’s residence.
After completion of the entrapment operation, one of the members of the buy-bust team, PO2
Dador, turned over the seized items and the marked money to SPO1 Mugot, who marked the
same, prepared the inventory and request for laboratory examination, and sent the seized items
to the PNP Crime Laboratory.

The PNP Crime Laboratory tested the following items: (a) the sachets seized from Sorin
during the buy-bust operation for the presence of illegal drugs; (b) Sorin’s hands and the
marked money used to purchase the aforementioned illegal drugs for ultraviolet fluorescent
powder; and (c) Sorin’s urine for the presence of illegal drugs. The seized sachets tested positive
for shabu, while Sorin’s hands and the marked money used contained traces of ultraviolet
fluorescent powder. Also, Sorin’s urine tested positive for the presence of shabu. For his part,
Sorin claimed that the sachets of shabu were planted by the police officers, and that no buy-bust
operation occurred. Sorin was convicted of violating Article II, Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165.

Issue: Whether Sorin’s conviction for violation of Article II, Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165 is proper.

Held: No. The prosecution failed to establish the identity of the substance allegedly confiscated
from Sorin due to unjustified gaps in the chain of custody, thus warranting his acquittal.

PO2 Dador, the apprehending officer who seized the sachets from Sorin during the buy-
bust operation, failed to mark the same and, instead, turned them over unmarked to SPO1
Mugot who was the one who conducted the marking; prepared the request for laboratory
examination of the seized sachets, Sorin’s urine, and the marked money; delivered the said
request, together with the seized sachets and marked money, to the PNP Crime Laboratory; and
later received the examination results. PO2 Dador had, in fact, admitted that the sachets he
seized from Sorin were not even marked in his presence.

In the absence of specifics on how, when and where this marking was done and who
witnessed the marking procedure, we cannot accept this marking as compliance with the
required chain of custody requirement. It is not enough that the seized drug be marked; the
marking must likewise be made in the presence of the apprehended violator.
 19

PEOPLE v. MATIBAG
G.R. No. 206381, 25 March 2015
Murder

Facts: Matibag confronted Duhan, and asked, "ano bang pinagsasasabi mo?" Duhan
replied "wala," and without warning, Matibag delivered a fist blow hitting Duhan on the left
cheek and causing him to teeter backwards. Matibag then pulled out his gun and shot Duhan,
who fell face-first on the pavement. While Duhan remained in that position, Matibag shot him
several more times. PO2 Tom Falejo, positively identified Matibag and stated on record that he
arrested the latter.

Matibag was charged with and convicted of murder with the qualifying circumstance of
treachery and the special aggravating circumstance of the use of unlicensed firearm.

Issue: Whether or not the CA correctly upheld the conviction of Matibag for murder.

Held: Yes. To warrant a conviction for murder, the prosecution must establish by proof beyond
reasonable doubt that: (a) a person was killed; (b) the accused killed him or her; (c) the killing
was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC; and
(d) the killing is not Parricide or Infanticide.

In this case, the prosecution proved that Matibag, who was armed with a gun,
confronted Duhan, and without any provocation, punched and shot him on the chest. Although
the attack was frontal, the sudden and unexpected manner by which it was made rendered it
impossible for Duhan to defend himself, adding too that he was unarmed. Matibag also failed
to prove that a heated exchange of words preceded the incident so as to forewarn Duhan
against any impending attack from his assailant. The deliberateness of Matibag’s act is further
evinced from his disposition preceding the moment of execution. As the RTC aptly pointed out,
Matibag was ready and destined to effect such dastardly act, considering that he had an axe to
grind when he confronted Duhan, coupled with the fact that he did so, armed with a loaded
handgun. Based on these findings, treachery was correctly appreciated.

PEOPLE v. ARGUTA and CAHIPE

G.R. No. 213216, 20 April 2015
Qualified Rape

Facts: On or about 5 December 1996, accused threatened AAA with a bladed weapon, dragged
her to a cottage, and bound her hands and feet. Thereafter, accused removed her clothes and
placed her on the floor. Arguta then mounted AAA and inserted his penis into her vagina. After
Arguta satisfied his lust, Cahipe took over and raped her. Thereafter, accused left AAA. An
hour later, Cahipe returned and dragged AAA to a store owned by a certain Ostero. There
Cahipe undressed her again, mounted her, and inserted his penis into her vagina. After trial,
both accused were convicted of simple rape.

Issue: Whether or not accused’s conviction for simple rape is correct.

Held: No. Under the old rape provisions of the RPC, the law applicable at the time of the
commission of the crime, the accused should be convicted of qualified rape in view of the
presence of 2 qualifying aggravating circumstances: (a) use of a deadly weapon; and (b) that
two persons committed the rapes. The first was alleged in the information while the second was
proved during trial.
 20

Under the old rape law, either circumstance is qualifying. When the two circumstances
are present, there is no legal basis to consider the remaining circumstance as a generic
aggravating circumstance for either is not considered as such under Article 14 of the Revised
Penal Code enumerating what are aggravating circumstances. Hence, the correct penalty is the
lesser penalty, which is reclusion perpetua, there being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstance, pursuant to Article 63, paragraph 2, No. 2, Revised Penal Code.

Force or intimidation as an element of Rape

Here, accused threatened AAA with a bladed instrument and tied her up before having
carnal knowledge of her without her consent. Jurisprudence holds that force or intimidation, as
an element of Rape, need not be irresistible; as long as the assailant's objective is accomplished,
any question of whether the force employed was irresistible or not becomes irrelevant.
Intimidation must be viewed from the lens of the victim's perception and judgment and it is
enough that the victim fears that something will happen to her should she resist her assailant's
advances. The act of holding a bladed instrument, by itself, is strongly suggestive of force or, at
least, intimidation, and threatening the victim with the same is sufficient to bring her into
submission.

WACOY v. PEOPLE
G.R. Nos. 213792 and 213886, 22 June 2015
Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray; Crime
committed is different from that intended; Lack of
intent to do so grave a wrong

Facts: Aro was sprawled on the ground. While in that position, Wacoy kicked Aro's stomach
twice, after which, Wacoy picked up a rock to throw at Aro but was restrained from doing so.
As Aro stood up, Quibac punched him on the stomach, causing him to collapse. Thereafter, Aro
was taken to the hospital where he suffered cardiac arrest, lapsed into a coma and later died.

Wacoy and Quibac were charged with the crime of Homicide under Article 249 of the
RPC for Aro’s death. The RTC convicted Wacoy and Quibac of Death Caused in a Tumultuous
Affray under Article 251 of the RPC.

The CA modified Wacoy and Quibac's conviction to that of Homicide under Article 249
of the RPC with the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong.

Issue: Whether or not Wacoy and Quibac are guilty of the crime of Homicide?

Held: Yes. The elements of Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray under Article 251 of the RPC
are as follows: (a) that there be several persons; (b) that they did not compose groups organized
for the common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally; (c) that these
several persons quarreled and assaulted one another in a confused and tumultuous manner; (d)
that someone was killed in the course of the affray; (e) that it cannot be ascertained who actually
killed the deceased; and (j) that the person or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries or
who used violence can be identified.

There was no tumultuous affray between groups of persons in the course of which Aro
died. The evidence established that there were only 2 persons, Wacoy and Quibac, who picked
on one defenseless individual, Aro, and attacked him repeatedly, taking turns in inflicting
punches and kicks on him. There was no confusion and tumultuous quarrel or affray, nor was
there a reciprocal aggression in that fateful incident. Wacoy and Quibac's act of mauling Aro
was the proximate cause of the latter's death; and as such, they must be held criminally liable,
specifically for the crime of Homicide.
 21

Crime committed is different from that intended

Wacoy's contention that their intent was only to inflict slight physical injuries on Aro,
and should only be meted a lesser penalty, pursuant to Article 49 of the RPC is unmeritorious.
Article 49 of the RPC applies only where the crime committed is different from that intended
and where the felony committed befalls a different person (error in personae); and not to cases
where more serious consequences not intended by the offender result from his felonious act
(praeter intentionem), as in this case. If the victim dies because of a deliberate act of the
malefactors, intent to kill is conclusively presumed. In such case, even if there is no intent to kill,
the crime is Homicide because with respect to crimes of personal violence, the penal law looks
particularly to the material results following the unlawful act and holds the aggressor
responsible for all the consequences thereof.

Effect of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong

The penalty for Homicide must be imposed in its minimum period due to the presence
of the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong under Article
13(3) of the RPC. In determining the presence of this circumstance, it must be considered that
since intention is a mental process and is an internal state of mind, accused's intention must be
judged by his conduct and external overt acts. The mitigating circumstance is available to
Wacoy and Quibac, given the absence of evidence showing that, apart from kicking and
punching Aro on the stomach, something else had been done; thus, evincing the purpose of
merely maltreating or inflicting physical harm, and not to end the life of Aro.

PEOPLE v. ARMANDO DIONALDO Y EBRON ET. AL

G.R. No. 207949, 9 September 2015
Criminal liability is extinguished by death.

Facts: On 23 July 2014, the Court rendered its Resolution finding accused-appellants Armando
Dionaldo y Ebron, Renato Dionaldo y Ebron (Renato), Mariano Gariguez, Jr. y Ramos, and
Rodolfo Larido y Ebron (accused-appellants) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special
complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide.

Accused-appellants collectively moved for reconsideration thereof, which the Court

denied with finality in its Resolution dated 24 September 2014. On even date, the Court received
a letter from the Bureau of Corrections informing the Court of Renato’s death on 10 June 2014,
as shown in his Certificate of Death..

Issue: Whether or not the criminal liability of Renato is extinguished by his death.

Held: YES. As Renato's death transpired before the promulgation of the Court's Resolution
dated 23 July 2014 in this case, i.e., when his appeal before the Court was still pending
resolution, Renato’s criminal liability is totally extinguished in view of the provisions of Article
89 of the Revised Penal Code which states:

Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary

penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender
occurs before final judgment;

In People v. Amistoso, the Court explained that the death of the accused pending appeal of
his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as his civil liability ex delicto.
 22

Consequently, Renato's death on 10 June 2014 renders the Court's Resolution dated 23 July 2014
irrelevant and ineffectual as to him, and is therefore set aside. The criminal case against Renato
is dismissed.

DIAZ v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 208113, 2 December 2015
Extinction of the penal action does not necessarily
extinguish civil liability.

Facts: An Information for estafa was filed against petitioner Dolores Diaz for her alleged failure
to return or remit the proceeds from various merchandise valued at P32,000.00 received by her
in trust, i.e., on consignment basis from Arcilla.

Accused is one of Arcilla’s agents in selling goods/merchandise who agreed to the the
condition that she shall turn over the proceeds or return the unsold items to her a month after
they were entrusted. Arcilla averred that on 20 February 1996, she entrusted merchandise
consisting of umbrellas and bath towels worth P35,300.00 to accused as evidenced by an
acknowledgment receipt dated 20 February 1996 duly signed by the latter. However, on 20
March 1996, accused was only able to remit the amount of P3,300.00 and thereafter, failed to
make further remittances and ignored respondent's demands to remit the proceeds or return the
goods.
The RTC acquitted petitioner of the charge of estafa but held her civilly liable to pay
respondent the amount of P32,000.00, with interest from the filing of the Information on 11
March 1999 until fully paid, and to pay the costs. The RTC found that the prosecution failed to
establish any intent on the part of the petitioner to defraud respondent and, thus, could not be
held criminally liable. However, it adjudged petitioner civilly liable "having admitted that she
received the products in the amount of P32,000.00.” The CA affirmed the RTC’s finding of civil
liability.

Issue: Whether the CA committed reversible error in finding accused civilly liable to Arcilla.

Held: No. Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability
where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence, or "greater
weight of the credible evidence," is required. Thus, an accused acquitted of estafa may still be
held civilly liable where the facts established by the evidence so warrant, as in this case.

The CA correctly found that Arcilla was able to prove by preponderance of evidence the
fact of the transaction, as well as accused’s failure to remit the proceeds of the sale of the
merchandise worth P32,000.00, or to return the same to Arcilla in case such merchandise were
not sold. This was established through the presentation of the acknowledgment receipt dated 20
February 1996, which, as the document's name connotes, shows that accused acknowledged
receipt from Arcilla of the listed items with their corresponding values, and assumed the
obligation to return the same on 20 March 1996 if not sold.

MANANSALA v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 215424, 9 December 2015
Falsification of Private Documents; acting under an
impulse of uncontrollable fear

Facts: Private complainant Siy, former Vice President for Finance of Urban Finance and Leasing
Corporation, now UMC Finance and Leasing Corporation (UMC), instructed her secretary,
Bautista, to withdraw via Automated Teller Machine (ATM) the amount of P38,000.00 from her
Metrobank and Bank of the Philippine Islands bank accounts. However, Bautista was unable to
 23

make such withdrawal as the ATM was offline. Instead, she took it upon herself to get such
amount from the petty cash custodian of UMC. However, she forgot to inform Siy about this
arrangement.

Thereafter, UMC Finance Manager Lacanilao informed Siy that as per the Petty Cash
Replenishment Report (subject report) prepared by UMC Petty Cash Custodian Manansala, she
allegedly made a cash advance in the amount of P38,000.00 which remained unliquidated. It
was only then that Siy found out what Bautista had done, and she immediately rectified the
situation by issuing 2 checks to reimburse UMC's petty cash account. As the checks were
eventually encashed, Lacanilao instructed Manansala to revise the subject report by deleting the
entry relating to Siy's alleged cash advance, to which Manansala acceded.

Sometime in March 2000, Lacanilao instructed Manansala to retrieve the subject report,
re-insert the entry relating to Siy's alleged cash advance therein, reprint the same on a scratch
paper, and repeatedly fold the paper to make it look old. On the basis of the reprinted subject
document, Siy was administratively charged for using office funds for personal use. On 18 April
2000, Siy was terminated from her job and Lacanilao succeeded the former in the position she
left vacant. Siy filed a criminal complaint for falsification of private documents against UMC
President Marty, Lacanilao and Manansala.

The MeTC found both Lacanilao and Manansala guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
committing the crime of Falsification of Private Documents. The MeTC found that Lacanilao
and Manansala conspired in falsifying the subject report by stating therein that Siy made a cash
advance and used it for her personal use, despite knowing all along that Siy never did so; thus,
resulting in Siy's termination from her work. In this regard, the MeTC tagged Lacanilao as the
mastermind of the crime as she benefited the most from Siy's termination, while Manansala
aided Lacanilao in the realization of her sinister motive. Nonetheless, the MeTC appreciated the
mitigating circumstance of acting under an impulse of uncontrollable fear in favor of
Manansala, noting that she merely acted upon Lacanilao's instructions and that she only
performed such acts out of fear that she would lose her job if she defied her superior's orders.

The RTC and CA affirmed the MeTC ruling in toto.

Issue: Whether or not the CA correctly affirmed Manansala's conviction for Falsification of
Private Documents.

Held: Yes. The elements of Falsification of Private Documents under Article 172 (2) of the RPC
are: (a) that the offender committed any of the acts of falsification, except those in Article 171 (7)
of the same Code; (b) that the falsification was committed in any private document; and (c) that
the falsification caused damage to a third party or at least the falsification was committed with
intent to cause such damage. On the other hand the elements of Falsification under Article 171
(4) of the RPC are as follows: (a) the offender makes in a public document untruthful statements
in a narration of facts; (b) he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by
him; and (c) the facts narrated by him are absolutely false.

In this case, the MeTC, RTC, and CA all correctly found Manansala guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the aforesaid crime, considering that: (a) as UMC's Petty Cash Custodian,
she is legally obligated to disclose only truthful statements in the documents she prepares in
connection with her work, such as the subject report; (b) she knew all along that Siy never made
any cash advance nor utilized the proceeds thereof for her personal use; (c) despite such
knowledge, she still proceeded in revising the subject report by inserting therein a statement
that Siy made such a cash advance; and (d) she caused great prejudice to Siy as the latter was
terminated from her job on account of the falsified report that she prepared.
 24

While the conviction of Manansala for the aforesaid crime was proper, it was erroneous
to appreciate the “mitigating circumstance” of acting under an impulse of uncontrollable fear.
“Acting under an impulse of uncontrollable fear” is not among the mitigating circumstances
enumerated in Article 13 of the RPC, but is an exempting circumstance provided under Article
12 (6) of the same Code. Moreover, while the records show that Manansala was apprehensive in
committing a falsity in the preparation of the subject report as she did not know the
repercussions of her actions, nothing would show that Lacanilao, or any of her superiors at
UMC for that matter, threatened her with loss of employment should she fail to do so. As there
was an absence of any real and imminent threat, intimidation, or coercion that would have
compelled Manansala to do what she did, such a circumstance cannot be appreciated in her
favor.

2016 DECISIONS

SOLOMON VERDADERO v. PEOPLE

G.R. NO. 216021, 2 March 2016
Insanity as a defense

Facts: Maynard Plata (Maynard) and his father Romeo were at the Baggao Police Station.
Together with Ronnie Elaydo (Ronnie), they went there to report that Solomon Verdadero
(Verdadero) had stolen the fan belt of their irrigation pump. After a confrontation with
Verdadero at the police station, the 3 men made their way home on a tricycle but stopped at a
drugstore as Maynard intended to buy some baby supplies. Romeo proceeded towards a store
near the drugstore while Ronnie stayed inside the tricycle. From the drug store, Maynard saw
Verdadero stabbing Romeo, after he was alerted by the shouts of Ronnie. Verdadero stabbed
Romeo on the left side of the latter's upper back with the use of a Rambo knife. He again struck
Romeo's upper back, just below the right shoulder. Maynard tried to help his father but
Verdadero attempted to attack him as well.

The responding police officers arrested Verdadero, while Maynard and Ronnie brought
Romeo to the hospital. Romeo, however died upon arrival. Based on the Post-Mortem
Examination Report, his cause of death was cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to severe
hemorrhage secondary to multiple stab wounds and hack wounds.

Verdadero raised the defense of insanity. Acting on the Order dated 4 January 2011 of the
RTC, Dr. Ethel Maureen Pagaddu (Dr. Pagaddu) conducted a mental examination on
Verdadero. She confirmed that as early as 1999, he was already brought to Cagayan Valley
Medical Center (CVMC) and that he was diagnosed with schizophrenia on July 21, 2003. Dr.
Pagaddu agreed with Dr. Andres-Juliana that Verdadero had suffered a relapse on the day of
the stabbing incident

Issue: Whether or not the lower courts erred in convicting Verdadero despite the fact that his
insanity at the time of the incident was established by clear and convincing evidence.

Held: The Supreme Court acquitted the petitioner of Homicide by reason of insanity. It is
undisputed that: (a) as early as 1999, Verdadero was brought to the Psychiatric Department of
CVMC for treatment; (b) he was diagnosed with depression in 2001; (c) he was diagnosed with
schizophrenia on July 21, 2003; (d) he was confined in the psychiatric ward sometime in 2009
due to a relapse; (e) he was in and out of psychiatric care from the time of his first confinement
in 1999 until the stabbing incident; and (f) he was diagnosed to have suffered a relapse on
March 20, 2009.
 25

Further, on 22 March 2009, he was officially diagnosed to have suffered a relapse of

schizophrenia. Generally, evidence of insanity after the commission of the crime is immaterial.
It, however, may be appreciated and given weight if there is also proof of abnormal behavior
before or simultaneous to the crime.

In exonerating Verdadero on the ground of insanity, the Court does not totally free him
from the responsibilities and consequences of his acts. Article 12(1) of the RPC expressly states
that "[w]hen an insane person has committed an act which the law defines as a felony, the court
shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums established for persons thus
afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the
same court." Instead of incarceration, Verdadero is to be confined in an institution where his
mental condition may be addressed so that he may again function as a member of society. He
shall remain confined therein until his attending physicians give a favorable recommendation
for his release.

PEOPLE v. ALLAN EGAGAMAO

G.R. No. 218809, 3 August 2016
Criminal liability is extinguished by death.

Facts: On 26 July 2004, a total of four (4) Informations were filed before the RTC, each charging
Egagamao of the crime of Rape defined and penalized under Article 266-A (1) (a) of the RPC.
On 22 August 2002, AAA was sleeping in her room when she was awakened as Egagamao went
inside her room, wearing only his underwear. AAA asked why Egagamao was in her room, but
the latter simply told her not to make any noise, and thereafter started kissing her lips and
cheeks and touching her body. AAA resisted and struggled but Egagamao pinned her hands,
boxed her legs, and covered her mouth. He then removed both their underwear, inserted his
penis into AAA's vagina, and did push and pull movements. After satisfying his lust, Egagamao
threatened AAA that he would kill her and her family if she told anyone what just happened.

According to AAA, Egagamao went on to have carnal knowledge of her without her
consent in November 2002, January 2004, and May 2004, and each time, he would repeat his
threats of bodily harm to AAA and her family should she reveal the rape incidents. In June
2004, AAA finally had the courage to tell her ordeal to her mother, who in turn, reported the
incidents to the police and had AAA undergo medical examination at a health center.
RTC found accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of 1 count of Rape and
acquitted him of three other charges for insufficiency of evidence. CA affirmed the RTC ruling
in toto.

Issue: Whether Egagamao is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing 1 count of Rape.

Held: No. The Supreme Court dismissed the case because the accused died pending appeal of
his conviction.

At the outset, it appears from the records that in a letter dated 27 January 2016, Davao
Prison and Penal Farm Acting Superintendent Gerardo F. Padilla informed the Court that
Egagamao died on 17 September 2013 due to Cardiopulmonary Arrest secondary to Acute
Myocardial Infarction, attaching thereto a duplicate copy of Egagamao's Certificate of
Death issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of B.E. Dujali, Davao del Norte.

In view of the foregoing, the criminal case against Egagamao, including the instant
appeal, is hereby dismissed.
 26

Upon Egagamao's death pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is
extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action
instituted therein for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded
as it is on the criminal action. However, it is well to clarify that Egagamao's civil liability in
connection with his acts against AAA may be based on sources of obligation other than delicts;
in which case, AAA may file a separate civil action against the estate of Egagamao, as may be
warranted by law and procedural rules.

PEOPLE v. MARIO GALIA BAGAMANO

G.R. No. 222658, 17 August 2016
Accused’s right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him.

Facts: An Information was filed before the RTC charging Bagamano of one (1) count of Rape.
According to the prosecution, AAA, her mother and sister, and her sister's common-law spouse,
Bagamano, lived at the same house. At around five (5) o'clock in the afternoon of 1 May 2006,
AAA was in the house of a neighbor, when suddenly, Bagamano, who was drunk at the time,
pulled her into their house while AAA' s mother and sister were not around. Once inside,
Bagamano ordered AAA to take off her clothes, covered her mouth, and then proceeded to have
carnal knowledge of her. Later that day, AAA's mother noticed that AAA was pale, bruised,
limping, and her dress soiled, making her suspect that Bagamano had something to do with
AAA's disheveled appearance. Such suspicion was later confirmed when AAA admitted to her
sister that Bagamano raped her, prompting AAA's mother and sister to bring her to the hospital
for medical examination. They also went to the police station to report the matter.

Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that taking into consideration that AAA is a
mental retardate, her positive testimony that Bagamano took advantage of her is credible and
trustworthy and, thus, sufficient to convict him of the crime of rape. In this relation, the CA
noted AAA's mental retardation in imposing the appropriate penalty on Bagamano.

Issue: Whether or not the accused’s conviction by the lower court of Rape should be upheld.

Held: For a charge of Rape by sexual intercourse under Article 266-A (1) of the RPC to prosper,
the prosecution must prove that: (a) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (b) he
accomplished this act through force, threat or intimidation, when the victim was deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious, by means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of
authority, or when the victim is under 12 years of age or is demented. The gravamen of Rape is
sexual intercourse with a woman against her will.

In this case, the Court agrees with the findings of both the RTC and the CA that the
prosecution established that AAA was indeed raped. Verily, the assessment and findings of the
trial court are generally accorded great weight, and are conclusive and binding to the Court if
not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and
influence, as in this case.

However, the CA should not have taken into account AAA's mental retardation. It must
be stressed that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him to ensure that his due process rights are observed. Thus,
every indictment must embody the essential elements of the crime charged with reasonable
particularity as to the name of the accused, the time and place of commission of the offense, and
the circumstances thereof. Hence, to consider matters not specifically alleged in the
 27

Information, even if proven in trial, would be tantamount to the deprivation of the accused's
right to be informed of the charge lodged against him.

PEOPLE v. ARIEL LAYAG

G.R. No. 214875, 17 October 2016
Criminal liability is extinguished by death.

Facts: In a Resolution dated 3 August 2015, the Court adopted in toto the Decision dated 29
January 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05383 finding accused-
appellant Ariel Layag (Layag) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of one (1) count of Qualified
Rape by Sexual Intercourse, two (2) counts of Qualified Rape by Sexual Assault, and one (1)
count of Acts of Lasciviousness.

Subsequently, the Court issued an Entry of Judgment dated 14 October 2015 declaring
that the aforesaid Resolution had already become final and executory. However, the Court
received a Letter dated 18 July 2016 from the Bureau of Corrections informing it of the death of
accused appellant on 30 July 2015, as evidenced by the Certificate of Death attached thereto.

Issue: Whether or not the criminal liability of the accused was already extinguished.

Held: Yes. The Supreme Court held that the criminal liability of the accused was already
extinguished.

In this case, Layag's death which occurred prior to the promulgation of the Resolution
dated 3 August 2015 - a matter which the Court was belatedly informed of - clearly shows that
there indeed exists a special or compelling circumstance warranting the re-examination of the
case despite its finality.

There is a need to reconsider and set aside said Resolution and enter a new one
dismissing the criminal cases against Layag. Under prevailing law and jurisprudence, Layag's
death prior to his final conviction by the Court renders dismissible the criminal cases against
him. Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally
extinguished by the death of the accused.

Thus, upon Layag's death pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is
extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action
instituted therein for the recovery of the civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished,
grounded as it is on the criminal action. However, it is well to clarify that Layag's civil liability
in connection with his acts against the victim, AAA, may be based on sources other than delicts;
in which case, AAA may file a separate civil action against the estate of Layag, as may be
warranted by law and procedural rules.

**Other 2016 cases:

1. GIRLIE M. QUISAY v. PEOPLE , G.R. No. 216920, 13 January 2016 - Criminal
Procedure - Authority to file Information
2. VINSON D. YOUNG, ET AL. v. PEOPLE ,G.R. No. 213910, February 3, 2016-
Criminal Procedure – Determination of Probable Cause
3. ROGER ALLEN BIGLER v. PEOPLE, G.R. NO. 210972, 2 March 2016- Criminal
Procedure – Doctrine of Finality of Judgment; Promulgation of Judgment
4. JESSICA LUCILA G. REYES v. THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN/JESSICA
LUCILA G. REYES v. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN AND PEOPLE
/JANET LIM NAPOLES v. CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, ET AL/JO
CHRISTINE NAPOLES AND JAMES CHRISTOPHER NAPOLES VS.
 28

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES IN HER CAPACITY AS OMBUDSMAN,

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SANDIGANBAYAN/JOHN RAYMUND DE
ASIS v. CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES ET AL, G.R. Nos. 212593-94/G.R. Nos.
213163-78/G.R. Nos. 213540-41/G.R. Nos. 213542-43/G.R. Nos. 215880-94/G.R. Nos.
213475-76. March 15, 2016 - Criminal Procedure /Evidence – Determination of
Probable Cause
5. PEOPLE v. GERRJAN MANAGO - Criminal Procedure – Searches and Seizure
6. PEOPLE v. ROMEO LINTAG, G.R. No. 219855. September 6, 2016- R.A. 9165; Chain
of Custody Rule – No New Doctrine
7. ELMER SINDAC v. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 220732. September 6, 2016- Criminal
Procedure – In Flagrante Delicto; Requirement of Personal Knowledge
8. EDMUND BULAUITAN v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 218891.
September 19, 2016- R.A. 9165; Chain of Custody Rule – No New Doctrine
9. PEOPLE v. PLACIDO GOCO, G.R. No. 219584. October 17, 2016- R.A. 9165; Chain
of Custody Rule – No New Doctrine
10. MARLON CURAMMENG v. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 219510, November 14, 2016 -
Criminal Procedure – Relaxation of Rules
11. ANTONIO GAMBOA v. PEOPLE , G.R. No. 220333, November 14, 2016- R.A. 9165;
Chain of Custody Rule – No New Doctrine
12. RICHARD A. CAMBE v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, ET AL./ RAMON
"BONG" REVILLA, JR. v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, ET AL./ RAMON
"BONG" REVILLA, JR. v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, ET AL./RICHARD A.
CAMBE v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, ET AL./JOHN RAYMUND DE ASIS
v. CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, ET AL./RONALD JOHN LIM v. CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES, ET AL./JANET LIM NAPOLES v. CONCHITA CARPIO
MORALES, ET AL./MARIO L. RELAMPAGOS, ET AL. v. SANDIGANBAYAN,
G.R. Nos. 212014-15/G.R. Nos. 212427-28/G.R. Nos. 212694-95/G.R. Nos. 213477-
78/G.R. Nos. 213532-33/G.R. Nos. 213536-37/G.R. Nos. 218744-59. December 6, 2016 -
Criminal Procedure/Evidence – Determination of Probable Cause

2017 DECISIONS

MANNY RAMOS v. PEOPLE

G.R. Nos. 218466 and 221425, 23 January 2017
Use of an Unlicensed Firearm as an aggravating
circumstance in the commission of the crime of
murder

Facts: Between 9:00 to 10:00 p.m. of 20 January 2002, Manny Ramos (Ramos), one of the accused,
yelled “Okinam patayan ka!” The accused chased and eventually surrounded the victim
Rolando and fired four successive shots. A witness saw that at the 4 th shot, Rolando fell face
down on the ground. Afterwards, Ramos approached Rolando and shot him again. The next
day, Rolando’s lifeless body was found near a tree.

Ramos was charged with murder, with the qualifying circumstance of treachery and
evident premeditation, taking advantage of their superior strength and at night time, armed
with an unlicensed firearm. The RTC convicted Ramos of murder, which was affirmed by the
CA.

Issue: Whether or not the RTC and CA correctly considered appreciated the aggravating
circumstance of Use of an Unlicensed Firearm in determining the imposable penalty for murder
against Ramos.
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Held: No, there is insufficient evidence to prove that Ramos and the other accused used an
unlicensed firearm in killing the victim.

Under Section 1 of R.A. No. 8294, “[i]f homicide or murder is committed with the use of
an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance.” The 2 requisites to establish such circumstance are: (a) the existence of the
subject firearm; and (b) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the gun did not have
the corresponding license or permit to carry it outside his residence.

The onus probandi of establishing these elements as alleged in the Information lies with
the prosecution. In this case, while it is undisputed that Rolando sustained five (5) gunshot
wounds which led to his demise, it is unclear from the records: (a) whether or not the police
officers were able to recover the firearm used as a murder weapon; and (b) assuming arguendo
that such firearm was recovered, whether such firearm was licensed. As the Information alleged
that accused-appellants used an unlicensed firearm in killing Rolando, the prosecution was
duty-bound to prove this allegation. Having failed in this respect, the Court cannot simply
appreciate the use of an unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance.

PEOPLE v. PUYAT MACAPUNDAG

G.R. No. 225965, 13 March 2017
Chain of custody rule; R.A. No. 9165

Facts: A buy-bust operation was conducted by the police against accused in Caloocan City.
After receiving the sachet and arresting the accused, PO3 Ardedon, the arresting officer marked
the plastic sachet he purchased from accused. Another member of the buy-bust team, SPO1
Amel Victoriano, marked the other three (3) sachets recovered from accused’s pocket.
Thereafter, they brought accused to the police station, where the seized items were turned over
to PO2 Hipolito, the investigator on duty. The examined specimen tested positive for ephedrine,
a dangerous drug.

Accused was charged with and convicted of violating Article II, Sections 5 and 11 of R.A.
No. 9165, for illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs. The CA affirmed the RTC’s
decision.

Issue: Whether accused’s conviction was correct.

Held: No. The buy-bust team failed to comply with the rule on chain of custody under Article
II, Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. Under this section, the apprehending team shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical inventory and photograph the seized items in
the presence of the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, his representative
or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice, and any elected
public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of
the same. Further, the seized drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within 24
hours from confiscation for examination.

In this case, the prosecution failed to state whether the police officers inventoried and
photographed the seized sachets in the presence of accused or his representative. Likewise, they
were silent as to the presence of the other required witnesses, i.e., a representative from the DOJ,
any elected public official, and a member of the press. In fact, the prosecution did not offer any
inventory of the seized items or photographs thereof as evidence. The Evidence
Acknowledgement Receipt and the Affidavit of Attestation, which form part of the evidence of
the prosecution, does not state if the seized items were actually inventoried or photographed in
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accordance with the parameters provided by Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR. Hence, the
submission thereof does not constitute compliance with the law.

FUENTES v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 186421, 17 April 2017
Violation of R.A. No. 3019, as amended

Facts: Private complainant Valenzuela is the sole proprietor of Triple A, which was operating in
the Port of Isabel, Leyte since 1993 until 2001 through the Business Permits issued by the LGU of
Isabela during the said period. In 2002, Fuentes, then Mayor of Isabel, refused to sign Triple A’s
Business Permit, despite: (a) its payment of renewal fees; (b) all the other municipal officers of
the LGU having signed the same, thereby signifying their approval; and (c) a Police Clearance
certifying that Valenzuela had no derogatory records in the municipality.

Initially, Triple A was able to carry out its business despite the lack of the said Permit by
securing temporary permits. However, Triple A’s operations were shut down when the BOC
issued a Cease and Desist Order after receiving Fuentes's unnumbered Memorandum alleging
that Valenzuela was involved in smuggling and drug trading. Valenzuela then wrote to Fuentes,
pleading that she be issued a Business Permit, but the latter’s security refused to receive the
same. Despite all her pleas, no Business Permit was issued for Triple A, causing losses for her
business.

Fuentes claimed that as early as 1999 to 2001, he has been hearing rumors that
Valenzuela was engaged in illegal activities such as smuggling and drug trading, but he did not
act on it. However, in 2002, he received written reports from the Prime Movers for Peace and
Progress and Chief of Police Tamse allegedly confirming said rumors, which prompted him to
hold the approval of Valenzuela's Business Permit for Triple A, and to issue the unnumbered
Memorandum addressed to port officials and the BOC. Fuentes maintained that if he went on
with the approval of such permit and the rumors turned out to be true, many would suffer and
be victimized; on the other hand, if the rumors were false, then only one stands to suffer.

The Sandiganbayan convicted Fuentes of violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019.

Issue: Whether or not the Fuentes’ refusal to issue a business permit to Triple A amounted to a
violation of Section 3(e), R.A. 3019, as amended.

Held: Yes. The elements of violation of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019, as amended, are as follows:
(a) that the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official
functions (or a private individual acting in conspiracy with such public officers); (b) that he
acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence; and (c) that his
action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private
party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his functions.

The first element is undisputed. The existence of the second element is evident from
Fuentes’ acts. If Fuentes truly believed that Valenzuela was indeed engaged in illegal
smuggling and drug trading, then he would not have issued Business Permits to the latter's
other businesses a However, and as aptly pointed out by the Sandiganbayan, Fuentes issued a
Business Permit to Valenzuela's other business, Gemini Security, which provides security
services to vessels in the Port of Isabel. Under these questionable circumstances, the Court is led
to believe that Fuentes's refusal to issue a Business Permit to Valenzuela's Triple A was indeed
committed with manifest partiality against the latter, and in favor of the other ship chandling
operators in the Port of Isabel.
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As regards the issue of bad faith, while it is within the municipal mayor's prerogative to
suspend, revoke, or refuse to issue Business Permits pursuant to Sections 1623 and 444 (b) (3)
(iv)24 of the Local Government Code as an incident of his power to issue the same, it must
nevertheless be emphasized that: (a) the power to suspend or revoke is premised on the
violation of the conditions specified therein; and (b) the power to refuse issuance is premised on
non-compliance with the pre-requisites for said issuance.

It is clear that Valenzuela had complied with all the prerequisites for the issuance of a
Business Permit for Triple A, as her application already contained the prior approval of the
other concerned officials of the LGU. In fact, Valenzuela even submitted numerous certifications
issued by various law enforcement agencies clearing her of any kind of participation from the
alleged illegal smuggling and drug trading activities in the Port of Isabel. Despite these, Fuentes
still refused to issue a Business Permit for Valenzuela's Triple A without affording her an
opportunity to controvert the rumors against her. Worse, he even issued the unnumbered
Memorandum which effectively barred Triple A from conducting its ship chandling operations
without a Business Permit.

As to the third and last element, Fuentes's acts of refusing to issue a Business Permit in
Valenzuela's favor, coupled with his issuance of the unnumbered Memorandum which
effectively barred Triple A from engaging in its ship handling operations without such Business
Permit, caused some sort of undue injury on the part of Valenzuela. Such suspension of Triple
A's ship chandling operations prevented Valenzuela from engaging in an otherwise lawful
endeavor for 2002.

PEOPLE v. JAO
G.R. No. 225634, 7 June 2017
Illegal delivery of drugs

Facts: A police team conducted a buy-bust operation at Four Queens Motel located in Negros
Oriental where Jao was billeted. A result thereof, Jao was arrested. The arresting policemen
searched Jao and found six (6) more plastic sachets containing shabu. One of the members of the
buy-bust team, SI Manzanaris, then marked the plastic sachets seized from Jao. However, when
SI Manzanaris was about to prepare the inventory of the seized items, Jao suddenly and
voluntarily informed the policemen that Catigtig was his source of contraband and agreed to
cooperate for the latter's arrest. Special Agent Dungog then instructed Jao to call Catigtig to
order ten (10) more sachets of shabu, to which the latter agreed to deliver that evening. Due to
this development, the conduct of the inventory was suspended, and consequently, the
policemen checked out of the motel and returned to their headquarters. During this time, SI
Manzanaris retained custody of the items seized from Jao. A buy-bust operation was again
conducted to arrest Catigtig which was successful.

The RTC convicted both Jao and Catigtig for violations of Article II, Sections 5 and 11 of
R.A. No. 9165. The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision in toto. During the pendency of the appeal,
Catigtig died.

Issue: Whether or not the Jao is guilty of violation of Sections 5 and 11 of R.A. No. 9165.

Held: Yes. For a successful prosecution of the crime of Illegal Delivery of Dangerous Drugs, it
must be proven that the accused passed on possession of a dangerous drug to another,
personally or otherwise, and by any means; that such delivery is not authorized by law; and
that the accused knowingly made the delivery. Delivery may be committed even without
consideration. On the other hand, in the crime of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, the
prosecution must prove that the accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified
 32

as a prohibited drug; that such possession is not authorized by law; and that the accused freely
and consciously possessed the drug.

In this case, both the RTC and the CA correctly found that the prosecution had
established Jao's criminal liability for the aforesaid crimes, considering that: (a) Jao himself
delivered a plastic sachet containing 0.01 gram of shabu to the informant during a legitimate
buy-bust operation; and (b) upon his arrest, the arresting officers searched Jao and found six (6)
more plastic sachets containing shabu with an aggregate weight of 0.06 gram. Similarly, both
courts a quo found that there was no break in the chain of custody of the sachets seized from Jao
as SI Manzanaris had sole possession of such sachets from the time of Jao's arrest until he
turned them over to PO1 Tan, who in turn, handed it over to Forensic Chemist PCI Llena for
qualitative examination.

PEOPLE v. MONROYO
G.R. No. 223708, 28 June 2017
Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to R.A. No. 7610; Qualified Rape

Facts: AAA, 14 years old at that time, was alone in her house when her uncle, Monroyo, arrived.
While AAA was cleaning the house, Monroyo approached her, touched her private organ, and
warned her against telling her parents about what happened. The incident was repeated on 13
October 2003 and in the morning of 15 October 2003.

At around 11:00 p.m., BBB, then 16 years old, woke up when she felt someone touching
her breast. She saw Monroyo who then instructed her to sit down on the floor and told her not
to make any noise. He then forced her to lie down on the floor and started kissing her all over
her body while BBB cried. He forcibly removed her shorts and panty and thereafter stood up to
remove his shorts and brief. He then placed himself on top of her, inserted his penis into her
private organ, and made a push and pull motion. BBB cried loudly but Monroyo covered her
mouth with his hand. After satisfying his lust, he put on his clothes and threatened to kill BBB
and her family if she tells anyone about what happened. BBB did not see him again after the
incident.

The RTC found Monroyo guilty of Rape and Acts of Lasciviousness. The CA affirmed
the decision of the RTC.

Issue: Whether the conviction for 3 counts of Acts of Lasciviousness and 1 count of Rape is
correct.

Held: Yes.

Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to R.A. No. 7610

Preliminarily, although the three Informations designated the crime committed only as
“Acts of Lasciviousness,” the facts alleged therein pertain not only to violations of Article 336 of
the RPC but also of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610. Nevertheless, the erroneous reference to the
law violated does not vitiate the information if the facts alleged therein clearly recite the facts
constituting the crime charged. As the Court had ruled, the real nature of the criminal charge is
determined not from the caption or preamble of the information, or from the specification of the
legal provision alleged to have been violated, which are mere conclusions of law, but by the
actual recital of facts in the information. In the present case, the recital of facts in the
Informations constitutes violations of Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC in
relation to Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610.
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The elements of Acts of Lasciviousness are: (a) that the offender commits any act of
lasciviousness or lewdness; (b) that it is done (i) by using force or intimidation, or (ii) when the
offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (iii) when the offended party
is under 12 years of age; and (c) that the offended party is another person of either sex. On the
other hand, the elements of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 are: (a) the accused commits the act of
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (b) the said act is performed with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (c) the child, whether male or female, is
below 18 years of age.

The Court agrees with the findings of the RTC and the CA that the prosecution was able
to establish the presence of the aforementioned elements. As correctly observed by the lower
courts, AAA clearly and convincingly narrated in detail each lascivious act committed by
Monroyo against her. On various occasions, Monroyo succeeded in touching AAA's private
organ. The Court finds that Monroyo's overt acts were done against AAA's will and much more,
committed without any other justifiable reason, hence, demonstrating its lewd character. AAA
also sufficiently established that she was a minor during that time. In this relation, it should be
pointed out that Monroyo was AAA's uncle and thus, exercised moral ascendancy and
influence over her, which according to case law, constitutes intimidation.

Qualified Rape
The elements of Qualified Rape under Article 266-A (1) (a) and Article 266-B are: (a) the
victim is a female over twelve (12) years but under eighteen (18) years of age; (b) the offender is
a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third
civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim; and (c) the offender has
carnal knowledge of the victim either through force, threat, or intimidation.

A perusal of the records reveals that all these elements are present. Both the RTC and the
CA found credible BBB's categorical testimony that on 18 November 2003, Monroyo had carnal
knowledge of her without her consent; that she was 16 years old at that time; and that Monroyo
is her uncle, being the husband of her mother's half-sister. In addition, the results of Dr. Valdez's
medical examination corroborated BBB's account. The lower courts also noted BBB's testimony
that Monroyo previously molested her 5 times prior to the rape incident but she opted not to
inform her parents due to Monroyo's threats against her.

PEOPLE v. DOMINADOR LADRA

G.R. No. 221443, 17 July 2017
Lascivious conduct under R.A. No. 7610

Facts: On 16 April 2008, accused squeezed the vagina of AAA, then 12 years old, and told her
that they were going to visit his house. Scared, AAA cried and told her cousin, DDD, about the
incident. Together, they reported the incident to the barangay and thereafter, had the incident
recorded in the police blotter. Later, AAA filed criminal cases against accused, who was
subsequently arrested.

The RTC found accused guilty of unjust vexation for his act of “just squeezing the
vagina” of AAA. The RTC’s decision was affirmed by the CA.

Issue: Whether the act of squeezing the vagina of a 12-year old constitutes unjust vexation.

Held: No. Accused is guilty of acts of lasciviousness in relation to Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610.
His act of squeezing AAA’s vagina is lascivious conduct as defined under the law.
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Conviction for Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC requires the
concurrence of the following elements: (a) that the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or
lewdness; (b) that it is done under any of the following circumstances: (i) through force, threat,
or intimidation, (ii) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious, (iii) by means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority,
and (iv) when the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though
none of the circumstances mentioned above be present; and (c) that the offended party is
another person of either sex.

Before an accused can be held criminally liable for lascivious conduct under Section 5 (b)
of R.A. No. 7610, the requisites of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness as penalized under Article
336 of the RPC above-enumerated must be met in addition to the requisites for sexual abuse
under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, as follows: (a) the accused commits the act of sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct; (b) the said act is performed with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (c) that the child, whether male or female, is
below 18 years of age.

A judicious examination of the records reveals that all the elements of the crime of Acts
of Lasciviousness under the RPC and lascivious conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610
have been sufficiently established. The prosecution was able to prove AAA's minority at the
time of the incident through the presentation of her Certificate of Live Birth showing that she
was born on 3 September 1995. At the time of the commission of the lascivious act, AAA was
then 12 years old. It was likewise established that accused-appellant, an adult who exercised
influence on AAA, committed a lascivious act by “squeezing” her vagina.

“Lascivious conduct” is defined in Section 2 of the Rules and Regulations on the

Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases as follows:

[T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia,

anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the
genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an
intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any
person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a
person.

The term “lewd” is commonly defined as something indecent or obscene; it is

characterized by or intended to excite crude sexual desire. That an accused is entertaining a
lewd or unchaste design is necessarily a mental process the existence of which can be inferred
by overt acts carrying out such intention, i.e., by conduct that can only be interpreted as lewd or
lascivious. The presence or absence of lewd designs is inferred from the nature of the acts
themselves and the environmental circumstances.

After a careful evaluation, the Court finds that the mere fact of “squeezing” the private
part of a child - a young girl 12 years of age – could not have signified any other intention but one
having lewd or indecent design. Indeed, the law indicates that the mere touching - more so,
“squeezing,” in this case, which strongly suggests that the act was intentional - of AAA's
genitalia clearly constitutes lascivious conduct. It could not have been done merely to annoy or
vex her, as opined by the courts a quo.

FIANZA v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 218592, 2 August 2017
 35

In instances where the child subjected to sexual abuse through

lascivious conduct is below 12 years of age, the offender should
be prosecuted under Article 336 of the RPC, but suffer the
higher penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period in
accordance with Article III, Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610;
“Child subjected to other sexual abuse” under R.A. No. 7610.

Facts: Sometime in July 2010, AAA, who was then 11 years old, was called by Fianza to his
house and thereupon, was asked to wash his clothes. After AAA was finished with the laundry,
Fianza asked her to go with him to the kamalig. Thereat, they proceeded to the second flooor
where Fianza removed his pants and briefs, lied down, and ordered AAA to hold his penis and
masturbate him. After ejaculating, Fianza put on his clothes, and gave P20.00 to AAA who,
thereafter, went home.

On 30 November 2010, while AAA was at home, Fianza called her to his house, and
asked her to clean the same. After she was done sweeping the floor, they proceeded to the
second floor of the kamalig. Thereat, Fianza again removed his pants and briefs, lied down, and
ordered AAA to fondle his penis. After the deed, he gave P20.00 to AAA who, thereafter, went
home. After the second incident, AAA related the matter to her cousin, CCC, who, in turn, told
BBB, AAA's mother, who reported the matter to the police.

In its Decision dated 24 November 2014, the CA upheld the RTC’s decision convicting
Fianza for 2 counts of violation of Article III, Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610.

Issue: Whether Fianza is guilty of 2 counts of violation of Article III, Section 5(b) of R.A. No.
7610.
.
Held: Yes. At the outset, the Court deems it appropriate to correct the appellation of the crime
with which Fianza was charged to Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC as the
victim, AAA, was only 11 years old at the time of the incidents. In instances where the child
subjected to sexual abuse through lascivious conduct is below 12 years of age, the offender
should be prosecuted under Article 336 of the RPC, but suffer the higher penalty of reclusion
temporal in its medium period in accordance with Article III, Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610.

Before an accused can be convicted of child abuse through lascivious conduct on a

minor below 12 years of age, the requisites for Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the
RPC must be met in addition to the requisites for sexual abuse thereunder.

The elements of Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC are: (a) the offender
commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; (b) the lascivious act is done under any of the
following circumstances: (i) by using force or intimidation; (ii) when the offended party is
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or (iii) when the offended party is under 12 years
of age; and (c) the offended party is another person of either sex. On the other hand, sexual
abuse, as defined under Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 has 3 elements: (a) the accused
commits an act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (b) the said act is performed with a
child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (c) the child is below 18
years old.

In this case, the existence of all the elements of Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336
of the RPC, as well as the first and third elements of sexual abuse under Article III, Section 5(b)
of R.A. No. 7610, remains undisputed. Records disclose that on two (2) occasions in July 2010
and on 30 November 2010, Fianza induced AAA, an 11-year-old minor, to hold his penis and
masturbate him. The only point of dispute is with regard to the existence of the second element
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of sexual abuse, i.e., whether or not the lascivious conduct was performed on a child subjected
to other sexual abuse.

A child is deemed subjected to other sexual abuse when the child indulges in lascivious
conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult. Lascivious conduct under the coercion or
influence of any adult exists when there is some form of compulsion equivalent to intimidation
which subdues the free exercise of the offended party's free will. Corollary thereto, Section 2(g)
of the Rules on Child Abuse Cases conveys that sexual abuse involves the element of influence
which manifests in a variety of forms. Thus, Fianza's acts were attended by coercion or influence
under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610. It is undisputed that AAA was only 11 years old
at the time of the incidents, hence, considered a child under the law.

PEOPLE v. RUBILLAR, JR.

G.R. No. 224631, 23 August 2017
The Sweetheart Theory defense in rape when duly
supported by evidence is sufficient to negate
allegation of rape.

Facts: At around 1:00 p.m. on 12 October 2006, AAA was waiting for a jeepney to go to the
public market when Rubillar, her father's kumpare, arrived and offered her a ride, to which
AAA assented. They eventually reached a place unfamiliar to AAA — which later, was
ascertained as Davao Motel — where Rubillar, then, drove his motorcycle inside and thereupon,
was assisted by a man.

When they were left alone, Rubillar dragged her upstairs and pushed her to the bed.
Despite AAA's resistance, Rubillar placed himself on top of her, forcibly held her hands,
undressed her, and kissed her. He then inserted his penis into AAA's vagina and made a push
and pull motion. Afterwards, Rubillar told her to wash herself in the comfort room and,
subsequently, to put on the helmet. Rubillar allegedly threatened to kill her should she tell
anyone about what happened. They then rode the motorcycle and Rubillar dropped her off at
the public market. AAA proceeded to buy groceries and rode a jeepney going home. Thereafter,
AAA ran away from home due to fear and embarrassment. Her sister took her home in January
2007 and only then did AAA tell her parents what happened. Subsequently, they reported the
incident to the police.

For his part, Rubillar admitted having carnal knowledge of AAA, but maintained that
they were sweethearts since August 2006 and their sexual act was consensual as they had a
relationship. Rubillar's claim that he had a relationship with AAA was thereafter corroborated
by numerous witnesses. The RTC and the CA convicted Rubillar of rape.

Issue: Whether or not Rubillar's conviction for Rape should be upheld.

Held: No. The Supreme Court ruled in the negative, thereby acquitting Rubillar. The Court held
that the victim's sole testimony examined in light of the other evidence presented in court,
failed to establish Rubillar's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Rubillar's invocation of the "sweetheart theory" is essentially an admission of him

having carnal knowledge with AAA, albeit maintaining that the same was consensual. The
"sweetheart theory" is an affirmative defense often raised to prove the nonattendance of force or
intimidation. The "sweetheart theory" operates to impair the victim's testimony or create doubt
on her version of the facts when the defense presents sufficient evidence of a relationship
between the accused and the victim but the latter simply denies it. Notably, a woman who was
sexually abused by a lover has no practicable reason to deny her relationship with the accused
 37

in a rape trial because admitting such relationship would not negate her allegation of rape, as
the Court has consistently ruled that "a 'love affair' does not justify rape, for the beloved cannot
be sexually violated against her will."

In this case, Rubillar's allegation of relationship with AAA was overwhelmingly

corroborated by his other witnesses. First, Odiongan testified that prior to the alleged incident,
AAA introduced Rubillar to him as her new boyfriend and that he saw them in an intimate
embrace. Second, Laguardia recalled that Rubillar introduced AAA to him as his girlfriend
through a text message, then, borrowed his motorcycle, which Rubillar and AAA used for about
an hour. Third and most relevant is the testimony of Kalan, AAA's long-time friend, who
testified that AAA explicitly told her that Rubillar was her boyfriend once before the alleged
incident and a second time after AAA ran away from home.

PERALTA v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 221991, 30 August 2017
Illegal possession of firearms and Ammunition

Facts: The instant case arose from an Information dated 20 November 2008 charging Peralta of
illegal possession of firearms and ammunition, defined and penalized under P.D. No. 1866.

The prosecution alleged that at 11:00 p.m. on 18 November 2008, a team of Police
Officers responded to a telephone call received by their desk officer-on-duty that there was a
man firing a gun at the back of the PLDT Building in Pantal District, Dagupan City. Upon
arrival thereat, the police officers saw two (2) men walking, later identified as Peralta and his
companion, Calimlim, holding a gun and a knife respectively. Upon seeing the police officers,
the men became uneasy, which prompted the police officers to swoop in. Upon apprehension,
they recovered a caliber .45 pistol with Serial Number 4517488 containing a magazine with five
(5) live ammunitions from Peralta and a knife from Calimlim. Both the RTC and the CA found
Peralta guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime as charged.

Issue: Whether the CA correctly upheld Peralta's conviction for Illegal Possession of Firearm
and Ammunition.

Held: Yes. The corpus delicti in the crime of illegal possession of firearms as defined under
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, is the accused's lack of license or
permit to possess or carry the firearm, as possession itself is not prohibited by law. To establish
the corpus delicti, the prosecution has the burden of proving that: (a) the firearm exists; and (b)
the accused who owned or possessed it does not have the corresponding license or permit to
possess or carry the same.

In this case, the prosecution had proven beyond reasonable doubt the existence of the
aforesaid elements, considering that: (a) the police officers positively identified Peralta as the
one holding a .45 caliber pistol with Serial Number 4517488 with magazine and live
ammunitions, which was seized from him and later on, marked, identified, offered, and
properly admitted as evidence at the trial; and (b) the Certification dated 10 August 2011 issued
by the Firearms and Explosives Office of the Philippine National Police which declared that
Peralta “is not a licensed/registered firearm holder of any kind and calibre, specifically Caliber .
45 Pistol, make (unknown) with Serial Number 4517488 per verification from the records of this
office as of this date.”

PEOPLE v. LIDASAN, ET. AL.

G.R. No. 227425, 4 September 2017
 38

Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention

Facts: At around 10:00 p.m. on 30 October 30, 1998, private complainant Ragos was in her
family's office/residential compound when suddenly, the accused and two (2) companions
entered her bedroom and declared “kidnapping ito.” One of the accused served as lookout,
while the other men tied Ragos's hands, sealed her mouth with packaging tape, ransacked all
the cabinets and drawers, and took with them cash and personal items amounting to
P200,000.00.

The kidnappers initially demanded ransom money in the amount of Php30,000,000.00,

but they eventually reduced the amount P4,830,000.00. Accused were arrested by the PAOCTF
team during the arranged pay-off. The RTC convicted the accused of kidnapping for ransom.
The RTC’s decision was affirmed by the CA.

Issue: Whether the convictions of accused for kidnapping for ransom should be upheld.

Held: Yes. The elements of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention under Article 267 of the
RPC are as follows: (a) the offender is a private individual; (b) he kidnaps or detains another, or
in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the act of detention or kidnapping must be
illegal; and (d) in the commission of the offense any of the following circumstances is present: (i)
the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (ii) it is committed by simulating
public authority; (iii) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained or threats to kill him are made; or (iv) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor,
female, or a public officer. The duration of detention is immaterial if the victim is a minor, or if
the purpose of the kidnapping is to extort ransom.

In this case, the prosecution had proven beyond reasonable doubt the existence of the
said elements as it is undisputed that accused, among others, illegally detained the victim Ragos
against her will for the purpose of extorting ransom from her family. Moreover, the collective
testimonies of prosecution witnesses, such as victim Ragos and state witness Bauting, positively
identified the perpetrators to the kidnapping — including accused Adil, Daliano, and Kamir —
as well as narrated in detail the events that transpired from Ragos's abduction up to her rescue.

PEOPLE v. RACHO
G.R. No. 227505, 2 October 2017
A person may be charged with and convicted of both illegal
recruitment and estafa: illegal recruitment is malum
prohibitum, while estafa is mala in se.

Facts: Accused Racho was charged with the crime of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and
Estafa. Complainants uniformly alleged that they heard either from a radio advertisement or a
friend about an employment opportunity in East Timor linked to Racho, who represented that
she is authorized to recruit workers in the Philippines for an employment opportunity in East
Timor. Thereafter, complainants left the Philippines for East Timor. After the lapse of three (3)
months in East Timor, complainants were never issued their work permits.

During the trial, the prosecution presented the testimony of Bella, a senior Labor and
Employment Officer from the POEA, who confirmed that Racho was neither licensed nor
authorized to recruit workers for employment abroad. The trial court found Racho guilty of
Illegal Recruitment and Estafa.

Issue: Whether or not Racho is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Recruitment in Large
Scale and Estafa.
 39

Ruling: Yes. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of
3 or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in
large scale if committed against 3 or more persons individually or as a group. The elements of
the offense are: (a) the offender has no valid license or authority to enable him to lawfully
engage in recruitment and placement of workers; (b) he undertakes any of the activities within
the meaning of “recruitment and placement” under Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code or any
prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor Code (now Section 6, R.A. No.
8042); and (c) he commits the same against three or more persons, individually or as a group.
Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an
offense involving economic sabotage.

In this case, the POEA certification, as confirmed by Bella, sufficiently established that
Racho is neither licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment. Thus,
Racho's act of offering and promising to deploy the complainants to East Timor for work and
collecting placement fees from more than 3 persons, despite not being authorized to do so,
renders her liable for Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale.

Moreover, Racho's conviction for Estafa is likewise warranted. Under Article 315 of the
RPC, Estafa by means of deceit is committed when these elements concur: (a) the accused used
fictitious name or false pretense that he possesses power, influence, qualifications, property,
credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or other similar deceits; (b) he used such
deceitful means prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the fraud; (c) the offended
party relied on such deceitful means to part with his money or property; and (d) the offended
party suffered damage.

Case law holds that the same pieces of evidence that establish liability for illegal
recruitment in large scale confirm culpability for Estafa. It is well-established in jurisprudence
that a person may be charged and convicted for both illegal recruitment and estafa. The reason
therefor is not hard to discern: illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum, while estafa is mala in se.
In the first, the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction. In the second, such
intent is imperative. Estafa under Article 315, par. 2(a) of the RPC is committed by any person
who defrauds another by using fictitious name, or falsely pretends to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of
similar deceits executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of fraud.

PEOPLE v. CHING
G.R. No. 223556, 9 October 2017
Failure to comply with the procedure in Section 21, Article
II of R.A. No. 9165 committed by the police officers, if
unacknowledged and unexplained by the State, militate
against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against
the accused as the integrity and evidentiary value of
the corpus delicti had been compromised.

Facts: Accused Manuel Lim Ching was charged for violation of Article II, Sections 5, 11 and 12
R.A. No. 9165, resulting from a buy-bust operation, which yielded to his arrest, and the seizure
of dangerous drugs. Days after the said buy bust operation, the seized items were delivered to
PDEA, where it was confirmed that the seized items were indeed dangerous drugs. The trial
Court convicted Ching of the crime charged, and was affirmed on appeal.

In arguing for his acquittal, Ching argues that the police officers failed to comply the
Chain of custody rule, as follows: (a) the sachets of drugs seized from his house were not
 40

properly identified as to which among them were connected to his particular offense; (b) no
photographs were taken of the items taken from his house; (c) no sealing of the seized drugs
took place; and, (d) it was not established who was entrusted with the safekeeping of the
specimens before their presentation in court and what precautions were taken to ensure their
integrity and value.
Issue: Whether or not Ching is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Article II, Sections 5,
11 and 12 R.A. No. 9165, despite the alleged failure to comply with the Chain of Custody Rule.

Ruling: No. The Court finds substantial gaps in the chain of custody of the seized dangerous
drugs/paraphernalia which were left unjustified, thereby casting reasonable doubt on their
integrity. The items seized during the buy-bust operation were delivered to PDEA and the PNP
crime laboratory only ten (10) days later.

When police officers do not turn over dangerous drugs to the laboratory within twenty-
four (24) hours from seizure, they must identify its custodian, and the latter must be called to
testify. The custodian must state the security measures in place to ensure that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the confiscated items were preserved. No custodian was presented to
testify in this case.

N.B. J. Perlas-Bernabe’s ponencia in People v. Niño Calibod (G.R. No. 230230, 20 November 2017) is
similar to this case.

ORSOS v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 214673, 20 November 2017
Acts of lasciviousness in relation to R.A. No. 7610

Facts: Accused was then working as a teacher and Citizen's Army Training (CAT)
Commandant. AAA, then 14 years old, was one of Orsos’ students. Orsos called AAA and asked
her if she had decided on becoming a CAT officer, to which she answered yes. Orsos then
instructed her to go to his house for her supposed initiation. Orsos asked her if she was really
determined to become a CAT officer, to which she replied in the affirmative. Orsos then told her
that he had a crush on her, that he wanted her to become his mistress, and that he will give her
all her needs. Then, he pulled her to his lap and asked her to kiss him. Thinking it was part of
the initiation rites, AAA kissed his right cheek. Thereafter, Orsos asked her to sit on the sofa and
proceeded to kiss her on the lips. Orsos then instructed her to lift her shirt and underwear, and
sucked her right breast. Orsos was about to unzip her pants when AAA pleaded for him not to
do so as she had her menstrual period. At this point, Orsos stood up and went back to the
bathroom.

Orsos was charged with acts of lasciviousness in relation to R.A. No. 7610. The RTC
convicted Orsos of acts of lasciviousness, which was affirmed on appeal.

Issue: Whether or not Orsos was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Acts of lasciviousness.

Held: Yes. The elements of acts of lasciviousness are: (a) the offender commits any act of
lasciviousness or lewdness; (b) that it is done under any of the following circumstances: (i)
through force, threat, or intimidation; (ii) when the offended party is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious; (iii) by means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
and (iv) when the offended party is under 12 years of age or is demented, even though none of
the circumstances mentioned above be present; and (c) that the offended party is another person
of either sex.
 41

On the other hand, the elements of the crime of sexual abuse under Section 5 (b) of R.A.
No. 7610 are: (a) the accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (b) the
said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse;
and (c) that the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.

AAA's minority, as she was only 14 years old at the time of the incident, had been
sufficiently established with the presentation of her Certificate of Live Birth. It was likewise
established that Orsos, who was then a teacher and CAT Commandant in AAA's school, and
therefore, a person who exercised moral ascendancy and influence upon her, committed
lascivious or lewd conduct against her.

In Quimvel v. People, the Court clarified that "force and intimidation" is subsumed under
"coercion and influence," and that "x x x lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of
any adult exists when there is some form of compulsion equivalent to intimidation which
subdues the free exercise of the offended party's free will.x x x [T]he term 'influence' means the
'improper use of power or trust in any way that deprives a person of free will and substitutes
another's objective.' Meanwhile, 'coercion' is the 'improper use of x x x power to compel another
to submit to the wishes of one who wields it.’"

In this case, it has been established that Orsos, who was AAA's teacher and then the CAT
Commandant in her school, was able to carry out his lewd acts by asking her twice if she was
determined to become a CAT officer. Orsos inquiry strongly suggested that if AAA really
wanted to become a CAT officer, she should accede to his demands and allow him to commit
lascivious conduct upon her person. Therefore, accused exercised influence and coercion upon
AA.A in order to commit the crime against her, thereby satisfying the element of force and
intimidation in this case. Besides, although Orsos was not armed nor did he threaten AAA, his
moral ascendancy over her is a sufficient substitute for the use of force or intimidation.

DIGNA RAMOS v. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 226454, 20 November 2017
Whether the offense committed is serious or slight oral
defamation depends not only upon the sense and
grammatical meaning of the utterances but also upon
the special circumstances of the case, like the social
standing or the advanced age of the offended party

Facts: On 17 September 2003, Dumaua noticed 5 children pick up dried leaves and throw them
into her yard. When she called the attention of the children, the latter ran towards the direction
of Ramos, who picked up dried banana leaves, and allegedly threw them into Dumaua's yard,
while saying "ta sinnu ti pabasulem nga agilappak ti bulung, siguro dakayo ta nagpabirthday
kayo" which means "Whom do you blame throwing leaves? Maybe you did because you hosted
a birthday party." This prompted a quarrel between Ramos and Dumaua, during the course of
which Ramos uttered to the latter, "Ukininam, puta, awan ad-adalmo, nagbalay kayo ti nagdakkelan,
magaburan daytoy balay kon" which translates to "Vulva of your mother, prostitute, illiterate, you
built a very big house, it overshadows my house." Thus, Ramos was convicted for Grave Oral
Defamation by the MCTC. Such conviction was affirmed by the RTC and CA.

Issue: Whether or not the conviction of Ramos for Grave Oral Defamation should be upheld.

Held: No. Ramos should be convicted only for Slight oral defamation. Whether the offense
committed is serious or slight oral defamation depends not only upon the sense and
grammatical meaning of the utterances but also upon the special circumstances of the case, like
the social standing or the advanced age of the offended party. The gravity depends upon: (a) the
 42

expressions used; (b) the personal relations of the accused and the offended party; and (c) the
special circumstances of the case, the antecedents or relationship between the offended party
and the offender, which may tend to prove the intention of the offender at the time. In
particular, it is a rule that uttering defamatory words in the heat of anger, with some
provocation on the part of the offended party constitutes only a light felony.

In this case, Ramos indeed uttered the words "ukininam, puta, awan ad-adal mo," which
means “vulva of your mother, prostitute, illiterate,” against Dumaua. However, no evidence
was presented to show that Ramos indeed started the altercation by instructing her children to
throw leaves into Dumaua's yard, and eventually, throwing dried banana leaves therein as well.
Thus, it may safely be concluded that while Ramos indeed said defamatory words against
Dumaua, the utterances were made in the heat of anger and were with some sort of provocation
on the part of the latter. As such, the Court is constrained to hold that Ramos is only guilty of
the crime of Slight Oral Defamation.

HILARIO LAMSEN v. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 227069, 22 November 2017
Falsification of public documents

Facts: Accused was charged with the crime of falsification of public documents, particularly the
owner’s duplicate title of a parcel of land located in Barrio Malabo, Valenzuela City, allegedly
owned by Dela Cruz. Accused however claims that while he was renting the place of his uncle
sometime in 1993, he validly bought and acquired the subject property from Spouses Tandas.
He added that the subject deed was executed, signed, and notarized by Spouses Tandas in the
presence of a certain Nicasio Cruz and Francisco Capinpin in the GSIS Office, Manila. He
averred that he subsequently left a photocopy of the subject deed at the Notary Public and took
the original with him. Ultimately, he contended that he no longer informed the relatives of
Aniceta about the sale. The trial court convicted accused of the crime charged. His conviction
was affirmed by the RTC and the CA.

Issue: Whether or not the conviction of Lamsen for the crime of falsification of public under
Article 172 (1) of the RPC should be upheld.

Held: No. The elements of Article 172(1) of the RPC are: (a) the offender is a private
individual; (b) the offender committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171;
and (c) the falsification was committed in a public document.

In this case, the prosecution presented an expert witness, Batiles, to prove its allegation
of falsification or forgery. While Batiles testified during cross-examination that the questioned
signatures were not written by one and the same person, and that there is a certainty that the
subject deed was falsified, the Court, however, finds this declaration unreliable and
inconclusive, as it is inconsistent with the Questioned Document Report No. 130-03. In the said
Report, which Batiles himself issued after examining the allegedly falsified subject deed, Batiles
found that no definite conclusion can be rendered because the documents submitted by the
prosecution were mere photocopies of the original. Batiles further clarified that there are other
handwriting elements which could not be determined in the photocopy, such as minor details
which could not be visibly detected by the naked eye, i.e., handwriting movement, line quality,
and emphasis.

Moreover, the following circumstantial evidence are insufficient to prove the crime of
falsification: (a) the subject deed was notarized in Manila even if accused and Spouses Tandas
were residents of Valenzuela; (b) accused failed to show when the alleged witnesses signed the
subject deed; (c) the subject deed was executed and notarized sometime in April 1993, but was
 43

registered with the Registry of Deeds only after the death of Aniceta sometime in May
2002; (d) the corresponding capital gains and documentary stamp taxes were paid only on April
11, 2002; and (e) the original copy of the subject deed, which was purportedly retained by
accused, was neither presented nor produced during trial.

The Supreme Court ruled that the above circumstantial evidence are insufficient to
support a conviction for falsification of public documents for the following reasons:

Firstly, the Notarial Law does not require the parties to have the subject deed notarized
in the place of their residence. Secondly, the issue on the date when the supposed witnesses
signed the subject deed is immaterial. In fact, Rule 132, Section 30 of the Rules of Court provides
that an instrument, such as a notarized document, may be presented in evidence without
further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment being prima facie evidence of the execution of
the instrument or document involved. Thirdly, having the subject deed registered with the
Registry of Deeds after an unreasonable length of time from its execution and notarization does
not necessarily imply that the subject deed was actually forged. Lastly, the supposed belated
payment of the corresponding capital gains and documentary stamp taxes has no relevance at
all with the supposed act of falsification.

PEOPLE v. DELOS SANTOS

G.R. No. 220685, 29 November 2017
Qualified Theft

Facts: In May 2007, accused undertook the construction of the CTTL Building in Baguio City,
adjacent to the Benguet Pines Tourist Inn (BPTI) which is a business establishment owned and
operated by the University of Manila (UM). UM, which owns BPTI, is an educational institution
established and owned by accused’s family. Virgilio owned 70. 79% of the entire shares of stock
of the UM, and accused himself claims 9.85% share thereof. Virgilio was the President and
Chairman of the BOT of UM at the time material to this case, and respondent himself was a
board member and stockholder. Virgilio allegedly ordered the employees of BPTI to assist
accused in all his needs in the construction. Specifically, upon instructions of Virgilio, accused
was permitted to tap into BPTI's electricity and water supply.

Virgilio died on 21 January 2008, and was succeeded by De Leon as President of UM. On
8 July 2011, UM filed a criminal complaint against Delos Santos for qualified theft of the
electricity and water supply of BPTI for the period of 2007 to 2011.

Issue: Whether there is probable cause against Delos Santos for Qualified Theft.

Held: No, accused used the electricity and water supply of BPTI based on his good faith belief
that he and his family own UM. Where one, in good faith, “takes another's property under
claim of title in himself, he is exempt from the charge of larceny, however puerile or mistaken
the claim may in fact be.” And the same is true where the taking is on behalf of another,
believed to be the true owner. The gist of the offense is the intent to deprive another of his
property in a chattel, either for gain or out of wantonness or malice to deprive another of his
right in the thing taken. This cannot be where the taker honestly believes the property is his
own or that of another, and that he has a right to take possession of it for himself or for
another," as in this case.

The fact that accused’s shares of stock in UM represents only a proportionate or aliquot
interest in the property of the corporation, or that his interest was only equitable or beneficial in
nature, does not negate his belief that he and his family own UM, and that the consent of his
father was sufficient approval for his use of BPTI's electricity and water supply. Accused’s bona
 44

fide reliance on the consent of his father was bolstered by the material fact that Virgilio had
utilized the resources of UM to shoulder the expenses of accused’s children.

PEOPLE v. RICO NIERBES

G.R. No. 230975, 4 December 2017
Qualified Rape

Facts: AAA, accused’s sister-in-law, was awaken by accused’s acts of kissing her on the cheeks,
neck, and down her body. Accused proceeded to have carnal knowledge of her. AAA was not
able to tell anyone about this until she complained of abdominal pains and was brought to the
doctor by her mother, BBB, in March 2011, where they also found out that AAA was pregnant.
On 7 February 2012, AAA visited a psychiatrist who made the finding that she was suffering
from mild mental retardation, and had an IQ equivalent to that of a nine (9)-year old child.

Accused was charged with and convicted of simple rape. The trial court did not
appreciate the qualifying circumstance of relationship by affinity between accused and AAA,
even if the same was proven in court, since said circumstance was not alleged in the
Information. The CA, however, convicted accused of Qualified Rape, considering that: (a)
AAA’s state of mental retardation was established on account of the testimony and psychiatric
evaluation of Dr. Laguidao on AAA; and (b) Niebres failed to dispute AAA’s mental retardation
during trial.

Issue: Whether or not the Niebres’ conviction for the crime of Qualified Rape should be upheld.

Ruling: No. Knowledge of the offender of the mental disability of the victim during the
commission of the crime of rape is a special qualifying circumstance, which makes it punishable
by death. Such qualifying circumstance, however, must be sufficiently alleged in the indictment
and proved during trial to be properly appreciated by the trial court. It must be proved with
equal certainty and clearness as the crime itself; otherwise, there can be no conviction of the
crime in its qualified form.

In this case, while the qualifying circumstance of knowledge of accused of AAA's mental
retardation was specifically alleged in the Information, no supporting evidence was adduced by
the prosecution. The fact that accused did not dispute AAA's mental retardation during trial is
insufficient to qualify the crime of rape, since it does not necessarily create moral certainty that
he knew of her disability at the time of its commission. It is settled that the evidence for the
prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from
the weakness of the evidence for the defense.

**Other 2017 Cases:

1. PEOPLE V. PORFERIO CULAS, G.R. No. 211166, 5 June 2017 - Same doctrine with
People v. Toukyu; criminal liability extinguished in view of accused’s death pending
appeal before the Supreme Court.
2. KEVIN BELMONTE v. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 224143. June 28, 2017 - Same doctrine with
People v. Macapundag. Chain of Custody rule in R.A. No. 9165.
3. PEOPLE v. AGAPITO DIMAALA, G.R. No. 225054. July 17, 2017- No new doctrine.
Criminal liability extinguished in view of accused’s death during the pendency of
appeal before the Supreme Court.

4. PEOPLE v. JOHN PAUL CERALDO Y RAMOS, G.R. No. 228894. August 7, 2017- No
new doctrine.

2018 DECISIONS
 45

PEOPLE v. ALVARO
G.R. No. 225596, 10 January 2018
R.A. No. 9165; Section 21 (Chain of Custody)

FACTS: This case stemmed from an Information filed with the RTC charging accused-
appellants of violating Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, as amended, and another
Information accusing Geronimo of violating Section 11 of the same law.

ISSUE: Whether or not accused-appellants' convictions for violation of Section 5, Article II of

R.A. No. 9165, and Geronimo's conviction for violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165
should be upheld.

HELD: In view of the unaccounted gap in the chain of custody and the multiple unrecognized
and unjustified departures of the police officers from the established procedure set under
Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR), the
Supreme Court therefore concluded that the integrity and evidentiary value of the subject drugs
had been compromised. Case law states that in cases involving dangerous drugs, the drugs
presented as the corpus delicti of the offense must be established with moral certainty to be the
same illicit substance taken from the accused. Absent such conclusive identification, there can
be no finding of guilt on the part of the accused. The persistence of reasonable doubt on the
identity of the drugs seized from the accused results in the latter's acquittal, as in this case.

RIVAC v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 224673, 22 January 2018
Estafa

FACTS: This case stemmed from an Information filed with the RTC of Laoag City, Ilocos
Norte, Branch 14 (RTC), charging Rivac of the crime of Estafa. The prosecution alleged that on
4 August 2007, Rivac went to the jewelry store owned by private complainant Asuncion C.
Farinas (Farinas) where she received from the latter several pieces of jewelry in the aggregate
amount of P439,500.00, which were meant for her to sell on consignment basis, as evidenced
by a document called jewelry consignment agreement (consignment document). Farifias and
Rivac agreed that after 7 days, Rivac was obligated to either remit the proceeds of the sold
jewelry or return the unsold jewelry to Farifias should she fail to sell the same. However,
despite the lapse of the aforesaid period, Rivac failed to perform what was incumbent upon
her, causing Farinas to send her a demand letter. This prompted Rivac to go to Farinas's store
and offer her a parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-9369 as
partial payment for the jewelry.

During arraignment, Rivac pleaded "not guilty" and maintained that her liability is
only civil, and not criminal, in nature. She narrated that she asked Farinas for a loan as she
badly needed money for her husband's dialysis, to which the latter agreed. As such, she went
to Farinas's store and handed over OCT No. 0-936 and other supporting documents to the
latter as collateral. In tum, Farinas gave her the amount of Pl50,000.00 and asked her to sign a
blank consignment document. She further averred that she was able to pay interest for several
months but was unable to pay the entire loan. According to Rivac, Farinas told her that she
would foreclose the collateral. Thereafter, she sent her a letter demanding payment of the
principal amount of P280,000.00 plus interest. The RTC found Rivac guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged,

ISSUE: Whether or not the conviction of the accused should be upheld.

 46

HELD: Yes. The elements of Estafa under Article 315 (1)(b) of the RPC are as follows: (a) the
offender's receipt of money, goods, or other personal property in trust or on commission, or
for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to deliver or to return the
same; (b) misappropriation or conversion by the offender of the money or property received,
or denial of receipt of the money or property; (c) the misappropriation, conversion or denial is
to the prejudice of another; and (d) demand by the offended party that the offender return the
money or property received.

Here, the facts clearly show the existence of all the elements of the crime charged,
considering that: (a) Rivac received various pieces of jewelry from Farinas on a sale-on-
consignment basis, as evidenced by the consignment document; (b) Rivac was under the
obligation to either remit the proceeds of the sale or return the jewelry after the period of 7 days
from receipt of the same; (c) Rivac failed to perform her obligation, prompting Farinas to
demand compliance therewith; and (d) Rivac failed to heed such demand, thereby causing
prejudice to Farinas, who lost the pieces of jewelry and/or their aggregate value of
P439,500.00.43.

PEOPLE v. JUGO
G.R. No. 231792, 29 January 2018
R.A. No. 9165; Section 21 (Chain of Custody)

FACTS: This case stemmed from an Information filed with the RTC charging Jugo of violation
of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.

The prosecution alleged that sometime in 2011, members of the San Fabian Police
Station conducted surveillance for three (3) months to verify the reports that Jugo was
engaged in illegal drug activities. In the morning of 5 August, 2011, a team composed of Police
Officer 2 Fernando Romero, Jr. (PO2 Romero) as the poseur-buyer, Senior Police Officer 1
Ariel Villegas (SPOl Villegas), Police Officer 3 Edmund Disu7 (PO3 Disu), Police Officer 3
Cristobal Eslabra, and Police Officer 1 Fernando Berongoy, Jr., prepared for a buy-bust
operation to be conducted at Primicias St., corner 4th Block, Barangay Sagud Bahley, San
Fabian, Pangasinan. At around 2:00p.m., PO2 Romero and the civilian informant met with
Jugo and his two (2) companions, Amor Lomibao (Lomibao) and Marvin Zamudio (Zamudio),
in front of a carinderia. The civilian informant first approached Jugo, followed by PO2
Romero. Afterwards, Jugo, Lomibao, and Zamudio executed the transaction with PO2
Romero, who then gave the marked money to Jugo; in sum, Jugo handed to PO2 Romero one
(1) heat-sealed plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. After the civilian asset
left, P02 Romero performed the pre-arranged signal, prompting the rest of the team to
approach them and arrest Jugo and his two (2) companions. SPOl Villegas conducted a body
search on Jugo and recovered the marked money. PO2 Romero retained possession of the
subject plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. The RTC found Jugo liable for
the crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, defined and penalized under Section 5, Article II
of R.A. No. 9165.

ISSUE: Whether or not the judgment of conviction against the accused was correct.

HELD:
Here, Jugo was charged with the crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, defined and
penalized under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. In order to properly secure the
conviction of an accused charged with illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must
prove: (a) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment. In such a crime, it is essential that the identity of
the prohibited drug be established with moral certainty. Thus, in order to obviate any
 47

unnecessary doubt on the identity of the dangerous drugs, the prosecution has to show an
unbroken chain of custody over the same. It must be able to account for each link in the chain
of custody over the dangerous drug from the moment of seizure up to its presentation in
court as evidence of the corpus delicti.

As may be gleaned from the foregoing, the preparation of the inventory, i.e.,
Confiscation Receipt, and taking of photographs were NOT done in the presence of: (a) the
accused or his representative; (b) an elected public official; and (c) a representative from the
DOJ or the media, contrary' to the express provisions of Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165,
as amended' by R.A. No. 10640. In such instances, the prosecution must provide a credible
explanation justifying the non-compliance with the rule as the presence of these individuals is
not just a matter of procedure. Rather, the rule exists to ensure that protection is given to the
innocent whose life and liberty are put at risk. Unfortunately, no such explanation was
proffered by the prosecution to justify the procedural lapse. By and large, the breaches of
procedure committed by the police officers militate against a finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt against the accused, as the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus
delicti had been compromised. It is well-settled that the procedure in Section 21, Article II of
R.A. No. 9165 is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a simple
procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment to the conviction of illegal drug
suspects.51 Perforce, since the prosecution failed to provide justifiable grounds for non-
compliance with Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, as amended by R.A. No. 10640, as well
as its, IRR, Jugo's acquittal is in order.

PEOPLE v. MAMANGON
G.R. No. 229102, 29 January 2018
R.A. No. 9165; Section 21 (Chain of Custody)

FACTS: This case stemmed from 2 Informations filed with the RTC charging Mamangon of
the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs. In the evening of 20
February 2009, a tip was received from a confidential informant that a certain "Pepe," who was
later on identified as Mamangon, was selling illegal drugs along the railroad track of Dagupan
Extension and Antipolo Street in Tondo, Manila. Acting on the said tip, a buy-bust operation
was organized in coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), and
the buy-bust team went to the target area at around 8:40 in the evening. Upon arriving thereat,
the informant, together with Police Officer (PO) 3 Erick Guzman (PO3 Guzman), the
designated poseur-buyer, approached Mamangon and ordered P300.00 worth of shabu from
him. Subsequently, Mamangon handed over one (1) piece of plastic sachet containing shabu to
PO3 Guzman, who simultaneously paid the former using the marked money. Shortly after,
PO3 Guzman removed his cap, which was the pre-arranged signal for the police to come in,
and consequently, Mamangon was apprehended. PO3 Guzman then recovered the marked
money from Mamangon and ordered him to empty his pockets, which purportedly contained
another plastic sachet of shabu. After securing the additional plastic sachet, PO3 Guzman
marked it alongside the other seized item in the presence of Mamangon. Thereafter, the team
went to the barangay hall but immediately left since none was around. The team then
proceeded to Police Station 7, where PO3 Guzman turned over Mamangon, as well as the
seized items, to PO2 Rolando Dela Cruz (PO2 Dela Cruz), the investigator on duty. 10 PO2
Dela Cruz then conducted the requisite inventory, while PO3 Guzman took photographs of
the confiscated items in the presence of Mamangon and the other arresting officers. After
conducting the inventory to which were attached the photographs, PO2 Dela Cruz prepared
the request for laboratory examination, which was submitted together with the seized items to
the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for examination. Accordingly, they
were received and examined by Forensic Chemist, Police Senior Inspector Elisa G. Reyes (FC
Reyes), who confirmed that they contained methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous
 48

drug.|The RTC found Mamangon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sections 5 and
11 (3), Article II of R.A. No. 9165.

ISSUE: Whether or not the judgment conviction against the accused was correct.

HELD: No. Accused should be acquitted. After a judicious study of the case, the Court finds
that the police officers committed unjustified deviations from the prescribed chain of custody
rule, thereby putting into question the integrity and evidentiary value of the dangerous drugs
allegedly seized from Mamangon. First, records reveal that while the requisite inventory and
photography of the confiscated drugs were conducted in the presence of Mamangon and the
other apprehending officers, the same were not done in the presence of an elected public
official and any representative from the DOJ and the media. Additionally, it also appears that
when the police officers subsequently arrived at the barangay hall, they had every
opportunity to coordinate with the barangay officials and secure the presence of the other
witnesses, yet they decided to leave and immediately proceeded to the police station.

To make matters worse, the prosecution did not proffer a plausible explanation —
apart from their unsubstantiated claim that "no one is around" the barangay hall when they
arrived — in order for the saving clause to apply. Records fail to disclose that the police
officers even attempted to contact and secure the presence of an elected public official, as well
as a representative from the DOJ and the media, when they were already at the police station.
To reiterate, the law requires the presence of these witnesses to ensure the establishment of
the chain of custody and remove any suspicion of switching, planting, or contamination of
evidence. Thus, considering the police officers' unjustified non-compliance with the
prescribed procedure under Section 21 of RA 9165, the integrity and evidentiary value of the
confiscated drugs are seriously put into question.

PEOPLE v. MIRANDA
G.R. No. 229671, 31 January 2018
R.A. No. 9165; Section 21 (Chain of Custody)

FACTS: This case stemmed from 2 Informations filed with the RTC, charging Miranda of the
crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, respectively defined and
penalized under Sections 5 and 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. The RTC ruled as follows: (a) in
Crim. Case No. 13-906, Miranda was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lower courts was correct in rendering a verdict of conviction
against the accused.

HELD: No. In this case, the prosecution failed to provide justifiable grounds for the police
officers' non-compliance with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, as well as its IRR. Thus, while these
lapses have only surfaced on appeal, reasonable doubt now persists in upholding the
conviction of the accused. As the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been
compromised, Miranda's acquittal is perforce in order.

PEOPLE v. CIRBETO
G.R. No. 231359, 7 February 2018
Murder

FACTS: On 31 December, 2010, at around 3:15p.m., while prosecution eyewitness Roger

Dalimoos (Dalimoos) was outside a fast food restaurant in front of Marikina Sports Center at
 49

the corner of Sumulong Highway and Toyota Avenue, Marikina City, he saw his friend
Ferdinand Casipit (Casipit) together with accused-appellant walking towards a nearby mall.
Dalimoos was on his way home then, so he boarded a jeepney by hanging on to its end
railings. Upon reaching the stoplight at the corner of Sumulong Highway and Tuazon St.,
from which vantage point he could still see Casipit and accused-appellant who were already
in front of the mall, Dalimoos saw the latter suddenly pull a knife from the right side of his
back, hold Casipit's shirt with his left hand, and stab him with the knife using his right hand.
Accused-appellant was able to stab Casipit once before the latter managed to run away.
However, accused-appellant ran after Casipit and caught up to him. Thereafter, the former
held the latter's shirt again, pulled him to the ground, and stabbed him repeatedly, resulting
in the latter's death. Consequently, accused-appellant was charged with the crime of Murder.
The RTC convicted accused-appellant as charged.

ISSUE: Whether or not the conviction of the accused was correct.

HELD: Yes. To successfully prosecute the crime of Murder, the following elements must be
established: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her; (3) that the
killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the
RPC; and (4) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide.

In this case, and as correctly found by the courts a quo, the prosecution was able to
establish a confluence of the foregoing elements, considering the following: (1) the victim
Casipit was killed; (2) accused-appellant was positively identified as the one who killed him; (3)
Casipit's killing was attended by treachery, a qualifying circumstance; and (4) the killing is
neither parricide nor infanticide.

GONZALEZ v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 225709, 14 February 2018
Violation of Section 32 of R.A. No. 7166 (COMELEC’s gun ban)

FACTS: In the early morning of 23 February, 2012, an operative of the Station Anti-Illegal
Drugs (SAID), Special Operation Task Group (SOTG), Valenzuela City, was informed of the
rampant selling of illegal drugs at a wake in Tamaraw Hills, Barangay Marulas, Valenzuela
City, which thus led to the conduct of an anti-illegal drug operation. At about 3:30 a.m.,
certain Police Officer (PO) 2 Lim, PO2 Recto, and POI Raya, together with POI Julius R.
Congson (POI Congson), proceeded to surveil the area near No. 75 Tamaraw Hills Street.
While in the area, P02 Recto and PO1 Congson saw a person coming out of an alley about four
(4) meters away, with a fan knife in his right hand. Since there was a ban issued by the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) on the carrying of deadly weapons at that time, PO2
Recto and PO1 Congson approached the person and introduced themselves as police officers.
The person, who they later identified as Gonzalez, immediately ran away, prompting the
police officers to chase and eventually, arrest him. PO1 Congson recovered the knife from
Gonzalez, frisked the latter, and ordered him to bring out the contents of his pocket, which
revealed one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing what PO1 Congson believed to
be shabu. PO1 Congson further recovered another heat-sealed transparent plastic pack,
labeled "Calypso", containing several plastic sachets. The RTC found Gonzalez guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 261 (q) of the OEC, As regard the charge of violation
of Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165, the RTC found Gonzalez not guilty due to insufficiency of
evidence.

ISSUE: Whether or not the conviction of the accused was erroneous.

 50

HELD: No. The Court agrees, as the prosecution failed to dispel all reasonable doubts
surrounding Gonzalez' arrest. In particular, the prosecution failed to establish its allegation
that, immediately before and at the time of his arrest, Gonzalez was holding a knife in a public
place -- the critical elements of the crime of violation of Section 26I (p)(q) of the OEC, as
amended by Section 32 of R.A. No. 7166. Thus, the conviction was set aside.

PEOPLE v. GUIEB
G.R. No. 233100, 14 February 2018
R.A. No. 9165; Section 21 (Chain of Custody)

FACTS: This case stemmed from 2 Informations filed with the RTC charging Guieb of the
crimes of Illegal Sale and Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs. The RTC found Guieb guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged,

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly upheld Guieb's conviction for the
crimes charged.

HELD: No. Guieb was charged with the crimes of Illegal Sale and Illegal Possession of
Dangerous Drugs, respectively defined and penalized under Sections 5 and 11 (3), Article II of
R.A. No. 9165. In every prosecution of unauthorized sale of dangerous drugs, it is essential
that the following elements are proven beyond reasonable doubt: (a) the identity of the buyer
and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment. Meanwhile, in order to convict an accused who is charged with Illegal Possession of
Dangerous Drugs, the prosecution must establish the following elements also by proof
beyond reasonable doubt: (a) the accused was in possession of an item or object identified as a
prohibited drug; (b) such possession was not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely
and consciously possessed the said drug.

After a judicious study of the case, the Court finds that the police officers committed
unjustified deviations from the prescribed chain of custody rule, thereby putting into question
the integrity and evidentiary value of the dangerous drugs allegedly seized from Guieb. Verily,
the procedural lapse committed by the police officers, which was unfortunately
unacknowledged and unexplained by the State, militates against a finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt against the accused, as the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti
had been compromised. It is well-settled that the procedure in Section 21, Article II of R.A. No.
9165, is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural
technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment to the conviction of illegal drug suspects. As
such, since the prosecution failed to provide justifiable grounds for non-compliance with
Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, as well as its IRR, Guieb's acquittal is perforce in order.

MELGAR v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 223477, 14 February 2018
R.A. No. 9262 (Economic Abuse)

FACTS: AAA had a romantic relationship with Melgar, which resulted in the birth of BBB, an
illegitimate child. Melgar freely acknowledged the paternity of BBB as evidenced by the
latter's Certificate of Live Birth, as well as numerous photographs showing Melgar with BBB.
However, AAA's relationship with Melgar turned sour as the latter had an affair with a
younger woman. When BBB was just about 1 year old, Melgar stopped giving support,
prompting AAA to file a case for support, which was eventually granted. This
notwithstanding, Melgar still refused to give support for her and BBB. As such, AAA was
 51

constrained to file the instant criminal case against Melgar. The RTC found Melgar guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5(e) of R.A. No. 9262.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly upheld Melgar's conviction for
violation of Section 5 (e) of R.A. No. 9262.

HELD: Yes. "Economic abuse" may include the deprivation of support of a common child of
the man-accused and the woman-victim, whether such common child is legitimate or not.
Under this provision, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is considered
an act of violence against women and children. Notably, case law instructs that the act of
denying support to a child is a continuing offense.

In this case, the courts a quo correctly found that all the elements of violation of
Section 5 (e) of R.A. No. 9262 are present, as it was established that: (a) Melgar and AAA had a
romantic relationship, resulting in BBB's birth; (b) Melgar freely acknowledged his paternity
over BBB; (c) Melgar had failed to provide BBB support ever since the latter was just a year
old; and (d) his intent of not supporting BBB was made more apparent when he sold to a third
party his property which was supposed to answer for, among others, his support-in-arrears to
BBB.

PEOPLE v. CRISPIAN MERCED LUMAYA

G.R. No. 231983, 7 March 2018
R.A. No. 9165; Section 21 (Chain of Custody)

FACTS: Accused Crispian umaya (“Crispian”) and Derek Lumaya (“Derek”) were charged
before the RTC with violation of Sections 5, 11 and 12 of R.A. No. 9165, as amended. Crispian
argues that the arresting officers failed to comply with the Chain of Custody Rule under Section
21 of R.A. No. 9165, without any justifiable cause, and thus calls for their acquittal.

The RTC rendered its judgment convicting Crispian and Derek for the charged offenses,
and was affirmed on appeal.

ISSUE: Whether the failure of the police officers, without justifiable cause, to comply with the
Chain of Custody Rule calls for the acquittal of accused in drug cases.

HELD: Yes, the failure to comply with the Chain of Custody Rule, without any justifiable cause,
justifies the acquittal of accused.

By and large, the breaches of procedure committed by the police officers militate against
a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against the accused, as the integrity and evidentiary
value of the corpus delicti had been compromised. It is well-settled that the procedure in Section
21 of R.A. No. 9165 is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a simple
procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment to the conviction of illegal drug
suspects. Perforce, since the prosecution failed to provide justifiable grounds for non-
compliance with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, as amended by R.A. No. 10640, as well as its IRR,
Crispian’s acquittal is in order.

It must be clarified that, under varied field conditions, strict compliance with the
requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 may not always be possible. In fact, the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 - which is now crystallized into
statutory law with the passage of R.A. No. 10640- provide that the said inventory and
photography may be conducted at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team
in instances of warrantless seizure, and that non-compliance with the requirements of Section 21
 52

of R.A. No. 9165 - under justifiable grounds - will not render void and invalid the seizure and
custody over the seized items so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items
are properly preserved by the apprehending officer or team. In other words, the failure of the
apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165
and the IRR does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items as void and
invalid, provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is justifiable ground
for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved. In People v. Almorfe, the Court stressed that for the above-saving clause to apply, the
prosecution must explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses, and that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized evidence had nonetheless been preserved. Also, in People v. De
Guzman, it was emphasized that the justifiable ground for non-compliance must be proven as a
fact, because the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even exist.

PEOPLE v. ROMEO ANTIDO

G.R. No. 208651, 14 March 2018
Rape; Article 89

FACTS: Accused Romeo Antido y Lantayan was found guilty of the crime of rape. During the
pendency of his appeal and before the promulgation of the Resolution of the appellate court,
which affirmed the ruling of the trial court, he died.

ISSUE: Whether or not the criminal liability of an accused is extinguished as he already died
before the promulgation of a Resolution finding him guilty of the crime charged.

HELD: Yes, the criminal liability of the accused is extinguished. Under prevailing law and
jurisprudence, accused-appellant's death prior to his final conviction by the Court renders
dismissible the criminal cases against him. Article 89(1) of the RPC provides that criminal
liability is totally extinguished by the death of the accused.

Thus, upon accused-appellant's death pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal
action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the
civil action instituted therein for the recovery of the civil liability ex delicto is ipso
facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal action.

PEOPLE v. MARCELINO CRISPO AND ENRICO HERRERA

G.R. No. 230065, 14 March 2018
R.A. No. 9165; Section 21 (Chain of Custody – presence of witnesses)

FACTS: Accused Marcelino Crispo y Descalso (“Crispo”) and Enrico Herrera y Montes
(“Herrera”) were convicted for their violation of R.A. No. 9165. Accused argues that the failure
on the part of the arresting officers to strictly comply with the Chain of Custody Rule without
any justifiable reason, by their failure to comply with the witness requirement, calls for their
acquittal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the failure of the arresting officers to strictly comply with the Chain of
Custody Rule without any justifiable reason, calls for the acquittal of accused.

HELD: Yes, the failure to strictly comply with the Chain of Custody Rule without any justifiable
reason calls for the acquittal of accused.
 53

The law requires the presence of an elected public official, as well as representatives
from the DOJ and the media, to ensure that the chain of custody rule is observed and thus,
remove any suspicion of tampering, switching, planting, or contamination of evidence which
could considerably affect a case. However, minor deviations may be excused in situations where
a justifiable reason for non-compliance is explained. In this case, despite the non-observance of
the witness requirement, no plausible explanation was given by the prosecution.

The absence of these required witnesses does not per se render the confiscated items
inadmissible. However, a justifiable reason for such failure or a showing of any genuine and
sufficient effort to secure the required witnesses under Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165
must be adduced. In People v. Umipang, the Court held that the prosecution must show
that earnest efforts were employed in contacting the representatives enumerated under the law
for "[a] sheer statement that representatives were unavailable - without so much as an
explanation on whether serious attempts were employed to look for other representatives, given
the circumstances - is to be regarded as a flimsy excuse." Verily, mere statements of
unavailability, absent actual serious attempts to contact the required witnesses are unacceptable
as justified grounds for non-compliance. These considerations arise from the fact that police
officers are ordinarily given sufficient time - beginning from the moment they have received the
information about the activities of the accused until the time of his arrest - to prepare for a buy-
bust operation and consequently, make the necessary arrangements beforehand knowing fully
well that they would have to strictly comply with the set procedure prescribed in Section 21,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165. As such, police officers are compelled not only to state reasons for
their non-compliance, but must in fact, also convince the Court that they exerted earnest efforts
to comply with the mandated procedure, and that under the given circumstances, their actions
were reasonable.

Thus, for failure of the prosecution to provide justifiable grounds or show that special
circumstances exist which would excuse their transgression, the Court is constrained to
conclude that the integrity and evidentiary value of the items purportedly seized have been
compromised. It is settled that in a prosecution for the sale and possession of dangerous drugs
under RA 9165, the State carries the heavy burden of proving not only the elements of the
offense, but also to prove the integrity of the corpus delicti, failing in which, renders the case for
the State insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

PEOPLE v. NESTOR AÑO

G.R. No. 230070, 14 March 2018
R.A. No. 9165; Section 21 (Chain of Custody - marking and inventory in the presence of witnesses)

FACTS: Accused Nestor Año y Del Remedios (“Año”) was found guilty by the RTC for
violation of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165, as amended. In assailing his conviction, accused argues
that the failure on the part of the arresting officers to strictly comply with the Chain of Custody
Rule without any justifiable reason calls for his acquittal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the failure of the arresting officers to strictly comply with the Chain of
Custody Rule without any justifiable reason calls for the acquittal of accused.

HELD: Yes, the failure to strictly comply with the Chain of Custody Rule without any justifiable
reason calls for the acquittal of accused. After a judicious study of the case, the Supreme Court
finds that there are substantial gaps in the chain of custody of the seized items from Año which
were unfortunately, left unjustified, thereby putting into question their integrity and
evidentiary value.
 54

While the fact of marking and inventory of the seized item was established by the
attached Inventory of Seized/Confiscated Items, the records are glaringly silent as to the
presence of the required witnesses, namely, the representatives from the media and the DOJ. To
reiterate, Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165, prior to its amendment by R.A. No. 10640, as well as its
IRR requires the presence of the following witnesses during the conduct of inventory and
photography of the seized items: (a) the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel; (b) any elected public official;
and (c) a representative from the media and the DOJ. In their absence, the prosecution must
provide a credible explanation justifying the noncompliance with the rule; otherwise, the saving
clause under the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 (and now, the amended Section 21, Article II of RA 9165)
would not apply.

Here, no such explanation was proffered by the prosecution to justify the procedural
lapse. It then follows that there are unjustified gaps in the chain of custody of the items seized
from Año, thereby militating against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt, which
resultantly warrants his acquittal. It is well-settled that the procedure under Section 21, Article II
of RA 9165 is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural
technicality; or worse ignored as an impediment to the conviction of illegal drug suspects.

LENIZA REYES v. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 229380; June 6, 2018
Section 11, R.A. No. 9165

FACTS: The accused was charged with a violation of Section 11 of R.A. 9165. During trial, she
raised the defense that she was a victim of frame up by the police authorities. The trial court
convicted the accused by holding that the prosecution successfully proved the legality of her
arrest and possession of a sachet of shabu. On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court’s ruling.

ISSUE: Is the verdict of conviction correct?

HELD: No. The Constitution mandates that a search or arrest may only be made on the strength
of a validly issued warrant and excludes any evidence obtained in violation thereof.

One of the recognized exceptions to the need of a warrant before a search may be
effected is a search incidental to a lawful arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure identifies three (3) instances when warrantless arrests may be lawfully
effected. These are: (a) an arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; ( b) an arrest of a suspect
where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable cause that said
suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which had just been committed; and ( c) an arrest of a
prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined during
the pendency of his case or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.

The Supreme Court finds that no lawful arrest was made on Reyes. POI Monteras
himself admitted that Reyes passed by them without acting suspiciously or doing anything
wrong, except that she smelled of liquor. As no other overt act could be properly attributed to
Reyes as to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO 1 Monteras that she had just committed, was
committing, or was about to commit a crime, the arrest is bereft of any legal basis. As case law
demonstrates, the act of walking while reeking of liquor per se cannot be considered a criminal
act. Neither has the prosecution established the conditions set forth in Section 5 (b ), Rule 113,
particularly, that the arresting officer had personal knowledge of any fact or circumstance
indicating that the accused had just committed a crime. "Personal knowledge" is determined
from the testimony of the witnesses that there exist reasonable grounds to believe that a crime
 55

was committed by the accused. As ruled by the Court, "[a] hearsay tip by itself does not justify a
warrantless arrest. Law enforcers must have personal knowledge of facts, based on their
observation, that the person sought to be arrested has just committed a crime." In this case,
records failed to show that PO 1 Monteras had any personal knowledge that a crime had been
committed by Reyes, as in fact, he even admitted that he merely relied on the two (2) teenagers'
tip and that, everything happened by "chance."

In fine, there being no lawful warrantless arrest, the sachet of shabu purportedly seized
from Reyes on account of the search is rendered inadmissible in evidence for being the
proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. And since the shabu is the very corpus delicti of the crime
charged, Reyes must necessarily be acquitted and exonerated from criminal liability.

PEOPLE v. EJERCITO
G.R. 229861, 2 July 2018
Art 335 of RPC; R.A No. 8353 and R.A. No. 7610

FACTS: In October 2001, then 15-year old high school student (AAA) was pointed a gun by
Ejercito (accused) and was dragged to a nearby barn. Ejercito undressed AAA, placed himself
on top of her and covered her mouth with his right hand and used the left hand to point the gun
at her as he inserted his penis into her vagina and made back and forth movements. After the
sexual act, Ejercito warned AAA not to tell anybody or else her parents will get killed. AAA
tearfully narrated the incident to CCC, her aunt and requested CCC to remain silent. AAA
moved to another city, but she was tracked by Ejercito who made AAA his sex slave from 2002-
2005. She was forced to take shabu and sexually abused by Ejercito. Eventually, AAA got
hooked on drugs and portrayed herself as Ejercito’s paramour and decided to live together.
After rehabilitation, AAA disclosed to her parents that she was raped by Ejercito back in 2001,
and the same was reported to the authorities. Ejercito argued that they were sweethearts.

The RTC found Ejercito guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and separately pay AAA and her parents
P50,000 each as moral damages. Ejercito appealed to the CA, which affirmed the conviction of
the RTC with modification. The CA sentenced Ejercito to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, and ordered him to pay AAA the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto,
P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages, with legal interest of six
percent ( 6%) per annum to be imposed on all monetary awards from finality of the ruling until
fully paid.

ISSUES: (1) Whether or not Ejercito should be convicted under Article 335 of RPC, which is the
old provision of the law; and (2) Whether or not Ejercito should be convicted both under RA
8353 and Sec 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610.

HELD:
(1) No, R.A. No. 8353 should apply. At the onset, the Court observes that the CA, in
modifying the RTC ruling, erroneously applied the old Rape Law, or Article 335 of the RPC,
since the same was already repealed upon the enactment of R.A. No. 8353 in 1997. To recount,
the Information alleges "[t]hat on or about the 10th day of October 2001 xx x [Ejercito], with
lewd design and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously lie and succeed in having carnal knowledge with [AAA], a minor who is only
fifteen (15) years old at the time of the commission of the offense against her will and consent x
xx"; hence, in convicting Ejercito of Rape, the CA should have applied the provisions of R.A.
No. 8353, which enactment has resulted in the new rape provisions of the RPC under Articles
266-A in relation to 266-B.
 56

For a charge of rape by sexual intercourse under Article 266-A (1) of the RPC, as
amended by R.A. No. 8353, to prosper, the prosecution must prove that: (a) the offender had
carnal knowledge of a woman; and (b) he accomplished this act under the circumstances
mentioned in the provision, e.g., through force, threat or intimidation. The gravamen of rape is
sexual intercourse with a woman against her will. In this case, the prosecution was able to prove
beyond reasonable doubt the presence of all the elements of Rape by sexual intercourse under
Article 266-A (1) of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 8353.

(2) No. Ejercito should be convicted only under Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended
by R.A. No. 8353. Ejercito committed the act of sexual intercourse against and without the
consent of AAA, who was then only fifteen (15) years old. As such, AAA may be considered
under said law as a ·child "exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse." Hence,
Ejercito's act may be classified as a violation of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610.

However, as between Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, and
Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610, the Court deems it apt to clarify that Ejercito should be convicted
under the former. Verily, penal laws are crafted by legislature to punish certain acts, and when
two (2) penal laws may both theoretically apply to the same case, then the law which is more
special in regardless of the time of enactment, should prevail. In much deliberation, the Court
observed that R.A. No. 8353 amending the RPC should now be uniformly applied in cases
involving sexual intercourse committed against minors, and not Section 5 (b) of RA 7610.
Indeed, while RA 7610 has been considered as a special law that covers the sexual abuse of
minors, R.A. No. 8353 has expanded the reach of our already existing rape laws. These existing
rape laws should not only pertain to the old Article 335 of the RPC but also to the provision on
sexual intercourse under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No.· 7610 which, applying Quimvel's
characterization of a child "exploited in prostitution or subjected to other abuse," virtually
punishes the rape of a minor.

Notably, in the more recent case of People v. Caoili, the Court encountered a situation
wherein the punishable act committed by therein accused, i.e., lascivious conduct, may be
prosecuted either under “Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC in relation to
Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610” or “Lascivious Conduct under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610.” In
resolving the matter, the Court did not consider the “focus” of the evidence for the prosecution
nor the penalty imposed. Rather, it is evident that the determining factor in designating or
charging the proper offense, and consequently, the imposable penalty therefor, is the nature of
the act committed, i.e., lascivious conduct, taken together with the attending circumstance of the
age of the victim.

PEOPLE v. CORDOVA AND EGUISO

G.R. No 231130, 9 July 2018
R.A. No. 9165; Chain of Custody

FACTS: Cordova was charged with the crimes of Illegal Sale and Illegal Possession of
Dangerous Drugs, while Eguiso was charged with the crime of Illegal Possession of Dangerous
Drugs. Notably, in order to properly secure the conviction of an accused charged with Illegal
Sale of Dangerous Drugs, the prosecution must prove: (a) the identity of the buyer and the
seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment.

Meanwhile, in instances wherein an accused is charged with Illegal Possession of

Dangerous Drugs, the prosecution must establish the following elements to warrant his
conviction: (a) the accused was in possession of an item or object identified as a prohibited drug;
(b) such possession was not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the said drug.
 57

Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 provides the chain of custody rule, outlining the
procedure that police officers must follow in handling the seized drugs, in order to preserve
their integrity and evidentiary value. Under the said section, prior to its amendment by R.A.
No. 10640, the apprehending team shall, among others, immediately after seizure and
confiscation conduct a physical inventory and photograph the seized items in the presence of
the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the
same, and the seized drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within twenty-
four (24) hours from confiscation for examination.

In People v. Mendoza, the Court stressed that "[w]ithout the insulating presence of the
representative from the media or the DOJ, any elected public official during the seizure and
marking of the (seized drugs), the evils of switching, 'planting' or contamination of the evidence
that had tainted the buy-busts conducted under the regime of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972) again reared their ugly heads as to negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and
confiscation of the (said drugs) that were evidence herein of the corpus delicti, and thus
adversely affected the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused. Indeed, the x x x
presence of such witnesses would have preserved an unbroken chain of custody."

The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with
the requirements of Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 may not always be possible. In fact,
the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 which is now crystallized into
statutory law with the passage of R.A. No. 10640 provide that the said inventory and
photography may be conducted at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team
in instances of warrantless seizure, and that non-compliance with the requirements of Section
21, Article II of RA 9165 -under justifiable grounds -will not render void and invalid the seizure
and custody over the seized items so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer or team.

In other words, the failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the
procedure laid out in Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR does not ipso facto
render the seizure and custody over the items as void and invalid, provided that the
prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b)
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved.

Court finds that the deviations from the prescribed chain of custody rule were
unjustified, thereby putting into question the integrity and evidentiary value of the items
purportedly seized from Cordova and Eguiso.

First. As stated-above, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 requires that the
apprehending team shall immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a physical
inventory and photograph the seized items in the presence of, among others, the accused or the
person from whom the items were seized. However, as admitted by P03 Sebastian, Eguiso, who
is one of the accused-appellants, was not present during the required photography of the seized
items as shown by his absence in the photos taken

Second. Records also fail to disclose that the other required witnesses, i.e., the
representatives from the DOJ and the media, were present during the required inventory and
photography of the seized items as required by law. As evinced by the Certification signed by
the barangay kagawads, the signatures of Eguiso, i.e., the other accused-appellant, as well as the
representatives from the media and the DOJ attesting to the propriety of the police action are
 58

clearly missing therefrom. In fact, there is dearth of evidence to show that the police officers
even attempted to contact and secure these witnesses, notwithstanding the fact that buy-bust
operations are usually planned out ahead of time. Neither did the police officers provide any
explanation for their non-compliance, such as a threat to their safety and security or the time
and distance which the other. witnesses would have had to consider.

Finally. It appears that the chain of custody of the seized items was actually tainted by
irregular circumstances. In particular, records show that the time of apprehension on April 8,
2005 was at 1:50 p.m. As disclosed by P03 Sebastian during trial, the said items were not
delivered to the crime laboratory immediately because there was no chemist present in the
afternoon of April 8, 2005, a Friday.

PEOPLE v. XXX AND YYY

G.R. No. 235652, 9 July 2018
R.A. No. 9208; Human trafficking

FACTS: The prosecution claimed that AAA, BBB, and CCC are the minor children of spouses
XXX and YYY. AAA claimed that sometime in April 2010, when she was just 13 years old, her
mother XXX brought her to a hotel in Makati to meet with a certain John Hubbard who
proceeded to have sexual intercourse with her. AAA further alleged that from 2008 to 2011, XXX
ordered her to engage in cybersex for three (3) to four (4) times a week in pornographic websites
where AAA was shown in her underwear and made to do sexual activities in front of the
computer. For their part, BBB and CCC corroborated AAA' s statements, both averring that
from 2010 to 2011, XXX ordered them to dance naked in front of the computer with internet
connectivity while facilitating the webcam sessions and chatting with a certain "Sam," their
usual client. BBB and CCC alleged that during those sessions, their father YYY would be outside
the room or fixing the computer. The children all claimed that they were made to do sexual
activities to earn money for their household expenses which were collected by YYY in
remittance centers.

After making an investigation and a technical verification of the pornographic websites

which revealed photos and transactions of AAA, the NBI applied for and was granted a search
warrant. Subsequently, the law enforcement authorities implemented the search warrant,
resulting in the rescue of AAA, BBB, and CCC, the confiscation of the computer units and
paraphernalia connected with the alleged crimes, and the arrest of both XXX and YYY.

ISSUE: Whether or not XXX and YYY are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four (4) and three
(3) counts, respectively, of Qualified Trafficking in Persons.

HELD: Yes. Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 9208 defines the term “Trafficking in Persons” as the
“recruitment, transportation, transfer or harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the
victim's consent or knowledge, within or across national borders by means of threat or use of
force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position,
taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or
benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person for the purpose
of exploitation which includes at a minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of others or
other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or
sale of organs.” The same provision further provides that “[t]he recruitment, transportation,
transfer, harboring or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall also be considered
as 'trafficking in persons' even if it does not involve any of the means set forth in the preceding
paragraph.”
 59

The crime of “Trafficking in Persons” becomes qualified under, among others, the
following circumstances:

Section 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons. The following are considered as

qualified trafficking:

(a) When the trafficked person is a child;

xx xx

(d) When the offender is an ascendant, parent, sibling, guardian or a

person who exercises authority over the trafficked person or when the
offense is committed by a public officer or employee;

As correctly ruled by the courts a quo, accused-appellants are guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of 3 counts of Qualified Trafficking in Persons under Section 4(e) in relation to Section 6
(a) and (d) of R.A. No. 9208 as the prosecution had established beyond reasonable doubt that:
(a) they admittedly are the biological parents of AAA, BBB, and CCC, who were all minors
when the crimes against them were committed; (b) they made their children perform acts of
cybersex for different foreigner customers, and thus, engaged them in prostitution and
pornography; (c) they received various amounts of money in exchange for the sexual
exploitation of their children; and (d) they achieved their criminal design by taking advantage
of their children's vulnerability as minors and deceiving them that the money they make from
their lewd shows are needed for the family's daily sustenance.

In the same manner, the courts a quo likewise correctly convicted XXX of 1 count of the
same crime, this time under Section 4(a) in relation to Section 6(a) and (d) of R.A. No. 9208, as it
was shown that XXX transported and provided her own minor biological child, AAA, to a
foreigner in Makati City for the purpose of prostitution, again under the pretext that the money
acquired from such illicit transaction is needed for their family's daily sustenance.

In light of the foregoing, the Court finds no reason to deviate from the factual findings of
the trial court, as affirmed by the CA, as there is no indication that it overlooked, misunderstood
or misapplied the surrounding facts and circumstances of the case. In fact, the trial court was in
the best position to assess and determine the credibility of the witnesses presented by both
parties, and hence, due deference should be accorded to the same. As such, accused-appellants'
conviction for Qualified Trafficking in Persons must be upheld.

RAMOS v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 233572, July 30, 2018
Article II, Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165

In order to properly secure the conviction of an accused charged with Illegal Possession
of Dangerous Drugs, the prosecution must prove that: (a) the accused was in possession of an
item or object identified as a dangerous drug; (b) such possession was not authorized by law;
and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.

The absence of these required witnesses under Section 21 of RA 9165 does not per se
render the confiscated items inadmissible. However, a justifiable reason for such failure or a
showing of any genuine and sufficient effort to secure the required witnesses must be adduced.

In People v. Umipang, the Court held that the prosecution must show that earnest
efforts were employed in contacting the representatives enumerated under the law for "a sheer
statement that representatives were unavailable without so much as an explanation on whether
 60

serious attempts were employed to look for other representatives, given the circumstances is to
be regarded as a flimsy excuse."

Mere statements of unavailability, absent actual serious attempts to contact the required
witnesses are unacceptable as justified grounds for non-compliance. These considerations arise
from the fact that police officers are ordinarily given sufficient time -beginning from the
moment they have received the information about the activities of the accused until the time of
his arrest -to prepare for a buy-bust operation and consequently, make the· necessary
arrangements beforehand knowing full well that they would have to strictly comply with the
set procedure prescribed in Section 21 of RA 9165. As such, police officers are compelled not
only to state reasons for their non-compliance, but must in fact, also convince the Court that
they exerted earnest efforts to comply with the mandated procedure, and that under the given
circumstance, their actions were reasonable.

For failure of the prosecution to provide justifiable grounds or show that special circumstances
exist which would excuse their transgression -as in fact the only reason given was that "they
exerted effort but nobody was available" -the Court is constrained to conclude that the integrity
and evidentiary value of the items purportedly seized from Ramos have been compromised.

PEOPLE v. PATACSIL
G.R. No. 234052, 6 AUGUST 2018
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165; Chain of custody

The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with
the requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 may not always be possible. In fact, the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 -which is now crystallized into statutory
law with the passage of RA 10640 -provide that the said inventory and photography may be
conducted at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team in instances of
warrantless seizure, and that non-compliance with the requirements of Section 21, Article II of
RA 9165 -under justifiable grounds -will not render void and invalid the seizure and custody
over the seized items so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer or team. In other words, the failure of the
apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21, Article II of RA
9165 and its IRR does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items as void and
invalid, provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is justifiable ground
for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved.

In People v. Almorfe the Court explained that for the above-saving clause to apply, the
prosecution must explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses, and that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized evidence had nonetheless been preserved. Also, in People v. De
Guzman, it was emphasized that the justifiable ground for non-compliance must be proven as a
fact, because the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even exist.

After a judicious study of the case, the Court finds that the arresting officers committed
unjustified deviations from the prescribed chain of custody rule, thereby putting into question
the integrity and evidentiary value of the dangerous drugs allegedly seized from Patacsil.

Here, a plain examination of P03 Meniano's handwritten Confiscation Receipt dated

September 28, 2012 -which stood as the inventory receipt -shows that while P03 Meniano claims
that representatives from the media witnessed the conduct of inventory, no such representatives
signed the document. Further, it also appears that no public elected official was present when
such inventory was made.
 61

In this case, PO3 Meniano himself admitted that no public elected official, e.g., barangay
officials, was present during the inventory because "they were not around" and that he simply
forgot to let the media representatives sign the inventory receipt because he "forgot" to do so.
Verily, these flimsy excuses do not justify a deviation from the required witnesses rule, hence,
the Court is impelled to conclude that the integrity and evidentiary value of the items
purportedly seized from Patacsil -which constitute the corpus delicti of the crimes charged
-have been compromised.

It is well-settled that the procedure in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 is a matter of substantive
law, and cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as an
impediment to the conviction of illegal drug suspects. As such, since the prosecution failed to
provide justifiable grounds for non-compliance with the aforesaid procedure, Patacsil' s
acquittal is perforce in order.

PEOPLE v. LIBRE
G.R. No. 235980, 20 August 2018
R.A. No. 9165; Chain of custody

The absence of a DOJ representative during the inventory and photography of the seized drugs
is not per se fatal to the prosecution's cause. However, as earlier intimated, it is incumbent upon
the prosecution to demonstrate that genuine and earnest efforts were employed in securing the
presence of the DOJ representative or that there exists a justifiable reason for non-compliance.
Here, the police officers, in their affidavits, merely stated that "the team exerted efforts to
contact any representative from the Department of Justice but to no avail." Far from satisfying
the legal requirement, this statement partakes of a mere general conclusion that is bereft of any
discernible detail regarding the steps and efforts the police officers had undertaken to secure the
presence of the DOJ representative. As the Court held in People v. Umipang, "[a] sheer
statement that representatives were unavailable -without so much as an explanation on whether
serious attempts were employed to look for other representatives, given the circumstances -is to
be regarded as a flimsy excuse" -as in this case -and hence, not a valid excuse for non-
compliance. At this juncture, it must be emphasized that the procedure in Section 21, Article II
of RA 9165 is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural
technicality. Accordingly, in light of the unjustified breach of procedure as explained above, the
Court is impelled to conclude that the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had
been compromised. As such, the acquittal of the accused-appellant, Leonila, is in order.

People v. Baptista
G.R. No. 225783, 20 August 2018
Sec 21, R.A. No. 9165

In this case, Regaspi did not provide a sufficient explanation why no barangay official
was present during the requisite inventory and photography. Simply stating that the witnesses
were invited, without more, is too plain and flimsy of an excuse so as to justify non-compliance
with the positive requirements of the law. Worse, the police officers had no qualms in admitting
that they did not even bother contacting a DOJ representative, who is also a required witness.

Verily, as earlier mentioned, there must be genuine and sufficient efforts to ensure the
presence of these witnesses, else non-compliance with the set procedure would not be excused.
Jurisprudence dictates that the procedure enshrined in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 is a
matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality; or
worse, ignored as an impediment to the conviction of illegal drug suspects.
 62

In view of the foregoing, There has been an unjustified breach of procedure and hence,
the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been compromised. Consequently,
Baptista's acquittal is in order.

PEOPLE v. QUILANG
G.R. No. 232619, 29 August 2018
Sec 21, R.A. No. 9165

For the conviction of an accused charged with Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs under
Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, the prosecution must prove: (a) the identity of the buyer and the
seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment.
Here, the courts a quo correctly found that all the elements of the crime charged are present, as
the records clearly show that Quilang was caught in flagrante delicto selling shabu to the
poseur-buyer during a legitimate buy-bust operation conducted by the operatives of PDEA
Region 2. Since there is no indication that the said courts overlooked, misunderstood, or
misapplied the surrounding facts and circumstances of the case, the Court finds no reason to
deviate from their factual findings. In this regard, it should be noted that the trial court was in
the best position to assess and determine the credibility of the witnesses presented by both
parties.

In an attempt to absolve himself from criminal liability, Quilang argues, inter alia, that
the PDEA agents failed to comply with the chain of custody rule as the marking and inventory
of the seized items were not done immediately at the place of the alleged buy-bust operation
but at the PDEA Region 2 Office, and that such failure had created doubt as to the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized item.

In this case, it is glaring from the records that the buy-bust team comprising of PDEA
operatives conducted the marking, physical inventory, and photography of the item seized from
Quilang at their office, i.e., PDEA Region 2 Office, and in the presence of a public elected official,
a DOJ representative, and a media representative. Moreover, the poseur-buyer, IO1 Benjamin
Binwag, Jr., positively identified during trial the item seized from Quilang during the buy-bust
operation. In view of the foregoing, the Court holds that there is sufficient compliance with the
chain of custody rule, and thus, the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti has
been preserved. Perforce, Quilang's conviction must stand.

PEOPLE v. WILT SAM BANGALAN

G.R. No. 232249, 3 September 2018
R.A. No. 9165; Section 21 (Chain of Custody)

FACTS: The prosecution alleged that at around 5:30p.m. of 27 July 2012, a team composed of
members of the PNP Tuguegarao City Police Station, with coordination from the PDEA,
conducted a buy-bust operation against Bangalan, during which 8.12 grams of dried marijuana
leaves were recovered from him.

The team, together with Bangalan, then proceeded to the Tuguegarao City Police Station
where the seized item was marked, photographed, and inventoried in the presence of Brgy.
Kagawad Remigio Cabildo (Kgwd. Cabildo). Thereafter, it was brought to the crime laboratory
where, after examination, it was confirmed to be marijuana, a dangerous drug.

ISSUE:
 63

Whether or not the chain of custody rule was followed when the evidence was seized
from the accused.

HELD:

No, the Court, in People v. Miranda, issued a definitive reminder to prosecutors when
dealing with drugs cases. It implored that "[since] the [procedural] requirements are clearly set
forth in the law, the State retains the positive duty to account for any lapses in the chain of
custody of the drugs/items seized from the accused, regardless of whether or not the defense
raises the same in the proceedings a quo; otherwise, it risks the possibility of having a
conviction overturned on grounds that go into the evidence's integrity and evidentiary value,
albeit the same are raised only for the first time on appeal, or even not raised, become apparent
upon further review."

In this case, it is apparent that the inventory of the seized item was not conducted in the
presence of any representative of the DOJ and the media contrary to the afore-described
procedure. During trial, Police Officer 2 Albert Caranguian (P02 Caranguian) effectively
admitted to this lapse when he testified in court.

Because of these deviations, the Court is therefore constrained to conclude that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the items purportedly seized from Bangalan were
compromised, which consequently warrants his acquittal.

PEOPLE v. JENNIE MANLAO

G.R. No. 234023, 3 September 2018
Qualified Theft

FACTS: An Information was filed charging Jennie with the crime of Qualified Theft. Jennie was
hired as a housemaid by Spouses Villaraza. One day, Jennie answered a phone call wherein she
was told that her employers met an accident. She was instructed to look for dollars in her
employers’ room. When she could not find any dollars, she was directed to take various
jewelries and watches. Thereafter, she gave the items to a woman she was instructed by the
person on the phone to meet with. When she got back to the house of her employers, they were
waiting for her unharmed.

Jennie insists that she was merely tricked in a modus operandi when she complied with
the verbal instructions relayed over the phone by a person whom she thought to be her
employer. She further points out that her non-flight manifests her lack of intent to gain;
otherwise she would not have returned to her employers’ residence.

ISSUES: (1) Whether or not Jennie is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Qualified Theft; and
(2) Whether R.A. No. 10951 will apply in determining the penalty to be imposed on Jennie.

HELD: (1) Yes, the prosecution was able to establish that the accused committed the crime of
Qualified Theft beyond reasonable doubt. The elements of Qualified Theft are as follows: (a) the
taking of personal property; (b) the said property belongs to another; (c) the said taking be done
with intent to gain; (d) it be done without the owner's consent; (e) it be accomplished without
the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor force upon things; and (f) it be done
under any of the circumstances enumerated in Article 310 of the RPC, i.e., committed by a
domestic servant.

The Court finds that these elements concur in this case as the prosecution, through its
witnesses, was able to establish that Jennie, while employed as Carmel's housemaid, admittedly
 64

took all of the latter's pieces of jewelry from the bathroom drawer without her authority and
consent.

Jurisprudence provides that intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act which
can be established through the overt acts of the offender and is presumed from the proven
unlawful taking. Actual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain.

In this case, suffice it to say that Jennie's animus lucrandi is presumed from her admitted
taking of the stolen items. Further, her aforesaid excuse that she was merely tricked cannot be
given credence for likewise being illogical, especially in view of employer’s warning against
scammers and explicit directive not to entertain such phone calls.

(2) Yes, R.A. No. 10951 should be given retroactive effect. Anent the proper penalty to be
imposed on Jennie, it is well to stress that pending the final resolution of this case, R.A. No.
10951 was enacted into law. As may be gleaned from the law's title, it adjusted the value of the
property and the amount of damage on which various penalties are based, taking into
consideration the present value of money, as opposed to its archaic values when the RPC was
enacted in 1932.

While it is conceded that Jennie committed the crime way before the enactment of R.A.
No. 10951, the newly-enacted law expressly provides for retroactive effect if it is favorable to the
accused, as in this case.

PEOPLE v. FERDINAND DE GUZMAN

G.R. No. 234190, 1 October 2018
Rape

FACTS: AAA was sleeping in her room when she was awakened by her aunt’s husband,
Ferdinand, who was already on top of her. Ferdinand then kissed her, undressed her and
forcible inserted his penis into her vagina. After a few months, the incident happened again.
AAA was sleeping in the living room when she felt that somebody carried her to the bedroom.
Upon realizing that someone was on top of her, she opened her eyes and saw Ferdinand,
prompting her to push him away. However, Ferdinand overpowered her, removed her lower
garments, and had carnal knowledge of her. After Ferdinand finished, he again threatened AAA
before leaving the scene. Eventually, AAA was able to reveal her ordeal to her parents, resulting
in the filing of the rape cases against Ferdinand.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused could be held liable of statutory rape.

HELD: Yes. In this case, the Court agrees with the findings of the courts a quo that the
prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Ferdinand had carnal knowledge
of his niece-in-law, AAA, on 2 separate occasions through force and intimidation and when she
was still below twelve (12) years of age.

Statutory Rape under Article 266-A (1) (d) of the RPC is committed by having sexual
intercourse with a woman below twelve (12) years of age regardless of her consent, or lack of it,
to the sexual act. Proof of force, threat, or intimidation, or consent of the offended party is
unnecessary as these are not elements of Statutory Rape, considering that the absence of free
consent is conclusively presumed when the victim is below the age of twelve (12). The law
presumes that the offended party does not possess discernment and is incapable of giving
intelligent consent to the sexual act. Thus, to sustain a conviction for Statutory Rape, the
prosecution must establish the following: (a) the age of the complainant; (b) the identity of the
accused; and (c) the sexual intercourse between the accused and the complainant. 20
 65

Furthermore, these acts of Rape shall be qualified pursuant to Article 266-B (1) of the RPC if: (i)
the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age; and (ii) the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-
parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.

In this regard, it has been long settled that "a young girl would not concoct a sordid tale
of a crime as serious as rape at the hands of her [own relative], allow the examination of her
private part, and subject herself to the stigma and embarrassment of a public trial, if her motive
were other than a fervent desire to seek justice. Hence, there is no plausible reason why AAA
would testify against her own relative, imputing to him the grave crime of rape, if this crime
didnot happen, as in this case. In view of the foregoing, as well as the fact that AAA's minority
and her relationship with Ferdinand were not only alleged in the Informations but also proven
during the trial, the Court finds it proper to upgrade Ferdinand's convictions to two (2) counts
of Qualified Statutory Rape.

PEOPLE v. ORLANDO TAGLE Y ROQUETA

G.R. No. 229348, 19 November 2018
Rape

FACTS: An Information was filed with the RTC charging Tagle of Rape. The prosecution
alleged that at around midnight of 6 May 2007, AAA was invited by her friend to get some
clothes from a certain “Mata” at Las Pinas City. Upon arrival thereat, “Mata” invited AAA and
her friend to join a drinking spree, and thereafter, brought them to an unlighted grassy area,
here Tagle and 4 other male individuals were drinking without any tables and chairs. The men
offered AAA some beer and forced her to drink but she poured the contents at her back when
no one was looking. After an hour, “Mata” and the 4 male individuals held AAA. Tagle and the
others undressed AAA and she tried to resist and run away but she was boxed on her stomach
and subsequently restrained. AAA claimed that while she was lying down, Tagle touched her
breasts, removed her short pants, mounted her, and inserted his penis into her vagina.
Meanwhile, the other 5 men did not do anything except watch Tagle rape AAA. After the
incident, they poked a knife at AAA and warned her not to report what happened to anyone or
else something might happen to her family. AAA’s friend returned at around 2 a.m. and found
AAA crying at the grassy area. AAA revealed that she was raped. She was brought to the
Barangay Hall and then to the police station to report the incident.

The RTC found Tagle guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape, defined and
penalized under Article 266-A of the RPC, in relation to RA 7610. The CA affirmed Tagle’s
conviction.

ISSUE: Whether or not Tagle’s conviction for Rape should be upheld.

HELD: Yes. For the successful prosecution of the crime of Rape by sexual intercourse under
Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the RPC, the prosecution must establish that: (a) the offender had
carnal knowledge of a woman; and (b) he accomplished this act through force, threat or
intimidation, or when the victim was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or by means
of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority, or when the victim is under twelve (12)
years of age or is demented. Essentially, the gravamen of Rape is sexual intercourse with a
woman against her will.

In this case, the Court agrees with the findings of both the RTC and the CA that the
prosecution established, that: (a) on May 6, 2007, AAA and her friend went to the place of
"Mata" at Las Pinas City; (b) when AAA and her friend arrived at the place of "Mata," the latter
brought them to an unlighted grassy area, where Tagle and four (4) other male individuals were
 66

drinking; (c) when AAA's friend momentarily left her, AAA was held down, boxed on her
stomach, and undressed by the male individuals for Tagle to have carnal knowledge of her; (d)
after Tagle had carnal knowledge of AAA, the other male individuals took turns in raping her as
well; ( e) after the incident, AAA reported the matter to the barangay and police authorities; and
(j) upon the conduct of medical examination, Dr. Palmero confirmed that AAA was indeed
raped.

Verily, the assessment and findings of the trial court are generally accorded great weight, and
are conclusive and binding to the Court if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some
fact or circumstance of weight and influence, which exceptions do not obtain in this case.

PEOPLE v. BRANDON DELA CRUZ AND JAMES FRANCIS BAUTISTA

G.R. No. 225741, 5 December 2018
R.A. No. 9165; Section 21 (Chain of Custody)

FACTS: The case stemmed from an Information filed with the RTC charging accused-
appellants of the crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs. The prosecution alleged that at
around 5:00 p.m., members of the Bambang Police Station successfully implemented a buy-bust
operation against accused-appellants, during which 0.029 gram of white crystalline substance
was recovered from them. The police officers then took accused-appellants and the seized item
to the police station where the marking, inventory, and photography were done in the presence
of Municipal Councilor Allas and Gaffuy, an employee of the DOJ. The seized item was then
brought to the crime laboratory where, after examination, the contents thereof tested positive
for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug.

The RTC found accused-appellants guilty of the crime charged in its Decision. The CA
affirmed the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the conviction of the accused should be upheld.

HELD: No. To establish the identity of the dangerous drug with moral certainty, the
prosecution must be able to account for each link of the chain of custody from the moment the
drugs are seized up to their presentation in court as evidence of the crime. As part of the chain
of custody procedure, the law requires, inter alia, that the marking, physical inventory, and
photography of the seized items be conducted immediately after seizure and confiscation of the
same. In this regard, case law recognizes that "marking upon immediate confiscation
contemplates even marking at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team."
Hence, the failure to immediately mark the confiscated items at the place of arrest neither
renders them inadmissible in evidence nor impairs the integrity of the seized drugs, as the
conduct of marking at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team is sufficient
compliance with the rules on chain of custody. The law further requires that the said inventory
and photography be done in the presence of the accused or the person from whom the items
were seized, or his representative or counsel, as well as certain required witnesses, namely:
namely: (a) if prior to the amendment of R.A. No. 9165 by R.A. No. 10640, "a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official"; or (b) if
after the amendment of R.A. No. 9165 by R.A. No. 10640, "an elected public official and a
representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media." The law requires the presence
of these witnesses primarily "to ensure the establishment of the chain of custody and remove
any suspicion of switching, planting, or contamination of evidence."

After an examination of the records, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to
comply with the above-described procedure since the inventory and photography of the seized
item were not conducted in the presence of a media representative.
 67

PEOPLE v. JEFFERSON MEDINA

G.R. No. 225747, 5 December 2018
R.A. No. 9165; Section 21 (Chain of Custody)

FACTS: An Information was filed with the RTC accusing Medina of violating Section 5, Article
II of R.A. No. 9165. The prosecution alleged that members of the District Anti-Illegal Drug –
Special Operation Task Group, Northern Police District successfully implemented a buy-bust
operation against Medina, during which one plastic sachet containing white crystalline
substance was recovered from him. PO3 Quintero then marked the seized item at the place of
arrest, and thereafter, brought it to the police station along with Medina. Thereat, PO3 Rana
conducted the inventory and photography of the seized item in the presence of Santos, a media
representative, and thereafter prepared the necessary paperworks for examination. Finally, the
seized items was then brought to the crime laboratory where upon examination, the contents
thereof tested positive for 0.05 gram of methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a
dangerous drug.

ISSUE: Whether or not the conviction of Medina should be upheld.

HELD: No. Medina should be acquitted.

In cases for Illegal Sale and/or Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs under R.A. No.
9165, it is essential that the identity of the dangerous drug be established with moral certainty,
considering that the dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of the corpus delicti of the
crime. To establish the identity of the dangerous drug with moral certainty, the prosecution
must be able to account for each link of the chain of custody from the moment the drugs are
seized up to their presentation in court as evidence of the crime. As part of the chain of custody
procedure, the law requires, inter alia, that the marking, physical inventory, and photography
of the seized items be conducted immediately after seizure and confiscation of the same. In this
regard, case law recognizes that "marking upon immediate confiscation contemplates even
marking at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team."

In this case, there was a deviation from the witness requirement as the conduct of
inventory and photography was not witnessed by an elected public official and a DOJ
representative. This may be easily gleaned from the Inventory of Drug Seized/Items which only
proves the presence of a media representative. It is incumbent upon the prosecution to account
for these witnesses' absence by presenting a justifiable reason therefor or, at the very least, by
showing that genuine and sufficient efforts were exerted by the apprehending officers to secure
their presence.