Abetment:

PROF- FOR- abetment:

The word ‘instigate’ denotes incitement or urging to do some drastic or inadvisable action or to stimulate
or incite. Presence of mens rea, therefore, is the necessary concomitant of instigation. It is common
knowledge that the words uttered in a quarrel or on the spur of the moment cannot be taken to be uttered
with mens rea. It is in a fit of anger and emotion.1

A mere acquiescence, or permission does not amount to an instigation. Nor can deliberate absence from
the scene of offence amount to instigation.2

There has to be a reasonable certainty in regard to the meaning of the words used by the ‘incitor’ in order
to judge whether or not there was an incitement, but it is not necessary in law to prove the actual words
used for the incitement.3

Justice Mukerji opined that the intention should be to aid the commission of a crime. A mere giving of an
aid will not make the act an abatement of an offence, if the person who gave the aid did not know that an
offence was being committed or contemplated. The intention should be to aid an offence or to facilitate
the commission of an offence. But if the person who lends his support does not know or has no reason to
believe that the act which he was aiding or supporting was in itself a criminal act, it cannot be said that he
intentionally aids or facilitates the doing of the offence.4

PROF- DEF- abetment:

A person is said to instigate another to an act, when he actively suggests or stimulates him to the act by
any means or language, direct or indirect, whether it takes the form of express solicitation, or of hints,
insinuation or encouragement.5

Words which amount merely to a permission may perhaps amount to an instigation, but this will depend
on the position of the speaker and the occasion on which they are spoken.6

1
Sanju AIR 2002 SC 1998; Sonti Rama Krishna v Shanti Sree (2009) 1 SCC 554
2
Etim Ali Majmudar (1900) 4 CWN 500
3
Prem Narain AIR 1957 All 177
4
Ram nath (1924) 47 All 268,267
5
Aminuddin Saleboy AIR 1923 Bom 44: 21 C 466; Shubha Srivastava 2018 Cri LJ 104 (MP)
6
Prem Narain AIR 1957 All 177
Mere presence at the commission of a crime cannot amount to intentional aid unless it was intended to
have that effect. To be present and aware that an offence is about to be committed does not constitute
abetment unless the person thus present holds some position of rank or influence such that his
countenancing what takes place may, under the circumstances, be held a direct encouragement or unless
some specific duty of prevention rests on him, which he leaves unfulfilled in such wise that he may be
safely taken as having joined in conspiracy for perpetration of the offence.7

In Shri Ram v. State of U.P.8 justice Chandrachud opined that in order to constitute abetment, the abettor
must be shown to have “intentionally” aided the commission of the crime. Mere proof that the crime
charged could not have been committed without the interposition of the alleged abettor is not enough
compliance with the requirements of S.107. It is not enough that an act on the part of the alleged abettor
happens to facilitate the commission of the crime. Intentional aiding and therefore active complicity is
the gist of the offence of abetment under the third paragraph of S. 107.

Prof. Bijyue had neither any intentional aiding nor any active complicity in the abetment of suicide. He
just gave a media bite in support of the students, who were protesting for the same cause.

7
Lakshmi (1886) Cr R No. 51 of 1886, Allah Wasaya (1947) 49 PLR 95:
8
Shri Ram v. State of U.P. AIR 1975 SC 175
CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY:

Petitioner:

Entering into an agreement by two or more persons to do an illegal act or legal act by illegal means is the
very quintessence of the offence of conspiracy.

In the case of Topandas v. State of Bombay, justice Bhagwathi has stated that, By the terms of the
definition of criminal conspiracy itself, there ought to be two or more persons who must be parties to such
an agreement and it is trite to say that one person alone can never be held guilty of criminal conspiracy
for the simple reason that one cannot conspire with oneself. If, therefore, 4 named individuals were
charged with having committed the offence under S. 120-B, Penal Code, and if three out of these four
were acquitted of the charge, the remaining accused could never be held guilty of the offence of criminal
conspiracy. 9

In CBI V. V.C. Shukla,10 Justice M.K. Mukherjee has stated that, One of the two when not shown as party
to the conspiracy, the charge of conspiracy cannot stand against the other For conspiracy there must be at
least two persons.

In Baldev Singh v. state of Punjab, Justice S.B Sinha, held that, offence of conspiracy requires
involvement of more than one person A person alone cannot have conspired, here only appellant was
charged with for offence under S. 120-B. Hence, held, appellant alone could not have been convicted
under S. 120-B.

In Halsbury’s Laws of England it was stated that “The actus reus in a conspiracy is the agreement to
execute the illegal conduct, not the execution of it. It is not enough that two or more persons pursued the
same unlawful object at the same time or in the same place; it is necessary to show a meeting of minds, a
consensus to effect an unlawful purpose. It is not, however, necessary that each conspirator should have
been in communication with every other.”11

“The gist of the offence of conspiracy then lies, not in doing the act, or effecting the purpose for which
the conspiracy is formed, nor in attempting to do them, nor in inciting others to do them, but in the forming

9
Topandas v. State of Bombay, AIR 1956 SC 33
10
CBI V. V.C. Shukla, (1998) 3 SCC 410
11
Halsbury's Laws of England, (4th Edn.), Vol. 11, para 58; p. 44; Vol. 11(1), para 59, pp. 56
of the scheme or agreement between the parties. Agreement is essential. Mere knowledge, or even
discussion of the plan is not, per se enough.”12

The court held that we must enquire whether the two persons are independently pursuing the same end or
they have come together to the pursuit of the unlawful object.13

Irrelevant, innocuous, innocent or inadvertent events and incidents cannot be artfully added together to
give an appearance of coherence.14

Where the conspiracy alleged in the charge is one in which only three persons are said to have been
participators and two of them are acquitted, the other is entitled to acquittal.15

Conviction cannot be sustained where the evidence against the accused is flimsy, unreasonable and does
not firmly establish his guilty.16

Just because certain persons hold communist beliefs, or the bare fact that they were present with persons
who were parties to the conspiracy, cannot constitute a valid foundation for a conviction on a charge of
conspiracy.17

In the case of CBI v. Narayana Rao K18 it was held that mere suspicion is not enough to frame charges
against the accused.

It is true that it is difficult to support the charge of conspiracy with direct evidence in every case but if the
prosecution relies upon circumstantial evidence, a clear link has to be established and the chain has to be
completed, otherwise it would indeed be hazardous to accept a part of the link as a complete one and on
the basis of such incomplete evidence, the allegation of conspiracy cannot be accepted.19

12
Kehar singhs case AIR 1988 1883s
13
Kehar singh case
14
State v Sheetla Sahai (2009) 8 SCC 617
15
Narasimha Rao BH 1995 Cri LJ 4181 (SC): 1995 AIR SCW 3717
16
Ramanlal Baldevdas Shah AIR 1992 SC 1916
17
Mahabir Prasad Akela 1987 Cri LJ 1545 (Pat)
18
CBI v. Narayana Rao K 2012 Cri Lj 4610(SC)
19
Damodar 2003 Cri LJ 5014 (SC): AIR 2003 SC 4414
Respondent:

Express agreement, however, need not be proved. Nor actual meeting of two persons is necessary. Nor is
it necessary to prove the actual words of communication. The evidence as to transmission of thoughts
sharing the unlawful design may be sufficient. The law does not require that the act of agreement take any
particular form and the fact of agreement may be communicated by words or conduct) It need not be
proved that the parties actually came together and agreed in terms to pursue the unlawful object or that
there was any express verbal agreement.20

In Nalini, Justice S.S.M. Quadri, pointed out that the meeting of minds of two or more persons for doing
an illegal act or an act by illegal means is a sine qua non of the criminal conspiracy.21

Criminal conspiracy would be proved where involvement of more than one person was established, though
ultimately only one person was convicted.22

It is not an ingredient of the offence under this section that all the parties should agree to do a single illegal
act.23

The essence of criminal conspiracy is an agreement to do an illegal act. Such an agreement can be proved
either by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence or by both. It is not necessary that there should be
express proof of the agreement, far from the acts and conduct of the parties the agreement can be inferred.24

In this case several terrorists arrived at Mumbai and divided themselves into pairs for waging war and
destabilising India. Each pair parted from the other to commit terror attacks at different places. The
appellant was the member of one such pair. He could not be held liable for the acts done by him and the
other member of the pair only, but also be guilty of the acts done by all other persons in different pairs at
different places even if he was physically not present at other places. All the terrorists were integrally
connected with each other and the appellant with his associate was as much part of the offences committed
at the other places. They were also responsible for the offences committed by them directly.25

20
Sudhir S. Mehta v CBI (2009) 8 SCC 1
21
1999) 5 SCC 253: AIR 1999 SC 2640
22
Mohd Arif (2011) 13 SCC 621
23
Barsay EG AIR 1961 SC 1762
24
Purushothaman K R 2005 Cri Lj 4648 (SC)
25
Mohammed Ajmal Mohammad Amir Kasab AIR 2012 SC 3565:2012 Cri LJ 4770 (SC).
The criminal responsibility for a conspiracy requires more than a mere passive attitude towards an existing
conspiracy. One who commits an overt act with knowledge of the conspiracy is guilty. And one who
tacitly consents to the object of a conspiracy and goes along with other conspirators, actually standing by
while the others put the conspiracy into effect, is guilty though he intends to take no active part in the
crime.26

It is immaterial whether the illegal act is the ultimate object of such crime or is merely incidental to that
object.27

It may not be correct to say that a conspiracy cannot be deduced from acts not in themselves illegal. If in
pursuance of a criminal conspiracy the conspirators commit several offences, then all of them will be
liable for the offences even if some of them had not actively participated in the commission of the
offences.28

26
State v. Navjot sandhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600
27
Saju AIR 2001 SC 175
28
State v. Krishna lal Prasad AIR 1987 SC 773.