Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
VIII.C
• VIUDA DE CAMILO V. ARANIO, L-15653, SEPTEMBER 29,
1961MARCELO
1. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; INTERPLEADER; NO
CONFLICTING CLAIMS; COMPLAINT FOR INTERPLEADER
WITHOUT CAUSE OF ACTION. — It appearing that there is no
conflicting claims among the defendants — their respective claims
being separate and distinct from the other — and that the
plaintiffs have interest (the prolongation of their occupancy or
possession of the portions encroached upon by them), the
requirements for an action to interplead do not exist, and
consequently, the complaint of interpleader in question is without
cause of action.
2. COURTS; COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE; JURISDICTION; ACTION
INVOLVE TITLE TO REALTY; SUBJECT-MATTER INCAPABLE OF
PECUNIARY ESTIMATION. — As the action for interpleader
would necessarily involve title to or possession of real property
or any interest therein, and that the subject-matter is incapable
of pecuniary estimation (there being no showing that rentals
were asked by the petitioners from the respondents), the case
would come under the original jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance (Sec 44, pars. (a) and (b), Judiciary Act).
FACTS:
Petitioner Petra Carpio Vda. de Camilo, had been by herself and
predecessors-in-interest in peaceful, open and adverse possession
of a parcel of public foreshore land, wherein a commercial building
stood.
The other petitioners, Severino Estrada, Felisa, Susana, Antonio and
the minors Isabelo, Rene and Ruben, all surnamed Francisco, the
said minors represented by their mother Susana, had also been in
possession in common peaceful, open and adverse, of a parcel of
public foreshore land is adjoining that land occupied by de Camilo.
There is also a commercial building here erected by the Franciscos.
Respondent Ong Peng Kee was a lessee of one of the apartments of
said commercial building of Petra.
Arthur Evert Bannister filed an unlawful detainer case against both
De Camilo and Ong Peng Kee with the Justice of Peace (JP).
Bannister was declared in default and P100.00 was awarded to De
Camilo on her counterclaim.
The two commercial buildings were burned down. Thereafter,
respondents Ong Peng Kee and Adelia Ong, constructed a building
of their own. The building, however, was so built that portions of the
lands previously occupied by petitioners (De Camilo and the
Franciscos) were encroached upon.
De Camilo filed a civil action for Forcible Entry against Ong Peng
Kee and Adelia Ong with the Justice of Peace (JP) of Malangas, with
respect to the portion belonging to her wherein the building of Ong
Peng Kee was erected.
Severino Estrada and the Franciscos filed a similar case
Pending trial of the two cases, the respondents Ong Peng Kee and
Adelia Ong filed a complaint for Interpleader against De Camilo,
Severino Estrada, the Franciscos, Arthur Evert Bannister, the Mayor
and Treasurer of Malangas.
Ong Peng Kee alleges that the filing of the three cases (by Bannister,
de Camilo, and Francisco), indicated that the defendants (in the
Interpleader) had conflicting interests, since they all claimed to be
entitled to the possession of the lot in question and they (Peng Kee
and Adelia), could not determine without hazard to themselves who
of the defendants was entitled to the possession. Interpleader
plaintiffs further alleged that they had no interest in the property
other than as mere lessees.
Motion to dismiss was filed by the petitioners alleging, inter alia,
that the Interpleader case lacks of cause of action.
JP denied the motion. Appeal was made with the CFI.
ISSUES:
a. WON the interpleader lacks a cause of action
b. Justice of the Peace Court has jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the Interpleader case.
HELD:
Cause of Action.
Yes.
The petitioners claimed the possession of the respective portion of
the lands belonging to them on which the respondents had erected
their house after the fire which destroyed petitioners' buildings.
This being the case, the contention of petitioners-appellants that
the complaint to interplead, lacked cause of action, is correct.
Section 1, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides —
"Interpleader when proper . — Whenever conflicting claims upon
the same subject-matter are or may be made against a person,
who claims no interest whatever in the subject-matter, or an
interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants,
he may bring an action against the conflicting claimants to compel
them to interplead and litigate their several claims among
themselves."
The petitioners did not have conflicting claims against the
respondents. Their respective claim was separate and distinct
from the other. De Camilo only wanted the respondents to vacate
that portion of her property which was encroached upon by them
when they erected their building. The same is true with Estrada and
the Franciscos. They claimed possession of two different parcels of
land, of different areas, adjoining each other. Furthermore, it is not
true that respondents Ong Peng Kee and Adelia Ong did not have
any interest, in the subject-matter. Their interest was the
prolongation of their occupancy or possession of the portions
encroached upon by them. It is, therefore, evident that the
requirements for a complaint of Interpleader do not exist.
Jurisdiction
It ’s not a PROVREM 2015  1

No.
The complaint asking the petitioners to interplead, practically took
the case out of the jurisdiction of the JP court, because the action
would then necessarily "involve the title to or possession of real
property or any interest therein" over which the CFI has original
jurisdiction (par. [b], sec. 44, Judiciary Act, as amended). Then also,
the subject-matter of the complaint (interpleader) would come
under the original jurisdiction of the CFI, because it would not be
capable of pecuniary estimation (Sec. 44, par. [a], Judiciary Act),
there having been no showing that rentals were asked by the
petitioners from respondents.
BAR TYPE QUESTION:
A owns a parcel of land with a commercial building with B as lessee.
C and D also owns a parcel of land adjoining than of A.
Fire burned both the commercial buildings. B, thereafter erected his
own building on the lands previously occupied by A, C and D.
A, C, and D subsequently filed for forcible entry with respect to
land belonging to them where B built his building. B filed an
action for interpleader alleging A, C and D have conflicting interest
over the parcel of land.
If you are the judge. How will you settle the case? (W.W.J.D.)
• WACK-WACK GOLF V. LEE WON, L-23851, MARCH 26, 1976
VALDEZ
Doctrine:
The interpleader suit cannot prosper because the Petitioner had
already been made independently liable in Civil Case No. 26044
and, therefore, its present application for interpleader would in
effect be a collateral attack upon the final judgment in the said civil
case.
It has been held that a stakeholder's action of interpleader is too
late when filed after judgment has been rendered against him in
favor of one of the contending claimants, especially where he had
notice of the conflicting claims prior to the rendition of the
judgment and neglected the opportunity to implead the adverse
claimants in the suit where judgment was entered. This must be so,
because once judgment is obtained against him by one claimant he
becomes liable to the latter.
LONG DIGEST
This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, in civil case 7656, dismissing the plaintiff-appellant's
complaint of interpleader upon the grounds of failure to state a
cause of action and res judicata.
In its amended and supplemental complaint, the Wack Wack Golf &
Country Club, Inc., a non-stock, civic and athletic corporation duly
organized under the laws of the Philippines, with principal office in
Mandaluyong, Rizal, alleged, for its first cause of action, that the
defendant Lee E. Won claims ownership of its membership fee
certificate 201, by virtue of the decision rendered in civil case
26044 of the CFI of Manila and also by virtue of membership fee
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
certificate 201-serial no. 1478 issued by Ponciano B. Jacinto, deputy
clerk of court of the said CFI of Manila, for and in behalf of the
president and the secretary of the Corporation and of the People's
Bank & Trust Company as transfer agent of the said Corporation;
that the defendant Bienvenido A. Tan, on the other hand, claims to
be lawful owner of its aforesaid membership fee certificate 201 by
virtue of membership fee certificate 201-serial no. 1199 issued to
him pursuant to an assignment made in his favor by "Swan,
Culbertson and Fritz," the original owner and holder of membership
fee certificate 201; that it has no means of determining who of the
two defendants is the lawful owner thereof; that it is without power
to issue two separate certificates for the same membership fee
certificate 201, or to issue another membership fee certificate to the
defendant Lee, without violating its articles of incorporation and by-
laws; and that the membership fee certificate 201-serial no. 1199
held by the defendant Tan and the membership fee certificate 201-
serial No. 1478 issued to the defendant Lee proceed from the same
membership fee certificate 201, originally issued in the name of
"Swan, Culbertson and Fritz".
For its second cause of action. it alleged that the membership fee
certificate 201-serial no. 1478 issued by the deputy clerk of court of
court of the CFI of Manila in behalf of the Corporation is null and
void because it is issued in violation of its by-laws, which require
the surrender and cancellation of the outstanding membership fee
certificate 201 before issuance may be made to the transferee of a
new certificate duly signed by its president and secretary, aside
from the fact that the decision of the CFI of Manila in civil case
26044 is not binding upon the defendant Tan.
The Corporation prayed that (a) an order be issued requiring Lee
and Tan to interplead and litigate their conflicting claims; and (b)
judgment be rendered, after hearing, declaring who of the two is the
lawful owner of membership fee certificate 201, and ordering the
surrender and cancellation of membership fee certificate 201-serial
no. 1478 issued in the name of Lee.
In separate motions the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint
upon the grounds of res judicata, failure of the complaint to state a
cause of action, and bar by prescription. These motions were duly
opposed by the Corporation. Finding the grounds of bar by prior
judgment and failure to state a cause of action well taken, the trial
court dismissed the complaint, with costs against the Corporation.
In this appeal, the Corporation contends that the court a quo erred
(1) in finding that the allegations in its amended and supplemental
complaint do not constitute a valid ground for an action of
interpleader, and in holding that "the principal motive for the
present action is to reopen the Manila Case and collaterally attack
the decision of the said Court"; (2) in finding that the decision in
civil case 26044 of the CFI of Manila constitutes res judicata and
bars its present action; and (3) in dismissing its action instead of
compelling the appellees to interplead and litigate between
themselves their respective claims.
On the other hand, the appellees argue that the trial court properly
dismissed the complaint, because, having the effect of reopening
civil case 26044, the present action is barred by res judicata.
Issue:
It ’s not a PROVREM 2015  2

Whether or not the interpleader suit will prosper.
Ruling:
No.
The action of interpleader, under section 120 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, is a remedy whereby a person who has personal
property in his possession, or an obligation to render wholly or
partially, without claiming any right to either, comes to court and
asks that the persons who claim the said personal property or who
consider themselves entitled to demand compliance with the
obligation, be required to litigate among themselves in order to
determine finally who is entitled to tone or the one thing. The
remedy is afforded to protect a person not against double liability
but against double vexation in respect of one liability. The
procedure under the Rules of Court is the same as that under the
Code of Civil Procedure, except that under the former the remedy of
interpleader is available regardless of the nature of the subject-
matter of the controversy, whereas under the latter an interpleader
suit is proper only if the subject-matter of the controversy is
personal property or relates to the performance of an obligation.
There is no question that the subject matter of the present
controversy, i.e., the membership fee certificate 201, is proper for an
interpleader suit. What is here disputed is the propriety and
timeliness of the remedy in the light of the facts and circumstances
obtaining.
A stakeholder should use reasonable diligence to hale the
contending claimants to court. He need not await actual institution
of independent suits against him before filing a bill of interpleader.
He should file an action of interpleader within a reasonable time
after a dispute has arisen without waiting to be sued by either of the
contending claimants. Otherwise, he may be barred by laches or
undue delay. But where he acts with reasonable diligence in view of
the environmental circumstances, the remedy is not barred.
Has the Corporation in this case acted with diligence, in view of all
the circumstances, such that it may properly invoke the remedy of
interpleader? We do not think so. It was aware of the conflicting
claims of the appellees with respect to the membership fee
certificate 201 long before it filed the present interpleader suit. It
had been recognizing Tan as the lawful owner thereof. It was sued
by Lee who also claimed the same membership fee certificate. Yet it
did not interplead Tan. It preferred to proceed with the litigation
(civil case 26044) and to defend itself therein. As a matter of fact,
final judgment was rendered against it and said judgment has
already been executed. It is not therefore too late for it to invoke the
remedy of interpleader.
It has been held that a stakeholder's action of interpleader is too
late when filed after judgment has been rendered against him in
favor of one of the contending claimants, especially where he had
notice of the conflicting claims prior to the rendition of the
judgment and neglected the opportunity to implead the adverse
claimants in the suit where judgment was entered. This must be so,
because once judgment is obtained against him by one claimant he
becomes liable to the latter.
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
The Corporation has not shown any justifiable reason why it did not
file an application for interpleader in civil case 26044 to compel the
appellees herein to litigate between themselves their conflicting
claims of ownership. It was only after adverse final judgment was
rendered against it that the remedy of interpleader was invoked by
it. By then it was too late, because to he entitled to this remedy the
applicant must be able to show that lie has not been made
independently liable to any of the claimants. And since the
Corporation is already liable to Lee under a final judgment, the
present interpleader suit is clearly improper and unavailing.
It is the general rule that before a person will be deemed to be in a
position to ask for an order of intrepleader, he must be prepared to
show, among other prerequisites, that he has not become
independently liable to any of the claimants. 25 Tex. Jur. p. 52, Sec. 3;
30 Am. Jur. p. 218, Section 8.
It is also the general rule that a bill of interpleader comes too late
when it is filed after judgment has been rendered in favor of one of
the claimants of the fund, this being especially true when the holder
of the funds had notice of the conflicting claims prior to the
rendition of the judgment and had an opportunity to implead the
adverse claimants in the suit in which the judgment was rendered.
United Procedures Pipe Line Co. v. Britton, Tex. Civ. App. 264 S.W.
176; Nash v. McCullum, Tex. Civ. 74 S.W. 2d 1046; 30 Am. Jur. p. 223,
Sec. 11; 25 Tex. Jur. p. 56, Sec. 5; 108 A.L.R., note 5, p. 275. 16
Indeed, if a stakeholder defends a suit filed by one of the adverse
claimants and allows said suit to proceed to final judgment against
him, he cannot later on have that part of the litigation repeated in an
interpleader suit. In the case at hand, the Corporation allowed civil
case 26044 to proceed to final judgment. And it offered no
satisfactory explanation for its failure to implead Tan in the same
litigation. In this factual situation, it is clear that this interpleader
suit cannot prosper because it was filed much too late.
To now permit the Corporation to bring Lee to court after the
latter's successful establishment of his rights in civil case 26044 to
the membership fee certificate 201, is to increase instead of to
diminish the number of suits, which is one of the purposes of an
action of interpleader, with the possibility that the latter would lose
the benefits of the favorable judgment. This cannot be done because
having elected to take its chances of success in said civil case 26044,
with full knowledge of all the fact, the Corporation must submit to
the consequences of defeat
In fine, the instant interpleader suit cannot prosper because the
Corporation had already been made independently liable in civil
case 26044 and, therefore, its present application for interpleader
would in effect be a collateral attack upon the final judgment in the
said civil case; the appellee Lee had already established his rights to
membership fee certificate 201 in the aforesaid civil case and,
therefore, this interpleader suit would compel him to establish his
rights anew, and thereby increase instead of diminish litigations,
which is one of the purposes of an interpleader suit, with the
possibility that the benefits of the final judgment in the said civil
case might eventually be taken away from him; and because the
Corporation allowed itself to be sued to final judgment in the said
case, its action of interpleader was filed inexcusably late, for which
reason it is barred by laches or unreasonable delay.
It ’s not a PROVREM 2015  3

QUICK DIGEST
Facts:
Lee Won claims ownership of a membership fee certificate at Wack
Wack Golf & Country Club. By virtue of a civil case, he was issued
such certificate. On the other hand, Bienvenido Tan also claims
ownership over such certificate pursuant to an assignment made by
the alleged true owner of the same certificate. Thus, Wack Wack
filed a complaint to compel Won and Tan to interplead and litigate
their conflicting claims. Defendants filed their separate motion to
dismiss the complaint upon the grounds of res judicata, failure to
state a cause of action and bar by prescription.Trial court dismissed
the complaint.
Issue:
Whether or not the interpleader suit will prosper.
Ruling:
No.
It has been held that a stakeholder's action of interpleader is too
late when filed after judgment has been rendered against him in
favor of one of the contending claimants, especially where he had
notice of the conflicting claims prior to the rendition of the
judgment and neglected the opportunity to implead the adverse
claimants in the suit where judgment was entered. This must be so,
because once judgment is obtained against him by one claimant he
becomes liable to the latter.
In fine, the instant interpleader suit cannot prosper because the
Corporation had already been made independently liable in civil
case 26044 and, therefore, its present application for interpleader
would in effect be a collateral attack upon the final judgment in the
said civil case; the appellee Lee had already established his rights to
membership fee certificate 201 in the aforesaid civil case and,
therefore, this interpleader suit would compel him to establish his
rights anew, and thereby increase instead of diminish litigations,
which is one of the purposes of an interpleader suit, with the
possibility that the benefits of the final judgment in the said civil
case might eventually be taken away from him; and because the
Corporation allowed itself to be sued to final judgment in the said
case, its action of interpleader was filed inexcusably late, for which
reason it is barred by laches or unreasonable delay.
• RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION V. METRO
CONTAINER CORPORATION, G.R. NO. 127913, SEPTEMBER 13,
2001 VILLAGANAS
PRINCIPLE:
A party who initiates an interpleader action may not be
compelled to pursue the interpleader case when the reason for
the interpleader action ceased.
FACTS:
(X) LEYCON contracted a loan from (Y) RCBC which was secured by
a real estate mortgage. Having failed to settle obligation, a
foreclosure took place with (Y) RCBC as the highest bidder.
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
(X) LEYCON filed an action for Unlawful Detainer against (Z)
METROCAN, lessee of the property, docket as civil case no. 6202.
(Z) METROCAN filed the interpleader action (Civil Case No. 4398-V-
94) because it was unsure which between (X) LEYCON and (Y)
RCBC was entitled to receive the payment of monthly rentals on the
subject property. (Y) LEYCON was claiming payment of the rentals
as lessor of the property while (X) RCBC was making a demand by
virtue of the consolidation of the title of the property in its name.
Thereafter, the court in civil case no. 6202 dismissed the complaint
in view of an amicable settlement they entered and ordered (Z)
METROCAN to pay (X) LEYCON whatever rentals due on the subject
premises.
And so in this case, (Z) METROCAN moved for the dismissal of the
interpleader action (civil case no. 4398-V-94) because there is no
need to pursue such cause of action because it is already moot and
academic.
(Y) RCBC on the other hand wants to prove his claim in the
interpleader action filed, thus, compelling (Z) METROCAN to pursue
the interpleader case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a party who initiates an interpleader action may be
compelled to pursue the interpleader case when the reason for the
interpleader action ceased.
RULING:
NO.
The reason for the interpleader action ceased when in Civil Case No.
6202 the court directed (Z) METROCAN to pay (X) LEYCON
"whatever rentals due on the subject premises x x x." While (Y)
RCBC, not being a party to Civil Case No. 6202, could not be bound
by the judgment therein, (Z) METROCAN is bound by the decision.
When the decision in Civil Case No. 6202 became final and
executory, (Z) METROCAN has no other alternative left but to pay
the rentals to (X) LEYCON. Precisely because there was already a
judicial fiat to (Z) METROCAN, there was no more reason to
continue with Civil Case No. 4398-V-94. Thus, METROCAN moved
for the dismissal of the interpleader action not because it is no
longer interested but because there is no more need for it to pursue
such cause of action.
It should be remembered that an action of interpleader is afforded
to protect a person not against double liability but against double
vexation in respect of one liability. It requires, as an indispensable
requisite, that conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are
or may be made against the plaintiff-in-interpleader who claims no
interest whatever in the subject matter or an interest which in
whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants. The decision in
Civil Case No. 6202 resolved the conflicting claims insofar as
payment of rentals was concerned.
(Y) Petitioner is correct in saying that it is not bound by the decision
in Civil Case No. 6202. It is not a party thereto. However, it could not
compel (Z) METROCAN to pursue Civil Case No. 4398-V-94. (Y)
It ’s not a PROVREM 2015  4

RCBC has other avenues to prove its claim. Is not bereft of other
legal remedies. In fact, the issue of ownership can very well be
threshed out in Civil Case No. 4037-V-93, the case for Nullification of
Extrajudicial Foreclosure Sale and Damages filed by (X) LEYCON
against (Y) RCBC.
SHORT DIGEST:
(X) LEYCON contracted a loan from (Y) RCBC which was secured by
a real estate mortgage. Failure to pay, it was foreclosed with (Y)
RCBC as the highest bidder.
(X) LEYCON filed an action for Unlawful Detainer against (Z)
METROCAN, lessee of the property. The court dismissed the action
in view of an amicable settlement they entered and ordered (Z)
METROCAN to pay (X) LEYCON whatever rentals due on the subject
premises.
Prior to the dismissal of the unlawful detainer case, (Z) METROCAN
filed the interpleader action because it was unsure which between
(X) LEYCON and (Y) RCBC was entitled to receive the payment of
monthly rentals on the subject property.
And so in this case, (Z) METROCAN moved for the dismissal of the
interpleader action (civil case no. 4398-V-94) because there is no
need to pursue such cause of action because it is already moot and
academic.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a party who initiates an interpleader action may be
compelled to pursue the interpleader case when the reason for the
interpleader action ceased.
RULING:
NO.
The reason for the interpleader action ceased when in
Civil Case No. 6202 the court directed (Z) METROCAN to pay (X)
LEYCON "whatever rentals due on the subject premises x x x." While
(Y) RCBC, not being a party to Civil Case No. 6202, could not be
bound by the judgment therein, (Z) METROCAN is bound by the
decision.
It should be remembered that an action of interpleader is afforded
to protect a person not against double liability but against double
vexation in respect of one liability. It requires, as an indispensable
requisite, that conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are
or may be made against the plaintiff-in-interpleader who claims no
interest whatever in the subject matter or an interest which in
whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants. The decision in
Civil Case No. 6202 resolved the conflicting claims insofar as
payment of rentals was concerned.
• BANK OF COMMERCE V. PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK, G.R.
NO. 154470-71, 24 SEPTEMBER 2012 GUANTERO
PRINICIPLE:
The remedy of an action of interpleader is designed to protect a
person against double vexation in respect of a single liability. It
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
requires, as an indispensable requisite, that conflicting claims upon
the same subject matter are or may be made against the
stakeholder (the possessor of the subject matter) who claims no
interest whatever in the subject matter or an interest which in
whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants.
FACTS:
RCBC was the registered owner of 7 Central Bank Bills (CB b) with a
total face value of 70M.
RCBC sold these CB b to Bank of Commerce (BOC).
BOC sold these CB b yo Planters Development Bank (PDB)
PDB sold to BOC treasury bills (TB) worth 70M, however instead of
delivering the TB, the PFB delivered the 7 CB b with the note
substitution in lieu of 6-29-94 which refers to the TB
BOC sold it back to PDB 3 CB b
PDB – Bancap
However BOC bought it back from Bancap
BOC reacquired the 3 CB b
BOC sold the remaining 4 CB b to Capital 1 Equities Corporation
Capital 1 – ALL asia
ALL asia – RCBC
RCBC – ALL asia only 1 CB b
When BSP refused to relase the amount of the CB b, BOC purchase
this 1 CB b from all asia.
For the remaining 3 CB bills
RCBC – IVI Capital and insular savings bank
When BSP refused to release the amount of this bill on maturity,
RCBC paid back its transferee, and reacquired these 3 CB b and sold
it to BOC
All in all the BOC acquired the 7 CB b.
Second Set of CB b
RCBC, registered owner sold 2 CB b worth 20M
PDB- Bancap – Al Amanah Islamic Investment Bank of the Phils –
BOC.
PDB move against the transfer of the first and second set of CB b.
Upon learning of the transfers involving the CB Bills, the PDB
informed the officer-in-charge of the BSP’s Government Securities
Deparment of the PDB’s claim over these CB bills, based on the
Detached Assignments in its possession. The requests of PDB were
denied by the officer-in-charge which prompted the petitioner to
It ’s not a PROVREM 2015  5

file an action so as to compel the BSP to determine the party legally
entitled to the proceeds of the subject CB bills.
The BSP asked that an interpleader suit be allowed between and
among the claimants to the subject CB bills on the position that
while it is able and willing to pay the subject CB bills’ face value, it is
duty bound to ensure that payment is made to the rightful owner.
The PDB agreed with the BSP’s alternative response for an
interpleader.
PDB agrees that the various claimants should now interplead and
substantiate their respective claims on the subject CB bills.
However, the total face value of the subject CB bills should be
deposited in escrow with a private bank to be disposed of only upon
order of the RTC.
What is quite unique in this case is that the BSP did not initiate the
interpleader suit through an original complaint but through its
Answer.
ISSUE:
1.) Whether or not a complaint for interpleader in the case at
bar is proper?
2. ) Whether or not a complaint for interpleader through an answer
is proper?
RULING:
1.
“SECTION 1. When interpleader proper. – Whenever conflicting
claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made against a
person who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter, or an
interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants,
he may bring an action against the conflicting claimants to compel
them to interplead and litigate their several claims among
themselves.”
The remedy of an action of interpleader is designed to protect a
person against double vexation in respect of a single liability. It
requires, as an indispensable requisite, that conflicting claims upon
the same subject matter are or may be made against the
stakeholder (the possessor of the subject matter) who claims no
interest whatever in the subject matter or an interest which in
whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants. 1
Through this remedy, the stakeholder can join all competing
claimants in a single proceeding to determine conflicting claims
without exposing the stakeholder to the possibility of having to pay
more than once on a single liability.
When the court orders that the claimants litigate among
themselves, in reality a new action arises, where the claims of the
interpleaders themselves are brought to the fore, the stakeholder as
plaintiff is relegated merely to the role of initiating the suit. In short,
the remedy of interpleader, when proper, merely provides an
avenue for the conflicting claims on the same subject matter to be
threshed out in an action
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
2.
The remedy of interpleader, as a special civil action, is primarily
governed by the specific provisions in Rule 62 of the Rules of Court
and secondarily by the provisions applicable to ordinary civil
actions. Indeed, Rule 62 does not expressly authorize the filing of a
complaint-in-interpleader as part of, although separate and
independent from, the answer. Similarly, Section 5, Rule 6, in
relation to Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court does not include a
complaint-in-interpleader as a claim, a form of defense, or as an
objection that a defendant may be allowed to put up in his answer
or in a motion to dismiss. This does not mean, however, that the
BSP’s "counter-complaint/cross-claim for interpleader" runs
counter to general procedures.
Apart from a pleading, the rules, allow a party to seek an affirmative
relief from the court through the procedural device of a motion.
While captioned "Answer with counter complaint/cross-claim for
interpleader," the RTC understood this as in the nature of a motion,
seeking relief which essentially consists in an order for the
conflicting claimants to litigate with each other so that "payment is
made to the rightful or legitimate owner" of the subject CB bills.
The rules define a "civil action" as "one by which a party sues
another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong." Interpleader may be considered
as a stakeholder’s remedy to prevent a wrong, that is, from making
payment to one not entitled to it, thereby rendering itself
vulnerable to lawsuit/s from those legally entitled to payment.
Interpleader is a civil action made special by the existence of
particular rules to govern the uniqueness of its application and
operation. Under Section 2, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court, governing
ordinary civil actions, a party’s claim is asserted "in a complaint,
counterclaim, cross-claim, third (fourth, etc.)-party complaint, or
complaint-in-intervention." In an interpleader suit, however, a claim
is not required to be contained in any of these pleadings but in the
answer-(of the conflicting claimants)-in-interpleader. This claim is
different from the counter-claim (or cross-claim, third party-
complaint) which is separately allowed under Section 5, par. 2 of
Rule 62.
• OCAMPO V. TIRONA, G.R. NO. 147812, 6 APRIL 2005
TORREJOS
Principle:
The action of interpleader is a remedy whereby a person who has
property whether personal or real, in his possession, or an
obligation to render wholly or partially, without claiming any right
in both, or claims an interest which in whole or in part is not
disputed by the conflicting claimants, comes to court and asks that
the persons who claim the said property or who consider
themselves entitled to demand compliance with the obligation, be
required to litigate among themselves, in order to determine finally
who is entitled to one or the other thing. The remedy is afforded not
to protect a person against a double liability but to protect him
against a double vexation in respect of one liability. When the court
orders that the claimants litigate among themselves, there arises in
reality a new action and the former are styled interpleaders, and in
It ’s not a PROVREM 2015  6

such a case the pleading which initiates the action is called a
complaint of interpleader and not a cross-complaint.
In this case, an action for interpleader is proper when the lessee
(TIRONA) does not know who between OCAMPO and Maria
Lourdes Mendiola should he give the rentals due to conflicting
claims on the property.
FACTS:
Ocampo alleged that he owns a parcel of land (subject land)
described in Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 134359, with an
approximate area of 500 square meters, located at Alvarez Street,
Pasay City. Ocampo acquired the subject land from Rosauro Breton,
heir of the subject lands registered owner Alipio Breton Cruz.
Possession and administration of the subject land are claimed to be
already in Ocampos management even though the TCT is not yet in
his name. Tirona, on the other hand, is a lessee occupying a portion
of the subject land. Tirona recognized the ownership of Ocampo by
paying some monthly rentals. On July 5, 1995, Ocampo received a
letter from Callejo Law Office stating among others, that, in view of
the fact that the subject premises was declared under area for
priority development, Tirona is invoking her right of first refusal
and in connection thereto Tirona will temporarily stop paying her
monthly rentals until and unless the National Housing Authority
have processed the pertinent papers as regards the amount due to
Ocampo by reason of the implementation of the law. Ocampo
demanded payment for the rentals in arrears. Despite receipt of
said letter, Tirona failed and refused and still fails and refuses to
heed the demands. A complaint for unlawful detainer with damages
was filed. The MTC ruled in favour of respondent. The RTC affirmed
in toto the decision of the MTC. The appellate court considered
partition of the estate of Alipio Breton as a prerequisite to Ocampo’s
action. The appellate court ruled that until the partition of the
estate is ordered by the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City in the
pending partition proceedings and the share of each co-heir is
determined by metes and bounds, Ocampo cannot rightfully claim
that what he bought is part of the property occupied by Tirona.
ISSUE:
Whether an action for interpleader is proper in the instant
case?
HELD:
Yes. In this case, an action for interpleader is proper when
the lessee (TIRONA) does not know who between OCAMPO and
Maria Lourdes Mendiola should he give the rentals due to
conflicting claims on the property.
The good faith of Tirona is put in question in her
preference for Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola. As a stakeholder,
Tirona should have used reasonable diligence in hailing the
contending claimants to court. Tirona need not have awaited actual
institution of a suit by Ocampo against her before filing a bill of
interpleader. An action for interpleader is proper when the lessee
does not know the person to whom to pay rentals due to conflicting
claims on the property.
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
The action of interpleader is a remedy whereby a person who has
property whether personal or real, in his possession, or an
obligation to render wholly or partially, without claiming any right
in both, or claims an interest which in whole or in part is not
disputed by the conflicting claimants, comes to court and asks that
the persons who claim the said property or who consider
themselves entitled to demand compliance with the obligation, be
required to litigate among themselves, in order to determine finally
who is entitled to one or the other thing. The remedy is afforded not
to protect a person against a double liability but to protect him
against a double vexation in respect of one liability. When the court
orders that the claimants litigate among themselves, there arises in
reality a new action and the former are styled interpleaders, and in
such a case the pleading which initiates the action is called a
complaint of interpleader and not a cross-complaint.
Ocampo has the right to eject Tirona from the subject land. All the
elements required for an unlawful detainer case to prosper are
present. Ocampo notified Tirona that he purchased the subject land
from Tirona’s lessor. Tirona’s continued occupation of the subject
land amounted to acquiescence to Ocampo’s terms. However, Tirona
eventually refused to pay rent to Ocampo, thus violating the lease.
QUICK DIGEST:
Ocampo owns a parcel of land 500 square meters acquired from
Rosauro Breton, heir of the subject lands registered owner Alipio
Breton Cruz. Possession and administration of the subject land are
claimed to be already in Ocampos management even though the
TCT is not yet in his name. Tirona is a lessee occupying a portion of
the subject land. Tirona recognized the ownership of Ocampo by
paying some monthly rentals. Tirona temporarily stop paying her
monthly rentals until and unless the National Housing Authority
have processed the pertinent papers as regards the amount due to
Ocampo by reason of the implementation of the law. Ocampo
demanded payment for the rentals in arrears. Tirona failed and
refused and still fails and refuses to heed the demands. A complaint
for unlawful detainer with damages was filed. In his answer, Tirona
averred that the land is owned by the Breton and that she kept on
paying rental to them. The MTC ruled in favour of petitioner. The
RTC affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC. The Supreme Court
ruled otherwise.
• PASRICHA V. DON LUIS DISON REALTY, INC. G.R. NO. 136409,
14 MARCH 2008 BITANGJOL
Principle:
An action for interpleader is proper when the lessee does
not know to whom payment of rentals should be made due to
conflicting claims on the property (or on the right to collect). The
remedy is afforded not to protect a person against double liability
but to protect him against double vexation in respect of one liability.
Long Digest
Facts:
Respondent Don Luis Dison Realty, Inc. and petitioners
executed two Contracts of Lease whereby the former, as lessor,
It ’s not a PROVREM 2015  7

agreed to lease to the latter Units 22, 24, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37 and
38 of the San Luis Building.
Petitioners were, likewise, required to pay for the cost of
electric consumption, water bills and the use of telephone cables.
The lease of Rooms 36, 37 and 38 did not materialize
leaving only Rooms 22, 24, 32, 33, 34 and 35 as subjects of the lease
contracts. While the contracts were in effect, petitioners dealt with
Francis Pacheco (Pacheco), then General Manager of private
respondent. Thereafter, Pacheco was replaced by Roswinda
Bautista (Ms. Bautista). Petitioners religiously paid the monthly
rentals until May 1992.
After that, however, despite repeated demands, petitioners
continuously refused to pay the stipulated rent. Because
petitioners still refused to comply, a complaint for ejectment was
filed by private respondent through its representative, Ms. Bautista,
before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila.
Petitioners admitted their failure to pay the stipulated rent
for the leased premises starting July until November 1992, but
claimed that such refusal was justified because of the internal
squabble in respondent company as to the person authorized to
receive payment. To further justify their non-payment of rent,
petitioners alleged that they were prevented from using the units
(rooms) subject matter of the lease contract, except Room 35.
To show good faith and willingness to pay the rents,
petitioners alleged that they prepared the check vouchers for their
monthly rentals from January 1993 to January 1994.
The MeTC rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint
for ejectment. It considered petitioners’ non-payment of rentals as
unjustified. The court held that mere willingness to pay the rent did
not amount to payment of the obligation; petitioners should have
deposited their payment in the name of respondent company. The
court, however, dismissed the complaint because of Ms. Bautista’s
alleged lack of authority to sue on behalf of the corporation.
RTC reversed the MeTC’s decision. It upheld Ms. Bautista’s
authority to represent respondent notwithstanding the absence of a
board resolution to that effect, since her authority was implied from
her power as a general manager/treasurer of the company.
CA affirmed RTC’s decision.
Issue:
Whether or not Interpleader is the proper remedy when
the lessee does not know to whom payment of rentals should be
made due to conflicting claims on the property (or on the right to
collect).
Ruling:
Yes. Interpleader or consignation is the proper remedy.
(Consignation is another remedy in case of conflicting rights to
collect the rent. You may not read the discussion on Consignation)
The Court’s discussion:
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
What was, clearly established by the evidence was
petitioners’ non-payment of rentals because ostensibly they did not
know to whom payment should be made. However, this did not
justify their failure to pay, because if such were the case, they were
not without any remedy. They should have availed of the provisions
of the Civil Code of the Philippines on the consignation of payment
and of the Rules of Court on interpleader.
Article 1256 of the Civil Code provides:
Article 1256. If the creditor to whom tender of payment has been
made refuses without just cause to accept it, the debtor shall be
released from responsibility by the consignation of the thing or sum
due.
Consignation alone shall produce the same effect in the following
cases:
xxxx
(4) When two or more persons claim the same right to collect;
x x x x.
Consignation shall be made by depositing the things due at the
disposal of a judicial authority, before whom the tender of payment
shall be proved in a proper case, and the announcement of the
consignation in other cases.
In the instant case, consignation alone would have produced the
effect of payment of the rentals. The rationale for consignation is to
avoid the performance of an obligation becoming more onerous to
the debtor by reason of causes not imputable to him. Petitioners
claim that they made a written tender of payment and actually
prepared vouchers for their monthly rentals. But that was
insufficient to constitute a valid tender of payment. Even assuming
that it was valid tender, still, it would not constitute payment for
want of consignation of the amount. Well-settled is the rule that
tender of payment must be accompanied by consignation in order
that the effects of payment may be produced.
Moreover, Section 1, Rule 62 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. When interpleader proper. – Whenever conflicting
claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made against a
person who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter, or an
interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants,
he may bring an action against the conflicting claimants to compel
them to interplead and litigate their several claims among
themselves.
Otherwise stated, an action for interpleader is proper when
the lessee does not know to whom payment of rentals should be
made due to conflicting claims on the property (or on the right to
collect) The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against
double liability but to protect him against double vexation in
respect of one liability.
Notably, instead of availing of the above remedies, petitioners opted
to refrain from making payments.
Short Digest
It ’s not a PROVREM 2015  8

Facts:
Petitioner (Pasricha) and respondent (Don Luis Dison Realty Inc.)
executed two contract of Lease.
Despite repeated demands, petitioners continuously
refused to pay the stipulated rent. Because petitioners still refused
to comply, a complaint for ejectment was filed by private
respondent through its representative, Ms. Bautista, before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila.
Petitioners admitted their failure to pay the stipulated rent for the
leased premises starting July until November 1992, but claimed that
such refusal was justified because of the internal squabble in
respondent company as to the person authorized to receive
payment.
To show good faith and willingness to pay the rents, petitioners
alleged that they prepared the check vouchers for their monthly
rentals from January 1993 to January 1994.
Issue:
Whether or not Interpleader is the proper remedy when
the lessee does not know to whom payment of rentals should be
made due to conflicting claims on the property (or on the right to
collect).
Ruling:
An action for interpleader is proper when the lessee does
not know to whom payment of rentals should be made due to
conflicting claims on the property (or on the right to collect) The
remedy is afforded not to protect a person against double liability
but to protect him against double vexation in respect of one liability.
Notably, instead of availing of the above remedies, petitioners opted
to refrain from making payments.
VIII.H
MAGLENTE V. HON. BALTAZAR-PADILLA, G.R. NO. 148182,
MARCH 7, 2007 ESPARAGOZA
VIII.H Determination.
Section 6. Determination. — After the pleadings of the conflicting
claimants have been filed, and pre-trial has been conducted in
accordance with the Rules, the court shall proceed to determine
their respective rights and adjudicate their several claims.
Doctrine:
A party is not automatically entitled to a writ of possession after
being adjudged in the interpleader case as the proper parties to buy
a subject property; it is only when the right of possession or
ownership has been validly determined in a case directly relating to
either that writ of possession complements the writ of execution.
Facts:
Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC), owner of a parcel of
entered into a contract of lease for three years with one of the
petitioners, Ursula Maglente. In the contract, it was stated that, if
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
PRC were to sell the leased property, Maglente would be given the
first priority (right of first refusal) to buy it. Both parties likewise
agreed that the lessee was prohibited from subleasing any portion
of the property without the consent of the lessor. However, after the
execution of the lease contract, petitioner Maglente subleased
portions of the property to respondents.
When the lease contract was about to expire, PRC sent a written
offer to sell the leased property to Maglente. PRC received a letter
from respondents expressing their desire to purchase the same
property.
PRC filed a complaint for interpleader in the RTC against both
petitioners and respondents so they could litigate among
themselves on who had the right to purchase the property.
The trial court ruled in favor of petitioners and declared them as
the rightful parties to purchase PRC's property.
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed
the judgment of the trial court.
On motion of petitioners, a writ of execution was later issued by the
RTC directing PRC to execute the contract of sale/contract to sell in
favor of petitioners.
As ordered, PRC executed a "deed of sale" in favor of petitioners.
The latter then filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of
possession but respondents (who were occupying the property)
objected on the ground that the trial court's decision on the
interpleader case merely resolved petitioners' right to purchase the
leased property but did not declare them as the owners entitled to
possession. The trial court sustained respondents' argument and
denied petitioners' motion.
Issue:
Whether or not they are entitled to a writ of possession after being
adjudged (in the interpleader case) as the proper parties to buy the
subject property, considering that a "deed of sale" has already been
executed in their favor.
Ruling:
No.
The trial court's decision in the interpleader case merely resolved
the question of whom, between petitioners and respondents had
the right to purchase PRC's property.
The directive was only for PRC to execute the necessary contract in
favor of petitioners as the winning parties, nothing else.
It was clear that, at that point, petitioners were not yet the owners
of the property. The execution of the "deed of sale" in their favor
was only preliminary to their eventual acquisition of the
property. Although the contract of sale between petitioners and
PRC had already been perfected, we refrained from declaring them
the owners since, pending the execution of the deed of sale or
delivery of the property, ownership had yet to transfer to them at
that time.
A writ of possession complements the writ of execution only when
the right of possession or ownership has been validly determined in a
case directly relating to either.
The interpleader case obviously did not delve into that issue.
It ’s not a PROVREM 2015  9

We thus cannot fault the trial court for refusing to issue a writ of
possession to petitioners as its issuance would not be in conformity
with the trial court's judgment in the interpleader case.
Finally, petitioners cannot recover possession of the property via a
mere motion. They must file the appropriate action in court against
respondents to recover possession. While this remedy can delay
their recovery, this Court cannot permit an abbreviated method
without subverting the rules and processes established for the
orderly administration of justice.
IX.C
• Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, 8 April 2014
VILLAMANTE
• Malana v. Tappa, G.R. No. 181303, September 17, 2009 BRAGAT
• OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN V. IBAY, G. R. NO. 137538,
SEPTEMBER 3, 2001 ROLLAN
Principle: The Supreme Court has held that the special civil action
of declaratory relief falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Courts. It is not among the actions within the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court even if only questions of law are
involved.
Facts: Petitioner conducted an investigation on the alleged scam on
the Public Estates Authority-Amari Coastal Bay Development
Corporation. The alleged anomaly was committed through the
issuance of checks which were subsequently deposited in several
financial institutions. Petitioner issued an Order directing private
respondent Lourdes Marquez, branch manager of Union Bank of the
Philippines branch at Julia Vargas Avenue, Pasig City, to produce
several bank documents for inspection relative to the accounts
reportedly maintained in the said bank. Private respondent failed to
comply with petitioners order. Petitioner reminded private
respondent that her acts constitute disobedience or resistance to a
lawful order and is punishable as indirect contempt and might also
constitute willful obstruction of the lawful exercise of the functions
of the Ombudsman. Instead of complying with the order of
petitioner, private respondent filed a petition for declaratory relief
with an application for temporary restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 135, presided by respondent Judge Francisco Ibay.
Public respondent issued an order declaring that it has jurisdiction
over the case since it is an action for declaratory relief under Rule
63 of the Rules of Court.
Issue: whether or not public respondent acted without jurisdiction
and/or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the cited
petition for declaratory relief.
Ruling: No.
The Supreme Court has held that the special civil action of
declaratory relief falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Courts. It is not among the actions within the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court even if only questions of law are
involved.
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
In this case, the public respondent has jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the petition for declaratory relief. Nor can it be said
that public respondent gravely abused its discretion in doing so.
Other principles:
1. The requisites of an action for declaratory relief are:
(1) there must be a justiciable controversy;
(2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are
adverse;
(3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the
controversy; and
(4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination.
SC ruling: In this case, the controversy concerns the extent of the
power of petitioner to examine bank accounts under Section 15 (8)
of R.A. 6770 vis--vis the duty of banks under Republic Act 1405 not
to divulge any information relative to deposits of whatever nature.
The interests of the parties are adverse considering the antagonistic
assertion of a legal right on one hand, that is the power of
Ombudsman to examine bank deposits, and on the other, the denial
thereof apparently by private respondent who refused to allow
petitioner to inspect in camera certain bank accounts. The party
seeking relief, private respondent herein, asserts a legal interest in
the controversy. The issue invoked is ripe for judicial determination
as litigation is inevitable. Note that petitioner has threatened
private respondent with indirect contempt and obstruction charges
should the latter not comply with its order.
2. Before an in camerainspection of bank accounts may be allowed,
there must be a pending case before a court of competent
jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly identified, and the
inspection limited to the subject matter of the pending case before
the court of competent jurisdiction. The bank personnel and the
account holder must be notified to be present during the inspection,
and such inspection may cover only the account identified in the
pending case (Marquez vs. Desierto).
SC ruling: In the present case, since there is no pending litigation yet
before a court of competent authority, but only an investigation by
the Ombudsman on the so-called scam, any order for the opening of
the bank account for inspection is clearly premature and legally
unjustified.
• DELA LLANA V. ALBA, L-57883, MARCH 12, 1982 GIME
FACTS:
De La Llana, et. al. filed an erroneously entitled Petition for
Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition in the supreme court
seeking to enjoin the Minister of the Budget, the Chairman of the
Commission on Audit, and the Minister of Justice from taking any
action implementing BP 129 which mandates that Justices and
judges of inferior courts from the CA to MTCs, except the occupants
of the Sandiganbayan and the CTA, unless appointed to the inferior
courts established by such act, would be considered separated from
the judiciary. It is the termination of their incumbency that for
petitioners justify a suit of this character, it being alleged that
thereby the security of tenure provision of the Constitution has
been ignored and disregarded.
It ’s not a PROVREM 2015  10

ISSUE:
Does the supreme court have the jurisdiction to decide on the
Declaratory Relief ?
RULING:
No, according to the opinion of justice aquino "The petition should
have been dismissed outright because this Court has no jurisdiction
to grant declaratory relief and prohibition is not the proper remedy
to test the constitutionality of the law. the petition is premature. No
jurisdictional question is involved."
Seven of the eight petitioners are practising lawyers. They have no
personality to assail the constitutionality of the said law even as
taxpayers.The eighth petitioner, Gualberto J. de la Llana, a city judge
(who in 1977 filed a petition for declaratory relief assailing
Presidential Decree No. 1229, which called for a referendum. De la
Llana his Comelec, 80 SCRA 525), has no cause of action for
prohibition. He is not being removed from his position.
Short digest:
X files a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition in the
supreme court seeking to enjoin the Minister of the Budget, the
Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and the Minister of Justice
from taking any action implementing BP 129 which mandates that
Justices and judges of inferior courts from the CA to MTCs, except
the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the CTA, unless appointed
to the inferior courts established by such act, would be considered
separated from the judiciary. Can a Petition for Declaratory Relief
and/or for Prohibition can be files in the supreme court?
Ans:
No.
The law provides, Any person interested under a deed, will, contract
or other written instrument, whose rights are affected by a statute,
executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental
regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action
in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of
construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or
duties, thereunder.(Rule 63, Sec. 1).
In the case at bar, the petition will be dismissed because a Petition
for Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition should be files in the
RTCs.
IX.D
• ALMEDA V. BATHALA MARKETING, G.R. NO. 150806, JANUARY
28, 2008 ALTERADO
DOCTRINE: As a rule, the petition for declaratory relief should be
dismissed in view of the pendency of a separate action for unlawful
detainer. In this case, however, the trial court had not yet resolved
the rescission/ejectment case during the pendency of the
declaratory relief petition. In fact, the trial court, where the
rescission case was on appeal, initiated the suspension of the
proceedings pending the resolution of the action for declaratory
relief
Requisites of an action for declaratory relief, as follows:
1) the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, statute, executive
order or regulation, or ordinance;
2) the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are
doubtful and require judicial construction;
3) there must have been no breach of the documents in
question;
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
4) there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the
ripening seeds of one between persons whose interests
are adverse;
5) the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and
6) adequate relief is not available through other means or
other forms of action or proceeding.
FACTS:
Bathala Marketing Industries, Inc. (respondents), as lessee,
renewed its Contract of Lease with Ponciano L. Almeda (Ponciano),
as lessor, husband of petitioner Eufemia and father of petitioner
Romel Almeda. Under the said contract, Ponciano agreed to lease a
portion of the Almeda Compound for a term of four (4) years from
May 1, 1997 unless sooner terminated as provided in the contract.
The contract of lease contained the following pertinent provisions
which gave rise to the instant case:
SIXTH It is expressly understood by the parties hereto that the rental
rate stipulated is based on the present rate of assessment on the
property, and that in case the assessment should hereafter be
increased or any new tax, charge or burden be imposed by authorities
on the lot and building where the leased premises are located,
LESSEE shall pay, when the rental herein provided becomes due, the
additional rental or charge corresponding to the portion hereby
leased; provided, however, that in the event that the present
assessment or tax on said property should be reduced, LESSEE shall
be entitled to reduction in the stipulated rental, likewise in proportion
to the portion leased by him;
SEVENTH In case an extraordinary inflation or devaluation of
Philippine Currency should supervene, the value of Philippine peso at
the time of the establishment of the obligation shall be the basis of
payment;
During the effectivity of the contract, Ponciano died. Thereafter,
respondent dealt with petitioners. Petitioners then advised
respondent that they shall assess and collect VAT on its monthly
rentals. Respondent, however, contended that VAT may not be
imposed, as the rentals fixed in the contract of lease were supposed
to include the VAT therein. Subsequently, petitioners informed
respondent that its monthly rental shall be increased by 73%
pursuant to their contract (SEVENTH clause) and Article 1250 of the
Civil Code. Respondent opposed to such increase contending that
there was no extraordinary inflation to warrant the application of
Article 1250.
Respondent refused to pay the VAT and adjusted rentals as
demanded by petitioners but continued to pay the stipulated
amount set forth in their contract. Respondent then instituted an
action for declaratory relief for purposes of determining the correct
interpretation of condition Nos. 6 and 7 of the lease contract to
prevent damage and prejudice.
In turn, petitioners filed an action for ejectment, rescission and
damages against respondent for failure of the latter to vacate the
premises after the demand made by the former. Petitioners later
moved for the dismissal of the declaratory relief case for being an
improper remedy considering that respondent was already in
breach of the obligation and that the case would not end the
litigation and settle the rights of the parties.
The trial court ruled in favor of respondent denying to the
petitioners their right to pass on to respondent the burden of
paying the VAT. The court, likewise, denied their right to collect the
demanded increase in rental, there being no extraordinary inflation
or devaluation as provided for in the (seventh clause) contract.
It ’s not a PROVREM 2015  11

Petitioners elevated the aforesaid case to the Court of Appeals
which affirmed with modification the RTC decision. Hence this
case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Declaratory relief is proper since respondent was in
breach when the petition for Declaratory relief was filed before the
trial court.
HELD:
YES.
Decisional law enumerates the requisites of an action for
declaratory relief, as follows: 1) the subject matter of the
controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance; 2)
the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful
and require judicial construction; 3) there must have been no
breach of the documents in question; 4) there must be an actual
justiciable controversy or the ripening seeds of one between
persons whose interests are adverse; 5) the issue must be ripe for
judicial determination; and 6) adequate relief is not available
through other means or other forms of action or proceeding.
Petitioners insist that respondent was already in breach of the
contract when the petition was filed, thus, respondent is barred
from filing an action for declaratory relief. However, after
petitioners demanded payment of adjusted rentals and in the
months that followed, respondent complied with the terms and
conditions set forth in their contract of lease by paying the rentals
stipulated therein. Respondent religiously fulfilled its obligations to
petitioners even during the pendency of the present suit. There is
no showing that respondent committed an act constituting a breach
of the subject contract of lease. Thus, respondent is not barred
from instituting before the trial court the petition for
declaratory relief.
Petitioners further claim that the instant petition is not proper
because a separate action for rescission, ejectment and damages
had been commenced before another court; thus, the construction
of the subject contractual provisions should be ventilated in the
same forum.
As a rule, the petition for declaratory relief should be dismissed in
view of the pendency of a separate action for unlawful detainer. In
this case, however, the trial court had not yet resolved the
rescission/ejectment case during the pendency of the declaratory
relief petition. In fact, the trial court, where the rescission case was
on appeal, initiated the suspension of the proceedings pending the
resolution of the action for declaratory relief.
SHORT DIGEST:
A contract of lease entered was entered into by P (Ponciano
Almeda) and B (Bathala). In the said contract, P agreed to lease a
portion of the Almeda Compund to B. It was renewed by B, as
lessee, with P as lessor, husband of petitioner P1 (Eufemia) and
father of petitioner P2 (Romel). During the effectivity of the
contract, P died. P1 & P2 advised B that they shall assess and collect
Value Added Tax (VAT) on its monthly rentals and that the monthly
rental should be increased by 73%. However B refused to pay the
VAT and the increase of rentals.
B then instituted an action for declaratory relief for the purposes of
determining the correct interpretation of the lease contract and to
prevent damage and prejudice. P1 & P2 then filed an action for
ejectment, recission and damages and moved for the dismissal of
the declaratory relief because there was already a breach of the
obligation. The RTC ruled in favor of the respondent. The Court of
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC with modifications.
Hence the instant petition.
• EDADES V. EDADES, 99 PHIL. 675 GOMBA
An action for declaratory relief is proper when any person is
interested “under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument,
or whose rights are affected by a statute or ordinance” in order to
determine any question of construction or validity arising under the
instrument or statute, or to declare his rights or duties thereunder
action should be predicated on the following conditions
(1) there must be a justiciable controversy;
(2) the controversy must be between persons whose interest are
adverse;
(3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in
the controversy;
(4) the issue involved must be ripened for judicial determination.
Facts
Plaintiff brought this action before the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan seeking a declaratory judgment on his hereditary rights
in the property of his alleged father and incidentally the recognition
of his status as an illegitimate son of Emigdio Edades.
In his complaint, he alleges that he is an illegitimate son of Emigdio
Edades with Maria de Venecia, having been born when said Emigdio
Edades was legally married to Maxima Edades as such illegitimate
child he is entitled to share in the inheritance of his father under the
law; that as the legitimate children of his father will deny, as in fact
they have denied his right to inherit.
Defendants, instead of answering, filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action.
Issue: won the plaintiff is entitled for declaratory relief
Ruling: no. Under the law, an action for declaratory relief is proper
when any person is interested “under a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute or
ordinance” in order to determine any question of construction or
validity arising under the instrument or statute, or to declare his
rights or duties thereunder (section 1, Rule 66). Moreover, the
action should be predicated on the following conditions
(1) there must be a justiciable controversy;
(2) the controversy must be between persons whose interest are
adverse;
(3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in
the controversy;
(4) the issue involved must be ripened for judicial determination.
The present case does not come within the purview of the law
authorizing an action for declaratory relief for it neither concerns a
deed, will, contract or other written instrument, nor does it affect a
statute or ordinance, the construction or validity of which is
involved. Nor is it predicated on any justiciable controversy for
admittedly the alleged rights of inheritance which Plaintiff desires
to assert against the Defendants as basis of the relief he is seeking
for have not yet accrued for the simple reason that his alleged father
Emigdio Edades has not yet died. In fact, he is one of the herein
Defendants. And the law is clear that “the rights to the succession
It ’s not a PROVREM 2015  12

are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent”
(Article 777, new Civil Code). Up to that moment, the right to
succession is merely speculative for, in the meantime, the law may
change, the will of the testator may vary, or the circumstances may
be modified to such an extent that he who expects to receive
property may be deprived of it. Indeed, the moment of death is the
determining point when an heir acquires a definite right to the
inheritance (5 Manresa, 5th ed., 324). This action therefore cannot
be maintained if considered strictly as one for declaratory relief.
Bar question
X an illegitimate child filed an action for declaratory relief against
his father, seeking recognition of his right to inherit to the estate of
the latter.
May the court validly issue the same Based on the said ground?
No,present case does not come within the purview of the law
authorizing an action for declaratory relief for it neither concerns a
deed, will, contract or other written instrument, nor does it affect a
statute or ordinance, the construction or validity of which is
involved. Nor is it predicated on any justiciable controversy for
admittedly the alleged rights of inheritance which Plaintiff desires
to assert has not yet accrued since his alleged father has not yet
died.
• TOLENTINO V. BOARD OF ACCOUNTANCY, 90 PHIL. 83
GARBANZOS
PRINCIPLE: The requisites for an action for declaratory relief may
be entertained are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2)
the controversy must be between persons whose interests are
adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal
interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue involved must be ripe
for judicial determination.
FACTS:
Plaintiff Hilario Tolentino is a certified public accountant.
Respondents, the Board of Accountancy is an administrative body
created by law and vested with the power and authority to regulate
and supervise the practice of the profession of accountancy in the
Philippines, and that the defendants Robert Orr Ferguson and Hans
Hausamann are foreigners, the former being a British subject and
the latter a Swiss subject, both admitted to the practice of
accountancy in the Philippines.
An action for declaratory relief was filed by Plaintiff in the CFI of
Manila for the purpose of testing the Constitutionality of Section 16
of Commonwealth Act No. 3105 otherwise known as the Philippine
Accountancy Law, as amended by Commonwealth Act 3105 on the
ground that it is a class legislation since by its terms it excludes
persons engaged in other callings or professions from adopting,
acquiring or using a trade name in connection with the practice of
such callings or professions. The action is addressed against the
Board of Accountancy, Robert Orr Ferguson, and Hans Hausamann
and notice thereof has been served on the Solicitor General under
section 4 of rule 66 of the Rules of Court; but the Board of
Accountancy did not answer the complaint, nor has the Solicitor
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
General intervened. Only Ferguson and Hausamann appeared and
answered through counsel.
The case was submitted on judgment on the pleadings and the
Court dismissed it holding that the disputed law is constitutional.
From that decision, plaintiff appealed to this Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the plaintiff has established the requisite facts to
entitle him to an action for declaratory relief.
RULING:
NO.
The authorities are unanimous that in order that an action for
declaratory relief may be entertained, it must be predicated on the
following requisite facts or conditions: (1) there must be a
justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between
persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking
declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and
(4) the issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination. These
requisite facts are wanting and, therefore, the complaint must fail
for lack of sufficient cause of action.
Justiciability; its requisites. — Except that accomplished physical
wrong need not be alleged in a petition for declaratory relief, a case
of such nature must exhibit all the usual conditions of an ordinary
action. There must be (1) real parties in interest (2) asserting
adverse claims and (3) presenting a ripe issue. The Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania summarized its exhaustive opinion on the
requisites of justiciability of an action for declaratory relief by
saying that the court must be "satisfied that an actual controversy,
or the ripening seeds of one, exists between parties, all of whom are
sui juris and before the court, and that the declaration sought will
be a practical help in ending the controversy." Justice Brandeis
thought that "the fact that the plaintiff's desires are thwarted by its
own doubts, or by the fears of others does not confer a cause of
action." But the doubt becomes a justiciable controversy when it is
translated into a claim of right which is actually contested.
SHORT DIGEST:
Mr. CPA is a certified public accountant. He filed an action for
declaratory relief against the Board of Accountancy (BOA), Mr.
Fergie and Mr.Haus, foreigners who are practicing accountant in the
country. The purpose of the action is to test the constitutionality of
Section 16 of Commonealth Act No. 3105 known as the Accountancy
Law on the ground that it is a class legislation since by its terms it
excludes persons engaged in other callings or professions from
adopting, acquiring or using a trade name in connection with the
practice of such callings or professions. Notices were served upon
the respondents but the BOA did not answer, nor has the solicitor
general intervened. Only Mr.Fergie and Mr. Haus appeared and
answered through counsel.
The case was submitted on judgment on the pleadings and the
Court dismissed it holding that the disputed law is constitutional.
From that decision, plaintiff appealed to this Court.
It ’s not a PROVREM 2015  13

X.A
• MACABAGO V. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 152163, 18 NOVEMBER
2002 CHUA
PRINCIPLES:
1. Rule 64 of the Rules of Court applies only to judgments or final
orders of the COMELEC in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
functions. The rule does NOT apply to interlocutory orders of the
COMELEC in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions or to its
administrative orders.
2. As a general rule, an administrative order of the COMELEC is not
a proper subject of a special civil action for certiorari. But when the
COMELEC acts capriciously or whimsically, with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing such
an order, the aggrieved party may seek redress from the SC via a
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules.
FACTS:
Petitioner Macabago was proclaimed by the Municipal Board of
Canvassers as the winning candidate for the position of Municipal
Mayor of Saguiran, Lanao del Sur. over his adversary, private
respondent Salacop.
Private respondent filed a petition with the COMELEC to annul the
elections and the proclamation of candidates alleging that there was
a massive substitution of voters, rampant and pervasive
irregularities in voting procedures in several precincts.
Petitioner alleged that the grounds relied upon by private
respondent would be proper in an election protest but not in a pre-
proclamation controversy.
The COMELEC En Banc took cognizance of the petition and issued
an order directing the Election Officer to bring to and produce
before the COMELEC Office in Manila the original VRRs of the
questioned precincts for technical examination.
In the same order, the COMELEC characterized the petition as one
for the annulment of the election or declaration of failure of election
in the municipality and concluded that there was convincing proof
of massive fraud in the conduct of the elections.
Petitioner filed with this Court the instant special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 praying for the reversal of the order of the
COMELEC EN BANC.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not petitioner’s recourse to SC under Rule 65 is in
order.
2. Whether or not the COMELEC committed a grave abuse of its
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of the petition of private respondent and in issuing the
assailed Order.
HELD:
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
1. Yes.
Rule 64 of the Rules applies only to judgments or final orders of the
COMELEC in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. The rule
does not apply to interlocutory orders of the COMELEC in the
exercise of its quasi-judicial functions or to its administrative
orders.
In this case, the assailed order of the COMELEC declaring private
respondents petition to be one for annulment of the elections or for
a declaration of a failure of elections in the municipality and
ordering the production of the original copies of the VRRs for the
technical examination is administrative in nature. Rule 64, a
procedural device for the review of final orders, resolutions or
decision of the COMELEC, does not foreclose recourse to this Court
under Rule 65 from administrative orders of said Commission
issued in the exercise of its administrative function.
2. Yes.
As a general rule, an administrative order of the COMELEC is not a
proper subject of a special civil action for certiorari. But when the
COMELEC acts capriciously or whimsically, with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing such
an order, the aggrieved party may seek redress from this Court via a
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules.
The grounds alleged by private respondent in his petition before the
COMELEC are those for a regular election protest and are not
proper in a pre-proclamation controversy; nor is such petition one
for annulment of the elections or for a declaration of failure of
elections. The COMELEC should have ordered the dismissal of the
petition instead of issuing the assailed order. The COMELEC thus
committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or
lack of jurisdiction in issuing the same. The error is correctible by
the special civil action for certiorari.
• CAGAS V. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 194139, 24 JANUARY 2012
CUEVAS
Principle:
GR: A party aggrieved by an interlocutory order issued by a Division
of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in an election protest
may not directly assail the order in the SC through a special civil
action for certiorari. The remedy is to seek the review of the
interlocutory order during the appeal of the decision of the Division
in due course.
Exception:
The Court may take cognizance of a petition for certiorari under
Rule 64 to review an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the
COMELEC on the ground of the issuance being made without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it does
not appear to be specifically provided under the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure that the matter is one that the COMELEC en banc may sit
and consider, or a Division is not authorized to act, or the members
of the Division unanimously vote to refer to the COMELEC en banc.
Of necessity, the aggrieved party can directly resort to the Court
It ’s not a PROVREM 2015  14

because the COMELEC en banc is not the proper forum in which the
matter concerning the assailed interlocutory order can be reviewed.
Facts:
Respondent Claude P. Bautista (Bautista) contested the position of
Governor of the Province of Davao del Sur where petitioner Cagas
was proclaimed winner during the May 2010 automated national
and local elections. Bautista filed an electoral protest alleging fraud,
anomalies, irregularities, vote-buying and violations of election
laws. The protest was raffled to the COMELEC First Division.
Petitioner averred as his special defense that Bautista did not make
the requisite cash deposit on time; and that Bautista did not render
a detailed specification of the acts or omissions complained of. The
COMELEC denied its affirmative defenses and its subsequent
motion for reconsideration. COMELEC held that petitioner’s prayer
to elevate the Motion for reconsideration to the Commission en
banc is merely interlocutory and does not dispose of the instant
case with finality.
Not satisfied, petitioner commenced the special civil action directly
to SC arguing that Section 9,21 Rule 6 of COMELEC Resolution No.
8804 obliged the COMELEC First Division to summarily dismiss the
protest for being insufficient in form and content; and that the
insufficiency in substance arose from the failure of the protest to:
(a) specifically state how the various irregularities and anomalies
had affected the results of the elections; (b) indicate in which of the
protested precincts were pre-shaded bogus-ballots used; (c)
identify the precincts where the PCOS machines had failed to
accurately account for the votes in favor of Bautista; and (d) allege
with particularity how many additional votes Bautista stood to
receive for each of the grounds he protested. He concludes that the
COMELEC First Division gravely abused its discretion in allowing
the protest of Bautista despite its insufficiency.
Issue:
Can an interlocutory order issue by a Division of the COMELEC in an
election protest be assailed in the Supreme Court through a special
civil action for certiorari?
Held:
NO.
The governing provision is Section 7, Article IX of the 1987
Constitution, which provides:
Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its
Members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from
the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter
is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the
last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the
Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by
this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by
the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
This provision, although it confers on the Court the power to
review any decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC, limits such
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
power to a final decision or resolution of the COMELEC en banc, and
does not extend to an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the
COMELEC. Otherwise stated, the Court has no power to review on
certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final resolution issued by
a Division of the COMELEC.
There is no question, therefore, that the Court has no jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the petition for certiorari assailing the denial by
the COMELEC First Division of the special affirmative defenses of
the petitioner. The proper remedy is for the petitioner to wait for
the COMELEC First Division to first decide the protest on its merits,
and if the result should aggrieve him, to appeal the denial of his
special affirmative defenses to the COMELEC en banc along with the
other errors committed by the Division upon the merits.
In the instant case, it does not appear that the subject controversy is
one of the cases specifically provided under the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure in which the Commission may sit en banc. Neither is it
shown that the present controversy a case where a division is not
authorized to act nor a situation wherein the members of the First
Division unanimously voted to refer the subject case to the
Commission en banc. Clearly, the Commission en banc, under the
circumstances shown above, cannot be the proper forum which the
matter concerning the assailed interlocutory orders can be referred
to.
Under the exception, therefore, the Court may take cognizance of a
petition for certiorari under Rule 64 to review an interlocutory
order issued by a Division of the COMELEC on the ground of the
issuance being made without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it does not appear to be specifically provided
under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure that the matter is one that
the COMELEC en banc may sit and consider, or a Division is not
authorized to act, or the members of the Division unanimously vote
to refer to the COMELEC en banc. Of necessity, the aggrieved party
can directly resort to the Court because the COMELEC en banc is not
the proper forum in which the matter concerning the assailed
interlocutory order can be reviewed.
However, the Kho v. Commission on Elections exception has no
application herein, because the COMELEC First Division had the
competence to determine the lack of detailed specifications of the
acts or omissions complained of as required by Rule 6, Section 7 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, and whether such lack called for the
outright dismissal of the protest. For sure, the 1987 Constitution
vested in the COMELEC broad powers involving not only the
enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative
to the conduct of elections but also the resolution and
determination of election controversies. The breadth of such
powers encompasses the authority to determine the sufficiency of
allegations contained in every election protest and to decide based
on such allegations whether to admit the protest and proceed with
the hearing or to outrightly dismiss the protest in accordance with
Section 9, Rule 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804.
Quick Digest:
Respondent X contested the position of Governor of the Province of
Davao del Sur where petitioner Y was proclaimed winner during the
May 2010 automated national and local elections. X filed an
It ’s not a PROVREM 2015  15

electoral protest alleging fraud, anomalies, irregularities, vote-
buying and violations of election laws which was raffled to the
COMELEC First Division.
Y moved to dismiss the protest for being insufficient in form and
content stating that the requisite cash deposit was not made on
time; and that it did not render a detailed specification of the acts or
omissions complained of. COMELEC denied Y’s defenses and
subsequent motion for reconsideration on the ground that X has
complied substantially with the requirements. Y then filed for a
petition for certiorari directly with the SC.
Question:
Can an interlocutory order issue by a Division of the COMELEC in an
election protest be assailed in the Supreme Court through a special
civil action for certiorari?
Answer:
NO
A party aggrieved by an interlocutory order issued by a Division of
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in an election protest may
not directly assail the order in the SC through a special civil action
for certiorari. The remedy is to seek the review of the interlocutory
order during the appeal of the decision of the Division in due
course.
The COMELEC First Division had the competence to determine the
lack of detailed specifications of the acts or omissions complained
of as required by Rule 6, Section 7 of COMELEC Resolution No.
8804, and whether such lack called for the outright dismissal of the
protest. For sure, the 1987 Constitution vested in the COMELEC
broad powers involving not only the enforcement and
administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of
elections but also the resolution and determination of election
controversies. The breadth of such powers encompasses the
authority to determine the sufficiency of allegations contained in
every election protest and to decide based on such allegations
whether to admit the protest and proceed with the hearing or to
outright dismiss the protest in accordance with Section 9, Rule 6 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8804.
• REYNA V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, G.R. NO. 167219, 8
FEBRUARY 2011 ECNEROL
Doctrine: It is well settled that findings of fact of quasi-judicial
agencies, such as the COA, are generally accorded respect and even
finality by this Court, if supported by substantial evidence, in
recognition of their expertise on the specific matters under their
jurisdiction.
FACTS:
Petitioners Ruben Reyna (Reyna) and Lloyd Soria (Soria) are Senior
Field Operations Specialist and Loans and Credit Analyst II,
respectively, of the Land Bank’s branch in Ipil, Zamboanga del Sur.
Ipil Branch received loan applications from four farmers’
cooperatives under the bank’s cattle financing program. To process
the applications, each cooperative accomplished a Credit Facility
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
Proposal (CFP), which required that they execute a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) with their proposed cattle supplier, Remad
Livestock Corporation (Remad). Consequently, after approval of the
loan applications, the Ipil Branch issued to Remad advance payment
for the cattle to be released. But, because of foot-and-mouth disease
that broke out among its herds, Remad failed to make the deliveries
when they fell due.
During a post audit, the Land Bank resident auditor, Belen Oranu-
Lu, disallowed the advance payment under CSB 95-005 and Notices
of Disallowance. She pointed out that the Ipil Branch paid for the
cattle in advance in violation of the Land Bank Manual on Field
Office Group (FOG) Lending Operations and Commission on Audit
(COA) rules and regulations. However, such disallowance was not on
account of evidence of dishonest connivance with the farmers’
cooperatives and their cattle supplier.
The bank branch’s resident auditor held Reyna and Soria, together
with four other employees of the Ipil Branch, personally liable for
the disallowed advances. This led to the filing of a criminal
complaint against the bank officers and employees with the Office
of the Ombudsman for gross negligence, violation of reasonable
office rules and regulations, conduct prejudicial to the interest of
the bank, and giving unwarranted benefits to persons, causing
undue injury
COA Regional Office - affirmed the findings of the auditor.
Ombudsman - dismissed the charges against the Ipil Branch officers
and employees for lack of sufficient evidence to support a finding of
probable cause against them regarding the charges.
COA – affirmed the findings of the local auditor and held that the
Ombudsman’s dismissal of the charges against the Land Bank
officers and employees did not affect the validity of the
disallowance which had already become final and executory.
Also, it ruled that the criminal case before the Ombudsman was
distinct and separate from the disallowance case which was civil in
nature.
ISSUES:
WON COA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in declaring the prepayment stipulation in the contract
between the bank and Remad proscribed by section 103 of the state
audit code of the Philippines.
RULING:
To emphasize, the Auditor noted that “nowhere in the documents
reviewed disclosed about prepayment scheme with REMAD.” It is
well settled that findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies, such as
the COA, are generally accorded respect and even finality by this
Court, if supported by substantial evidence, in recognition of their
expertise on the specific matters under their jurisdiction.
If the prepayment scheme was in fact authorized, petitioners should
have produced the document to prove such fact as alleged by them
in the present petition. However, as stated before, even this Court is
It ’s not a PROVREM 2015  16

at a loss as to whether the prepayment scheme was authorized as a
review of the document (CATTLE BREEDING AND BUY BACK
MARKETING AGREEMENT ) to which petitioners base their
authority to make advance payments, does not contain such a
stipulation or provision. Highlighted also is the fact that petitioners
clearly violated the procedure in releasing loans found in the
Manual on Lending Operations which provides that payments to the
dealer shall only be made after presentation of reimbursement
documents acknowledged by the authorized LBP representative
that the same has been delivered.
Based on the foregoing, the COA should, therefore, not be faulted for
finding that petitioners facilitated the commission of the irregular
transaction. The evidence they presented before the COA was
insufficient to prove their case. So also, even this Court is at a loss as
to the truthfulness and veracity of petitioners' allegations as they
did not even present before this Court the documents that would
serve as the basis for their claims.
Short Digest:
FACTS:
Petitioners Ruben Reyna (Reyna) and Lloyd Soria (Soria) are Senior
Field Operations Specialist and Loans and Credit Analyst II,
respectively, of the Land Bank’s branch in Ipil which received loan
applications from four farmers’ cooperatives under the bank’s cattle
financing program. Consequently, after approval of the loan
applications, the Ipil Branch issued to Remad Livestock Corporation
(Remad) advance payment for the cattle to be released. But, because
of foot-and-mouth disease that broke out among its herds, Remad
failed to make the deliveries when they fell due.
During a post audit, the Land Bank resident auditor, Belen Oranu-
Lu, disallowed the advance payment in view of non-delivery of the
cattle. She pointed out that the Ipil Branch paid for the cattle in
advance in violation of the Land Bank Manual on Field Office Group
(FOG) Lending Operations and Commission on Audit (COA) rules
and regulations.
The bank branch’s resident auditor held Reyna and Soria, together
with four other employees of the Ipil Branch, personally liable for
the disallowed advances. This led to the filing of a criminal
complaint against the bank officers and employees with the Office
of the Ombudsman for gross negligence, violation of reasonable
office rules and regulations, conduct prejudicial to the interest of
the bank, and giving unwarranted benefits to persons, causing
undue injury
COA – affirmed the findings of the local auditor and held that the
Ombudsman’s dismissal of the charges against the Land Bank
officers and employees did not affect the validity of the
disallowance which had already become final and executory.
ISSUES:
WON COA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in declaring the prepayment stipulation in the contract
between the bank and Remad proscribed by section 103 of the state
audit code of the Philippines.
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
RULING:
To emphasize, the Auditor noted that “nowhere in the documents
reviewed disclosed about prepayment scheme with REMAD.” It is
well settled that findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies, such as
the COA, are generally accorded respect and even finality by this
Court, if supported by substantial evidence, in recognition of their
expertise on the specific matters under their jurisdiction.
If the prepayment scheme was in fact authorized, petitioners should
have produced the document to prove such fact as alleged by them
in the present petition. However, as stated before, even this Court is
at a loss as to whether the prepayment scheme was authorized as a
review of the document (CATTLE
BREEDING AND BUY BACK MARKETING AGREEMENT ) to which
petitioners base their authority to make advance payments, does
not contain such a stipulation or provision. Highlighted also is the
fact that petitioners clearly violated the procedure in releasing
loans found in the Manual on Lending Operations which provides
that payments to the dealer shall only be made after presentation of
reimbursement documents acknowledged by the authorized LBP
representative that the same has been delivered.
Based on the foregoing, the COA should, therefore, not be faulted for
finding that petitioners facilitated the commission of the irregular
transaction. The evidence they presented before the COA was
insufficient to prove their case. So also, even this Court is at a loss as
to the truthfulness and veracity of petitioners' allegations as they
did not even present before this Court the documents that would
serve as the basis for their claims.
X.B
• IBRAHIM V. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 192289, 8 JANUARY 2013
LAMBAN
PRINCIPLE:
Resolutions issued by COMELEC en banc can be reviewed by way of
filing before the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari.
FACTS:
-Ibrahim filed his certificate of candidacy to run as Vice-Mayor of
Datu-Unsay in the May 10, 2010 elections.
-respondent Rolan G. Buagas (Buagas), then Acting Election Officer
in the said municipality, forwarded to the COMELEC’s Law
Department (Law Department) the names of 20 candidates who
were not registered voters therein. The list 5 included Ibrahim’s
name
-COMELEC en banc issued the herein assailed December 22, 2009
Resolution:
a. disqualifying the foregoing candidates for not being registered
voters of the respective municipalities where they seek to be elected
without prejudice to their filing of an opposition within two (2)
days from publication hereof; and
It ’s not a PROVREM 2015  17

b. Filing of election offense cases against said candidates for
violation of Sec. 74 in relation to Sec. 262 of the Omnibus Election
Code.
-Ibrahim and 50 candidates filed their Petition/Opposition but was
denied anchored on the certification which was issued in the
performance of official duty, hence, the presumption of regularity
attached to it in the absence of contrary evidence. Ibrahim and
company failed to adduce evidence proving their allegations of
registration and residence.
-In the May 10, 2010 elections, during which time the Resolution
dated May 6, 2010 had not yet attained finality, Ibrahim obtained
446 votes, the highest number cast for the Vice-Mayoralty race in
Datu Unsay; However, the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC),
which was then chaired by Buagas, suspended Ibrahim’s
proclamation on the basis of Section 5, Rule 25 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure.
- the instant Petition challenges is the authority of the MBOC to
suspend Ibrahim’s proclamation and of the COMELEC en banc to
issue the assailed resolutions.
ISSUE:
WON certiorari is the proper action in questioning the authority of:
a. MBOC in suspending wining candidate's proclamation and
b. COMELEC to issue resolution disqualifyig a candidate.
HELD:
Positive.
Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution in part substantially
provides that any decision, order or ruling of any of the
Constitutional Commissions may be brought for review to the
Supreme Court on certiorari within 30 days from receipt of a copy
thereof. The orders, ruling and decisions rendered or issued by the
COMELEC en banc must be final and made in the exercise of its
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power.
Further, Section 1, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court states that it shall
govern the review of final judgments and orders or resolutions of
the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit.
In the case at bar, the now assailed Resolutions dated December 22,
2009 and May 6, 2010 were issued with finality by the COMELEC en
banc. Under the Constitution and the Rules of Court, the said
resolutions can be reviewed by way of filing before us a petition for
certiorari. Besides, the issues raised do not at all relate to alleged
irregularities in the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and
appreciation of the election returns or to the composition and
proceedings of the board of canvassers. What the instant Petition
challenges is the authority of the MBOC to suspend Ibrahim’s
proclamation and of the COMELEC en banc to issue the assailed
resolutions which can be assailed via certiorari.
ADDITIONAL INFO:(DILI NA NI PROVREM)
WON THE RESOLUTION AND SUSPENSION IS VALID.
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
HELD:
Negative.
Under Section 3, Rule 23 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure,
a petition for the denial or cancellation of a certificate of candidacy
must be heard summarily after due notice. It is thus clear that
cancellation proceedings involve the exercise of the quasi-judicial
functions of the COMELEC which the COMELEC in division should
first decide. More so in this case where the cancellation proceedings
originated not from a petition but from a report of the election
officer regarding the lack of qualification of the candidate in the
barangay election. The COMELEC en banc cannot short cut the
proceedings by acting on the case without a prior action by a
division because it denies due process to the candidate.
In the case at bar, the COMELEC en banc, through the herein
assailed resolutions, ordered Ibrahim’s disqualification even when
no complaint or petition was filed against him yet. Let it be stressed
that if filed before the conduct of the elections, a petition to deny
due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of
the OEC is the appropriate petition which should have been
instituted against Ibrahim considering that his allegedly being an
unregistered voter of Datu Unsay disqualified him from running as
Vice-Mayor. His supposed misrepresentation as an eligible
candidate was an act falling within the purview of Section 78 of the
OEC. Moreover, even if we were to assume that a proper petition
had been filed, the COMELEC en banc still acted with grave abuse of
discretion when it took cognizance of a matter, which by both
constitutional prescription and jurisprudential declaration, instead
aptly pertains to one of its divisions.
The MBOC has no authority to suspend Ibrahim’s proclamation
especially since the herein assailed resolutions, upon which the
suspension was anchored, were issued by the COMELEC en banc
outside the ambit of its jurisdiction.
Mastura v. COMELEC41 is emphatic that:
(T)he board of canvassers is a ministerial body. It is enjoined by law
to canvass all votes on election returns submitted to it in due form.
It has been said, and properly, that its powers are limited generally
to the mechanical or mathematical function of ascertaining and
declaring the apparent result of the election by adding or compiling
the votes cast for each candidate as shown on the face of the returns
before them, and then declaring or certifying the result so
ascertained. x x x.42 (Italics ours)
The simple purpose and duty of the canvassing board is to ascertain
and declare the apparent result of the voting while all other
questions are to be tried before the court or other tribunal for
contesting elections or in quo warranto proceedings. 43
In the case at bar, the MBOC motu propio suspended Ibrahim’s
proclamation when the issue of the latter’s eligibility is a matter
which the board has no authority to resolve. Further, under Section
644 of R.A. 6646, the COMELEC and not the MBOC has the authority
to order the suspension of a winning candidates’s proclamation.
Such suspension can only be ordered upon the motion of a
complainant or intervenor relative to a case for disqualification, or a
petition to deny due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy
It ’s not a PROVREM 2015  18

pending before the COMELEC, and only when the evidence of the
winning candidate’s guilt is strong. Besides, the COMELEC en banc
itself could not have properly ordered Ibrahim’s disqualification
because in taking cognizance of the matter, it had already exceeded
its jurisdiction.
• REBLORA V. ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO.
195842, 18 JUNE 2013 CABUENAS
Principle(s):
Decisions and resolutions of the COA are reviewable by Supreme
Court, not via an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, but thru a
special civil action of certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65
of the Rules of Court.
Section 2 of Rule 64, which implements the mandate of Section 7 of
Article IX-A of the Constitution,19 is clear on this:
Section 2. Mode of Review.—A judgment or final order or resolution
of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit may be
brought by the aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on certiorari
under Rule 65, except as hereinafter provided.
The distinction between an appeal under Rule 45 and a special civil
action under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 is the difference of one
to the other with respect to the permissible scope of inquiry in each.
Indeed, by restricting the review of judgments or resolutions of the
COA only thru a special civil action for certiorari, the Constitution
and the Rules of Court precisely limits the permissible scope of
inquiry in such cases only to errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion. Hence, unless tainted with grave abuse of discretion,
simple errors of judgment committed by the COA cannot be
reviewed—even by Supreme Court.
LONG DIGEST:
Facts:
This is an appeal via a Petition for Review on Certiorari, assailing
the Decision of the Commission on Audit (COA), which denied the
petitioner’s claim for additional retirement benefit.
Petitioner is a retired Captain of the Philippine Navy born on May
22, 1944. Prior to entering military service, he rendered civilian
government service as a Barrio Development Worker at the
Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) from 6
January 1969 to 20 July 1974. He entered military service as a
Probationary Ensign in the Philippine Navy and was called to active
duty effective August 26, 1974.
On 1996, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) officially
confirmed the incorporation of petitioner’s civilian government
service at the DILG with his length of active service in the military
pursuant to Section 3 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1638,9 as
amended by PD No. 1650 which provides:
Section 3. For purposes of this Decree active service of a military
person shall mean active service rendered by him as a commissioned
officer, enlisted man, cadet, probationary officer, trainee or draftee in
the Armed Forces of the Philippines and service rendered by him as a
civilian official or employee in the Philippine government prior to the
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
date of his separation or retirement from the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, for which military and/or civilian service he shall have
received pay from the Philippine Government and/or such others as
may hereafter be prescribed by law as active service; Provided, That
for purposes of retirement, he shall have rendered at least ten (10)
years of active service as an officer or enlisted man in the Armed
Forces of the Philippines; and Provided further, That no period of such
civilian government service longer than his active military service
shall be credited for purposes of retirement.
On 2003, at the age of 59 and after a total of thirty-four (34) years of
active service, the petitioner was compulsorily retired from the
military. He was, at that time, already ranked as a Commander in the
Philippine Navy. Petitioner chose to avail of the monthly retirement
pay with the option to receive in advance and in lump sum an
amount equivalent to three (3) years worth thereof for the first
three years after his retirement.
The AFP granted petitioner’s claim of retirement benefits and
immediately paid the latter the sum of P722,297.16 as advance
lump, however, the AFP did not include petitioner’s civilian
government service at the DILG. The AFP only considered
petitioner’s actual military service i.e., covering the period between
May 21, 1973 up to May 22, 2003 or a period of only thirty (30)
years.
Petitioner disagreed and insisted that the computation of his
retirement benefit should include the period of his civilian
government service at the DILG immediately before he entered
military service
for a total of four (4) years and five (5) months. It is argued that the
computation of the AFP does not reflect the true length of his
military service of thirty-four (34) years and that it is, in fact, a full
four (4) years short. Petitioner thus claims that he is entitled to
P135, 991.81 in additional retirement benefit.
After an unsuccessful bid to obtain a favorable legal opinion from
the AFP Judge Advocate General, the petitioner requested assistance
from the COA for the collection of his claimed additional retirement
benefit. The COA rendered a Decision denying petitioner’s claim.
COA agreed with the petitioner that his civilian service at the DILG
should and ought to be included as part of his active service in the
military for purposes of computing his retirement benefits under
PD No. 1638. However, since his civilian service should be included
as part of his active service in the military, the COA opined that
petitioner should also have been considered as compulsorily retired
on 22 May 2000 and not on 22 May 2003.
The COA explained that as of 22 May 2000, petitioner has already
reached the age of fifty-six (56) with a total of thirty-one (31) years
in active service, inclusive of his four years in the DILG, which
fulfilled the conditions for compulsory retirement under Section
5(a) of PD No. 1638, as amended. Verily, the COA found that,
applying the provisions of PD No. 1638 as amended, petitioner was
not actually underpaid but was rather overpaid his retirement
benefit in the amount of P77,807.16.
It ’s not a PROVREM 2015  19

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the COA
remained steadfast on their resolution. Aggrieved, petitioner
questioned the Decision and Resolution of the COA via the present
Rule 45 petition before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
1. WON the COA’s decision/judgment be reviewed by
Supreme Court via Rule 45.
2. WON COA’s computation of retirement benefit is correct?
HELD:
1. The Court dismissed the instant petition on account of it
being the wrong remedy. Decisions and resolutions of the
COA are reviewable by Supreme Court, not via an appeal
by certiorari under Rule 45, as is the present petition, but
thru a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 64 in
relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Section 2 of Rule
64, which implements the mandate of Section 7 of Article
IX-A of the Constitution,19 is clear on this:
Section 2. Mode of Review.—A judgment or final order or resolution
of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit may be
brought by the aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on certiorari
under Rule 65, except as hereinafter provided.
The Constitution and the Rules of Court precisely limits the
permissible scope of inquiry in such cases only to errors of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. Hence, unless tainted with
grave abuse of discretion, simple errors of judgment committed by
the COA cannot be reviewed by Supreme Court.
2. The Court finds that the computation of COA is the one
that is supported by PD No. 1638. Sections 5 and 7 of PD
No. 1638, as amended, identifies the instances of
compulsory retirement in the military service:
Section 5 (a). Upon attaining fifty-six (56) years of age or upon
accumulation of thirty (30) years of satisfactory active service,
whichever is later, an officer or enlisted man shall be compulsorily
retired; Provided, That such officer or enlisted-man who shall have
attained fifty-six (56) years of age with at least twenty (20) years of
active service shall be allowed to complete thirty (30) years of service
but not beyond his sixtieth (60th) birthday; xxxx
This Court discerns that the COA was correct in holding that
petitioner should be considered as compulsorily retired on May
2000 for purposes of computing his retirement benefits under the
same law. COA correctly held that for purposes of computing his
retirement benefits under PD No 1638, as amended, petitioner
should have been considered compulsorily retired as of 22 May
2000 per Section 5(a) of the same law.20 This is so because it was
on 22 May 2000 that petitioner reached the age of fifty-six (56)
after a total of thirty-one (31) years in active service—fulfilling
thereby the conditions for compulsory retirement under the said
section.21 In coming up with such a conclusion, COA most certainly
reckoned the beginning of petitioner’s active service in the military
from his stint as civilian worker at the DILG.
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
The inclusion of petitioner’s civilian government service at the DILG
in the computation of his length of active service in the military, on
the other hand, is only but proper in light of Section 3 of PD No.
1638, as amended.
SHORT DIGEST:
Facts:
X, a retired Philippine Navy, questioned the judgment or decision
made by COA with regards to his retirement benefit computation.
Instead of 34 years length of service as X’s alleged, COA discern that
X has only 31 years length of active service reckoned at the
beginning of petitioner’s active service in the military from his stint
as civilian worker at the DILG.
X filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 to question
said decision of COA.
Issue:
WON the COA’s decision/judgment be reviewed by Supreme Court
via Rule 45.
Held:
The Court dismissed the instant petition on account of it being the
wrong remedy. Decisions and resolutions of the COA are reviewable
by Supreme Court, not via an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, as
is the present petition, but thru a special civil action of certiorari
under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Section 2. Mode of Review.—A judgment or final order or resolution
of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit may be
brought by the aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on certiorari
under Rule 65, except as hereinafter provided.
• SAHALI V. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 201796, 15 JANUARY 2013
SURRALTA
Doctrine: (1) "A party agrieved by an interlocutory order issued by a
division of the Comelec in an election protest may not directly assail
the order to the Court through a special civil action for certiorari.
The remedy is to seek the review of the interlocutory order during
the appeal of the decision of the Division in due course; (2) The
power of the Court to review election cases falling within the
original eclusive jurisdiction of the Comelec only extends to final
decisions or resolutions of the COMELEC EN BANC, not to
interlocutory order issued by a Division thereof."
FACTS:
Petitioner Sahali and private respondent Matba were candidates for
governor in the province of Tawi-Tawi in the 2010 Automated
Elections. The provincial board of canvassers proclaimed petitioner
as the duly elected governor of the province. Alleging that said
elections in the province were attended by massive and wide scale
irregularities, private respondent filed an election protest with the
Comelec and moved for a technical examination of the Election Day
Computer's Voters List (EDCVL), the Voters Registration Records
(VRR), and the Book of Voters for the contested precincts in the
province of Tawi-Tawi by comparing the signatures and the
It ’s not a PROVREM 2015  20

thumbmarks appearing on the EDCVL as against those appearing on
the VRRs and Book of Voters.
The comelec first division issued an order which granted the motion
and thus directed its Election Records and Statistics Department to
conduct the said technical examination. The petitioner filed with the
Comelec first division a Motion for Reconsideration of said order
granting the technical examination. However, the Comelec First
division issued an order (interlocutory) denying the motion for
reconsideration.
Aggrieved by such order, petitioner went directly to the Supreme
Court via certiorari assailing the interlocutory order issued by the
Comelec first division.
Is petitioner correct in resorting to the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari to question an interlocutory order issued by the Comelec
first division?
Answer:
NO.
A party agrieved by an interlocutory order issued by a division of
the Comelec in an election protest may not directly assail the order
to the Court through a special civil action for certiorari. The remedy
is to seek the review of the interlocutory order during the appeal of
the decision of the Division in due course.
The power of the Court to review election cases falling within the
original eclusive jurisdiction of the Comelec only extends to final
decisions or resolutions of the COMELEC EN BANC, not to
interlocutory order issued by a Division thereof.
BAR EXAM QUESTION
Jun Lacobo, a defeated candidate in the 2010 governatorial
elections for the Province of Bundok Tralala, filed with the
COMELEC an election protest against the duly elected governor,
Elsie Lacsa, and moved for recounting of election returns. The
Comelec first division issued an order granting the motion and
directed its concern officers to conduct the recount. Elsie Lacsa filed
a motion for reconsideration of the order granting recount to which
the Comelec first division denied.
Can she assail the interlocutory order issued by a division of the
Comelec directly to the Supreme Court via certiorari?
Answer:
No.
A party agrieved by an interlocutory order issued by a division of
the Comelec in an election protest may not directly assail the order
to the Court through a special civil action for certiorari. The remedy
is to seek the review of the interlocutory order during the appeal of
the decision of the Division in due course.
The power of the Court to review election cases falling within the
original eclusive jurisdiction of the Comelec only extends to final
decisions or resolutions of the COMELEC EN BANC, not to
interlocutory order issued by a Division thereof.
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
Optional Readings:
• LIMKAICHONG V. COMELEC, G.R. NOS. 178831-32/G.R. NO.
179120/G.R. NOS. 179132-33/G.R. NOS. 179240-41, APRIL 1,
2009 CANETE
Principle:
Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and
assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the
jurisdiction of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
begins over election contests relating to his election, returns, and
qualifications, and mere allegation as to the invalidity of her
proclamation does not divest the Electoral Tribunal of its
jurisdiction.
Facts:
March 26, 2007 - Limkaichong filed with the COMELEC her
Certificate of Candidacy for a position of a Representative of the
First District of Negros Oriental.
April 4, and April 11, 2007 - Napoleon Camero and Renald F.
Villando, respectively, registered voters of filed the petition for her
disqualification on the ground that she lacked the citizenship
requirement of a Member of the House of Representatives, claiming
that when Limkaichong was born, her parents are Chinese Citizens
as the proceedings for the naturalization of Julio Ong Sy, her father,
never attained finality due to procedural and substantial defects.
The Office of the Solicitor General was deprived of its participation
in all the stages of the proceedings therein, as required under
Commonwealth Act No. 473 or the Revised Naturalization Law and
Republic Act No. 530, An Act Making Additional Provisions for
Naturalization. The OSG, being the counsel for the government, has
to participate in all the proceedings so that it could be bound by
what has transpired therein. Lacking the participation of this
indispensable party to the same, the proceedings are null and void
and, hence, no rights could arise therefrom.
LImkaichong claimed that she is a natural-born Filipino since she
was born to a naturalized Filipino father and a natural-born Filipino
mother, who had reacquired her status as such due to her husband's
naturalization. Thus, at the time of her birth on November 9, 1959,
nineteen (19) days had already passed after her father took his Oath
of Allegiance on October 21, 1959 and after he was issued a
Certificate of Naturalization on the same day.
May 14, 2007 – The National and Local Elections were conducted
and the disqualification case remained pending
After the casting, counting and canvassing of votes in the said
elections, Limkaichong emerged as the winner with Olivia Paras as
the second.
May 15, 2007 - Paras filed with the COMELEC a Very Urgent Motion
for Leave to Intervene and to Suspend the Proclamation of
Limkaichong as Winning Candidate of the First District of Negros
Oriental
May 17, 2007 - COMELEC Second Division granted the petitions in
the disqualification cases, disqualified Limkaichong as a candidate
It ’s not a PROVREM 2015  21

for Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental, directed
the Provincial Supervisor of the COMELEC to strike out her name
from the list of eligible candidates, and for the Provincial Board of
Canvassers (PBOC) to suspend her proclamation as winning
candidate, if any, until this decision has become final.
Evening of the same day, the Provincial Board of Canvassers
received the Joint Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division and
suspended the proclamation of Limkaichong.
May 18, 2007 - COMELEC En Banc issued Resolution No. 8062
adopting the policy-guidelines of not suspending the proclamation
of winning candidates with pending disqualification cases which
shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the hearing and
resolution of the involved cases.
May 20, 2007 – Limkaichong filed with the COMELEC a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Joint Resolution of May 17, 2007 and Urgent
Motion to Lift the Order Suspending Proclamation
May 22, 2007 - Limkaichong filed another motion for the lifting of
the directive suspending her proclamation, insisting that she should
be proclaimed as the winner in the congressional race pursuant to
COMELEC Resolution No. 8062
May 25, 2007- the PBOC, in compliance with COMELEC Resolution
No. 8062, reconvened and proclaimed Limkaichong as the duly
elected Member of the House of Representatives for the First
District of Negros Oriental
May 30, 2007 - Paras filed with the COMELEC Fist Divisiona Petition
to Nullify and/or Annul the Proclamation of Jocelyn Sy-Limkaichong
as First District Representative of Negros Oriental in relation to the
May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division but
was dismissed ratiocinating that the disqualification cases were not
yet final when Limkaichong was proclaimed. Accordingly, her
proclamation which was valid or legal, effectively divested the
COMELEC of its jurisdiction over the cases.
Paras moved for a reconsideration.
June 29, 2007 – COMELEC en banc , on 3:3 vote , denied
Limkaichong's motion for reconsideration of the Joint Resolution of
the COMELEC Second Division in the disqualification cases which
reads:
Anent the issue of jurisdiction, We rule that the
Commission has jurisdiction to rule on Respondent
Limkaichong's Motion for Reconsideration notwithstanding her
proclamation as it is only this Commission, and not the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which has
jurisdiction to review resolutions or decisions of the COMELEC,
whether issued by a division or en banc.
July 3, 2007 - Limkaichong filed in the disqualification cases against
her a Manifestation and Motion for Clarification and/or To Declare
the Petitions as Dismissed in Accordance with Section 6, Rule 18 of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
Despite Limkaichong's repeated pleas for the resolution of her
manifestation and motion for clarification, the COMELEC did not
resolve the same.
August 1, 2007 - filed with this Court a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65, in relation to Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
praying for the annulment of the May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution of
the COMELEC Second Division and the June 29, 2007 Resolution of
the COMELEC En Banc in the disqualification cases for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. She averred that since she was already proclaimed on
May 25, 2007 as Representative of the First District of Negros
Oriental, had assumed office on June 30, 2007, and had started to
perform her duties and functions as such, the COMELEC had lost its
jurisdiction and it is now the HRET which has jurisdiction over any
issue involving her qualifications for the said office.
August 16, 2007 - the COMELEC En Banc ruled on Limkaichong's
manifestation and motion for clarification and resolves that all
pending incidents relating to the qualifications of Limkaichong as
Member of the House of Representatives should now be determined
by the HRET.
ISSUE:
WON a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, in relation to Rule 64
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure filed by Limkaichong proper
HELD:
YES
The petitioner’s proclamation was valid. When she timely filed her
motion for reconsideration and lifting the order suspending her
proclamation on May 20, 2007, it effectively suspends the execution
of the May 17, 2007 Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division,
Thus, there is no impediment to proclaim her as the winner.
Section 2, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides:
Sec. 2. Period for Filing Motions for Reconsideration. ' A motion to
reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division shall
be filed within five (5) days from the promulgation thereof. Such
motion, if not pro forma, suspends the execution for
implementation of the decision, resolution, order and ruling.
and
Section 13(b), Rule 18 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure:
Sec. 13. Finality of Decisions or Resolutions. - x x x
(b) In Special Actions and Special Cases, a decision or resolution of
the Commission en banc shall become final and executory after
five (5) days from its promulgation unless restrained by the
Supreme Court.
The May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division
disqualifying Limkaichong and suspending her proclamation cannot
yet be implemented considering that she timely filed a motion for
reconsideration.
It ’s not a PROVREM 2015  22

Thus, pursuant to Section 13(c), Rule 18 and Section 2 Rule 19 of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the Joint Resolution has not yet
attained finality for it to be implemented.
Notably, the seeming impropriety of the Resolution of the COMELEC
En Banc dated June 29, 2007 has since been remedied by the
promulgation of its Resolution dated August 16, 2007, recognizing
that it no longer has jurisdiction over the disqualification cases
following the valid proclamation of Limkaichong and her
assumption of office as a Member of the House of Representatives.
• LIMKAICHONG V. COMELEC, RESOLUTION, G.R. NOS. 178831-
32/G.R. NO. 179120/G.R. NOS. 179132-33/G.R. NOS. 179240-
41, JULY 30, 2009 PAGAPONG
Principle:
Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath,
and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives,
the jurisdiction of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
begins over election contests relating to his election, returns, and
qualifications, and mere allegation as to the invalidity of her
proclamation does not divest the Electoral Tribunal of its
jurisdiction.
Long digest:
Facts:
(These are consolidated cases)
Limkaichong filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the
position of Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental.
In the following weeks, two (2) petitions for her disqualification
were instituted before the COMELEC on the ground that she lacked
the citizenship requirement because her parents were Chinese
citizens at the time of her birth.
In her Answers to the petitions, Limkaichong claimed that she is
a natural-born Filipino since she was born to a naturalized Filipino
father and a natural-born Filipino mother.
The case was pending before the COMELEC until the election and
proclamation of Limkaichong.
In a Joint Resolution, the COMELEC dismissed the cases on the
ground that Limkaichong’s subsequent election and assumption of
office divest the COMELEC jurisdiction and transfer it to HRET.
Thus, these cases ( petition for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus)
against COMELEC were filed.
(actually, one of the actions i.e. certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus, was filled by Limkaichong herself assailing COMELEC’s
jurisdiction)
The petitioners (in one of the cases) argue that the issue concerning
Limkaichong’s disqualification is still within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the COMELEC En Banc to resolve because when
Limkaichong was proclaimed the matter was still pending
resolution before the COMELEC En Banc.
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
Issue:
Whether, upon Limkaichong's proclamation, the HRET, instead of
the COMELEC, should assume jurisdiction over the disqualification
cases.
Ruling: HRET
The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has
been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of
the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over
election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications
ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins. It follows then that
the proclamation of a winning candidate divests the COMELEC of its
jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of the
proclamation. The party questioning his qualification should now
present his case in a proper proceeding before the HRET, the
constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and decide a case
involving a Member of the House of Representatives with respect to
the latter's election, returns and qualifications.
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of
nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme
Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six
shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as
the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented
therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its
Chairman.
Corollary thereto is Rule 14 of the 1998 Rules of the HRET, as
amended, which states:
RULE 14. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the Members
of the House of Representatives.
In view of the proclamation of Limkaichong and her subsequent
assumption of office, it is ruled that all pending incidents relating to
the qualifications of Limkaichong should now be determined by the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal in accordance with the
above-quoted provision of the Constitution.
Short digest:
X’s filling of COC for congressional seat was opposed on the ground
that X is not a natural-born citizen, being born before her parents
were naturalized.
Pending the action before the COMELEC, X was allowed to run,
where she won and was subsequently proclaimed and assumed
office.
With this, the COMELEC dismissed the action ratiocinating that X’s
subsequent proclamation and assumption of office divest its
jurisdiction. The petitioners however contended that COMELEC’s
It ’s not a PROVREM 2015  23

prior jurisdiction is not affected with the subsequent proclamation
of X. Decide.
(First sentence: yes! Hahaha)
X.C
• PATES V. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 184915, 30 JUNE 2009 DACUA
Time to File Petition:
Rule 64, Sec. 3. Time to file petition. The petition shall be filed
within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order or
resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing of a motion for new
trial or reconsideration of said judgment or final order or
resolution, if allowed under the procedural rules of the Commission
concerned, shall interrupt the period herein fixed. If the motion is
denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the
remaining period, but which shall not be less than five (5) days in
any event, reckoned from notice of denial.
Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution provides that unless
otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, any decision,
order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Court
on certiorari by the aggrieved party within 30 days from receipt of a
copy thereof. For this reason, the Rules of Court provide for a
separate rule (Rule 64) specifically applicable only to decisions
of the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit. This Rule
expressly refers to the application of Rule 65 in the filing of a
petition for certiorari, subject to the exception clause except as
hereinafter provided.
Rule 64, cannot simply be equated to Rule 65 even if it expressly
refers to the latter rule. They exist as separate rules for substantive
reasons as discussed below. Procedurally, the most patent
difference between the two i.e., the exception that Section 2, Rule 64
refers to is Section 3 which provides for a special period for the
filing of petitions for certiorari from decisions or rulings of the
COMELEC en banc. The period is 30 days from notice of the
decision or ruling (instead of the 60 days that Rule 65
provides), with the intervening period used for the filing of any
motion for reconsideration deductible from the originally-
granted 30 days (instead of the fresh period of 60 days that
Rule 65 provides).
FACTS:
- February 1, 2008 The COMELEC First Division issued its
Resolution (assailed in the petition);
- February 4, 2008 The counsel for petitioner Nilo T. Pates
(petitioner) received a copy of the February 1, 2008 Resolution;
- February 8, 2008 The petitioner filed his motion for
reconsideration (MR) of the February 1, 2008 Resolution (4 days
from receipt of the February 1, 2008 Resolution)
- September 18, 2008 The COMELEC en banc issued a
Resolution denying the petitioners MR (also assailed in the
petition).
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
- September 22, 2008 The petitioner received the COMELEC en
banc Resolution of September 18, 2008
Under this chronology, the last day for the filing of a petition
for certiorari, i.e., 30 days from notice of the final COMELEC
Resolution, fell on a Saturday (October 18, 2008), as the petitioner
only had the remaining period of 26 days to file his petition, after
using up 4 days in preparing and filing his Motion for
Reconsideration. Effectively, the last day for filing was October 20,
2008 the following Monday or the first working day after October
18, 2008. The petitioner filed his petition with us on October 22,
2008 or two days late; hence, our Resolution of dismissal
of November 11, 2008.
The petitioner asks us in his Urgent Motion for Reconsideration
with Reiteration for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
to reverse the dismissal of his petition, arguing that the petition was
seasonably filed under the fresh period rule enunciated by the
Supreme Court in a number of cases decided beginning the year
2005. The fresh period refers to the original period provided under
the Rules of Court counted from notice of the ruling on the motion
for reconsideration by the tribunal below, without deducting the
period for the preparation and filing of the motion for
reconsideration.
He claims that, historically, the fresh period rule was the prevailing
rule in filing petitions for certiorari. This Court, he continues,
changed this rule when it promulgated the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure and Circular No. 39-98, which both provided for the filing
of petitions within the remainder of the original period,
the remainder being the original period less the days used up in
preparing and filing a motion for reconsideration. He then points
out that on September 1, 2000 or only three years after, this Court
promulgated A.M. No. 00-02-03-SC bringing back the fresh period
rule.
Arguments of parties:
Petitioner said that the SC has consistently held that the order or
resolution denying the motion for reconsideration or new trial is
considered as the final order finally disposing of the case, and the
date of its receipt by a party is the correct reckoning point for
counting the period for appellate review.
Respondent countered in her comment stating that: (1) we are
absolutely correct in concluding that the petition was filed out of
time; and (2) the petitioners reliance on Section 4, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court (as amended by A.M. No. 00-02-03-SC) is totally
misplaced, as Rule 64, not Rule 65, is the vehicle for review of
judgments and final orders or resolutions of the
COMELEC. Respondent Almirante points out that Rule 64 and Rule
65 are different; Rule 65 provides for a 60-day period for filing
petitions for certiorari, while Rule 64 provides for 30 days.
ISSUE: Whether or not the time for filing the petitioner for
certiorari from the decisions or rulings of the COMELEC en banc is
reckoned 30 days from notice of its decision or ruling based on Rule
64 and not the fresh period of 60 days based on Rule 65.
RULING: Yes.
It ’s not a PROVREM 2015  24

Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution provides that unless
otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, any decision,
order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the
Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within 30 days from
receipt of a copy thereof. For this reason, the Rules of Court
provide for a separate rule (Rule 64) specifically applicable
only to decisions of the COMELEC and the Commission on
Audit. This Rule expressly refers to the application of Rule 65 in the
filing of a petition for certiorari, subject to the exception clause
except as hereinafter provided.
Rule 64, cannot simply be equated to Rule 65 even if it expressly
refers to the latter rule. They exist as separate rules for substantive
reasons as discussed below. Procedurally, the most patent
difference between the two i.e., the exception that Section 2, Rule
64 refers to is Section 3 which provides for a special period for
the filing of petitions for certiorari from decisions or rulings of
the COMELEC en banc. The period is 30 days from notice of the
decision or ruling (instead of the 60 days that Rule 65
provides), with the intervening period used for the filing of any
motion for reconsideration deductible from the originally-
granted 30 days (instead of the fresh period of 60 days that
Rule 65 provides).
General Rule is strict compliance of the rules.
Exception is the liberal interpretation and application of the rules of
procedure can be resorted to only in proper cases and under
justifiable causes and circumstances. exceptional circumstances or
compelling reasons may have existed in the past when we either
suspended the operation of the Rules or exempted a particular case
from their application.
Significantly, the petitioner presented no exceptional circumstance
or any compelling reason to warrant the non-application of Section
3, Rule 64 to his petition. He failed to explain why his filing was late.
Other than his appeal to history, uniformity, and convenience, he did
not explain why we should adopt and apply the fresh period rule to
an election case.
QUICK DIGEST:
- February 1, 2008 The COMELEC First Division issued its
Resolution (assailed in the petition);
- February 4, 2008 The counsel for petitioner Nilo T. Pates
(petitioner) received a copy of the February 1, 2008 Resolution;
- February 8, 2008 The petitioner filed his motion for
reconsideration (MR) of the February 1, 2008 Resolution (4 days
from receipt of the February 1, 2008 Resolution)
- September 18, 2008 The COMELEC en banc issued a
Resolution denying the petitioners MR (also assailed in the
petition).
- September 22, 2008 The petitioner received the COMELEC en
banc Resolution of September 18, 2008
Under this chronology, the last day for the filing of a petition
for certiorari, i.e., 30 days from notice of the final COMELEC
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
Resolution, fell on a Saturday (October 18, 2008), as the petitioner
only had the remaining period of 26 days to file his petition, after
using up 4 days in preparing and filing his Motion for
Reconsideration. Effectively, the last day for filing was October 20,
2008 the following Monday or the first working day after October
18, 2008. The petitioner filed his petition with us on October 22,
2008 or two days late; hence, our Resolution of dismissal
of November 11, 2008.
Petitioner argued that under Rule 65, it should be the fresh period
rule of 60 days that is to be applied for the filing of petition for
certiorari.
Respondent to the contrary also argued that it should be 30 days
from the notice of decision or ruling of the COMELEC that must be
applied for the filing of petitioner for certiorari. Hence, resolution of
dismissal is correct because of petitioner’s late filing.
Rule on the motion. (99.9%)
• Osmena v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 188818, 31 May 2011
SITOY
XI.A.1 • ARAULLO V. AQUINO, G.R NO. 209287, 1 JULY 2014
10/13 AMORES SEE XI. B
PRINCIPLES
Certiorari - The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction
of errors of jurisdiction, which includes the commission of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Prohibition – A preventive remedy issued to restrain future action,
and is directed to the court itself.
Petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to
raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify
the acts of legislative and executive officials.
Doctrine of Operative Fact – recognizes the legal effect of an act
prior to it being declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court
LONG DIGEST
FACTS:
When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration
noticed the sluggish growth of the economy. The World Bank
advised that the economy needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary
Florencio “Butch” Abad then came up with a program called the
Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of
government projects. DAP enables the Executive to realign funds
from slow moving projects to priority projects instead of waiting for
next year’s appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was that
if a certain government is being undertaken slowly by a certain
executive agency, the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by
the Executive. Once withdrawn these funds are declared as
“savings” by the Executive and said funds will then be reallotted to
other priority projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate the
economy as economic growth was in fact reported and portion of
It ’s not a PROVREM 2015  25

such growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by the Supreme
Court).
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed
funds from the General Appropriation Act (GAA). Unprogrammed
funds are standby appropriation made by Congress in the GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada
made an expose’ claiming that he, and other Senators, received
Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in favor of the
impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary Abad
claimed that the money was taken from the DAP but was disbursed
upon the request of the Senators.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that
the DAP does not only realign funds within the Executive. It turns
out that some non-Executive projects were also funded; to name a
few: Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera People’s Liberation Army),
Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front), Php700M
for the Quezon Province, Php50 – 100M for certain Senators each,
Php10B for Relocation Projects, etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the
Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and several other concerned citizens
to file various petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the
validity of DAP. Among their contentions was:
DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the
constitutional rule which provides that “no money shall be paid out
of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by
law”.
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain
laws particularly the GAA (savings and augmentation provisions
thereof), Sec. 25 (5), Art VI of the Constitution (power of the
President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive Order 292
(power of the President to suspend expenditures and authority to
use savings, respectively).
ISSUE:
WON certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus are proper remedies to
assail the constitutionality and validity of the Disbursement
Acceleration Program (DAP), National Budget Circular (NBC) No.
541, and all other executive issuances allegedly implementing the
DAP.
HELD:
The petitions under Rule 65 are proper remedies.
The present Rules of Court uses two special civil actions
for determining and correcting grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. These are the special civil actions
for certiorari and prohibition, and both are governed by Rule 65. A
similar remedy for certiorari exists under Rule 64, but the remedy is
expressly applicable only to the judgments and final orders or
resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on
Audit.
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
The ordinary nature and function of the writ of certiorari
in our present system are aptly explained in Delos Santos v.
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company:
In the common law, from which the remedy of certiorari
evolved, the writ of certiorari was issued out of Chancery, or the
King’s Bench, commanding agents or officers of the inferior courts
to return the record of a cause pending before them, so as to give
the party more sure and speedy justice, for the writ would enable
the superior court to determine from an inspection of the record
whether the inferior court’s judgment was rendered without
authority. The errors were of such a nature that, if allowed to stand,
they would result in a substantial injury to the petitioner to whom
no other remedy was available. If the inferior court acted without
authority, the record was then revised and corrected in matters of
law. The writ of certiorari was limited to cases in which the inferior
court was said to be exceeding its jurisdiction or was not
proceeding according to essential requirements of law and would
lie only to review judicial or quasi-judicial acts.
The concept of the remedy of certiorari in our judicial
system remains much the same as it has been in the common law. In
this jurisdiction, however, the exercise of the power to issue the writ
of certiorari is largely regulated by laying down the instances or
situations in the Rules of Court in which a superior court may issue
the writ of certiorari to an inferior court or officer. Section 1, Rule
65 of the Rules of Court compelling provides the requirements for
the purpose, viz:
The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of
errors of jurisdiction, which includes the commission of grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In this regard, mere
abuse of discretion is not enough to warrant the issuance of the
writ. The abuse of discretion must be grave, which means either
that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a
positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to
act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or
board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a
capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.
Although similar to prohibition in that it will lie for want
or excess of jurisdiction, certiorari is to be distinguished from
prohibition by the fact that it is a corrective remedy used for the re-
examination of some action of an inferior tribunal, and is directed to
the cause or proceeding in the lower court and not to the court
itself, while prohibition is a preventive remedy issuing to restrain
future action, and is directed to the court itself. The Court
expounded on the nature and function of the writ of prohibition in
Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc v. Defensor:
A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to
assail an IRR issued in the exercise of a quasi-legislative function.
Prohibition is an extraordinary writ against any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, ordering said entity or
person to desist from further proceedings when said proceedings
are without or in excess of said entity’s or person’s jurisdiction, or
It ’s not a PROVREM 2015  26

are accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no
appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. Prohibition lies against judicial or
ministerial functions, but not against legislative or quasi-legislative
functions. Generally, the purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a
lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain
the administration of justice in orderly channels. Prohibition is the
proper remedy to afford relief against usurpation of jurisdiction or
power by an inferior court, or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in
handling matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior court
transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where there
is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law by
which such relief can be obtained. Where the principal relief sought
is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners’ remedy is an ordinary action for
its nullification, an action which properly falls under the jurisdiction
of the Regional Trial Court. In any case, petitioners’ allegation that
“respondents are performing or threatening to perform functions
without or in excess of their jurisdiction” may appropriately be
enjoined by the trial court through a writ of injunction or a
temporary restraining order.
With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of
certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and
reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to
correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal,
corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act
of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government,
even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions.
Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are
appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review
and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive
officials.
Necessarily, in discharging its duty under Section 1, to set
right and undo any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the
Government, the Court is not at all precluded from making the
inquiry provided the challenge was properly brought by interested
or affected parties. The Court has been thereby entrusted expressly
or by necessary implication with both the duty and the obligation of
determining, in appropriate cases, the validity of any assailed
legislative or executive action. This entrustment is consistent with
the Republican system of checks and balances.
OTHER ISSUES
I. WON the DAP violates the principle “no money shall be
paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law” (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI,
Constitution).
II. WON the DAP realignments can be considered as
impoundments by the executive.
III. WON the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
IV. WON the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is
constitutional.
V. WON the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.
HELD:
I. No, the DAP did not violate Sec. 29(1), Art. VI,
Constitution. DAP was merely a program by the
Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation.
It is a program for prioritizing government
spending. As such, it did not violate the Constitutional
provision cited in Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution. In
DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from the
Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by law
would have been required. Funds which were already
appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being
realigned via the DAP.
II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP.
Impoundment of funds refers to the President’s
power to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain
or deduct appropriations for whatever reason.
Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA
unless there will be an unmanageable national
government budget deficit (which did not happen).
Nevertheless, there’s no impoundment in the case at
bar because what’s involved in the DAP was the
transfer of funds.
III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were
unconstitutional. It is true that the President (and
even the heads of the other branches of the
government) are allowed by the Constitution to make
realignment of funds, however, such transfer or
realignment should only be made “within their
respective offices”. Thus, no cross-border
transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under
the DAP, this was violated because funds
appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being
transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive
agencies.
Further, transfers “within their respective offices” also contemplate
realignment of funds to an existing project in the GAA. Under the
DAP, even though some projects were within the Executive, these
projects are non-existent insofar as the GAA is concerned because
no funds were appropriated to them in the GAA. Although some of
these projects may be legitimate, they are still non-existent under
the GAA because they were not provided for by the GAA. As such,
transfer to such projects is unconstitutional and is without legal
basis.
On the issue of what are “savings” these DAP transfers are not
“savings” contrary to what was being declared by the Executive.
Under the definition of “savings” in the GAA, savings only occur,
among other instances, when there is an excess in the funding of a
certain project once it is completed, finally discontinued, or finally
abandoned. The GAA does not refer to “savings” as funds withdrawn
from a slow moving project. Thus, since the statutory definition of
savings was not complied with under the DAP, there is no basis at all
It ’s not a PROVREM 2015  27

for the transfers. Further, savings should only be declared at the end
of the fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds are already being
withdrawn from certain projects in the middle of the year and then
being declared as “savings” by the Executive particularly by the
DBM.
IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be
used as money source for the DAP because under the
law, such funds may only be used if there is a
certification from the National Treasurer to the effect
that the revenue collections have exceeded the
revenue targets. In this case, no such certification was
secured before unprogrammed funds were used.
V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes
the legal effects of an act prior to it being declared as
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is applicable.
The DAP has definitely helped stimulate the economy.
It has funded numerous projects. If the Executive is
ordered to reverse all actions under the DAP, then it
may cause more harm than good. The DAP effects can
no longer be undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP
cannot be asked to return what they received
especially so that they relied on the validity of the
DAP. However, the Doctrine of Operative Fact may not
be applicable to the authors, implementers, and
proponents of the DAP if it is so found in the
appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or
administrative) that they have not acted in good faith.
QUICK DIGEST
FACTS:
When President Benigno Aquino III took office the then Budget
Secretary Florencio “Butch” Abad came up with a program called
the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) to speed up the
funding of government projects. However, in September 2013,
Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an expose’ claiming that he, and
other Senators, received Php50M from the President as an incentive
for voting in favor of the impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato
Corona which was taken from the DAP. It turns out that the DAP
does not only realign funds within the Executive but some non-
Executive projects were also funded. This prompted Maria Carolina
Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and
several other concerned citizens to file various petitions with the
Supreme Court questioning the validity of DAP.
ISSUE:
WON certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus are proper remedies to
assail the constitutionality and validity of the Disbursement
Acceleration Program (DAP), National Budget Circular (NBC) No.
541, and all other executive issuances allegedly implementing the
DAP.
HELD:
The petitions under Rule 65 are proper remedies. The present Rules
of Court uses two special civil actions for determining and
correcting grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
jurisdiction. These are the special civil actions for certiorari and
prohibition, and both are governed by Rule 65. The sole office of the
writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, which
includes the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction. In this regard, mere abuse of discretion is not
enough to warrant the issuance of the writ. The abuse of discretion
must be grave, which means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial
power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason
of passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge,
tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to
perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as
when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Although similar to prohibition in
that it will lie for want or excess of jurisdiction, certiorari is to be
distinguished from prohibition by the fact that it is a corrective
remedy used for the re-examination of some action of an inferior
tribunal, and is directed to the cause or proceeding in the lower
court and not to the court itself, while prohibition is a preventive
remedy issuing to restrain future action, and is directed to the court
itself. Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate
remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or
prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials.
XI. B. Distinguished from each other
ARAULLO, id
The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of
jurisdiction, which includes the commission of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In this regard, mere
abuse of discretion is not enough to warrant the issuance of the
writ. The abuse of discretion must be grave, which means either
that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a
positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to
act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or
board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a
capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.
Prohibition is an extraordinary writ against any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, ordering said entity or
person to desist from further proceedings when said proceedings
are without or in excess of said entity’s or person’s jurisdiction, or
are accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no
appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. Prohibition lies against judicial or
ministerial functions, but not against legislative or quasi-legislative
functions. Generally, the purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a
lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain
the administration of justice in orderly channels. Prohibition is the
proper remedy to afford relief against usurpation of jurisdiction or
power by an inferior court, or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in
handling matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior court
transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where there
is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law by
which such relief can be obtained. Where the principal relief sought
It ’s not a PROVREM 2015  28

is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners’ remedy is an ordinary action for
its nullification, an action which properly falls under the jurisdiction
of the Regional Trial Court.
Certiorari is to be distinguished from prohibition by the fact that it
is a corrective remedy used for the re-examination of some action of
an inferior tribunal, and is directed to the cause or proceeding in
the lower court and not to the court itself, while prohibition is a
preventive remedy issuing to restrain future action, and is directed
to the court itself.
The writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors
of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board
or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions
but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch
or instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not
exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.
• TRIPLEX ENTERPRISES, INC V. PNB-REPUBLIC BANK, G.R. NO.
151007, JULY 17, 2006 RAVENS
LONG DIGEST
Principles:
Certiorari as a special civil action is proper when any tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has
acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion, and there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy at law. The writ may be issued only where it is
convincingly proved that the lower court committed grave abuse of
discretion, or an act too patent and gross as to amount to an evasion
of a duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or act
in contemplation of law, or that the trial court exercised its power in
an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility.
While certiorari may be maintained as an appropriate remedy to
assail an interlocutory order in cases where the tribunal has issued
an order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion, it does not lie to correct every controversial
interlocutory ruling.xxx
The writ of certiorari is restricted to truly extraordinary cases
wherein the act of the lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly
void. Moreover, it is designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and
not errors in judgment. The rationale of this rule is that, when a
court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so
engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when
the error is committed. Otherwise, every mistake made by a court
will deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment will
be a void judgment.
Facts:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assails the May 29, 2001 decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 53033 which dismissed the petition for certiorari
filed by petitioner Triplex Enterprises, Inc. for lack of merit.
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
Petitioner sought to annul the sale of two parcels of land situated in
Tagaytay City by PNB-Republic Bank to Solid Builders, Inc. and to
compel PNB-Republic Bank to award instead the sale to it as the
highest bidder. Petitioners claim was rejected by PNB-Republic
Bank due to the sale of the properties to Solid Builders, Inc. After
the rejection of petitioners bid, Atty. Romeo Roque, the real estate
broker whose services were engaged by petitioner for its
negotiations with PNB-Republic Bank concerning the Tagaytay
properties, obtained a legal opinion from the Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC)xxx
During the pre-trial conference, petitioner marked the December 7,
1994 opinion of the OGCC as Exhibit C and offered the matter of its
existence for stipulation between the parties. Respondents
admitted the existence of the opinion but manifested their
disagreement with its contents.
During trial, petitioner called Atty. Roque to testify. When
Roques testimony was offered specifically with respect to the legal
opinion of the OGCC, counsels for respondents objected to its
admission for being violative of the rule on attorney-client privilege
between the OGCC and PNB-Republic Bank. The trial court
sustained the objection.
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the court a quos refusal
to admit its evidence but it was denied in an order dated February
26, 1999. The order disallowed the presentation and admission in
evidence of any testimony referring to the December 7, 1994
opinion of the OGCC. The prohibition was based on the ground that
the testimony was in violation of the rule on privileged
communication between attorney and client, i.e., the OGCC and
PNB-Republic Bank.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals. However, the appellate court dismissed the
petition. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was
denied. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that the trial
court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in disallowing the
presentation and admission in evidence of Roques testimony.
Ruling: NO
When the court has jurisdiction over the case and person of the
defendant, any mistake in the application of the law and the
appreciation of evidence committed by a court may be corrected
only by appeal. The determination made by the trial court regarding
the admissibility of evidence is but an exercise of its jurisdiction and
whatever fault it may have perpetrated in making such a
determination is an error in judgment, not of jurisdiction. Hence,
settled is the rule that rulings of the trial court on procedural
questions and on admissibility of evidence during the course of a
trial are interlocutory in nature and may not be the subject of a
separate appeal or review on certiorari. They must be assigned as
errors and reviewed in the appeal properly taken from the decision
rendered by the trial court on the merits of the case.
It ’s not a PROVREM 2015  29

Here, petitioner assails the order of the trial court disallowing the
admission in evidence of the testimony of Roque on the opinion of
the OGCC. By that fact alone, no grave abuse of discretion could be
imputed to the trial court. Furthermore, the said order was not an
error of jurisdiction. Even assuming that it was erroneous, the
mistake was an error in judgment not correctable by the writ of
certiorari.
SHORT DIGEST
Facts:
The case stemmed from an action for annulment of contract,
mandamus and damages filed by petitioner against Leverage &
Services Group, Inc. and respondents PNB-Republic Bank and Solid
Builders, Inc. before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch
153. It was docketed as Civil Case No. 64941.
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the court a quos refusal
to admit its evidence but it was denied in an order dated February
26, 1999. The order disallowed the presentation and admission in
evidence of any testimony referring to the December 7, 1994
opinion of the OGCC. The prohibition was based on the ground that
the testimony was in violation of the rule on privileged
communication between attorney and client, i.e., the OGCC and
PNB-Republic Bank.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals. However, the appellate court dismissed the
petition. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was
denied. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that the trial
court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in disallowing the
presentation and admission in evidence of Roques testimony.
Ruling: NO
Here, petitioner assails the order of the trial court disallowing the
admission in evidence of the testimony of Roque on the opinion of
the OGCC. By that fact alone, no grave abuse of discretion could be
imputed to the trial court. Furthermore, the said order was not an
error of jurisdiction. Even assuming that it was erroneous, the
mistake was an error in judgment not correctable by the writ of
certiorari.
XI.A.2 • DAVID V. RIVERA, G.R. NOS. 139913 & 140159,
JANUARY 16, 2004 CORTES
Principle: It is a settled rule that prohibition is the proper remedy
to afford relief against usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an
inferior court, or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in handling
matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior court transgresses
the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no
adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law by which
such relief can be obtained.
Facts: Claiming to be the owner of an eighteen thousand (18,000)-
square meter portion (hereafter, "subject land") of Lot No. 38-B,1 a
five (5)-hectare lot situated at MacArthur Highway, Dau, Mabalacat,
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
Pampanga, herein respondent Agustin Rivera filed on May 10, 1994
a Complaint 2 for "Maintenance of Peaceful Possession with Prayer
for Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction" before the
Provincial Adjudication Board (PARAB) of San Fernando, Pampanga
against petitioners heirs of Spouses Cristino and Consolacion David.
The respondent averred that the petitioners had been harassing
him for the purpose of making him vacate the subject land although
it had already been given to him sometime in 1957 by the parents of
the petitioners as "disturbance compensation", in consideration of
his renunciation of his tenurial rights over the original eighteen
(18)-hectare farmholding.
For their part, the petitioners filed a Complaint for ejectment before
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Mabalacat and
Magalang, Pampanga. They alleged that the respondent was
occupying the subject land without paying rentals therefor. The
petitioners also averred that they need the subject land for their
personal use but the respondent refused to vacate it despite
repeated demands.
On September 28, 1995, the MCTC rendered its Decision ordering
the respondent to vacate the subject land. The court found that
there was a dearth of evidence supportive of the respondent‘s claim
that the land is agricultural or that it is devoted to agricultural
production. Further, it ruled that the petitioners as the registered
owners have a better right to possession of the subject land.
Without appealing the MCTC Decision but within the period to
appeal, the respondent filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Angeles City a Petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction
and/or temporary restraining order, seeking the nullification of the
MCTC Decision. The thrust of the petition was that the MCTC had no
jurisdiction as the issue before it was agrarian in nature.
On February 25, 1998, the RTC issued an Order denying the motion
to dismiss. The court ruled that the motion, which was filed after
the presentation of the plaintiff‘s evidence, partakes of a demurrer
to evidence which under Section 1, Rule 33 of the Rules of Court,
may be granted only upon a showing that the plaintiff has shown no
right to the relief prayed for. Noting that "the evidence presented by
the petitioner establishes an issue which is addressed to [the] court
for resolution. . . whether or not the respondent court had
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case filed before it", the
RTC ruled that the denial of the motion to dismiss is proper. The
petitioners moved for reconsideration but such was denied in an
Order dated June 23, 1998.
ISSUES: 1. WON there was usurpation or erroneous assumption of
jurisdiction by the MCTC?
2. WON Petition for Prohibition was a proper remedy?
RULING:
1. YES. There was erroneous assumption of jurisdiction by
the MCTC since jurisdiction is expressly vested DAR.
It is clear that the respondent filed the petition for prohibition to
correct what he perceived was an erroneous assumption of
jurisdiction by the MCTC. Indeed, the propriety of the recourse to
It ’s not a PROVREM 2015  30

the RTC for a writ of prohibition is beyond cavil in view of the
following considerations:
The peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case, where two
tribunals exercised jurisdiction over two cases involving the same
subject matter, issue, and parties, and ultimately rendered
conflicting decisions, clearly makes out a case for prohibition. The
MCTC manifestly took cognizance of the case for ejectment
pursuant to Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Blg.129, as amended. On
the other hand, the ratiocination of the DARAB, which the
respondent echoes, is that the case falls squarely within its
jurisdiction as it arose out of, or was connected with, agrarian
relations. The respondent also points out that his right to possess
the land, as a registered tenant, was submitted for determination
before the PARAB prior to the filing of the case for ejectment.
Executive Order No. 129-A created the DARAB to assume the
powers and functions with respect to the adjudication of agrarian
reform cases. Section 1, Rule II of the DARAB Rules of Procedure
enumerates the cases falling within the primary and exclusive
jurisdiction of the DARAB, which is quoted hereunder in so far as
pertinent to the issue at bar:
Section 1. Primary And Exclusive Original and Appellate
Jurisdiction. The board shall have primary and exclusive
jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and
adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) under Republic
Act no. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 228, 229, and 129-A, Republic
Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, Presidential
Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules
and regulations. Specifically, such jurisdiction shall include but not
be limited to cases involving the following:
a) The rights and obligations of persons, whether natural or
juridical engaged in the management, cultivation and use of all
agricultural lands covered by the CARP and other agrarian laws;
...
g) Those cases previously falling under the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the defunct Court of Agrarian Relations under Section
12 of Presidential Decree No. 946, except sub-paragraph (Q) thereof
and Presidential Decree No. 815.
It is understood that the aforementioned cases, complaints or
petitions were filed with the DARAB after August 29, 1987.
As earlier pointed out, jurisdiction over agrarian reform matters is
now expressly vested in the DAR, through the DARAB.
2. YES. Petition for prohibition was the proper remedy
With the facts doubtlessly presenting a question of jurisdiction, it
follows that the respondent has availed of the proper, speedy and
adequate remedy which is the special civil action of prohibition. It is
a settled rule that prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief
against usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior court or
when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in handling matters clearly
within its cognizance the inferior court transgresses the bounds
prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no adequate remedy
available in the ordinary course of law by which such relief can be
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
obtained. The purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower
court within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the
administration of justice in orderly channels. While appeal is the
recognized remedy to question the judgment of an inferior court,
this does not detract from the authority of a higher court to issue a
writ of prohibition to restrain the inferior court, among other
instances, from proceeding further on the ground that it heard and
decided the case without jurisdiction. Since the right to prohibition
is defeated not by the existence, but by the adequacy, of a remedy by
appeal, it may accordingly be granted where the remedy by appeal
is not plain, speedy or adequate.
QUICK DIGEST:
Facts: Agustin Rivera(claiming to be the owner of an 18,000 SQM
which is part of Lot No. 38-B, a 5 hectar lot) filed a Complaint for
"Maintenance of Peaceful Possession with Prayer for Restraining
Order and Preliminary Injunction" before PARAB against petitioners
heirs of Spouses David. The respondent averred that the petitioners
have been harassing him for the purpose of making him vacate the
land. Spouses David filed a complaint for ejectment before MCTC,
which ordered Agustin Rivera to vacate the land and ruled that
Spouses David as registered owners. Rivera, without appealing, filed
a Petition for Prohibition with the RTC seeking to annul the MCTC’s
decision. David filed a motion to dismiss but denied by the court.
Subsequently, the petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari with the
CA. CA found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in
denying the motion to dismiss.
Issue: WON Petition for Prohibition was the proper remedy (Filed
by Augusto Rivera)?
Ruling: YES
Prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief against usurpation
of jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or when, in the
exercise of jurisdiction in handling matters clearly within its
cognizance the inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed to
it by the law, or where there is no adequate remedy available in the
ordinary course of law by which such relief can be obtained.
It is clear that the respondent filed the petition for prohibition to
correct what he perceived was an erroneous assumption of
jurisdiction by the MCTC. While appeal is the recognized remedy to
question the judgment of an inferior court, this does not detract
from the authority of a higher court to issue a writ of prohibition to
restrain the inferior court, among other instances, from proceeding
further on the ground that it heard and decided the case without
jurisdiction. Since the right to prohibition is defeated not by the
existence, but by the adequacy, of a remedy by appeal, it may
accordingly be granted where the remedy by appeal is not plain,
speedy or adequate.
• ESQUIVEL V. OMBUDSMAN, G.R. NO. 137237, SEPTEMBER 17,
2002 TIU
In certiorari, the grave abuse of discretion must be established.
A writ of prohibition is directed to the court itself, commanding
it to cease from the exercise of a jurisdiction to which it has no
legal claim. As an extraordinary remedy, prohibition cannot be
It ’s not a PROVREM 2015  31

resorted to when the ordinary and usual remedies provided by
law are adequate and available. Prohibition is granted only
where no other remedy is available or sufficient to afford
redress.
Mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when
refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its chief use and not a
discretionary duty. The duty is ministerial only when the
discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official
discretion nor judgment.
LONG DIGEST:
FACTS:2 policemen, Eduardo and catacutan, filed a complaint in the
PNP for illegal arrest, arbitrary detention, maltreatment, attempted
murder, and grave threats against herein petitioners Antonio,
municipal mayor, and mark , barangay captain.
Eduardo alleged in his affidavit that on his way to the house of his
mother, the petitioners arrived and disarmed him. He was asked to
board the vehicle and was brought to the municipal hall.
Eduardo told the PNP that Eduardo was most likely maltreated and
threatened because of jueteng and padua and the mayor thinks that
Eduardo was one of those who raided the said activities.
After the investigation of the PNP, the record was forwarded to the
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon for appropriate action.
Later on, the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon issued a resolution
recommending that both the mayor and the Brgy Captain be
indicted for the crime of less serious physical injury and the mayor
only for grave threats.
After the Ombudsman approved the resolution, the criminal cases
for less serious physical injuries against the mayor and the captain
and grave threats against the mayor were filed in the
Sandiganbayan.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but was however
denied.
Hence, the petitioners elevated the matters to the SC alleging GAD
on the part of the public respondents in rendering the resolution
and order. They also plea for the issuance of TRO directing the
public respondents to refrain from prosecuting the said cases.
ISSUE:
1.) WON the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in
directing the filing of the informations against petitioners?
(2) WON the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in
assuming jurisdiction over Criminal Cases Nos. 24777 and 24778?
HELD:
Petitioners argue that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of
discretion when he failed to consider the exculpatory evidence in
their favor, namely, the admission of PO2 Eduardo that he was in
good physical condition when he left the police station in Jaen,
Nueva Ecija. With such admission, PO2 Eduardo is now estopped
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
from claiming that he was injured since it is conclusive evidence
against him and need not be proven in any other proceeding.
The Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there exists
reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and
that the accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the
corresponding information with the appropriate courts. Settled is
the rule that the Supreme Court will not ordinarily interfere with
the Ombudsman’s exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory
powers without good and compelling reasons to indicate otherwise.
In this case, petitioners utterly failed to establish that the
Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion in rendering the
disputed resolution and order.
There was no abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman,
much less grave abuse in disregarding PO2 Eduardo’s admission
that he was in good physical condition when he was released from
the police headquarters. Such admission was never brought up
during the preliminary investigation. The records show that no such
averment was made in petitioners’ counter-affidavit nor was there
any document purporting to be the exculpatory statement attached
therein as an annex or exhibit. Petitioners only raised this issue in
their motion for reconsideration.
Given these circumstances, certiorari is not the proper remedy.
2. Petitioners theorize that the latter has no jurisdiction over their
persons as they hold positions excluded in Republic Act No.
7975. As the positions of municipal mayors and barangay captains
are not mentioned therein, they claim they are not covered by said
law under the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
Petitioners’ claim lacks merit. In Rodrigo, Jr. vs.
Sandiganbayan, Binay vs. Sandiganbayan, and Layus vs.
Sandiganbayan, we already held that municipal mayors fall under
the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. R.A.
7975, as amended by R.A. No. 8249, provides that it is only in cases
where "none of the accused (underscoring supplied) are occupying
positions corresponding to salary grade ‘27’ or higher" that
"exclusive original jurisdiction shall be vested in the proper regional
trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and
municipal circuit court, as the case may be, pursuant to their
respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
amended."
Note that under the 1991 Local Government Code, Mayor Esquivel
has a salary grade of 27. Since Barangay Captain Esquivel is the co-
accused in Criminal Case No. 24777 of Mayor Esquivel, whose
position falls under salary grade 27, the Sandiganbayan committed
no grave abuse of discretion in assuming jurisdiction over said
criminal case, as well as over Criminal Case No. 24778, involving
both of them. Hence, the writ of certiorari cannot issue in
petitioners’ favor.
Extra ruling of the SC:
For the same reason, petitioners’ prayer for a writ of prohibition
must also be denied.
It ’s not a PROVREM 2015  32

First, note that a writ of prohibition is directed to the court itself,
commanding it to cease from the exercise of a jurisdiction to which
it has no legal claim. As earlier discussed, the Sandiganbayan’s
jurisdiction over Criminal Cases Nos. 24777-78 is clearly founded
on law.
Second, being an extraordinary remedy, prohibition cannot be
resorted to when the ordinary and usual remedies provided by law
are adequate and available. Prohibition is granted only where no
other remedy is available or sufficient to afford redress. That the
petitioners have another and complete remedy at law, through an
appeal or otherwise, is generally held sufficient reason for denying
the issuance of the writ.
Third, a writ of prohibition will not be issued against an inferior
court unless the attention of the court whose proceedings are
sought to be stayed has been called to the alleged lack or excess of
jurisdiction. The foundation of this rule is the respect and
consideration due to the lower court and the expediency of
preventing unnecessary litigation;
Nor can petitioners claim entitlement to a writ of mandamus.
Mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused,
of a ministerial duty, this being its chief use and not a discretionary
duty. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same
requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment.
Short digest:
FACTS: Two police officers filed complaint-affidavits against
petitioners Antonio Esquivel, municipal mayor of Jaen, Nueva Ecija
and his brother, Mark Anthony Esquivel, barangay captain of
Barangay Apo, Jaen, Nueva Ecija. They were charged with illegal
arrest, arbitrary detention, maltreatment, attempted murder and
grave threats. After the preliminary investigation, the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon issued a resolution recommending that both
petitioners be indicted for less serious physical injuries and Mayor
Esquivel alone for grave threats. The Ombudsman approved the
resolution. Informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioners pleaded not guilty to the charges.
XI.A.3 MILITANTE V. CA, G.R. NO. 107040, APRIL 12, 2000
SAURA
FACTS:
Petitioner Pilo Militante is the registered owner of three (3)
contiguous parcels of land with an aggregate area of 1,590 square
meters in Balintawak, Caloocan City.
In 1975, President Marcos issued Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1315 expropriating forty (40) hectares of land in Bagong Barrio,
Caloocan City. Almost all of these 40 hectares had been
expropriated as early as 1979 except the 1,590 sq. m. lot of
petitioner.
The land sought to be expropriated under P.D. No. 1315 is defined
as an area "identified as a blighted area and included in the SIR
Program" which means Slum Improvement and Resettlement
Program. On October 2, 1981, however, Human Settlements
Regulatory Commission (HSRC) Commissioner Dizon, Jr. certified
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
that petitioner's lot is "outside the declared Urban Land Reform
Zone."
With this certificate, petitioner asked the National Housing
Authority (NHA) to relocate the squatters on his land. Acting on the
request, General Gaudencio Tobias, NHA General Manager, sent a
letter dated October 6, 1981 to Mayor Macario Asistio, Jr., of
Caloocan City, to conduct a census of the families occupying
petitioner’s lots.
The NHA called the squatters for a dialogue "to look into the
possibility of amicably settling the eviction problem and/or to find
out why a clearance should be issued or not for the
removal/demolition of all the illegal structures in the said property."
The squatters did not attend the meeting. In view of their failure to
attend, Joaquin Castano, Acting Division Manager, Resettlement
Division, NHA, wrote a memorandum to the Department Manager,
Resettlement Department, NHA, recommending the issuance of a
demolition clearance.
On January 21, 1982, NHA General Manager Tobias granted
clearance to dismantle and remove all illegal structures on
petitioner's property within three (3) months from receipt of the
order. Clearance was also granted for the relocation of the 24
families (squatters) to the Sapang Palay Resettlement Project. The
clearance was addressed to Mayor Asistio.
The demolition did not take place. In a letter dated September
16, 1982, General Tobias inquired from Mayor Asistio whether
Caloocan City had plans of developing petitioner's properties in the
Bagong Barrio Project. On December 13, 1982, Mayor Asistio
replied that "considering the said properties are private in
character, the City has no plans presently or in the immediate future
to develop or underwrite the development of said properties."
On September 8, 1990, petitioner, through counsel, requested for a
revalidation of his demolition clearance and relocation of the
squatters.
On January 15, 1991, NHA General Manager Monico Jacob
revalidated the demolition clearance and informed Mayor
Asistio that the NHA was making available enough serviced home
lots in Bagong Silang Resettlement Project for the 24 families.
Respondent Annabelle Carangdang, NHA Project Manager in
Bagong Barrio, refused to implement the clearance to eject the
squatters on petitioner's land. At the conference of February 13,
1991, Carangdang claimed that petitioner’s land had already been
declared expropriated by P.D. 1315.
Petitioner then filed with the respondent Court of Appeals a
"Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus with Declaration as
Inexistent and Unconstitutional Presidential Decree No. 1315"
against the NHA and Carangdang.
In a decision dated April 24, 1992, the respondent Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition.
ISSUE:
It ’s not a PROVREM 2015  33

WON issuance of writ of mandamus will be granted to compel
Carangdang to evict the squatters and demolish their shanties on
the subject property when there is no direct order for her to do so.
RULING:
No. Mandamus is a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board,
or person to do the act required to be done when it or he unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right
or office to which such other is entitled, there being no other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
It is incumbent upon petitioner to show that he has a well-defined,
clear and certain right to warrant the grant of the writ of
mandamus. He failed to discharge this burden. The records show
that there is no direct order from the NHA General Manager
addressed to respondent Carangdang to evict the squatters and
demolish their shanties on the subject property. The NHA
demolition clearance issued by General Tobias on January 21, 1982
was addressed to Mayor Asistio, the mayor of Caloocan City. The
clearance's revalidation by NHA General Manager Monico Jacob was
likewise addressed to Mayor Asistio.
Furthermore, mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that may be
availed of only when there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law. A petition for mandamus is premature
if there are administrative remedies available to the petitioner. If
superior administrative officers could grant the relief prayed for,
special civil actions are generally not entertained. In the instant
case, petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies. He
may seek another demolition order from the NHA General Manager
this time directly addressed to respondent Carangdang or the
pertinent NHA representative. #####
These are other issues in the case other than Mandamus :
On Petitioner’s petition for Prohibition:
Prohibition is a preventive remedy. It seeks for a judgment ordering
the defendant to desist from continuing with the commission of an
act perceived to be illegal.
In the case at bar, petitioner does not pray that respondent
Carangdang should be ordered to desist from relocating the
squatters. What petitioner challenges is respondent Carangdang's
refusal to implement the demolition clearance issued by her
administrative superiors. The remedy for a refusal to discharge a
legal duty is mandamus, not prohibition.
On the petition for the declaration of unconstitutionality of P.D.
1315:
Petitioner's procedure in assailing the constitutionality of P.D. No.
1315 is flawed. His principal concern is the relocation of the
squatters on his land. If he could attain this aim, petitioner himself
admits in his Petition that "there may not be a need for declaring
P.D. No. 1315 null and void." Indeed, petitioner assails P.D. No. 1315,
purely out of pique against respondent Carangdang who refused to
implement the demolition order of her superior. To use petitioner's
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
own words, he has to attack the constitutionality of P.D. No. 1315 "to
. . . break respondent Carangdang's hypocrisy and pretension." We
hold that petitioner has no privilege to assail P.D. No. 1315 as
unconstitutional to serve a petty purpose.
Short digest/Principle (Atty. Acosta issue-ruling type)
Facts: P asked the NHA to relocate the squatters on his land. NHA
General Manager granted clearance to dismantle and remove all
illegal structures on P's property. Clearance was also granted for the
relocation of the squatters. The clearance was addressed to Mayor
A. Demolition did not take place. R, NHA Project Manager, refused to
implement the clearance to eject the squatters on P's land.
Issue: WON issuance of writ of mandamus is proper to compel a
person to do an act when there is no direct order for that person to
do so.
Ruling: No.
Mandamus cannot be granted to compel a person to do an act when
there is no direct order for that person to do so.
Mandamus is a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, or
person to do the act required to be done when it or he unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station.
XI.B • PAMANA V.CA, G.R. NO. 133033, JUNE 15, 2005
EDOMBINGO
PRINCIPLE:
The special civil action of certiorari is directed only against a
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions. Upon the other hand, prohibition is directed against a
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person exercising judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.
Certiorari and prohibition differ as to purpose. Certiorari
is aimed at annulling or modifying a proceeding, prohibition is
directed at commanding the respondent to desist from further
proceedings in the action or matter specified in the petition.
FACTS:
Petitioner filed two (2) separate complaints, both for
forcible entry in the Municipal Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna
against two (2) set of defendants (now, the respondents).
It was alleged that petitioner was the owner and in lawful
possession of parcels of land located at barrios Bocal and Lecheria,
Calamba, Laguna evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Titles; and
that respondents by means of force, strategy and stealth, unlawfully
entered and occupied said parcels of land and built their shanties.
Respondent’s answer denied the material allegations of
the complaints averred that the lots they are occupying are not
owned by the petitioner but owned and registered under the name
of the Philippine Sugar Estate Development Corporation which give
them permission to occupy. Respondents prayed for the dismissal of
the complaints for petitioner’s lack of cause of action against them.
It ’s not a PROVREM 2015  34

MTC tried the cases under the Rules on Summary
Procedure and rendered a joint decision ordering respondents to
vacate the premises.
Respondents went on appeal to the Regional Trial Court at
Calamba, Lagana where it initially set aside the decision of the MTC
and ordered the remand of the cases to the latter for the reason that
the suits could not have been covered by the Rules on Summary
Procedure because the defense interposed by the respondents
raised the question of ownership.
Upon petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, RTC set
aside its decision and affirmed en toto the appealed MTC decision.
Said order become final and executory.
MTC issued a Writ of Execution commanding the sheriff to
cause respondents removal from the premises and to restore
petitioner. The order was followed by a Writ of Demolition ordering
the sheriff to destroy and demolish respondent’s houses and
constructions.
Respondents went to the Court of Appeals via a Petition
for Prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining order
praying to restrain the sheriff from implementing the writ of
demolition. Order of Execution, the Writ of Execution and the Writ
of Demolition are ordered to desist from further implementing.
Petitioner’s motion for consideration having been denied
by the appellate court; hence this petition
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred when it
gave due course and acted favorably on the petition for
prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining order of
a final and executory decision.
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred when it
ruled that the decision of the Municipal Trial Court of
Calamba in Civil cases do not include lots 5 & 7, the
premises occupied by the respondents.
3. Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred when it
prohibited the implementation of the writ of demolition,
as prohibition is a preventive remedy and does not lie to
restrain an act which is already fait accompli.
HELD:
The petition lacks merit.
1. In the petition for prohibition filed by
respondents in CA-G.R. SP No. 45879, they did not seek to
annul or modify the Order of Execution, Writ of Execution
and Writ of Demolition issued by the MTC. What they
there assailed was the sheriffs power and authority to
implement said writs vis--vis the lots actually occupied by
them, namely, Lot No. 5 and Lot No. 7 of TCT Nos. T-66140
and T-61703, respectively, registered in the name of the
Philippine Sugar Estate Development Corporation. It is as
regards those lots that they want the sheriff restrained
and prohibited from implementing said writs, more
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
particularly the writ of demolition. Consequently,
prohibition, not certiorari, is the appropriate remedy for
them.
2. Lots 5 and 7 are never included in the complaints
for ejectment filed by the petitioner before the MTC as it is
under the name of Philippine Sugar Estate Development
Corporation. The sheriff’s act of implementing the writs
on said lots by causing the demolition of respondents’
houses clearly constitutes a violation of his mandate,
restrainable by prohibition.
The Sheriffs Return persuasively proved that the
demolition was effected prior to respondents filing of their petition
for prohibition with the Court of Appeals. Petitioner having failed to
prove its point, the Court of Appeals finding must be left
undisturbed. It appears undisputed that respondents are still in
occupancy of Lots 5 and 7. The implementation of the order of
demolition does not alter that decision of the Court of Appeals from
setting aside the order of execution and writs complained of and
ordering respondents to desist from further implementing the
same.
SHORT DIGEST:
FACTS:
Petitioner filed two (2) separate complaints of forcible
entry in the Municipal Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna against two
(2) set of defendants alleging that petitioner was the owner and in
lawful possession of parcels of land and that respondents by means
of force, strategy and stealth, unlawfully entered and occupied said
parcels of land and built their shanties. Allegations were denied by
respondents saying that the lots they are occupying are not owned
by the petitioner and prayed for the dismissal of the complaints for
petitioner’s lack of cause of action against them. MTC and RTC ruled
in favor of petitioner but reversed by the CA. Petitioner’s motion for
consideration having been denied by the appellate court; hence this
petition
ISSUE:
4. Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred when it
gave due course and acted favorably on the petition for
prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining order of
a final and executory decision.
5. Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred when it
ruled that the decision of the Municipal Trial Court of
Calamba in Civil cases do not include lots 5 & 7, the
premises occupied by the respondents.
6. Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred when it
prohibited the implementation of the writ of demolition,
as prohibition is a preventive remedy and does not lie to
restrain an act which is already fait accompli.
HELD:
The petition lacks merit.
It ’s not a PROVREM 2015  35

3. In the petition for prohibition filed by
respondents in CA-G.R. SP No. 45879, they did not seek to
annul or modify the Order of Execution, Writ of Execution
and Writ of Demolition issued by the MTC. What they
there assailed was the sheriffs power and authority to
implement said writs vis--vis the lots actually occupied by
them, namely, Lot No. 5 and Lot No. 7 of TCT Nos. T-66140
and T-61703, respectively, registered in the name of the
Philippine Sugar Estate Development Corporation. It is as
regards those lots that they want the sheriff restrained
and prohibited from implementing said writs, more
particularly the writ of demolition. Consequently,
prohibition, not certiorari, is the appropriate remedy for
them.
4. Lots 5 and 7 are never included in the complaints
for ejectment filed by the petitioner before the MTC as it is
under the name of Philippine Sugar Estate Development
Corporation. The sheriff’s act of implementing the writs
on said lots by causing the demolition of respondents’
houses clearly constitutes a violation of his mandate,
restrainable by prohibition.
The Sheriffs Return persuasively proved that the
demolition was effected prior to respondents filing of their petition
for prohibition with the Court of Appeals. Petitioner having failed to
prove its point, the Court of Appeals finding must be left
undisturbed. It appears undisputed that respondents are still in
occupancy of Lots 5 and 7. The implementation of the order of
demolition does not alter that decision of the Court of Appeals from
setting aside the order of execution and writs complained of and
ordering respondents to desist from further implementing the
same.
• Araullo, id. AMORES
• ENRIQUEZ V. MACADAEG, G.R. NO. L-2422, SEPTEMBER 30,
1949 DAPANAS
Principle/s:
When the "venue is improperly laid", as the action sought to be
dismissed affects title to and the recovery of possession of real
property. Mandamus is not the proper remedy for correcting that
error, for this is not a case where a tribunal "unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office" or "unlawfully excludes another from the
use and enjoyment of a right." It is rather a case where a judge is
proceeding in defiance of the Rules of Court by refusing to dismiss
an action which would not be maintained in his court.
The remedy in such case is prohibition and that remedy is available
in the present case because the order complained of, being merely
of an interlocutory nature, is not appealable.
Bar Alike Question:
X filed a petition for a writ of mandamus against Judge Y when the
latter denied their motion to dismiss the case filed by Z on the
ground, among others, that, as the action concerned title to and
possession of real estate venue was improperly laid. Is the judge
correct in denying the motion to dismiss? Is the writ of mandamus
is the proper remedy? Rule.
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
Facts:
A petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent judge
to dismiss a civil action. In question is for the recovery of a piece of
real property situated in Negros Oriental, the complaint alleging
that the said property had been bought by plaintiff at an execution
sale but the judgment debtor, as supposed owner, subsequently
mortgaged the same to the PNB and refused to surrender
possession to plaintiff. The latter brought suit to have himself
declared owner of said property and placed in possession thereof.
Before filing their answer, the defendants (now petitioner) in that
case moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground, among
others, that, as the action concerned title to and possession of real
estate situated in Negros Oriental, venue was improperly laid in the
Court of First Instance of Cebu. The motion having been denied, the
defendants filed the present petition for mandamus to compel the
respondent judge to dismiss the action. The respondent judge puts
up the defense that the act sought to be ordered involves the
exercise of judicial discretion and that petitioner has another
adequate remedy, which is by appeal.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the respondent judge is correct when it denied
petitioner motion for dismissal on the ground, among others, that,
as the action concerned title to and possession of real estate
situated in Negros Oriental, venue was improperly laid in the Court
of First Instance of Cebu.
In relation to, whether or not the writ of mandamus is the proper
remedy for petitioner to file?
Held:
1st issue:
NO. The Rules of Court requires that actions affecting title to or
recovery of possession of real property be commenced and tried in
the province where the property lies, while the defendant may,
within the time for pleading, file a motion to dismiss the action
when "venue is improperly laid." In this case, as the action sought to
be dismissed affects title to and the recovery of possession of real
property situated in Oriental Negros, it is obvious that the action
was improperly brought in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The
motion to dismiss was therefore proper and should have been
granted.
2nd issue:
NO. While the respondent judge committed a manifest error in
denying the motion, mandamus is not the proper remedy for
correcting that error, for this is not a case where a tribunal
"unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office" or "unlawfully
excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right." It is rather
a case where a judge is proceeding in defiance of the Rules of Court
by refusing to dismiss an action which would not be maintained in
his court.
The remedy in such case is prohibition and that remedy is available
in the present case because the order complained of, being merely
of an interlocutory nature, is not appealable.
Though, the SC ruled that While the petition is for mandamus, the
same may well be treated as one for prohibition by waiving strict
adherence to technicalities in the interest of a speedy
administration of justice pursuant.
It ’s not a PROVREM 2015  36
 Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
Wherefore, let a writ of prohibition issue, enjoining the respondent
judge or his successor from taking cognizance of this case unless it
be to dismiss the same in accordance with the Rules. Without costs.
So ordered.

It ’s not a PROVREM 2015  37