EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 304 August 31, 1987 NOW, THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, public order so require.
public order so require. In issuing travel
AUTHORIZING THE TASK FORCE ON
REFUGEE ASSISTANCE AND
ADMINISTRATION AND THE DEPARTMENT
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO RESPECTIVELY
ISSUE IDENTITY PAPERS AND TRAVEL
DOCUMENTS TO REFUGEES STAYING IN
THE PHILIPPINES AND PRESCRIBING
GUIDELINES THEREFOR
WHEREAS, the Republic of the Philippines is a
signatory to the 1951 Convention (and the 1967
Protocol) Relating to the Status of Refugees;
WHEREAS, pursuant to Articles 27 and 28 of the
1951 Convention, the Philippines undertakes to
issue identity papers to any refugee in the
Philippines who does not possess a valid travel
document, and to issue travel document to
refugees lawfully staying in the Philippines to
enable them to travel outside Philippine territory,
unless compelling reasons of national security or
public sector otherwise require; and
WHEREAS, under Article 35 (1) of the 1951
Convention, the Philippines undertakes to
cooperate with the Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees, or any other
agency of the United Nations which may
succeed it, in the exercise of its functions, and
shall in particular facilitate its duty of supervising
the application of the provisions of the said
Convention;
1
President of the Philippines, by virtue of the documents, the DFA shall in particular give
powers vested in me by law, and in order to sympathetic consideration to refugees who are
effect the needed assistance to refugees unable to obtain travel documents from the
reaching the Philippines, do hereby order: country of their lawful residence.
Sec. 1. For the purpose of implementing Article Sec. 4. The travel documents to be issued
27 of the 1951 Convention on the Status of pursuant to this Order shall be similar to the
Refugees, the Task Force on Refugee specimen annexed to the 1951 Convention on
Assistance and Administration (TFRAA) created Refugees. They shall also be subject to the
under Executive Order No. 554 dated August 21, provisions of the "Schedule" attached to the text
1974 is hereby authorized and directed to issue of the 1951 Convention.
identity papers to any refugee staying in the
Philippines who does not possess a valid travel Sec. 5. This Executive Order shall take effect
document. For this purpose, the TFRAA is immediately. lawphi1.net
hereby authorized to conduct such investigations
as may be necessary and practicable to the end DONE in the City of Manila, this 31st day of
that only lawfully staying refugees are issued August, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen
identity papers, and that the information stated in hundred and eighty-seven.
such documents are authentic.
Sec. 2. In effecting Article 28 of the above-
mentioned Convention, the Department of
Foreign Affairs (DFA) is hereby authorized to
issue to refugees lawfully staying in the
Philippines travel documents to enable them to
travel outside Philippine territory, subject to the
guidelines hereinbelow prescribed.
Sec. 3. No travel document/s shall be issued to a
refugee without the favorable recommendation of
the TFRAA, and such other documents as may
be reasonably required by the DFA. Upon
information obtained by the DFA, it may deny
issuance of travel documents to any refugee
when compelling reasons of national security or
TIMELINE: PHILIPPINE LAWS AND POLICIES ON
REFUGEES
MANILA, Philippines – The United Nations (UN)
General Assembly decided in 2000 to celebrate
World Refugee Day every June 20.
To this day, there are millions of refugees
worldwide in search of a safe place. Some of
them have been forced to flee their home country
due to war, while others are running away from
conflict and persecution.
The UN defines "refugee" as "any person who:
owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted
for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group, or
political opinion, is outside the country of his
nationality, and is unable to or, owing to such
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection
of that country."
In the past, the Philippines had taken in
thousands of refugees – all coming from different
parts of the world. Some have relocated to
different areas, while others remained and
established themselves here in our country.
Here are laws and policies set by the previous
government. See how they covered the groups
of refugees that fled to the country.
2
August 21, 1937
President Manuel Quezon
issued Proclamation No. 173
With Chinese refugees fleeing from the
advancing Imperial Japanese forces in mainland
China, Quezon directed government agencies in
Manila, Baguio, Rizal, and the Mountain
Province to provide aid for refugees especially
Filipinos and Americans in China who fled to our
country.
September 8, 1937
Quezon authorized the admission of ethnic
German and German Jews refugees
Quezon allowed a large group of ethnic German
and German Jews to enter Manila aboard the
Norddeutscher Lloyd steamship, Gneisenau. He
also formed the Jewish Refugee Committee to
assist these refugees.
November 10, 1937
Quezon declared a policy of absolute
neutrality during the Spanish Civil War
In a letter sent to the Rector of the San Juan de
Letran College, Quezon said he and the
government do not, and cannot, approve of the
Philippines "being converted into a theater of
propaganda." He further explained that the
Philippines has no reason to take sides, and said
that our interest must be limited only to see
peace be re-established in Spain.
February 15, 1939
The Philippine government opened its doors
to political refugees with professional
qualifications
Quezon sent a message to Congress and urged
members to allow more German Jewish
professionals, initially planning on taking as
much as 10,000 refugees – resettling them in
farming communities in hopes of helping the
Philippine economy.
April 23, 1940
Quezon donated Marikina land to the Jewish
refugees
Seven-and-a-half hectares of Quezon’s country
estate were donated as working farms for the
refugees. He said in his speech, “It is my hope,
and indeed my expectation, that the people of
the Philippines will have in the future every
reason to be glad that when the time of need
came, their country was willing to extend a hand
of welcome.”
July 1, 1940
Quezon signed Proclamation No. 570
With the expansion of the Imperial Japanese,
residents of the then British colony of Hong Kong
fled to the Philippines, which led Quezon to sign
the proclamation.
August 26, 1940
Quezon signed Commonwealth Act 613 (The
Philippines Immigration Act of 1940)
The law stated: For humanitarian reasons, and
when not opposed to the public interest, [the
President has the power] to admit aliens who are
refugees for religious, political, or racial reasons,
in such classes of cases and under such
conditions as he may prescribe.
June 21, 1949
The Cabinet approved the request of the
International Refugee Organization for a 4-
month extension of the stay of the White
Russian refugees
In December 1948, White Russian refugees fled
to the Philippines in fear of persecution from the
Bolshevik Red Army. President Elpidio Quirino
offered to the 8,000 evacuees the choice to stay
in the former naval base of Tubabao Island in
Guiuan, Samar. A 4-month extension was
granted to them in 1949, and some were even
allowed to visit Manila. (READ: PH a 'paradise'
for White Russian refugees and IN PHOTOS:
The life of White Russian refugees in PH)
August 21, 1979
President Ferdinand Marcos issued
Executive Order No. 554, establishing a Task
Force on International Refugee Assistance
and Administration
3
This executive order was issued to build refugee
processing centers and to work with the United
Nations High Commission for Refugees
(UNHCR) in helping refugees. It assigned
Ulugan Bay and Tara Island in Palawan as
preliminary refugee processing centers.
January 21, 1980
The Philippine Refugee Processing Center
was inaugurated in Morong, Bataan
This served as a holding center for Indochinese
refugees prior to their relocation and settlement
in the US, Canada, France, Australia, and other
countries. It was funded by the UNHCR, and also
provided English as a Second Language (ESL)
classes and primary education programs.
July 22, 1981
The Philippines acceded to the 1951
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees
and its 1967 Protocol
Its legal framework was implemented through
Department Order No. 94 issued by the
Department of Justice (DOJ), which established
a refugee status determination procedure.
August 31, 1987
President Corazon Aquino issued Executive
Order No. 304
EO 304 authorized the Task Force on Refugee
Assistance and Administration and the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) to
respectively issue identity papers and travel
documents to refugees staying in the Philippines.
The Task Force was reconstituted the following
year.
March 7, 1995
President Fidel Ramos ordered the closure of
the Philippine Refugee Processing Center by
virtue of Memorandum Order No. 267
Due to the significant decrease of refugees, the
UNHCR – which exclusively funds the refugee
center – asked that the refugee center be closed.
The facilities were then turned over to the
Philippine government to be used for other
purposes, once no longer required for the
refugee program. It provided food, shelter, and
education to about 400,000 refugees.
1996
"Viet Ville” was established in Palawan.
With the Indochinese refugee program in
Palawan slated to be closed by the Ramos
administration, some refugees were still left in
Palawan – including the Vietnamese refugees
who were prevented from visiting their families in
Vietnam due to issues of the legality of their
status. The Catholic Bishops' Conference of the
Philippines (CBCP) requested the Philippine
government to allow 2,710 Vietnamese refugees
to remain in the Philippines indefinitely, leading
to the establishment of “Viet Ville” – a
Vietnamese refugee settlement in Palawan
sponsored by Vietnamese communities around
the world and supported by the Center for
Assistance to Displaced Persons (CADP) of the
CBCP.
1998
The Department of Justice formed a Refugee
Processing Unit (RPU)
May 18, 2015
The Philippines opened its doors to the
Rohingya "boat people"
The government announced it is open to
providing shelter to up to 3,000 "boat people"
from Myanmar and Bangladesh.

The unit, however, did not grant authorization to

cater to the needs of stateless individuals.

May 30, 2011

President Benigno Aquino III signed the
instrument of ratification of the 1954 UN
Convention relating to the Status of Stateless
Persons

It was submitted to the UN on September 22,

2011. It resulted to the change in name of the
RPU to the Refugee and Stateless Persons
Protection Unit (RSPPU).

October 18, 2012

The Department of Justice issues Department
Circular No. 058 – Rules on “Establishing the
Refugee and Stateless Status Determination
Procedure”

Under these rules, groups of refugees and

stateless persons will be given access to an
efficient process application for the granting of a
refugee or a stateless status.

4
July 29, 2015
G.R. No. 210412
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
KAMRAN F. KARBASI, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
The Contracting States shall as far as possible
facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of
refugees. They shall in particular make every effort to
expedite naturalization proceedings and to reduce as
far as possible the charges and costs of such
proceedings. 1
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court assailing the January 29, 2013
Decision2 and the November 27, 20133 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 01126-
MIN, which affirmed the January 17, 2007 Order of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, Dipolog
City (RTC), in a naturalization case docketed as
Naturalization Case No. 2866. The RTC order granted
the petition for naturalization and, thus, admitted
Karman F. Karbasi as a citizen of the Philippines.
The Facts
On June 25, 2002, Kamran F. Karbasi (Karbasi) filed
a petition for naturalization with the RTC, where he
alleged the following:
1. His full name is Kamran F. Karbasi;
5
2. He is recognized as a Person of Concern by the
United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) as shown in a certification duly
issued by the UNHCR;
3. He is presently residing with his family at 341
Burgos Street, Dipolog City, since early part of June
2000 and more so has resided continuously in the
Philippines for not less than 11 years immediately
preceding the date of this petition; to wit, since 11 July
1990 and in Dipolog City for more than one (1) year;
4. His last place of foreign residence was Pakistan
and his other places of residence, prior to his present
residence, were as follows (i) Panay Ave., Quezon
City; (ii) Sta. Filomena, Dipolog City; (iii) Capitol Area,
Dumaguete City; (iv) Dohinob, Roxas, Zamboanga
del Norte;
5. He was born on 4 September 1966 in Tehran, Iran,
as shown in his identity card which also serves as his
birth certificate;
6. He is married and is the father of one (1) child;
7. His wife Cliji G. Lim Karbasi is a Filipino citizen, 22
years old and born on 10 August 1979 in Cebu City,
whom he married on 12 October 2000 in Dipolog City,
as shown in
their certificate of marriage;
8. His child, Keenyji L. Karbasi, 1-year old , was born
on 9 June 2001 in Dipolog City and presently residing
with him and his wife at 341 Burgos Street, Dipolog
City;
9. He arrived in Manila, Philippines, under an
assumed name (Syed Gul Agha) from Pakistan on 11
July 1990 specifically at the Manila International
Airport on board Philippine Airlines Flight No. 731, per
UNHCR certification containing reference to his
Pakistani passport issued under said assumed name;
10. Due to his marriage, he is entitled to the benefit of
Section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, which
reduced to five years the ten year requirement of
continuous residence;
11. He speaks and writes English and Visayan;
12. His trade or occupation is as a repair technician in
which he has been engaged since 1998 and, as such,
he derives an average annual income of Php
80,000.00 more or less;
13. He has all the qualifications required under
Section 2 and none of the disqualifications under
Section 4, of the Commonwealth Act No. 473;
14. He has complied with the requirements of the
Naturalization Law (Commonwealth Act No. 473)
regarding the filing with the Office of the Solicitor
General of his bona fide intention to become a citizen
of the Philippines, as shown in his Declaration of
Intention duly filed on 25 May 2001;
15. It is his intention in good faith to become a citizen
of the Philippines and to renounce absolutely and
forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince,
potentate, state or sovereignty, and particularly to Iran
of which, at this time, he is a citizen or subject; that he
will reside continuously in the Philippines from the
date of filing of this petition up to the time of his
admission to Philippine citizenship;
16. Dominador Natividad Tagulo, of legal age,
Filipino, married and residing at ABC Compound,
Quezon Ave., Miputak, Dipolog City and Alton C.
Ratificar, of legal age, Filipino, married and residing at
047 Burgos Street, Dipolog City, who are Filipino
citizens, whose affidavits are attached to his petition,
will appear and testify as witnesses at the hearing
thereof.
[Emphasis Supplied]
On July 2, 2002, after finding the petition sufficient in
form and substance, the RTC issued an order setting
the petition for hearing on October 21, 2002 and
ordering the publication thereof, once a week for three
(3) consecutive weeks, in the Official Gazette and in a
newspaper of general circulation in Zamboanga del
Norte and in the cities of Dipolog and Dapitan. In the
same Order, persons concerned were enjoined to
show cause, if any, why the petition should not be
granted and oppose the petition.
On July 22, 2002, the RTC amended its previous
order and, with notice to the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), reset the hearing on September 10,
2003 instead because the National Printing Office
could no longer accommodate the publication
requirement before the first hearing date.
On December 2, 9 and 16, 2002, copies of the
amended order and Karbasi’s petition were published
in the Official Gazette. Subsequently, the same were
published in Press Freedom on January 27, February
3 and 10, 2003. The said copies were likewise posted
on the bulletin boards of the RTC and the Municipal
Building of Roxas, Zamboanga del Norte and Capitol
Building, Dipolog City.
6
On September 10, 2003, Karbasi and his counsel
appeared and presented proof of compliance with the
jurisdictional requirements. Nobody appeared to
interpose an objection to the petition. During the
hearing on May 18, 2006, Alton C.
Ratificar (Ratificar) and Dominador Natividad
Tagulo (Tagulo) testified as character witnesses.
Ratificar testified that in 1990, he was introduced to
Karbasi whose house was located about 30 meters
away from his; that he came to know him since then;
that when Karbasi got married, he was invited to the
wedding ceremony where the then City Mayor of
Dipolog was one of the wedding sponsors; that he
also attended the celebration; that he used to see
Karbasi almost every day as he owned an electronics
repair shop near his house; that Karbasi would also
allow neighbors, who did not own television sets at
home, to watch shows at his repair shop; that he
never heard of any complaint by the neighbors
against Karbasi, who went to church during Sundays
and even on weekdays; that on several occasions, he
was invited to Karbasi’s home, where he observed his
good relationship with his in-laws and his treatment of
his wife and child which was in accordance with
Filipino customs; and that Karbasi talked to him in
both Visayan and English.
For his part, witness Tagulo testified that he worked at
the Andres Bonifacio College and had known Karbasi
since July 1990 when the latter was then enrolled in a
vocational course; that Karbasi was very respectful to
his instructors and that he had good grades; that he
treated his schoolmates in accordance with Filipino
customs; that he never showed any inclination to
violence; that when Karbasi transferred to Dumaguete
City, he visited him there; and that during this visits,
Tagulo witnessed how Karbasi socially interacted and
mingled with the rest of the community.
On August 10, 2006, the wife of Karbasi, Cliji G.
Lim (Cliji), also took the witness stand. She testified
that her father introduced her to Karbasi during her
graduation party; that a courtship followed thereafter
for five months, during which Karbasi was well-
behaved and acted like any other Filipino; that when
Karbasi proposed marriage to her, he was
accompanied by his brother, Ali Karbasi; that
Karbasi’s baptism as a Catholic coincided with her
birthday; that after their marriage, they begot two (2)
children; that Karbasi continuously stayed with his
family and never returned to Iran; that he was a good
husband, father and provider; that all his income from
the repair shop was turned over to her for the
budgeting of the family’s expenses; and that he was
then earning a daily income of P1,000.00.
She added that Karbasi and his family regularly
attended the Catholic mass and received communion;
that they were active members of Couples for Christ
since 2003; that he actively participated in Catholic
practices like the novena and vigil for her deceased
grandfather; that Karbasi was not a polygamist and
that he did not flirt with other women; that she never
heard her husband speak of any terrorist groups; and
that he was never known to have an immoral
reputation.
On several hearing dates thereafter, Karbasi himself
took the witness stand. As summarized by the RTC,
the gist of his testimony is as follows:
He is an Iranian national. He was born in Tehran,
Iran, and resided there since birth up to 1986. His
father is Abdolhossein Karbasi, a doctor in Iran, and
his mother is Narjes Froghnia Karbasi, a retired
teacher.
He has five brothers and two sisters. The eldest of the
brood, Hamid Reza Karbasi, is in the United States of
America and is now an American Citizen. The
second, Dr. Ali Reza Karbasi, admitted as Filipino
citizen in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Dipolog
City, is in the Philippines. The third is Qite Karbasi, his
sister. The fourth, his brother, Dr. Abduoul Reza
Karbasi, graduated in India. The fifth, his sister, Kia
Karbasi, is a nurse. The sixth, his brother Qolam
Reza Karbasi, is an engineer who graduated in
France. His last four siblings are all in Iran.
He was a Shiite Muslim before he was converted as
Roman Catholic. His former religion believes in the
existence of a Supreme Being called God. It believes
in the existence of government and repudiates
violence. His said religion is not within an organization
of Al Qaeda, Jemayah Islamiya, or any terrorist group.
It also adheres to the principle of one man-one
woman marital relation. He and his brother, Ali Reza
Karbasi, left Iran in 1986 because of the war between
Iran and Iraq at that time. When the Shah of Iran,
Pahlavi, was overthrown by Ayatolah Khomini in
1979, some Iranian nationals left Iran. He and Ali
Reza, who also condemns the act of overthrowing an
existing government by force and violence, were
among those who left. Since the government
confiscated his passport, they traveled by camel and
passed by the desert during night time to reach
Pakistan. He stayed there for almost three (3) years,
Being foreigners in Pakistan, they submitted
themselves to the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees. However, they were not granted the
status of refugee right away since Pakistan is
adjacent to Iran. They had to transfer to a third
country not at war with Iran. Since his brother Ali
Reza was already studying in the Philippines, they
decided to come here.
7
As it was difficult for him to get travel documents,
petitioner procured a Pakistani passport under the
assumed name of Syed Gul Agha.
Upon his arrival in the Philippines on July 11, 1990,
he submitted himself to the United Nations in Manila.
After several interviews, he was admitted as a
refugee and, later on, as a person of concern. As a
refugee, he was granted by the United Nations
allowances, medical benefits and protection to some
extent.
After having been interviewed by the Solicitor General
regarding his intention to become a Filipino citizen, he
filed the corresponding Declaration of Intention, dated
March 28, 2001, on May 25, 2001.
Sometime in 2002, petitioner, having signified his
intention to become a Filipino citizen, was issued a
certification captioned "UN High Commissioner for
Refugees, Liaison Office for the Philippines," dated 25
June 2002, certifying that he has been recognized as
a person of concern who arrived in the Philippines on
11 July 1990 on board Philippine Airlines flight 731
under an assumed name (Syed Gul Agha).
At the time of the filing of the petition, he was already
married and residing at 341 Burgos Street, Dipolog
City. However, upon arrival in the Philippines, he first
resided at Panay Avenue, Quezon City, where he
stayed for almost six months. During those times, the
United Nations provided him a monthly allowance of
P2,800.00, being a refugee. He then transferred to
Burgos Street, Miputak, Dipolog City, where he
stayed at the house of the fatherin- law of his brother
Ali Reza for a month.
He then moved to Sta. Filomena, Dipolog City, at the
house of his sister-in-law. It was during this time that
he enrolled at Andres Bonifacio College where he
studied from 1990 to 1992. He finished a two-year
vocational course in said school as evidenced by a
Diploma issued by the Andres Bonifacio College,
Dipolog City. In Iran, he finished Bachelor of Science
in Economics.
He then pursued a four-year course (Bachelor of
Science in Industrial Technology Major in Electronics)
at the Central Visayas Polytechnic College in
Dumaguete City. He resided in the Capitol Area of
said city. He was already receiving a monthly
allowance of P4,800.00 from the United Nations at
that time. He graduated from said institution as
evidenced by a Diploma issued by said school. He
also attended technical trainings conducted by Asian
Durables Manufacturing, Inc. as evidenced by a
Certificate of Attendance issued by said company.
In 1996, he returned to Dipolog City and resided at
Burgos Street where he opened his electronics repair
shop (KX3 Electronics Repair Shop).
On October 12, 2000, he got married. The couple
transferred to the house of his parents-in-law after the
marriage. When the grandfather of his wife got ill, they
were requested to take care of him. Thus, the couple
transferred their residence to Dohinob, Roxas.
However, they moved back to their house in Burgos
Street, Dipolog City, as it is nearer to a hospital.
When his grandfather-in-law died, he participated in
all the rites and ceremonies relative to his wake and
burial.
At present, his repair shop’s gross monthly income
hovers between P20,000.00 to P25,000.00."4
Additionally, Karbasi claimed that he had never been
involved in any demonstration or mass action
protesting any issuances, policies or acts of the
Philippine Government and its officials; that he had
never made any rebellious or seditious utterances;
that he believed in the principles underlying the
Philippine Constitution and he had even memorized
the preamble; and that he can also sing the Philippine
National Anthem and recite the Filipino Patriotic
Pledge, both of which he did in open court.
The following documents were proffered in Karbasi’s
Formal Offer of Exhibits: 1] Identity Card issued by
Iran to prove his Iranian citizenship; 2] Pakistani
passport with visa under the assumed name of Syed
Gul Agha; 3] Certifications and Identification Card
issued by the UNHCR to prove his status as a
refugee and, later, as a "person of concern"; 4] Alien
Certificate of Registration; 5] Certifications to prove
Filipino nationality of Karbasi’s wife, Cliji G. Lim; 6]
Certificate of Marriage between Karbasi and Cliji; 7]
Certificates of Live Birth of his children Keenyji and
Kerl Jasmen; 8] Karbasi’s Certificate of Baptism; 9]
Affidavits of his character witnesses Alton C. Ratificar
and Dominador Tagulo; 10] Police and NBI
Clearances; 11] Certifications and Diploma to prove
his completion of vocational technology, BS Industrial
Technology, and training seminars; 12] Alien
Employment Permit for Refugees; 13] Business
Permit, Clearances and DTI Certificates of
Accreditation to KX3 Repair Shop, Karbasi’s source of
livelihood; 14] Income Tax Returns for the years 2001
to 2005; and 15] Contract of Service with Quality
Circuits Services, Inc. and Kolins Philippines Intl. Inc.,
including a Summary of Accounts paid to KX3
Electronics Repair Shop.5
On January 17, 2007, the RTC found Karbasi’s
evidence sufficient to support his petition. Finding
Karbasi as possessing all the qualifications and none
of the disqualifications to become a Filipino citizen,
8
the RTC rendered its decision, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition
for naturalization filed by KAMRAN F. KARBASI to be
admitted as citizen of the Philippines is hereby
GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.6
Not in conformity, the Republic of the Philippines,
through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), interposed an appeal to the CA,
based mainly on the ground that the RTC erred in
granting Karbasi’s petition as he failed to comply with
the provisions of Commonwealth Act No.
473 (Naturalization Law) on character, income and
reciprocity. Specifically, the OSG pointed out that
Karbasi failed to establish that: 1] Iran grants
reciprocal rights of naturalization to Filipino citizens; 2]
he has a lucrative income as required under the law;
and 3] he is of good moral character as shown by his
disregard of Philippine tax laws when he had
underdeclared his income in his income tax returns
(ITRs) and overstated the same in his petition for
naturalization.
On January 29, 2013, the CA rendered the assailed
decision affirming the grant of Filipino citizenship to
Karbasi. The dispositive portion of the CA decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal
is DENIED. The Decision dated 17 January 2007 of
the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City, Branch 10 in
Naturalization Case No. 2866 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.7
The CA ruled that the alleged under declaration in
Karbasi’s ITRs was prepared in good faith because
he was of the belief that he no longer needed to
include the income he received as payment of his
services to Daewoo Electronics Electronics Services,
Inc. (Daewoo) and Kolins Philippines International,
Inc. (Kolins), because the same were already withheld
at source. The CA likewise affirmed the RTC finding
that Karbasi, as a refugee, need not prove reciprocity
between Philippine and Iranian laws.
Hence, this petition.
Position of the OSG
The OSG asserts that the findings of the courts a
quo are not in accord with law and jurisprudence
because Karbasi failed to prove that he had a
lucrative income and an irreproachable character. It
insists that Karbasi failed to establish his lucrative
income considering that at the time of the filing of his
petition for naturalization in 2002, his gross income
was P21,868.65. Per table of Annual Income and
Expenditure in Western Mindanao, the average
income for the year 2000 was P86,135.00 and for
2003 was P93,000.00. This shows that Karbasi’s
declared gross income was way below the average
income and average expenses in Western Mindanao,
the region where Dipolog City, his residence, is
located. The OSG argues that even if the subsequent
years were to be considered, Karbasi’s income was
still insufficient as compared to the average income
and expenditure in the area. Karbasi’s declared
income for the years 2003, 2004 and 2005 were
P31,613.00, P41,200.00 and P39,020.00,
respectively. The same table presentation, however,
provides that the average expenditure for the year
2000 was P69,452.00, and for the year 2003 was
P75,000.00. This shows that Karbasi’s declared gross
income was not enough to support his family within
the contemplation of the law. Whether based on his
testimony or on his ITRs, Karbasi’s gross income was
not adequate, given the high cost of living prevailing
in the region. The OSG also mentions that Karbasi’s
child had started formal schooling which would entail
substantial income on the part of Karbasi, so that he
could meet his family’s needs.
The OSG cites the discrepancy between his petition
for naturalization and his ITRs as another reason to
deny his application for Filipino citizenship. An
examination of the petition discloses that Karbasi
claimed an annual income of P80,000.00. He had
also declared in his testimony that he was earning
P20,000.00 to P25,000.00, monthly, from his
electronic repair shop. His ITRs on the other hand,
show his gross income as P14,870.00 in 2001;
P21,868.65 in 2002; P31,613.00 in 2003; P41,200.00
in 2004; and P39,020.00 in 2005.
The OSG further argues that the "underdeclaration" of
Karbasi’s income in his ITRs reflects his disregard of
Philippine tax laws and, worse, its overstatement in
his petition indicates his intent to make it appear that
there was compliance with the Naturalization Law,
when there was actually none. According to the OSG,
this negates irreproachable behavior which required
of every applicant for naturalization because the
failure to enter the true income on the tax return is
indicative of dishonesty. The OSG cited the ruling
in Republic v. Yao,8 where the Court ordered the
cancellation of the naturalization certificate issued to
the applicant therein upon the discovery of his
underdeclaration and underpayment of income tax. In
the OSG’s words, "[u]nderdeclaration of income is a
serious matter that it is used as a ground to cancel
the certificate of naturalization. If the court can
reverse the decision in an application for
naturalization, with more reason can underdeclaration
9
be considered in denying an application," as in
Karbasi’s case.9
Position of Karbasi
In the April 7, 2014 Resolution of the Court, Karbasi
was required to file a comment on the petition in
which he mainly argued that the petition did not raise
questions of law but questions of facts which were too
unsubstantial to require consideration. He countered
that while, admittedly, the "lucrative trade/occupation"
requirement under the law must be complied with, it
has been emphasized in jurisprudence that, the
objective of this economic requirement is to ensure
that the applicant should not become a public charge
or an economic burden upon the society.10Karbasi
claims that he had more than satisfactorily
established his lucrative trade or occupation, showing
that he would become a citizen who could contribute
to national progress. This has been clearly and
unanimously appreciated by the RTC and the CA.
Karbasi also avers that the analysis of the OSG with
respect to the data on Annual Income and
Expenditure in Western Mindanao is misplaced.
Firstly, the data presented were merely statistical and
not actual, and did not reflect the circumstances
relative to a specific subject or person. Hence, these
are greatly unreliable with respect to a specific person
in a naturalization case. At best, it was only intended
for the purpose it was made – for planning and for
policy making of the government and not to determine
whether a certain trade, occupation or income is
lucrative or not.
Anent the allegation that the underdeclaration of his
income projects was a flaw on his moral character,
Karbasi point out that he had sincerely explained that
his failure to declare his correct annual income was in
good faith not intended to commit fraud. He believed
that the other sources of his income apart from his
repair shop had already been withheld by the
companies for whom he had rendered services. For
Karbasi, the meaning of "irreproachable" as required
by the law does not mean "perfectly faultless."
On September 18, 2014, Karbasi moved for leave of
court to file a supplemental pleading, in which he
insisted that pursuant to the 1951 Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, to which
the Philippines was a signatory, the country was
bound to safeguard the rights and well-being of the
refugees and to ensure the facility of their local
integration including naturalization. Karbasi reasoned
that this was precisely why Department Circular 58
Series of 2012 was issued by the Department of
Justice (DOJ). Under the said circular, the Refugees
and Stateless Persons Unit was created not only to
facilitate the identification and determination of
refugees but also for the protection of these refugees.
Karbasi insisted that unlike any other alien applying
for naturalization, he had to leave Iran out of fear of
persecution without any mental and financial
preparation, and only with a view of finding safe
refuge in the Philippines.
Reply of OSG
In its Reply, the OSG contended that Karbasi could
not downplay the significance of the Data on Annual
Income and Expenditure in Western Mindanao, as it
was an accurate illustration of the financial condition
of a typical family in a particular region. The said table
was prepared by the National Statistics Coordination
Board (NSCB), which strengthened the credibility of
the report. The OSG explained that whether the data
were statistical or actual, the numbers still reflected
the financial standing of Karbasi. It followed then that
Karbasi could not claim good faith in failing to declare
the income he gained from his transactions with
several companies. He even failed to present a
certificate of tax withheld to show that these
companies had actually remitted the withholding taxes
due to the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Even
assuming that Karbasi’s declared income allegedly
excluded the amount withheld by these companies,
the OSG claimed that his income would still be below
the standard income and expenditure per the table.
The Court’s Ruling
The Court is confronted with the issue of whether or
not the CA had correctly affirmed the RTC decision
granting Karbasi’s application for naturalization
despite the opposition posed by the OSG.
Citizenship is personal and, more or less a permanent
membership in a political community. It denotes
possession within that particular political community
of full civil and political rights subject to special
disqualifications. Reciprocally, it imposes the duty of
allegiance to the political community.11 The core of
citizenship is the capacity to enjoy political rights, that
is, the right to participate in government principally
through the right to vote, the right to hold public office
and the right to petition the government for redress of
grievance.12
No less than the 1987 Constitution enumerates who
are Filipino citizens.13 Among those listed are citizens
by naturalization. Naturalization refers to the legal act
of adopting an alien and clothing him with the
privilege of a native-born citizen. Under the present
laws, the process of naturalization can be judicial or
administrative. Judicially, the Naturalization Law
10
provides that after hearing the petition for citizenship
and the receipt of evidence showing that the petitioner
has all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications required by law, the competent court
may order the issuance of the proper naturalization
certificate and its registration in the proper civil
registry. On the other hand, Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9139 provides that aliens born and residing in the
Philippines may be granted Philippine citizenship by
administrative proceeding by filing a petition for
citizenship with the Special Committee, which, in view
of the facts before it, may approve the petition and
issue a certificate of naturalization.14 In both cases,
the petitioner shall take an oath of allegiance to the
Philippines as a sovereign nation.
It is a well-entrenched rule that Philippine citizenship
should not easily be given away.15 All those seeking
to acquire it must prove, to the satisfaction of the
Court, that they have complied with all the
requirements of the law. The reason for this
requirement is simple. Citizenship involves political
status; hence, every person must be proud of his
citizenship and should cherish it. Naturalization is not
a right, but one of privilege of the most discriminating,
as well as delicate and exacting nature, affecting, as it
does, public interest of the highest order, and which
may be enjoyed only under the precise conditions
prescribed by law therefor.16
Jurisprudence dictates that in judicial naturalization,
the application must show substantial and formal
compliance with the law. In other words, an applicant
must comply with the jurisdictional requirements;
establish his or her possession of the qualifications
and none of the disqualifications enumerated under
the law; and present at least two (2) character
witnesses to support his allegations.17 Section 2 of the
Naturalization Law clearly sets forth the qualifications
that must be possessed by any applicant, viz:
Section 2. Qualifications. – Subject to section four of
this Act, any person having the following qualifications
may become a citizen of the Philippines by
naturalization:
First. He must be not less than twenty-one years of
age on the day of the hearing of the petition;
Second. He must have resided in the Philippines for a
continuous period of not less than ten years;
Third. He must be of good moral character and
believes in the principles underlying the Philippine
Constitution, and must have conducted himself in
a proper and irreproachable manner during the
entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his
relation with the constituted government as well as
with the community in which he is living.
Fourth. He must own real estate in the Philippines
worth not less than five thousand pesos, Philippine
currency, or must have some known lucrative
trade, profession, or lawful occupation;
Fifth. He must be able to speak and write English or
Spanish and any one of the principal Philippine
languages;
Sixth. He must have enrolled his minor children of
school age, in any of the public schools or private
schools recognized by the Office of Private
Education1 of the Philippines, where the Philippine
history, government and civics are taught or
prescribed as part of the school curriculum, during the
entire period of the residence in the Philippines
required of him prior to the hearing of his petition for
naturalization as Philippine citizen.
[Emphasis supplied]
The contention in this case revolves around the
following points:
1. the sufficiency of Karbasi’s income for purposes of
naturalization;
2. the effect of the alleged discrepancy in the amounts
of his gross income as declared in his ITRs, on one
hand, and in his petition for naturalization on the
other; and
3. the necessity of proving reciprocity between Iranian
and Philippine laws on naturalization.
The Court resolves these issues in seriatim.
First. A reading of the OSG’s pleadings discloses that
its position arose out of a comparison made between
Karbasi’s declared income and the amounts reflected
in the Data on Annual Income and Expenditure in
Western Mindanao issued by the NSCB. The OSG
also invokes the past rulings of the Court where the
concept of "lucrative trade, trade, profession or lawful
occupation" was explained in this wise:
It means not only that the person having the
employment gets enough for his ordinary necessities
in life. It must be shown that the employment gives
one an income such that there is an appreciable
margin of his income over his expenses as to be able
to provide for an adequate support in the event of
unemployment, sickness, or disability to work and
thus avoid one’s becoming the object of charity or a
public charge. His income should permit him and the
members of his family to live with reasonable comfort,
in accordance with the prevailing standard of living,
and consistently with the demands of human dignity,
at this stage of our civilization.18
11
A long line of cases reveals that the Court did not
hesitate in reversing grants of citizenship upon a
showing that the applicant had no lucrative income
and would, most likely, become a public charge. A
summary of some of these notable cases is in order:
1. In the Matter of the Petition for Admission
to Philippine Citizenship of Engracio Chan
also known as Nicasio Lim.19– The Court
found that the petitioner, who was a salesman
at the Caniogan Sari-Sari and Grocery Store,
then located in Pasig, Rizal, from which he
received a monthly salary of P200.00, with
free board and lodging, had no lucrative
income. Even if the petitioner was then an
unmarried man without dependents, a
monthly income of P200.00 with free board
and lodging, was not considered gainful
employment. Further, there was no proof that
he was legally authorized to use an alias and
his use thereof, being in violation of the Anti-
Alias Law, was indicative of a reproachable
conduct.
2. In the Matter of the Petition of Antonio Po
to be admitted a Citizen of the Philippines.20–
The Court found Antonio Po, then single and
employed as collector of the Surigao
Chamber of Commerce as without lucrative
income on the ground that his employment
had so long depended upon the selection of
the succeeding presidents of the chamber
and that he then got free board and lodging
by living with his widowed mother. Simply put,
there was not enough stability in his claimed
salary. His additional income gained from
helping his mother to run a store was also
insufficient to satisfy the law, in the amount
and in its steadiness. His free board and
lodging pretense was also discerned as
indicative of dependence upon his mother for
support.
3. In the Matter of the Petition of Tanpa Ong
Alias Pedro Tan to be admitted a Citizen of
the Philippines.21– The income of the
applicant as contemplated in the
naturalization law was only P3,000.00 a year.
Considering that he had a wife and seven
children to support, this income was held as
insufficient to meet the high cost of living at
that time.
4. Keng Giok v. Republic.22– The Court held
that an income of P9,074.50 per annum was
not sufficient for a married applicant with a
wife and five children to support.
5. Sy Ang Hoc vs. Republic.23– The Court
held that his income, derived from
employment in a business enterprise of the
petitioner's father, was not sufficient to
establish compliance with the statutory
requirement of lucrative occupation or calling.
6. In the Matter of the Petition to be admitted
a Citizen of the Philippines by Pantaleon Sia
alias Alfredo Sia.24–The Court ruled that the
determination of lucrative income or
occupation should be reckoned as of the time
of the filing of the petition. The Court decided
against the petitioner as his regular salary
was not ample enough to defray his family’s
expenses. The excess amounts representing
his bonuses and commissions should not be
considered in determining whether or not
petitioner had a lucrative income or
occupation.
With the pronouncements in these cases in mind, the
comparison made by the OSG now begets another
question: can the possession of an applicant’s
lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation, for
purposes of naturalization, be fairly determined
through a simplistic read-through on government
data?
The Court answers in the negative.
While it is true that a naturalization case is not an
ordinary judicial contest to be decided in favor of the
party whose claim is supported by the preponderance
of the evidence, this does not accord infallibility on
any and all of the OSG’s assertions. If this were the
case, the rules of evidence might as well be brushed
aside in order to accord conclusiveness to every
opposition by the Republic. Needless to state, the
Court still has the final authority and duty to evaluate
the records of proceedings a quo and decide on the
issues with fair and sound judgment.
Here, it is clear that the circumstances prevailing in
the above-cited cases are not at all attendant in
Karbasi’s situation. There was neither a showing that
Karbasi was dependent on another person for support
nor proof that his family’s extraordinary expenses that
would render his income as inadequate. As in any
other business venture, the risk of losses is a
possibility for his repair shop but, still, this risk was not
clearly established to render his livelihood as unstable
and volatile. In fact, the OSG does not belie the fact
that Karbasi has been engaged by reputable
companies for his services. Conversely, the findings
of the RTC would indicate that Karbasi had indeed
exhibited industry and hard work in putting up his
repair shop business and that his wife considered him
as a good provider, not to mention a vocational and
college degree holder. Admittedly, testimonies in
favor of an applicant for naturalization are expected to
12
be self-serving. Nevertheless, the Court finds it
difficult to agree with the OSG’s meager use of
government data to prove that Karbasi would become
a burden to the Philippine society in the future. Except
for its own citation of government data, nothing else
was presented to establish that Karbasi had indeed
no lucrative income or trade to support himself and
his family.
To accept the OSG’s logic is a dangerous precedent
that would peg the compliance to this requirement in
the law to a comparison with the results of research,
the purpose of which is unclear. This is not to say that
the data produced by government research are
inappropriate, or much less irrelevant in judicial
proceedings. The plain reliance on this research
information, however, may not be expected to
produce the force of logic which the OSG wants to
attain in this case. Besides, had the law intended for
government data on livelihood and income research
to be used as a gauge for the "lucrative income"
requirement, it must have stated the same and
foreclosed the Court’s power to assess existing facts
in any given case. Here, the Court opts to exercise
this power and delve into a judicious review of the
findings of the RTC and the CA and, as explained, to
rule that Karbasi, possesses a lucrative income and a
lawful occupation, as required by the Naturalization
Law.1âwphi1
At this point, it is worthy to note the Court’s ruling
in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Chua25(Chua), where the Court assessed the
prevailing circumstances of an applicant for
naturalization who was a medical student at the time
of the filing of her petition. In Chua, the Court rejected
the Republic’s argument that the applicant’s status as
a subsequent passer of the Board Examinations of
1985 for Doctors of Medicine could not by itself be
equated with "gainful employment or tangible
receipts." The Court held that this interpretation of the
income requirement in the law is "too literal and
restrictive." It then cited Uy v. Republic,26 where the
Court laid down the public policy underlying the
lucrative income requirement as follows:
[T]he Court must be satisfied that there is reasonable
assurance not only that the applicant will not be a
social burden or liability but that he is a potential asset
to the country he seeks to adopt for himself and quite
literally, for his children and his children's children.
The Court, in Chua, continued:
The economic qualification for naturalization may be
seen to embody the objective of ensuring that the
petitioner would not become a public charge or an
economic burden upon society. The requirement
relates, in other words, not simply to the time of
execution of the petition for naturalization but also to
the probable future of the applicant for naturalization.
In the case at bar, the Solicitor General does not
dispute that respondent applicant, then a student, was
earning P2,000.00 a month, with free board and
lodging, at the time she filed her Petition in August
1984. While this amount was not, even in 1984,
exactly a princely sum, she was not then a public
charge and the respondent applicant having passed
the qualifying medical board examinations, can
scarcely be regarded as likely to become a public
charge in the future should she be admitted as a
citizen of this Republic. Respondent is certainly in a
position to earn substantial income if allowed to
exercise her profession. Being a Doctor of Medicine,
she is also clearly a "potential asset to the country."27
As in Chua’s case, it does not at all seem likely that
Karbasi, in his current circumstances, will ever
become a public charge. It bears emphasis to note
that from a refugee who had nothing when he came to
the Philippines, Karbasi had indeed refused to be the
object of charity by working hard to graduate from
college and to eventually engage in business to give
his family support and comfort. The CA could not
have explained this in better terms—
Thus, Karbasi went from being a refugee – who was
dependent on the UNCHR for support – to a self-
made entrepreneur who can ably support himself and
his family. As such, there is no showing that Karbasi
may turn out to be a public charge and a burden to
our country’s resources. The fact moreover that he
overcame this adversity through his education and
skills shows that he is a potential asset of the country.
Second. The OSG raised the issue of Karbasi’s
alleged underdeclaration of income in his ITRs. It
contended that even if Karbasi had, indeed, a
lucrative means of earning, his failure to declare the
income which he had earned from service contracts
and to present any proof of the withholding of the
taxes thereon, would reflect adversely on his conduct,
which under the statute must be "proper and
irreproachable." The OSG cited Lim Eng Yu v.
Republic28(Lim Eng Yu), where the applicant later
refuted the amounts reflected in his ITRs in order to
prove that he had lucrative trade or occupation. The
Court rebuffed this "eleventh hour explanation" and
concluded that the applicant had to conceal his true
income for the purpose of evading payment of lawful
taxes. The Court found that Lim Eng Yu, at that time,
had a wife and two children, so, at most, his total tax
exemption then, was P5,000.00. Had he stated the
net incomes he claimed in his ITRs, he would have
been required to pay income taxes, it appearing that
the same exceeded his exemption under the law.
Such conduct showed that Lim Eng Yu’s moral
character was not irreproachable, or as good as it
should be, thus, disqualifying him for naturalization.
13
Like the CA, the Court is inclined not to apply the
rigidity of the ruling in Lim Eng Yu to the present case.
Unlike Lim Eng Yu, Karbasi did not deny the charge
of the OSG and instead admitted a procedural lapse
on his part. Here, there is no showing that the income
earned by Karbasi was undeclared in order to benefit
from statutory tax exemptions. To clarify, this does not
intend to downplay the requirement of good moral
character in naturalization cases. It bears stressing
that the granting of applications for naturalization still
necessitates that only those who are deserving may
be admitted as Filipino citizens. The character of the
applicant remains to be one of the significant
measures to determine entitlement to Filipino
citizenship. Nonetheless, the tenor of the ground used
for the denial of the application in Lim Eng Yu is not
akin to what happened in this case.
Clearly, in Lim Eng Yu, the petitioner altogether
intended to evade the payment of taxes by abusing
the benefits granted by tax exemptions.1âwphi1 In
this case, Karbasi did not deny that he gained income
through his transactions with Daewoo and Kolin. He
even presented, as evidence, the contracts of service
he had entered into with the companies including a
Summary of Accounts paid to his repair shop. He did
not disclaim that he had rendered services to these
companies and that he had earned a considerable
sum therefrom. Instead, he explained the cause of his
lapse and acknowledged his mistaken belief that his
earnings from these transactions need not be
declared in his ITRs as these were withheld already.
Again, it is not the objective of the Court to justify
irregularities in ITRs by reason of a "mistaken belief."
The Court, however, finds it difficult to equate
Karbasi’s lapse with a moral depravity that is fatal to
his application for Filipino citizenship. This mistaken
understanding of the proper way to declare income is
actually so common to individual taxpayers, including
lawyers and other professionals. While this is not to
be taken as an excuse for every irregularity in ITRs,
the Court is not prepared to consider this as an
outright reflection of one’s immoral inclinations. With
due consideration to his character as established by
witnesses, and as observed by the RTC during the
hearings, Karbasi should be deemed to have
sufficiently explained his mistake.
In the case of Chua, the Court had even disregarded
the OSG’s argument that the applicant’s failure to
execute her ITR "reflects adversely on her conduct."
Her explanation of non-filing as an "honest mistake"
was accepted by the Court with due regard to the
other circumstances of her case. Like the CA, the
Court also finds the same degree of sincerity in
Karbasi’s case, for he was candid enough to elicit this
conclusion. Besides, there was no suggestion in the
records that Karbasi habitually excluded particular
income in his ITRs. Echoing the findings in Chua, the
Court does not believe that this one lapse should be
regarded as having so blackened Karbasi’s character
as to disqualify him from naturalization as a Philippine
citizen.
Third. Considering the above disquisitions, the Court
does not need to belabor the last issue on reciprocity
between Iranian and Philippine laws on naturalization.
True, the Naturalization Law disqualifies citizens or
subjects of a foreign country whose laws do not grant
Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or
subjects. A perusal of Karbasi’s petition, both with the
RTC and the CA, together with his supplemental
pleadings filed with the Court, however, reveals that
he has successfully established his refugee status
upon arrival in the Philippines. In effect, the country’s
obligations under its various international
commitments come into operation. Articles 6 and 34
of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees, to which the Philippines is a signatory,
must be considered in this case, to wit:
Article 6 of the 1951 Convention:
For the purposes of this Convention, the term "in the
same circumstances" implies that any requirements
(including requirements as to length and conditions of
sojourn or residence) which the particular individual
would have to fulfill for the enjoyment of the right in
question, if he were not a refugee, must be fulfilled by
him, with the exception of requirements which by their
nature a refugee is incapable of fulfilling.
Article 34 of the 1951 Convention:
The Contracting States shall as far as
possible facilitate the assimilation and
naturalization of refugees. They shall in
particular make every effort to expedite
naturalization proceedings and to reduce as far as
possible the charges and costs of such proceedings.
In the same vein, Article 729 of the said Convention
expressly provides exemptions from reciprocity, while
Article 34 states the earnest obligation of contracting
parties to "as far as possible facilitate the assimilation
and naturalization of refugees." As applied to this
case, Karbasi' s status as a refugee has to end with
the attainment of Filipino citizenship, in consonance
with Philippine statutory requirements and
international obligations. Indeed, the Naturalization
Law must be read in light of the developments in
international human rights law specifically the granting
of nationality to refugees and stateless persons.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
14
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ESTELA M. PERLAS-
ARTURO D. BRION
BERNABE*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
POE-LLAMANZARES vs. COMELEC
CARPIO, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Commission on Elections; Jurisdiction; View that Section
2(1), Article IX-C of the Constitution vests in the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) the power, among
others, to “[e]nforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
x x x.”—Section 2(1), Article IX-C of the Constitution
vests in the COMELEC the power, among others, to
“[e]nforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election, x x x.” Screening
initially the qualifications of all candidates lies within
this specific power. In my dissent in Tecson v.
COMELEC, 424 SCRA 277 (2004), involving the issue of
Fernando Poe, Jr.’s citizenship, I discussed the
COMELEC’s jurisdiction, to wit: x x x. Under Section
2(1), Article IX-C of the Constitution, the COMELEC has
the power and function to “[E]nforce and administer all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election.” “The initial determination of who are qualified
to file certificates of candidacies with the Comelec clearly
falls within this all-encompassing constitutional mandate
of the Comelec. The conduct of an election necessarily
includes the initial determination of who are qualified
under existing laws to run for public office in an election.
Otherwise, the Comelec’s certified list of candidates will
be cluttered with unqualified candidates making the
conduct of elections unmanageable. For this reason, the
Comelec weeds out every presidential election dozens of
candidates for president who are deemed nuisance
candidates by the Comelec. Section 2(3), Article IX-C of
the Constitution also empowers the Comelec to “[D]ecide,
except those involving the right to vote, all questions
affecting elections x x x.” The power to decide “all
questions affecting elections” necessarily includes the
power to decide whether a candidate possesses the
qualifications required by law for election to public office.
This broad constitutional power and function vested in
the Comelec is designed precisely to avoid any situation
where a dispute affecting elections is left without any
legal remedy. If one who is obviously not a natural-born
Philippine citizen, like Arnold Schwarzenneger, runs for
President, the Comelec is certainly not powerless to
cancel the certificate of candidacy of such candidate.
There is no need to wait until after the elections before
such candidate may be disqualified. (Italicization in the
original; boldfacing supplied) Clearly, pursuant to its
constitutional mandate, the COMELEC can initially
determine the qualifications of all candidates and
disqualify those found lacking any of such qualifications
before the conduct of the elections. In fact, the
COMELEC is empowered to motu proprio cancel CoCs of
nuisance candidates.
Election Law; Nuisance Candidates; View that it cannot
be disputed that a person, not a natural-born Filipino
citizen, who files a certificate of candidacy (CoC) for
President, “put[s] the election process in mockery” and is
therefore a nuisance candidate. Such person’s CoC can
motu proprio be cancelled by the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) under Section 69 of the Omnibus
Election Code (OEC), which empowers the COMELEC to
cancel motu proprio the CoC if it “has been filed to put
the election process in mockery.”—It cannot be disputed
that a person, not a natural-born Filipino citizen, who
files a certificate of candidacy for President, “put[s] the
election process in mockery” and is therefore a nuisance
candidate. Such person’s certificate of candidacy can
motu proprio be cancelled by the COMELEC under
Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code, which
empowers the COMELEC to cancel motu proprio the CoC
if it “has been filed to put the election process in
mockery.”
Same; Same; View that allowing a nuisance candidate to
run for President renders meaningless the Commission
on Elections’ (COMELEC’s) constitutional power to
“[e]nforce and administer all laws x x x relative to the
conduct of an election, x x x.”—To allow a person, who is
found by the COMELEC not to be a natural-born Filipino
citizen, to run for President of the Philippines constitutes
a mockery of the election process. Any person, who is not
a natural-born Filipino citizen, running for President is
obviously a nuisance candidate under Section 69 of the
Omnibus Election Code. Allowing a nuisance candidate
to run for President renders meaningless the
COMELEC’s constitutional power to “[e]nforce and
administer all laws x x x relative to the conduct of an
election, x x x.” The election process becomes a complete
mockery since the electorate is mercilessly offered choices
which include patently ineligible candidates. The
electorate is also needlessly misled to cast their votes,
and thus waste their votes, for an ineligible candidate.
15
The COMELEC cannot be a party to such mockery of the
election process; otherwise, the COMELEC will be
committing a grave abuse of discretion.
Citizenship; View that based on Section 1, Article IV of
the 1935 Constitution, petitioner’s citizenship may be
determined only under paragraphs (3), (4) and (5).—
Based on Section 1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution,
petitioner’s citizenship may be determined only under
paragraphs (3), (4) and (5). Paragraph (1) of Section 1 is
not applicable since petitioner is not a Filipino citizen at
the time of the adoption of the 1935 Constitution as
petitioner was born after the adoption of the 1935
Constitution. Paragraph (2) of Section 1 is likewise
inapplicable since petitioner was not born in the
Philippines of foreign parents who, before the adoption of
the Constitution, had been elected to public office in the
Philippines. Of the Filipino citizens falling under
paragraphs (3), (4) and (5), only those in paragraph (3) of
Section 1, whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines,
can be considered natural-born Filipino citizens since
they are Filipino citizens from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship. In short, they are Filipino citizens by the
mere fact of birth. Under paragraph (4) of Section 1,
those Filipino citizens whose mothers are Filipinos and
whose fathers are aliens cannot be considered natural-
born Filipino citizens since they are still required to elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority
— they are not Filipino citizens by the mere fact of birth.
However, under paragraph (2), Section 1 of Article IV of
the 1987 Constitution, those whose fathers are Filipino
citizens and those whose mothers are Filipino citizens
are treated equally. They are considered natural-born
Filipino citizens. Moreover, under Section 2, Article IV of
the 1987 Constitution, in relation to paragraph (3),
Section 1 of the same Article, those born before 17
January 1973 of Filipino mothers and who elected
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority
are also deemed natural-born Filipino citizens.
Same; Natural-born Citizens; Foundlings; View that
none of the framers of the 1935 Constitution mentioned
the term “natural-born” in relation to the citizenship of
foundlings.—None of the framers of the 1935
Constitution mentioned the term “natural-born” in
relation to the citizenship of foundlings. Again, under the
1935 Constitution, only those whose fathers were
Filipino citizens were considered natural-born Filipino
citizens. Those who were born of Filipino mothers and
alien fathers were still required to elect Philippine
citizenship, preventing them from being natural-born
Filipino citizens. If, as petitioner would like us to believe,
the framers intended that foundlings be considered
natural-born Filipino citizens, this would have created an
absurd situation where a child with unknown parentage
would be placed in a better position than a child whose
mother is actually known to be a Filipino citizen. The
framers of the 1935 Constitution could not have intended
to create such an absurdity.
Same; Same; Same; View that clearly, it was the intent of
the framers of the 1935 Constitution to refer to natural-
born citizens as only those who were Filipino citizens by
the mere fact of being born to fathers who were Filipino
citizens — nothing more and nothing less; As a matter of
course, those whose parents are neither Filipino citizens
or are both unknown, such as in the case of foundlings,
cannot be considered natural-born Filipino citizens.—
Clearly, it was the intent of the framers of the 1935
Constitution to refer to natural-born citizens as only
those who were Filipino citizens by the mere fact of being
born to fathers who were Filipino citizens — nothing
more and nothing less. To repeat, under the 1935
Constitution, only children whose fathers were Filipino
citizens were natural-born Filipino citizens. Those who
were born of alien fathers and Filipino mothers were not
considered natural-born Filipino citizens, despite the fact
that they had a blood relation to a Filipino parent. Since
a natural-born citizen is a citizen by birth who need not
perform any act to acquire or perfect Philippine
citizenship, then those born of Filipino mothers and alien
fathers and who had to elect citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority, an overt act to perfect citizenship,
were not considered natural-born Filipino citizens. As a
matter of course, those whose parents are neither
Filipino citizens or are both unknown, such as in the case
of foundlings, cannot be considered natural-born Filipino
citizens.
International Law; View that generally accepted
principles of international law are those legal principles
which are so basic and fundamental that they are found
universally in the legal systems of the world.—Generally
accepted principles of international law are those legal
principles which are so basic and fundamental that they
are found universally in the legal systems of the world.
These principles apply all over the world, not only to a
specific country, region or group of states. Legal
principles such as laches, estoppel, good faith, equity and
res judicata are examples of generally accepted principles
of international law.
Same; Natural-born Citizens; Convention on the Rights
of the Child; View that the Convention on the Rights of
the Child does not guarantee a child a nationality at
birth, much less a natural-born citizenship at birth as
understood under the Philippine Constitution, but
merely the right to acquire a nationality in accordance
with municipal law.—The Philippines signed the
Convention on the Rights of the Child on 26 January
1990 and ratified the same on 21 August 1990. The
Convention defines a child to mean every human being
16
below the age of eighteen years unless, under the law
applicable to the child, the age of majority is attained
earlier. Since petitioner was born in 1968 or more than
20 years before the Convention came into existence, the
Convention could not have applied to the status of her
citizenship at the time of her birth in 1968. Petitioner’s
citizenship at birth could not be affected in any way by
the Convention. The Convention guarantees a child the
right to acquire a nationality, and requires the
contracting states to ensure the implementation of this
right, in particular where the child would otherwise be
stateless. Thus, as far as nationality is concerned, the
Convention guarantees the right of the child to acquire a
nationality so that the child will not be stateless. The
Convention does not guarantee a child a nationality at
birth, much less a natural-born citizenship at birth as
understood under the Philippine Constitution, but
merely the right to acquire a nationality in accordance
with municipal law.
Same; Citizenship; Jus Soli; Jus Sanguinis; View that
under the jus soli principle, the place of birth determines
citizenship at birth, not blood relation to the parents;
Under the jus sanguinis principle, citizenship at birth is
determined by blood relation to the parents.—Nationality
at birth may result because the law applicable is either
jus soli or jus sanguinis. A child born in the United
States to foreign parents is a citizen of the United States
at birth because the United States adopts the jus soli
principle. Under the jus soli principle, the place of birth
determines citizenship at birth, not blood relation to the
parents. In contrast, a child born in the Philippines to
foreign parents is not a Philippine citizen at birth but a
foreigner because the Philippines follows the jus
sanguinis principle. Under the jus sanguinis principle,
citizenship at birth is determined by blood relation to the
parents.
Same; Same; Natural-born Citizens; Foundlings; View
that there is no international treaty to which the
Philippines is a contracting party, which provides
expressly or impliedly that a foundling is deemed a
natural-born citizen of the country in which the foundling
is found.—Nationality at birth does not necessarily mean
natural-born citizenship as prescribed under the
Philippine Constitution. The Constitution recognizes
natural-born citizens at birth only under the principle of
jus sanguinis — there must be a blood relation by the
child to a Filipino father or mother. Even assuming, and
there is none, that there is an international law granting
a foundling citizenship, at birth, of the country where the
foundling is found, it does not necessarily follow that the
foundling qualifies as a natural-born citizen under the
Philippine Constitution. In the Philippines, any
citizenship granted at birth to a child with no known
blood relation to a Filipino parent can only be allowed by
way of naturalization as mandated by the Constitution,
under paragraph 5, Section 1 of Article IV of the 1935
Constitution, paragraph 4, Section 1 of Article III of the
1973 Constitution, and paragraph 4, Section 1 of Article
IV of the 1987 Constitution. Such a child is a naturalized
Filipino citizen, not a natural-born Filipino citizen. In
sum, there is no international treaty to which the
Philippines is a contracting party, which provides
expressly or impliedly that a foundling is deemed a
natural-born citizen of the country in which the foundling
is found. There is also obviously no international treaty,
to which the Philippines is not a party, obligating the
Philippines to confer automatically Philippine citizenship
to a foundling at birth.
Same; Universal Declaration of Human Rights; View
that Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR) affirms that “everyone has the right to a
nationality.”—Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights affirms that “everyone has the right to a
nationality.” With these words, the international
community recognizes that every individual, everywhere
in the world, should hold a legal bond of nationality with
a state. The right to a nationality is a fundamental
human right from which springs the realization of other
cardinal human rights. Possession of a nationality
carries with it the diplomatic protection of the country of
nationality and is also often a legal or practical
requirement for the exercise of political and civil rights.
Consequently, the right to a nationality has been
described as the “right to have rights.”
Same; Foundlings; View that in the absence of proof to
the contrary, a foundling is deemed born in the country
where the foundling is found.—Consi-dering that there is
no conventional or customary international law
automatically conferring nationality to foundlings at
birth, there are only two general principles of
international law applicable to foundlings. First is that a
foundling is deemed domiciled in the country where the
foundling is found. A foundling is merely considered to
have a domicile at birth, not a nationality at birth. Stated
otherwise, a foundling receives at birth a domicile of
origin which is the country in which the foundling is
found. Second, in the absence of proof to the contrary, a
foundling is deemed born in the country where the
foundling is found. These two general principles of
international law have nothing to do with conferment of
nationality.
Same; View that international law can become part of
domestic law either by transformation or incorporation.—
Under Section 3, Article II of the 1935 Constitution,
Section 3, Article II of the 1973 Constitution, and Section
2, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, the Philippines
adopts the generally accepted principles of international
law as part of the law of the land. International law can
17
become part of domestic law either by transformation or
incorporation. The transformation method requires that
an international law be transformed into a domestic law
through a constitutional mechanism such as domestic
legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by
mere constitutional declaration, international law is
deemed to have the force of domestic law. The Philippine
Constitution adheres to the incorporation method.
Same; View that if a treaty, customary international law
or generally accepted international law principle does not
contravene the Constitution and statutory laws, then it
becomes part of the law of the land.—Any treaty,
customary international law, or generally accepted
international law principle has the status of municipal
statutory law. As such, it must conform to our
Constitution in order to be valid in the Philippines. If a
treaty, customary international law or generally accepted
international law principle does not contravene the
Constitution and statutory laws, then it becomes part of
the law of the land. If a treaty, customary international
law or generally accepted international law principle
conforms to the Constitution but conflicts with statutory
law, what prevails is the later law in point of time as
international law has the same standing as municipal
statutory law. However, if a treaty, customary
international law or generally accepted international law
principle conflicts with the Constitution, it is the
Constitution that prevails. The Constitution remains
supreme and prevails over any international legal
instrument or principle in case of conflict.
Citizenship; Natural-born Citizens; View that only those
citizens at birth because of jus sanguinis, which requires
blood relation to a parent, are natural-born Filipino
citizens under the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.—
There is a difference between citizenship at birth because
of jus soli, and citizenship at birth because of jus
sanguinis. The former may be granted to foundlings
under Philippine statutory law pursuant to paragraph
(5), Section 1 of Article IV of the 1935 Constitution but
the Philippine citizenship thus granted is not that of a
natural-born citizen but that of a naturalized citizen.
Only those citizens at birth because of jus sanguinis,
which requires blood relation to a parent, are natural-
born Filipino citizens under the 1935, 1973 and 1987
Constitutions.
Same; Same; Foundlings; View that if a child’s parents
are unknown, as in the case of a foundling, there is no
basis to consider the child as a natural-born Filipino
citizen since there is no proof that either the child’s
father or mother is a Filipino citizen.—If a child’s parents
are neither Filipino citizens, the only way that the child
may be considered a Filipino citizen is through the
process of naturalization in accordance with statutory
law under paragraph (5), Section 1 of Article IV of the
1935 Constitution. If a child’s parents are unknown, as in
the case of a foundling, there is no basis to consider the
child as a natural-born Filipino citizen since there is no
proof that either the child’s father or mother is a Filipino
citizen. Thus, the only way that a foundling can be
considered a Filipino citizen under the 1935 Constitution,
as well as under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, is for
the foundling to be naturalized in accordance with law.
International Law; Citizenship; Natural-born Citizens;
Foundlings; View that customary international law
cannot validly amend the Constitution by adding another
category of natural-born Filipino citizens, specifically by
considering foundlings with no known parents as
natural-born citizens.—Customary international law has
the same status as a statute enacted by Congress. Thus,
it must not run afoul with the Constitution. Customary
international law cannot validly amend the Constitution
by adding another category of natural-born Filipino
citizens, specifically by considering foundlings with no
known parents as natural-born citizens. Again, under
paragraphs (3) and (4) of Section 1, Article IV of the 1935
Constitution, in relation to Sections 1 and 2, Article IV of
the 1987 Constitution, only those born of Filipino fathers
or Filipino mothers are considered natural-born Filipino
citizens. Applying customary international law to the
present case, specifically the right of every human being
to a nationality and the Philippines’ obligation to grant
citizenship to persons who would otherwise be stateless,
a foundling may be naturalized as a Filipino citizen upon
proper application for citizenship. This application
should not be interpreted in the strictest sense of the
word. On the contrary, the term “application” for
purposes of acquiring citizenship must be construed
liberally in order to facilitate the naturalization of
foundlings. The application for citizenship may be any
overt act which involves recognition by the Philippines
that the foundling is indeed its citizen. Thus, the
application for citizenship may be as simple as applying
for a Philippine passport, which serves as evidence of
citizenship. An application for a passport is an
application for recognition that the holder is a citizen of
the state issuing such passport. In the case of petitioner,
she applied for, and was issued a Philippine passport on
the following dates: (1) 4 April 1988; (2) 5 April 1993; (3)
19 May 1998; (4) 13 October 2009; (5) 19 December 2013;
and (6) 18 March 2014. In any event, for a foundling to be
granted citizenship, it is necessary that the child’s status
as a foundling be first established. It must be proven that
the child has no known parentage before the state can
grant citizenship on account of the child being a
foundling. In the Philippines, a child is determined to be
a foundling after an administrative investigation
verifying that the child is of unknown parentage. The
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Act No.
3753 and Other Laws on Civil Registration provide that
18
the barangay captain or police authority shall certify that
no one has claimed the child or no one has reported a
missing child with the description of the foundling.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that there is no
constitutional provision or statute that confers natural-
born citizenship based on statistical probability.—There
is no law or jurisprudence which supports the Solicitor
General’s contention that natural-born citizenship can be
conferred on a foundling based alone on statistical
probability. Absent any legal foundation for such
argument, the Solicitor General cannot validly conclude
that a 99.93% (or 99.83%) statistical probability that a
foundling born in the Philippines is a natural-born
Filipino citizen legally confers on such foundling natural-
born citizenship. There is no constitutional provision or
statute that confers natural-born citizenship based on
statistical probability.
Adoption; View that either Filipino or alien children
found in the Philippines, over which the Philippine
government exercises jurisdiction as they are presumed
domiciled in the Philippines, may be subject to adoption
under Republic Act (RA) No. 8552 or RA No. 8043.—
Clearly, there is no specific provision in these adoption
laws requiring that adoptees must be Filipinos, much
less natural-born Filipinos. These adoption laws do not
distinguish between a Filipino child and an alien child
found in the Philippines, and thus these adoption laws
apply to both Filipino and alien children found in the
Philippines. In other words, either Filipino or alien
children found in the Philippines, over which the
Philippine government exercises jurisdiction as they are
presumed domiciled in the Philippines, may be subject to
adoption under RA 8552 or RA 8043. However, the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 8552, issued
by the Department of Social Welfare and Development,
provide that they shall “apply to the adoption in the
Philippines of a Filipino child by a Filipino or alien
qualified to adopt under Article III, Section 7 of RA
8552.” The IRR, in effect, restricted the scope of RA 8552
when the IRR expressly limited its applicability to the
adoption of a Filipino child when the law itself, RA 8552,
does not distinguish between a Filipino and an alien
child. In such a case, the IRR must yield to the clear
terms of RA 8552. Basic is the rule that the letter of the
law is controlling and cannot be amended by an
administrative rule.
Election Law; Natural-born Citizens; Burden of Proof;
View that any person who claims to be qualified to run
for the position of President of the Philippines because he
or she is, among others, a natural-born Filipino citizen,
has the burden of proving he or she is a natural-born
Filipino citizen.—Any person who claims to be a citizen of
the Philippines has the burden of proving his or her
Philippine citizenship. Any person who claims to be
qualified to run for the position of President of the
Philippines because he or she is, among others, a
natural-born Filipino citizen, has the burden of proving
he or she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. Any doubt
whether or not he or she is natural-born Filipino citizen
is resolved against him or her. The constitutional
requirement of a natural-born citizen, being an express
qualification for election as President, must be complied
with strictly. As the Court ruled in Paa v. Chan, 21
SCRA 753 (1967): It is incumbent upon the respondent,
who claims Philippine citizenship, to prove to the
satisfaction of the court that he is really a Filipino. No
presumption can be indulged in favor of the claimant of
Philippine citizenship, and any doubt regarding
citizenship must be resolved in favor of the State.
Natural-born Citizens; Evidence; Deoxyribonucleic Acid;
View that the issue of parentage may be resolved by
conventional methods or by using available modern and
scientific means. One (1) of the evidence that she could
have presented is deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) evidence
which could conclusively show that she is biologically
(maternally or paternally) related to a Filipino citizen,
which in turn would determine whether she is a natural-
born Filipino citizen.—As the burden of evidence has
shifted to petitioner, it is her duty to present evidence to
support her claim that she is a natural-born Filipino
citizen, and thus eligible to run for President. The issue
of parentage may be resolved by conventional methods or
by using available modern and scientific means. One of
the evidence that she could have presented is
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) evidence which could
conclusively show that she is biologically (maternally or
paternally) related to a Filipino citizen, which in turn
would determine whether she is a natural-born Filipino
citizen. The probative value of such DNA evidence,
however, would still have to be examined by the Court.
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, the
Court would consider, among others things, the following
data: how the samples were collected, how they were
handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples,
the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether
the proper standards and procedures were followed in
conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst
who conducted the tests.
Same; Foundlings; View that there is no Philippine law
automatically conferring Philippine citizenship to a
foundling at birth.—The 1987 Philippine Constitution is
clear: “No person may be elected President unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, x x x, and a
resident of the Philippines for at least ten years
immediately preceding such election.” Is petitioner, being
a foundling, a natural-born Filipino citizen? The answer
is clearly no. First, there is no Philippine law
automatically conferring Philippine citizenship to a
19
foundling at birth. Even if there were, such a law would
only result in the foundling being a naturalized Filipino
citizen, not a natural-born Filipino citizen. Second, there
is no legal presumption in favor of Philippine citizenship,
whether natural-born or naturalized. Citizenship must
be established as a matter of fact and any doubt is
resolved against the person claiming Philippine
citizenship. Third, the letter and intent of the 1935
Constitution clearly excluded foundlings from being
considered natural-born Filipino citizens. The
Constitution adopts the jus sanguinis principle, and
identifies natural-born Filipino citizens as only those
whose fathers or mothers are Filipino citizens. Petitioner
failed to prove that either her father or mother is a
Filipino citizen. Fourth, there is no treaty, customary
international law or a general principle of international
law granting automatically Philippine citizenship to a
foundling at birth. Petitioner failed to prove that there is
such a customary international law. At best, there exists
a presumption that a foundling is domiciled, and born, in
the country where the foundling is found. Fifth, even
assuming that there is a customary international law
presuming that a foundling is a citizen of the country
where the foundling is found, or is born to parents
possessing the nationality of that country, such
presumption cannot prevail over our Constitution since
customary international law has the status merely of
municipal statutory law. This means that customary
international law is inferior to the Constitution, and
must yield to the Constitution in case of conflict. Since
the Constitution adopts the jus sanguinis principle, and
identifies natural-born Filipino citizens as only those
whose fathers or mothers are Filipino citizens, then
petitioner must prove that either her father or mother is
a Filipino citizen for her to be considered a natural-born
Filipino citizen. Any international law which contravenes
the jus sanguinis principle in the Constitution must of
course be rejected. Sixth, petitioner failed to discharge
her burden to prove that she is a natural-born Filipino
citizen. Being a foundling, she admitted that she does not
know her biological parents, and therefore she cannot
trace blood relation to a Filipino father or mother.
Without credible and convincing evidence that
petitioner’s biological father or mother is a Filipino
citizen, petitioner cannot be considered a natural-born
Filipino citizen. Seventh, a foundling has to perform an
act, that is, prove his or her status as a foundling, to
acquire Philippine citizenship. This being so, a foundling
can only be deemed a naturalized Filipino citizen because
the foundling has to perform an act to acquire Philippine
citizenship. Since there is no Philippine law specifically
governing the citizenship of foundlings, their citizenship
is addressed by customary international law, namely: the
right of every human being to a nationality, and the
State’s obligations to avoid statelessness and to facilitate
the naturalization of foundlings.
Election Law; Natural-born Citizens; Nuisance
Candidates; View that not being a natural-born Filipino
citizen, petitioner is a nuisance candidate whose
certificate of candidacy (CoC) for President can motu
proprio be cancelled by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC).—Not being a natural-born Filipino citizen,
petitioner is a nuisance candidate whose certificate of
candidacy for President can motu proprio be cancelled by
the COMELEC. In fact, the COMELEC is duty-bound to
cancel petitioner’s CoC because to allow a person who, as
found by the COMELEC is not a natural-born Filipino
citizen, to run for President makes a mockery of the
election process. Since petitioner is not a natural-born
Filipino citizen, I deem it irrelevant to discuss the issue
of whether petitioner complied with the ten-year
residency requirement to run for President. At any rate,
assuming petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen,
which she is not, I concur with Justice Mariano C. Del
Castillo’s Dissenting Opinion on the residency issue.

Same; Same; View that natural-born Filipino citizens

who have renounced Philippine citizenship and pledged
allegiance to a foreign country have become aliens, and
can reacquire Philippine citizenship, just like other
aliens, only if “naturalized in accordance with law.”—
Natural-born Filipino citizens who have renounced
Philippine citizenship and pledged allegiance to a foreign
country have become aliens, and can reacquire Philippine
citizenship, just like other aliens, only if “naturalized in
accordance with law.” Otherwise, a natural-born Filipino
citizen who has absolutely renounced and abjured
allegiance to the Philippines and pledged sole allegiance
to the United States, undertaking to bear arms against
any foreign country, including the Philippines, when
required by U.S. law, could still become the Commander-
in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines by
performing a simple act — taking an oath of allegiance
before a Philippine public official — to reacquire natural-
born Philippine citizenship. The framers of the
Constitution, and the Filipino people who ratified the
Constitution, could not have intended such an anomalous
situation. For this reason, this Court should one day
revisit the doctrine laid down in Bengson III v. HRET,
357 SCRA 545 (2001).

20
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO 1069
PRESCRIBING THE PROCEDURE FOR THE
EXTRADITION OF PERSONS WHO HAVE
COMMITTED CRIMES IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY
WHEREAS, under the Constitution the Philippines
adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land, and
adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice,
freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations;
WHEREAS, the suppression of crime is the
concern not only of the estate where it is committed
but also of any other state to which the criminal
may have escaped, because it saps the foundation
of social life and is an outrage upon humanity at
large, and it is in the interest of civilized
communities that crimes should not go unpunished;
WHEREAS, is recognition of this principle the
Philippines recently concluded as extradition treaty
with the Republic of Indonesia, and intends to
conclude similar treaties with other interested
countries;
WHEREAS, there is need for rules to guide the
executive department and the courts in the proper
implementation of the extradition treaties to which
the Philippines is a signatory.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS,
President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers
vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby order
and decree the following:
21
Section 1. Short-Title. This Decree shall be known
as the "Philippine Extradition Law".
Section 2. Definition of Terms. When used in this
law, the following terms shall, unless the context
otherwise indicates, have meanings respectively
assigned to them:
(a) "Extradition" The removal of an accused
from the Philippines with the object of
placing him at the disposal of foreign
authorities to enable the requesting state or
government to hold him in connection with
any criminal investigation directed against
him or the execution of a penalty imposed
on him under the penal or criminal law of
the requesting state or government.
(b) "Extradition Treaty or Convention" An
extradition agreement between the
Republic of the Philippines and one or more
foreign states or governments.
(c) "Accused" The person who is, or is
suspected of being, within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Philippines, and whose
extradition has been requested by a foreign
state or government.
(d) "Requesting State or Government" The
foreign state or government from which the
request for extradition has emanated.
(e) "Foreign Diplomat" Any authorized
diplomatic representative of the requesting
state or government and recognized as
such by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs.
(f) "Secretary of Foreign Affairs" The head
of the Department of Foreign Affairs of the
Republic of the Philippines, or in his
absence, any official acting on his behalf or
temporarily occupying and discharging the
duties of that position.
Section 3. Aims of Extradition. Extradition may be
granted only pursuant to a treaty or convention,
and with a view to:
(a) A criminal investigation instituted by
authorities of the requesting state or
government charging the accused with an
offense punishable under the laws both of
the requesting state or government and the
Republic of the Philippines by imprisonment
or other form relevant extradition treaty or
convention; or
(b) The execution of a prison sentence
imposed by a court of the requesting state
or government, with such duration as that
stipulated in the relevant extradition treaty
or convention, to be served in the
jurisdiction of and as a punishment for an
offense committed by the accused within
the territorial jurisdiction of the requesting
state or government.
Section 4. Request; By whom made;
Requirements.
(1) Any foreign state or government with
which the Republic of the Philippines has
entered into extradition treaty or
convention, only when the relevant treaty or
 convention, remains in force, may request
for the extradition of any accused who is or
suspected of being in the territorial
jurisdiction of the Philippines.
(2) The request shall be made by the
Foreign Diplomat of the requesting state or
government, addressed to the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, and shall be accompanied
by:
(a) The original or an authentic
copy of either -
(1) the decision or sentence
imposed upon the accused
by the court of the
requesting state or
government; or
(2) the criminal charge and
the warrant of arrest issued
by the authority of the
requesting state or
government having
jurisdiction of the matter or
some other instruments
having the equivalent legal
force.
(b) A recital of the acts for which
extradition is requested, with the
fullest particulars as to the name
and identity of the accused, his
whereabouts in the Philippines, if
known, the acts or omissions
complained of, and the time and
22
place of the commission of these
acts;
(c) The text of the applicable law or
a statement of the contents of said
law, and the designation or
description of the offense by the
law, sufficient for evaluation of the
request; and
(d) Such other documents or
information in support of the
request.
Section 5. Duty of Secretary of Foreign Affairs;
Referral of Request: Filing of Petition. (1) Unless it
appears to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the
request fails to meet the requirements of this law
and the relevant treaty or convention, he shall
forward the request together with the related
documents to the Secretary of Justice, who shall
immediately designate and authorize an attorney in
his office to take charge of these case.
(2) The attorney so designated shall file a
written petition with the proper Court of First
Instance of the province or city having
jurisdiction of the place, with a prayer that
the court take the request under
consideration and shall attach to the
petition all related documents. The filing of
the petition and the service of the summons
to the accused shall be free from the
payment of docket and sheriff's fees.
(3) The Court of First Instance with which
the petition shall have been filed shall have
and continue to have the exclusive power
to hear and decide the case, regardless of
the subsequent whereabouts of the
accused, or the change or changes of his
place of residence.
Section 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary
Arrest; Hearing, Service of Notices. (1) Immediately
upon receipt of the petition, the presiding judge of
the court shall, as soon as practicable, summon the
accused to appear and to answer the petition on
the day and hour fixed in the order. We may issue
a warrant for the immediate arrest of the accused
which may be served any where within the
Philippines if it appears to the presiding judge that
the immediate arrest and temporary detention of
the accused will best serve the ends of justice.
Upon receipt of the answer, or should the accused
after having received the summons fail to answer
within the time fixed, the presiding judge shall hear
the ace or set another date for the hearing thereof.
(2) The order and notice as well as a copy
of the warrant of arrest, if issued, shall be
promptly served each upon the accused
and the attorney having charge of the case.
Section 7. Appointment of Counsel de Oficio. If on
the date set for the hearing the accused does not
have a legal counsel, the presiding judge shall
appoint any law practitioner residing within his
territorial jurisdiction as counsel de oficio for the
accused to assist him in the hearing.
Section 8. Hearing in Public; Exception; Legal
Representation.
 (1) The hearing shall be public unless the
accused requests, with leave of court, that
it be conducted in chamber.
(2) The attorney having charge of the case
may upon request represent the requesting
state or government throughout the
proceeding. The requesting state or
government may, however, retain private
counsel to represent it for particular
extradition case.
(3) Should the accused fail to appear on the
date set for hearing, or if he is not under
detention, the court shall forthwith issue a
warrant for this arrest which may be served
upon the accused anywhere in the
Philippines.
Section 9. Nature and Conduct of Proceedings. (1)
In the hearing, the provisions of the Rules of Court
insofar as practicable and not inconsistent with the
summary nature of the proceedings, shall apply to
extradition cases, and the hearing shall be
conducted in such a manner as to arrive as a fair
and speedy disposition of the case.
(2) Sworn statements offered in evidence at
the hearing of any extradition case shall be
received and admitted as evidence if
properly and legally authenticated by the
principal diplomatic or consular officer of
the Republic of the Philippines residing in
the requesting state.
Section 10. Decision. Upon conclusion of the
hearing, the court shall render a decision granting
23
the extradition, and giving his reasons therefor
upon showing of the existence of a prima facie
case. Otherwise, it shall dismiss the petition.
Section 11. Service of Decision. The decision of
the court shall be promptly served on the accused if
he was not present at the reading thereof, and the
clerk of the court shall immediately forward two
copies thereof to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs
through the Department of Justice.
Section 12. Appeal by Accused; Stay of Execution
(1) The accused may, within 10 days from
receipt of the decision of the Court of First
Instance granting extradition cases shall be
final and immediately executory.
(2) The appeal shall stay the execution of
the decision of the Court of First Instance.
Section 13. Application of Rules of Court. The
provisions of the Rules of Court governing appeal
in criminal cases in the Court of Appeals shall apply
in appeal in Extradition cases, except that the
parties may file typewritten or mimeograph copies
of their brief within 15 days from receipt of notice to
file such briefs.
Section 14. Service of Decision of Court of
Appeals. The accused and the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs, through the Department of Justice, shall
each be promptly served with copies of the
decision of the Court of Appeals.
Section 15. Concurrent Request for Extradition. In
case extradition of the same person has been
requested by two or more states, the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, after consultation with the
Secretary of Justice, shall decide which of the
several requests shall be first considered, and
copies of the former's decision thereon shall
promptly be forwarded to the attorney having
charge of the case, if there be one, through the
Department of Justice.
Section 16. Surrender of Accused. After the
decision of the court in an extradition case has
become final and executory, the accused shall be
placed at the disposal of the authorities of the
requesting state or government, at a time and place
to be determined by the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs, after consultation with the foreign diplomat
of the requesting state or government.
Section 17. Seizure and Turn Over of Accused
Properties. If extradition is granted, articles found in
the possession of the accused who has been
arrested may be seized upon order of the court at
the instance of the requesting state or government,
and such articles shall be delivered to the foreign
diplomat of the requesting state or government who
shall issue the corresponding receipt therefor.
Section 18. Costs and Expenses; By Whom
Paid. Except when the relevant extradition treaty
provides otherwise, all costs or expenses incurred
in any extradition proceeding and in apprehending,
securing and transmitting an accused shall be paid
by the requesting state or government. The
Secretary of Justice shall certify to the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs the amounts to be paid by the
requesting state or government on account of
expenses and costs, and the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs shall cause the amounts to be collected and
transmitted to the Secretary of Justice for deposit in
the National Treasury of the Philippines.
Section 19. Service of Court Processes. All
processes emanating from the court in connection
with extradition cases shall be served or executed
by the Sheriff of the province or city concerned or
of any member of any law enforcement agency;
Section 20. Provisional Arrest. (a) In case of
urgency, the requesting state may, pursuant to the
relevant treaty or convention and while the same
remains in force; request for provisional arrest of
the accused pending receipt of the request for
extradition made in accordance with Section 4 of
this Decree.
(b) A request for provisional arrest shall be
sent to the Director of the National Bureau
of Investigation, Manila, either through the
diplomatic channels or direct by post or
telegraph.
(d) If within a period of 20 days after the
provisional arrest the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs has not received the request for
extradition and the documents mentioned in
Section 4 of this Decree, the accused shall
be released from custody.
(e) Release from provisional arrest shall not
prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the
accused if a request for extradition is
received subsequently in accordance with
the relevant treaty of convention.
Section 21. Effectivity. this Decree shall take effect
immediately and its provisions shall be in force
during the existence of any extradition treaty or
convention with, and only in respect of, any foreign
state or government.
DONE in the City of Manila , this 13th day of
January in the Year of Our Lord nineteen hundred
and seventy-seven.

(c) The Director of the National Bureau of

Investigation or any official acting on his
behalf shall upon receipt of the request
immediately secure a warrant for the
provisional arrest of the accused from the
presiding judge of the Court of First
Instance of the province or city having
jurisdiction of the place, who shall issue the
warrant for the provisional arrest of the
accused. The Director of the National
Bureau of Investigation through the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs shall inform the
requesting of the result of its request.

24
 [COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 613]
AN ACT TO CONTROL AND REGULATE THE
IMMIGRATION OF ALIENS INTO THE PHILIPPINES
Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the
Philippines:
TITLE OF ACT
SECTION 1. This Act shall be known as “The
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940.”
BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION
SEC. 2. A Bureau of Immigration is established under
a Commissioner of Immigration, who shall have two
assistants, a First Deputy Commissioner of
Immigration and a Second Deputy Commissioner of
Immigration. For administrative purposes, the Bureau
of Immigration shall be under the supervision and
control of the Department of Labor or of any other
executive department which the President may
subsequently determine.
COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION
SEC. 3. The Commissioner of Immigration shall be
appointed by the President, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments of the National
Assembly, and shall hold office at the pleasure of the
President. He shall receive compensation at the rate
of ten thousand pesos per annum. He shall be the
administrative head of the Bureau of Immigration and
shall possess the powers generally conferred upon
bureau chiefs. He shall have charge of the
administration of all laws relating to the immigration of
aliens into the Philippines and shall have the
25
immediate control, direction and supervision of all
officers, clerks, and employees of the Bureau of
Immigration. He shall issue, subject to the approval of
the Department Head, such rules and regulations and
prescribe such forms of bond, reports, and other
papers, and shall issue from time to time such
instructions not inconsistent with law, as he shall
deem best calculated to carry out the provisions of the
immigration laws. He shall submit a report to the
President, in writing, of the transactions of his office,
annually or oftener as the President may require.
DEPUTY COMMISSIONERS OF IMMIGRATION
SEC. 4. (a) The two Deputy Commissioners shall be
appointed by the President, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments of the National
Assembly, and they shall hold office at the pleasure of
the President. The First Deputy Commissioner shall
receive compensation at the rate of nine thousand
pesos per annum and the Second Deputy
Commissioner shall receive compensation at the rate
of eight thousand four hundred pesos per annum.
During the absence or disability of the Commissioner,
the First Deputy Commissioner shall act as
Commissioner, and during the absence or disability of
both the Commissioner and the First Deputy
Commissioner, the Second Deputy Commissioner
shall act as Commissioner, and the Deputy
Commissioner who shall so act as Commissioner,
shall perform the duties of the latter in addition to his
own duties.
(b) No person shall be appointed Commissioner or
Deputy Commissioner unless he be a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines and is at least thirty years of
age.
IMMIGRANT INSPECTORS
SEC. 5. (a) The position of Immigrant Inspector is
created, appointments to which shall be made upon
the recommendation of the Commissioner of
Immigration in accordance with the Civil Service laws.
Immigrant Inspectors shall receive a salary the
maximum of which shall not be more than three
thousand six hundred pesos per anum;
(b) Whenever he shall deem it necessary, the
Commissioner of Immigration may appoint, with the
consent of the proper Department Head, any qualified
employee of the Government to serve as Acting
Immigrant Inspector. Acting Immigrant Inspectors
shall have the same powers and authority as
Immigrant Inspectors.
SEC. 6. The examination of aliens concerning their
right to enter or remain in the Philippines shall be
performed by Immigrant Inspectors, with the advice of
medical authorities in appropriate cases. Immigrant
Inspectors are authorized to admit any alien
complying with the applicable provisions of the
immigration laws and to enforce the immigration laws
and regulations prescribed thereunder. Immigrant
Inspectors are also empowered to administer oaths,
to take and consider evidence concerning the right of
any alien to enter or reside in the Philippines, and to
go aboard and search for aliens on any vessel or
other conveyance in which they believe aliens are
being brought into the Philippines. Immigrant
Inspectors shall have the power to arrest, without
warrant, any alien who in their presence or view is
entering or is still in the course of entering the
Philippines in violation of immigration laws or
regulations prescribed thereunder.
OTHER EMPLOYEES
SEC. 7. All other employees of the Bureau of
Immigration except as otherwise provided in this Act,
shall be appointed by the Head of Department, upon
the recommendation of the Commissioner of
Immigration, in accordance with civil service rules and
regulations, and they shall receive such salaries as
may be assigned to them conformably to the
provisions of Commonwealth Act Numbered Four
hundred and two.
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS
SEC. 8. The board of Commissioners, hereinafter
referred to in this Act, shall be composed of the
Commissioner of Immigration and the two Deputy
Commissioners. In the absence of a member of the
Board, the Department Head shall designate an
officer or employee in the Bureau of Immigration to
serve as a member thereof. In any case coming
before the Board of Commissioners, the decision of
any two members shall prevail.
NONIMMIGRANTS
SEC. 9. Aliens departing from any place outside the
Philippines, who are otherwise admissible and who
qualify within one of the following categories, may be
admitted as nonimmigrants:
(a) A temporary visitor coming for business or for
pleasure or for reasons of health;
(b) A person in transit to a destination outside the
Philippines;
(c) A seaman serving as such on a vessel arriving at
a port of the Philippines and seeking to enter
temporarily and solely in the pursuit of his calling as a
seaman;
26
(d) A person seeking to enter the Philippines solely to
carry on trade between the Philippines and the foreign
state of which he is a national, his wife, and his
unmarried children under twenty-one years of age, if
accompanying or following to join him, subject to the
condition that citizen of the Philippines under similar
conditions are accorded like privileges in the foreign
state of which such person is a national;
(e) A person previously lawfully admitted into the
Philippines for permanent residence, who is returning
from a temporary visit abroad to an unrelinquished
residence in the Philippines; and
(f) A student, having means sufficient for his
education and support in the Philippines, who is at
least fifteen years of age and who seeks to enter the
Philippines temporarily and solely for the purpose of
study at a school or other institutions of learning
approved for such alien students by the
Commissioner of Immigration.
DOCUMENTATION OF NONIMMIGRANTS
SEC. 10. Nonimmigrants must present for admission
into the Philippines unexpired passports or official
documents in the nature of passports issued by the
governments of the countries to which they owe
allegiance or other travel documents showing their
origin and identity as prescribed by regulations, and
valid passport visas granted by diplomatic or consular
officers, except that such documents shall not be
required of the following aliens:
(a) A child qualifying as a nonimmigrant, born
subsequent to the issuance of the passport visa of an
accompanying parent, the visa not having expired;
and
(b) A seaman qualifying as such under section 9 (c) of
this Act.
(c) A returning resident, as referred to in section nine
hereof, presenting a Reëntry Permit as provided for in
section twenty-two of this Act.
SEC. 11. The form and manner of applying for a
passport visa and the form and validity of such
passport visa shall be established by regulations.
SEC. 12. A passport visa shall not be granted to an
applicant who fails to establish satisfactorily his
nonimmigrants status or whose entry into the
Philippines would be contrary to the public safety.
IMMIGRANTS
SEC. 13. Under the conditions set forth in this Act,
there may be admitted into the Philippines
immigrants, termed “quota immigrants” not in excess
of five hundred of any one nationality or without
nationality for any one calendar year, except that the
following immigrants, termed “nonquota immigrants,”
may be admitted without regard to such numerical
limitations:
(a) An alien coming to prearranged employment, for
whom the issuance of a visa has been authorized in
accordance with section twenty of this Act, and his
wife, and his unmarried children under twenty-one
years of age, if accompanying him or if following to
join him within a period of two years from the date of
his admission into the Philippines as an immigrant
under this paragraph;
(b) The wife or the husband or the unmarried child
under twenty-one years of age of a Philippine citizen,
if accompanying or following to join such citizen;
(c) A child of alien parents born during the temporary
visit abroad of the mother, the mother having been
previously lawfully admitted into the Philippines for
permanent resident, if the child is accompanying or
coming to join an parent and applies for admission
within five years from the date of its birth;
(d) A child born subsequent to the issuance of the
immigration visa of the accompanying parent, the visa
not having expired;
(e) A woman who was a citizen of the Philippines and
who lost her citizenship because of her marriage to an
alien or by reason of the loss of Philippine citizenship
by her husband, and her unmarried child under
twenty-one years of age, if accompanying or following
to join her;
(f) The wife or the husband or the unmarried child
under twenty-one years of age, of an alien lawfully
admitted into the Philippines for permanent residence
prior to the date on which this Act becomes effective
and who is resident therein, if such wife, husband, or
child applies for admission within a period of two
years following the date on which this Act becomes
effective.
SEC. 14. The nationality of an immigrant whose
admission is subject to the numerical limitations
imposed by section thirteen of this Act shall be that of
the country of which the immigrant is a citizen or
subject, self-governing dominions being treated as
separate countries. The nationality of an immigrant
possessing dual nationality may be that of either of
the two countries regarding him as a citizen or subject
if he applies for a visa in a third country, but if he
applies for such visa within one of the two countries
regarding him as a national, his nationality shall be
27
that of the country in which he shall file his
application.
DOCUMENTATION OF IMMIGRANTS
SEC. 15. Immigrants must present for admission into
the Philippines unexpired passports or official
documents in the nature of passports issued by the
governments of the countries to which they owe
allegiance or other travel documents showing their
origin and identity as prescribed by regulations, and
valid immigration visas issued by consular officers,
except that children born subsequent to the issuance
of the immigration visa of an accompanying parent,
the visa not having expired, shall not be subject these
documentary requirements.
SEC. 16. The form and manner of applying for an
immigration visa and the form and validity of such
immigration visa shall be established by regulations.
SEC. 17. No immigration visa shall be issued to an
immigrant if the consular officer knows from
statements in the application therefor or from the
papers submitted therewith or otherwise has reason
to believe that the immigrant is inadmissible into the
Philippines under the immigration laws.
IMMIGRATION VISAS FOR QUOTA IMMIGRANTS
SEC. 18. An immigration visa shall not be issued by a
consular officer to an immigrant whose admission into
the Philippines is subject to the numerical limitations
imposed by section thirteen of this Act until the
consular officer shall have received from the
Commissioner of Immigration the allotment of a quota
number to be placed upon the visa for the immigrant.
SEC. 19. In allotting quota numbers, the
Commissioner of Immigration shall accord preference
to immigrants who are the fathers and mothers of
Philippine citizens who are twenty-one years of age or
over, and the wives, husbands, and unmarried
children under of twenty-one years of age, of aliens
lawfully admitted into the Philippines for permanent
residence and residing therein. Such preference shall
be accorded only upon petition made therefor under
regulations prescribed by the Commissioner.
IMMIGRATION VISAS FOR NONQUOTA
IMMIGRANTS
SEC. 20. (a) A nonquota immigration visa for an
immigrant referred to in section thirteen (a) of this Act
who is coming to prearranged employment shall not
be issued by a consular officer until the consular
officer shall have received authorization for the
issuance of the visa. Such authorization shall be
given only on petition filed with the Commissioner of
Immigration establishing that no person can be found
in the Philippines willing and competent to perform the
labor or service for which the immigrant is desired and
that the immigrant’s admission would be beneficial to
the public interest. The petition shall be made under
oath, in the form and manner prescribed by
regulations, by the prospective employer or his
representative. The petition shall state fully the nature
of the labor or service for which he is to be engaged,
the wages and other compensation which he is to
receive, the reasons why a person in the Philippines
cannot be engaged to perform the labor or service for
which the immigrant is desired and why the
immigrant’s admission would be beneficial to the
public interest. The petition shall be accompanied by
a certified copy of any written contract or agreement
entered into for the immigrant’s service and shall
contain such additional information as may be
deemed material. Substantiation of any allegation
made in the petition may be required.
(b) If the Board of Commissioners finds that the
petition complies with the requirements of the
preceding paragraph and that the petitioner has
established the facts entitling him to the authorization,
the Board shall grant the petition and the
Commissioner shall so inform the petitioner and
promptly transmit authorization to the consular office
at which the immigrant is to apply for a visa. Such an
immigrant, upon receiving a visa and applying for
admission into the Philippines, shall be exempt from
the provisions of paragraph fourteen of section
twenty-nine (a) of this Act excluding aliens coming to
perform unskilled manual labor in pursuance of a
promise or offer of employment.
SEC. 21. Nonquota immigration visas may be issued
by the consular officers to other immigrants claiming
nonquota status upon the receipt of satisfactory proof
that they are entitled to such status.
REËNTRY PERMITS
SEC. 22. Any lawful resident alien about to depart
temporarily from the Philippines who desires a reëntry
permit may apply to the Commissioner of Immigration
for such permit. If the Commissioner finds that the
applicant has been lawfully admitted into the
Philippines for permanent residence, he shall issue
the permit which shall be valid for a period not
exceeding one year except that upon application for
extension and good cause therefor being shown by
the applicant, it may be extended by the
Commissioner for additional periods not exceeding
one year each. The Commissioner shall prescribe the
form of permit. Applications for the issuance or
extension of permits shall be made under oath and in
28
such form and manner as the Commissioner shall by
regulations prescribe.
CANCELLATION OF ENTRANCE DOCUMENTS
FOR FRAUD
SEC. 23. An immigration visa, or a passport visa, or a
Reentry Permit, obtained by fraud or willful
misrepresentation of fact shall be subject to
cancellation by the issuing officer or by the Board of
Commissioners.
PORTS OF ENTRY
SEC. 24. The Commissioner of Immigration shall
designate ports, from among the ports of entry
designated by law, as ports of entry for customs
purposes, at which aliens may enter the Philippines.
Such ports shall be designated by the Commissioner
as unlimited or ports of limited ports of entry. At
limited ports of entry only such classes of aliens may
enter as may be permitted by the Commissioner
under regulations prescribed by him. He shall also
have power to close ports so designated whenever he
should deem it to be advisable in the public interest
and upon sufficient notice to the public.
DETENTION OF ARRIVING ALIENS
SEC. 25. For the purpose of determining whether
aliens arriving in the Philippines belong to any of the
classes excluded by the immigration laws, the Period
examining immigration officers may order such aliens
detained on board the vessel bringing them or in such
other place as the officers may designate, such
detention to be for a sufficient length of time to enable
the officers to determine whether they belong to an
excluded class and their removal to such other place
to be at the expense of the vessel bringing them.
BOARDS OF SPECIAL INQUIRY
SEC. 26. Every alien who may not appear to the
examining immigration officer at the port of arrival to
be clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to land shall be
detained for examination in relation thereto by a board
of special inquiry.
SEC. 27. (a) Every board of special inquiry shall be
composed of a Chairman and two members, who
shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines
alone and shall be removable at his pleasure. The
Commissioner of Immigration may assign to such
officers duties and functions in addition to those
pertaining to them by reason of their membership in
the board. At ports where it is not convenient or
necessary to organize permanent boards of special
inquiry, the resident may designate any other
employee of the Government to serve as a member of
the board of special inquiry which might be organized
therein from time to time.
(b) A board of special inquiry shall have authority to
determine whether an alien seeking to enter or land in
the Philippines shall be allowed to enter or land or
shall be excluded. For this purpose, the board or any
member thereof, may administer oaths and take
evidence. The hearing of all cases brought before a
board of special inquiry shall be conducted under
rules of procedure to be prescribed by the
Commissioner of Immigration. The decision of any
two members of the board shall prevail and shall be
final unless reversed on appeal by the Board of Board
of Commissioners as hereafter stated.
(c) An alien excluded by a board of special inquiry
may appeal to the Board of Commissioners, whose
decision in the case shall be final. In appeal cases,
the alien shall have the right to be presented by an
attorney or counsel who shall have access to the
record of the board of special inquiry in the particular
case on appeal.
MEDICAL EXAMINATION OF ARRIVING ALIENS
SEC. 28. The physical and mental examination of
arriving aliens shall be made by medical officers of
the Government designated under order of the
President to make such examinations, who shall
certify for the information of the immigration officers
and the boards of special inquiry any and all physical
and mental defects or disease observed after an
examination by them of such aliens. Should such
medical officers be not available, private physicians
may be employed for examining arriving aliens, the
necessary expenses therefor to be chargeable
against the appropriation provided for the Bureau of
Immigration.
EXCLUDED CLASSES
SEC. 29. (a) The following classes of aliens shall be
excluded from entry into the Philippines:
(1) Idiots or insane persons and persons who have
been insane;
(2) Persons afflicted with a loathsome or dangerous
contagious disease, or epilepsy:
(3) Persons who have been convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude;
(4) Prostitutes, or procurers, or persons coming for
any immoral purposes;
(5) Persons likely to become, public charge;
29
(6) Paupers, vagrants, and beggars;
(7) Persons who practice polygamy or who believe in
or advocate the practice of polygamy;
(8) Persons who believe in or advocate the overthrow
by force and violence of the Government of the
Philippines, or of constituted lawful authority, or who
disbelieve in or are opposed to organized
government, or who advocate the assault or
assassination of public officials because of their
office, or who advocate or teach principles, theories,
or ideas contrary to the Constitution of the Philippines
or advocate or teach the unlawful destruction of
property, or who are members of or affiliated with any
organization entertaining or teaching such doctrines;
(9) Persons over fifteen years of age, physically
capable of reading, who cannot read printed matter in
ordinary use in any language selected by the alien,
but this provision shall not apply to the grandfather,
grandmother, father, mother, wife, husband or child of
a Philippine citizen or of an alien lawfully resident in
the Philippines;
(10) Persons who are members of a family
accompanying an excluded alien, unless in the
opinion of the Commissioner of Immigration no
hardship would result from their admission;
(11) Persons accompanying an excluded person who
is helpless from mental or physical disability or
infancy, when the protection or guardianship of such
accompanying person or persons is required by the
excluded person, as shall be determined by the
Commissioner of Immigration;
(12) Children under fifteen years of age,
unaccompanied by or not coming to a parent, except
that any such children may be admitted in the
discretion of the Commissioner of Immigration, if
otherwise admissible;
(13) Stowaways, except that any stowaway may be
admitted in the discretion of the Commissioner of
Immigration, if otherwise admissible;
(14) Persons coming to perform unskilled manual
labor in pursuance of a promise or offer of
employment, express or implied, but this provision
shall not apply to persons bearing nonquota
immigration visas authorized by section twenty of this
Act;
(15) Persons who within one year prior to the date of
application for admission have been excluded or
deported from the Philippines, but this provision may
be waived in the discretion of the Commissioner of
Immigration;
(16) Persons who have been removed from the
Philippines at the expense of the Government of the
Philippines, as indigent aliens, under the provisions of
section forty-three of this Act, and who have not
obtained the consent of the Board of Commissioners
to apply for readmission; and
(17) Persons not properly documented for admission
as may be required under the provisions of this Act.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, the
Commissioner of Immigration, in his discretion, may
permit to enter any alien properly documented, who is
subject to exclusion under this section, but who is–
(1) An alien lawfully resident in the Philippines who is
returning from a temporary visit abroad;
(2) An alien applying for temporary admission.
SEC. 30. Any alien seeking admission into the
Philippines may be required to testify under oath on
matters relating to his admissibility. The burden of
proof shall be upon such alien to establish that he is
not subject to exclusion under any provision of the
immigration laws.
IMMIGRANT HEAD TAX
SEC. 31. A tax of twenty-five pesos shall be collected
for every alien over sixteen years of age admitted into
the Philippines for a stay exceeding sixty days. The
tax shall be paid to the Collector of Customs at the
port to which the alien shall come, by the master,
agent, owner, or consignee of the vessel bringing said
alien to the Philippines, or by the alien himself where
collection from the master, agent, owner, or
consignee of the vessel shall be impracticable. The
tax imposed by this Section shall be a lien on the
vessel and shall be a debt in favor of the Government
of the Philippines against the owner or owners of the
vessel, and payment thereof may be enforced by any
legal remedy.
CREW LISTS AND PASSENGERS MANIFESTS
SEC. 32. The master, agent, owner or consignee of
any vessel arriving in the Philippines from a place
outside thereof, or departing from the Philippines for a
place outside thereof, shall furnish to the immigration
officer in charge at the port of arrival and at the port of
departure, such crew lists and passenger manifests
and such other information concerning the persons
arriving or departing on the vessel as shall be
required in regulations prescribed by the
Commissioner of Immigration: Provided, that the
Commissioner of Immigration may, in his discretion,
30
exempt any vessel or vessels from the requirement of
this section.
SEAMEN
SEC. 33. It shall be the duty of the master, agent,
owner, or consignee of any vessel arriving in the
Philippines from a place outside thereof to detain on
board any alien seaman employed on such vessel
until the immigration officer in charge has inspected
such seaman, and to detain such seaman on board
after inspection and to remove such seaman if
required by the immigration officer in charge or by the
Commissioner of Immigration to do so. No seaman
employed on board such a vessel shall be paid off or
discharged while the vessel is in a port of the
Philippines without the permission of the immigration
authorities.
SEC. 34. An alien seaman employed on a vessel
arriving in the Philippines from a place outside thereof
may be permitted to land temporarily under such
regulations as shall be prescribed by the
Commissioner of Immigration.
OBLIGATION OF TRANSPORTING VESSELS IN
CASES OF
DETENTION AND EXCLUSION
SEC. 35. The cost of maintenance while on land,
medical treatment in hospital or elsewhere, burial in
the event of death, and transfer to the vessel in the
event of return, of any alien brought to the Philippines
and temporarily removed from the vessel for
examination by order of the immigration officers, shall
be borne by the owner or owners of the vessel on
which the alien came.
SEC. 36. An alien brought to the Philippines who is
excluded shall be immediately sent back, in
accommodations of the same class in which he
arrived, to the country whence he came, on the same
vessel bringing him, unless in the opinion of the
Commissioner of Immigration, immediate return is not
practicable or proper. The expense of the return of
such an alien shall be borne by the owner or owners
of such vessel. If the Commissioner of Immigration
finds that immediate return is not practicable or
proper, or if the vessel by which the excluded alien
came has left the Philippines and it is impracticable
for any reason to return the alien within a reasonable
time by another vessel owned by the same interests,
the cost of return may be paid by the Government and
recovered from the owner, agent, or consignee of the
vessel. Where return to the country whence the
excluded alien. came cannot for any reason be
effected, the Commissioner of Immigration may direct
the alien’s removal to the country of his nativity or of
which he is a national, and the cost of such removal, if
removal by vessel on which he came or by another
vessel owned by the same interests cannot be
accomplished within a reasonable time, shall likewise
be at the expense of the owners of such vessel.
DEPORTATION OF ALIENS
SEC. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested
upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration
or of any other officer designated by him for the
purpose and deported upon the warrant of the
Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by
the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the
ground for deportation as charged against the alien:
(1) Any alien who enters the Philippines after the
effective date of this Act by means of false and
misleading statements or without inspection and
admission by the immigration authorities at a
designated port of entry;
(2) Any alien who enters the Philippines after the
effective date of this Act, who was not lawfully
admissible at the time of entry;
(3) Any alien who, after the effective date of this Act,
is convicted in the Philippines and sentenced for a
term of one year or more for a crime involving moral
turpitude committed within five years after his entry to
the Philippines, or who, at any time after such entry, is
so convicted and sentenced more than once;
(4) Any alien who is convicted and sentenced for a
violation of the law governing prohibited drugs;
(5) Any alien who practices prostitution or is an
inmate of a house of prostitution or is connected with
the management of a house of prostitution, or is a
procurer;
(6) Any alien who becomes a public charge within five
years after entry from causes not affirmatively shown
to have arisen subsequent to entry;
(7) Any alien who remains in the Philippines in
violation of any limitation or condition under which he
was admitted as a nonimmigrant;
(8) Any alien who believes in, advises, advocates or
teaches the overthrow by force and violence of the
Government of the Philippines, or of constituted law
and authority, or who disbelieves in or is opposed to
organized government or who advises, advocates, or
teaches the assault or assassination of public officials
because of their office, or who advises, advocates, or
teaches the unlawful destruction of property, or who is
a member of or affiliated with any organization
31
entertaining, advocating or teaching such doctrines,
or who in any manner whatsoever lends assistance,
financial or otherwise, to the dissemination of such
doctrines.
(b) Deportation may be effected under clauses 2, 7,
and 8, of paragraph (a) of this section at any time
after entry, but shall not be effected under any other
clause unless the arrest in the deportation
proceedings is made within five years after the cause
for deportation arises. Deportation under clauses 3
and 4 shall not be effected if the court, or judge
thereof, when sentencing the alien, shall recommend
to the Commissioner of Immigration that the alien be
not deported.
(c) No alien shall be deported without being informed
of the specific grounds for deportation nor without
being given a hearing under rules of procedure to be
prescribed by the Commissioner of Immigration.
(d) In any deportation proceeding involving the entry
of an alien the burden of proof shall be upon the alien
to show that he entered the Philippines lawfully, and
the time, place, and manner of such entry, and for this
purpose he shall be entitled to a statement of the
facts in connection with his arrival as shown by any
record in the custody of the Bureau of Immigration.
(e) Any alien under arrest in a deportation proceeding
may be released under bond or under such other
conditions as may be imposed by the Commissioner
of Immigration.
SEC. 38. An alien ordered deported shall, at the
option of the Commissioner of Immigration, be
removed to the country whence he came, or to the
foreign port at which he embarked for the Philippines,
or to the country of his nativity or of which he is a
citizen or subject, or to the country in which he
resided prior to coming to the Philippines.
SEC. 39. If deportation proceedings are instituted
within five years after entry, unless deportation is
made by reason of causes which arose subsequent to
the alien’s entry, the cost of deportation from the port
of deportation shall be at the expense of the owner or
owners of the vessel by which the alien came; if that
is not practicable, in such case and in all other cases,
the cost of deportation shall be payable from the
appropriations available for the purpose.
BONDS
SEC. 40. (a) The Commissioner of Immigration shall
have the power to exact bonds in such amounts and
containing such conditions as he may prescribe:
(1) To control and regulate the admission into, and
departure from, the Philippines of aliens applying for
temporary admission;
(2) To insure against alien passengers liable to be
excluded as likely to become public charges, from
becoming public charges;
(3) To insure the appearance of aliens released from
custody during the course of deportation proceedings
instituted against them.
(b) In lieu of such bond, a deposit in cash may be
made with the Collector of Customs in such amount
as the Commissioner of Immigration may require.
(c) When the conditions of the bond or cash deposit
are fulfilled, or, in the case of a bond or deposit given
to insure against an alien becoming a public charge,
when the Commissioner of Immigration shall decide
that the likelihood no longer exists, or in the event of
the naturalization as a Philippine citizen or the death
of the alien in whose behalf the bond or deposit is
given, the bond shall be canceled or the sum
deposited shall be returned to the depositor, or his
legal representative. In case of forfeiture, the
proceeds of the bond or the cash deposit, as the case
may be, shall be deposited in the Philippine Treasury
by the Collector of Customs.
LEGALIZATION OF RESIDENCE OF ALIENS
SEC. 41. (a) Any alien in the Philippines at the time of
the passage of this Act concerning whom no record of
admission for permanent residence exists or can be
located may apply to the Commissioner of
Immigration for legalization of his residence in the
Philippines. The application shall be made in the form
and manner prescribed by regulations issued by the
Commissioner. The application must be made within
one year after the effective date of this Act, except
that if the Commissioner is satisfied that the alien for
justifiable reasons has failed to apply within the period
of one year, he may accept the alien’s application at
any time after the date when this Act becomes
effective: Provided, however, That any alien in the
Philippines, whose record of admission for permanent
residence does not exist or cannot be located and
who shall fail to legalize his residence in the
Philippines as provided in this section, shall be
presumed to be unlawfully within the Philippines.
(b) If the Commissioner of Immigration finds that the
applicant–
(1) entered in the Philippines prior to the effective
date of this Act;
32
(2) has maintained a residence in the Philippines
since he entered;
(3) is a person of good moral character; and
(4) is not subject to deportation–
the Commissioner shall make a record in the Bureau
of Immigration that the applicant’s residence in the
Philippines has been legalized.
(c) An alien whose residence has been legalized in
accordance with the provisions of this Section shall be
deemed to have been lawfully admitted into the
Philippines as of the date of his entry.
FEES
SEC. 42. (a) In addition to the documentary stamp
required by existing law, there shall be collected and
paid into the Philippine Treasury the following fees for
services, as indicated, for aliens seeking to enter or
remain in the Philippines under the provisions of this
Act:
(1) Executing application for passport visa for nonimmigrant
(2) Passport visa for nonimmigrant
(3) Reëntry permit
Provided, however, That upon payment of a fee of
P10, a resident alien may use his reëntry permit,
during a period of one year, regardless of the number
of trips made by him to and from foreign ports.
(4) Extension of reentry permit
(5) Executing application for immigration visa
(6) Immigration visa
(7) Legalization of residence
(8) Petition for preference quota status
(9) Petition for nonquota status for immigrant coming to prearranged em
(10) Certificate of residence
(11) Duplicate certificate of residence
Provided, however, That any alien who shall fail to
legalize his residence within the period of one year
provided in section 41 (a) of this Act, but whose
application be accepted by the Commissioner of
Immigration after the lapse of one year, shall pay for
the legalization of his residence the sum of twenty
pesos.
(b) No fee shall be charged for a passport visa
granted to a foreign government official or his family,
attendants, and household helpers, and employees,
nor shall a fee be charged for a passport visa for a
nonimmigrant in transit to a destination outside the
Philippines.
REMOVAL OF INDIGENT ALIENS
SEC. 43. The Commissioner of Immigration shall
have the authority to remove either to their native
country, or to the country from whence they come, or
to the country of which they are citizens or subjects,
at any time after entry, at the expense of any
appropriation available, such aliens as fall into
distress or need public aid from causes arising
subsequent to their entry and are desirous of being so
removed, but any person thus removed shall forever
be ineligible for readmission except, upon the
authorization of the Board of Commissioners obtained
previous to embarkation for the Philippines.
 ADMINISTRATIVE FINES AGAINST VESSELS
SEC. 44. (a) If any vessel or aircraft arriving at a port
of the Philippines from a place outside thereof–
(1) Fails to submit to the immigration officials at the
port of arrival the crew lists and passenger manifests
and other information required by regulations issued
under section thirty-two of this Act; or
(2) Fails to produce or satisfactorily account for every
seaman or passenger whose name appears in such
crew list or passenger manifest — payment against the vessel in the same manner as
the master, agent, owner, or consignee of the vessel
shall be subject to a fine of fifty pesos in the case of
each person concerning whom there is such failure.
(b) If any vessel or aircraft arriving at a port in the
Philippines from a place outside thereof and having
an alien on board–
(1) Fails to prevent the landing of such alien in the
Philippines at any time place other than as designated
by the immigration officers; or
(2) Refuses or fails to pay the cost of maintenance
and other costs, as required by section thirty-five of
this Act, of such alien when temporarily removed from
the vessels or aircraft for examination by order of the
immigration officers; or
(3) Refuses to receive such alien on board for
removal from the Philippines if he is excluded, or to
pay the cost of his removal, if by another vessel or
aircraft, as required by section thirty-six of this Act; or
(4) Makes any charge against such alien for the cost
referred to in clause (2) above, or for the cost of the
33
removal of the alien from the Philippines if he is
excluded, or takes any security from the alien for the
payment of any such costs –the master, agent, owner
or consignee of the vessel or aircraft shall be subject
to a fine of five hundred pesos for each and every
violation of these provisions in the case of each
person concerning whom there is such violation.
(c) Whenever the Commissioner of Immigration shall
find that there has been a violation of any of the
foregoing provisions of this section, the Collector of
Customs shall collect the fine and may enforce its
fines are collected and enforced against vessels
under the customs law. The fines shall be deposited
in the Philippine Treasury. No vessel shall be granted
clearance pending the determination of the question
of the liability to the payment of such fine or while the
fine remains unpaid, except upon deposit with the
Bureau of Immigration of security sufficient to cover
the fine.
(d) No prosecution or proceeding for the enforcement
of any penalty for any violation of the provisions of
this section shall be instituted more than five years
after the violation is committed.
PENAL PROVISIONS
SEC. 45. Any individual who–
(a) When applying for an immigration document,
personates another individual, or falsely appears in
the name of deceased individual, or evades the
immigration laws by appearing under an assumed or
fictitious name; or
(b) issues or otherwise disposes of an immigration
document to any person not authorized by law to
receive such document; or
(c) obtains, accepts or uses any immigration
document, knowing it to be false; or
(d) being an alien, enters the Philippines without
inspection and admission by the immigration officials,
or obtains entry into the Philippines by willful, false, or
misleading representation or willful concealment of a
material fact; or
(e) being an alien shall, for any fraudulent purpose,
represent himself to be a Philippine citizen in order to
evade any requirement of the immigration laws: or
(f) in any immigration matter, shall knowingly make
under oath any false statement or representations; or
(g) attempts or conspires with another to commit any
of the foregoing acts–
shall be guilty of an offense, and upon conviction
thereof, shall be fined not more than one thousand
pesos, or imprisoned for not more than two years, or
both.
SEC. 46. Any individual who shall bring into or land in
the Philippines or conceal or harbor any alien not duly
admitted by any immigration officer or not lawfully
entitled to enter or reside within the Philippines under
the terms of the immigration laws, or attempts,
conspires with, or aids another to commit any such
act, shall be guilty of an offense, and upon conviction
thereof, shall be fined not less than one thousand
pesos, or imprisoned for not more than two years, or
both.
SPECIAL PROVISIONS
SEC. 47. Notwithstanding the provisions of this Act,
the President is authorized–
(a) When the public interest so warrants–
(1) To waive the documentary requirements for any
class of nonimmigrants, under such conditions as he
may impose;
(2) To admit, as nonimmigrants, aliens not otherwise
provided for by this Act, who are coming for
temporary period only, under such conditions as he
may prescribe;
(3) To waive the passport requirements for
immigrants, under such conditions as he may
prescribe;
(4) To reduce or to abolish the passport visa fees in
the case of any class of nonimmigrants who are
nationals of countries which grant similar concessions
to Philippine citizens of a similar class visiting such
countries;
(5) To suspend the entry of aliens into the Philippines
from any country in which cholera or other infectious
or contagious disease is prevalent;
(b) For humanitarian reasons, and when not opposed
to the public interest, to admit aliens who are refugees
for religious, political, or racial reasons, in such
classes of cases and under such conditions as he
may prescribe.
FOREIGN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
SEC. 48. Nothing in this Act shall be construed to
apply to an official of a recognized foreign
34
government who is coming on the business of his
government, nor to his family, attendants, servants,
and employees, except that they shall be in
possession of passports or other credentials shoving
their official status, unless the President orders
otherwise, and that their names shall appear on the
passenger lists of transporting vessels required by
section 32 of this Act, and further, that any alien
admitted in the status of attendant, servant, or
employee of a foreign government official who fails to
maintain such status, shall be deported under the
procedure prescribed by section 37 of this Act.
APPROPRIATION FOR ENFORCEMENT OF ACT
SEC. 49. All sums available for the payment of the
salaries of the officers and employees of the
Immigration Division under the Department of Labor
and for the sundry expenses for said Immigration
Division for the fiscal year ending June thirtieth,
nineteen hundred and forty, are made available for
carrying out the provisions of this Act; and there is
appropriated, out of any funds in the Philippine
Treasury not otherwise appropriated, the additional
amount of one hundred fifty thousand pesos or such
thereof as may be necessary for the purpose of
carrying out the provisions of this Act during the fiscal
year ending June thirtieth, nineteen hundred and
forty-one: Provided, That appropriations for the
Bureau of Immigration for subsequent fiscal years
shall be included in the annual general appropriation
acts.
GENERAL DEFINITIONS
SEC. 50. As used in this Act:–
(a) The term “Philippines” means all the territory and
waters subject to the jurisdiction of the Government of
the Philippines.
(b) The term “alien” means any person not a citizen of
the Philippines.
(c) Except for the period covered by section 55, the
term “consular officer” means any official acting for
the Government of the Philippines, designated by the
President for the purpose of issuing visas to aliens as
required of aliens by this Act.
(d) The term “unmarried” when used in reference to
an individual as of any time, means an individual who
at such time is not married, whether or not previously
married.
(e) The terms “child,” “father,” and “mother,” do not
include a child or parent by adoption unless the
adoption took place before May 1, 1939.
(f) The terms “wife” and “husband” do not include a
wife or husband by reason of a proxy or picture
marriage taking place after the effective date of this
Act.
(g) The word “person” shall be construed to import
both the plural and the singular, as the case may be,
and shall include partnerships, corporations,
companies, and associations. When construing and
enforcing the provisions of this Act, the act, omission,
or failure of any director, officer, agent, or employee
of any partnership, corporation, company, or
association acting within the scope of his employment
or office shall, in every case, be deemed the act,
omission, or failure of such partnership, corporation,
company, or association.
(h) The term “vessel” shall include civil aircraft as well
as water craft.
(i) The term “seaman” means a person serving in any
capacity on board a vessel or civil aircraft.
(j) The term “immigrant” means any alien departing
from any place outside the Philippines destined for
the Philippines, other than a nonimmigrant.
(k) The term “immigration laws” shall mean this Act
and any other law hereafter enacted relating to the
entry of aliens into the Philippines, and their
exclusion, deportation, and repatriation therefrom.
(l) The words “the President” refer to the President of
the Philippines.
EFFECTIVE DATE OF ACT
SEC. 51. When this Act shall have been approved by
the President of the United States, such fact shall be
made known by proclamation of the President of the
Philippines and this Act shall take effect on the one
hundred and twentieth day after the date of such
proclamation: Provided, however, That the provisions
of this Act creating the Bureau of Immigration and
appropriating funds for its support and maintenance
shall take effect on the date of the proclamation
above-referred to, announcing the approval of this Act
by the President of the United States.
REPEAL OF EXISTING LAWS
SEC. 52. This Act is in substitution for and
supersedes all previous laws relating to the entry of
aliens into the Philippines, and their exclusion,
deportation, and repatriation therefrom, with the
35
exception of section sixty-nine of Act Numbered
Twenty-seven hundred and eleven which shall
continue in force and effect: Provided, That nothing
contained in this Act shall be construed to affect any
prosecution, suit, action, or proceedings brought, or
any act, thing, or matter, civil or criminal, done or
existing at the time of the taking effect of this Act; but
as to all such prosecutions, suits, actions,
proceedings, acts, thing, or matters, the laws or parts
of laws repealed or amended by this Act are
continued in force and effect: And Provided, further,
That as to such prosecutions, actions, suits, or
proceedings or as to such acts, things, or matters, the
procedure provided for by this Act or by the
regulations prescribed thereunder shall be followed in
so far as the same may be applicable.
ABOLITION OF DIVISION OF IMMIGRATION
SEC. 53. The Division of Immigration of the
Department of Labor is abolished and its functions,
duties and activities, together with its appropriations,
records, equipment, and other properties are
transferred to the Bureau of Immigration herein
created and the President is authorized to make the
necessary adjustments incidental to such transfer
conformably to the provisions of this Act.
GENERAL RESERVATIONS
SEC. 54. Notwithstanding the provisions of this Act,
pending the final and complete withdrawal of the
sovereignty of the United States over the Philippines:
(a) The term “alien” shall not include a citizen of the
United States of America, nor an Indian of the United
States, not other person owning permanent allegiance
to the United States.
(b) The term “consular officer” shall refer only to
officers of the Government of the United States
stationed outside the Philippines, authorized by that
Government to issue visas to aliens. In so far as the
activities of such officers are concerned with the
enforcement of the immigration laws and rules and
regulations prescribed thereunder, such activities
shall be under the direct supervision and control of
the Secretary of State of the United States, and rules
and regulations relating to such activities shall be
issued only with the approval of the Secretary of
State.
(c) The provision of this Act applicable to the alien
wife or husband, and unmarried child under twenty-
one years of age, of a Philippine citizen shall apply
equally to the alien wife or husband, and unmarried
child under twenty-one years of age, of a citizen of the
United States, accompanying the citizen to the
Philippines or following to join him there.
(d) Aliens lawfully admitted into the United States for
permanent residence who proceed from the United
States to the Philippines on a continuous journey shall
be exempt from the documentary requirements
imposed by this Act upon nonimmigrants, when
seeking admission into the Philippines as
nonimmigrants. The term “United States”, as used in
this subsection, means the States, the Territories of
Alaska and Hawaii, the District of Columbia, Puerto
Rico, and the Virgin Islands.
(e) Aliens lawfully admitted into the United States for
permanent residence who proceed from the United
States from the Philippines on a continuous journey
shall be exempt from the documentary requirements
and the numerical limitations imposed by this Act
upon nonimmigrants, when seeking admission into
the Philippines as nonimmigrants. The term “United
States”, as used in this subsection, means the States,
the Territories of Alaska and Hawaii, the District of (j) The term “foreign government officials” as used in
Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, but the section forty-eight of this Act, exempting such officials
provisions of this subsection shall not apply to alien from the provisions of this Act, shall refer only to
residents of a territory or insular possession of the officials of foreign governments recognized by the
United States who are not entitled to enter the Government of the United States.
Continental United States for permanent residence.
Approved, August 26, 1940.
(f) Aliens admitted in the United States as
nonimmigrants who proceed from the United States to
the Philippines on a continuous journey shall be
exempt from the documentary requirements imposed
by this Act upon nonimmigrants, when seeking
admission into the Philippines as nonimmigrants.

(g) Aliens having documents valid for their admission

into the United States as nonimmigrants shall not be
required to present other documents for their
admission into the Philippines as nonimmigrants.

(h) One-half of the fees prescribed by section forty-

two of this Act for services for aliens entering the
Philippines, which are collected by officials of the
Government of the United States, for services
performed by those officials, shall be paid into the
Treasury of the United States, and one-half shall be
paid into the Treasury of the Philippines.

(i) With reference to section forty-seven of this Act,

granting the President of the Philippines power to
reduce passport visa fees for nonimmigrants, or to
abolish them altogether, as a reciprocal measure, for
nationals of countries which grant similar concessions
to Philippine citizens, such power shall be exercised
only by the Secretary of State of the United States
acting under the authority granted him by Executive
Order No. 5427 of August 20, 1930 of the President of
the United States, entitled “Waiver or Reduction of
Application and Visa Fees for Nonimmigrants.”

36
G.R. No. 159835 January 21, 2010
THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE
BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND
DEPORTATION, Petitioner,
vs.
JUNG KEUN PARK @ JUNG GEUN PARK @
CHUNG KEUN PARK, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is the Petition for Review on
Certiorari1 filed by the petitioner Board of
Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation (BID) assailing the June 13, 2002
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 67614, which reversed the deportation orders
issued by the BID. The petition also assails the CA’s
September 4, 2003 Resolution3 which denied the
BID’s motion for reconsideration.
THE FACTS
Respondent Jung Keun Park (Park) is a national of
the Republic of Korea who came to the Philippines
with his family in the early 1990s to invest in various
businesses in the country.
Sometime in 2000, the BID received a letter dated
July 6, 20004 (July 6, 2000 letter) from Gyung Taek
Cha, Consul/Police Attaché of the Embassy of the
Republic of Korea in Manila, requesting the BID’s
assistance and cooperation in deporting Park as he
was purportedly facing charges of fraud in Korea for
which a warrant for his arrest had been issued by the
Korean Police. The letter also stated that Park’s
Korean Passport No. NW0057145 had been
37
cancelled on March 8, 2000 and no other passport
had been issued to him since. Acting on this July 6,
2000 letter, the BID officials arrested Park and
deported him to Korea on July 24, 2000.
On October 28, 2000, Park returned to the
Philippines, entering via Zamboanga City from
Malaysia, aboard the Sampaguita Ferry 2. Believing
that Park re-entered the country without a valid
passport, the BID again arrested Park on December
11, 2000 and, through a Charge Sheet5 dated
December 22, 2000, indicted him for violating Section
37(a)(7)6 of Commonwealth Act No. 613 or the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended
(Immigration Act).
On the very same date that Park was indicted, the
BID issued a Summary Deportation Order (SDO)
against Park after finding that he had indeed violated
the Immigration Act. Accordingly, the BID ordered
Park to be deported, imposed upon him administrative
fines and fees, and included him in its Blacklist.
To secure his provisional release pending
deportation, Park filed on January 19, 2001 a Petition
for Bail7 with the BID, stating that he had already paid
the administrative fines and fees imposed on him in
the SDO. Park also claimed that he should no longer
be considered an undocumented alien because (a) he
had been issued a Travel Certificate by the Embassy
of the Republic of Korea in Manila that was valid from
January 16, 2001 up to June 19, 2001, and (b) he
was a holder of a Special Investor’s Resident Visa
(SIRV). The BID, however, did not act on his petition,
prompting Park to move for its early resolution on
February 19, 2001.8 Apart from reiterating his plea for
his provisional liberty, Park pointed out that there was
no longer any basis for the execution of the SDO.
Apparently, Park learned, after communicating with
the Korean Embassy, that it did not issue the July 6,
2000 letter that declared his Passport No.
NW0057145 as cancelled. Park argued that since the
SDO was issued solely on the basis of the July 6,
2000 letter, the Korean Embassy’s disavowal of the
letter should result in the nullification of the SDO
against him. In an Order dated February 27, 2001, the
BID granted Park’s petition for bail but did not resolve
his claim against the validity of the SDO.9
About six months after the BID issued the SDO, Park
filed a motion to have it set aside.10 He insisted that
he should not be considered as an undocumented
alien since his Passport No. NW0057145 had not
really been cancelled as falsely stated in the July 6,
2000 letter – a letter which he claimed was later
disavowed by the Korean Embassy. Even assuming
that this passport was actually cancelled, Park argues
that the Korean Embassy had already issued him a
new passport (Passport No. PH0003486) on April 5,
2001, with validity up to April 5, 2006. Moreover, he
was a holder of a SIRV and a travel certificate.
Without, however, going into the merits of Park’s
claims, the BID denied his motion to set aside the
SDO in a Resolution dated October 15, 2001
(October 15, 2001 Resolution); it ruled that the motion
was belatedly filed, since the SDO had already
become final and executory for Park’s failure to
appeal it within the reglementary period provided in
the Rules of Procedure to Govern Deportation
Proceedings (Deportation Rules).
Park assailed the BID’s SDO and October 15, 2001
Resolution, through a certiorari petition filed before
the CA.11He reiterated his arguments why he should
no longer be considered as an undocumented alien
and submitted the following in support of his claim:
a. the February 16, 2001 letter12 from the
Embassy of the Republic of Korea in Manila
written by Young Chai Kim, Consul for
 Passport Affairs, stating that he did not write
the July 6, 2000 letter and that a travel
certificate had been issued in Park’s favour;
and
b. the May 28, 2001 letter13 from the Embassy
of the Republic of Korea in Manila written by
Consul/Police Attaché Gyung Taek Cha (the
same person who wrote the July 6, 2000
letter), stating that Park had no pending
criminal cases in Korea.
Park also claimed that he had been denied of his right
to due process, since no hearing of his case was
conducted before the BID’s Board of Special Inquiry
or the Board of Commissioners; the SDO was in fact
issued on the same day that the Charge Sheet was
filed.
In its Decision dated June 13, 2002,14 the CA found
Park’s certiorari petition meritorious. It considered
material the February 16, 2001 and May 28, 2001
letters of the Korean Embassy officials that effectively
negated the July 6, 2000 letter. The appellate court
also relied on Park’s travel certificate and SIRV as
documents supporting his claims. As a result, it set
aside the SDO and the October 15, 2001 Resolution
of the BID.15 As the BID’s motion for reconsideration
of the CA decision had been denied in a resolution
dated September 4, 2003, it filed before this Court the
present petition for review on certiorari.
THE ISSUE and THE PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS
At the core of the present controversy is the validity of
the two issuances by the BID: the SDO dated
December 22, 2000 and the October 15, 2001
Resolution denying Park’s motion to set aside the
SDO. The CA declared that the BID’s issuance of the
38
SDO and the October 15, 2001 Resolution was
characterized by grave abuse of discretion and,
accordingly, nullified them. The BID contests this
ruling as legally erroneous and invokes the Court’s
appellate jurisdiction via a Rule 45 petition.
In its petition, the BID insists that it had sufficient
basis for ordering Park’s deportation – Park did not
have with him a valid passport when he returned to
the Philippines on October 28, 2000, and was
therefore not lawfully admitted. At the time Park was
indicted, the July 6, 2000 letter reporting the
cancellation of Park’s Passport No. NW0057145
stood uncontroverted. The BID thus claims that its
reliance on the July 6, 2000 letter cannot be
considered an abuse of its discretion.
Although Park was able to present letters16 from the
Korean Embassy that apparently repudiated the July
6, 2000 letter, the BID alleges that these letters were
submitted when the SDO had already become final
and executory, since Park failed to appeal the SDO
with the Office of the President within the 30-day
period provided under Rule XIII of the Deportation
Rules17; the BID, therefore, found it unnecessary to
consider the February 16, 2001 and May 28, 2001
letters. As the SDO had already lapsed into finality,
the BID posits that it could not be faulted for denying
Park’s motion to set aside the SDO in its October 15,
2001 Resolution.
Park counters the BID’s allegations by insisting that
he had a valid and existing passport when he
returned to the Philippines on October 28, 2000. He
claims that his Passport No. NW0057145 was never
cancelled; otherwise, he would not be able to use the
same on a trip to Malaysia days prior to his return to
the Philippines. As proof, he appends to his Comment
and Memorandum a photocopy of this passport
bearing stamp marks showing the date of his arrival in
and departure from Malaysia on October 20, 2000
and October 27, 2000,18 respectively, and of his
arrival in the Philippines on October 28,
2000.19 Moreover, he contends that the Korean
Embassy’s February 16, 2001 and May 28, 2001
letters constituted a repudiation of the July 6, 2000
letter upon which the SDO was based. With this
repudiation, Park insists there was no more basis for
upholding the SDO. Park also relies on the travel
certificate and SIRV issued to him by the Korean
Embassy and the Philippine government (through the
Bureau of Investments), respectively, as documents
that further evidenced his authority to enter and
remain in the country.
While Park concedes that his motion to set aside the
SDO was filed beyond the 30-day period, he
nevertheless contends that the SDO could never
achieve finality because it was, in the first place, null
and void. He attacks the SDO by claiming it was
issued in violation of his right to due process, under
Section 37(c) of the Immigration Act, which reads:
No alien shall be deported without being informed of
the specific grounds for deportation nor without being
given a hearing under rules of procedure to be
prescribed by the Commissioner of Immigration.
First, Park claims that the Charge Sheet indicting him
for violation of the Immigration Act failed to sufficiently
inform him of the specific grounds for his deportation.
He was accused of violating Section 37(a)(7) of the
Immigration Act20 for remaining in the Philippines in
violation of any limitation or condition under which he
was admitted as a non-immigrant. A charge for
violation of Section 37(a)(7), he alleges, is contrary to
the BID’s claim that he was not lawfully admitted
when he returned to the Philippines on October 28,
2000 because he did not have a valid passport then.
If he was not lawfully admitted in the first place, he
could not have violated any limitation or condition of
his admission into the country.
Second, he posits that his case should have been
heard under the regular deportation proceedings, not
the summary deportation proceedings. Rule X of the
Deportation Rules states that summary deportation
shall be observed in cases where the charge is either
overstaying or expiration of passport. Since he had
been charged for allegedly violating the conditions of
his admission, Park contends his case is not among
those covered by summary deportation proceedings.
THE COURT’S RULING
We resolve to grant the petition.
A review of the records compels us to rule that the
BID had sufficient factual and legal basis for the SDO
and the October 15, 2001 Resolution. The CA
committed legal error in finding that the BID acted
with grave abuse of discretion when it issued the SDO
and the October 15, 2001 Resolution.
Non-immigrants are required by law to present valid
passports and visas upon entry into the Philippines
All non-immigrants are required to present unexpired
passports and valid visas prior to their admission into
the Philippines under Section 10 of the Immigration
Act:
Section 10. Non-immigrants must present for
admission into the Philippines unexpired passports or
official documents in the nature of passports issued
by the governments of the countries to which they
owe allegiance or other travel documents showing
their origins and identity as prescribed by regulations,
and valid passport visas granted by diplomatic or
39
consular officers, except that such document shall not
be required of the following aliens: (a) a child
qualifying as a non-immigrant, born subsequent to the
issuance of the passport visa of the accompanying
parent, the visa not having expired; and (b) a seaman
qualifying as such under section (9) of this Act.
[Emphasis supplied.]
Park was indicted for violating this requirement
because when he returned to the Philippines on
October 28, 2000, he used his Passport No.
NW0057145 – a passport that had already been
cancelled according to the Korean Embassy’s July 6,
2000 letter. At the time Park was indicted, there was
no official document repudiating the July 6, 2000
letter. Park did not present other competent proofs
that his Passport No. NW0057145 had not been
cancelled. In deportation proceedings, the alien bears
the burden of proving that he entered the Philippines
lawfully.21 We do not believe that Park was able to
discharge this burden by belatedly presenting a
photocopy of his Passport No. NW0057145 that bore
stamp marks of the date of his arrival in and departure
from Malaysia, just days before his return to the
country. In all his pleadings before the BID and the
CA, he never mentioned this prior Malaysian trip, and
he conveniently excused the presentation of his
Passport No. NW0057145 by claiming he had
misplaced/lost it. Since the authenticity of the arrival
and departure stamp marks in Park’s Passport No.
NW0057145 had not been passed upon by either the
BID or the CA, we cannot accord it weight and
credence.
As things therefore stood on December 22, 2000
(when the SDO was issued), there was no evidence
that would negate the cancellation of Park’s Passport
No. NW0057145 that was stated in the Korean
Embassy’s July 6, 2000 letter. The BID had sufficient
ground to believe that Park did not have with him a
valid and existing passport upon his return to the
country. We thus cannot fault the BID for relying in
good faith on the letter when it issued the SDO; its act
can hardly be classified as a capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction,
correctable by a writ of certiorari.
No due process violation when the summary
deportation proceedings were held and when the
SDO was issued
Were the documents that Park subsequently
presented sufficient to set aside the SDO? The BID
posits that these documents should not even be
considered because the SDO had already lapsed into
finality (for which reason, the BID denied Park’s
motion in its October 15, 2001 Resolution). Park
disagrees and claims that the SDO cannot be final
because its issuance was tainted with due process
violations by the BID. We, however, fail to see the
SDO the way Park does.
The Charge Sheet22 indicted Park for violating Section
37(a)(7) of the Immigration Act, which provision
reads:
Section 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested
upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration
or of another officer designated by him for the
purpose and deported upon the warrant of the
Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by
the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the
ground for deportation as charged against the alien:
xxxx
(7) Any alien who remains in the Philippines in
violation of any limitation or condition under which he
was admitted as a non-immigrant; [Emphasis
supplied.]
However, the Charge Sheet contained not just a
citation of the provision of law allegedly violated by
Park, but more importantly, a statement of the act
constituting the offense, i.e., Park’s status as an
undocumented alien whose passport had been
cancelled by the Korean Government. The pertinent
portion of the Charge Sheet reads:
The undersigned Special Prosecutor charges CHING
GEUN PARK @ JUNG GEUN PARK @ CHING
KEUN PARK, Korean national, for deportation for
violation of Section 37 (a)(7) of the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, committed as
follows:
That the respondent’s passport was cancelled by the
Korean Government, therefore, he is now an
undocumented alien in violation of Section 37(a)(7) of
the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended.
[Emphasis supplied.]
The actual designation of the offense is not material
so long as the act constituting the offense was clearly
alleged in the Charge Sheet and sufficient enough to
inform Park of the specific ground for his deportation.
In this case, we think it was. Notably, in the pleadings
Park filed with the BID, he insisted that his Passport
No. NW0057145 had not been cancelled; that he
possessed the requisite travel documents; and that he
is not an undocumented alien. Under these
circumstances, we highly doubt Park’s claim that he
had been denied of his right to be informed;
otherwise, he would not have found the need to raise
such defenses against the charge. Our opinion is
fortified by the fact that Park never raised this
particular objection to the charge when the case was
40
still before the BID and the CA. Thus, the allegations
in the Charge Sheet were sufficient, and there was full
compliance by the BID with the requirement under
Section 37(c) that no alien shall be deported without
being informed of the specific grounds for his
deportation.
We likewise do not agree with Park’s claim that his
case should be heard under the regular deportation
proceedings where a full hearing is required before
the BID’s Board of Special Inquiry. Section 1, Rule X
of the Deportation Rules states that:
Summary deportation shall be observed in cases
where the charge against the alien is overstaying or
expiration of his passport. In such case, the Board of
Special Inquiry shall merely require the presentation
of the alien’s valid passport and shall submit the
appropriate recommendation on the bases thereof.
[Emphasis supplied.]
Park was charged for having a cancelled passport,
which theoretically is equivalent to an expired
passport – in either case, the alien does not possess
the valid passport required under Section 10 of the
Immigration Act. The July 6, 2000 letter in fact stated
that "Park’s Korean Passport No. NW0057145 has
been expired and cancelled." The BID Office
Memorandum Order No. 19 on Summary
Deportation23 lists aliens with cancelled passports to
be covered under Summary Deportation Proceedings.
Thus, Park’s case was properly heard as one for
summary deportation, and a full-blown deportation
hearing was not necessary.
After rejecting Park’s legal objections against the
SDO, we proceed to a determination of whether there
remains factual basis to uphold the SDO and affirm
the October 15, 2001 Resolution.
Before anything else, we note that upon issuance of
the SDO, Park immediately and without any question
or reservation paid the administrative fines and fee
imposed on him under the SDO. He supposedly paid
the fees to support the petition for bail which he filed
with the BID. The payment of the administrative fines
and fees, however, is not material in considering a
bail petition. In deportation proceedings, the decision
to grant bail is entirely at the discretion of the BID
Commissioner.24 While not material in the grant of his
bail petition, the payment of the fines and fee was
nonetheless a significant indication of Park’s
acceptance of and compliance with the SDO. Park’s
act of payment effectively placed him in estoppel and
now bars him from contesting the validity of the SDO.
Park mainly relies on the following documents that
purportedly evidenced his authority to enter and
remain in the country: the February 16, 2001 and May
28, 2001 letters of the Korean Embassy which, he
claims, repudiated the July 6, 2000 letter on which the
SDO was based; the travel certificate dated January
16, 2001, also issued by the Korean Embassy; the
SIRV issued on January 8, 1997 by the Bureau of
Investments; and the new Passport No. PH0003486
issued on April 5, 2001. The CA considered the above
documents sufficient to overturn the SDO and the
October 15, 2001 Resolution, and thus faulted the
BID for disregarding them. A closer inspection of
these documents, however, compels us to rule for the
BID.
Contrary to Park’s claims, the February 16, 2001 and
May 28, 2001 letters did not categorically repudiate
the cancellation of Park’s Passport No. NW0057145
that was stated in the July 6, 2000 letter. The
February 16, 2001 letter simply declared that its
author, Young Chai Kim, did not write any letter
similar to the July 6, 2000 letter – an immaterial
allegation since it was Gyung Taek Cha who wrote it.
Gyung Taek Cha’s May 28, 2001 letter cannot be
considered a repudiation of his July 6, 2000 letter, as
it only stated that Park, as of that date (May 28,
2001), did not have any pending criminal cases in
Korea. Not one of the letters definitely stated that
Park’s Passport No. NW0057145 was not cancelled
on March 8, 2000. Gyung Taek Cha may have written
a letter on October 7, 2002 acknowledging error in
making the July 6, 2000 letter, but this came in too
late and was vague in denying the cancellation of the
passport. Besides, the fact that Park had been
previously deported on the strength of the July 6,
2000 letter renders the October 7, 2002 letter
suspect. Simply put, the Korean Embassy’s letters
never directly repudiated the cancellation of Park’s
Passport No. NW0057145.
Park’s SIRV and travel certificate cannot stand as
substitutes for his cancelled passport. As mentioned,
Section 10 of the Immigration Act requires non-
immigrants to have (1) unexpired passports, and (2)
valid passport visas. The grant of the SIRV only
relieves the alien from the necessity of securing a
valid visa; it does not replace the requirement of a
valid passport. Section 2(a) of Executive Order No. 63
declares that the SIRV entitles the alien to enter and
leave the Philippines without further documentary
requirements other than valid passports or other
travel documents in the nature of passports. Neither
can Park rely on the travel certificate; it was issued on
January 16, 2001 by the Korean Embassy after Park
had been charged and indicted, and served only as
authority for Park to return to Korea.
The issuance of a new passport to Park in no way
obliterated the fact that he entered the country on
October 28, 2000 without the requisite valid passport.
Park’s Passport No. PH0003486 was issued only on
April 5, 2001, months after he had been charged and
indicted for violating our immigration laws.
41
While we ruled in the 2004 case of Domingo v.
Scheer25 that the subsequent issuance of a new and
regular passport to the alien rendered the SDO moot
and academic, we cannot adopt that principle in the
present case because the Scheer ruling was arrived
at after considering a significantly different factual
situation.
The cancellation of Scheer’s passport resulted in the
loss of his privilege to stay in the country and for
which reason, the BID ordered his deportation. The
subsequent issuance of a new passport to Scheer,
however, remedied his undocumented status and
authorized his continued stay; thus, we declared the
SDO against him moot and academic. On the other
hand, Park was ordered deported because his
cancelled passport denied him of the privilege to re-
enter the country. The subsequent issuance of a new
passport to Park, as we said, did not erase the fact
that he was not lawfully admitted into the country in
the first place, as he returned without a valid passport.
When an alien has already physically gained entry in
the country, but such entry is later found unlawful or
devoid of legal basis, the alien can be excluded
anytime after it is found that he was not lawfully
admissible at the time of his entry.26
Given these findings, we rule that the supporting
documents presented by Park do not provide
sufficient factual basis for overturning the SDO that, at
that point, had already lapsed into finality for Park’s
failure to contest it on time. The BID thus correctly
denied Park’s motion to set aside the SDO in its
October 15, 2001 Resolution.
Deported aliens are generally barred from re-entering
the territory of the deporting state
We conclude this case by recognizing and pointing
out certain aspects that the BID may, in its discretion,
still want to look into. Section 29 (a) of the
Immigration Act states:
Section 29. (a) The following classes of aliens shall
be excluded from entry into the Philippines:
xxxx
(15) Persons who have been excluded or deported
from the Philippines, but this provision may be waived
in the discretion of the Commissioner of Immigration:
Provided, however, That the Commissioner of
Immigration shall not exercise his discretion in favor
of aliens excluded or deported on the ground of
conviction for any crime involving moral turpitude or
for any crime penalized under sections forty-five and
forty-six of this Act or on the ground of having
engaged in hoarding, black-marketing of profiteering
unless such aliens have previously resided in the
Philippine immediately before his exclusion or
deportation for a period of ten years or more or are
married to a native Filipino woman; [Emphasis
supplied.]1avvphi1
As a rule, an alien is barred from re-entering the
territory of the deporting State. However, States may,
upon proper application, waive previous deportation
orders and allow an alien to re-enter, provided, the re-
entry and readmission of the alien do not pose a risk
to the general welfare. As stated in the quoted
provision above, the Commissioner of Immigration
may exercise sound discretion in the readmission of
previously excluded aliens (subject to certain
limitations). After Park was first deported back to
Korea on July 24, 2000 on the strength of the July 6,
2000 letter, he returned to the Philippines apparently
without the requisite consent of the Commissioner of
Immigration prior to his re-entry. Whether the July 6, ARTURO D. BRION
2000 letter was actually repudiated by the Korean Associate Justice
Embassy does not figure into this equation, as Park’s
earlier deportation was already a fait accompli. His WE CONCUR:
failure to secure the Commissioner of Immigration’s
consent/waiver prior to readmission into the deporting ANTONIO T. CARPIO
State leaves the Commissioner sufficient ground to
Associate Justice
charge him with violation of Section 37(a)(2) of the Chairperson
Immigration Act, which declares that:

Section 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested MARIANO C. DEL
ROBERTO A. ABAD
upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration CASTILLO
Associate Justice
or of another officer designated by him or the purpose Associate Justice
and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner
of Immigration after a determination by the Board of JOSE P. PEREZ
Commissioners of the existence of the ground for Associate Justice
deportation as charged against the alien:

xxxx

(2) Any alien who enters the Philippines after the

effective date of this Act, who was not lawfully
admissible at the time of entry; [Emphasis supplied.]

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review

on certiorari and REVERSE the June 13, 2002
Decision and September 4, 2003 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67614. The
Summary Deportation Order of December 22, 2000
and Resolution of October 15, 2001 of the petition is
AFFIRMED and REINSATED. This ruling is without
prejudice to such action the Bureau of Immigration
and Deportation may undertake for the
commencement of the proper proceedings against
respondent Jung Keun Park for his re-entry into the
Philippines on October 28, 2000, subsequent to his
deportation.

SO ORDERED.

42