Prior Knowledge, Explanation and Application in Design

HF700 Spring 2019

Jonathan Levy
 Introduction

To change is the very nature of technology. It is because of this, designers need to

evaluate their choices when implementing innovative solutions. Maintaining a balance between
the new and the familiar is essential for product adoption. This equilibrium will affect how novice
users transition into newly developed products. As physical and digital environments are
interacted with, humans will make correct or incorrect choices. These decisions are based on a
lifetime’s worth of knowledge forming the basis of top down thinking (Johnson-Laird, 2001).
Like a network, knowledge is created by various linked modules. Simple abstract concepts
interconnect to form relationships resulting in complex cognitive structures (Anderson, 1996).
Over time, this network can change, adapting to novel environments and supporting necessary
decisions. Harnessing this resource and adaptability enables communication that is extremely
efficient for mapping new ideas. By tapping into existing mental models, onboarding of new tools
and features can be optimized, but to oppose, this can make for an unnecessarily challenging
experience. Within this paper, connections will be made to current theories surrounding prior
knowledge. Application of these concepts in design will be accomplished through analysis of
Adobe Photoshop. For designers, this will provide an understanding for how knowledge is stored,
structured, and accessed. Comprehension of these topics will hopefully provide clarity to
designers looking to control and minimize complexity of their future solutions.
Encoding, Retrieval, and Depth
During a lifetime, the brain will repeat a never-ending cycle of experiencing and
remembering. Encoding is the first essential step in this process allowing for the translation of
environmental information to the brain (Anderson, 1996; McDaniel, Einstein, Graham, & Rall,
2004). Ultimately, this is for the ideal purpose of remembering or retrieving later as needed for
task completion. For an easier transfer of data, the encoding process sends information as chunks
to the brain (Anderson, 1996; Meulemans & Van Der Linden, 2003; Miller, 1956). This allows
for larger comprehension of larger abstract concepts by first understanding smaller bits of
information (Neath & Suprenant, 2005).
Defined as either shallow or deep, encoding determines how and where these chunks will
be stored and ultimately retrieved (F. Craik & Lockhart, 1972). Shallow encoding locates data
within the short-term or working memory. This may involve the initial memorization of an
object’s shape or form. With deep encoding, information is understood from a semantic level.
Here an objects meaning and its relation to the observer is understood. Deep encoding is
primarily located within the long-term store (Kapur, Craik, Tulving, & Houle, 2002). Retrieval of
information encoded in the deeper levels is often highly successful and achieved with more ease.
This differentiating factor can be used to define novice or expert comprehension. Initially, a user
approaching a new product might accomplish a shallow understanding. As that novice progresses
to an expert, they will possess a deeper knowledge; seeing the solution from a holistic perspective
(Hoffman, 1998). Looking deeper into long term memory, two organizational categories exist: the
explicit and the implicit.
Long term organization
Long-term memory can be defined by its types and functions: the declarative, which is
the “knowing what” knowledge and the procedural, known as the “how to do” memory (Cohen &
Squire, 1980). Declarative includes semantic and episodic knowledge. The semantic category
consists of general knowledge and experiences throughout a lifetime (Tulving, Donaldson, &
Bower, 1972). Here subject matter is understood on an abstract level, which is necessary for
solving complex issues or problems which are connected to areas of the brain responsible for
perceiving and action (Fergus Craik & Tulving, 1975; Eichenbaum, 2001; Jacoby, Bartz, &
Evans, 1978; Loftus, 1973; Patterson, Nestor, & Rogers, 2007). Episodic memories are those
pertaining to humans within the context of their environment. They relate to a sense of time or
experiences regarding events. Memories in this space can shift to semantic, for instance
remembering when a hot kettle burned the skin, to understanding why something hot burned.
Implicit knowledge is sometimes referred to as procedural; this relates to task familiarity
such as tying a pair of shoes, riding a bike, and typing on a keyboard (Warrington & Weiskrantz,
1974). As new tasks are understood and repeated over time, the brain evolves. Declarative
knowledge can shift to more implicit states, advancing to an almost automatic unconscious effort
akin to muscle memory (Anderson, 1982; Berry, 1987; Fitts, 1964; Hoffman, 1998).
The interconnected structure
Knowledge of even the simplest object involves an expansive network of concepts and
ideas. For example, a simple table can be cross referenced among many categories: furniture,
wood, eating, dining, surface. These categories form nodes across a network relating to many
elements and their associations (Collins & Loftus, 1975). Evidence for this interconnected
structure can be explained by the fan effect (Collins & Loftus, 1975; Radvansky & Zacks, 1991;
Sohn, Anderson, Reder, & Goode, 2004). As a concept is understood and linked to more nodes,
response time increases due to the extra effort needed to find a mental match. Like fitting a piece
of a puzzle, the brain evaluates whether new information fits the current composition. Travel time
and therefore response time will be decreased for pathways used repeatedly and most recently
(Yantis & Meyer, 1988). This can explain why familiar objects or words seen out of their context
in unlikely environments will be hard to remember or even forgotten (Brewer et al., 1981;
McNamara & Diwadkar, 1996).
 The acquired associations of concepts with their attributes within the brain is referred to
as schema (Barsalou,Lawrence W., 1999; Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977). These schemas and their
compositions make up how a person perceives their world and dictate what responses seem
appropriate. Represented in an abstract way, schemas form the most elementary version of a
concept (Kohls & Scheiter, 2008). Related to schemas are scripts, which consist of repeated
actions or behaviors associated with an event or place (Abelson, 1981). Script activities such as
forming a line for a show, ordering at a restaurant, and doing laundry can all be associated with
repeated actions frequently experienced over time. It is obvious to see from these frameworks that
humans prefer repetition as it allows for predictability and reliable outcomes. When interruptions
or newly encountered events occur, further evaluation and adaptation is then required.
Learning is revision
Like much of biology, knowledge does not remain constant throughout life. Over time,
adaptation is unavoidable and cognitive structures are revised. As identified earlier, schemas and
current concept maps are referenced when encountering new and foreign material. The first step
is assimilation, fitting these new elements into the current knowledge architecture (Piaget, 1976).
If new information can be absorbed into existing frameworks then less evaluation is required.
However, if the information is novel enough, the existing knowledge will require restructuring,
thus accomodation occurs. This restructuring is much more draining on the cognitive system as
new structures are required for the mind to support new schemas (Rumelhart & Norman, 1978).
The easiest method for conveying new information is by utilizing existing knowledge or if
necessary, requiring a slight adjustment through “tuning”. Throughout life this iterative process
hones and refines knowledge. As learners advance, more information can be accommodated than
what was previously enabled (Reinking, Labbo, & McKenna, 2000). The balance of assimilation
versus accommodation determines whether a new task is perceived as difficult. It is because of
this, new information needs to be presented matching the observer’s current comprehension level.
If done incorrectly, errors will occur and incorrect mental models may be drawn about the subject
(D. A. Norman & Bobrow, 1975).

Affordance and Metaphors

Often interface designers and user researchers will want to determine an interface’s
intuitiveness. This can be done by assessing its affordance: how easy is it for the user to
assimilate and accommodate (Gibson, 1966). Humans will try to perceive how new objects are
intended to be used. Procedural memory can come into play as the interaction can be linked with
physical movement of related experiences (D. Norman, 2013; You & Chen, 2007). Like the door
handle meant to be grabbed, designs with great affordance are simple and take little cognitive
effort to use. Design patterns can be one effective way for increasing affordance for digital
interactions. Some common examples are how a drop down menu functions or the website
breadcrumbs that are used for navigating site architecture. Over time as a user repeatedly
encounter these methods of interface control, these interactions become more engrained and
encoded with them. This will greatly increase the affordance for future designs utilizing these
interaction methods.
Metaphors are one method for providing additional affordance. By creating references to
well-known schemas, inferences can be drawn across new digital elements. A common example
seen today is the digital shopping cart on ecommerce websites. While online shopping may have
seemed innovative and new at the time, providing a shopping cart helped novice users understand
how this digital act related to the physical one. This provided a way for the user to understand a
new capability by utilizing an existing script and schema. Using analogies aids in learning new
tasks and in some cases can help in complex problem solving as links can be drawn from one
perspective to another (Gick & Holyoak, 1983). These methods provide bridges to new concepts
from existing ones, activating current memory structures in order to make new ones (Holland,
Holyoak, Thagard, & Nisbett, 1989)
Prior Knowledge in Application
When Adobe Photoshop arrived, it was one of the first software programs to
enable photo editing on a computer. Today it has become the gold standard for the design
industry and even made its
way into pop culture
vernacular. To "Photoshop" an
image, new users must first
understand functionality of
tools and features, hopefully
advancing from novice to
expert. To aid in this
transition, Photoshop adopted Example screenshot of Photoshop
well-encoded metaphors as
well as great affordances within its UI, although not perfectly. When Photoshop debuted, there
were awkward design patterns that still exist in the current version. These choices go against
intuition but fortunately, can be remedied by minor adjustments.
Upon first opening of the tool, a new user may become overwhelmed from visible
buttons, menus, and windows. Disorienting at first, focus may shift to the various menus and
toolbars where some recognizable features maybe seen. Within the toolbar on the left side are the
most frequently used functions. Here, interface designers were successful in utilizing physical
metaphors for digital interactions. One of the best examples of this is the magnifying glass icon.

Magnifying Glass Selected
sometimes being divisive among visual designers it helps tremendously in comprehension.
As in real life and therefore how a user's schema is likely
defined, the magnifying glass functions in showing the image in a
larger, increased scale. This tool not only matches with a user's
semantic understanding for how it works but also has become a
design pattern itself across other programs. The paint bucket
shown also has ties to a physical sense. Like spilling a bucket of
paint on the floor, this tool fills any enclosed area with a specified
color or pattern. Matching these digital features to physical ones
can sometimes be referred to as "Skeuomorphism" and although

Not all these tools are successful in their representation. The Magic Wand tool is one
specific feature found unique to Photoshop. Typically, during photo modification, image editors
will mask off certain areas to preserve their original
content from what is being edited. The Magic Wand
does this by selecting and masking similar colors when
clicked on. While this feature is handy, the icon has
zero affordance for new users. The interface designers
matched a unique function with an object not Magic Wand tool selected

commonly used, which then becomes open for

interpretation. After using repeatedly, the Photoshop
user has restructured their schema for a magic wand
and can now accommodate its meaning, however
this less than ideal.
The clone feature is another well represented
action by metaphor. While this function is new, the
icon is not. Identified by its icon representation, the
stamp tool is an essential Photoshop feature. This
enables editors to sample part of an image and
transfer it to another location. By using a well
understand physical element analogies can be easily
drawn as to how this tool works. The sampled image
area becomes the "inkpad" for the stamp to copy onto other locations. This interaction process
matches the steps one would take using a physical
Clone Stamp tool shown with animation offering
even more affordance through demonstration ink stamp. At first in Photoshop this capability
might not be first comprehended, however utilizing an existing schema surely assists in learning
it.
The layer tool works exactly as it sounds, allowing photo editors to apply effects or other
elements across various levels or "layers" within the image. The list order matches how these
elements are displayed within the window. Items on top will overlap and cover those on
bottom. This tool aligns with schema for representing how stacked elements appear.
However when trying to filter these layers the user may have a difficult time. Unlike typical
filters used in other programs represented by an actual filter icon, here the filter tool is a toggle
button placed next to icons and a dropdown bar. Users will more than likely not have previous
experience seeing a filter displayed this way and will not grasp full functionality at first. While
it's understood that there are multiple selectable options within Photoshop's filters, this could have
been executed in a way utilizing more common design patterns.

Odd application of filters shown on left with Photoshop utilizing toggle bar and buttons. Example of
typical filter behavior show on the right. Here filters are accessed through menu rather than exposing
one at a time.

As mentioned at the start of this paper, previous knowledge will shape user
decisions. Due to comfort in consistency, humans will expect items from experience to perform
similarly in the future. When encountering new information, humans will attempt to comprehend
it framing perceptions upon the most similar comparisons they have available. In trying to convey
unique behaviors, UX designers and product developers are best to map their new functionality to
the closest representation the user is familiar with. By enabling the user to see similarities from
software to their other mental models, a deeper encoding can occur; this increases retention and
recollection of the software's capabilities. Understanding this principle, it is essential to assess a
user's prior knowledge of a subject or task. Constructing a model for a user's knowledge base
allows designers to choose appropriate methods of conveying information as well as define what
needs to be communicated. This is a core responsibility for a UX designer. As technology
advances in the future and disruptions are guaranteed to occur, product innovation must not
outpace usability.
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