The Asian Values Debate Implications For The Spread of Liberal Democracy

The Asian Values Debate: Implications for the Spread of Liberal Democracy
Author(s): Surain Subramaniam

Source: Asian Affairs: An American Review, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Spring, 2000), pp. 19-35
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The Asian Values Debate: Implications
for the Spread of Liberal Democracy
SURAIN SUBRAMANIAM
T hehas
debate over
attracted the array
a broad compatibility ofevidenced
of scholars, as liberal by
democracy
the scope ofwith
the "Asian values"
scholarly literature that addresses the issue.' In this article I seek to trace the gen-
esis of the debate, place it in a scholarly framework, and delineate the main
schools of thought within it.
The Genesis of the Asian Values Debate
Most scholars trace the genesis of the debate on Asian values to Singapore,2
but few have delved deeply into its background. Even prominent scholars of East
Asia have written on the subject without adequate examination of the reasons
behind its appearance in Singapore. For example, in an otherwise excellent and
highly thought-provoking article, Donald K. Emmerson writes, "The notion of
'Asian values', for all its vast scope, originated in Singapore in the late 1980s and
early 1990s as Lee Kuan Yew and his fellow ministers pondered their city-state's
identity and how to strengthen it."3 In fact, research shows that as far back as
1976, the topic of Asian values had already been raised by the Singaporeans as
part of their efforts to examine the role of values within the broader context of
modernization. As a harbinger of things to come, Seah Chee-Meow wrote:
The failure of parliamentary democracy in many new states, after varying periods
of experimentation, indicates the limitations of transplanting externally-induced
ideas or institutions, especially if the bulk of the people are not sufficiently appre-
ciative of the relevance or desirability of such institutions or ideas.4
19
20 Asian Affairs
Clearly questioning the

pates the position attrib
namely, that liberal de
incompatible.
I find three component
the formative componen
Each must be considered
sues in the debate over t
The Formative Compone
The early discourse on

tify those values that w
interesting to note that
virtues of Asian values. I
to mean the prevailing
Asian societies, those values were a barrier to modernization and economic
growth and development.6 For example, Ho Wing Meng wrote:
It is therefore more appropriate to use the term "Asian values" to denote not a par-
ticular set of attitudes, beliefs and institutions which all Asian people share in com-
mon, but rather to refer to the great diversities which characterize Asian values as
such, and which in the context of this discussion, pose serious difficulties to the task
of modernizing Asia for social, economic and political development.7
Yet there was also the belief during this period that certain values associated
with Asian cultures ought to be maintained as Singaporean society underwent
modernization. As early as 1970, in a speech given in the United States, Prime
Minister Lee Kuan Yew stated:
The question leaders of the less developed countries have to answer, is not whether
or not to modernize. The question these leaders have to answer is how rapidly they
can modernize their societies and equally important, how much of their traditional
past can they retain, so that they are not just poor imitations of the West, with all the
fads and fetishes, the disorders and aberrations of contemporary Western societies.8
Nevertheless, as a consequence of its drive toward modernization Singapore-

an society was, predictably, becoming more westernized.9 Fearing that western-
ization would threaten Singapore's Asian identity, its continued economic pros-
perity, and its existing political order, one scholar pointed out that the Asian
values question had been raised as a revisionist response to the "early stigmatiz-
ing of Confucianism as backward and retrogade."'o Finally, the Asian values dis-
course was part of a much larger process that involved the cultural construction
of a national identity: the process of nation building that began when the small
island-state gained its independence in 1965."
The Asian Values Debate 21
When we examine the evolut

mative period, several themes
subject a sense of ambivalence
Asian cultural values. Second,
to capture the heterogeneity o
Critics of the Singapore schoo
lence and pessimism only und
However, I argue that it is bet
of Asian values has been in th
ing in response to new challen
The Reactive Component: Saf
The reactive component bec

position and thrust the deba
assertive position gained muc
Scholars have correctly point
Asian countries was not new
of 1919 and the Meiji Restorat
tural assertiveness. Other As
school, and in a short time t
enlivened discourse on the ro
The reactive component rese
seen by many as an Asian cha
West. Consistent with such a
Singapore school can be seen a
scholars fail to recognize is th
stream in the wider debate ov
in a broader analytical frame
developments.
Those include, first, the triu
after the end of the Cold War
the East Asian countries." Eq
growth, especially in the face
democratic political reforms w
lectual front, Samuel Huntin
elicited strong reactions from
reactive vein of the Asian valu
of civilizations, at least in the
ism and Asian cultures.
It is critical to recognize the broader conceptual framework because it places

the reactive component of the Asian values position in proper perspective. Crit-
22 Asian Affairs
ics of the notion of A

are being depicted in t
which conceal major
Asia and the West."20 A
quick to dismiss the le
institutions in the regio
The Pragmatic Compon
The pragmatic compon

most justifiable defens
ly free of counterprodu
ably also the most clear
response to a unique se
matic argument is simp
tasks of economic grow
The main features of
eral democracy is only
ernment;23 (b) each cou
tural resources, as wel
governance or the polit
unique features but als
that society; in short,
problems of governanc
democracy, must be ev
the case of Singapore,
perity); and (e) determi
particular society invo
means of a pragmatic
Kausikan aptly points o
implied by the term 'm
cannot be a 'Singapore
In the pragmatic argu
of the Singapore schoo
eral values. At the risk
Asian values are superi
facing Singapore. Kaus
Today's "Asian values" d

and development. These
cess; the question now be
to sustain development o
ends that have confront
Asian societies are now searchin

ket, state, and society .... The r
ues of any particular geographi
ues, in what degree and in
development, the maintenanc
problems.... The real choices a
among different values, right
between different sets of value
society. The balance in each cou
one direction. Thus the debate
Evaluation: Implications for t
What can we take away from

ues position in Singapore? At
nificance of Asian values, we
catch-all that claims to repre
term has a clear genesis: Just
racy" emerged through a pr
ment, so too did the ideas cont
cept of Asian values is consta
and exogenous forces. And t
school has several componen
-which are consistent, howev
Fitting the Three Streams
Asian Values as the Indigeniz
Samuel Huntington has argu

nomic development, the in
whole often "encourages pe
become culturally assertive."
societies in the wake of mode
than produce cultural western
nomic development "promot
indigenous cultures."'6 Witho
values position in Singapore,
fits neatly within the fram
Although not necessarily fals
Rather than reflecting the i
sense of cultural assertivenes
by the Singaporean leadership
insidious encroachment of
24 Asian Affairs
Although one could eas

values position was cult
challenges: first, the w
the end of the Cold W
embrace liberal democ
Asian Values as the Un

at an International Level?
Some scholars have argued that to focus on the cultural dichotomy between
Asian values and liberal democratic values is to miss a far more universal and
significant aspect of the debate, that is, a conservative political/philosophical
attack on liberal democracy.28 Richard Robison points out that "one of the impli-
cations of such interpretations is that the rise of conservatism in Asia may tilt
the global balance against liberalism and influence the contest within the West
itself."29 What does this mean for the provenance of Asian values? If we put aside
for the moment the possibility that this interpretation runs the risk of seeing
Asian values through the lense of western ideological categories, we are left with
the prospect that Asian values are not much more than conservative western val-
ues-a conclusion that severely weakens the culturalist claims of the Asian val-
ues proponents.
Defining Asian Values
To determine the merits of the culturalist claims of the Singapore school we

must begin with the question, What constitutes Asian values?30 One way of delin-
eating the constituent parts of Asian values is to separate them into social values
and the effects of those values in the political-economic sphere.
Asian values as conceived by the Singapore school are ostensibly Confucian
values.31 However, some are also consistent with Weber's Protestant work ethic.32
Others defy strict categorization. The inventory of Asian values as conceived by
the Singapore school consists mainly of the following: respect for authority,
strong families, reverence for education, hard work, frugality, teamwork, and a
balance between the individual's interests and those of society.33
Political-Economic Outcomes
But the real challenge posed by the Asian values position, one that goes to
the heart of the issue of its compatibility with liberal democracy, is that the
above-mentioned social values are said to give rise to specific political-economic
preferences in a society: First, social order and political stability are valued over
individual rights and liberal democracy. Second, collective social norms tend to
have greater weight than in

vidualistic.34 Third, democra
other, preferred social goods
not an end in itself. Fourth,
sus building and trust in poli
they achieve and maintain "g
economic wealth and the ma
in society. To achieve good g
broad powers with moral rec
necessary conditions for econ
social stability, and commun
perity of society is seen to ou
ing the individualistic assump
western values, free enterpr
Asian societies prefer to adop
as destabilizing.38
One of the biggest problem
gapore school is determining
social values and the politica
ly, is the role of culture in
the moral and ethical bases o
and western societies differ
and ethics. In particular, m
familism and duty as much
state is to establish those moral and ethical standards. The state has a clear role
in determining the moral and ethical criteria on which its society is based, and
presumably also in enforcing those criteria. This is antithetical to the liberal
understanding of the role of the state as being neutral with respect to society's
moral or ethical bases.39
In short, the Singapore school argues for a relativistic understanding of the
relationship between cultural values and systems of government. Its approach to
governance is one in which the state has a particular view of what is good for its
society and acts according to that view.40 The appropriate test for Singapore's
democracy is "whether it works for Singapore and serves the interests of Singa-
poreans."41 As far as the Singapore school is concerned, Asian values are clearly
incompatible with liberal democracy.
Is the Asian values position merely an engineered ideological stance of the
Singaporean leadership? Or is there something deeper in it that resonates with the
rest of Asia? What is its significance for the broader question of the compatibil-
ity of liberal democracy with Asian political and cultural traditions? To evaluate
these issues I now turn to an examination of the other school of thought on the
issue, which I call the "universalist school."
26 Asian Affairs
The Universalist Scho

with Asian Values
The universalists42 ma
patibility of liberal dem
1. Liberal democrati
and those liberties transcend cultural boundaries. Inoue Tatsuo writes that the
centralization of the powers of coercion in the hands of the modern sovereign
state has meant that the state poses the greatest threat to individuals. Traditional
safeguards, such as autonomous village community structures, no longer pro-
tect individuals against state tyranny.43 The universalists argue that under such
conditions, the state should be allowed to exist only insofar as basic civil and
political liberties are secured for individuals; to argue that basic civil and polit-
ical liberties in Asian societies are culturally incompatible is "misguided and
perverse."44
2. Liberal democratic values are an integral part of the good society; there-
fore, liberal democratic systems should be seen as ends in themselves.45 Univer-
salists argue that Asians deserve as much liberty as westerners and that as the
forces of modernization, democratization, and globalization sweep through for-
merly traditional societies, their populations are demanding liberal democratic
systems of government in increasing numbers.46 Citing an example of that wave
of democratization, Margaret Ng writes:
[T]he case of Hong Kong is not that of a community aspiring to democracy as a

means to the economic development that Western democracies seem to enjoy.
... Rather, democracy was desired because it would give the people of Hong Kong
a say in decisions concerning their lives, and because it was the only instrument
that could provide real protection for human rights against an authoritarian gov-
ernment.47
3. Asian civilizations have liberal heritages. The argument for the universali-
ty of liberal democratic values receives further support from the claim that in the
histories of Asian civilizations there are clear roots of values now associated with
western liberal democracy.48
4. Human cultures are mutable and dynamic by nature. Some universalists
subscribe to a simple, teleological understanding of cultural change, holding that
all cultures will eventually converge on the doorstep of western liberalism.49 Oth-
ers offer a more sophisticated understanding, viewing liberal democracy as "an
unfinished project . . . in the deeper sense that its foundations, principles, and
institutional devices leave much to be clarified, refined, and developed."'5 In both
cases, the main thrust of the universalist position is that "cultures change."''51 This
is one of the most formidable challenges against any strong culturalist claims on
behalf of Asian values.
The universalist claim that w

values contains an implicit assum
tion of liberal democratic values. Fareed Zakaria writes:
Under the impact of economic growth, technological change and social transfor-
mation, no culture has remained the same. Most of the attributes that Lee [Kuan
Yew] sees in Eastern cultures were once part of the West. Four hundred years of
economic growth changed things. .. . But to be modem without becoming more
Western is difficult; the two are not wholly separable. The West has left a mark on
"the rest," and it is not simply a legacy of technology and material products. It is,
perhaps most profoundly, in the realm of ideas.52
The universalists, then, reject the Huntingtonian argument that the processes of
modernization, economic growth, and technological change can operate in a
delimited sphere with cultural integrity simultaneously preserved in a separate
domain. Rather, they believe that there is a complex relationship between those
processes and cultural change. Modernization, economic growth, and technologi-
cal change not only push cultures toward a common set of values consistent with
modemrn liberal values, but also, once initiated, require those values to be sustained.
Universalist Critiques ofAsian Values
The universalists level at least five critiques against the Asian values position:
1. The Asian values position, the universalists argue, offers what "soft" author-
itarian regimes would like to believe is a "principled defense of their reluctance
to broaden political participation."'53 But it lacks the normative or philosophical
basis to provide a real alternative to liberal democracy.54 Moreover, the cultural-
ist claims made by proponents of Asian values are self-serving; most proponents
are representatives of the leadership elite in these "Asian-style" democracies. For
universalists, culturalist claims are little more than attempts by authoritarian
regimes to take refuge in "traditional" values55 or to exploit their societies'
resentment of the West.56
2. In the universalists' view, proponents of Asian values have created a false
monolithic label that overlooks the heterogeneity of Asian cultural values and the
presence of liberal democratic voices within Asian cultures.57 In their attempts to
make Asian values the normative "other" of western values, they have in effect
orientalized or essentialized Asian cultures.58
3. Contrary to the argument by Asian values proponents that it is the culture
of Asian values that explains the economic growth in their countries, universalist
critics hold that the relationship between economic growth and values is com-
plex. Amartya Sen writes that the economic policies that led to growth in those
societies included "openness to competition, the use of international markets, a
high level of literacy and education, successful land reforms, and public provi-
sions of incentives for investment, exporting and industrialization." He adds:
28 Asian Affairs
There is nothing whatso

with greater democracy,
of authoritarianism. .. . [
a friendlier economic cli
centrate only on econom
ignoring political incen
deeply unbalanced set of
Other universalists hav

ship between Asian va
4. Good leadership is im
They argue that we ne
tem or even a political
and "good leadership"
Such criteria soon beco
ism.62 Some universali
ment" is often misint
writes:
Asian authoritarians misu

governance and the conc
the bad elements of econ
without consent; the sam
strength of Asia's proud
5. The universalists h
material prosperity, a
enough to be given pri
and freedom.64 There i
latter.
Asian Values as an Elite Discourse
Few scholars have studied the extent to which, in societies whose elites are
proponents of Asian values, that position resonates with "the man in the street."65
An exception is Donald K. Emmerson, who raises an interesting point, albeit
based on anecdotal evidence:
[I]n any society, some individuals are likely to value order and fear disorder more
than others do. It follows that such order-valuing, disorder-fearing people may con-
stitute a higher proportion of the citizenry of one society compared with another. If
that is so, implementing representative democracy in these two societies could have
different implications for human rights. An electorate that values individual rights,
is accustomed to social order, and sees little or no contradiction between them could
democratically enlarge personal freedom. But an electorate less confident of the
capacity of its social order to withstand the conflicts that greater personal freedoms
might entrain could, just as democratically, curtail them.66
Emmerson's argument closely

position in Singapore. Howeve
advocates is to demonstrate th
Asian cultural values, not simp
It has also been argued that A
tification by certain authoritar
alism and legitimize illiberal p
this view, irrespective of cult
itself becomes a factor in dete
in those societies.68
"Illiberal" Democracy
What is an illiberal democr

approach to democratic practi
solidarity and political virtue i
cratic societies do."70 Illiberal
cratic structures are developed
life,'" such as "economic, mo
strong family structure, as opp
the individual against the state
Emmerson suggested the fol
democracies that unfolded afe
[E]ven if there are no quintessen

taken seriously by students of
what we mean by that term [dem
cally implement differing views
individual rights, it follows that
could be nonliberal-or at any r
compared to their liberal counter
Indeed, in their path-breakin

PacificAsia, the authors write
expect a 'triumph' of liberal d
Southeast Asia." Indeed, they c
democratization in East and South

cratic practices and institutions o
with different ways of organizin
to the question of who counts as
Fareed Zakaria has argued pe

"democratic" regimes and "con
both theoretically and historic
30 Asian Affairs
acterized by open, free

protections for the rule
speech, assembly, relig
ensure that the proced
case of "constitutional
to which a government
sources of coercion-sta
cratic" elections have o
ate strong centralized
entrenched coalitions,
eties." According to Zak
ernment with that for
adhere to the principle
and pursue tough polic
process (32).
Based on these criteria, Zakaria is alarmed by the fact that "half of the 'democ-
ratizing' countries in the world today are illiberal democracies" (24). More sig-
nificantly, far from maturing into liberal democracies, the illiberal democracies
are "moving toward heightened illiberalism," which seems to suggest that illib-
eral democracies are not "temporary or transitional" stages toward western liber-
al democracy, but rather alternative forms of government (24). Pointing to the his-
torical record, Zakaria argues that although constitutional liberalism has led to
democracy, the reverse is seldom true. Democracy does not necessarily bring
about constitutional liberalism (28).
Conclusion
The essential question of the Asian values debate is to what extent the devel-
opmental path identified with Asian values can be seen as a legitimate alternative
to the liberal democratic path of political development. As shown above, the uni-
versalists claim that the liberal democratic path has universal applicability. Pro-
ponents of Asian values challenge the universal applicability of liberal democratic
values and institutions in Asian cultural contexts.
The universalist position that western liberal democracy is compatible with
Asian cultures leads easily to what one scholar calls "wishful thinking" about
democracy.75 The moral force of universalist critiques of Asian values is greatest
when the arguments are explicitly framed in terms of democracy versus authori-
tarianism. However, more relevant is the universalists' implicit claim for the uni-
versality of liberal democracy, a variant of democratic political systems that
includes western liberal values. Far from being universal, those values are unique
to the historical, political, social, and cultural experiences of western Europe.
Both the cultural relativists and the liberal universalists seem to have it only
half-right. Consequently, I pro

Garry Rodan calls "false mono
syncretists argue that the iss
tems are concerned have unive
would unilaterally exclude As
in shaping positions around
cultures have a longer histor
tion and economic developme
responses to those challenges
Through engagement with lib
at culturally syncretist respo
countries have adopted capita
cific economic challenges fac
cal moralities"'78 that might
theless can be shaped to suit
It is quite unfortunate that
became polarized, without so
lithic categories. The debate h
plurality of cultures and valu
Asian cultures and values, and
ponents of liberal democratic
research on Asian values coul
NOTES
I am most grateful to Professor Robert G. Wirsing for all his guidance, comments, and suggestions
in the process of writing this article. I would also like to thank Professor Donald J. Puchala for his
unending support and Professor Donald E. Weatherbee for taking a keen interest in my work.
1. A few examples are Joanne R. Bauer and Daniel A. Bell, eds., The East Asian Challenge for
Human Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Wm. Theodore de Bary, Asian Val-
ues and Human Rights: A Confucian Communitarian Perspective (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1998); Daniel A. Bell, David Brown; Kanishka Jayasuriya, and David Martin Jones,
eds., Towards Illiberal Democracy in Pacific Asia (Oxford: St. Martin's Press, 1996); Joseph Chan,
"Asian Values and Human Rights: An Alternative View," in Democracy in East Asia, ed. Larry Dia-
mond and Marc E Plattner (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 28-41; Donald K.
Emmerson, "Singapore and the 'Asian Values' Debate," Journal of Democracy 6, no. 4 (October
1995): 95-105; Amartya Sen, "Human Rights and Asian Values," New Republic, 14 and 21 July 1997,
33-40; Stephen J. Hood, "The Myth of Asian-Style Democracy," Asian Survey 38, no. 9 (September
1998): 853-66; and Diane K. Mauzy, "The Human Rights and 'Asian Values' Debate in Southeast
Asia: Trying to Clarify the Key Issues," Pacific Review 10, no. 2 (1997): 210-36.
2. Chan, "Asian Values and Human Rights," 35; and Emmerson, "Singapore and the 'Asian Val-
ues' Debate." Although it is commonly believed that the Singaporeans were among the first to use the
term "Asian values," scholars have also noted that "when commentators speak of 'Asian values' they
implicate Northeast Asia too, notably China and Japan." See Donald K. Emmerson, "Region and
Recalcitrance: Rethinking Democracy through Southeast Asia," Pacific Review 8, no. 2 (1995):
223-48, at 235.
3. Emmerson, "Region and Recalcitrance," 236.
4. Seah Chee-Meow, ed., Asian Values and Modernization (Singapore: Singapore University
Press, 1977), x.
32 Asian Affairs
5. The term can be traced to Eri

National Interest 35 (Spring 199
6. See Ho Wing Meng, "Asian V
ed. Seah Chee-Meow (Singapore:
7. Ibid., 13. This also shows that on
values, i.e., its inherent heterogen
Singaporeans.
8. Quoted in Peter S. J. Chen, "Asian Values and Modernization: A Sociological Perspective," in
Asian Values and Modernization, ed. Seah Chee-Meow (Singapore: Singapore University Press,
1977), 21-22.
9. Peter S. J. Chen writes, "Being a late-comer, Singapore borrows the advanced technological,
political, economic and ideological systems as well as most western values from the indigenous devel-
opers. Inevitably, the process of modernization directly or indirectly influences the values, behaviour
patterns and life-styles of the population of Singapore." Ibid., 39. Also see Eddie C. Y. Kuo, "Confu-
cianism as Political Discourse in Singapore: The Case of an Incomplete Revitalization Movement,"
in Confucian Traditions in East Asian Modernity: Moral Education and Economic Culture in Japan
and the Four Mini-Dragons, ed. Tu Wei-ming (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996),
295-97.
10. De Bary, Asian Values and Human Rights, 4 (note 1 above). In the revisionist view, "post-
Confucian" culture was instead considered to be "a powerful human resource for modernization."
Ibid., 4.
11. For a more detailed discussion, see Beng-Huat Chua, Communitarian Ideology and Democ-
racy in Singapore (London: Routledge, 1995), 101-23.
12. S. Rajaratnam, "Asian Values and Modernization," in Asian Values and Modernization, ed.
Seah Chee-Meow (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1977), 95-100. Also see Chen, "Asian Val-
ues and Modernization," 29 (note 8 above).
13. Judging from the literature, this component of the Asian values position was most prevalent
in the early 1990s, almost two decades after the issue had been introduced in Singapore. The most
prominent early writings include Lee Kuan Yew, "The East Asian Way," New Perspectives Quarterly
(Winter 1992): 4-13; Kishore Mahbubani, "The West and the Rest," The National Interest 28 (Sum-
mer 1992); Kishore Mahbubani, "The Dangers of Decadence: What the Rest Can Teach the West,"
Foreign Affairs 72, no. 4 (September/October 1993): 10-14; Bilahari Kausikan, "Asia's Different
Standard," Foreign Policy 92 (Fall 1993): 24-41; Kishore Mahbubani, "The United States: 'Go East,
Young Man,'" Washington Quarterly 17, no. 2 (Spring 1994): 5-23; Kishore Mahbubani, "The Pacif-
ic Way," Foreign Affairs 74, no. 1 (January/February 1995): 100-111, to name just a few.
14. Chan, "Asian Values and Human Rights," 36 (note 1 above).
15. An entire issue of the New Perspectives Quarterly (Winter 1992) was devoted to the subject.
Entitled "Looking East: The Confucian Challenge to Western Liberalism," the issue included Li Xian-
glu, "The Post-Cold War Challenge from Asia," 13-14; Takeshi Umehara, "Individualism vs. Con-
fucianism," 15; Mahathir bin Mohamed and Anwar Ibrahim, "Look East," 16-19; and Yoichi Fun-
abashi, "Globalize Asia." Also see Michael Vatikiotis and Robert Delfs, "Cultural Divide: East Asia
Claims the Right to Make Its Own Rules," Far Eastern Economic Review, 17 June 1993, 20-22; and
Anwar Ibrahim, The Asian Renaissance (Singapore: Times Books International, 1996).
16. The term "cultural nationalism" is used in Lily Zubaidah Rahim, "In Search of the 'Asian
Way': Cultural Nationalism in Singapore and Malaysia," Commonwealth and Comparative Politics
36, no. 3 (November 1998): 54-73.
17. A clear example is the now infamous work by Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the
Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992), which argues for an explicit link between capitalism and lib-
eral democracy. In a later article, Fukuyama offers an interesting defense of liberal democracy as a
political system but concedes some of its socially pernicious effects. He writes, "[O]ne of the reasons
that the whole 'Asian values' debate arose in the first place was that in social terms the United States
was not nearly as attractive a model to many Asian elites in the 1990s as it had been in the 1950s and
1960s." He later continues, "Asians see in the United States symptoms of excessive individualism and
self-indulgence, deterioration of the family, and all of the pathologies that stem therefrom." Francis
Fukuyama, "The Illusions of 'Asian Exceptionalism,'" in Democracy in EastAsia, ed. Larry Diamond
and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 227.
18. Particularly Japan and the "fou

Singapore, and in the early 1990s, the
19. Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash
22-49. Apart from the initial publishe
ilizations? The Debate, A Foreign Affa
entire volume is devoted exclusively t
Rashid, ed., "The Clash of Civilization
20. Garry Rodan, "The Internation
Pacific Review 9, no. 3 (1996): 328.
21. The clearest expression of the pr
Kausikan, "The 'Asian Values' Debate: A
Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimo
tive to note that an almost identical e
that Works" (Journal of Democracy 8
pragmatic argument.
22. De Bary, Asian Values and Huma
23. Kausikan, "The 'Asian Values' D
democratic theory. See Bhikhu Pare
Prospects ofDemocracy, ed. David He
24. Kausikan, "The 'Asian Values' De
25. For a good discussion of the cul
Particularity of Liberal Democracy,"
26. Samuel P. Huntington, "The West
ber/December 1996): 28-46, at 37.
27. Chua, Communitarian Ideology
28. Rodan, "The Internationalizatio
Richard Robison, "The Politics of 'A
Rodan and Kevin Hewison, "A 'Clash o
ways to Asia: The Politics of Engagem
and Unwin, 1996), 29-55; and Richard
29. Richard Robison, introduction to
30. The use of the term "values" here
de Bary: "Values ordinarily connote th
(mostly seen as moral but not exclusivel
ing institutions." Asian Values and Hu
31. For more on social values in Singa
Current History 93 (December 1994
32. See David Landes, The Wealth an
Poor (New York: W. W. Norton, 1998)
values, argues that the behavior that f
behavior that followed from adherenc
economic development. Consequently,
political West, but short of expressive
said to resemble those of America in
than Calvinist values. See David Gress,
(New York: Free Press, 1998), 540.
33. This list is drawn from a study c
Asian Values and the United States: Ho
International Studies, 1994), 2.
34. Michael R. J. Vatikiotis, Political
don: Routledge, 1996), 111.
35. Yung-Myung Kim, "Asian-Style
no. 12 (December 1997): 1121. Kim argu
itarian system of government that inc
idarity, and a paternalistic-authoritaria
36. De Bary, Asian Values and Huma
34 Asian Affairs
37. Vatikiotis, Political Cha

38. Ibid., 95.
39. SeeMichael Sandel, Dem
ophy (Cambridge, Mass.: Ha
40. One scholar has argued t
ian direction, high-speed eco
Values and Human Rights, 4
41. Kausikan, "The 'Asian V
42. Margaret Ng, "Why Asia
Asia, ed. Larry Diamond an
3-16; Stephen J. Hood, "The
1998): 853-66; Kim Dae Jung
eign Affairs 73, no. 6 (Novem
Values" (note 1 above); de Ba
eral Democracy and Asian Or
R. Bauer and Daniel Bell (Ca
"Cultural Relativism and De
Asia, ed. Richard Robison (S
Fukuyama, "The Illusion of
"The Propaganda Way," Fore
gapore's Authoritarian Capi
(Fairfax, Va.: Locke Institute
ues,'" Pacific Review 9, no.
Critique from East Asia," As
43. Tatsuo, "Liberal Democr
44. Ibid., 29. On the other h
istic, modernist one that mi
political liberties. See Gress
45. Ng, "Why Asia Needs D
46. Kim, "Is Culture Destin
47. Ng, "Why Asia Needs D
48. Sen, "Human Rights an
42 above).
49. An example can be foun
es the view that Asian values
that ultimately prevails in tha
sis," Commentary 105, no.
50. Tatsuo, "Liberal Democr
tinguish his version of unive
should be incorporated into t
Ibid., 29.
51. Fareed Zakaria, "Culture Is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew," Foreign Affairs 73,
no. 2 (March/April 1994): 126.
52. Ibid., 126. This view of the mutability of culture is also shared by Kim Dae Jung; see Kim,
"Is Culture Destiny?" 190 (note 42 above). But as we shall see, Zakaria's optimism about the uni-
versalism of liberal democratic values is tempered by his recognition that some political systems
might take the parallel path of "illiberal" democracy.
53. Fukuyama, "Asian Values and the Asian Crisis," 23 (note 49 above).
54. Tatsuo, "Liberal Democracy and Asian Orientalism," 29 (note 42 above).
55. Christopher Lingle, a strong critic of the Asian values position of the Singapore school, writes
that the Singapore regime has used (and continues to use) "the notion of the existence of a unique set
of 'Asian values' as a basis for the rejection of continued democratic reforms." Lingle, Singapore's
Authoritarian Capitalism, 6 (note 42 above); also see Lingle, "The Propaganda Way" (note 42 above).
56. Tatsuo, "Liberal Democracy and Asian Orientalism," 29 (note 42 above).
57. Sen, "Human Rights and Asian Values" (note 1 above). A similar argument can be seen in
Amartya Sen, "Universal Truths: Hum

Review (Summer 1998): 40-44.
58. Inoue Tatsuo writes that the ins
turalists is that the legitimate claims
peoples of the West, can be framed o
liberal values. Tatsuo, "Liberal Demo
59. Sen, "Human Rights and Asian
60. Fukuyama, "Asian Values and t
61. Kim, "'Asian-Style Democracy,
62. Ibid.
63. Kim, "Is Culture Destiny?" 193 (note 42 above).
64. Kim, "Asian-Style Democracy," 1134 (note 42 above).
65. Indeed, the issue of Asian values as a discourse among elites is pertinent to much of the
research on Asian values. For example, in his foreword to Hitchcock's Asian Values and the United
States (note 33 above), William Clark Jr. writes that the study was commissioned to "explore whether
leaders of Asia, with their different historical experiences and cultural heritages, have a moral per-
spective that differs significantly from that of the West" (viii). Hitchcock writes that the respondents
to his surveys were academics, think thank experts, officials, businessmen, journalists, and religious
and cultural leaders (ix).
I managed to unearth few scholarly works that address this issue. Bridget Welsh writes that "the
influence of an 'Asian values' discourse has apparently had some effect on attitudes of the Malaysian
respondents opposing the expansion of democracy." Yet later in the study, she writes that only half of
those who responded that there were distinct Asian values could define those values. See Welsh, "Atti-
tudes toward Democracy in Malaysia," Asian Survey 36, no. 9 (September 1996): 882-903, at 896.
66. Emmerson, "Singapore and the 'Asian Values' Debate," 95 (note 1 above).
67. Emmerson, "Region and Recalcitrance," 236 (note 2 above).
68. Ibid., 235.
69. The most recent writings to appear on this theme are Bell et al., Towards Illiberal Democra-
cy in Pacific Asia (note 1 above); Fareed Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," Foreign Affairs
76, no. 6 (November/December 1997): 22-43; and Russell Arben Fox, "Confucian and Communi-
tarian Responses to Liberal Democracy," Review of Politics 59, no. 3 (Summer 1997): 561-92.
70. Fox, "Confucian and Communitarian Responses," 561.
71. Ibid., 564.
72. Emmerson, "Singapore and the 'Asian Values' Debate," 96 (note 1 above).
73. Bell et al., Towards Illiberal Democracy in Pacific Asia, 2 (note 1 above).
74. Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," 22-43 (note 69 above).
75. Emmerson, "Region and Recalcitrance," 223 (note 2 above).
76. Rodan, "The Internationalization of Ideological Conflict" (note 20 above).
77. Although still in the rudimentary stage, there exists a body of work by prominent scholars
who have begun to sketch the contours of this position. See Bauer and Bell, eds., The EastAsian Chal-
lenge for Human Rights (note 1 above); Onuma Yasuaki, "Towards an Intercivilizational Approach to
Human Rights," in The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights, ed. Joanne R. Bauer and Daniel A.
Bell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 103-23; Tu Wei-ming, "Epilogue: Human
Rights as a Confucian Moral Discourse," in Confucianism and Human Rights, ed. Theodore de Bary
and Tu Wei-ming (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998); Tu Wei-ming, "Joining East and
West: A Confucian Perspective on Human Rights," Harvard International Review 20, no. 3 (Summer
1998): 44-49; and Chan, "Asian Values and Human Rights" (note 1 above).
78. Chan, "Asian Values and Human Rights," 32 (note 1 above).

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The Asian Values Debate: Implications for the Spread of Liberal Democracy

Author(s): Surain Subramaniam

The Genesis of the Asian Values Debate

Clearly questioning the

The Formative Compone

The early discourse on

Nevertheless, as a consequence of its drive toward modernization Singapore-

When we examine the evolut

The Reactive Component: Saf

The reactive component bec

It is critical to recognize the broader conceptual framework because it places

ics of the notion of A

The Pragmatic Compon

The pragmatic compon

Today's "Asian values" d

Asian societies are now searchin

Evaluation: Implications for t

What can we take away from

Fitting the Three Streams

Asian Values as the Indigeniz

Samuel Huntington has argu

Although one could eas

Asian Values as the Un

Defining Asian Values

To determine the merits of the culturalist claims of the Singapore school we

have greater weight than in

The Universalist Scho

[T]he case of Hong Kong is not that of a community aspiring to democracy as a

The universalist claim that w

Universalist Critiques ofAsian Values

There is nothing whatso

Other universalists hav

Asian authoritarians misu

Asian Values as an Elite Discourse

Emmerson's argument closely

What is an illiberal democr

[E]ven if there are no quintessen

Indeed, in their path-breakin

democratization in East and South

Fareed Zakaria has argued pe

acterized by open, free

half-right. Consequently, I pro

5. The term can be traced to Eri

18. Particularly Japan and the "fou

37. Vatikiotis, Political Cha

Amartya Sen, "Universal Truths: Hum

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