39) 10. Biflex Phils., Inc., Labor Union vs. Filflex Industrial & Mfg., Corp., G.R. No.

155679,
December 19, 2006
Facts:
Petitioners Patricia Villanueva, Emilia Bandola, Raquel Cruz, Delia Relato, Regina Castillo, Lolita
delos Angeles, Marissa Villoria, Marita Antonio, Lolita Lindio, Eliza Caraulia, and Liza Sua were
officers of Biflex (Phils.) Inc. Labor Union. On the other hand, petitioners Myrna dela Torre,
Avelina Añonuevo, Bernice Borcelo, Narlie Yagin, Evelyn Santillan, Leony Serdoncilo, Trinidad
Cuya, Andrea Lumibao, Gynie Arneo, Elizabeth Capellan, Josephine Detosil, Zenaida Francisco,
and Florencia Anago were officers of Filflex Industrial and Manufacturing Labor Union.
The two petitioner-unions, which are affiliated with National Federation of Labor Unions
(NAFLU), are the respective collective bargaining agents of the employees of corporations.
Respondents Biflex (Phils.) Inc. and Filflex Industrial and Manufacturing Corporation
(respondents) are sister companies engaged in the garment business. Situated in one big
compound along with another sister company,
General Garments Corporation (GGC), they have a common entrance.
On October 24, 1990, the labor sector staged a welga ng bayan to protest the accelerating prices
of oil. On even date, petitioner-unions, led by their officers, herein petitioners, staged a work
stoppage which lasted for days, prompting respondents to file on October 31, 1990 a petition to
declare the work stoppage illegal for failure to comply with procedural requirements. On
November 13, 1990, respondents resumed their operations.
Petitioners, claiming that they were illegally locked out by respondents, assert that aside from
the fact that the welga ng bayan rendered it difficult to get a ride and the apprehension that
violence would erupt between those participating in the welga and the authorities, respondents‘
workers were prevented from reporting for work.
Petitioners further assert that respondents were ―slighted‖ by the workers‘ no-show, and as a
punishment, the workers as well as petitioners were barred from entering the company
premises.
On their putting up of tents, tables and chairs in front of the main gate of respondents‘ premises,
petitioners, who claim that they filed a notice of strike on October 31, 1990, explain that those
were for the convenience of union members who reported every morning to check if the
management would allow them to report for work.
Respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the work stoppage was illegal since the following
requirements for the staging of a valid strike were not complied with: (1) filing of notice of strike;
(2) securing a strike vote, and (3) submission of a report of the strike vote to the Department of
Labor and Employment.
The Labor Arbiter decided in favor of the respondents and held that the strike was illegal.
Consequently, their following officers are declared to have lost their employment status.
Respondents thereupon terminated the employment of petitioners.
On appeal, the NLRC reversed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter, it holding that there was no strike
to speak of as no labor or industrial dispute existed between the parties. It accordingly ordered
respondents to reinstate petitioners
to their former positions, without loss of seniority rights, and with full backwages from the date
of their termination. On respondents‘ petition for certiorari, the Court of Appeals reversed that
of the NLRC and reinstatedthat of the Labor Arbiter.
Issue:

Whether or not the strike staged by the union was illegal.

Ruling:

The SC held that the strike was illegal.

That petitioners staged a work stoppage on October 24, 1990 in conjunction with the welga ng
bayan organized bythe labor sector to protest the accelerating prices of oil, it is not disputed.
Stoppage of work due to welga ng bayan is in the nature of a general strike, an extended
sympathy strike. It affects numerous employers including thosewho do not have a dispute with
their employees regarding their terms and conditions of employment.
Employees who have no labor dispute with their employer but who, on a day they are scheduled
to work, refuse to work and instead join a welga ng bayan commit an illegal work stoppage.
Even if petitioners‘ joining the welga ng bayan were considered merely as an exercise of their
freedom of expression, freedom of assembly or freedom to petition the government for redress
of grievances, the exercise of such rights is not absolute. For the protection of other significant
state interests such as the ―right of enterprises to reasonable returns on investments, and to
expansion and growth‖ enshrined in the 1987 Constitution must also be considered, otherwise,
oppression or self-destruction of capital in order to promote the interests of labor would be
sanctioned. And it would give imprimatur to workers‘ joining demonstrations/rallies even before
affording the employer an opportunity to make the necessary arrangements to counteract the
implications of the work stoppage on the business, and ignore the novel ―principle of shared
responsibility between workers and employers aimed at fostering industrial peace.
There being no showing that petitioners notified respondents of their intention, or that they were
allowed by respondents, to join the welga ng bayan on October 24, 1990, their work stoppage is
beyond legal protection.
Even assuming arguendo that in staging the strike, petitioners had complied with legal
formalities, the strike would just the same be illegal, for by blocking the free ingress to and egress
from the company premises, they violated
Article 264(e) of the Labor Code which provides that ―no person engaged in picketing shall …
obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employer‘s premises for lawful purposes, or
obstruct public thoroughfares. In fine, the legality of a strike is determined not only by
compliance with its legal formalities but also by the means by which it is carried out.
Petitioners, being union officers, should thus bear the consequences of their acts of knowingly
participating in an illegal strike, conformably with the third paragraph of Article 264 (a) of the
Labor Code which provides:
. . . Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union
officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be
declared to have lost his employment status:
Provided, That mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient
ground for termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the employer
during such lawful strike.
The SC, passing on the use of the word ―may in the immediately quoted provision, held that
―the law . . . grants the employer the option of declaring a union officer who participated in an
illegal strike as having lost his employment. Reinstatement of a striker or retention of his
employment, despite his participation in an illegal strike, is a management prerogative which this
Court may not supplant.

40) 11. Manila Hotel Employees Association vs. Manila Hotel Corp., G.R. No. 154591, March 5,
2007, citing Grand Boulevard Hotel vs. Dacanay, G.R. No. 153665, July 18, 2003
Facts:
On 11 November 1999, the MHEA filed a Notice of Strike with the NCMB Manila Hotel on the
grounds of unfair labor practices. Upon the petition of Manila Hotel, the SOLE certified the labor
dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration pursuant to Article 263(g) of the Labor Code.
Specifically, the Order enjoined any strike or lockout and the parties were ordered to cease and
desist from committing any acts that may exacerbate the situation. MHEA filed a Motion for
Reconsideration dated 29 November 1999 assailing the validity of said Order. During the
conferences at the NLRC, the parties were advised of the certification order, which prohibited
them from taking any action that would exacerbate the situation.
On 10 February 2000, the MHEA conducted a strike despite the clear terms of the Order issued
by the SOLE, and despite the repeated reminders thereof. Manila Hotel then filed a complaint
with prayer for injunction and or TRO, alleging that MHEA conducted an illegal strike, blocked all
ingress and egress of the hotel premises, harassed and intimidated company officers, non-
striking employees, customers and suppliers. In addition, it sought a declaration that the strike
was illegal and that, consequently, the striking employees lost their employment.
The NLRC issued an Order directing the striking workers to return to work immediately and the
hotel to accept them back under the same terms and conditions of employment. The NLRC
further instructed the parties to submit proof of compliance with the instant order immediately
after the lapse of twenty-four hours. The NLRC received a copy of the Compliance filed by Manila
Hotel on 14 February 2000, manifesting that only six striking employees complied with the
return-to-work Order and were reinstated. The other striking employees had openly defied the
said Order.
In response to the NLRC‘s return-to-work order, the union filed a motion alleging that the NLRC
had not acquired jurisdiction over the labor dispute pending the resolution of the MR filed
questioning the order of the SOLE. The union claimed that said motion had prevented the said
Order of the SOLE from becoming final and executory.
The NLRC ruled that the strike held by the union was illegal for its defiance of the return-to-work
order. However, it determined that only the union officers were deemed to have lost their
employment. It ruled that there was no evidence showing who among the striking employees
were actually notified of the return-to-work order, and therefore, such employees have not
forfeited their employment. But in view of the antagonism on both sides, the NLRC awarded a
severance pay equivalent to one-month salary to the returning union members for every year of
service, instead of ordering Manila Hotel to reinstate them.
Issue:
Whether or not the strike held by petitioner was illegal.
Ruling:
The SC held that it was illegal. MHEA members seek their reinstatement after participating in an
illegal strike, that is, a strike that was conducted after receiving an Order of assumptionby the
SOLE certifying the dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration.
Worse still, the strikers failed to comply with the 11 February 2000 return-to-work Order, issued
by the NLRC, despite receipt thereof. The law explicitly prohibits such acts.
ART. 263. STRIKES, PICKETING, AND LOCKOUTS
xxxx
(g) When, in his opinion there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout
in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may
assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for
compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically
enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or
certification order. If one has already taken place at the time of the assumption or certification,
all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall
immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions
prevailing before the strike or lockout. The Secretary of Labor and Employment or the
Commission may seek the assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with
this provision as well as with such orders as he may issue to enforce the same.
ART. 264. PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES
(a) x x x x
No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the
Minister or after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration
or during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout.
More to the point, the Court has consistently ruled in a long line of cases spanning several
decades that once the SOLE assumes jurisdiction over a labor dispute, such jurisdiction should
not be interfered with by the application of the coercive processes of a strike or lockout. Defiance
of the assumption order or a return-to work order by a striking employee, whether a union officer
or a member, is an illegal act and, therefore, a valid ground for loss of employment status.
The assumption of jurisdiction by the SOLE over labor disputes causing or likely to cause a strike
or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest is in the nature of a police power
measure.
The allegation that the strikers relied on their honest belief that the filing of a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order, issued by the SOLE on 24 November 1999, entitled them to
participate in a strike, cannot be sustained. A return-to-work order is immediately executory
notwithstanding the filing of a motion for reconsideration. It must be strictly complied with even
during the pendency of any petition questioning its validity.
The very nature of a return-to-work order issued in a certified case lends itself to no other
construction. The certification attests to the urgency of the matter, affecting as it does an
industry indispensable to the national interest. The order is issued in the exercise of the court‘s
compulsory power of arbitration, and therefore must be obeyed until set aside. To say that its
[return-to-work order] effectivity must await affirmance on a motion for reconsideration is not
only to emasculate it but indeed to defeat its import, for by then the deadline fixed for the
return to work would, in the ordinary course, have already passed and hence can no longer be
affirmed insofar as the time element it concerned.
Returning to work in this situation is not a matter of option or voluntariness but of obligation.
The worker must return to his job together with his co-workers so the operations of the company
can be resumed and it can continue serving the public and promoting its interest. This
extraordinary authority given to the Secretary of Labor is aimed at arriving at a peaceful and
speedy solution to labor disputes, without jeopardizing national interests.
Regardless therefore of their motives, or the validity of their claims, the striking workers must
cease and/or desist from any and all acts that tend to, or undermine this authority of the
Secretary of Labor, once an assumption and/or certification order is issued. They cannot, for
instance, ignore return-to-work orders, citing unfair labor practices on the part of the company,
to justify their action

41) 12. San Miguel Foods Inc., vs. San Miguel Corp Employees Union-PTGWO, G.R. No.
168569, October 5, 2007
Facts:
On November 9, 1992, some employees of San Miguel Foods, Inc‘s Finance Department, through
the Union represented by Edgar Moraleda, brought a grievance against Finance Manager Gideon
Montesa (Montesa), for "discrimination, favoritism, unfair labor practices, promoting
divisiveness, etc, before SMFI Plant Operations Manager George Nava in accordance with Step 1
of the grievance machinery. The Union sought the "1. review, evaluation & upgrading of all
Finance staff and 2. promotion of G.Q. Montesa to other SMC affiliates & subsidiaries."
SMFI informed the Union that it planned to address the grievance through a "work management
review" to be completed by March 1993. However, it was not completed by March 1993,
prompting the Union to, elevate the grievance to Step 2.
Almost 9 months after the grievance meeting was held or on October 6, 1993, SMFI rendered a
"Decision on Step 1 Grievance" stating that it was still in the process of completing the "work
management review," hence, the Union‘s requests could not be granted.
The Union filed a complaint on October 20, 1993 before the NLRC, Arbitration Branch, against
SMFI, its President Amadeo P. Veloso, and its Finance Manager Montesa for "unfair labor
practice, [and] unjust discrimination in matters of promotion . . . " It prayed that SMFI et al. be
ordered to promote the therein named employees "with the corresponding pay increases, etc.
SMFI et al. filed a motion to dismiss,8contending that the issues raised in the complaint were
grievance issues and, therefore, "should be resolved in the grievance machinery. The Labor
Arbiter granted SMFI et al.‘s motion to dismiss and ordered the remand of the case to the
grievance machinery for completion of the proceedings.
On appeal, to the NLRC by "Motion for Reconsideration/Appeal", such was granted and
accordingly ordered the Labor Arbiter to continue the proceedings on the Union‘s complaint.
Hence, SMFI filed a petition for certiorari with SC which they referred the case to the CA pursuant
to St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC.
Court of Appeals denied SMFI et al.‘s petition for certiorari, it holding that the Labor Arbiter has
jurisdiction over the complaint of the Union, they having violated the seniority rule under the
CBA by appointing and promoting certain employees which amounted to a ULP.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the labor arbiter has jurisdiction over the case.
(2) Whether or not SMFI is guilty of unfair labor practice.
Ruling:
Section 1 of Rule 8 of the Rules of Court should thus not be strictly applied to a case filed before
a Labor Arbiter. In determining jurisdiction over a case, allegations made in the complaint, as well
as those in the position paper, may thus be considered.
SMFI argues that the allegations in the Union‘s complaint filed before the Labor Arbiter do not
establish a cause of action for ULP, the Union having merely contended that SMFI was guilty
thereof without specifying the ultimate facts upon which it was based. It cites Section 1 of Rule
8 of the Rules of Court as applying suppletorily to the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter. Thus,
SMFI concludes that the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over its complaint.
The jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters, enumerated in Article 217 of the Labor Code, includes
complaints for ULP.
Indeed, the particular acts of ULP alleged to have been committed by SMFI were not specified;
neither were the ultimate facts in support thereof. In its Position Paper, however, the Union
detailed the particular acts of ULP attributed to SMFI and the ultimate facts in support
thereof.LABOR RELATIONS LAW
Section 7, Rule V of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC provides: The proceedings before
the Labor Arbiter shall be non-litigious in nature. The technicalities of law and procedure and the
rules obtaining in the courts of law shall not strictly apply thereto. The Labor Arbiter may avail
himself of all reasonable means to ascertain the facts of the controversy speedily, including
ocular inspection and examination of well-informed persons.
Section 1 of Rule 8 of the Rules of Court should thus not be strictly applied to a case filed before
a Labor Arbiter. In determining jurisdiction over a case, allegations made in the complaint, as well
as those in the position paper, may thus be considered.
SMFI guilty of ULP but only on the ground of violation of the CBA Agreement.
ULP on the ground of discrimination which must allege that that they were done to encourage or
discourage membership in a labor organization.
Based on Art. 248. Unfair labor practices of employers. – It shall be unlawful for an employer to
commit any of the following unfair labor practices: (e) To discriminate in regard to wages, hours
of work, and other terms and conditions of employment in order to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization.
On the questioned promotions, the Union did not allege that they were done to encourage or
discourage membership in a labor organization. In fact, those promoted were members of the
complaining Union. The promotions do not thus amount to ULP under Article 248(e) of the Labor
Code.
ULP on the ground of violation of Collective Bargaining Agreement –
(1) gross violation of the CBA; AND
(2) the violation pertains to the economic provisions of the CBA.
As for the alleged ULP committed under Article 248(i), for violation of a CBA, this Article is
qualified by Article 261 of the Labor Code, the pertinent portion of which latter Article reads:
xxx
violations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, except those which are gross in character, shall
no longer be treated as unfair labor practice and shall be resolved as grievances under the
Collective Bargaining Agreement. For purposes of this article, gross violations of Collective
Bargaining Agreement shall mean flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic
provisions of such agreement.
In Silva v. NLRC, for a ULP case to be cognizable by the Labor Arbiter, and the NLRC to exercise its
appellate jurisdiction, the allegations in the complaint should show prima facie the concurrence
of two things, namely: (1) gross violation of the CBA; AND (2) the violation pertains to the
economic provisions of the CBA.
First, The grievance machinery provision in the CBA is not an economic provision, however,
hence, the second requirement for a Labor Arbiter to exercise jurisdiction of a ULP is not present.
Second, the Union alleges that violated the Job Security provision in the CBA, specifically the
seniority rule, in that SMFI "appointed less senior employees to positions at its Finance
Department, consequently intentionally bypassing more senior employees who are deserving of
said appointment."
Since the seniority rule in the promotion of employees has a bearing on salary and benefits, it
may, following a liberal construction (following the rule on construction in favor of labor) of
Article 261 of the Labor Code, be considered an "economic provision" of the CBA.
the Union charges SMFI to have promoted less senior employees, thus bypassing others who
were more senior and equally or more qualified. It may not be seriously disputed that this charge
is a gross or flagrant violation of the seniority rule under the CBA, a ULP over which the Labor
Arbiter has jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeals having affirmed the NLRC decision finding that the Labor Arbiter has
jurisdiction over the Union‘s complaint and thus remanding it to the Labor Arbiter for
continuation of proceedings thereon, the appellate court‘s said finding may be taken to have
been made only for the purpose of determining jurisdiction.
42) 13. Toyota Motor Phils Workers Asso. Vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 158786, October 19, 2007
Facts:
Toyota Motor Phils.Workers Assoc. (Union) is a legitimate labor organization duly registered with
the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and is the sole and exclusive bargaining agent
of all Toyota rank and file employees.
The Union applied and was granted the immediate holding of a certification election (the most
democratic and expeditious method by which the laborers can freely determine the union that
shall act as their representative in their dealings with the establishment where they are working.
It is the appropriate means whereby controversies and disputes on representation may be laid
to rest, by the unequivocal vote of the employees themselves) and was later recognized by the
NCMB as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the Toyota rank and file employees. Toyota
challenged said Order via an appeal to the DOLE Secretary.
Pending Toyota’s appeal, the Union submitted its CBA proposals to Toyota which the latter
denied. On February 22 & 23, 2001, Despite denial of the Union’s request, more than 200
employees staged mass actions on in front of the BLR and the DOLE offices, to protest the
partisan and anti-union stance of Toyota which resulted to substantial company losses.
On March 16, 2001, Toyota terminated the employment of 227 employees. In reaction to the
dismissal of its union members and officers, the Union went on strike on March 17, 2001.
Subsequently, from March 28, 2001 to April 12, 2001, the Union intensified its strike by
barricading the gates of Toyota’s Bicutan and Sta. Rosa plants. The strikers prevented workers
who reported for work from entering the plants.
On April 10, 2001, the DOLE Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute and issued an
Order certifying the labor dispute to the NLRC. In said Order, the DOLE Secretary directed all
striking workersto return to work at their regular shifts by April 16, 2001. On the other hand, it
ordered Toyota to accept the returning employees under the same terms and conditions
obtaining prior to the strike or at its option, put them under payroll reinstatement.
Meanwhile, on May 23, 2001, at around 12:00 noon, despite the issuance of the DOLE Secretary’s
certification Order, several payroll-reinstated members of the Union staged a protest rally in
front of Toyota’s Bicutan Plant bearing placards and streamers in defiance of the April 10, 2001
Order.
Then, on May 28, 2001, around forty-four (44) Union members staged another protest action in
front of the Bicutan Plant. At the same time, some twenty-nine (29) payroll-reinstated employees
picketed in front of the Santa Rosa Plant’s main entrance, and were later joined by other Union
members. When the parties were asked to submit their position papers, only Toyota heeded the
order and the NLRC declared the strikes illegal.

Issues:

(1) Whether the mass actions committed by the Union on different occasions are illegal strikes;
(2) Extent of the liabilities of union members participating in the strike
(3) Whether separation pay should be awarded to the Union members who participated in the
illegal strikes.

Ruling:

On the 1st issue:

Noted authority on labor law, Ludwig Teller, lists six (6) categories of an illegal strike, viz:
(1) [when it] is contrary to a specific prohibition of law, such as strike by employees performing
governmental functions; or
(2) [when it] violates a specific requirement of law, such as Article 263 of the Labor Code on the
requisites of a valid strike]; or
(3) [when it] is declared for an unlawful purpose, such as inducing the employer to commit an
unfair labor practice against non-union employees; or
(4) [when it] employs unlawful means in the pursuit of its objective, such as a widespread
terrorism of non-strikers [for example, prohibited acts under Art. 264(e) of the Labor Code]; or
(5) [when it] is declared in violation of an existing injunction, [such as injunction, prohibition, or
order issued by the DOLE Secretary and the NLRC under Art. 263 of the Labor Code]; or
(6) [when it] is contrary to an existing agreement, such as a no-strike clause or conclusive
arbitration clause.
A strike means any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result
of an industrial or labor dispute. A labor dispute, in turn, includes any controversy or matter
concerning terms or conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons
in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or arranging the terms and conditions of
employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of the
employer and the employee.
The term “strike” has been elucidated to encompass not only concerted work stoppages, but also
slowdowns, mass leaves, sit-downs, attempts to damage, destroy, or sabotage plant equipment
and facilities, and similar activities.
While we recognize the right of every person or a group to peaceably assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances, the exercise of such right is governed by existing laws,
rules and regulations.
There are prerequisites for a valid strike under Art. 263 of the Labor Code, and the Union failed
to comply with the following
requirements:
(1) a notice of strike filed with the DOLE 30 days before the intended date of strike, or 15 days in
case of unfair labor practice;
(2) strike vote approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit
concerned obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose; and
(3) notice given to the DOLE of the results of the voting at least seven days before the intended
strike.
These requirements are mandatory and the failure of a union to comply with them renders the
strike illegal.
The evident intention of the law in requiring the strike notice and the strike-vote report is to
reasonably regulate the right to strike, which is essential to the attainment of legitimate policy
objectives embodied in the law
With respect to the strikes committed from March 17 to April 12, 2001, those were initially legal
as the legal requirements were met. However, on March 28 to April 12, 2001, the Union
barricaded the gates of the Bicutan and Sta. Rosa plants and blocked the free ingress to and
egress from the company premises.
This is a palpable violation of Art. 264(e), which proscribes acts of violence, coercion, or
intimidation, or which obstruct the free ingress to and egress from the company premises.
While it may be conceded that there was no work disruption in the two Toyota plants, the fact
still remains that the Union and its members picketed and performed concerted actions in front
of the Company premises. This is a patent violation of the assumption of jurisdiction and
certification Order of the DOLE Secretary, which ordered the parties “to cease and desist from
committing any act that might lead to the worsening of an already deteriorated situation.” While
there are no work stoppages, the pickets and concerted actions outside the plants have a
demoralizing and even chilling effect on the workers inside the plants and can be considered as
veiled threats of possible trouble to the workers when they go out of the company premises after
work and of impending disruption of operations to company officials and even to customers in
the days to come.
Union officers are liable for unlawful strikes or illegal acts during a strike
Under Art. 264 (a) of the Labor Code, It is clear that the responsibility of union officials is greater
than that of the members. They are tasked with the duty to lead and guide the membership in
decision making on union activities in accordance with the law, government rules and
regulations, and established labor practices. The leaders are expected to recommend actions that
are arrived at with circumspection and contemplation, and always keep paramount the best
interests of the members and union within the bounds of law. If the strike is legal at the beginning
and the officials commit illegal acts during the duration of the strike, then they cannot evade
personal and individual liability for said acts.
Member’s liability depends on participation in illegal acts Art. 264(a) of the Labor Code provides
that a member is liable when he knowingly participates in an illegal act “during a strike.” While
the provision is silent on whether the strike is legal or illegal, we find that the same is irrelevant.
As long as the members commit illegal acts, in a legal or illegal strike, then they can be terminated
However, when union members merely participate in an illegal strike without committing any
illegal act, are they liable?
This was squarely answered in Gold City Integrated Port Service, Inc. v. NLRC, where it was held
that an ordinary striking worker cannot be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike.
This was an affirmation of the rulings in Bacus v. Ople and Progressive Workers Union v. Aguas,
where it was held that though the strike is illegal, the ordinary member who merely participates
in the strike should not be meted loss of employment on the considerations of compassion and
good faith and in view of the security of tenure provisions under the Constitution. In Esso
Philippines, Inc. v. Malayang Manggagawa sa Esso (MME), it was explained that a member is not
responsible for the union’s illegal strike even if he voted for the holding of a strike which became
illegal.
Noted labor law expert, Professor Cesario A. Azucena, Jr., traced the history relating to the
liability of a union member in an illegal strike, starting with the “rule of vicarious liability,” thus:
Under [the rule of vicarious liability], mere membership in a labor union serves as basis of liability
for acts of individuals, or for a labor activity, done on behalf of the union. The union member is
made liable on the theory that all the members are engaged in a general conspiracy, and the
unlawful acts of the particular members are viewed as necessary incidents of the conspiracy.
Thus, the rule on vicarious liability of a union member was abandoned and it is only when a
striking worker “knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike” that he
will be penalized with dismissal.
Now, what are considered “illegal acts” under Art.264(a)? No precise meaning was given to the
phrase “illegal acts.” It may encompass a number of acts that violate existing labor or criminal
laws, such as the following:
(1) Violation of Art. 264(e) of the Labor Code which provides that “[n]o person engaged in
picketing shall commit any act of violence, coercion or intimidation or obstruct the free ingress
to or egress from the employer’s premises for lawful purposes, or obstruct public thoroughfares”;
(2) Commission of crimes and other unlawful acts in carrying out the strike; and
(3) Violation of any order, prohibition, or injunction issued by the DOLE Secretary or NLRC in
connection with the assumption of jurisdiction/certification Order under Art. 263(g) of the Labor
Code.
As earlier explained, this enumeration is not exclusive and it may cover other breaches of existing
laws.
In the cases at bench, the individual respondents participated in several mass actions, viz:
(1) The rallies held at the DOLE and BLR offices on February 21,22, and 23, 2001;
(2) The strikes held on March 17 to April 12, 2001; and
(3) The rallies and picketing on May 23 and 28, 2001 in front of the Toyota Bicutan and Sta. Rosa
plants.
Association of Independent Unions in the Philippines v. NLRC lays down the rule on the liability
of the union members: An ordinary striking employee cannot be terminated for mere
participation in anillegal strike. There must be proof that he committed illegal acts during the
strike and the striker who participated in the commission of illegal act[s] must be identified. But
proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required. Substantial evidence available under the
circumstances, which may justify the imposition of the penalty of dismissal, may suffice.
In the landmark case of Ang Tibay vs. CIR, the court ruled “Not only must there be some evidence
to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be ‘substantial.’ Substantial evidence
is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might
accept as sufficient to support a conclusion.
2nd issue:
The general rule is that when just causes for terminating the services of an employee under Art.
282 of the Labor Code exist, the employee is not entitled to separation pay. The apparent reason
behind the forfeiture of the right to termination pay is that lawbreakers should not benefit from
their illegal acts. The dismissed employee, however, is entitled to “whatever rights, benefits and
privileges [s/he] may have under the applicable individual or collective bargaining agreement
with the employer or voluntary employer policy or practice” or under the Labor Code and other
existing laws. This means that the employee, despite the dismissal for a valid cause, retains the
right to receive from the employer benefits provided by law, like accrued service incentive leaves.
With respect to benefits granted by the CBA provisions and voluntary management policy or
practice, the entitlement of the dismissed employees to the benefits depends on the stipulations
of the CBA or the company rules and policies.
As in any rule, there are exceptions. One exception where separation pay is given even though
an employee is validly dismissed is when the court finds justification in applying the principle of
social justice well entrenched in the 1987 Constitution. The new Constitution contains a separate
article devoted to the promotion of social justice and human rights with a separate sub-topic for
labor. Article XIII expressly recognizes the vital role of labor, hand in hand with management, in
the advancement of the national economy and the welfare of the people in general. The
categorical mandates in the Constitution for the improvement of the lot of the workers are more
than sufficient basis to justify the award of separation pay in proper cases even if the dismissal
be for cause.
We hold that henceforth separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social justice only in
those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious
misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character. Where the reason for the valid dismissal
is, for example, habitual intoxication or an offense involving moral turpitude, like theft or illicit
sexual relations with a fellow worker, the employer may not be required to give the dismissed
employee separation pay, or financial assistance, or whatever other name it is called, on the
ground of social justice.
A contrary rule would, as the petitioner correctly argues, have the effect, of rewarding rather
than punishing the erring employee for his offense. There are two exceptions when the NLRC or
the courts should not grant separation pay based on social justice:
Serious misconduct (which is the first ground for dismissal under Art. 282); or Acts that reflect on
the moral character of the employee.
What is unclear is whether the ruling likewise precludes the grant of separation pay when the
employee is validly terminated from work on grounds laid down in Art. 282 of the Labor Code
other than serious misconduct.
In all of the foregoing situations, the Court declined to grant termination pay because the causes
for dismissal recognized under Art. 282 of the Labor Code were serious or grave in nature and
attended by willful or wrongful intent or they reflected adversely on the moral character of the
employees. We therefore find that in addition to serious misconduct, in dismissals based on other
grounds under Art. 282 like willful disobedience, gross and habitual neglect of duty, fraud or
willful breach of trust, and commission of a crime against the employer or his family, separation
pay should not be conceded to the dismissed employee.
In analogous causes for termination like inefficiency, drug use, and others, the NLRC or the courts
may opt to grant separation pay anchored on social justice in consideration of the length of
service of the employee, the amount involved, whether the act is the first offense, the
performance of the employee and the like, using the guideposts enunciated in PLDT (see full text
for case reference) on the propriety of the award of separation pay.
The union officers who participated in and the union members who committed illegal acts during
the illegal strike have lost their employment status. In this case, the strike was held illegal because
it violated agreements providing for arbitration. Again, there was no award of separation pay nor
financial assistance.
Lastly, Even though strikes and lockouts have been recognized as effective bargaining tools, it is
an antiquated notion that they are truly beneficial, as they only provide short-term solutions by
forcing concessions from one party; but staging such strikes would damage the working
relationship between employers and employees, thus endangering the business that they both
want to succeed.
43) 14. Yokohama Tire Phils vs. Yokohama Employees Union G.R. No. 159553, December 10,
2007
Facts:
On October 7, 1999, respondent Yokohama Employees Union (Union) filed a petition for
certification election among the rank-and-file employees of Yokohama. Upon appeal from the
Med-Arbiter’s order dismissing the petition, the Secretary of the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) ordered an election with (1) “Yokohama Employees’ Union” and (2) “No
Union” as choices. The election held on November 23, 2001 yielded the following result:
YOKOHAMA EMPLOYEES UNION – 131, NO UNION - 117, SPOILED - 2; Total votes cast = 250.
Yokohama challenged 78 votes cast by dismissed employees. On the other hand, the Union
challenged 68 votes cast by newly regularized rank-and-file employees and another five (5) votes
by alleged supervisor-trainees. Yokohama formalized its protest and raised as an issue the
eligibility to vote of the 78 dismissed employees, while the Union submitted only a handwritten
manifestation during the election.
Issue:
Whether or not it is proper to appreciate the votes of the dismissed employees

Ruling:

Yes. The votes of the dismissed employees shall be appreciated. Section 2, Rule XII (of the rules
implementing Book V of the Labor Code), the rule in force during the November 23, 2001
certification election clearly, unequivocally and unambiguously allows dismissed employees to
vote during the certification election if the case they filed contesting their dismissal is still pending
at the time of the election.
Here, the votes of employees with illegal dismissal cases were challenged by petitioner although
their cases were still pending at the time of the certification election on November 23, 2001.
These cases were filed on June 27, 2001 and the appeal of the Labor Arbiter’s February 28, 2003
Decision was resolved by the NLRC only on August 29, 2003.
Even the new rule has explicitly stated that without a final judgment declaring the legality of
dismissal, dismissed employees are eligible or qualified voters. Thus,
Rule IX
Conduct of Certification Election Section 5. Qualification of voters; inclusion-exclusion. – . . . An
employee who has been dismissed from work but has contested the legality of the dismissal in a
forum of appropriate jurisdiction at the time of the issuance of the order for the conduct of a
certificationelection shall be considered a qualified voter, unless his/her dismissal was declared
valid in a final judgment at the time of the conduct of the certification election.
xxxx
Thus, we find no reversible error on the part of the DOLE Acting Secretary and the Court of
Appeals in ordering the appreciation of the votes of the dismissed employees. Finally, we need
not resolve the other issues for being moot. The 68 votes of the newly regularized rank-and-file
employees, even if counted in favor of “No Union,” will not materially alter the result. There
would still be 208 votes in favor of respondent and 189 votes in favor of “No Union.”
We also note that the certification election is already a fait accompli, and clearly petitioner’s rank-
and-file employees had chosen respondent as their bargaining representative
44) 15. Phil. Airlines Inc. vs. Phil Airlines Employees Association, G.R. No. 142399, March 12,
2008
Facts:
On 6 February 1987, petitioner PAL and respondent PALEA entered into a CBA covering the period
of 1986-1989. Part of said agreement required petitioner PAL to pay its rank and file employees
the following bonuses:
Section 4. 13th Month Pay (Mid-year Bonus) A 13th month pay, equivalent to one month‘s
current basic pay, consistent with the existing practice shall be paid in advance in May.
Section 5. Christmas Bonus The equivalent of one month‘s current basic pay as of November 30,
shall be paid in December as a Christmas bonus. Payment may be staggered in two (2) stages. It
is distinctly understood that nothing herein contained shall be construed to mean that the
Company may not at its sole discretion give an additional amount or increase the Christmas
bonus.
On 22 April 1988, prior to the payment of the 13th month pay (mid-year bonus), petitioner PAL
released a guideline implementing the afore quoted provision, to wit:
1)Eligibility
a) Ground employees in the general payroll who are regular as of April 30, 1988;
b)Other ground employees in the general payroll, not falling within category a) above shall
receive their 13th
Month Pay on or before December 24, 1988;
2) Amount
a)For category a) above, one month basic salary as of April 30, 1988;
b)Employees covered under 1 b) above shall be paid not less than 1/12 of their basic salary for
every month of service within the calendar year.
3)Payment Date: May 9, 1988 for category 1 a) above. Respondent PALEA assailed the
implementation of the foregoing guideline on the ground that all employees of PAL, regular or
non-regular, must be paid their 13th month pay. In response thereto, petitioner PAL informed
respondent PALEA that rank and file employees who were regularized after 30 April 1988 were
not entitled to the 13th month pay as they were already given their Christmas bonuses on 9
December 1988 per the Implementing Rules of Presidential Decree No. 851.
Disagreeing with petitioner PAL, respondent PALEA filed a labor complaint [16] for unfair labor
practice against petitioner PAL before the NLRC on 1 March 1989. The complaint interposed that
“the cut-off period for regularization should not be used as the parameter for granting [the]
13th month pay considering that the law does not distinguish the status of employment but (sic)
the law covers all employees. petitioner PAL countered that those rank and file employees who
were not regularized by 30 April of a particular year are, in principle, not denied their 13th month
pay considering they receive said mandatory bonus in the form of the Christmas Bonus; that the
Christmas Bonus given to all its employees is deemed a compliance with Presidential Decree No.
851 and the latter’s implementing rules. It argues that 1) the CBA does not apply to non-
regular employees such that any benefits arising from said agreement cannot be made to apply
to them, including the mid- year bonus; and 2) it has always been the company practice not to
extend the mid-year bonus to those employees who have not attained regular status prior to the
month of May, when payment of the particular bonus accrues.
Issue:
Whether or not employees regularized after 30 April 1988 are entitled to 13th month pay or mid-
year bonus
Ruling:
Be that as it may, a cursory reading of the 1986-1989 CBA of the parties herein will instantly
reveal that Art. I, Sec. 3 of said agreement made its provision applicable to all employees in the
bargaining unit.
Section 3.Application. All the terms and conditions of employment of employees within the
bargaining unit are embodied in this Agreement, xxx without distinguishing between regular and
non-regular employees. As succinctly put by respondent PALEA in its Memorandum:
All employees in (sic) PAL are entitled to the same benefit as they are within the same collective
bargaining unit and the entitlement to such benefit spills over to even non-union members. It is
a well-settled doctrine that the benefits of a CBA extend to the laborers and employees in the
collective bargaining unit, including those who do not belong to the chosen bargaining labor
organization. Otherwise, it would be a clear case of discrimination.
Hence, to be entitled to the benefits under the CBA, the employees must be members of the
bargaining unit, but not necessarily of the labor organization designated as the bargaining agent.
A ―bargaining unit has been defined as a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of
all or less than all of the entire body of employees, which the collective interest of all the
employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicates to be the best suited to serve the
reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law.
At this point, the allegation of petitioner PAL that the non-regular employees do not belong to
the collective bargaining unit and are thus not covered by the CBA is unjustified and
unsubstantiated. It is apparent to us that petitioner PAL excludes certain employees from the
benefits of the CBA only because they have not yet achieved regular status by the cut-off date,
30 April 1988. There is no showing that the non-regular status of the concerned employees by
said cut-off date sufficiently distinguishes their interests from those of the regular employees so
as to exclude them from the collective bargaining unit and the benefits of the CBA.
Having ruled that the benefits provided by the subject CBA are applicable even to non-regular
employees who belong to the bargaining unit concerned, the next and crucial query to be
addressed is whether the 13th month pay or mid- year bonus can be equated to the Christmas
bonus. Xxx It must be stressed that in the 1986-1989 CBA, petitioner PAL agreed to pay its
employees 1) the 13th month pay or the mid-year bonus, and 2) the Christmas bonus. The 13th
month pay, guaranteed by Presidential Decree No.851, is explicitly covered or provided for as the
mid-year bonus in the CBA, while the Christmas bonus is evidently and distinctly a separate
benefit. Petitioner PAL may not be allowed to brush off said distinction, and unilaterally and
arbitrarily declare that for non-regular employees, their Christmas bonus is the same as or
equivalent to the
13th month pay. Xxx The non-regular rank and file employees of petitioner PAL as of 30 April
1988, are not actually seeking more benefits than what the other member-employees of the
same bargaining unit are already enjoying. They are only requesting that all members of the
bargaining unit be treated equally and afforded the same privileges and benefits as agreed upon
between respondent PALEA and petitioner PAL in the CBA. Petitioner PAL is committing a patent
act of inequity that is grossly prejudicial to the non-regular rank and file employees there being
no rational basis for withholding from the latter the benefit of a Christmas bonus besides the
13th month pay or mid-year bonus, while the same is being granted to the other rank and file
employees of petitioner PAL who have been regularized as of 30 April 1988, although both types
of employees are members of the same bargaining unit. As it had willfully and intentionally
agreed to under the terms of the CBA, petitioner PAL must pay its regular and non-regular
employees who are members of the bargaining unit represented by respondent PALEA their 13th
month pay or midyear bonus separately from and in addition to their Christmas bonus.
A collective bargaining agreement refers to a negotiated contract between a legitimate labor
organization and the employer concerning wages, hours of work and all other terms and
conditions of employment in a bargaining unit. As in all other contracts, the parties to a CBA may
establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided
these are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. Thus, where
the CBA is clear and unambiguous, it becomes the law between the parties, and compliance
therewith is mandated by the express policy of the law.
45) 16. Steel Corp., vs. SCP Employees Union-NFL, G. R. No. 169829-30, April 16, 2008
Facts:
Petitioner Steel Corporation of the Philippines (SCP) is engaged in manufacturing construction
materials, supplying approximately 50% of the domestic needs for roofing materials. SCP-
Federated Union of the Energy Leaders – General and Allied Services (FUEL-GAS) filed a petition
for Certification Election in its bid to represent the rank-and-file employees of the petitioner.
Respondent SCP Employees Union (SCPEU) – National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU)
intervened, seeking to participate and be voted for in such election but the same was denied for
having been filed out of time. Later on, a consent election was conducted, with “FUEL-GAS” and
“NO UNION” as choices. Said election was however declared a failure because less than a
majority of the rank-and-file employees cast their votes.
Later on, NAFLU, the mother federation of respondent SCPEU, filed a petition for Certification
Election for and on behalf of its affiliate, seeking to represent the rank-and-file employees of
petitioner. The Med-Arbiter granted the petition for certification election filed by NAFLU and
further ordered the conduct of the election with “NAFLU” and “NO UNION” as choices. Both
petitioner and FUEL-GAS appealed to the Secretary of Labor, which appeals were later
consolidated.
DOLE Undersecretary rendered a consolidated decision ordering the conduct of a certification
election with “SCPEU,” respondent and “NO UNION” as choices. Subsequent motions for
reconsideration were denied. Unsatisfied, petitioner and FUEL-GAS appealed to the CA.However,
the certification election, as ordered by the Med-Arbiter, proceeded. FUEL-GAS participated
without prejudice to the decision of the CA in its pending petition. In said election, respondent
emerged as winner; hence, an election protest filed by FUEL-GAS.
Meanwhile, the Undersecretary rendered a Decision certifying respondent as the exclusive
bargaining agent of petitioner’s employees. Petitioner and FUEL-GAS timely filed motions for
reconsideration of the aforesaid decision. As a consequence of its certification as the exclusive
bargaining agent, respondent sent to petitioner CBA proposals. Petitioner, however, held in
abeyance any action on the proposals in view of its pending motion for reconsideration. Finding
no justification in petitioner’s refusal to bargain with it, respondent filed a Notice of Strike with
the NCMB.
Later, respondent filed another Notice of Strike alleging as grounds, petitioner’s refusal to
bargain and union busting. The notice was later dismissed and respondent was enjoined from
holding a strike. Later, respondent filed another Notice of Strike on the grounds of refusal to
bargain and union busting.
Respondent thereafter went on strike. However, the Labor Secretary certified the dispute to the
NLRC and directed the employees to return to work.

Issue:

Whether or not the strike staged by respondent union is illegal

Ruling:

Whether or not respondent is the recognized collective bargaining agent had been finally
resolved in the negative. Consequently, as correctly concluded by the CA, it could not compel
petitioner to bargain with it. Thus, the only issues left for determination are: the validity of the
strike participated in by the officers of the respondent union; and the validity of their termination
from employment by reason of such participation.
The strike is a legitimate weapon in the human struggle for a decent existence. It is considered
as the most effective weapon in protecting the rights of the employees to improve the terms and
conditions of their employment. But to be valid, a strike must be pursued within legal bounds.
The right to strike as a means for the attainment of social justice is never meant to oppress or
destroy the employer. The law provides limits for its exercise.
In the instant case, the strike undertaken by the officers of respondent union is patently illegal
for the following reasons: (1) it is a union-recognition-strike which is not sanctioned by labor laws;
(2) it was undertaken after the dispute had been certified for compulsory arbitration; and (3) it
was in violation of the Secretary's return-to-work order.
Respondent's notices of strike were founded on petitioner's continued refusal to bargain with it.
It thus staged the strike to compel petitioner to recognize it as the collective bargaining agent,
making it a union-recognition-strike. As its legal designation implies, this kind of strike is
calculated to compel the employer to recognize one's union and not other contending groups, as
the employees' bargaining representative to work out a collective bargaining agreement despite
the striking union's doubtful majority status to merit voluntary recognition and lack of formal
certification as the exclusive representative in the bargaining unit. The certification election that
was conducted where respondent emerged as winner, not having been recognized as valid, it has
no authority to represent the rank and file employees of petitioner. Thus, it could not ask
petitioner to bargain with it. As the issue of its identity had been the subject of a separate case
which had been settled by the court with finality,61 petitioner cannot, therefore, be faulted in
refusing to bargain. Neither could this Court sustain respondent's imputation of unfair labor
practice and union busting against petitioner. With more reason, this Court cannot sustain the
validity of the strike staged on such basis.
Even if this Court were to uphold the validity of respondent's purpose or objective in staging a
strike, still, the strike would be declared illegal for having been conducted in utter defiance of the
Secretary's return-to-work order and after the dispute had been certified for compulsory
arbitration. Although ostensibly there were several notices of strike successively filed by
respondent, these notices were founded on substantially the same grounds – petitioner's
continued refusal to recognize it as the collective bargaining representative.
Article 263(g) of the Labor Code provides:
When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in
an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may
assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for
compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically
enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or
certification order. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all
striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall
immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions
prevailing before the strike or lockout. The Secretary of Labor and Employment or the
Commission may seek the assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure the compliance with
this provision as well as with such orders as he may issue to enforce the same. x x x.
The powers granted to the Secretary under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code have been
characterized as an exercise of the police power of the State, aimed at promoting the public good.
When the Secretary exercises these powers, he is granted "great breadth of discretion" to find a
solution to a labor dispute. The most obvious of these powers is the automatic enjoining of an
impending strike or lockout or its lifting if one has already taken place.
The moment the Secretary of Labor assumes jurisdiction over a labor dispute in an industry
indispensable to national interest, such assumption shall have the effect of automatically
enjoining the intended or impending strike. It was not even necessary for the Secretary of Labor
to issue another order directing a return to work.
The mere issuance of an assumption order by the Secretary of Labor automatically carries with it
a return-to-work order, even if the directive to return to work is not expressly stated in the
assumption order.
A return-to-work order imposes a duty that must be discharged more than it confers a right that
may be waived. While the workers may choose not to obey, they do so at the risk of severing
their relationship with their employer.
Says the Labor Code:
Art. 264. Prohibited activities. –
x x x No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or
the Secretary or after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary
arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or
lockout. Returning to work in this situation is not a matter of option or voluntariness but of
obligation. The worker must return to his job together with his co-workers so that the operations
of the company can be resumed and it can continue serving the public and promoting its interest.
This extraordinary authority given to the Secretary of Labor is aimed at arriving at a peaceful and
speedy solution to labor disputes, without jeopardizing national interests. Regardless of their
motives, or the validity of their claims, the striking workers must cease and/or desist from any
and all acts that undermine or tend to undermine this authority of the Secretary of Labor, once
an assumption and/or certification order is issued. They cannot, for instance, ignore return-to-
work orders, citing unfair labor practices on the part of the company, to justify their action.
Respondent, in the instant case, after the assumption of jurisdiction and certification of the
dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration, filed notices of strike and staged the strike
obviously contrary to the provisions of labor laws. Worse, it filed not one but several notices of
strike which resulted in two certified cases which were earlier consolidated. These disputes could
have been averted had respondent respected the CA's decision. That way, the collective
bargaining agent would have been determined and petitioner could have been compelled to
bargain. Respondent, through its officers, instead opted to use the weapon of strike to force
petitioner to recognize it as the bargaining agent. The strike, having been staged after the dispute
had been certified for arbitration and contrary to the return-to-work order, became a prohibited
activity, and was thus illegal.
Strikes exert disquieting effects not only on the relationship between labor and management,
but also on the general peace and progress of society, not to mention the economic well-being
of the State. It is a weapon that can either breathe life to or destroy the union and members in
their struggle with management for a more equitable due of their labors. Hence, the decision to
wield the weapon of strike must therefore rest on a rational basis, free from emotionalism,
unswayed by the tempers and tantrums of a few, and firmly focused on the legitimate interest
of the union which should not however be antithetical to the public welfare. In every strike staged
by a union, the general peace and progress of society and public welfare are involved.
Having settled that the subject strike was illegal, this Court shall now determine the proper
penalty to be imposed on the union officers who knowingly participated in the strike.
Article 264 of the Labor Code further provides:
Art. 264. Prohibited activities.— x x x Any workers whose employment has been terminated
as a consequence of an unlawful lockout shall be entitled to reinstatement with full back wages.
Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer
who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to
have lost his employment status: Provided, that mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike
shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a replacement
had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike. x x x.
It bears stressing that the law makes a distinction between union members and union officers. A
worker merely participating in an illegal strike may not be terminated from employment. It is
only when he commits illegal acts during a strike that he may be declared to have lost
employment status. For knowingly participating in an illegal strike or participating in the
commission of illegal acts during a strike, the law provides that a union officer may be terminated
from employment. The law grants the employer the option of declaring a union officer who
participated in an illegal strike as having lost his employment. It possesses the right and
prerogative to terminate the union officers from service. Otherwise, the workers will simply
refuse to return to their work and cause a standstill in the company operations while retaining
the positions they refuse to discharge and preventing management from filling up their positions
46) 17. Standard Chartered Bank Employees Union vs. Standard Chartered Bank et al., G.R.
No. 161933, April 22, 2008
Facts:
Petitioner and the Standard Chartered Bank (Bank) began negotiating for a new Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) in May 2000 as their 1998-2000 CBA already expired. Due to a
deadlock in the negotiations, petitioner filed a Notice of Strike prompting the Secretary of Labor
and Employment to assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute. On May 31, 2001, Secretary
Patricia A. Sto. Tomas of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) issued an Order for
the parties to execute their CBA.
Issue:
Whether the Bank's Chief Cashiers and Assistant Cashiers, personnel of the Telex Department
and HR staff are confidential employees, such that they shall be excluded in the bargaining unit
Ruling:
The CBA provisions in dispute are the exclusion of certain employees from the appropriate
bargaining unit and the adjustment of remuneration for employees serving in an acting capacity
for one month. In their proposal, petitioner sought the exclusion of only the following employees
from the appropriate bargaining unit – all managers who are vested with the right to hire and
fire employees, confidential employees, those with access to labor relations materials, Chief
Cashiers, Assistant Cashiers, personnel of the Telex Department and one Human Resources (HR)
staff.
The Secretary's disposition of the issues raised by petitioner were affirmed by the CA. The Court
sustains the CA. Whether or not the employees sought to be excluded from the appropriate
bargaining unit are confidential employees is a question of fact, which is not a proper issue in a
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This holds more true in the present case
in which petitioner failed to controvert with evidence the findings of the Secretary and the CA.
The disqualification of managerial and confidential employees from joining a bargaining unit for
rank and file employees is already well-entrenched in jurisprudence. While Article 245 of the
Labor Code limits the ineligibility to join, form and assist any labor organization to managerial
employees, jurisprudence has extended this prohibition to confidential employees or those who
by reason of their positions or nature of work are required to assist or act in a fiduciary manner
to managerial employees and hence, are likewise privy to sensitive and highly confidential
records.
In this case, the question that needs to be answered is whether the Bank's Chief Cashiers and
Assistant Cashiers, personnel of the Telex Department and HR staff are confidential employees,
such that they should be excluded.
As regards the qualification of bank cashiers as confidential employees, National Association of
Trade Unions (NATU) – Republic Planters Bank Supervisors Chapter v. Torres declared that they
are confidential employees having control, custody and/or access to confidential matters, e.g.,
the branch's cash position, statements of financial condition, vault combination, cash codes for
telegraphic transfers, demand drafts and other negotiable instruments, pursuant to Sec. 1166.4
of the Central Bank Manual regarding joint custody, and therefore, disqualified from joining or
assisting a union; or joining, assisting or forming any other labor organization.
Golden Farms, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja meanwhile stated that ―confidential employees such as
accounting personnel, radio and telegraph operators who, having access to confidential
information, may become the source of undue advantage. Said employee(s) may act as spy or
spies of either party to a collective bargaining agreement.
Finally, in Philips Industrial Development, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, the Court
designated personnel staff, in which human resources staff may be qualified, as confidential
employees because by the very nature of their functions, they assist and act in a confidential
capacity to, or have access to confidential matters of, persons who exercise managerial functions
in the field of labor relations.
Petitioner insists that the foregoing employees are not confidential employees; however, it failed
to buttress its claim. Aside from its generalized arguments and despite the Secretary's finding
that there was no evidence to support it, petitioner still failed to substantiate its claim. Petitioner
did not even bother to state the nature of the duties and functions of these employees, depriving
the Court of any basis on which it may be concluded that they are indeed confidential employees.
As aptly stated by the CA: While We agree that petitioner's proposed revision is in accordance
with the law, this does not necessarily mean that the list of exclusions enumerated in the 1998-
2000 CBA is contrary to law. As found by public respondent, petitioner failed to show that the
employees sought to be removed from the list of exclusions are actually rank and file employees
who are not managerial or confidential in status and should, accordingly, be included in the
appropriate bargaining unit.
Absent any proof that Chief Cashiers and Assistant Cashiers, personnel of the Telex department
and one (1) HR Staff have mutuality of interest with the other rank and file employees, then they
are rightfully excluded from the appropriate bargaining unit. x x x Petitioner cannot simply rely
on jurisprudence without explaining how and why it should apply to this case. Allegations must
be supported by evidence. In this case, there is barely any at all
47) 18. Samahan ng Mga Manggagawa sa Samma-Lakas sa Industriya ng Kapatirang Haligi ing
Alyansa (Samma-Likha) vs. Samma Corp., G.R. No. 167141, Mar. 13, 2009
Facts:
Petitioner Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Samma– Lakas sa Industriya ng Kapatirang Haligi ng
Alyansa (SAMMA-LIKHA) filed a petition for certification election on July 24, 2001 in the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), Regional Office IV. It claimed that: (1) it was a
local chapter of the LIKHA Federation, a legitimate labor organization registered with the DOLE;
(2) it sought to represent all the rank-and-file employees of respondent Samma Corporation; (3)
there was no other legitimate labor organization representing these rank-andfile employees; (4)
respondent was not a party to any collective bargaining agreement and (5) no certification or
consent election had been conducted within the employer unit for the last 12 months prior to
the filing of the petition.
Respondent moved for the dismissal of the petition arguing that (1) LIKHA Federation failed to
establish its legal personality; (2) petitioner failed to prove its existence as a local chapter; (3) it
failed to attach the certificate of non-forum shopping and (4) it had a prohibited mixture of
supervisory and rank-and-file employees.
In an order dated November 12, 2002, med-arbiter Arturo V. Cosuco ordered the dismissal of the
petition on the following grounds: (1) lack of legal personality for failure to attach the certificate
of registration purporting to show its legal personality; (2) prohibited mixture of rank-and-file
and supervisory employees and (3) failure to submit a certificate of non-forum shopping.
Issues:
1. Whether a certificate for non-forum shopping is required in a petition for certification election;
2. Whether petitioner had the legal personality to file the petition for certification election.

Ruling:

No requirement of certificate of non-forum shopping.

The requirement for a certificate of non-forum shopping refers to complaints, counter-claims,
cross-claims, petitions or applications where contending parties litigate their respective positions
regarding the claim for relief of the complainant, claimant, petitioner or applicant. A certification
proceeding, even though initiated by a "petition," is not a litigation but an investigation of a non-
adversarial and fact-finding character.
… [The] rationale for the requirement of a certification against forum shopping is to apprise the
Court of the pendency of another action or claim involving the same issues in another court,
tribunal or quasi-judicial agency, and thereby precisely avoid the forum shopping situation. Filing
multiple petitions or complaints constitutes abuse of court processes, which tends to degrade
the administration of justice, wreaks havoc upon orderly judicial procedure, and adds to the
congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the courts. Furthermore, the rule proscribing
forum shopping seeks to promote candor and transparency among lawyers and their clients in
the pursuit of their cases before the courts to promote the orderly administration of justice,
prevent undue inconvenience upon the other party, and save the precious time of the courts. It
also aims to prevent the embarrassing situation of two or more courts or agencies rendering
conflicting resolutions or decisions upon the same issue.
The same situation holds true for a petition for certification election. Under the omnibus rules
implementing the Labor Code as amended by D.O. No. 9, it is supposed to be filed in the Regional
Office which has jurisdiction over the principal office of the employer or where the bargaining
unit is principally situated. The rules further that where two or more petitions involving the same
bargaining unit are filed in one Regional Office, the same shall be automatically consolidated.
Hence, the filing of multiple suits and the possibility of conflicting decisions will rarely happen in
this proceeding and, if it does, will be easy to discover. Notably, under the Labor Code and the
rules pertaining to the form of the petition for certification election, there is no requirement for
a certificate of non-forum shopping either in D.O. No. 9, series of 1997 or in D.O. No. 40-03, series
of 2003 which replaced the former.
Considering the nature of a petition for certification election and the rules governing it, we
therefore hold that the requirement for a certificate of non-forum shopping is inapplicable to
such a petition.
Legal Personality of Petitioner
Petitioner argues that the erroneous inclusion of one supervisory employee in the union of rank-
and-file employees was not a ground to impugn its legitimacy as a legitimate labor organization
which had the right to file a petition for certification election.
LIKHA was granted legal personality as a federation under certificate of registration no. 92-1015-
032-11638-FEDLC. Subsequently, petitioner as its local chapter was issued its charter certificate
no. 2-01.With certificates of registration issued in their favor, they are clothed with legal
personality as legitimate labor organizations:
Section 5.Effect of registration. – The labor organization or workers‘ association shall be deemed
registered and
vested with legal personality on the date of issuance of its certificate of registration. Such legal
personality cannot thereafter be subject to collateral attack, but may be questioned only in an
independent petition for cancellation in accordance with these Rules.
Section 3.Acquisition of legal personality by local chapter. - A local/chapter constituted in
accordance with Section 1 of this Rule shall acquire legal personality from the date of filing of the
complete documents enumerated therein.
Upon compliance with all the documentary requirements, the Regional Office or Bureau of Labor
Relations shall issue in favor of the local/chapter a certificate indicating that it is included in the
roster of legitimate labor organizations.
Such legal personality cannot thereafter be subject to collateral attack, but may be questioned
only in an independent petition for cancellation of certificate of registration. Unless petitioner‘s
union registration is cancelled in independent proceedings, it shall continue to have all the rights
of a legitimate labor organization, including the right to petition for certification election.
Furthermore, the grounds for dismissal of a petition for certification election based on the lack
of legal personality of a labor organization are the following: (a) petitioner is not listed by the
Regional Office or the Bureau of Labor Relations in its registry of legitimate labor organizations
or (b) its legal personality has been revoked or cancelled with finality in accordance with the
rules.
As mentioned, respondent filed a petition for cancellation of the registration of petitioner on
December 14, 2002. In a resolution dated April 14, 2003, petitioner‘s charter certificate was
revoked by the DOLE. But on May 6, 2003, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of this
resolution. Neither of the parties alleged that this resolution revoking petitioner‘s charter
certificate had attained finality. However, in this petition, petitioner prayed that its charter
certificate be "reinstated in the roster of active legitimate labor [organizations]." This cannot be
granted here. To repeat, the proceedings on a petition for cancellation of registration are
independent of those of a petition for certification election. This case originated from the latter.
If it is shown that petitioner‘s legal personality had already been revoked or cancelled with finality
in accordance with the rules, then it is no longer a legitimate labor organization with the right to
petition for a certification election.
A Final Note
Respondent, as employer, had been the one opposing the holding of a certification election
among its rank-and-file employees. This should not be the case. We have already declared that,
in certification elections, the employer is a bystander; it has no right or material interest to assail
the certification election.

48) 19. Hotel Enterprises of the Phils., (Hyatt Regency) vs Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa
Hyatt- (NUWHRAIN), GR No. 165756, June 5, 2009

Facts:
Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Hyatt-National Union of Workers in the Hotel Restaurant and
Allied Industries (Union) is the certified collective bargaining agent of the rank-and-file
employees of Hyatt Regency Manila, a hotel owned by petitioner Hotel Enterprises of the
Philippines, Inc. (HEPI).
In 2001, HEPI‘s hotel business suffered a slump due to the local and international economic
slowdown. After
implementing several schemes to recover their losses, HEPI decided to implement a downsizing
scheme by removing positions identified as redundant. The effect was to be a reduction of the
hotel‘s rank-and file employees from the agreed number of 248, from their CBA, down to just
150. The Union opposed the downsizing plan because they did not believe the financial report
stating that the hotel was incurring heavy financial losses, and for being violative of the CBA.
Despite its opposition, a list of the positions declared redundant and to be contracted out was
given by the management to the Union. Notices of termination were, likewise, sent to 48
employees whose positions were to be retrenched or declared as redundant.
The Union filed a notice of strike based on unfair labor practice (ULP) against HEPI. A petition was
likewise filed by HEPI to declare the strike illegal.
The NLRC decided in favor of HEPI. They gave credence to the financial report that the hotel had
incurred huge financial losses necessitating the adoption of a downsizing scheme. Thus, NLRC
declared the strike illegal, suspended all Union officers for a period of six (6) months without pay,
and dismissed the ULP charge against HEPI.

Issue:
Whether or not the Union staged a valid strike.

Ruling:
The Constitution affords full protection to labor, but the policy is not to be blindly followed at the
expense of capital. Always, the interests of both sides must be balanced in light of the evidence
adduced and the peculiar circumstances surrounding each case.
The requisites for a valid strike are: (a) a notice of strike filed with the DOLE 30 days before the
intended date thereof or 15 days in case of ULP; (b) a strike vote approved by a majority of the
total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot in a meeting
called for that purpose; and (c) a notice to the DOLE of the results of the voting at least seven (7)
days before the intended strike. The requirements are mandatory and failure of a union to
comply therewith renders the strike illegal.
In this case, respondent fully satisfied the procedural requirements prescribed by law: a strike
notice filed on April 12, 2002; a strike vote reached on April 25, 2002; notification of the strike
vote filed also on April 25, 2002; conciliation proceedings conducted on May 8, 20002; and the
actual strike on May 10, 2002.
Substantively, however, there appears to be a problem. A valid and legal strike must be based on
"strikeable" grounds, because if it is based on a "non-strikeable" ground, it is generally deemed
an illegal strike. Corollarily, a strike grounded on ULP is illegal if no acts constituting ULP actually
exist. As an exception, even if no such acts are committed by the employer, if the employees
believe in good faith that ULP actually exists, then the strike held pursuant to such belief may be
legal. As a general rule, therefore, where a union believes that an employer committed ULP and
the surrounding circumstances warranted such belief in good faith, the resulting strike may be
considered legal although, subsequently, such allegations of unfair labor practices were found to
be groundless.
Here, respondent Union went on strike in the honest belief that petitioner was committing ULP
after the latter decided to downsize its workforce contrary to the staffing/manning standards
adopted by both parties under a CBA forged only four (4) short months earlier. The belief was
bolstered when the management hired 100 contractual workers to replace the 48 terminated
regular rank-and-file employees who were all Union members. Indeed, those circumstances
showed prima facie that the hotel committed ULP. Thus, even if technically there was no legal
ground to stage a strike based on ULP (because the downzising/retrenchment scheme by the
employer was declared valid), since the attendant circumstances support the belief in good faith
that petitioner‘s retrenchment scheme was structured to weaken the bargaining power of the
Union, the strike, by exception, may be considered legal.
Because of this, we view the NLRC‘s decision to suspend all the Union officers for six (6) months
without pay to be too harsh a punishment. A suspension of two (2) months without pay should
have been more reasonable and just.
Be it noted that the striking workers are not entitled to receive strike-duration pay, the ULP
allegation against the employer being unfounded.

49) 20. Miranda vs. Asian Terminals Inc., et al., GR No. 174316, June 23, 2009
Facts:
Petitioner Teodorico S. Miranda, Jr. was employed by respondent ATI in 1991 as Checker I. He
also became a member of the Associated Port Checkers and Workers Union (APCWU or the
union). On April 10, 1992, the petitioner, who was then the Vice President of the union, was
appointed to the position of Shop Steward which is a union position under the payroll of the
company. The Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between the union and ATI provided for
the appointment of a Shop Steward from among the union members, upon the recommendation
of the union president. The Shop Steward is a field representative of both the company and the
union and acts as an independent arbiter of all complaints brought to his attention.[ On
December 28, 1993, Roger P. Silva, the President of APCWU, wrote a letter to the petitioner
regarding the recall of his designation as the union Shop Steward. The union president explained
that the petitioner was recalled as union Shop Steward due to loss of trust and confidence in him,
pursuant to the ―Agreement Amending the MPSI (Marina Port Services, Inc.) - APCWU CBA.‖
The letter further stated that the petitioner refused to heed the union president‘s reminders
concerning his ―chronic absenteeism‖ that ―is hurting the interest of the Union members as
they are left with no responsible union officer when summoned for investigation concerning
alleged infractions of company rules.
Upon the conclusion of the investigation, the grievance committee issued its report
recommending to ATI the recall of the petitioner as Shop Steward and for his reversion to his
former position of Checker I, in accordance with the CBA. The petitioner questioned his recall as
union Shop Steward, and the union president, Roger P. Silva, issued a letter which reasoned that
the petitioner‘s recall as Shop Steward was pursuant to Section 13 of the Agreement Amending
the MPSI-APCWU CBA, amending Section 2, Article V of the MPSI-APCWU CBA which required
that the term of office of the Shop Steward shall be based on trust and confidence and favorable
recommendation of the duly elected president of the Union.
The petitioner argues that he is entitled to claim reinstatement as Shop Steward as well as the
payment of his backwages pending the respondent‘s appeal. He further contends that the Court
of Appeals erred in dismissing his consolidated petitions which prayed for the enforcement of his
reinstatement as Shop Steward for being moot and academic.
The respondent, on the other hand, maintains that both the NLRC and the Court of Appeals relied
on substantial evidence in arriving at their decision that the consolidated petitions are already
moot and academic in view of the previous reinstatement of the petitioner to Checker I and his
retrenchment and separation from ATI since October 31, 2001.
Issues:

(1) Whether or not the petitioner should be reinstated to the position of Shop Steward
(2) Whether or not the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over the dispute

Ruling:

A cursory look at the responsibilities of a shop steward leads to the conclusion that it is a position
within the union, and not within the company. A shop steward is appointed by the union in a
shop, department, or plant and serves as representative of the union, charged with negotiating
and adjustment of grievances of employees with the supervisor of the employer. He is the
representative of the union members in a building or other workplace. Black's Law Dictionary
defines a shop steward as a union official elected to represent members in a plant or particular
department. His duties include collection of dues, recruitment of new members and initial
negotiations for the settlement of grievances. The shop steward is responsible for receiving
complaints and grievances of the employees and for bringing these complaints to the immediate
supervisor of the employee concerned. If the grievance is not settled through the efforts of the
shop steward, it is referred to the grievance committee.
It is quite clear that the jurisdiction of shop stewards and the supervisors includes the
determination of the issues arising from the interpretation or even implementation of a provision
of the CBA, or from any order or memorandum, circular or assignments issued by the appropriate
authority in the establishment. In fine, they are part and parcel of the continuous process of
grievance resolution designed to preserve and maintain peace among the employees and their
employer. They occupy positions of trust and laden with awesome responsibilities. Since the
Shop Steward is a union position, the controversy surrounding his recall from his position as Shop
Steward becomes a dispute within the union.
An "Internal Union Dispute" or intra-union conflict refers to a conflict within or inside a labor
union. It includes all disputes or grievances arising from any violation of or disagreement over
any provision of the constitution and bylaws of a union, including any violation of the rights and
conditions of union membership provided for in the Code.[ Article 226 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines vests on the Bureau of Labor Relations and the Labor Relations Division jurisdiction
to act on all inter-union or intra-union conflicts.
The actions of the petitioner bolster the conclusion that his grievances were directed against the
union and not the respondent company, making the dispute an intra-union dispute. The first
Complaints filed by the petitioner were against the union and the Union President for illegal recall
of his designation as Shop Steward. A Complaint was then filed before the DOLE Med-Arbiter
praying for reinstatement to union Shop Steward and for the award of the salary differential
while he was allegedly illegally demoted. But the money claims could not be brought before the
union since the salaries of the petitioner were paid by the respondent company; thus, a
Complaint for illegal demotion amounting to constructive dismissal was filed before the Labor
Arbiter, against the union, union president and this time including respondent company and the
president of the company.
Notwithstanding the determination of the Med-Arbiter, as affirmed by the Secretary of Labor,
that the petitioner should be reinstated to the position of Shop Steward, which is binding on this
Court, the petitioner could not be reinstated to the position of Shop Steward because his
eventual separation from respondent ATI made
reinstatement unfeasible. Employment with respondent ATI and membership in the union are
required in order to occupy the position of Shop Steward. But the petitioner is neither a member
of the union nor employed with respondent ATI. He was already retrenched from respondent ATI
since October 21, 2001, and his retrenchment was finally settled through the execution of a Quit
Claim and Release which was executed before the Second Division of the NLRC in NLRC CA No.
032809-02. The Quit Claim and Release provides that in consideration of the receipt
ofP367,500.00, the petitioner discharges respondent ATI and its officers from any claims arising
from his retrenchment, without prejudice to the present labor case filed by the petitioner.
It may seem that the outcome of this case provides no relief for the petitioner despite his invalid
removal from the position of union Shop Steward, but the reinstatement of the petitioner could
not be forced into the present circumstances because the petitioner is no longer employed by
the respondent company. It is a fact that we cannot avoid and must consider in resolving this
case. He was already compensated for his retrenchment from ATI, and he released respondent
ATI from any and all claims or liability with respect to his separation from employment due to
retrenchment. To order the respondent company to reinstate the petitioner to his employment
in ATI would render the Quit Claim and Release nugatory.
The events which have taken place during the pendency of the case have rendered the present
petition moot and academic.
50) 21. National Union of Workers in Hotels Restaurants and Allied Industries-Manila Pavilion
Hotel Chapter vs. SOLE, et al., GR No. 181531, July 31, 2009

Facts:
A certification election was conducted on June 16, 2006 among the rank-and-file employees of
respondent Holiday Inn Manila Pavilion Hotel (the Hotel) with the following results:
Employees in voters list= 353
Total votes cast= 346
NUWHRAIN-MPHC= 151
HIMPHLU= 169
NO UNION= 1
SPOILED= 3
SEGRATED= 22
In view of the significant number of segregated votes, contending unions, petitioner,
NUHWHRAIN-MPHC, and respondent Holiday Inn Manila Pavillion Hotel Labor Union (HIMPHLU),
referred the case back to Med-Arbiter Ma. Simonette Calabocal to decide which among those
votes would be opened and tallied. Eleven (11) votes were initially segregated because they were
cast by dismissed employees, albeit the legality of their dismissal was still pending before the
Court of Appeals. Six other votes were segregated because the employees who cast them were
already occupying supervisory positions at the time of the election. Still five other votes were
segregated on the ground that they were cast by probationary employees and, pursuant to the
existing Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), such employees cannot vote. It bears noting
early on, however, that the vote of one Jose Gatbonton (Gatbonton), a probationary employee,
was counted. Petitioner, which garnered 151 votes, appealed to the Secretary of Labor and
Employment (SOLE), arguing that the votes of the probationary employees should have been
opened considering that probationary employee Gatbonton‘s vote was tallied. And petitioner
averred that respondent HIMPHLU, which garnered 169 votes, should
not be immediately certified as the bargaining agent, as the opening of the 17 segregated ballots
would push the number of valid votes cast to 338 (151 + 169 + 1 + 17), hence, the 169 votes which
HIMPHLU garnered would be one vote short of the majority which would then become 169.
By the assailed Resolution of January 22, 2007, the Secretary of Labor and Employment (SOLE),
through then Acting Secretary Luzviminda Padilla, affirmed the Med-Arbiter‘s Order. The Order
granting the petition for the conduct of the certification election, the six probationary employees
were not yet hired, hence, they could not vote.
In fine, the SOLE concluded that the certification of HIMPHLU as the exclusive bargaining agent
was proper.

Issues:

The relevant issues for resolution then are first, whether employees on probationary status at
the time of the certification elections should be allowed to vote, and second, whether HIMPHLU
was able to obtain the required majority for it to be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent.

Ruling:

On the first issue, the Court rules in the affirmative.

The inclusion of Gatbonton‘s vote was proper not because it was not questioned but because
probationary employees have the right to vote in a certification election. The votes of the six
other probationary employees should thus also have been counted. As Airtime Specialists, Inc. v.
Ferrer-Calleja holds:
In a certification election, all rank and file employees in the appropriate bargaining unit, whether
probationary or permanent are entitled to vote. This principle is clearly stated in Art. 255 of the
Labor Code which states that the "labor organization designated or selected by the majority of
the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit shall be the exclusive representative of the
employees in such unit for purposes of collective bargaining." Collective bargaining covers all
aspects of the employment relation and the resultant CBA negotiated by the certified union binds
all employees in the bargaining unit. Hence, all rank and file employees, probationary or
permanent, have a substantial interest in the selection of the bargaining representative. The
Code makes no distinction as to their employment status as basis for eligibility in supporting the
petition for certification election. The law refers to "all" the employees in the bargaining unit. All
they need to be eligible to support the petition is to belong to the "bargaining unit." (Emphasis
supplied)
EMPLOYEES IN VOTERS‘ LIST = 353
TOTAL VOTES CAST = 346
NUWHRAIN-MPHC = 151
HIMPHLU = 169
NO UNION = 1
SPOILED = 3
SEGREGATED = 22
Rule II, Sec. 2 of Department Order No. 40-03, series of 2003, which amended Rule XI of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, provides:
Rule II
Section 2. Who may join labor unions and workers' associations. - All persons employed in
commercial, industrial and agricultural enterprises, including employees of government owned
or controlled corporations without original charters established under the Corporation Code, as
well as employees of religious, charitable, medical or educational institutions whether operating
for profit or not, shall have the right to self-organization and to form, join or assist labor unions
for purposes of collective bargaining: provided, however, that supervisory employees shall not
be eligible for membership in a labor union of the rank-and-file employees but may form, join or
assist separate labor unions of their own. Managerial employees shall not be eligible to form, join
or assist any labor unions for purposes of collective bargaining. Alien employees with valid
working permits issued by the Department may exercise the right to self-organization and join or
assist labor unions for purposes of collective bargaining if they are nationals of a country which
grants the same or similar rights to Filipino workers, as certified by the Department of Foreign
Affairs.
For purposes of this section, any employee, whether employed for a definite period or not, shall
beginning on the first day of his/her service, be eligible for membership in any labor organization.
All other workers, including ambulant, intermittent and other workers, the self-employed, rural
workers and those without any definite employers may form labor organizations for their mutual
aid and protection and other legitimate purposes except collective bargaining.
The provision in the CBA disqualifying probationary employees from voting cannot override the
Constitutionally-protected right of workers to self-organization, as well as the provisions of the
Labor Code and its Implementing Rules on certification elections and jurisprudence thereon.
Prescinding from the principle that all employees are, from the first day of their employment,
eligible for membership in a labor organization, it is evident that the period of reckoning in
determining who shall be included in the list of eligible voters is, in cases where a timely appeal
has been filed from the order of the MedArbiter, the date when the Order of the Secretary of
Labor and Employment, whether affirming or denying the appeal, becomes final and executory.
The filing of an appeal to the SOLE from the Med-Arbiter’s Order stays its execution, in
accordance with Sec. 21, and rationally, the Med-Arbiter cannot direct the employer to furnish
him/her with the list of eligible voters pending the resolution of the appeal.
During the pendency of the appeal, the employer may hire additional employees. To exclude the
employees hired after the issuance of the Med-Arbiter‘s Order but before the appeal has been
resolved would violate the guarantee that every employee has the right to be part of a labor
organization from the first day of their service.
In the present case, records show that the probationary employees, including Gatbonton, were
included in the list of employees in the bargaining unit submitted by the Hotel on May 25, 2006
in compliance with the directive of the Med-Arbiter after the appeal and subsequent motion for
reconsideration have been denied by the SOLE, rendering the Med-Arbiter‘s August 22, 2005
Order final and executory 10 days after the March 22, 2007 Resolution (denying the motion for
reconsideration of the January 22 Order denying the appeal), and rightly so.
Because, for purposes of self-organization, those employees are, in light of the discussion above,
deemed eligible to vote.
A certification election is the process of determining the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of
the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit for purposes of collective bargaining. Collective
bargaining, refers to the negotiated contract between a legitimate labor organization and the
employer concerning wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment in
a bargaining unit.
The significance of an employee‘s right to vote in a certification election cannot thus be
overemphasized for he has considerable interest in the determination of who shall represent him
in negotiating the terms and conditions of his employment.
Even if the Implementing Rules gives the SOLE 20 days to decide the appeal from the Order of
the Med-Arbiter, experience shows that it sometimes takes months to be resolved. To rule then
that only those employees hired as of the date of the issuance of the Med-Arbiter‘s Order are
qualified to vote would effectively disenfranchise employees hired during the pendency of the
appeal. More importantly, reckoning the date of the issuance of the Med-Arbiter‘s Order as the
cut-off date would render inutile the remedy of appeal to the SOLE.
But while the Court rules that the votes of all the probationary employees should be included,
under the particular circumstances of this case and the period of time which it took for the appeal
to be decided, the votes of the six supervisory employees must be excluded because at the time
the certification elections was conducted, they had ceased to be part of the rank and file, their
promotion having taken effect two months before the election.
2nd Issue:
As to whether HIMPHLU should be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent, the Court rules in
the negative. It is well-settled that under the so-called "double majority rule," for there to be a
valid certification election, majority of the bargaining unit must have voted AND the winning
union must have garnered majority of the valid votes cast.
Prescinding from the Court‘s ruling that all the probationary employees‘ votes should be deemed
valid votes while that of the supervisory employees should be excluded, it follows that the
number of valid votes cast would increase – from 321 to 337. Under Art. 256 of the Labor Code,
the union obtaining the majority of the valid votes cast by the eligible voters shall be certified as
the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the workers in the appropriate bargaining unit. This
majority is 50% + 1. Hence, 50% of 337 is 168.5 + 1 or at least 170.
HIMPHLU obtained 169 while petitioner received 151 votes. Clearly, HIMPHLU was not able to
obtain a majority vote. The position of both the SOLE and the appellate court that the opening of
the 17 segregated ballots will not materially affect the outcome of the certification election as
for, so they contend, even if such member were all in favor of petitioner, still, HIMPHLU would
win, is thus untenable.
It bears reiteration that the true importance of ascertaining the number of valid votes cast is for
it to serve as basis for computing the required majority, and not just to determine which union
won the elections. The opening of the segregated but valid votes has thus become material. To
be sure, the conduct of a certification election has a two-fold objective: to determine the
appropriate bargaining unit and to ascertain the majority representation of the bargaining
representative, if the employees desire to be represented at all by anyone. It is not simply the
determination of who between two or more contending unions won, but whether it effectively
ascertains the will of the members of the bargaining unit as to whether they want to be
represented and which union they want to represent them.
Having declared that no choice in the certification election conducted obtained the required
majority, it follows that a run-off election must be held to determine which between HIMPHLU
and petitioner should represent the rankand-file employees.
A run-off election refers to an election between the labor unions receiving the two (2) highest
number of votes in a certification or consent election with three (3) or more choices, where such
a certified or consent election results in none of the three (3) or more choices receiving the
majority of the valid votes cast; provided that the total number of votes for all contending unions
is at least fifty percent (50%) of the number of votes cast.8 With 346 votes cast, 337 of which are
now deemed valid and HIMPHLU having only garnered 169 and petitioner having obtained 151
and the choice "NO UNION" receiving 1 vote, then the holding of a run-off election between
HIMPHLU and petitioner is in order.

51) 22. A. Soriano Aviation vs. Employees Association of A. Soriano Aviation et al., GR No.
166879, Aug. 14,2009

Facts:
A. Soriano Aviation (petitioner or the company) and respondent Employees Association of A.
Soriano Aviation (the Union), the duly-certified exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and file
employees of petitioner, entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) which included a
―No-Strike, No-Lock-out‖ clause.
On May 1 & 12, and June 12, 1997, which were legal holidays and peak season for the company,
eight mechanics members of respondent Union refused to render overtime work. Petitioner
treated the refusal to work as a concerted action which is a violation of the ―No-Strike, No-
Lockout‖ clause in the CBA. It thus meted the workers a 30-day suspension. It also filed a
complaint for illegal strike.
The attempted settlement between the parties having been futile, the Union filed a Notice of
Strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board on October 3, 1997, attributing to
petitioner the following acts: (1) union busting, (2) illegal dismissal of union officer, (3) illegal
suspension of eight mechanics, (4) violation of memorandum of agreement, (5) coercion of
employees and interrogation of newly-hired mechanics with regard to union affiliation, (6)
discrimination against the aircraft mechanics, (7) harassment through systematic fault-finding,
(8) contractual labor, and (9) constructive dismissal of the Union President, Julius Vargas. As
despite conciliation no amicable settlement of the dispute was arrived at, the Union went on
strike on October 22, 1997.
The Labor Arbiter declared that the newly implemented work-shift schedule was a valid exercise
of management prerogative and the refusal of herein individual respondents to work on three
consecutive holidays was a form of protest by the Union, hence, deemed a concerted action.
Noting that the Union failed to comply with the formal requirements prescribed by the Labor
Code in the holding of strike, the strike was declared illegal.
The Labor Arbiter declared the second strike illegal. The Labor Arbiter went on to hold that the
Union deliberately resorted to the use of violent and unlawful acts in the course of the ―second
strike, hence, the individual respondents were deemed to have lost their employment.
NLRC affirmed in toto the Labor Arbiter‘s decision. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside
the NLRC ruling, holding that the acts of violence committed by the Union members in the course
of the strike were not serious or pervasive to call for loss of employment of the striking
employees. Specifically, the appellate court noted that at the time petitioner filed its complaint
in June 1998, almost eight months had already elapsed from the commencement of the strike
and, in the interim, the alleged acts of violence were committed only during nine non-consecutive
days.
Issue:

In issue then is whether the strike staged by respondents is illegal due to the alleged commission
of illegal acts and violation of the ―No Strike-No Lockout‖ clause of the CBA and, if in the
affirmative, whether individual respondents are deemed to have lost their employment status
on account thereof.

Ruling:

The Court rules in the affirmative.

The Court notes that, as found by the Labor Arbiter in NLRC Case No. 07-05409-97, the first strike
or the mechanics‘ refusal to work on 3 consecutive holidays was prompted by their disagreement
with the management imposed new work schedule. Having been grounded on a non-strikeable
issue and without complying with the procedural requirements, then the same is a violation of
the ―No Strike-No Lockout Policy‖ in the existing CBA. Respecting the second strike, where the
Union complied with procedural requirements, the same was not a violation of the ―No Strike-
No Lockout‖ provisions, as a ―No Strike-No Lockout‖ provision in the Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA) is a valid stipulation but may be invoked only by employer when the strike is
economic in nature or one which is conducted to force wage or other concessions from the
employer that are not mandated to be granted by the law. It would be inapplicable to prevent a
strike which is grounded on unfair labor practice. In the present case, the Union believed in good
faith that petitioner committed unfair labor practice when it went on strike on account of the 30-
day suspension meted to the striking mechanics, dismissal of a union officer and perceived union-
busting, among others.
The Court holds that the second strike became invalid due to the commission of illegal action in
its course. It is hornbook principle that the exercise of the right of private sector employees to
strike is not absolute. Thus Section 3 of Article XIII of the Constitution provides:
SECTION 3. x x x
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and
negotiations and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with
law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage.
They shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and
benefits as may be provided by law. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Indeed, even if the
purpose of a strike is valid, the strike may still be held illegal where the means employed are
illegal. Thus, the employment of violence, intimidation, restraint or coercion in carrying out
concerted activities which are injurious to the right to property renders a strike illegal. And so is
picketing or the obstruction to the free use of property or the comfortable enjoyment of life or
property, when accompanied by intimidation, threats, violence, and coercion as to constitute
nuisance.
Apropos is the following ruling in Sukhothai Cuisine v. Court of Appeals:
Well-settled is the rule that even if the strike were to be declared valid because its objective or
purpose is lawful, the strike may still be declared invalid where the means employed are illegal.
Among such limits are the prohibited activities under Article 264 of the Labor Code, particularly
paragraph (e), which states that no person engaged in
picketing shall:
a) commit any act of violence, coercion, or intimidation or
b) obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employer's premises for lawful purposes, or
c) obstruct public thoroughfares.
The following acts have been held to be prohibited activities: where the strikers shouted
slanderous and scurrilous words against the owners of the vessels; where the strikers used
unnecessary and obscene language or epithets to prevent other laborers to go to work, and
circulated libelous statements against the employer which show actual malice; where the
protestors used abusive and threatening language towards the patrons of a place of business or
against co-employees, going beyond the mere attempt to persuade customers to withdraw their
patronage; where the strikers formed a human cordon and blocked all the ways and approaches
to the launches and vessels of the vicinity of the workplace and perpetrated acts of violence and
coercion to prevent work from being performed; and where the strikers shook their fists and
threatened non-striking employees with bodily harm if they persisted to proceed to the
workplace. Permissible activities of the picketing workers do not include obstruction of access of
customers.
The appellate court found in the present case, as in fact it is not disputed, that the Union
committed illegal acts during the strike. The Union members‘ repeated name-calling, harassment
and threats of bodily harm directed against company officers and non-striking employees and,
more significantly, the putting up of placards, banners and streamers with vulgar statements
imputing criminal negligence to the company, which put to doubt reliability of its operations,
come within the purview of illegal acts under Art. 264 and jurisprudence.
That the alleged acts of violence were committed in nine non-consecutive days during the almost
eight months that the strike was on-going does not render the violence less pervasive or
widespread to be excusable. Nowhere in Art. 264 does it requires that violence must be
continuous or that it should be for the entire duration of the strike.
The appellate court took against petitioner its filing of its complaint to have the strike declared
illegal almost eight months from the time it commenced. Art. 264 does not, however, state for
purposes of having a strike declared as illegal that the employer should immediately report the
same. It only lists what acts are prohibited. It is thus absurd to expect an employer to file a
complaint at the first instance that an act of violence is alleged to be committed, especially, as in
the present case, when an earlier complaint to have the refusal of the individual respondents to
work overtime declared as an illegal strike was still pending — an issue resolved in its favor only
on September 25, 1998.
The records show that the Union went on strike on October 22, 1997, and the first reported
harassment incident occurred on October 29, 1997, while the last occurred in January, 1998.
Those instances may have been sporadic, but as found by the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, the
display of placards, streamers and banners even up to the time the appeal was being resolved by
the NLRC works against the Union‘s favor.
The acts complained of including the display of placards and banners imputing criminal
negligence on the part of the company and its officers, apparently with the end in view of
intimidating the company‘s clientele, are, given the nature of its business, that serious as to make
the ―second strike‖ illegal. Specifically with respect to the putting up of those banners and
placards, coupled with the name-calling and harassment, the same indicates that it was resorted
to coerce the resolution of the dispute – the very evil which Art. 264 seek to prevent.
2nd Issue:
As to the issue of loss of employment of those who participated in the illegal strike, Sukhothai
instructs:
In the determination of the liabilities of the individual respondents, the applicable provision is
Article 264(a) of the Labor Code:
Art. 264. Prohibited Activities – (a) x x x
x x x x Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union
officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during an illegal strike may
be declared to have lost his employment status: Provided, That mere participation of a worker in
a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a
replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike.
xxxx
In Samahang Manggagawa sa Sulpicio Lines, Inc.-NAFLU v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc., this Court
explained that the effects of such illegal strikes, outlined in Article 264, make a distinction
between workers and union officers who participate therein: an ordinary striking worker cannot
be terminated for mere participation in an illegal. There must be proof that he or she committed
illegal acts during a strike. A union officer, on the other hand, may be terminated from work when
he knowingly participates in an illegal strike, and like other workers, when he commits an illegal
act during an illegal strike. In all cases, the striker must be identified. But proof beyond reasonable
doubt is not required. Substantial evidence available under the attendant circumstances, which
may justify the imposition of the penalty of dismissal, may suffice.
The liability for prohibited acts has thus to be determined on an individual basis. A perusal of the
Labor Arbiter‘s Decision, which was affirmed in toto by the NLRC, shows that on account of the
staging of the illegal strike, individual respondents were all deemed to have lost their
employment, without distinction as to their respective participation.
Of the participants in the illegal strike, whether they knowingly participated in the illegal strike in
the case of union officers or knowingly participated in the commission of violent acts during the
illegal strike in the case of union members, the records do not indicate. While respondent Julius
Vargas was identified to be a union officer, there is no indication if he knowingly participated in
the illegal strike. The Court not being a trier of facts, the remand of the case to the NLRC is in
order only for the purpose of determining the status in the Union of individual respondents and
their respective liability, if any.