The undisputed presence of all the accused at the situs of the incident is a legitimate
ARTICLE 11
YAPYUCO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
GR Nos. 120744-46, June 25, 2012
FACTS:
• The accused-petitioners Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno who were members of the
Integrated National Police; Reyes and Pamintuan who were barangay captains;
Manguerra, Lacson, Pabalan who were either members of the Civil Home Defense
Force or civilian volunteers of Quiebawan and Del Carmen alleged that they all
received information concerning a reported presence of armed NPA in Quiebawan.
• On that night of the incident, the victims had just attended a barrio fiesta
celebration. On the way back, suddenly, as they were approaching a curve on the
road, they met a burst of gunfire and instantly the victims were all wounded and
bleeding profusely, and thereafter pronounced dead. Thus, all the accused were
charged with murder, multiple attempted murder and frustrated murder.
• On the other hand, the petitioner-accused contends that they flagged the jeepney
that the victims boaded and signaled for it to stop. He claimed that instead of
stopping, the jeepney accelerated and swerved to its left. This allegedly inspired him,
and his fellow police officers Cunanan and Puno, to fire warning shots but the
jeepney continued pacing forward, hence they were impelled to fire at the tires
thereof and instantaneously, gunshots allegedly came bursting from the direction of
Narons house directly at the subject jeepney.
ISSUE: Whether Yapyuco and his men and the offense committed is the necessary
consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right?
HELD: NO. Article 11. Justifying circumstances. - The following do not incur any
criminal liability: 5. Any person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful
exercise of a right or office.
The availability of the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or lawful exercise of
a right or office under Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code rests on proof that (a)
the accused acted in the performance of his duty or in the lawful exercise of his right
or office, and (b) the injury caused or the offense committed is the necessary
consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right
or office. The justification is based on the complete absence of intent and negligence on
the part of the accused, inasmuch as guilt of a felony connotes that it was committed
with criminal intent or with fault or negligence. Where invoked, this ground for non-
liability amounts to an acknowledgment that the accused has caused the injury or has
committed the offense charged for which, however, he may not be penalized because
the resulting injury or offense is a necessary consequence of the due performance of
his duty or the lawful exercise of his right or office. Thus, it must be shown that the
acts of the accused relative to the crime charged were indeed lawfully or duly
performed; the burden necessarily shifts on him to prove such hypothesis.
We find that the requisites for justification under Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal
Code do not obtain in this case.
BAUTISTA, CARTAGENA, MENDOZA, RIVERA
law enforcement operation. No objection is strong enough to defeat the claim that all of
them – who were either police and barangay officers or CHDF members tasked with the
maintenance of peace and order – were bound to, as they did, respond to information
of a suspected rebel infiltration in the locality. While, it may certainly be argued that
rebellion is a continuing offense, it is interesting that nothing in the evidence
suggests that the accused were acting under an official order to open fire at or
kill the suspects under any and all circumstances. Even more telling is the absence
of reference to the victims having launched such aggression as would threaten the
safety of any one of the accused, or having exhibited such defiance of authority that
would have instigated the accused, particularly those armed, to embark on a violent
attack with their firearms in self-defense.
But whether or not the passengers of the subject jeepney were NPA members and
whether or not they were at the time armed, are immaterial in the present inquiry
inasmuch as they do not stand as accused in the prosecution at hand. Besides, even
assuming that they were as the accused believed them to be, the actuations of these
responding law enforcers must inevitably be ranged against reasonable expectations
that arise in the legitimate course of performance of policing duties. The rules of
engagement, of which every law enforcer must be thoroughly knowledgeable and for
which he must always exercise the highest caution, do not require that he should
immediately draw or fire his weapon if the person to be accosted does not heed his call.
Pursuit without danger should be his next move, and not vengeance for personal
feelings or a damaged pride. Police work requires nothing more than the lawful
apprehension of suspects, since the completion of the process pertains to other
government officers or agencies.
BAXINELA vs. PEOPLE
GR No. 149652, March 24, 2006
FACTS:
• Baxinela was charged with the crime of Homicide in the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan.
• The prosecution's contends that Baxinela, Legarda and Regimen were already in
Superstar Disco Club as early as 11pm of October 18, 1996. At around 12mn to
12:30am a minor altercation ensued between the deceased Sgt. Lajo and anothe
customer, but eventually the two were able to patch things up. Lajo was on his way
out when Baxinela followed him with a gun already drawn out. Baxinela held Lajo's
left arm and said "Ano ka hay? Mam-am may baril ka?" Lajo responded, "I am MIG,
Pare". After that, an explosion came out of Baxinela's gun. Lajo was shot by Baxinela.
• Baxinela argued that he proceeded to Superstar Disco in response to an information
that there was a minor altercation between Lajo and an armed drunken man. He
approached them and introduced himself as a policeman and asked why Lajo had a
handgun. Lajo suddenly drew on him prompting Baxinela to pull out his gun and fire
upon Lajo, critically wounding him.
• Baxinela raised the justifying circumstance of Self defense or in the alternative the
lawful performance of official duty under Article 11, paragraphs 1 and 5.
• RTC & CA found the version of the prosecution more convincing and convicted
Baxinela.
ISSUE: Whether Baxinela is entitled to the justifying circumstance of Self- defense or
in the alternative the lawful performance of duty?
HELD: NO. The requisites for self-defense are: 1) unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim; 2) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused; and 3)
employment of reasonable means to prevent and repel and aggression. By invoking
self-defense, Baxinela, in effect, admits killing Lajo, thus shifting upon him the burden
of the evidence on these elements.
The first requisite is an indispensable requirement of self-defense. Unlawful aggression
contemplates an actual, sudden and unexpected attack on the life and limb of a person
or an imminent danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude.
The attack must be real, or at least imminent. Mere belief by a person of an impending
attack would not be sufficient. As the evidence shows, there was no imminent threat
that necessitated shooting Lajo at that moment.
To avail the alternative defense of fulfillment of a duty, it must be shown that: 1) the
accused acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office;
and 2) the injury caused or the offense committed is the necessary consequence of the
due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of a right or office. While the first
condition is present, the second is clearly lacking. Baxinela’s duty was to investigate
the reason why Lajo had a gun tucked behind his waist in a public place. This was
what Baxinela was doing when he confronted Lajo at the entrance, but perhaps
through anxiety, edginess or the desire to take no chances, Baxinela exceeded his duty
by firing upon Lajo who was not at all resisting. The shooting of Lajo cannot be
considered due performance of a duty if at that time Lajo posed no serious threat or
harm to Baxinela or to the civilians in the pub.
POMOY vs. PEOPLE
GR No. 150647, September 29, 2004
FACTS:
• Tomas Balboa was a master teacher of the Concepcion College of Science and
Fisheries in Concepcion, Iloilo. He was arrested, allegedly in connection with a
robbery, which took place in the municipality. Balboa was taken to the Headquarters
of the already defunct 321st Philippine Constabulary Company at Camp Jalandoni,
Sara, Iloilo. He was detained in the jail thereat, along with Edgar Samudio, another
suspect in the robbery case.
• Later that day, petitioner, who is a police sergeant, went near the door of the jail
where Balboa was detained and directed the latter to come out, purportedly for
tactical interrogation at the investigation room. The jail guard on duty, Nicostrado
Estepar, opened the jail door and walked towards the investigation room.
• At that time, petitioner had a gun (a 45 caliber pistol) tucked in a holster which was
hanging by the side of his belt. The gun was fully embedded in its holster, with only
the handle of the gun protruding from the holster.
• When they reached the investigation room, two gunshots were heard. When the
source of the shots were verified, petitioner was seen still holding a 45 caliber pistol,
facing Balboa, who was lying in a pool of blood, about 2 feet away. When the
Commanding Officer of the Headquarters arrived, he disarmed petitioner and
directed that Balboa be brought to the hospital. But according to Dr. Palma
BAUTISTA, CARTAGENA, MENDOZA, RIVERA
(happened to be at the crime scene) said that it was unnecessary to bring Balboa to
the hospital for he was dead.
• Upon request of the wife of the deceased, Dr. Ricardo Jabpnete, the medico-legal
officer of the National Bureau of Investigation conducted an autopsy on the remains
of Tomas Balboa.
• Petitioner raised the defense of accident and self-defense. As the deceased
persistently attempted to wrest the weapon from him, while he resolutely tried to
thwart those attempts.
ISSUE: Whether self-defense is consistent with exempting circumstance of accident?
HELD: NO. Self-defense is inconsistent with the exempting circumstance of accident,
in which there is no intent to kill. On the other hand, self-defense necessarily
contemplates a premeditated intent to kill in order to defend oneself from the imminent
danger.
Here, the fatal shots did not occur out of any conscious or premeditated effort to
overpower, or kill the victim for the purpose of self-defense against any aggression
rather they appeared to be the spontaneous and accidental result of both parties
attempts to possess the firearm.
NOTE elements of accident as an exempting circumstance:
1. the accused was at the time performing a lawful act with due care,
2. the resulting injury was caused by mere accident
3. on the part of the accused, there was no fault or no intent to cause the injury.
ANGCACO vs. PEOPLE
GR No. 146664, February 28, 2002
FACTS:
• In the early morning of Sept. 25, 1980, petitioner and his co-accused, led by Edep,
went to the house of Restituto Bergante in Bato, Taytay, Palawan to serve a warrant
for the latter’s arrest.
• When they reached the house, Edep and his men took positions as they had been
warned that Restituto Bergante might resist arrest.
• Decosto and Angcaco were each armed with armalites, Lota had a carbine, Felizarte a
revolver, and Edep a carbine and a revolver.
• Edep called Restituto Bergante to come out of the house as he (Edep) had a warrant
for his arrest. Restituto’s wife replied that her husband was not in the house, having
gone to Puerto Princesa.
• A commotion then took place inside the house and, shortly after, Angcaco saw a man
coming down the house. They fired warning shots to stop the man, but Angcaco saw
another person with a bolo near Edep. He shouted, “Sarge, this is the man who tried
to hack you!,” and shot the unidentified man, who fell to the ground face up. They
later learned that the person killed was Freddie Ganancial.
• Due to that, a case for murder was filed against them.
• RTC & CA - Angcaco is guilty, the other co-accused were acquitted.
• Angcaco claims that the killing was done in fulfilment of a lawful duty.
ISSUE: Whether Angcaco is justified in killing Freddie under the justifying
circumstance of fulfilment of a lawful duty?
HELD: NO. For this justifying circumstance to be appreciated, the following must be
established: (1) that the offender acted in the lawful exercise of a right or a duty; and
(2) that the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due
performance of such right or office.
Here, the missing of Angcaco and his colleagues was to effect the arrest of Restituto
Bergante. As Edep himself explained, the standard procedure in making an arrest was,
first, to identify themselves as police officers and to show the warrant to the arrestee
and to inform him of the charge against him, and, second, to take the arrestee under
custody. But, it was not shown here that the killing of Freddie was in furtherance of
such duty. No evidence was presented by the defense to prove that Freddie attempted
to prevent Angcaco and his fellow officers from arresting Restituto Bergante. There was
in fact no clear evidence as to how Freddie was shot. Indeed, as already stated, any
attempt by the victim to arrest the wanted person was pointless as Restituto Bergante
was not in his house. As regards the second requisite, there can be no question that
the killing of Freddie was not a necessary consequence of the arrest to be made on
Restituto Bergante.
Hence, Angcaco is liable only for homicide as neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstances attended the commission of the crime.
ARTICLE 12
EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE
TY vs. PEOPLE
GR No.
FACTS:
• Petitioner was charged before the RTC Manila of 7 counts of violation of BP 22. The
evidence for the prosecution showed that the petitioner issued seven postdated
checks payable to private complainant Manila Doctors Hospital in payment of her
mother's hospital bills. The checks were, however, dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds. For her defense, petitioner did not deny having issued the
seven checks but contended that the issuance of the checks was under the impulse
of an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury or in avoidance of a greater evil or injury.
She claimed that she was compelled to issue the checks — a condition the hospital
allegedly demanded of her before her mother could be discharged — for fear that her
mother's health might deteriorate further due to the inhumane treatment of the
hospital, or worse, her mother might commit suicide. She further argued that there
was absence of valuable consideration for the issuance of the checks and that the
payee had knowledge of the insufficiency of funds in the account. The trial court,
however, rejected the theory of the defense and gave full faith and credence to the
prosecution's evidence. It convicted the petitioner of the crime charged and sentenced
her to a prison term. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the
trial court with modification setting aside the penalty of imprisonment and instead
ordered the petitioner to pay a fine. Hence, the instant petition.
BAUTISTA, CARTAGENA, MENDOZA, RIVERA
ISSUE: Whether the defense of uncontrollable fear is tenable to warrant her exemption
from criminal liability?
HELD: NO. Uncontrollable fear - For this exempting circumstance to be invoked
successfully, the following requisites must concur: (1) existence of an uncontrollable
fear; (2) the fear must be real and imminent; and (3) the fear of an injury is greater
than or at least equal to that committed.
Here, the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated.  If the evil sought
to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated or may happen in the future, this
defense is not applicable.
It must appear that the threat that caused the uncontrollable fear is of such gravity
and imminence that the ordinary man would have succumbed to it. It should be based
on a real, imminent or reasonable fear for one’s life or limb. A mere threat of a future
injury is not enough.    It should not be speculative, fanciful, or remote.  A person
invoking uncontrollable fear must show therefore that the compulsion was such that it
reduced him to a mere instrument acting not only without will but against his will as
well. It must be of such character as to leave no opportunity to the accused for escape.
Speculative fear
The fear harbored by Ty was not real and imminent.  Ty claims that she was compelled
to issue the checks, a condition the hospital allegedly demanded of her before her
mother could be discharged, for fear that her mother’s health might deteriorate further
due to the inhumane treatment of the hospital or worse, her mother might commit
suicide.  This is speculative fear; it is not the uncontrollable fear contemplated by law.
PEOPLE vs. FELICIANO
GR No.
FACTS:
• PO2 Monte, PO2 Caparas and PO1 Mapula conducted a buy bust operation.
• Edward Feliciano and Anita Laurora was found guilty of Section 5 and 15 Article II of
RA 9165, and Maglalang and Romelito Ruelo guilty of violation of Sec. 15 of RA 9165
• The accused contented that buy bust operation was not legitimate and valid since no
search warrant had been issued against their premises. The police officers who
conducted the buy-bust operation had sufficient time to obtain a warrant of arrest
considering that they were already in possession of pertinent information, i.e., the
letter-complaint from the Barangay Captain.
• Thus, they argue that the police officers had no basis to show any urgency upon
which to justify a warrantless arrest.
ISSUE: Whether the buy bust operation is legitimate and valid form of entrapment?
HELD: YES. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment that is resorted to for
trapping and capturing criminals. It is legal and has been proved to be an effective
method of apprehending drug peddlers, provided due regard to constitutional and legal
safeguards is undertaken.
The argument that the police officers should have instead secured an arrest warrant is
misplaced and untenable considering the nature of the offense involved, the obscurity
of the transgressors thereof, and the unpredictability of the transaction subject of the
offense. Moreover, this Court has ruled time and again that a buy-bust operation is
employed to trap and catch a malefactor in flagrante delicto. In fact, there is a fine
distinction between entrapping a criminal versus instigating him to commit the crime,
to wit:
ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION.
While it has been said that the practice of entrapping persons into crime for the
purpose of instituting criminal prosecutions is to be deplored, and while instigation, as
distinguished from mere entrapment, has often been condemned and has sometimes
been held to prevent the act from being criminal or punishable, the general rule is that
it is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its commission were
purposely placed in his way, or that the criminal act was done at the decoy solicitation
of persons seeking to expose the criminal, or that detectives feigning complicity in the
act were present and apparently assisting in its commission. Especially is this true in
that class of cases where the offense is one of a kind habitually committed, and the
solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. Mere deception by the
detective will not shield defendant, if the offense was committed by him, free from the
influence or instigation of the detective. The fact that an agent of an owner acts as a
supposed confederate of a thief is no defense to the latter in a prosecution for larceny,
provided the original design was formed independently of such agent; and where a
person approached by the thief as his confederate notifies the owner or the public
authorities, and, being authorised by them to do so, assists the thief in carrying out
the plan, the larceny is nevertheless committed. It is generally held that it is no
defense to a prosecution for an illegal sale of liquor that the purchase was made by a
spotter, detective, or hired informer; but there are cases holding the contrary.
Clearly, in this case, the buy-bust operation was proper. All the essential elements of
the crime of illegal sale of drugs have been established, i.e., (1) the identity of the buyer
and the seller, the object of the sale, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the
thing sold and the payment for it. What is material is the proof that the transaction or
sale actually took place. The delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the
receipt by the seller of the marked money successfully consummate the buy-bust
transaction.
Here, the prosecution was able to establish these elements beyond moral certainty.
Accused-appellants sold the shabu for PhP 200 to PO2 Monte posing as buyer; the said
drug was seized and identified as a prohibited drug and subsequently presented in
evidence; there was actual exchange of the marked money and contraband; and finally,
accused-appellant Feliciano was fully aware that he was selling and delivering a
prohibited drug.
BAUTISTA, CARTAGENA, MENDOZA, RIVERA
ARTICLE 13
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE
PEOPLE vs. CA and TANGAN
GR No. 103613, February 23, 2001
FACTS:
• Navy Captain Eladio Tangan was driving alone on Roxas Boulevard heading south.
He had just come from Buendia Avenue on an intelligence operation. At the same
time, Generoso Miranda, optometrist was driving his car in the same direction along
Roxas Boulevard with his uncle, Manuel Miranda, after coming from the Ramada
Hotel. Generoso was moving ahead of Tangan. Suddenly, firecrackers were thrown in
Generoso’s way, causing him to swerve to the right and cut Tangan’s path. Tangan
blew his horn several times. Generoso slowed down to let Tangan pass. Tangan
accelerated and overtook Generoso, but when he got in front, Tangan reduced speed.
Generoso tried four or five times to overtake on the right lane but Tangan kept
blocking his lane. As he approached Airport Road, Tangan slowed down to make a U-
turn. Generoso passed him, pulled over and got out of the car with his uncle. Tangan
also stopped his car and got out. As Mirandas got near Tangans car, Generoso loudly
retorted, Putang ina mo, bakit mo ko ginigitgit ang sasakyan ko? Generoso and
Tangan then exchanged expletives. Tangan pointed his hand to Generoso and the
latter slapped it, saying, Huwag mo akong dinuduro. Tangan went to his car and got
his 38 caliber handgun on the front seat. And shot Miranda causing the latter to fall.
Tangan was charged with the crime of murder with the use of an unlicensed firearm.
After a reinvestigation, the information was amended to homicide with the use of a
licensed firearm and he was separately charged with illegal possession of unlicensed
firearm.
• During trial, the prosecution and the defense stipulated the privileged mitigating
circumstance of incomplete self-defense.
ISSUE: Whether Tangan acted in incomplete self-defense?
HELD: NO. Incomplete self-defense is not considered as a justifying act, but merely a
mitigating circumstance, hence the burden of proving the crime charged in the
information is not shifted to the accused. In order that it may be successfully
appreciated, however, it is necessary that a majority of the requirements of self-defense
be present, particularly the requisite of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.
The element of unlawful aggression in self-defense must not come from the person
defending himself but from the victim. A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is
not sufficient except when coupled with physical assault. There being no lawful
aggression on the part of either antagonists, the claim of incomplete self-defense falls.
Tangan undoubtedly had possession of the gun, but the Mirandas tried to wrestle the
gun from him. It may be said that the former had intention of killing the victim but
simply to retain possession of his gun. However, the fact that the victim subsequently
died as a result of the gunshot wound, though the shooter may not have the intention
to kill, does not absolve him from the culpability.
The third requisite of lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself is not supported by evidence. By repeatedly blocking the path of Mirandas for
almost five times, Tangan was in effect the one who provoked the former. Sufficient
provocation as a requisite of incomplete self-defense is different from sufficient
provocation as a mitigating circumstance. As an element of self-defense, it pertains to
its absence on the part of the person defending himself, while as a mitigating
circumstance; it pertains to its presence on the part of the offended party.
PEOPLE vs. TORPIO
GR No. 138984, June 4, 2004
FACTS:
• While Torpio’s family were having dinner, Anthony Rapas knocked and asked for
Dennis Torpio who, after eating, went and left home with Anthony upon the latter’s
invitation for a drinking spree.
• Both left after dinner, went to the store of a certain Codog and there started drinking.
They consumed a half-gallon of tuba and 2 red horse, drinking with a companion
named Porboy Perez.
• The 3 proceeded to the seashore, in a cottage of a beach resort named Shoreline.
Arriving there, there were some people drinking also and they offered them drinks
and the 2 obliged. Afterwards, they went to a cottage and later Porboy arrived
bringing with him a liquor gin.
• Dennis did not drink the gin, only Anthony and Porboy did. [T]hen after drinking the
gin, Anthony tried to let Dennis drink the gin and as the latter still refused, Anthony
allegedly bathed Dennis with gin and mauled him several times.
• Dennis crawled beneath the table and Anthony tried to stab him with a 22 fan knife
but did not hit him.
• Dennis went home and got a knife and as his mother was alarmed and shouted, a
commotion ensued. Manuel, his father, awoke and tried to scold Dennis and
confiscate from him the knife but he failed, resulting to Manuel’s incurring a wound
on his hand.
• He went back to the cottage by another route and upon arrival Porboy and Anthony
were still there. Upon seeing Dennis, Anthony allegedly avoided Dennis and ran by
passing the shore towards the creek. Rey Mellang went out of his house at this time
and said “meet him ‘Den,’ ” alluding to Anthony and to Dennis.
• Dennis did meet him, virtually blocked him and stabbed him. When he was hit,
Anthony ran but then he got entangled with a fishing net beside the creek and
Anthony fell on his back, and Dennis mounted on him and continued stabbing him.
• Dennis voluntarily surrendered himself the next morning of the incident.
• RTC found Dennis guilty of murder qualified by treachery or evident premeditation
and appreciating in his favor the following mitigating circumstances: (a) sufficient
provocation on the part of the offended party (the deceased Anthony) preceded the
act; (b) the accused acted to vindicate immediately a grave offense committed by the
victim; and, (c) voluntary surrender.
ISSUE: Whether mitigating circumstances should be considered in the Dennis’ favor?
HELD: YES. However, only 2 out of 3 mitigating circumstances considered by the RTC
can be credited to Dennis — (1) voluntary surrender as it had been established that
the appellant, after he killed Anthony, lost no time in submitting himself to the
authorities by going to Boy Estrera, a police officer; (2) having acted in the immediate
vindication of a grave offense as Dennis was humiliated, mauled and almost stabbed
BAUTISTA, CARTAGENA, MENDOZA, RIVERA
by the deceased. Although the unlawful aggression had ceased when the appellant
stabbed Anthony, it was nonetheless a grave offense for which the appellant may be
given the benefit of a mitigating circumstance. But the mitigating circumstance of
sufficient provocation cannot be considered apart from the circumstance of vindication
of a grave offense. These two circumstances arose from 1 and the same incident, i.e.,
the attack on Dennis by Anthony, so that they should be considered as only 1
mitigating circumstance.
Under Art. 249, homicide is punishable by reclusion temporal However, considering
that there are two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance
attendant to the crime, the imposable penalty, is prision mayor, the penalty next lower
to that prescribed by law, in the period that the court may deem applicable.
PEOPLE vs. GENOSA
GR No. 135981, January 15, 2004
FACTS:
• Appellant (who was pregnant at that time), in her testimony, stated that she and her
husband, Ben Genosa, had a quarrel. When she was about to pack her clothes as the
quarrel had escalated, her husband allegedly flew into a rage, dragged appellant
outside of the bedroom towards a drawer holding her by the neck. Ben got a blade, as
the drawer - that contained a gun, was locked. She however, smashed the arm of Ben
with a pipe, causing him to drop the blade and his wallet. Appellant then smashed
Ben at his nape with the pipe as he was about to pick up the blade and his wallet.
She thereafter ran inside the bedroom. Appellant, however, insisted that she ended
the life of her husband by shooting him. She supposedly distorted the drawer where
the gun was and shot Ben. He did not die on the spot, though, but in the bedroom.
• It should be noted that appellant was physically abused by her husband. The defense
presented Dra. Natividad Dayan, a decorated clinical psychologist. Dra. Dayan
believed that appellant is a battered woman or is suffering the Battered Woman
Syndrome. Another decorated expert, Dr. Alfredo Pajarillo, a physician, Dr. Pajarillo
said that at the time she killed her husband appellant's mental condition was that
she was re-experiencing the trauma.
ISSUE: Whether passion and obfuscation can be availed by the appellant?
HELD: YES. The Court held that there present was the circumstance of having acted
upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion and obfuscation.
It has been held that this state of mind is present when a crime is committed as a
result of an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts
or by a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason. For passion and
obfuscation to be applied there should be an act, both unlawful and sufficient to
produce such a condition of mind; and the act is not far removed from the commission
of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the accused might recover
her normal equanimity.
Here, the battering incident preceded victim's death. He also threatened to kill her
while dragging her by the neck towards a cabinet in which he had kept a gun. More
importantly, appellant was eight months pregnant at the time. His abusive and violent
acts, an aggression which was directed at the lives of both appellant and her unborn
child, naturally produced passion and obfuscation overcoming her reason. Even
though she was able to retreat to a separate room, her emotional and mental state
continued. According to her, she felt her blood pressure rise; she was filled with
feelings of self-pity and of fear that she and her baby were about to die, thus shooting
her husband
Upon this sequence, there was no lapse in time before the commission of the crime.
Also, as appellant has an anxiety brought about her Battered Woman Syndrome, those
who suffer this syndrome relives the beating or trauma as if it were real, although she
is not actually being beaten at the time.
PEOPLE vs. GONZALES
GR No. 139542, June 21, 2001
FACTS:
• Inocencio Gonzalez was charged for the complex crime of Murder, Double Murder,
Frustrated Murder and Attempted Murder.
• The families of Noel Andres and that of Inocencio Gonzalez were on their way to the
exit of the Loyola Memorial Park. Andres was with his pregnant wife Feliber Andres,
his two year old son, Kenneth, his nephew Kevin and his sister-in-law, Francar
Valdez.
• At the intersection near the Garden of Remembrance, the vehicle of Inocencio and
Andres almost collided. Andres was able to timely step on the brakes. Inocencio
continued driving along his way while Andres drove behind Inocencio's car. Andres
then got out of his vehicle and knocked on the Inocencio's car window and repeatedly
cursed Inocencio, "Putang ina mo, ang tanda-tanda mo na hindi ka pa marunong
magmaneho. Ang bobo-bobo mo." Inocencio stayed inside his car and allegedly
replied, "Pasensiya ka na hindi kita nakita, nasilaw ako. Aksidente lang." Diño, the
son of Inocencio arrived and argued with Andres. Andres went back to his car to get
something, Diño froze; this prompted Inocencio to get his gun, feeling that his son
was threatened, so he got out of his car and was ready to shoot. When he saw that
Andres did not have a weapon, he put down his hand holding the gun. Trisha, who
was with Diño, arrived at the scene, and hugged her father. Inocencio lost his
balance and accidentally fired the gun in the last window on the left side of the
Tamaraw Fx, and injured Francar Valdez, Kenneth and Kevin.
• Inocencio pleaded to the defense of passion and obfuscation.
ISSUE: Whether Inocencio is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion and
obfuscation?
HELD: NO. The mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation is not obtaining.
For this mitigating circumstance to be considered, it must be shown that (1) an
unlawful act sufficient to produce passion and obfuscation was committed by the
intended victim; (2) that the crime was committed within a reasonable length of time
from the commission of the unlawful act that produced the obfuscation in the accused
mind; and that (3) the passion and obfuscation arose from lawful sentiments and not
from a spirit of lawlessness or revenge.
Noel Andres' act of shouting at the Inocencio's son, who was then a nurse and of legal
age, is not sufficient to produce passion and obfuscation as it is claimed by the
BAUTISTA, CARTAGENA, MENDOZA, RIVERA
accused. Besides, Dino was shouting back at Noel Andres. It was not a case wherein
the appellants son appeared helpless and oppressed that the appellant lost his reason
and shot at the FX of Noel Andres. The same holds true for the Inocencio's claim of
provocation on the part of Noel Andres. Provocation must be sufficient to excite a
person to commit the wrong committed and that the provocation must be
commensurate to the crime committed. The sufficiency of provocation varies according
to the circumstances of the case. The aggressive behavior of Noel Andres towards the
appellant and his son may be demeaning or humiliating but it is not sufficient
provocation to shoot at the complainants vehicle.
PEOPLE vs. ENGUITO
GR No. 128812, February 28, 2000
FACTS:
• Felipe Requerme, a motorela driver who while driving his motorela with his wife on
board, from Lapasan towards Poblacion, Cagayan de Oro City, picked up a passenger
near the Nazareno church. The passenger was later identified as the deceased, Engr.
Wilfredo Achumbre. Achumbre asked him to bring him across the Marcos bridge
towards his home. After travelling, Requerme’s motorela was bumped by a white
motor vehicle. The vehicle kept pushing the motorela causing it to run very fast until
it reached the area in front of Wheels Marketing. Because of the violent push the
motorela turned around facing the direction where it came from and fell on its right
side.
ISSUE: Whether the 2 mitigating circumstances of acting in passion and voluntary
surrender should be appreciated?
HELD: NO. Accused was allegedly still very angry while he was following, bumping and
pushing the motorela which was in front of him. He was previously mauled by the
deceased and he was allegedly rendered unconscious by the blows inflicted on him.
When he regained consciousness, he claims that he wanted to look for a policeman to
report that he was mauled. Clearly, accused’s state of mind after he was mauled and
before he crushed Achumbre to death was such that he was still able to act
reasonably. In fact, he admitted having seen a police mobile patrol nearby but instead,
he chose to resort to the dastardly act which resulted in the death of Achumbre and in
the injuries of the spouses Requerme.
For passion to be considered as a mitigating circumstance, facts must be proved to
show causes sufficient to produce loss of self-control and to overcome reason. The
turmoil and unreason which naturally result from a quarrel or fight should not be
confused with the sentiment or excitement in the mind of a person injured or offended
to such a degree as to deprive him of his sanity and self-control.
The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender cannot be appreciated. Evidence
shows that the accused was further pursued by the police.

DE VERA vs. DE VERA
GR No. 172832, April 7, 2009
FACTS:
• Rosario De Vera accused her husband Geren and Josephine of Bigamy.
• Upon arraignment, Geren pleaded guilty. However, in a motion, he prayed that he be
allowed to withdraw his plea in the meantime in order to prove the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender.
• The motion was opposed by Rosario on the ground that not all the elements of the
mitigating circumstance of “voluntary surrender” were present. She added that
“voluntary surrender” was raised only as an afterthought, as Geren had earlier
invoked a “voluntary plea of guilty” without raising the former. Finally, she posited
that since the case was ready for promulgation, Geren’s motion should no longer be
entertained.
• RTC & CA granted Geren’s motion and appreciated the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender and plea of guilty in the determination of the penalty to be
imposed.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in appreciating the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender?
HELD: NO. For voluntary surrender to be appreciated, the following requisites should
be present: 1) the offender has not been actually arrested; 2) the offender surrendered
himself to a person in authority or the latter’s agent; 3) the surrender was voluntary;
and 4) no pending warrant of arrest or information filed.
Here, it appears that the Information was filed with the RTC on Feb. 24, 2005. On Mar.
1, 2005, the court issued an Order finding probable cause for the accused to stand
trial for the crime of bigamy and for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. In the
afternoon of the same day, Geren surrendered to the court and filed a motion for
reduction of bail. After the accused posted bail, there was no more need for the court
to issue the warrant of arrest.
The foregoing circumstances clearly show the voluntariness of the surrender. Upon
learning that the court had finally determined the presence of probable cause and even
before the issuance and implementation of the warrant of arrest, Geren already gave
himself up, acknowledging his culpability. This was bolstered by his eventual plea of
guilt during the arraignment. Thus, the trial court was correct in appreciating the
mitigating circumstance of “voluntary surrender.”
We would like to point out that the mere filing of an information and/or the issuance of
a warrant of arrest will not automatically make the surrender “involuntary.”
PEOPLE vs. TARAYA
GR No. 135551, October 27, 2000
FACTS:
• Prosec Version: Mariano Adillo a co-worker of the victim Salvador Reyes in a sash
factory, testified that he had known Salvador for two months. At about 10:00 p.m. of
BAUTISTA, CARTAGENA, MENDOZA, RIVERA
24 September 1995, he, Salvador and three other companions were in a beer house
in Famy, Laguna. Salvador drank his beer outside the pub and was in a conversation
with a girl. Both were within the view of Mariano. Later, Salvador was approached
and surrounded by three men, one of them faced him while the two others positioned
themselves behind him. Mariano hollered at the men, who immediately left.
• Half an hour later Mariano went out, but Salvador was nowhere in sight. At about
11:00 p.m., Mariano and a boy searched for him up to a billiard hall which was
about 200 meters away. They returned to the beer house and he instructed the boy
to hail a tricycle for his ride home. When no tricycle could be found he and a
companion walked home. The following day he learned of Salvador’s death.
• Defense Version: Domingo Decena was at home and watching a television show on
the night of 24 September 1995 and until 2:00 a.m. of the following day. Thereafter,
he left the house to go to his brother’s place to sleep. While he was walking along the
street, he saw another person who was also walking and holding an iron pipe about
one and a half feet long. He later learned that the man was Salvador Reyes. He also
saw AMPIE. When AMPIE came face to face with Salvador, the latter tried to hit
AMPIE once with the pipe, but AMPIE was able to duck and avoid being hit by the
pipe. AMPIE retaliated by hacking Salvador with a bolo. Salvador ran away, followed
behind by AMPIE. Frightened with what he saw, Domingo rushed back to his house.
Twenty-five minutes later he saw a commotion outside and learned that Salvador was
found dead twenty meters away from AMPIE’s house.
• SPO2 Emmanuel Martinez was among the policemen who arrived at the scene of the
crime. The body of Salvador Reyes was found some ten yards from the house of
David Angeles, Jr. Accused-appellants were implicated by an eyewitness to the death
of Salvador. ARLY and JONAR were immediately incarcerated while AMPIE,
accompanied by his sister, surrendered at the police station on 9 October 1997. He
recorded in the police blotter the date and time of AMPIE’s surrender. AMPIE
admitted that he killed Salvador, but alleged that he did so in self-defense. Martinez
then discontinued the investigation and advised AMPIE to avail of the services of a
lawyer from the Public Attorney’s Office.
• RTC - guilty of murder qualified by treachery — AMPIE could not benefit from the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. Salvador Reyes was killed on 24
September 1995. The complaint for murder was filed on the third day of the following
month, October, and a warrant of arrest was issued the day after. He admitted the
killing under claim of self-defense, it cannot be believed that he was unaware of the
filing of the case. The trial court concluded that the purpose of AMPIE’s visit to the
police station on 9 October 1995, accompanied by his sister, was not to surrender
but to verify the charge filed against him.
ISSUE: Whether AMPIE is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender?
HELD: NO. The following are the requisites of voluntary surrender: (1) the offender had
not been actually arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in
authority or to the latter's agent; (3) the surrender was voluntary; and (4) there is no
pending warrant of arrest or information filed. For a surrender to be voluntary, it must
be spontaneous and must also show the intent of the accused to submit himself
unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or he
wishes to save them the trouble and expense incidental to his search and capture.
It cannot be denied that when AMPIE learned that the police authorities were looking
for him in connection with the death of Salvador Reyes, he immediately went to the
police station on 9 October 1995. It was there where he confessed to killing Salvador in
self-defense. This is bolstered by the testimony of the investigating officer SPO2
Emmanuel Martinez, who even entered in the police blotter that AMPIE voluntarily
surrendered to the police. However, the said surrender does not constitute one which
would classify as a mitigating circumstance. It must be emphasized that at the time of
his surrender, AMPIE already had a pending warrant of arrest which was issued on 4
October 1995, or five days before his surrender. His arrest by that time was imminent.
We cannot then appreciate in favor of AMPIE the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender.
PEOPLE vs. DAWATON
GR No. 146247, September 17, 2002
FACTS:
• Edgar Dawaton was charged for the crime of murder qualified by treachery and
evident premeditation.
• Esmeraldo Cortez was entertaining visitors in his house in Sitio Garden. His brother-
in-law Edgar Dawaton and kumpadre Leonides Lavares dropped by at about 12:00
o'clock noon followed by Domingo Reyes shortly after. All three (3) guests of
Esmeraldo were residents of Sitio Garden. They started drinking soon after. At about
3:00 o'clock in the afternoon and after having consumed four (4) bottles of gin, they
went to the house of Amado Dawaton, Edgar's uncle, located about twenty (20)
meters away from Esmeraldo's house.
• Already drunk, Leonides decided to sleep on a papag or wooden bench, lying down on
his right side facing Domingo and Edgar using his right hand for a pillow. Edgar,
Domingo and Esmeraldo continued drinking until they finished another bottle of gin.
• At about 3:30 in the afternoon, 20 minutes after Leonides had gone to sleep, Edgar
stood up and left for his house. When he returned he brought with him a stainless
knife with a blade 2 to 3 inches long. Without a word, he approached Leonides who
was sleeping and stabbed him near the base of his neck.
• Leonides attempted to flee but Edgar grabbed the collar of his shirt and repeatedly
stabbed Leonides. Edgar stopped only when Leonides was already dead.
• When first arraigned he pleaded not guilty, but during the pre-trial, he offered to
plead guilty to the lesser offense of homicide but was rejected by the prosecution,
hence, the case proceeded to trial.
• RTC convicted Edgar of murder qualified by treachery and evident premeditation.
• Edgar avers that he is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty.
ISSUE: Whether Edgar is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty?
HELD: NO. While the accused offered to plead guilty to the lesser offense of homicide,
he was charged with murder for which he had already entered a plea of not guilty. The
court has ruled that an offer to enter a plea of guilty to a lesser offense cannot be
considered as an attenuating circumstance under the provisions of Art. 13 of The
Revised Penal Code because to be voluntary the plea of guilty must be to the offense
charged.
BAUTISTA, CARTAGENA, MENDOZA, RIVERA
Furthermore, Sec. 2, Rule 116, of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires the
consent of the offended party and the prosecutor before an accused may be allowed to
plead guilty to a lesser offense necessarily included in the offense charged. We note
that the prosecution rejected the offer of the accused.
LEGRAMA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
GR No. 178626, June 13, 2012
FACTS:
• Office of the Provincial Auditor of the Commission on Audit, Zambales directed an
Audit Team to conduct an examination of the cash and account of petitioner Cecilia
Legrama, the Municipal Treasurer of the Municipality of San Antonio, Zambales. The
COA prepared a Special Cash Examination Report on the Cash and Accounts of
petitioner which contained the findings that petitioners cash accountability has a
shortage in the amount of P1,152,900.75. From the total amount of the shortage,
petitioner was able to restitute the initial amount of P60,000.00. Consequently,
petitioner and Romeo D. Lonzanida, the Municipal Mayor were charged in an
Information with the crime of Malversation of Public Funds. Both petitioner and
Lonzanida voluntarily surrendered and posted their respective cash bonds.
Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision acquitting Lonzanida (lack of proof that is
conspired with petitioner). However, the tribunal concluded that petitioner malversed
the total amount of P1,131,595.05 and found her guilty of the crime of Malversation
of Public Funds. The amount involved in the instant case is more than
Php22,000.00. Hence, pursuant to the provisions of Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code, the penalty to be imposed is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
reclusion perpetua. Considering the absence of any aggravating circumstance and
the presence of two mitigating circumstances, viz., accused Legramas voluntary
surrender and partial restitution of the amount involved in the instant case, and
being entitled to the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, she is hereby
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of 4 years, 2 months and 1 day of
prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as
maximum. Further, she is ordered to pay the amount of Php299,204.65, representing
the balance of her incurred shortage after deducting therein the restituted amount of
Php832,390.40 and the Php200.00 covered by an Official Receipt dated August 18,
1996 issued in the name of the Municipality of San Antonio. She is also ordered to
pay a fine equal to the amount malversed which is Php1,131,595.05 and likewise
suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification and to pay costs.
ISSUE: Whether the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and restitution
should be appreciated?
HELD: YES. Although restitution is akin to voluntary surrender, as provided for in
paragraph 7 of Article 13, in relation to paragraph 10 of the same Article of the RPC,
restitution should be treated as a separate mitigating circumstance in favor of the
accused when the 2 circumstances are present in a case, which is similar to instances
where voluntary surrender and plea of guilty are both present even though the two
mitigating circumstances are treated in the same paragraph 7, Article 13 of the
Revised Penal Code. Considering that restitution is also tantamount to an admission of
guilt on the part of the accused, it was proper for the Sandiganbayan to have
considered it as a separate mitigating circumstance in favor of the petitioner.
 Here, petitioner Exuperancio Canta had not actually been arrested. In fact, no
CANTA vs. PEOPLE
complaint had yet been filed against him when he surrendered the cow to the
GR No. 140937, February 28, 2001
authorities. It has been repeatedly held that for surrender to be voluntary, there must
be an intent to submit oneself unconditionally to the authorities, showing an intention
FACTS: to save the authorities the trouble and expense that his search and capture would
• Narciso Gabriel acquired from his half-sister Erlinda, a cow where he gave the require. In petitioner’s case, he voluntarily took the cow to the municipal hall of Padre
custody to Generoso, then to Maria, then to Gardenio where the cow was lost in the Burgos to place it unconditionally in the custody of the authorities and thus saved
mountain. them the trouble of having to recover the cow from him. This circumstance can be
• Gardenio found hoof prints which led to the house of Filomeno where he was told considered analogous to voluntary surrender and should be considered in favor of
that Canta had taken the cow. petitioner.
• Upon instructions of the owner, Gardenio and Maria Tura went to recover the animal
from petitioner’s wife, but they were informed that petitioner had delivered the cow to
his father, Florentino Canta, who was at that time barangay captain.
• Accordingly, the two went to Florentino’s house. On their way, they met petitioner
who told them that if Narciso was the owner, he should claim the cow himself.
Nevertheless, petitioner accompanied the two to his father’s house, where Maria
recognized the cow. As petitioner’s father was not in the house, petitioner told
Gardenio and Maria he would call them the next day so that they could talk the
matter over with his father.
• However, petitioner never called them. Hence, Narciso Gabriel reported the matter to
the police, and as a result, Narciso and petitioner were called to an investigation.
Petitioner admitted taking the cow but claimed that it was his and that it was lost on
Dec. 3, 1985. He presented 2 certificates of ownership.
• Narciso presented a certificate of ownership signed by the municipal treasurer, in
which the cow was described as 2 years old and female. On the reverse side of the
certificate is the drawing of a cow with cowlicks in the middle of the forehead,
between the ears, on the right and left back, and at the base of the forelegs and
hindlegs, which was confirmed by all the caretakers.
• Petitioner claimed that he acquired the animal under an agreement which he had
with Pat. Diosdado Villanueva, that the latter would give Petitioner a calf it the cow
produced 2 offsprings.
• This cow given by Pat. Villanueva was lost, and that his uncle told him that he had
seen the cow under the care of Gardenio.
• Petitioner went to Gardenio with the mother cow to see whether the cow would
suckle the mother cow. As the cow did, petitioner took it with him and brought it,
together with the mother cow, to his father Florentino Canta.
• Maria trued to get the cow but Florentino refused to give it to her and instead told
her to call Narciso so that they could determine the ownership of the cow.
• As Narciso did not come the following day, although Maria did, Florentino said he
told his son to take the cow to the Municipal Hall of Padre Burgos.
• Petitioner did as he was told, and after 3 days Florentino and Petitioner were called
for investigation.
• RTC & CA found Petitioner guilty of Anti-Cattle Rustling law

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner should be given the benefit of mitigating circumstance
analogous to voluntary surrender?

HELD: YES. The circumstance of voluntary surrender has the following elements: (1)
the offender has not actually been arrested; (2) the offender surrenders to a person in
authority or to the latter’s agent; and (3) the surrender is voluntary.

BAUTISTA, CARTAGENA, MENDOZA, RIVERA