Hontiveros-Baraquel v Toll Regulatory Board

V
Approval of the ASTOA by the
DOTC Secretary was approval by
the President.

The doctrine of qualified political agency declares that, save in matters on which the Constitution or the circumstances
require the President to act personally, executive and administrative functions are exercised through executive
departments headed by cabinet secretaries, whose acts are presumptively the acts of the President unless disapproved
by the latter.

Monsanto v Factoran, Jr

Facts:

The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City) of the crime of
estafa through falsification of public documents. She was sentenced to jail and to indemnify the government in the sum of
P4,892.50.The SC affirmed the decision. She then filed a motion for reconsideration but while said motion was pending,
she was extended by then President Marcos absolute pardon which she accepted (at that time, the rule was that
clemency could be given even before conviction). By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog City treasurer
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requesting that she be restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer since the same was still vacant. Her letter
was referred to the Minister of Finance who ruled that she may be reinstated to her position without the necessity of a new
appointment not earlier than the date she was extended the absolute pardon.

Petitioner wrote the Ministry stressing that the full pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the crime which implies that her
service in the government has never been interrupted and therefore the date of her reinstatement should correspond to
the date of her preventive suspension; that she is entitled to backpay for the entire period of her suspension; and that she
should not be required to pay the proportionate share of the amount of P4,892.50

The Ministry referred the issue to the Office of the President. Deputy Executive Secretary Factoran denied Monsanto’s
request averring that Monsanto must first seek appointment and that the pardon does not reinstate her former position.

Issues:

1. Is Monsanto entitled to backpay?

2. Is a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, entitled to reinstatement to her
former position without need of a new appointment?

3. May petitioner be exempt from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon her by the sentence?

Held:

1. Pardon is defined as "an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws, which
exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the
private, though official act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended, and not
communicated officially to the Court.

While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so that in the eye of the law the offender
is as innocent as though he never committed the offense, it does not operate for all purposes. The very essence of a
pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt. Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase the fact of the commission of the crime
and the conviction thereof. It does not wash out the moral stain. It involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness.

A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It affords no relief for what has been
suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the government any obligation to make reparation for what has been
suffered. “Since the offense has been established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or suffered while
they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required.”
This would explain why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive backpay for lost earnings and benefits.

2. The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public employment but it
cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual
procedure required for a new appointment.

3. Civil liability arising from crime is governed by the Revised Penal Code. It subsists notwithstanding service of sentence,
or for any reason the sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence. Petitioner's civil liability
may only be extinguished by the same causes recognized in the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing due,
remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor, compensation and novation.
Risos-Vidal v Comelec

Risos-Vidal v. COMELEC

ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, (D)
G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015

FACTS:

 September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada, a former President of the Republic
of the Philippines, for the crime of plunder.

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  October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (former President Arroyo) extended
executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former President Estrada.

 October 2, 2012, former President Estrada once more ventured into the political arena, and filed a Certificate of
Candidacy, this time vying for a local elective post, that of the Mayor of the City of Manila.

 January 24, 2013, Risos-Vidal, the petitioner in this case, filed a Petition for Disqualification against former
President Estrada before the COMELEC. Risos Vidal anchored her petition on the theory that "Former President
Estrada is Disqualified to Run for Public Office because of his Conviction for Plunder by the Sandiganbayan
Sentencing Him to Suffer the Penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with Perpetual Absolute Disqualification."

ISSUE:

 Whether or not former President Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted for in public office as a result of the
pardon granted to him by former President Arroyo.

HELD:

 Yes, former President Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted for in public office as a result of the pardon
granted to him by former President Arroyo. It is well-entrenched that where the words of a statute are clear, plain,
and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. Verba
legis non est recedendum. From the words of a statute there should be no departure. It is this Court’s firm view
that the phrase in the presidential pardon at issue which declares that former President Estrada "is hereby
restored to his civil and political rights" substantially complies with the requirement of express restoration.

 Facts:
 petitioners respectfully pray that the Honorable Court RECONSIDER, REVERSE, AND SET - ASIDE its Decision
dated January 12, 2016, and issue a new Decision GRANTING the instant consolidated petitions by declaring the
Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) entered into by the respondents for the Philippine
government, with the United States of America, UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND INVALID and to permanently enjoin
its implementation.
 petitioners claim this Court erred when it ruled that EDCA was not a treaty.[5] In connection to this, petitioners
move that EDCA must be in the form of a treaty in order to comply with the constitutional restriction under Section
25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution on foreign military bases, troops, and facilities.[6] Additionally, they
reiterate their arguments on the issues of telecommunications, taxation, and nuclear weapons.[7]
 Petitioners assert that this Court contradicted itself when it interpreted the word "allowed in" to refer to the initial
entry of foreign bases, troops, and facilities, based on the fact that the plain meaning of the provision in question
referred to prohibiting the return of foreign bases, troops, and facilities except under a treaty concurred in by the
Senate
 Secondly, by interpreting "allowed in" as referring to an initial entry, the Court has simply applied the plain
meaning of the words in the particular provision.[10] Necessarily, once entry has been established by a subsisting
treaty, latter instances of entry need not be embodied by a separate treaty. After all, the Constitution did not state
that foreign military bases, troops, and facilities shall not subsist or exist in the Philippines.
 Issues:
 constitutionality of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the Republic of the
Philippines and the United States of America (U.S.)
 Ruling:
 we find that EDCA did not go beyond the framework. The entry of US troops has long been authorized under a
valid and subsisting treaty, which is the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA).[14] Reading the VFA along with the
longstanding Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT)[15] led this Court to the conclusion that an executive agreement such
as the EDCA was well within the bounds of the obligations imposed by both treaties.
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  Thus, we find no reason for EDCA to be declared unconstitutional. It fully conforms to the Philippines' legal regime
through the MDT and VFA. It also fully conforms to the government's continued policy to enhance our military
capability in the face of various military and humanitarian issues that may arise. This Motion for Reconsideration
has not raised any additional legal arguments that warrant revisiting the Decision.
 Principles:
 The settled rule is that the plain, clear and unambiguous language of the Constitution should be construed as
such and should not be given a construction that changes its meaning
Bayan v Executive Secretary

Facts:

The United States panel met with the Philippine panel to discussed, among others, the possible elements of the Visiting
Forces Agreement (VFA). This resulted to a series of conferences and negotiations which culminated on January 12 and
13, 1998. Thereafter, President Fidel Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by Secretary Siazon and
United States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard.

Pres. Joseph Estrada ratified the VFA on October 5, 1998 and on May 27, 1999, the senate approved it by (2/3) votes.

Cause of Action:

Petitioners, among others, assert that Sec. 25, Art XVIII of the 1987 constitution is applicable and not Section 21, Article
VII.

Following the argument of the petitioner, under they provision cited, the “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities” may
be allowed in the Philippines unless the following conditions are sufficiently met:
a) it must be a treaty,
b) it must be duly concurred in by the senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum held for that
purpose if so required by congress, and
c) recognized as such by the other contracting state.

Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Section 21 Article VII is applicable so that, what is requires for such treaty to
be valid and effective is the concurrence in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the senate.

ISSUE:

Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Art VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution?

HELD:

Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases, troops or facilities should
apply in the instant case. To a certain extent and in a limited sense, however, the provisions of section 21, Article VII will
find applicability with regard to the issue and for the sole purpose of determining the number of votes required to obtain
the valid concurrence of the senate.

The Constitution, makes no distinction between “transient” and “permanent.” We find nothing in section 25, Article XVIII
that requires foreign troops or facilities to be stationed or placed permanently in the Philippines.

It is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under
international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty.

Araullo v Aquino III

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When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the sluggish growth of the economy. The World
Bank advised that the economy needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio “Butch” Abad then came up with a
program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP enables the Executive to realign
funds from slow moving projects to priority projects instead of waiting for next year’s appropriation. So what happens
under the DAP was that if a certain government project is being undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the
funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as “savings” by the
Executive and said funds will then be reallotted to other priority projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate the
economy as economic growth was in fact reported and portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by the
Supreme Court).
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General Appropriations Act (GAA). Unprogrammed
funds are standby appropriations made by Congress in the GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an exposé claiming that he, and other Senators, received
Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato Corona.
Secretary Abad claimed that the money was taken from the DAP but was disbursed upon the request of the Senators.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only realign funds within the Executive. It
turns out that some non-Executive projects were also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera People’s
Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front), P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M
for certain Senators each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and several other concerned
citizens to file various petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP. Among their contentions was:
DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that “no money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA (savings and augmentation provisions
thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution (power of the President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive Order
292 (power of the President to suspend expenditures and authority to use savings, respectively).
Issues:
I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle “no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law” (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution).
II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by the executive.
III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.
IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is constitutional.
V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.
HELD:
I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a program by the Executive and
is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing government spending. As such, it did not violate the
Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from
the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by law would have been required. Funds, which were already appropriated
for by the GAA, were merely being realigned via the DAP.
II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the President’s power to refuse to
spend appropriations or to retain or deduct appropriations for whatever reason. Impoundment is actually prohibited by the
GAA unless there will be an unmanageable national government budget deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless,
there’s no impoundment in the case at bar because what’s involved in the DAP was the transfer of funds.
III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the President (and even the heads of the
other branches of the government) are allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of funds, however, such transfer
or realignment should only be made “within their respective offices”. Thus, no cross-border transfers/augmentations may
be allowed. But under the DAP, this was violated because funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being
transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive agencies.
Further, transfers “within their respective offices” also contemplate realignment of funds to an existing project in the GAA.
Under the DAP, even though some projects were within the Executive, these projects are non-existent insofar as the GAA

5
is concerned because no funds were appropriated to them in the GAA. Although some of these projects may be
legitimate, they are still non-existent under the GAA because they were not provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer to
such projects is unconstitutional and is without legal basis.
On the issue of what are “savings”
These DAP transfers are not “savings” contrary to what was being declared by the Executive. Under the definition of
“savings” in the GAA, savings only occur, among other instances, when there is an excess in the funding of a certain
project once it is completed, finally discontinued, or finally abandoned. The GAA does not refer to “savings” as funds
withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus, since the statutory definition of savings was not complied with under the
DAP, there is no basis at all for the transfers. Further, savings should only be declared at the end of the fiscal year. But
under the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn from certain projects in the middle of the year and then being declared
as “savings” by the Executive particularly by the DBM.
IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for the DAP because under the law, such
funds may only be used if there is a certification from the National Treasurer to the effect that the revenue collections have
exceeded the revenue targets. In this case, no such certification was secured before unprogrammed funds were used.
V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act prior to it being declared as
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is applicable. The DAP has definitely helped stimulate the economy. It has funded
numerous projects. If the Executive is ordered to reverse all actions under the DAP, then it may cause more harm than
good. The DAP effects can no longer be undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to return what they
received especially so that they relied on the validity of the DAP. However, the Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be
applicable to the authors, implementers, and proponents of the DAP if it is so found in the appropriate tribunals (civil,
criminal, or administrative) that they have not acted in good faith.
Neri v Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigation

ACTS: On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into a contract with
Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband
Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be
financed by the People’s Republic of China.
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the September 18, 2007 hearing Jose de Venecia III
testified that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN
Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing wherein
he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in
exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery
attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking
“executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate averring that the communications
between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. He was cited
in contempt of respondent committees and an order for his arrest and detention until such time that he would appear and
give his testimony.

ISSUE:
Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive privilege?
HELD:
The communications are covered by executive privilege

The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide by the Constitution, existing
laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v. Ermita when they are invited to legislative
inquiries in aid of legislation.), does not in any way diminish the concept of executive privilege. This is because this
concept has Constitutional underpinnings.

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The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power textually
committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution,
the President is the repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers. Consistent with
the doctrine of separation of powers, the information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than
others.
Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential communications privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable presidential power.”
2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor of the President or the President
himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational proximity” with the President.

3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of
adequate need, such that the information sought “likely contains important evidence” and by the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the ground that the
communications elicited by the three (3) questions “fall under conversation and correspondence between the President
and public officials” necessary in “her executive and policy decision-making process” and, that “the information sought to
be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China.” Simply put,
the bases are presidential communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or foreign
relations.

Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are
covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the communications relate to a “quintessential and non-
delegable power” of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority
of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been
recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are “received” by a close advisor of the President.
Under the “operational proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo’s
cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and
of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioner’s claim of executive privilege violates the
constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern.50 We might have agreed
with such contention if petitioner did not appear before them at all. But petitioner made himself available to them during
the September 26 hearing, where he was questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he expressly manifested his
willingness to answer more questions from the Senators, with the exception only of those covered by his claim of
executive privilege.
The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of Article III provides:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used
as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

Resident Mammals v Reyes

Petitioners in G.R. No. 180771, collectively referred to as the "Resident Marine Mammals" in the petition, are the toothed
whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean species, which inhabit the waters in and around the Tañon Strait. They
are joined by Gloria Estenzo Ramos
(Ramos) and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio (Eisma-Osorio) as their legal guardians and as friends (to be collectively known as
"the Stewards") who allegedly empathize with, and seek the protection of, the aforementioned marine species.
On June 13, 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting through the DOE, entered into a Geophysical Survey and
Exploration Contract-102 (GSEC-102) with JAPEX. This contract involved geological and geophysical studies of the
Tañon Strait. The studies included surface geology,... sample analysis, and reprocessing of seismic and magnetic data.
JAPEX, assisted by DOE, also conducted geophysical and satellite surveys, as well as oil and gas sampling in Tañon
Strait.

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On December 21, 2004, DOE and JAPEX formally converted GSEC-102 into SC-46 for the exploration, development, and
production of petroleum resources in a block covering approximately 2,850 square kilometers offshore the Tañon Strait.
JAPEX committed to drill one exploration well during the second sub-phase of the project. Since the well was to be drilled
in the marine waters of Aloguinsan and Pinamungajan, where the Tañon Strait was declared a protected seascape in
1988,[10] JAPEX... agreed to comply with the Environmental Impact Assessment requirements pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 1586, entitled "Establishing An Environmental Impact Statement System, Including Other Environmental
Management Related Measures And For Other Purposes."[
On January 31, 2007, the Protected Area Management Board[12] of the Tañon Strait (PAMB-Tañon Strait) issued
Resolution No. 2007-001,[13] wherein it adopted the Initial Environmental Examination (IEE) commissioned by JAPEX,
and... favorably recommended the approval of JAPEX's application for an ECC.
It was in view of the foregoing state of affairs that petitioners applied to this Court for redress, via two separate original
petitions both dated December 17, 2007, wherein they commonly seek that respondents be enjoined from implementing
SC-46 for, among others, violation of... the 1987 Constitution.
Protesting the adverse ecological impact of JAPEX's oil exploration activities in the Tañon Strait, petitioners Resident
Marine Mammals and Stewards aver that a study made after the seismic survey showed that the fish catch was reduced
drastically by 50 to 70 percent. They claim... that before the seismic survey, the average harvest per day would be from
15 to 20 kilos; but after the activity, the fisherfolk could only catch an average of 1 to 2 kilos a day. They attribute this
"reduced fish catch" to the destruction of the "payao" also known as the
"fish aggregating device" or "artificial reef."
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS HAVE LOCUS STANDI TO FILE THE INSTANT PETITION
Issues:
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS HAVE LOCUS STANDI TO FILE THE INSTANT PETITION
Locus Standi of the Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards, petitioners in G.R. No. 180771;
Ruling:
The Resident Marine Mammals, through the Stewards, "claim" that they have the legal standing to file this action since
they stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment in this suit.[40] Citing Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,[41]... they also assert
their right to sue for the faithful performance of international and municipal environmental laws created in their favor and
for their benefit.
EC. 5. Citizen suit. - Any Filipino citizen in representation of others, including minors or generations yet unborn, may file
an action to enforce rights or obligations under environmental laws. Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the court shall issue...
an order which shall contain a brief description of the cause of action and the reliefs prayed for, requiring all interested
parties to manifest their interest to intervene in the case within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The plaintiff may
publish the order once in a... newspaper of a general circulation in the Philippines or furnish all affected barangays copies
of said order.
Citizen suits filed under R.A. No. 8749 and R.A. No. 9003 shall be governed by their respective provisions.
Citizen suit. To further encourage the protection of the environment, the Rules enable litigants enforcing environmental
rights to file their cases as citizen suits. This provision liberalizes standing for all cases filed enforcing environmental laws
and... collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct interest, on the principle that humans are stewards of nature.
The terminology of the text reflects the doctrine first enunciated in Oposa v. Factoran, insofar as it refers to minors and
generations yet... unborn.
Moreover, even before the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases became effective, this Court had already taken a
permissive position on the issue of locus standi in environmental cases. In Oposa, we allowed the suit to be brought in the
name of generations yet... unborn "based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is concerned."[56] Furthermore, we said that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology,
a right that does not even need to be... stated in our Constitution as it is assumed to exist from the inception of
humankind, carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
In light of the foregoing, the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been eliminated by our Rules,
which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our environmental laws. It is worth noting
here that the Stewards are... joined as real parties in the Petition and not just in representation of the named cetacean
8
species. The Stewards, Ramos and Eisma-Osorio, having shown in their petition that there may be possible violations of
laws concerning the habitat of the Resident Marine Mammals, are... therefore declared to possess the legal standing to
file this petition.
It is the power and authority of the court to hear, try, and decide a case arising from a letter petition introduced by a third
person, rather than the aggrieved party, for the protection of public interest, pursuant to the concept of Judicial
Activism.

Oposa v Factoran

FACTS:

A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their generation and generations yet
unborn, and represented by their parents against Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They prayed that judgment
be rendered ordering the defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to:

1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;

2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new TLAs;

and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.” They alleged that they have a clear
and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as
parens patriae. Furthermore, they claim that the act of the defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the
remaining forests constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources property he holds in trust for
the benefit of the plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.

The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:

1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;

2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive
branches of the government.

ISSUE:

Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to “prevent the misappropriation or impairment of
Philippine rainforests?”

HELD:

Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations to come. The Supreme Court
ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation, and for the succeeding generation, file a class suit. Their
personality to sue in behalf of succeeding generations is based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar
as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature”
which indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the
country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to the end that their
exploration, development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as the future generations.

Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full
enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minor’s assertion of their right to a sound

9
environment constitutes at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the
generations to come.

Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v Anti-Terrorism Council

Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad the definition of the crime of terrorism under RA
9372 (the Human Security Act of 2007) in that terms like “widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the
populace” and “coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand” are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies
with no standard to measure the prohibited acts.

ISSUE:

Can the Human Security Act of 2007 be facially challenged on the grounds of vagueness and overbreadh doctrines?

RULING:

No.

A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free speech cases, wherein certain rules of constitutional litigation are
rightly excepted.

In Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan it was held that:

A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible”chilling
effect” upon protected speech. The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is
outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester
because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.

This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very
existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws
against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.

Re: COA Opinion on the Appraised Value of the Properties Purchased for the retired
Chief/Associate Justices of SC, 678 SCRA 1 (2012)

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A.M. No. 13-09-08-SC October 1, 2013

RE: REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE/CLARIFICATION ON SECTION 7, RULE III OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10154
REQUIRING RETIRING GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES TO SECURE A CLEARANCE OF PENDENCY/NON-
PENDENCY OF CASE/S FROM THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is a Memorandum dated September 18, 2013 from Atty. Eden T. Candelaria, Deputy Clerk of Court and
Chief Administrative Officer, Office of Administrative Services of the Supreme Court, requesting guidance/clarification on
the applicability to the Judiciary of Section 7, Rule III of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. (RA)
101541 which states:

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Section 7. Notice of Pendency of Case. The retiring employee shall seek Clearance of Pendency/Non-Pendency of
Administrative Case from his/her employer agency, Civil Service Commission (CSC), Office of the Ombudsman, or in
case of presidential appointees, from the Office of the President.

Section 6,2 Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution) exclusively vests in the Court administrative
supervision over all courts and court personnel.3 As such, it oversees the court personnel’s compliance with all laws and
takes the proper administrative action against them for any violation thereof. 4 As an adjunct thereto, it keeps in its custody
records pertaining to the administrative cases of retiring court personnel.1âwphi1

In view of the foregoing, the Court rules that the subject provision – which requires retiring government employees to
secure a prior clearance of pendency/non-pendency of administrative case/s from, among others, the CSC – should not
be made to apply to employees of the Judiciary.1âwphi1 To deem it otherwise would disregard the Court’s
constitutionally-enshrined power of administrative supervision over its personnel. Besides, retiring court personnel are
already required to secure a prior clearance of the pendency/non-pendency of administrative case/s from the Court which
makes the CSC clearance a superfluous and non-expeditious requirement contrary to the declared state policy of RA
10154.5

To further clarify the matter, the same principles dictate that a prior clearance of pendency/non-pendency of administrative
case/s from the Office of the President (albeit some court personnel are presidential appointees, e.g., Supreme Court
Justices) or the Office of the Ombudsman should not equally apply to retiring court personnel. Verily, the administrative
supervision of court personnel and all affairs related thereto fall within the exclusive province of the Judiciary.

It must, however, be noted that since the Constitution only accords the Judiciary administrative supervision over its
personnel, a different treatment of the clearance requirement obtains with respect to criminal cases. As such, a clearance
requirement which pertains to criminal cases may be imposed by the appropriate government agency, i.e., the Office of
the Ombudsman,6 on retiring court personnel as it is a matter beyond the ambit of the Judiciary’s power of administrative
supervision.

WHEREFORE, the requirement of seeking a Clearance of Pendency/Non-Pendency of Administrative Case from the Civil
Service Commission embodied in Section 7, Rule III of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No.
10154 is declared INAPPLICABLE to retiring employees of the Judiciary.

SO ORDERED.

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13
14
Chavez v JBC

Facts:

In 1994, instead of having only 7 members, an eighth member was added to the JBC as two representatives from
Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having
one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the
representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each. Senator Francis Joseph G.
Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the
legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition. Respondents argued that the crux of the
controversy is the phrase “a representative of Congress.” It is their theory that the two houses, the Senate and the House
of Representatives, are permanent and mandatory components of “Congress,” such that the absence of either divests the
term of its substantive meaning as expressed under the Constitution. Bicameralism, as the system of choice by the
Framers, requires that both houses exercise their respective powers in the performance of its mandated duty which is to
legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution speaks of “a representative from Congress,” it should
mean one representative each from both Houses which comprise the entire Congress.

Issue:

1. Are the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the power of judicial review have been met in this case?

2. Is the JBC’s practice of having members from the Senate and the House of Representatives making 8 instead of 7
sitting members unconstitutional?

3. What is the effect of the Court's finding that the current composition of the JBC is unconstitutional?

Held:

1. Yes. The Courts’ power of judicial review is subject to several limitations, namely: (a) there must be an actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have “standing” to challenge;
he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a
result of its enforcement; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (d)
the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when
these conditions sine qua non are present, especially when the constitutionality of an act by a co-equal branch of
government is put in issue.

The Court disagrees with the respondents’ contention that petitioner lost his standing to sue because he is not an official
nominee for the post of Chief Justice. While it is true that a “personal stake” on the case is imperative to have locus
standi, this is not to say that only official nominees for the post of Chief Justice can come to the Court and question the
JBC composition for being unconstitutional. The JBC likewise screens and nominates other members of the Judiciary.
Albeit heavily publicized in this regard, the JBC’s duty is not at all limited to the nominations for the highest magistrate in
the land. A vast number of aspirants to judicial posts all over the country may be affected by the Court’s ruling. More
importantly, the legality of the very process of nominations to the positions in the Judiciary is the nucleus of the
15
controversy. The claim that the composition of the JBC is illegal and unconstitutional is an object of concern, not just for a
nominee to a judicial post, but for all citizens who have the right to seek judicial intervention for rectification of legal
blunders.

2. Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the

Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio

Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a

representative of the private sector.

From a simple reading of the above-quoted provision, it can readily be discerned that the provision is clear and
unambiguous. The first paragraph calls for the creation of a JBC and places the same under the supervision of the Court.
Then it goes to its composition where the regular members are enumerated: a representative of the Integrated Bar, a
professor of law, a retired member of the Court and a representative from the private sector. On the second part lies the
crux of the present controversy. It enumerates the ex officio or special members of the JBC composed of the Chief
Justice, who shall be its Chairman, the Secretary of Justice and “a representative of Congress.”

The use of the singular letter “a” preceding “representative of Congress” is unequivocal and leaves no room for any other
construction. It is indicative of what the members of the Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may
designate only one (1) representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention that more than one (1) representative from the
legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided.

One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free
from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled
principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of the Constitution should be
understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed
compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the
people mean what they say. Verba legis non est recedendum – from the words of a statute there should be no departure.

Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the word “Congress” used in Article VIII, Section
8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or
the House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular representative may be allowed
to sit in the JBC.

It is worthy to note that the seven-member composition of the JBC serves a practical purpose, that is, to provide a solution
should there be a stalemate in voting. This underlying reason leads the Court to conclude that a single vote may not be
divided into half (1/2), between two representatives of Congress, or among any of the sitting members of the JBC for that
matter. This unsanctioned practice can possibly cause disorder and eventually muddle the JBC’s voting process,
especially in the event a tie is reached. The aforesaid purpose would then be rendered illusory, defeating the precise
mechanism which the Constitution itself createdWhile it would be unreasonable to expect that the Framers provide for
every possible scenario, it is sensible to presume that they knew that an odd composition is the best means to break a
voting deadlock.

The respondents insist that owing to the bicameral nature of Congress, the word “Congress” in Section 8(1), Article VIII of
the Constitution should be read as including both the Senate and the House of Representatives. They theorize that it was
so worded because at the time the said provision was being drafted, the Framers initially intended a unicameral form of
Congress. Then, when the Constitutional Commission eventually adopted a bicameral form of Congress, the Framers,
through oversight, failed to amend Article VIII, Section 8 of the Constitution.

It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body refers to its primary function in government – to legislate.
In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role of each house in the process. The same
holds true in Congress’ non-legislative powers. An inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the realization of
these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. This, however, cannot be said in the case
of JBC representation because no liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence, the term
“Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative department.
16
Jardeleza v Sereno

FACTS: Associate Justice Roberto Abad was about to retire and the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) announce an opening
for application and recommendation for the said vacancy. Francis H. Jardeleza (Jardeleza), incumbent Solicitor General
of the Republic was included in the list of candidates. Hence, he was interviewed.

However, he received calls from some Justices that the Chief Justice herself – CJ Sereno, will be invoking unanimity rule
against him. It is invoked because Jardeleza’s integrity is in question.

During the meeting, Justice Carpio disclosed a confidential information which characterized Jardeleza’s integrity as
dubious. Jardeleza answered that he would defend himself provided that due process would be observed. His request
was denied and he was not included in the shortlist.

Hence, Jardeleza filed for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for TRO to compel the JBC to include him in the list on the
grounds that the JBC and CJ Sereno acted with grave abuse of discretion in excluding him, despite having garnered a
sufficient number of votes to qualify for the position.

ISSUE: Whether or not the right to due process is available in the course of JBC proceedings in cases where an objection
or opposition to an application is raised.

RULING: Yes. While it is true that the JBC proceedings are sui generis, it does not automatically denigrate an applicant’s
entitlement to due process.

The Court does not brush aside the unique and special nature of JBC proceedings. Notwithstanding being “a class of its
own,” the right to be heard and to explain one’s self is availing.
In cases where an objection to an applicant’s qualifications is raised, the observance of due process neither contradicts
the fulfillment of the JBC’s duty to recommend. This holding is not an encroachment on its discretion in the nomination
process. Actually, its adherence to the precepts of due process supports and enriches the exercise of its discretion. When
an applicant, who vehemently denies the truth of the objections, is afforded the chance to protest, the JBC is presented
with a clearer understanding of the situation it faces, thereby guarding the body from making an unsound and capricious
assessment of information brought before it. The JBC is not expected to strictly apply the rules of evidence in its
assessment of an objection against an applicant. Just the same, to hear the side of the person challenged complies with
the dictates of fairness because the only test that an exercise of discretion must surmount is that of soundness.

Consequently, the Court is compelled to rule that Jardeleza should have been included in the shortlist submitted to the
President for the vacated position of Associate Justice Abad. This consequence arose from the violation by the JBC of its
own rules of procedure and the basic tenets of due process.

True, Jardeleza has no vested right to a nomination, but this does not prescind from the fact that the JBC failed to observe
the minimum requirements of due process.

Villanueva v JBC

Facts:
Presiding Judge Ferdinand R. Villanueva (petitioner) directly came to this Court via a Petition for Prohibition, Mandamus,
and Certiorari, and Declaratory Relief[1] under Rules 65 and 63 of the Rules of Court,... respectively, with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, to assail the policy of the Judicial and Bar
Council (JBC), requiring five years of service as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicant to...
second-level courts, on the ground that it is unconstitutional, and was issued with grave abuse of discretion.
The petitioner was appointed on September 18, 2012 as the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
Compostela-New Bataan, Poblacion, Compostela Valley Province, Region XI, which is a first-level court. On September
27, 2013, he applied for the vacant position of
Presiding Judge in the following Regional Trial Courts (RTCs): Branch 31, Tagum City; Branch 13, Davao City; and
Branch 6, Prosperidad, Agusan Del Sur.

17
In a letter[2] dated December 18, 2013, JBC's Office of Recruitment, Selection and Nomination, informed the petitioner
that he was not included in the list of candidates for the said stations. On the same date, the petitioner sent a letter,
through... electronic mail, seeking reconsideration of his non-inclusion in the list of considered applicants and protesting
the inclusion of applicants who did not pass the prejudicature examination.
The petitioner was informed by the JBC Executive Officer, through a letter[3] dated February 3, 2014, that his protest and
reconsideration was duly noted by the JBC en banc. However, its decision not to include his name in the list of applicants
was... upheld due to the JBC's long-standing policy of opening the chance for promotion to second-level courts to, among
others, incumbent judges who have served in their current position for at least five years, and since the petitioner has
been a judge only for more than a year, he... was excluded from the list. This caused the petitioner to take recourse to this
Court.
In his petition, he argued that: (1) the Constitution already prescribed the qualifications of an RTC judge, and the JBC
could add no more; (2) the JBC's five-year requirement violates the equal protection and due process clauses of the
Constitution; and (3) the JBC's five-year... requirement violates the constitutional provision on Social Justice and Human
Rights for Equal Opportunity of Employment. The petitioner also asserted that the requirement of the Prejudicature
Program mandated by Section 10[4] of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
8557[5] should not be merely directory and should be fully implemented. He further alleged that he has all the
qualifications for the position prescribed by the Constitution and by Congress, since he has already complied with the
requirement of 10 years of... practice of law.
In compliance with the Court's Resolution[6] dated April 22, 2014, the JBC[7] and the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG)[8] separately submitted their Comments. Summing up the arguments of the JBC and the OSG,... they essentially
stated that the petition is procedurally infirm and that the assailed policy does not violate the equal protection and due
process clauses. They posited that: (1) the writ of certiorari and prohibition cannot issue to prevent the JBC from
performing its... principal function under the Constitution to recommend appointees to the Judiciary because the JBC is
not a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function; (2) the remedy of mandamus and declaratory relief will not lie
because the petitioner has no clear legal right... that needs to be protected; (3) the equal protection clause is not violated
because the classification of lower court judges who have served at least five years and those who have served less than
five years is valid as it is performance and experience based; and (4) there is no... violation of due process as the policy is
merely internal in nature.
HELD :
As an offspring of the 1987 Constitution, the JBC is mandated to recommend appointees to the judiciary and only those
nominated by the JBC in a list officially transmitted to the President may be appointed by the latter as justice or judge in
the judiciary. Thus, the JBC is... burdened with a great responsibility that is imbued with public interest as it determines
the men and women who will sit on the judicial bench. While the 1987 Constitution has provided the qualifications of
members of the judiciary, this does not preclude the JBC from having its... own set of rules and procedures and providing
policies to effectively ensure its mandate.
The functions of searching, screening, and selecting are necessary and incidental to the JBC's principal function of
choosing and recommending nominees for vacancies in the judiciary for appointment by the President. However, the
Constitution did not lay down in precise terms... the process that the JBC shall follow in determining applicants'
qualifications. In carrying out its main function, the JBC has the authority to set the standards/criteria in choosing its
nominees for every vacancy in the judiciary, subject only to the minimum qualifications... required by the Constitution and
law for every position. The search for these long held qualities necessarily requires a degree of flexibility in order to
determine who is most fit among the applicants. Thus, the JBC has sufficient but not unbridled license to act in
performing... its duties.
JBC's ultimate goal is to recommend nominees and not simply to fill up judicial vacancies in order to promote an effective
and efficient administration of justice. Given this pragmatic situation, the JBC had to establish a set of uniform criteria in
order to ascertain whether an... applicant meets the minimum constitutional qualifications and possesses the qualities
expected of him and his office. Thus, the adoption of the five-year requirement policy applied by JBC to the petitioner's
case is necessary and incidental to the function conferred by the Constitution to the JBC.

Re: Petition for recognition of the exemption of the GSIS from payment of legal fees, 612
SCRA 193 (2010)

ACTS:
18
The GSIS seeks exemption from the payment of legal fees imposed on GOCCs under Sec 22, Rule 141 (Legal Fees) of
the ROC. The said provision states:

SEC. 22. Government exempt. – The Republic of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities are exempt from
paying the legal fees provided in this Rule. Local government corporations and government-owned or controlled
corporations with or without independent charter are not exempt from paying such fees. xx

The GSIS anchors its petition on Sec 39 of its charter, RA 8291 (The GSIS Act of 1997):
SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien. – It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State that the
actuarial solvency of the funds of the GSIS shall be preserved and maintained at all times and that contribution rates
necessary to sustain the benefits under this Act shall be kept as low as possible in order not to burden the members of the
GSIS and their employers. Taxes imposed on the GSIS tend to impair the actuarial solvency of its funds and increase the
contribution rate necessary to sustain the benefits of this Act. Accordingly, notwithstanding any laws to the contrary, the
GSIS, its assets, revenues including accruals thereto, and benefits paid, shall be exempt from all taxes, assessments,
fees, charges or duties of all kinds. These exemptions shall continue unless expressly and specifically revoked and any
assessment against the GSIS as of the approval of this Act are hereby considered paid. Consequently, all laws,
ordinances, regulations, issuances, opinions or jurisprudence contrary to or in derogation of this provision are hereby
deemed repealed, superseded and rendered ineffective and without legal force and effect. xx

Required to comment on the GSIS’ petition, the OSG maintains that the petition should be denied. On this Court’s order,
the Office of the Chief Attorney (OCAT) submitted a report and recommendation on the petition of the GSIS and the
comment of the OSG thereon. According to the OCAT, the claim of the GSIS for exemption from the payment of legal fees
has no legal basis.

ISSUE: May the legislature exempt the GSIS from legal fees imposed by the Court on GOCCs and local government
units?
HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition of the GSIS for recognition of its exemption from the payment of legal fees imposed
under Sec 22 of Rule 141 of the ROC on GOCCs and LGUs is hereby DENIED .
NO
Rule 141 (on Legal Fees) of the ROC was promulgated by this Court in the exercise of its rule-making powers under Sec
5(5), Art VIII of the Constitution:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxxxxxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure
in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged.
xxxxxxxx

Clearly, therefore, the payment of legal fees under Rule 141 of the ROC is an integral part of the rules promulgated by this
Court pursuant to its rule-making power under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution. In particular, it is part of the
rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in courts. Indeed, payment of legal (or docket) fees is a jurisdictional
requirement.
Since the payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by this Court concerning pleading, practice
and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or modified by Congress. As one of the safeguards of this Court’s
institutional independence, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now the Court’s exclusive
domain. That power is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, much less with the Executive.

NOTES:
-The GSIS cannot successfully invoke the right to social security of government employees in support of its petition. It is a
corporate entity whose personality is separate and distinct from that of its individual members. The rights of its members
are not its rights; its rights, powers and functions pertain to it solely and are not shared by its members.

-Congress could not have carved out an exemption for the GSIS from the payment of legal fees without transgressing
another equally important institutional safeguard of the Court’s independence — fiscal autonomy.

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