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L. Austin, How To Do Things With Words, ed. 1. O. Urmson and Marina Sbisa,
11.
2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975).
Book Reviews 123
3Kramer does suggest, for instance, that "interpretation is an art modelled on the
experience of [instrumental] music" (16).
4Jacques Derrida, "Signature Event Context," trans. Samuel Weber and Jeffrey
Hehlman, Glyph 1 (1977): 172-97.
126 Indiana Theory Review Vol. 15/2
"to limit the instability of illocution" (8). Indeed, since speech acts
"presuppose the possibility of their repetition in new contexts" -what
Derrida calls their iterability-they also "necessarily presuppose the
possibility of difference, and hence also the possibility of their being
redirected, reinterpreted" precisely because of this possibility of
repetition, this iterability (8). The very structure of the sign is divided,
as Derrida teaches, between iterability and difference. "One can speak
the words of the same but in another voice, a voice that emerges from
within language to spread itself throughout the whole system, fissuring
it in every direction" (178). Iterability entails the heterogeneity of
language. There can never be just one meaning for a word, phrase,
structure or even style; for that word, phrase, structure or style can be
uttered again and in the act of repetition can become different to the
extent that the context has changed. 5 The always-changing context thus
dislocates meaning and prevents meaning from ever being wholly
identical with itself. Hence, "the prospect of what Austin thinks of as
a 'misfire,' as 'infelicitous' deviation from the norm, is actually the
norm itself" (8). Misfire is the very condition of possibility of
successful, completed communication, and, so, potential misfires are
always already latent in any attempt to complete a speech act. Kramer
generalizes this notion of speech-act theory to music by locating
illocutionary force wherever a musical speech act, what Kramer
identifies as an "act of expression or representation," is iterable and
where "in being produced the act seeks to affect a flow of events, a
developing situation" (9).
"Other-voiced texts," Kramer writes, "are those that accentuate
the always-latent prospect of a misfire, that openly invite a
reinterpretation, a revoicing, of prominent expressive acts" (180). In
particular, this other-voicedness draws on the Derridean concept of
"force," which both supplements and opposes structure. Force,
Kramer tells us, "is temporal and dynamic in character and associated
7Ibid., 155. Indeed, theory, for Kramer, is dangerous in that, if taken too literally,
it threatens us with the death of interpretation, of meaning, and ultimately even of
ourselves.
9Ibid ., 154.
Book Reviews 129
11 Kramer ,
"Dangerous Liaisons: The Literary Text in Musical Criticism,"
Nineteenth-Century Music 13, no. 2 (1989): 159-67.
12Ibid., 161.
Book Reviews 131
annexation. ,'13 With the manifest analogy, then, Kramer assumes that
one work of the pair is prior (both historically and philosophically) to
the other and that the later one is in some sense a response to the first,
or a "reading" of it. The second term of a manifest analogy then is to
be interpreted, according to Kramer, as an intentional act of
appropriation of the first.
This assumption of intentionality is not necessary for elucidating
a deep-structural convergence, however. Works that share similar deep
structures seem to be articulating common underlying social tensions or
enforcing common experiences of time and common structures of the
life-world. For this reason we can speak of such convergences as
"cultural practices." "When we claim to find a deep-structural
convergence, " Kramer writes, "we should assume that the convergent
works indirectly affirm a common core of values. ,,14 There is no
implication here that one work is responding to or trying to appropriate
another work. An objection against Kramer-that the comparison of,
say, a Chopin prelude and English Romantic poetry makes little sense
because the relationship between Chopin and this poetry seems so
tenuous and arbitrary 15 -loses force as soon as one realizes that the
structural trope or deep-structural convergence does not imply in any
way that the works (or rather their producers) have knowledge of one
another. 16 That is, similarity of deep structure need not suggest that one
deep structure is a reading of the other. Rather this resemblance is a
product of responding to a similar social structure or situation. It is
latent rather than immanent in the respective texts, a kind of
"unconscious" of the texts that is revealed only by bringing the various
13 Ibid ., 162.
17In his article "Musical Narratology," Kramer criticizes Anthony Newcomb for
using narrative' 'to install a latent order amid manifest disorder" (146). But Kramer does
not extend this critique to his own position, which likewise depends on the reading of
latent contents from musical works. The question that remains unanswered by Kramer,
and indeed that can only be satisfactorily answered in a theoretical mode that is granted
more than just "provisional" authority, is: What separates the latency of Newcomb's
narratives from that of Kramer's structural tropes?
20Ibid ., 215.
134 Indiana Theory Review Vol. 15/2
a body of theory. Only by doing analysis, by engaging in
the work of interpretation whether as analyst or analysand,
could one be persuaded that Freudian claims are credible
. . . . The same is true of musical hermeneutics . . . . I
will, to be sure, theorize a little in what follows, both about
music and about interpretation. The value of theory,
though, must rest with the interpretive practices that it
empowers. (2)21
210ne wonders what Kramer would do with the well-known claim, which Freud
advanced in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, that "the aim of all life is death." In the
terms developed here, this claim transmutes into "the aim of all interpretation is
theory. " Interpretation can avoid and regulate theory no more than, and in the same way
that, life can avoid and regulate death. That is, one can to a certain extent defer but
never entirely escape death or theory.
Book Reviews 135
22As Marion Guck recently pointed out, Allen Forte's analytical discourse does
indeed construct a definite context for the music he analyzes. What those who object to
his practice must dislike, then, "is not a lack of context, but, in fact, the particular
context in which Forte places the music" (" Analytical Fictions, " Music Theory Spectrum
16, no. 2 [1994]: 223n).
Book Reviews 137