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Drawbacks of decentralized natural resource management: Experience from

Chilimo Participatory Forest Management project, Ethiopia

Article  in  Journal of Forest Research · February 2012

DOI: 10.1007/s10310-011-0270-9

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J For Res (2012) 17:30–36
DOI 10.1007/s10310-011-0270-9
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Drawbacks of decentralized natural resource management:
experience from Chilimo Participatory Forest Management
project, Ethiopia
Abrar Juhar Mohammed • Makoto Inoue
Received: 14 June 2010 / Accepted: 2 March 2011 / Published online: 30 March 2011
Ó The Japanese Forest Society and Springer 2011
Abstract This paper highlights the drawbacks of decen-
tralized natural resource management in the rarely resear-
ched country, Ethiopia. We argue that, under the guise of
decentralization policies, the central government extended
its authority and also forced the high costs of its policy onto
local people. In addition, local authorities have been
dominated by local leaders who have changed rules to their
own advantage. Moreover, the central government has
failed to support local authorities. We also show the neg-
ative impacts of the shortcomings of decentralization on
natural resource governance by local people, including
lessened discharge of responsibilities for management and
exclusion, as well as on people’s livelihoods, as in the
polarization of benefits.
Keywords CBNRM
Decentralization
Ethiopia
Introduction
Background
Forests covered about 42% of Ethiopia’s total area of 1.1
million sq km in the early twentieth century, but had
A. J. Mohammed (&)
M. Inoue
Graduate School of Agricultural and Life Sciences,
The University of Tokyo, 1-1-1 Yayoi, Bunkyo,
Tokyo 113-8657, Japan
e-mail: aj_mhmmd@yahoo.com
M. Inoue
e-mail: mkinoue@fr.a.u-tokyo.ac.jp
123
declined to less than 2.3% by 1992 (EFAP 1994), of
which 70% is believed to be highly degraded (Kidane
2002). In recognition of the global significance of this
ongoing degradation and deforestation, the remnant for-
ests have been incorporated into global biodiversity hot-
spots by Conservation International. One of these hotspots
is dry afromontane forests. These forests are located in
areas inhabited by the majority of the Ethiopian popula-
tion, and are a zone of sedentary cereal-based mixed
agriculture. Forests have diminished in most areas
because of population pressure and the failure of the
central government’s forest policy (Gebremedhin et al.
2003).
In Ethiopia, where 85% of the population is agricultur-
alist, the impact of environmental service collapse due to
forest loss is immense. In addition, the majority of the
Ethiopian population is dependent on direct forest use. The
forest is an energy source for more than 70% of the pop-
ulation (Anonymous 2004), and a source of medicinal
plants for 70–90% of the population (Girma 1998).
Moreover, a significant portion of the rural population
depends on timber and nontimber forest products for
income. The cultural value of forests is also vital, espe-
cially for rural dwellers. However, governing common-
pool resources such as forests is difficult because such
resources combine the most problematic aspects of
resource governance, namely subtractability and exclud-
ability (Andersson and Ostrom 2008). These resources are
used by multiple individuals while generating finite quan-
tities of resource units, where one person’s use subtracts
from the quantity of resource units available to others.
Moreover, most common-pool resources are sufficiently
large that multiple actors can simultaneously use the
resource system, and excluding potential beneficiaries is
very costly (Basurto and Ostrom 2009).
J For Res (2012) 17:30–36 31

Theoretical setting and research objectives Central governments force costly policies onto local
people (Agrawal and Ribot 1999; Gibson 1999; Blair
The concept of community1-based natural resource man- 2000);
agement (CBNRM) as a feasible policy to replace cen- Decentralized authorities are dominated by local leaders
tralized command and control of resource management by or elites who just change rules to their own advantage
the state has received considerable attention in recent years (Andersson and Ostrom 2008); and
and is being actively promoted across the world (Armitage Central governments rarely provide enough support to
2005; Balooni and Inoue 2007). Especially in the devel- local authorities (Gibson 1999; Blair 2000; Smoke
oping world, where natural resource degradation has sig- 2003).
nificant impact on rural livelihoods, CBNRM has received
For the purpose of providing constructive policy impli-
substantial attention (Baland and Platteau 1996; Banana
cations, this paper aims to investigate the negative aspects of
et al. 2007).
decentralization, based on its impact on the forests and the
At the center of the interest in the transition from cen-
livelihood of the rural poor in Chilimo Forest Area, Ethiopia.
tralized forest policy to CBNRM is the involvement of
local people in decision-making (Feeny et al. 1990). These
decision-making arrangements are embedded within what
Research methods
Ostrom (1990) termed collective decision rules, which
encompass rules on who may participate in decisions for
Study site description
creating operational rules, who can make the final decision
on the operational rules, and what the process is for making
In Ethiopia, decentralized forest resource management was
decisions on operational rules, e.g., leaders acting arbi-
initiated in the mid 1990s with the support of international
trarily/autonomously, unanimously, by majority, or with
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to mitigate natural
the concurrence of government agencies (Thomson and
resource degradation and its effects on the livelihood of people
Freudenberger 1997).
in one of the poorest nations in the world. The Chilimo Par-
Of the different collective decision-making rules, those
ticipatory Forest Management (PFM) project is a pioneering
related to property rights have long been recognized as an
project, and one of the most influential. It is also used as a
important precondition for effective management of the
model for further expansion of CBNRM in the country. The
commons. In general, there are five types of property
project was implemented from 1996 to 2007, where com-
rights: access, management, use, exclusion, and alienation
munities in and around Chilimo Forest signed agreements
(transfer)2 (Schlager and Ostrom 1992; Ostrom 2008).
with the government to protect, manage, and use the forest.
Decentralization of decision-making on these rights has
Chilimo Forest is one of the very few remnant dry afro-
been championed for its positive role in increasing the
montane forests in Ethiopia. The forest is located in Dendi
quality of public services (Ackerman 2004), improving the
District, West Showa Zone, Oromoia Regional State
responsiveness and accountability of local governments
(Fig. 1). Currently, the forest covers about 5,000 ha, com-
(Blair 2000), and enhancing equitable access to productive
prising both plantations (about 415 ha) and natural forest
assets and services (Blair 2000; UNDP 2002). However,
(Zelalem 2005). We selected and contrasted two cases in
research has also shown the possible undesirable results of
terms of accessibility of the site for government staff and
decentralization, which include:
income-generating potential of the forest for the community
Central governments extend their centralized authority
under the guise of decentralization policies (e.g., Gibson
1999; Smoke 2003);

1
To avoid confusion about what ‘‘communities’’ are (e.g., see
Agrawal and Gibson 1999), in this research a community is defined as
people living in and/or around natural resources that have been
organized by themselves or by government, directly or through non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), to protect, manage, and use the
resources without regard to their heterogeneity or size.
2
According to Forest Development, Conservation and Utilization
Proclamation No. 542/2007, only private and state forest ownership is
recognized by the government. There is no community ownership of
existing forests in Ethiopia. Therefore, the decentralized collective Fig. 1 Location of the study site. a Location of Ethiopia in Africa.
decision rules discussed in this paper are analyzed in terms of three b Location of Oromoia Regional State, Dendi District, and Chilimo
property rights: management, exclusion, and use. Forest in Ethiopia. c Location of case I and case II in Chilimo Forest

123
32
Table 1 Description of the two
Characteristic
cases of the study
Number of members
Natural forest area (ha)
Plantation area (the only possible
source of high income) (ha)
Distance from Ginchi Town
Altitude (m)
Accessibility for district
government staff
Source: Fieldwork
(Table 1), because these two factors have direct impact on
the factors studied such as the possibility for central gov-
ernment dominance of local self-governance of resource,
decentralization of important use rights to the community, as
well as success or failure of the project.
Data collection
The data sources for the study are: key informants from
among government employees, community members, and
NGO staff members; documents from government offices,
NGOs, and community offices; interviews with randomly
selected 30% of community members of each wealth class
from each community, totaling 35 households from case I
and 55 from case II; and a socioeconomic household survey
of all 119 members of case I and 187 members of case II. A
simple wealth ranking method was used to categorize the
members into four wealth classes: rich, middle, poor, and
very poor. The poor and particularly the very poor are
characterized by having no or poor housing, no or very few
livestock, and no or share-cropped farming land. The rich
and the middle classes, however, are those with good housing
and possessing sufficient land and livestock. The impacts of
decentralization on forest conditions and on people’s live-
lihoods were measured using a perception-based method that
is triangulated with project forest survey data and partici-
patory observation. A perception-based method involves
eliciting local people’s assessment of the status and/or
development of forest condition and/or indicators of forest
condition (e.g., Huntington 2000) and/or their livelihood
(e.g., Robb and World Bank 1999) through interviews and
surveys. The data were collected in two research trips con-
ducted in October–November 2008 and July–August 2009.
Results and discussion
Outward decentralization policies
According to Forest Proclamation No. 542/2007 and the
agreement between the local people and the government,
123
J For Res (2012) 17:30–36
Case I Case II
119 187
664 384
246 0
Near, about 1–3 km Far, about 15–20 km
2,300 2,900
Easy, no topographic Difficult, constrained by the
barriers seasonal road as well as
topographic barriers
income generation from natural forest is prohibited.
However, the communities can raise income by selling logs
from the plantation after developing a plan on how many
hectares to sell per year. The final decision on whether to
sell or not is made by the government, as permission must
be obtained from district forestry officials before logging
the plantation. The operational plan by members of case I
was to sell 10 ha of plantation every year and replant the
harvested area. However, the district forestry staff per-
mitted this only once, and even that was done during the
early stage of project implementation to minimize the
distrust that the local people had towards the government’s
willingness to devolve the usage right to them.
In addition to the above, approval from the district
government staff is required when community members
need to vote out their leaders. The consequence of this is
covered in the next section.
Domination by local government officials
or community elites
As noted in the previous section, government approval is
needed before logging the plantation to sell. District gov-
ernment officials have used this as a means to create a
patronage network with wealthy nonmembers and com-
munity leaders of case I to deprive the local people of
power and benefits. Using this network and the power they
derived from the forest proclamation, district government
officials and community leaders sold plantation timber to
wealthy nonmembers at a price much lower than the
market price. Consequently, the community received only
about 9.5% of the logs’ market value (compared with the
market value of plantation timber sold by neighboring
communities using a bidding system).
Although local government officials have the final say
on income from the natural forest and plantation, both
communities were given the freedom to decide how to use
logs from the forest for subsistence purposes, mainly to
build or repair houses and fences. Data collected during the
simple wealth ranking indicate that the members who are
dependent on this usage right, i.e., those without homes and
J For Res (2012) 17:30–36
those having houses in poor condition and unable to shelter
their families from the elements, were the poor and very
poor classes. However, as shown in Tables 2 and 3 for
case I and case II, respectively, mostly those who were
better served are the leaders and/or the upper wealth clas-
ses, for whom the usage right was found to create only a
minor incentive to value the contribution of the forest to
their livelihood.
In addition to this usage right, there were also supple-
mentary benefits provided by NGOs targeting the poor and
particularly the very poor, because these groups were
exclusively dependent on the forest for income before
PFM. These supplementary benefits were training and
credit for livelihood diversification. However, those who
benefited were the upper wealth classes and leaders
(Tables 2, 3).
The collective decisions on all the benefits mentioned in
Tables 2 and 3 are made by the leaders autonomously and
arbitrarily. Neither the local people nor the internal com-
munity bylaws give the leaders this authority, which was
created by the leaders without the consent of their com-
munities. Owing to disappointment over misconduct by the
leaders on benefit-sharing, members of both communities
have tried to vote out the leaders. This requires the
approval of local government officials, as mentioned
above. However, community members were left powerless
because government officials were reluctant to approve
their request. In case I, the reason that district government
officials were reluctant to recognize the local people’s
complaint against their leaders was found to be the
patronage network that officials have with community
leaders. In case II, district government officials want to
maintain the leadership because they assume that it has
contributed to the strong enforcement of communities’
responsibilities to manage the forest and to exclude illegal
users from forest logging, which is the only measure of
success for the officials. This and the poor infrastructure of
the district, which make access to case II difficult, were the
reasons that officials rely on the existing leadership rather
than taking a chance on new leaders.
Table 2 Benefit-sharing among political and wealth classes in case I
Political/ Percentage No. of training/ Usage right for wood distribution (% of members)
wealth status of trained trained members
members Requested
and served
Leaders 52 1.88 41
Rich 57 4.67 72
Middle 19 1.14 23
Poor 11 1.25 14
Very poor 17 1.4 31
Source: Fieldwork
33
Increasing costs borne by the people
Although collective decisions on benefit streams are made
and constrained by community leaders and by government
officials, community members have to plant and guard
forests in accordance with the agreement they signed with
the government. Under the agreement, if the government is
not satisfied with the community’s performance in con-
serving or developing the forest, it can take the forest away
from the community. Collective decisions on management
and exclusion responsibilities, e.g., when to plant, how
much to plant, where to plant, and who should stand guard
when and where, are devolved to community members.
Decisions are made by majority. Case I and case II planted
about 7,500 and 2,000 seedlings, respectively, in 2008. In
2009, case I planted 3,000 and case II planted 4,700.
The impact of the above-mentioned constraints on
benefit streams, and on the community’s role of executing
its management and exclusion responsibilities, was found
to differ between the two communities depending on the
salience of the benefits. In case I, the major incentive for
all wealth classes to execute their management and
exclusion responsibility is plantation income, which is
constrained by government reluctance to relinquish this
usage right. In the satisfaction ranking conducted during
household interviews, all interviewees (100%) expressed
their dissatisfaction with the small contribution of the
usage right to their livelihood (Table 4).
Not only community members’ motivation to guard the
forest, but also the trust that has been built between them
and the government through NGOs, were found to be
gradually declining because the community had been
deprived of this major income source. Some of the inter-
viewees even preferred to call the forest ‘‘their forest,’’
meaning the government’s forest. In addition, those who
need the usage right the most in this community receive
only limited income from supplementary benefits, which
are those in addition to income from the usage right on
the logs, and which are important for the subsistence of
the poor and very poor (Table 2). Because of this, 65% of
Average amount of
money received (ETH
Requested Did not Birr & US $0.075)
but refused request
59 0 460
14 14 493
67 10 460
80 6 439
55 14 418
123
34 J For Res (2012) 17:30–36

Table 3 Benefit-sharing among political and wealth classes in case II

Political/ Percentage No. of training/ Usage right for wood distribution (% of members) Average amount of
wealth status of trained trained members money received (ETH
members Requested Requested Did not Birr & US $0.075)
and served but refused request

Leaders 92 2.6 91 9 0 524

Rich 29 2.75 35 0 65 478
Middle 35 3.08 38 10 52 490
Poor 30 1.92 57 13 30 423
Very poor 17 1 61 13 26 348
Source: Fieldwork

Table 4 Satisfaction ranking of different usage rights and benefits in the two cases (in % of members)
Case Income from Forage for Fuelwood for Fuelwood for Logs for Credit and Training
plantation livestock subsistence selling subsistence savings
S D S D S D S D S D S D S D

I 0 100 100 0 100 0 36 64 29 71 29 71 62 38

II – – 100 0 100 0 87 13 93 7 43 57 33 67
Source: Fieldwork
S satisfied, D dissatisfied

the interviewees said that community members have
become reluctant to guard the forest. Moreover, 54% said
that increased illegal logging inside the forest has led to
deterioration. Seventy-four percent said that, since imple-
menting PFM, there has been no change in the forest, or
that it is even more degraded. Plantation area declined from
246 to 132 ha, with the remainder having a poor stock of
about 39.42 m3/ha, whereas that of the neighboring com-
munity has 98.23 m3/ha (project document). Seedling
planting also declined, from 7,500 seedlings in 2008 to
3,000 in 2009.
Case II has not been affected by government reluctance
to relinquish the usage right on the plantation because they
do not have a collectively managed plantation. Moreover,
they are less dependent on logs from the forest for sub-
sistence use, because 73% of the members have their own
private woodlots, compared with 15% in case I (Table 5).
In addition, only 13% of the poor and very poor that have
requested logs for subsistence use have been refused,
compared with 80% and 55% of the poor and very poor,
respectively, in case I (Tables 2, 3). Consequently, 92% of
interviewees said livelihoods have improved since imple-
menting PFM, which created a positive incentive to dis-
charge management and exclusion responsibilities. All
interviewees said the forest is being guarded well by the
community. The community has also established a small
area (about 3 ha) of new plantation, in addition to enrich-
ment planting inside the natural forest (project document).
Additionally, planted seedlings increased from 2,000 in
2008 to 4,700 in 2009.
Lack of central government support
In the agreement signed between the government and the
communities, one of the responsibilities of district gov-
ernment officials is to monitor the condition of the forest by
taking inventory at least once a year. Community members
also have the responsibility to assist government officials in
taking the inventory. However, except at the commence-
ment of the project, no inventory monitoring has been
undertaken in the forest. During project implementation,
selected members of the community were trained how to
use different instruments such as calipers and a hypsometer
to take a forest inventory. However, after the project was
phased out, these tools were taken from the district forestry
office to higher government offices such as the district
agricultural bureau and regional agricultural bureau. Dis-
trict forestry section government personnel cited the lack of
inventory tools as a reason for the absence of recent forest
inventory data and for depending exclusively on qualitative
observation to evaluate the condition of the forest. In
addition to the inventory tools, other materials such as seed
collection tools, pruning shears, computers, and vehicles,
which may have contributed to efficient implementation of
decentralization policy, were also taken from the district
forestry office.

123
J For Res (2012) 17:30–36
Table 5 Percentage of members with private woodlots
Class Case I Case II
Rich 43 88
Middle 26 95
Poor 8 75
Very poor 3 55
Total 15 73
Source: Fieldwork
Conclusion and policy implications
The expected positive impact of decentralization on local
resource governance and livelihood was found to be
threatened by several drawbacks: government reluctance to
relinquish its power over important usage rights, patronage
networks between lower government officials and com-
munity leaders, domination over benefits by political and
wealth elites, and community leaders’ lack of account-
ability to community members. A stable property-rights
regime that devolves not just management and exclusion
but also usage rights for high-value resources such as
plantations to communities may help change community
members’ ‘‘it is not our forest’’ attitude and provide an
incentive for them to manage it sustainably with minimized
opportunistic behavior. This can be achieved by incorpo-
rating the institution of CBNRM in government forest
policy and improving the capacity to implement it. Insti-
tuting CBNRM should involve giving local people auton-
omy to devise their own management, exclusion, and usage
right rules with minimum environmental requirements. The
compliance with the minimum environmental requirements
should be monitored by external agents, possibly district
government employees. Instituting CBNRM should also
incorporate a means to keep decision-makers, including
community leaders as well as lower-echelon government
employees, accountable to local people, who shoulder the
burden of exclusion and management responsibilities.
Capacity-building should involve both district govern-
ment employees and the community. Current government
employees are all products of the forestry curriculum
developed to implement the government’s command-and-
control forest policy. Incorporating CBNRM into forestry
and related academic training will help build a corps of
educated manpower to support policy implementation.
Capacity-building should also involve communities and
their leaders to make them aware of proper conduct and
show them how to monitor proper conducts among them-
selves. In addition, the capacity to perform forest inven-
tories should be improved. Owing to the lack of equipment
for taking inventories, currently only direct observations
are being used to evaluate the condition of the forest.
35
Moreover, there is no information regarding how much
takeout from the forest can be allowed to keep the forest
producing sustainably, i.e., the forest’s carrying capacity.
The other important issue is that the government
extension as well as other NGOs should emphasize liveli-
hood diversification. This should place due emphasis on the
poor and very poor. Considering their high dependency on
the forest for subsistence, providing alternative means of
livelihood to fulfill at least the basic requirements for
subsistence is vital so that these community members obey
the usage right rules and discharge their exclusion
responsibilities. In particular, selective provision of alter-
native means of livelihood to the poor and very poor is
important. As a quick fix, this can be done by direct pro-
vision to the poor and very poor rather than through the
community hierarchy, at least until leadership quality
within the community is improved.
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