1977 Bar Examinations Questions and Answers

By: Bautista, Cecille Loie G.

Topic: Breach of Contract of Carriage

Question:
X, a businessman boarded a PANTRANCO bus bound for Dagupan City where he would meet Y, to
arrange a business transaction. Somewhere in San Fernando, Pampanga, Z, the Deputy Sheriff of
Pampanga, intercepted and seized the PANTRANCO but at the instance of W who had earlier
obtained from the court a writ of attachment. As a result of the seizure by the Sheriff, X failed to
reach Dagupan City where he was supposed to transact business. Feeling aggrieved by the loss of
an otherwise juicy transaction, sued PANTRANCO for breach of contract. Decide with reasons.

Answer:
It is undeniable that there is a pre-existing contractual relation of carriage between X and the PANTRANCO
Bus and that X failed to reach his destination in breach of the PANTRANCO Bus’ obligation to transport
him to the same. However, it is notable that there was no fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude on the
part of the carrier.

In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who acted in good faith is liable shall
be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation and which the
parties have foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted.

In the case at bar, it can reasonably be assumed that the claim for damages refers to the profits which X
failed to obtain. In determining the extent of the liability of PANTRANCO Bus the first paragraph of Art. 2201
of the Civil Code is applicable. Under this provision, the company is liable for all the natural and probable
consequences of the breach of the obligation which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably
foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted. In this regard the loss of profits from the would-be
business transaction is not only a natural and probable consequences of the breach; it could have been
reasonably foreseen by the parties at the time X boarded the bus. At that time he was bound for Dagupan
City to arrange a business transaction and we can very well assume that the said transaction would be
consummated and that he could have possibly gained from the said transaction. Therefore, the claim for
damages will prosper.
 1977 Bar Examinations Questions and Answers
By: Bautista, Cecille Loie G.

Topic: Recovery of Damages; Marine Protest

Question:
A. In the morning of April 2, 1977, the South-bound FS-90 belonging to William Lines, Inc.
reached the waters of the Verde island Passage. About the same time, the M.S. General Del Pilar,
another interisland vessel owned by the General Shipping, was likewise in the same waters,
steaming northward to Manila. The vessels, coming from the opposite directions and towards each
other, suddenly collided at a certain point of the passage which resulted in the sinking of FS-190,
together with all its cargoes, part of which belonged to Tanya, who was a paying passenger and
Rafael, who was a shipper.

Tanya and Rafael brought an action in court to recover for their losses and for damages arising
from the collision.

Were they under obligation to file a maritime protest for a successful maintenance of the action?
Why?

Answer:
No, Tanya and Rafael are not under obligation to file maritime protest. Art. 835 of the Code of Commerce
states that “the action for recovery of damages and losses arising from collisions cannot be admitted without
a previous protest or declaration presented by the captain within 24 hours before the competent authority
of the point where the collision took place, or of the first port of arrival.” Therefore, a marine protest is
required to be made by the master of the vessel not by the passenger or shipper.

A. Explain a Maritime Protest.

Answer:
Maritime Protest—a written statement by the master of vessel, attested by a proper judicial officer or a
notary, to the effect that damage suffered by the ship or her voyage was caused by storms or other perils
of the sea, without any negligence or misconduct on his part.
 1977 Bar Examinations Questions and Answers
By: Bautista, Cecille Loie G.

Topic: Salvage vs. Towage;

Question:
A. About 8:00 pm of March 20, 1974, X as captain of the MV Christina, received an S.O.S. or
distressed signal by blinkers, from the MV Rosario, owned by Y. answering the S.O.S. call, X altered
the course of his vessel which was then sailing from Dumaguete City, and headed towards the
beckoning MV Rosario. X found MV Rosario to be in trouble due to engine failure and the loss of
her propeller, for which reason, it was drifting slowly southward from Negros Island towards Borneo
in the open China Sea, at the mercy of a moderate easterly wind. About 8:25 pm on the same day,
the MV Christina succeeded in getting near the MV Rosario—in fact as near as about 7 meters from
the latter ship. With the consent and knowledge of the captain and/or master of the MV Rosario, X
caused the MV Rosario to be tied to, or well-secured and connected with tow lines from the MV
Christina. The MV Chrisitna had the MV Rosario in tow and proceeded towards the direction of
Dumaguete City, as evidenced by a written certificate to this effect executed by the Master, the Chief
Engineer, the Chief Officers, and he Second Engineer of the MV Rosario, who were then on board
the ship at the time of the occurrence stated above.

Did the service rendered by X to Y constitute “salvage” or “towage”? Why?

Answer:
The circumstance all show that there was no marine peril, and the vessel was not a quasi-derelict, as to
warrant a valid salvage claim for the towing of the vessel. X’s service to Y can be considered as a quasi-
contract of “towage” because in consenting to X’s offer to tow the vessel, Y thereby impliedly entered into
a juridical relation of “towage” with the owner of the towing vessel, captained by X.

B. May X recover from Y compensation for such service? Why?

Answer:
No, X may not recover from Y compensation for such service. Where the contract created is one of towage,
only the owner of the towing vessel, to the exclusion of the crew of said vessel, may be entitled to
compensation. (Barios v. Carlos A. Go Thong & Co., 7 SCRA 535)