1.

Quatar vs Bahrain
Facts:
The Parties agree that the exchanges of letters of December 1987
constitute an international agreement with binding force in their mutual
relations.

Bahrain, however, maintains that the Minutes of 25 December 1990 were

no more than a simple record of negotiations, similar in nature to the Minutes
of the Tripartite Committee; that accordingly they did not rank as an
international agreement and could not, therefore, serve as a basis for the
jurisdiction of the Court.

Moreover, Vienna Convention defines treaty as an international

agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by
international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more
related instruments and whatever its particular designation,”

Facts:
Qatar and Bahrain has dispute concerning:
1. sovereignty over Hawar island,
2. Sovereign rights over the shoal of Dibal, and Qit’at Jaradah, and
3. The delimitation of the maritime areas of Qatar and Bahrain. These are the
issues they sought to resolve for 20 years.

During the 20 year period, letters were exchanged and acknowledged by

both parties heads of state. A Tripartite Committee “for the purpose of
approaching the International Court of Justice…..” was formed by
representatives of Qatar , Bahrain and Saudi Arabia.

Though the committee met several time, it failed to produce an

agreement on the specific terms for submitting the dispute to the Court(ICJ).
Eventually, the meetings culminated in “Minutes”, which reaffirmed the
process and stipulated that the parties “may” submit the dispute to the I.C.J.
after giving the Saudi King six months to resolve the dispute. The King of
Saudi Arabia did not lead to the desired outcome within the time limit fixed.
Thus, Qatar filed a claim before the ICJ.
 However, The ICJ’s jurisdiction was disputed by Bahrain. It claims that
the ICJ has no jurisdiction because the “Minutes” were only record of
negotiation and, thus, cannot serve as basis for the jurisdiction of the ICJ.

Issue: WON ICJ has jurisdiction

Ruling:
Yes. Bahrain argued that the Minutes were only a record of negotiation
and could not serve as a basis for the ICJ’s jurisdiction. However, the ICJ after
a careful examination of the minutes observes that both parties agreed that the
letters constituted an international agreement with binding force.

Note that international agreements under the Vienna Convention do not

take a single form. No particular form is required. Here, the Minutes not only
contain the record of the meetings between the parties, it also contained the
reaffirmation of obligations previously agreed to and agreement to allow the
King of Saudi Arabia to try to find a solution to the dispute during a six-month
period, and indicated the possibility of the involvement of the ICJ. The Minutes
stipulated commitments to which the parties agreed, thereby creating rights and
obligations in international law. This is the basis therefore of the existence of
international agreement.

Bahrain’s minister argued that no agreement existed he never intended

to enter to an agreement is not valid because he signed signed documents which
creates right and and obligation for his country. Qatar’s delay in applying to
the United Nations Secretariat does not indicate that Qatar never considered
the Minutes to be an international agreement as Bahrain argued.

2. Norway vs Denmark on sovereignty in Eastern Greenland

On international agreements
Facts:
There is a dispute between Denmark and Norway on sovereignty over
Eastern Greenland. During negotiations, Denmark wanted to obtain Norway’s
agreement to do nothing to obstruct the Danish plans with Greenland. On July
22, 1919, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Norway replied: “I told the
Danish Minister today that the Norwegian Government would not make any
difficulty in the settlement of this question.” (called the Ihlen Declaration;
Foreign Minister Nils Claus Ihlen)

Issue: WON this statement constitutes an international agreement

Held:
Yes. The Court considers it beyond all dispute that a reply of this nature
given by the Minister for Foreign Affairs on behalf of his Government in
response to a request by the diplomatic representative of a foreign power, in
regard to a question falling within his province, is binding upon the country to
which the Minister belongs.

On the legal status of Eastern Greenland

Facts:
On July 10th, 1931, the Norwegian Government published a
proclamation declaring its occupation in certain territories in Eastern
Greenland, that it is terra nullius.

Denmark argued that the Norwegian occupation of part of the East coast
of Greenland is invalid because it has already claimed and exercised sovereign
rights over Greenland as a whole for a long time and has obtained thereby a
valid title to sovereignty. Denmark’s argument is based on the Palmas Island
decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration that there is a title "founded on
the peaceful and continuous display of State authority over the island". In order
to render the Norwegian occupation invalid, Denmark must have exercised
sovereignty over the territory on July I0th, 1931.

Issue: To which territory does Greenland belong?

Held:
Denmark. It has succeeded in establishing her contention that at the
critical date, on July 10th, 1931, she possessed a valid title to the sovereignty
over all Greenland.
 A claim to sovereignty based not upon some particular act or title but
merely upon continued display of authority, involves two elements: the
intention and will to act as sovereign, and some actual exercise or display of
such authority.

The extent to which the sovereignty is also claimed by some other Power
must also be taken into account. The tribunal has had to decide which of the
two is the stronger. The Court holds that, as a result of the separation of Norway
and Denmark and culminating in Article 9 of the Convention of September 1st,
1819, Norway has recognized Danish sovereignty over the whole of Greenland
and consequently cannot proceed to the occupation of any part thereof. The
Ihlen Declaration was used by Denmark as a ground that Norway has
recognized Danish title over the territory. The court rejected this ground.
However the court concluded that Norway’s attitude in making the declaration
had the ability of making a bilateral agreement. In accepting these bilateral and
multilateral agreements as binding, Norway reaffirmed that it recognizes
Danish sovereignty; thereby debarring herself from contesting such, and, in
consequence, from proceeding to occupy any part of Greenland. Furthermore,
the Court has regarded that Denmark displayed authority over the territory
even before July 10, 1931 sufficient to confer valid title to sovereignty.

3. Nuclear Test Cases, Australia vs France, New Zealand vs France

FACTS: France announced by a series of unilateral announcements that it

would conduct no further tests after 1973.

This case was brought to the International Court of Justice on 9 May

1973 when New Zealand instituted proceedings against France in terms of a
dispute concerning the legality of atmospheric nuclear tests conducted by
France in the South Pacific region.

The government of New Zealand asked the court to declare that the
nuclear tests run by the French Government in the South Pacific which lead to
radioactive fallout were a violation of New Zealand’s right under international
law. The French Government stated that the court was “manifestly not
competent” in the case and that it could not accept its jurisdiction, further
requesting the removal of the case from the court list.

New Zealand filed a memorial and presented argument at public hearings

supporting that the court had jurisdiction. France did not file counter-memorial
and was not represented at the hearings. The Court then rejected France’s
request to remove the case from the court list and affirmed its jurisdiction in
this case. When the case was heard in 1974, France had issued numerous public
statements within that year that it planned to hold no further nuclear tests in the
South Pacific.

New Zealand, the plaintiff, claimed that its rights under international law
were violated by the French government’s nuclear testing in the South Pacific.

France, the defendant, argued in the first place that the court did not have
sufficient competence to hear the case. When this was dismissed, France
contended that it no longer had plans to continue testing in the South Pacific
and therefore, no further ruling on the claims of the plaintiff could take place.

ISSUEs:

a.) Whether or not the public statements made by the Office of the President of
the French Republic created certain legal obligations for the French
Government?

b.) Whether or not a dispute still exists between New Zealand and France that
the international court can adjudicate?

RULING:
It is well-recognized that declarations made by way of unilateral acts
concerning legal or factual situations, may have the effect of creating legal
obligations. Declarations of this kind may be, and often are, very specific.
When it is the intention of the State making the declaration that it should
become bound according to its terms, that intention confers on the declaration
the character of a legal undertaking, the State being thenceforth legally
required to follow a course of conduct consistent with the declaration. An
undertaking of this kind, if given publicly, and with an intent to be bound, even
though not made within the context of international negotiations, is binding.

Two characteristics the Court found which convinced it that a binding

obligation had been incurred. First, the commitment was very specific; second,
there was a clear intent to be bound.

The court recognized that public statements made by the Office of the
President of the French Republic and other government officials since the case
originated, conveyed an announcement of the French government to cease
nuclear testing after the completion of its 1974 series. These public statements
in effect created certain legal obligations for the French Government, the
binding character of which is based on “good faith” and that “interested states
are entitled to require that the obligation be respected.”

In announcing that the 1974 series of atmospheric tests would be the last,
the French Government conveyed to the world at large its intention to terminate
these tests. It was bound to assume that other states might take note of these
statements and rely on their being effective. The validity of these statements
and their legal consequences must be considered within the general framework
of the security of international intercourse, and the confidence and trust which
are so essential in the relations among states.

Thus, the court stated, in a vote of 9 to 6, that the objective of New

Zealand for the total cessation of nuclear-atmospheric testing by the French
Government had been reached and there no longer existed a dispute for which
the court could contemplate and adjudicate.

4. Case concerning Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 (EU vs

USA, 1999)

5. Bayan vs Zamora Oct 10, 2000

 The power to enter into treaties or international agreements, the
Constitution vests the same in the President, subject only to the concurrence
of at least two-thirds vote of all the members of the Senate.

Facts:
The Visiting Force Agreement (VFA) provides for the mechanism for
regulating the conditions under which US Armed Forces and defense personnel
may be present in the Philippines. President Joseph E. Estrada, through
respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs, ratified the VFA and transmitted the
document to the Senate of the Philippines for concurrence pursuant to Section
21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioners (BAGONG
ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN, et. al) imputed grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the chief Executive in ratifying the VFA, and referring the same to
the Senate pursuant to the provisions of Section 21, Article VII of the
Constitution.

Issue: Whether the Chief Executive committed grave abuse of discretion in

ratifying the VFA, and referring the same to the Senate pursuant to the
provisions of Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution.

Ruling:
NO. As regards the power to enter into treaties or international
agreements, the Constitution vests the same in the President, subject only to
the concurrence of at least two-thirds vote of all the members of the Senate. In
this light, the negotiation of the VFA and the subsequent ratification of the
agreement are exclusive acts which pertain solely to the President, in the lawful
exercise of his vast executive and diplomatic powers granted him no less than
by the fundamental law itself.

Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude, and Congress
itself is powerless to invade it. Consequently, the acts or judgment calls of the
President involving the VFA-specifically the acts of ratification and entering
into a treaty and those necessary or incidental to the exercise of such principal
acts - squarely fall within the sphere of his constitutional powers and thus, may
not be validly struck down, much less calibrated by this Court, in the absence
of clear showing of grave abuse of power or discretion.
 It is the Courts considered view that the President, in ratifying the VFA
and in submitting the same to the Senate for concurrence, acted within the
confines and limits of the powers vested in him bythe Constitution. It is of no
moment that the President, in the exercise of his wide latitude of discretion and
in the honest belief that the VFA falls within the ambit of Section 21, Article
VII of the Constitution, referred the VFA to the Senate for concurrence under
the aforementioned provision. Certainly, no abuse of discretion, much.

6. Pimentel vs Executive Secretary July 6, 2005

The power to ratify is vested in the President, subject to the concurrence of the
Senate.

Facts:
Petitioners filed the instant petition to compel the respondents to transmit
the signed text of a treaty to the Senate of the Philippines for ratification. It is
the theory of the petitioners that ratification of a treaty, under both domestic
law and international law, is a function of the Senate. Hence, it is the duty of
the executive department to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute to
the Senate to allow it to exercise its discretion with respect to ratification of
treaties.

Issue: Whether the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs
have a ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute
signed by a member of the Philippine Mission to the United Nations even
without the signature of the President.

Ruling:
NO. It should be emphasized that under our Constitution, the power to
ratify is vested in the President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The
role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or withholding its consent,
or concurrence, to the ratification.

Hence, it is within the authority of the President to refuse to submit a

treaty to the Senate or, having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to
ratify it. Although the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty which has been signed
in its behalf is a serious step that should not be taken lightly, such decision is
within the competence of the President alone, which cannot be encroached by
this Court via a writ of mandamus. This Court has no jurisdiction over actions
seeking to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties. The
Court, therefore, cannot issue the writ of mandamus prayed for by the
petitioners as it is beyond its jurisdiction to compel the executive branch of the
government to transmit the signed text of Rome Statute to the Senate.

In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is

regarded as the sole organ and authority in external relations and is the
country’s sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief architect of
foreign policy, the President acts as the country’s mouthpiece with respect to
international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal
with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain
diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of
foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole
authority to negotiate with other states.

7. Agustin vs Edu Feb 2, 1979

a case involving a presidential Letter of Instruction prescribing the use of early

warning devices (EWD), the Court said that the constitutional provision
“possesses relevance.” The court pointed out that the 1968 Vienna
Convention on Road Signs and Signals had been ratified by the Philippine
government under Presidential Decree No. 207. “It is not for this country to
repudiate a commitment to which it had pledged its word. The concept Pacta
sunt servanda stands in the way of such an attitude, which is, moreover, at war
with the principle of international morality.” 10 Strictly speaking, therefore,
the incorporation here was done not via the Constitution but by ratification.

FACTS:
"[Whereas], statistics show that one of the major causes of fatal or
serious accidents in land transportation is the presence of disabled, stalled or
parked motor vehicles along streets or highways without any appropriate early
warning device to signal approaching motorists of their presence; [Whereas],
the hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized by
international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention
on Road Signs and Signals and the United Nations Organization

(U.N.);

[Whereas], the said Vienna Convention which was ratified by the Philippine
Government under P.D. No. 207, recommended the enactment of local
legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices;

[Now, therefore, I, Ferdinand E. Marcos], President of the Philippines, in the

interest of safety on all streets and highways, including expressways or limited
access roads, do hereby direct:

1. That all owners, users or drivers of motor vehicles shall have at all times in
their motor vehicles at least one (1) pair of early warning device consisting of
triangular, collapsible reflectorized plates in red and yellow colors at least 15
cms. at the base and 40 cms. at the sides.

2. Whenever any motor vehicle is stalled or disabled or is parked for thirty (30)
minutes or more on any street or highway, including expressways or limited
access roads, the owner, user or driver thereof shall cause the warning device
mentioned herein to be installed at least four meters away to the front and rear
of the motor vehicle staged, disabled or parked.

3. The Land Transportation Commissioner shall cause Reflectorized

Triangular Early Warning Devices, as herein described, to be prepared and
issued to registered owners of motor vehicles, except motorcycles and trailers,
charging for each piece not more than 15 % of the acquisition cost. He shall
also promulgate such rules and regulations as are appropriate to effectively
implement this order.

4. All hereby concerned shall closely coordinate and take such measures as are
necessary or appropriate to carry into effect then instruction.

As for the petitioner, he is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car,

already properly equipped when it came out from the assembly lines with
blinking lights fore and aft, which could very well serve as an early warning
device in case of the emergencies mentioned in Letter of Instructions No. 229,
as amended, as well as the implementing rules and regulations in
Administrative Order No. 1 issued by the land transportation Commission,"

He contends that the letter instruction:

• "Clearly violates the provisions delegation of police power, [sic] * * * and

• "For him they are "oppressive, unreasonable, arbitrary, confiscatory, nay

unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of our compassionate New
Society."

• "Infected with arbitrariness because it is harsh, cruel and unconscionable to

the motoring public;"

• "One-sided, onerous and patently illegal and immoral because [they] will
make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires at the expense of car
owners who are compelled to buy a set of the so-called early warning device
at the rate of P 56.00 to P72.00 per set."

• “Are unlawful and unconstitutional as being compulsory and confiscatory on

the part of the motorists who could very well provide a practical alternative
road safety device, or a better substitute to the specified set of EWD's."

• He therefore prayed for a judgment both the assailed Letters of Instructions

and Memorandum Circular void and unconstitutional and for a restraining
order in the meanwhile.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Letter of Instruction No. 229 and the subsequent
Administrative Order issued is unconstitutional.

RULING:
No. The court pointed out that the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road
Signs and Signals had been ratified by the Philippine government under
Presidential Decree No. 207. “It is not for this country to repudiate a
commitment to which it had pledged its word. The concept Pacta sunt servanda
stands in the way of such an attitude, which is, moreover, at war with the
principle of international morality.” Strictly speaking, therefore, the
incorporation here was done not via the Constitution but by ratification.

The letter of instruction is not unconstitutional. The Supreme Court ruled for
the dismissal of the petition.

The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the

police power.

That is conceded by petitioner and is the main reliance of respondents. It

is the submission of the former, however, that while embraced in such a
category, it has offended against the due process and equal protection
safeguards of the Constitution, although the latter point was mentioned only in
passing.

The purpose of which was: "To promote safe transit upon, and avoid
obstruction on roads and streets.” Also, The President had the necessary
statistical information and data at the time he issued said letter of instructions,
and such factual foundation cannot be defeated by petitioner's naked assertion
that early warning devices 'are not too vital to the prevention of nighttime
vehicular accidents' because allegedly only 390 or 1.5 per cent of the supposed
26,000 motor vehicle accidents that in 1976 involved rear-end collisions (p. 12
of petition). Petitioner's statistics is not backed up by demonstrable data on
record.

Moreover, being universal among the signatory countries to the said

1968 Vienna Conventions, and visible even under adverse conditions at a
distance of at least 400 meters, any motorist from this country or from any part
of the world, who sees a reflectorized rectangular early seaming device
installed on the roads, highways or expressways, will conclude without
thinking, that somewhere along the travelled portion of that road, highway, or
expressway, there is a motor vehicle which is stationary, stalled or disabled
which obstructs or endangers passing traffic.

On the other hand, a motorist who sees any of the aforementioned other
built in warning devices or the petroleum lamps will not immediately get
adequate advance warning because he will stink what that blinking light is all
about whether it is an emergency vehicle or a law enforcement car or an
ambulance.

Such confusion or uncertainty in the mind of the motorist will thus

increase rather than decrease, the danger of collision.

The alleged infringement of the fundamental principle of non-delegation

of legislative power is equally without any support-"To avoid the taint of
unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least
that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down
fundamental policy. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative
command is to be effected. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office
designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental
rules and regulations. In the Reflector Law clearly, the legislative objective is
public safety. The principle of non-delegation "has been made to adapt itself
to the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within
certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation."

"The Philippines * * * adopts the generally accepted principles of

international law as part of the law of the land * * *." 36 The 1968 Vienna
Convention on Road Signs and Signals is impressed with such a character. It
is not for this country to repudiate a commitment to which it had ledged its
word. The concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of such an attitude,
which is, moreover, at war with the principle of international morality.

8. Reservation to the Genocide Convention (ICJ Reports 1951)

Facts:
The convention on Genocide was unanimously adopted by the United
Nations in 1951. Several states made reservations to one or more of its
provisions. An opinion as to whether a party could express reservations and
still be considered a signatory was laid before the International Court of
Justice.
Issue: May a reservation to the U.N. Convention on Genocide be made by a
state and still be considered a signatory thereto?

Ruling:
Yes. A reservation to the U.N. Convention on Genocide may be effected
by a state and still be considered a signatory thereto. In a multilateral treaty,
as long as the reservation does not defeat the purpose of the treaty, a
reservation is permitted. By virtue of its sovereignty, it has been argued that
a state may effect any reservation.

In this case, the validity of each reservation must be examined on a case-

by-case basis since numerous reservations were made by different states. (The
court held that the state objecting to a reservation could if it desired, consider
the reserving state not to be a party to the Convention.

Discussion. Politics was at play in this case as it has also been in other
cases. Going by precedence, international law usually held that reservations to
a multilateral treaty had to be accepted by all other parties. Unanimous
acceptance of the Convention would not have made the Convention possible if
the rule was followed. The Court was undoubtedly determined to facilitate such
unanimity

9. Air France vs Saks 470 US 392

In case there is conflict among “official texts,” the language that is
agreed by the parties as authoritative is followed.

Facts:
On November 16, 1980, Valerie Saks boarded an Air France jetliner in
Paris for a 12-hour flight to Los Angeles. Saks felt severe pressure and pain in
her left ear. Saks disembarked without informing any Air France crew member.
She consulted a doctor who concluded that she had become permanently deaf
in her left ear. Saks filed suit against Air France alleging that her ailment was
caused by negligent maintenance and operation of the jetliner's pressurization
system. Air France responded that Saks could not prove that her injury was
caused by an "accident" within the meaning of the Warsaw Convention.
 Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention makes air carriers liable for
injuries sustained by a passenger "if the accident which caused the damage so
sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the
operations of embarking or disembarking."

Evidence shows that the aircraft's pressurization system had operated in

the usual manner. The District Court granted summary judgment to Air France.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision.

The CA defined accident as an occurrence associated with the operation

of an aircraft which takes place between the times any person boards the
aircraft with the intention of flight and all such persons have disembarked . . .
." That normal cabin pressure changes qualify as an "accident" under this
definition. The Warsaw Convention imposes absolute liability on airlines for
injuries proximately caused by the risks inherent in air travel.

Issue: Whether a loss of hearing proximately caused by normal operation of

the aircraft's pressurization system is an `accident' within the meaning of
Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention.

Held:
The judgment of the Court of Appeals in this case must accordingly be
reversed.

We conclude that liability under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention

arises only if a passenger's injury is caused by an unexpected or unusual event
or happening that is external to the passenger. But when the injury indisputably
results from the passenger's own internal reaction to the usual, normal, and
expected operation of the aircraft, it has not been caused by an accident, and
Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention cannot apply.

To ascertain the meaning of treaties the SC looked beyond the written

words to the history of the treaty, the negotiations, and the practical
construction adopted by the parties. With the principle in mind that treaties are
more liberally construed than private documents. The SC looked into the
French legal meaning because the Warsaw Convention was drafted in French
by continental jurists. The SC also referred to the records of its drafting and
negotiation. As well as how courts in other jurisdictions, who are signatories
to the treaty, defined the term accident. French courts observed that the term
"accident" in Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention embraces causes of injuries
that are fortuitous or unpredictable. European legal scholars have generally
construed the word "accident" in Article 17 to require that the passenger's
injury be caused by a sudden or unexpected event other than the normal
operation of the plane. All records show that the interpretation of the term
accident is in accord with American decisions. And that there is a refusal to
extend the definition to routine procedures.

Held:

Liability under Article 17 arises only if a passenger’s injury is caused by

an unexpected or unusual event or happening that is external to the passenger,
and not where the injury results from the passenger’s own internal reaction to
the usual, normal, and expected operation of the aircraft, in which case it has
not been caused by an accident under Article 17.

(a) The text of the Warsaw Convention suggests that the passenger’s injury
must be so caused. The difference in the language of Article 17 imposing
liability for injuries to passengers caused by an “accident” and Article 18
imposing liability for destruction or loss of baggage by an “occurrence,”
implies that the drafters of the Convention understood the word “accident” to
mean something different than the word “occurrence.” Moreover, Article 17
refers to an accident which caused the passenger’s injury, and not to an
accident which is the passenger’s injury. The text thus implies that, however
“accident” is defined, it is the cause of the injury that must satisfy the definition
rather than the occurrence of the injury alone. And, since the Warsaw
Convention was drafted in French by continental jurists, further guidance is
furnished by the French legal meaning of “accident” — when used to describe
a cause of injury, rather than the event of injury — as being a fortuitous,
unexpected, unusual, or unintended event.

(b) The above interpretation of Article 17 is consistent with the negotiating

history of the Warsaw Convention, the conduct of the parties thereto, and the
weight of precedent in foreign and American courts.
(c) While any standard requiring courts to distinguish causes that are
“accidents” from causes that are “occurrences” requires drawing a line that
may be subject to differences as to where it should fall, an injured passenger is
only required to prove that some link in the chain of causes was an unusual or
unexpected event external to the passenger. Enforcement of Article 17’s
“accident” requirement cannot be circumvented by reference to the Montreal
Agreement. That Agreement while requiring airlines to waive “due care”
defenses under Article 20(1) of the Warsaw Convention, did not waive Article
17’s “accident” requirement. Nor can enforcement of Article 17 be escaped by
reference to the equation of “accident” with “occurrence” in Annex 13, which,
with its corresponding Convention, expressly applies to aircraft accident
investigations and not to principles of liability to passengers under the Warsaw
Convention.

10. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (ICJ Reports 1973) UK vs Iceland

Facts:
<The United Kingdom, as part of what was known as “the Cold Wars,”
applied to the Court claiming that the proposed extension of Iceland’s
exclusive fisheries jurisdiction from 12 miles to 50 miles was a breach of an
agreement between the two states, evidenced by an Exchange of Notes in 1961.

Iceland contended that the Court had no jurisdiction to hear the case and
it also submitted that any agreement which it had with the United Kingdom not
to extend its fisheries jurisdiction, was no longer binding due to a fundamental
change of circumstances since that agreement.>

Iceland agreed with the UK that any dispute concerning Icelandic

fisheries jurisdiction beyond the 12-mile limit be referred to the International
Court of Justice. In return the United Kingdom recognized Iceland's claim to a
12-mile fisheries limit. This was referred to as the 1961 Exchange of Notes.

In 1972, Iceland proposed to extend its exclusive fisheries jurisdiction

from 12 to 50 miles around its shores. As a result, the United Kingdom filed
an application before the ICJ, based on the 1961 Exchange of Notes.
 Iceland contended that it has been relieved of its commitment from such
agreement because of a change of legal circumstances that relieved Iceland of
its commitment – the general recognition of the limit.

Issue: WON the change in circumstances resulted in the termination of the

treaty? And WON the ICJ has jurisdiction.

Held:

NO. Change in circumstances could result in the termination of a treaty.

But it is necessary that the change has resulted in a radical transformation of
the extent of the obligations still to be performed. The change must have
increased the burden of the obligations yet to be executed to the extent of
rendering the performance something essentially different from that initially
undertaken.

The change of circumstances alleged by Iceland in this case cannot be

said to have transformed radically the extent of the jurisdictional obligation
that was imposed in the 1961 Exchange of Notes.

The basic requirement embodied in Article 62 is that the change of

circumstances must have been a fundamental one. In this respect, Iceland
referred to the increased exploitation of the fishery resources in the seas that
surrounds it because of the increase in the catching capacity of fishing fleets.

The invocation by Iceland of its vital interests which were not made the
subject of an express reservation to the acceptance of the jurisdictional
obligation under the 1961 Exchange of Notes, must be interpreted, in the
context of the assertion of changed circumstances, as an indication by Iceland
of the reason why it regards as fundamental the changes which in its view have
taken place in previously existing fishing techniques. This interpretation would
correspond to the traditional view that the change of circumstances which must
be regarded as fundamental or vital are those which imperil the existence or
vital development of the parties.
In order that a change of circumstances may give rise to a ground for
invoking the termination of a treaty it is also necessary that it should have
resulted in a radical transformation to the extent of the obligation still to be
performed.

The change must have increased that burden of the obligation to be

executed t the extent of rendering the performance something essentially
different from the originally undertaken.

ICJ finds that such condition is unsatisfied, the change of circumstance

alleged by Iceland cannot be said to have transformed radically the extent of
its obligation which is imposed in the Exchange of Notes. In this case, the
juridical obligation between both states remained precisely what it was in 1961.

Yes, ICJ has jurisdiction. The compromissory clause enabled either of

the parties to submit to the Court any dispute between them relating to an
extension of Icelandic fisheries jurisdiction in the waters above its continental
shelf beyond the 12mile limit. The present dispute is exactly of the character
anticipated in the compromissory clause of the Exchange of Notes. Not only
has the jurisdictional obligation not been radically transformed in its extent; it
has remained precisely what it was in 1961.

Furthermore, Iceland has received benefits from those parts of the

agreement already executed; it should comply with its side of the bargain. With
the treaty still in force, the ICJ has jurisdiction.

11. Namibia Case ICJ Report 1971

Facts:
Under a claim of right to annex the Namibian territory and under the
claim that Namibia’s nationals desired South Africa’s rule, South Africa began
the occupation of Namibia.

On 27 October 1966, the UN General Assembly decided that the

mandate for South West Africa (Namibia) was terminated (Resolution 2145).
The Security Council then issued Resolution 276 that South Africa had no
other right to administer the Territory. The mandate system’s objective was
self-determination and independence. The mandatory was to observe a number
of obligations.

The UN Mandate prohibited South Africa from taking physical control

of other territories because it was a Member State of the United Nations.
Included in Resolution 276, the UN called upon all States to refrain from any
dealings with the South African Government that were incompatible with that
declaration. South Africa demanded an ICJ Advisory Opinion.

Issue: Are mandates adopted by the United Nations binding upon all Member
States so that breaches or violations thereof by the violator result in a legal
obligation on the part of other Member States to recognize the conduct as a
violation and to refuse to aid in such violations?

Held:
Yes. Member States of the United Nations are bound by its mandates and
violations or breaches results in a legal obligation on the part of the other
Member States to recognize the conduct as a violation and to refuse to aid in
such violation.

As a Member State, the obligation to keep intact and preserve the rights
of other States and the people in them has been assumed. So when a Member
State violates the mandate, that State cannot be recognized as retaining the
rights that it claims to derive from the relationship.

In this particular case, the General Assembly discovered that South

Africa contravened the Mandate because of its deliberate actions and persistent
violations of occupying Namibia.

Hence, it is within the power of the Assembly to terminate the Mandate

with respect to a violating Member State, which was accomplished by
resolution 2145 (XXI) in this case. The resolutions and decisions of the
Security Council in enforcing termination of this nature are binding on the
Member States, regardless of how they voted on the measure when adopted.
South Africa is therefore bound to obey the dictates of the Mandate, the
resolution terminating it as to South Africa, and the enforcement procedures of
the Security Council.
 12. Danube Dam case (Hungary vs Slovakia) 1998

Facts:
In 1977, The Treaty between the Hungarian People’s Republic and the
Czechoslovak Socialist Republic concerning the Construction and Operation
of the Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros System of Locks was concluded on 16
September 1977.

The treaty was concluded to facilitate the construction of dams on the

Danube River. It addressed broad utilization of the natural resources of the
Danube between Bratislava and Budapest. Intense criticism of the construction
at Nagymaros centered upon endangerment of the environment and uncertainty
of continued economic viability.

This growing opposition engendered political pressures upon the

Hungarian Government. In response, Czechoslovakia carried out unilateral
measures. Hungary then claimed the right to terminate the treaty, at which
point the dispute was submitted to the International Court of Justice.

Hungary also submitted that it was entitled to terminate the treaty on the
ground that Czechoslovakia had violated Articles of the Treaty by undertaking
unilateral measures, culminating in the diversion of the Danube. Slovakia
became a party to the 1977 Treaty as successor to Czechoslovakia.

Issue: Whether or not the treaty may be validly terminated.

Held:
The 1977 Treaty does not contain any provision regarding its
termination. The Court turned to the first ground advanced by Hungary, that of
the state of necessity.

In this respect, the Court merely observed that, even if a state of necessity
is found to exist, it is not a ground for the termination of a treaty. It may only
be invoked to exonerate from its responsibility a State which has failed to
implement a treaty.
 Hungary also relied on the principle of the impossibility of performance.
If the joint exploitation of the investment was no longer possible, this was
originally because Hungary did not carry out most of the works for which it
was responsible. Article 61, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Convention expressly
provides that impossibility of performance may not be invoked for the
termination of a treaty by a party to that treaty when it results from that party’s
own breach of an obligation flowing from that treaty. Hungary further argued
that it was entitled to invoke a number of events which, cumulatively, would
have constituted a fundamental change of circumstances.

The changed circumstances advanced by Hungary are, in the Court’s

view, not of such a nature’ that their effect would radically transform the extent
of the obligations still to be performed in order to accomplish the Project.

A fundamental change of circumstances must have been unforeseen;

the existence of the circumstances must have constituted an essential basis of
the consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty.

It is only a material breach of the treaty itself, by a State party to that

treaty, which entitles the other party to rely on it as a ground for terminating
the treaty. In the Court’s view, therefore, the notification of termination by
Hungary on 19 May 1992 was premature.

13. Goldwater vs Carter 1979

Facts:
President Jimmy Carter terminated America’s Mutual Defense Treaty
with Taiwan unilaterally, so that relations could instead be established with the
People’s Republic of China. Senatory Barry Goldwater and other members of
the US Congress challenged President Carter’s actions, claiming that it
deprived them of their constitutional role with respect to a change in the
supreme law of the land (because according to the US Constitution, treaties
shall be part of the supreme law of the land).
Congress has taken no official action, aside from the filing of the case.
Although the Senate has considered a resolution declaring that a Senate
approval would be necessary for the termination of any mutual defense treaty,
no final vote has been taken on the resolution and it likewise unclear whether
the resolution would have a retroactive effect.

ISSUE: Whether the issue of the President’s unilateral termination of a treaty

without Congressional approval is a non-justiciable political question.

HELD:
YES, it is a non-justiciable judicial question.

Citing Buckley v. Valeo, the Court ruled that the issue should not be
decided if it is not ripe for judicial review.

In this case, the US SC maintains that it is not ready for judicial review
unless and until each branch has taken action asserting its constitutional
authority. This is because the decision takes on political, rather than legal,
considerations. The Judicial Branch should not decide issues affecting the
allocation of powers between the President and Congress until the political
branches reach a constitutional impasse. It is only then that the Courts would
step in.

Therefore, in this case, the US SC ruled that it cannot rule upon the
validity or invalidity of the actions of President Carter, the issue being a non-
justiciable political question.

14. Reparations Case 1949 ICJ Rep -

The subjects of law in any legal system are not necessarily identical in
their nature or in the extent of their rights, and their nature depends upon the
needs of the community. Throughout its history, the development of
international law has been influenced by the requirements of international life,
and the progressive increase in the collective activities of States has already
given rise to instances of action upon the international plane by certain entities
which are not States....
 States enjoy the fullest personality in international law. They will be the
concern of this chapter. Other subjects will be treated in the following chapter.

Facts:
The newly formed United Nations had appointed Bernadotte as the
mediator in the first Israeli-Arab conflict, with Israel fighting for
independence. With his first partition plan, Bernadotte angered many extremist
forces within Israel. He came to be seen as an enemy of Israel, and was
assassinated in Jeruzalem at point blank range by the Jewish group .

Because Bernadotte was in the service of the United Nations, the new
organization sought to improve security for its agents like Bernadotte. One
avenue is the ability to hold someone or something responsible for injuries
suffered by the organization or its agents, and extract reparations. Bu whether
the UN was able to do so, like states, was unclear.

Issue: The UN General Assembly (UNGA) asked the International Court of

Justice for an advisory opinion on the issue. Did the UN have the capacity to
make an international claim to demand reparations when a state is responsible
for injuries to one of its agents in the performance of its duties?

Held:
The court unanimously answered the question in the affirmative. In
particular, after consideration of the Charter of the United Nations and the
purposes and powers of the organization, the court held that the test of
functional necessity required the attribution to the United Nations of a legal
personality separate from the legal personalities of its member states. Thus, as
a subject of public international law, the United Nations was capable of
possessing rights and duties, including the capacity to maintain its rights by
bringing an international claim against a sovereign state.

With regard to its agents, Do the provisions of the Charter relating to

the functions of the Organization imply that the latter is empowered to assure
its agents limited protection? In discharging its functions, the Organization
may find it necessary to entrust its agents with important missions to be
performed in disturbed parts of the world. These agents must be ensured of
effective protection. It is only in this way that the agent will be able to carry
out his duties satisfactorily. The Court therefore reaches the conclusion that the
Organization has the capacity to exercise functional protection in respect of its
agents. The situation is comparatively simple: in the case of Member States,
for these have assumed variouss obligations towards the Organization.

But what is the situation when a claim is brought against a State which
is not a Member of the Organization? The Court is of opinion that the Members
of the United Nations created an entity possessing objective international
personality and not merely personality recognized by them alone. As in the
case of Question I (a), the C411urt therefore answers Question I (6) in the
affirmative.

Question No. I1 of the General Assembly refers to the reconcilirltion of

action by the United Nations with such rights as mqy be possessed by the State
of which the victim is a national. In other words, what is involved is possible
competition between the rights of diplomatic protection on the one hand md
functional protection on the other. The Court does not sate here which of these
two categories of protection should have priority and in the case of Member
States it stresses their duty to render every assistance provided by Article 2 of
the Charter. It adds that the risk of competition between the Organization and
the national State can be reduced or eliminated either by a general convention
or by agreements entered into in each particular case, and it refers further to
cases that have already arisen in which a practical solution has already been
found.

15. US vs Dorr, 2 Phil 332 cited in Bacani vs NACOCO 100 Phil 44

Government, as an element of a state, is defined as “that institution or

aggregate of institutions by which an independent society makes and carries
out those rules of action which are necessary to enable men to live in a social
state, or which are imposed upon the people forming that society by those who
possess the power or authority of prescribing them.

16. The Tinoco Arbitration, Great Britain vs Costa Rica

Facts:
In January 1917, the Government of Costa Rica, under President Alfredo
Gonzalez, was overthrown by Frederico Tinoco. Tinoco assumed power,
called an election, and established a new constitution in June, 1917. His
government continued until August, 1919, when Tinoco retired, and left the
country. His government fell in September following and the old constitution
was restored and elections held under it. The restored government is a
signatory to this treaty of arbitration. The Government of Costa Rica denies its
liability for the acts or obligations of the Tinoco government and maintains
that the Law of Nullities was a legitimate exercise of its legislative governing
power. Great Britain contends that the Tinoco government was the only
government of Costa Rica de facto and de jure for two years and nine months;
that during that time there is no other government disputing its sovereignty,
that it was in peaceful administration of the whole country, with the
acquiescence of its people. This affects of the recognition of the government.

Issue: Whether or not there was recognition of the Tinoco government by other
nations.

Held:
NONE. Changes in the government or the internal policy of a state do
not as a rule affect its position in international law; though the government
changes, the nation remains, with rights and obligations unimpaired. Under the
principle of the continuity of states, the state is bound by engagements entered
into by governments that have ceased to exist; the restored government is
generally liable for the acts of the usurper. The non-recognition by other
nations of a government claiming to be a national personality, is usually
appropriate evidence that it has not attained the independence and control
entitling it by international law to be classed as such. If a change in government
in an existing state comes about through ordinary constitutional procedure,
recognition by others comes as a

matter of course. The problem is acute when a new government within a state
comes into existence through extra-constitutional means.
 17. Upright vs Mercury Business Machines Co.

A foreign government, although not recognized by the political

arm of the United States Government, may nevertheless have de facto existence
which is juridically cognizable. The acts of such a de facto government may
affect private rights and obligations arising either as a result of activity in, or
with persons or corporations within, the territory controlled by such de facto
government. This is traditional law.

FACTS:

Plaintiff, an individual, sues as the assignee of a trade acceptance drawn on and

accepted by defendant in payment for business typewriters sold and delivered*
to it by a foreign corporation. The trade acceptance is in the amount of
$27,307.45 and was assigned to plaintiff after dishonor by defendant.

Involved on this appeal is only the legal sufficiency of the first affirmative
defense. It alleges that the foreign corporation is the creature of the East
German Government, a government not recognized by the United States. It
alleges, moreover, that such corporation is an enterprise controlled by and that
it is an arm and instrument of such government.

ISSUE: WON the foreign corporation can sue in the US courts it being a
creature of the East German Government not recognized by the US.

RULING:
A foreign government, although not recognized by the political arm of
the United States Government, may nevertheless have de facto existence which
is juridically cognizable. The acts of such a de facto government may affect
private rights and obligations arising either as a result of activity in, or with
persons or corporations within, the territory controlled by such de facto
government. This is traditional law.

It is insufficient for defendant merely to allege the nonrecognition of the

East German Government and that plaintiff's assignor was organized by and is
an arm and instrumentality of such unrecognized East German Government.
The lack of jural status for such government or its creature corporation is not
determinative of whether transactions with it will be denied enforcement in
American courts, so long as the government is not the suitor.

It is a false notion, if it prevail anywhere, that an unrecognized

government is always an evil thing and all that occurs within its governmental
purview are always evil works. There are many things which may occur within
the purview of an unrecognized government which are not evil and which will
be given customary legal significance in the courts of nations which do not
recognize the prevailing de facto government. In a time in which governments
with established control over territories may be denied recognition for many
reasons, it does not mean that the denizens of such territories or the corporate
creatures of such powers do not have the juridical capacity to trade, transfer
title, or collect the price for the merchandise they sell to outsiders, even in the
courts of nonrecognizing nations.

The public policy which denies juridical recognition to the East German
Government is determined by the refusal of the political arm to recognize it.
That means the East German Government cannot sue in our courts. The
question whether its corporate instrumentality can sue is not so clear. Perhaps
it could sue. But another, not otherwise lacking in capacity to sue, may, by way
of transfer or other mesne assignment, sue on the underlying transaction, unless
such transaction itself or the assignment is shown to violate the national or
public policy. In order for such transaction or the assignment to violate national
or public policy, it must be shown either to violate our laws or some definite
policy. If the national government does not administratively forbid, or if it
facilitates, the purchase and delivery into this country of East German
typewriters, and no law forbids it, then defendant buyer will be hard put to
show the "illegality" of the underlying transaction, or the assignment, and
thereby avoid payment of the price for such merchandise.

All of this explains why defendant's pleading should be required to

depend on a sound theory. The effect of nonrecognition, used by defendant as
some sort of umbrella to protect it from liability is not the answer.
 18. Advisory Opinion on the Use of Nuclear Weapons (1996)

19. International Catholic Migration Commission vs Calleja September

28, 1990

FACTS:
This case involves the validity of the claim of immunity by the
International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC) and the International
Rice Research Institute, Inc. (IRRI) from application of Philippine labor laws.

ICMC an accredited refugee processing center in Morong Bataan, is a

non-profit agency involved in international humanitarian and voluntary work.
It is duly registered with the ECOSOC and enjoys Consultative status II. On
July 14, 1986, Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS)
filed with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment a Petition for
Certification Election among the rank and file members employed by the
ICMC. On the other hand, IRRI was initially an organization registered with
the SEC as a private corporation subject to all laws and regulations. However,
by virtue of Pres. Decree No. 1620, promulgated on 19 April 1979, IRRI was
granted the status, prerogatives, privileges and immunities of an international
organization. On 20 April 1987, the Kapisanan ng Manggagawa at TAC sa
IRRI filed a Petition for Direct Certification Election with Region IV, Regional
Office of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)

ICMC contends that it enjoys diplomatic immunity through (1) its

Memorandum of Agreement with the Philippine Government giving it the
status of a specialized agency; (2) the Convention on the Privileges and
Immunities of Specialized Agencies, adopted by the UN GA on 21 November
1947 and concurred in by the Philippine Senate through Resolution No. 91 on
17 May 1949 (the Philippine Instrument of Ratification was signed by the
President on 30 August 1949 and deposited with the UN on 20 March 1950);
and (3) Article II, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which declares that the
Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part
of the law of the land. Intervenor DEFORAF upholds immunity ICMC'S claim
of diplomatic Respondent BLR Director, on the other hand, with whom the
Solicitor General agrees, cites State policy and Philippine labor laws to justify
its assailed Order, she contends that a certification election is not a litigation
but a mere investigation of a non-adversary, fact-finding character. It is not a
suit against ICMC its property, funds or assets, but is the sole concern of the
workers themselves.

ISSUE: WON the grant of diplomatic privileges and immunities to ICMC

extends to immunity from the application of Philippine labor laws. YES

HELD:
The reason for the grant of immunity to these organizations is to avoid
the danger of partiality and interference by the host country in their internal
workings. The exercise of jurisdiction by the Department of Labor in these
instances would defeat the very purpose of immunity, which is to shield the
affairs of international organizations, in accordance with international practice,
from political pressure or control by the host country to the prejudice of
member States of the organization, and to ensure the unhampered performance
of their functions.

There are basically three propositions underlying the grant of

international immunities to international organizations. These principles,
contained in the ILO Memorandum are stated thus: 1) international institutions
should have a status which protects them against control or interference by any
one government in the performance of functions for the effective discharge of
which they are responsible to democratically constituted international bodies
in which all the nations concerned are represented; 2) no country should derive
any national financial advantage by levying fiscal charges on common
international funds; and 3) the international organization should, as a
collectivity of States members, be accorded the facilities for the conduct of its
official business customarily extended to each other by its individual member
States.

The immunity granted being "from every form of legal process except in
so far as in any particular case they have expressly waived their immunity," it
is inaccurate to state that a certification election is beyond the scope of that
immunity for the reason that it is not a suit against ICMC. A certification
election cannot be viewed as an independent or isolated process. It could tugger
off a series of events in the collective bargaining process together with related
incidents and/or concerted activities, which could inevitably involve ICMC in
the "legal process," which includes "any penal, civil and administrative
proceedings." The eventuality of Court litigation is neither remote and from
which international organizations are precisely shielded to safeguard them
from the disruption of their functions. Clauses on jurisdictional immunity are
said to be standard provisions in the constitutions of international
Organizations. "The immunity covers the organization concerned, its property
and its assets. It is equally applicable to proceedings in personam and
proceedings in rem."

20. Kapisana ng mga Manggagawa vs IRRI

IRRI was created not by a treaty but by a Memorandum of Agreement
between the Philippine Government on the one hand and the Rockefeller and
Ford Foundations, two private organizations. It is therefore not an international
organization. Initially, IRRI was organized and registered with the Securities
and Exchange Commission as a private corporation subject to all laws and
regulations. However, by virtue of Pres. Decree No. 1620, promulgated on 19
April 1979, IRRI was granted the status, prerogatives, privileges and
immunities of an international organization. The Supreme Court has
consistently recognized the immunity granted to IRRI declaring it to be on the
same footing as the International Catholic Migration Commission.

21. DFA vs NLRB Septemeber 18, 1996

FACTS:
Private respondent Jose C. Magnayi filed a case against petitioner ADB
for illegal dismissal and and the latter's violation of the "labor-only"
contracting law. ADB and the DFA then notified respondent Labor Arbiter that
the ADB, as well as its President and Office, were covered by an immunity
from legal process except for borrowings, guaranties or the sale of securities
pursuant to Article 50(1) and Article 55 of the Agreement Establishing the
Asian Development Bank (the "Charter") in relation to Section 5 and Section
44 of the Agreement Between The Bank And The Government Of The
Philippines Regarding The Bank's Headquarters (the "Headquarters
Agreement").
 Labor Arbiter took cognizance of the complaint on the impression that
the ADB had waived its diplomatic immunity from suit and rendered judgment
in favour of private respondent. ADB did not appeal the decision instead, it
referred the matter to the NLRC. In its reply, the NLRC stated that the DFA
should file a complaint against the labor arbiter with the Office of the
Ombudsman if it feels that the action of Labor Arbiter constitutes misconduct,
malfeasance or misfeasance. Dissatisfied, DFA filed a petition for certiorari
with the SC.

ISSUE: WON ADB has immunity from suit.

RULING:
ADB has immunity from suit. Article 50(1) of the Charter provides for
the “immunity of the bank from every form of legal process, except in cases
arising out of or in connection with the exercise of its powers to borrow money,
to guarantee obligations, or to buy and sell or underwrite the sale of securities.”
The same provision is found under Sec. 5 of the Headquarters Agreement.

It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of

separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political
question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the
executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic
immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the
government . . . it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity
upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the government, . .
. or other officer acting under his direction.

Being an international organization that has been extended diplomatic

status, the ADB is independent of the municipal law.

Private respondent’s argument that ADB has waived its immunity from
sit when it descended to the level to the level of an ordinary party to party to a
commercial transaction is without merit. The service contracts referred to by
private respondent have not been intended by the ADB for profit or gain but
are official acts over which a waiver of immunity would not attack.
 DFA has the legal standing to file the case since it is within its function.
The DFA must be allowed to plead its case whenever necessary or advisable
to enable it to help keep the credibility of the Philippine government before the
international community.

22. WHO vs aquino Nov 29, 1972

Facts:

Dr. Leonce Verstuyft was assigned by WHO to its regional office in

Manila as Acting Assistant Director of Health Services.

During his stay, the Constabulary Offshore Action Center (COSAC)

suspected that Verstuyft’s personal effects that was allowed free entry from
duties and taxes, were to “contain large quantities of highly dutiable goods”
beyond his official needs. Hence, upon application of the COSAC officers,
Judge Aquino issued a search warrant for the search and seizure of the personal
effects of Verstuyft.

However, Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo advised Judge

Aquino that Dr. Verstuyft is entitled to immunity from search in respect for his
personal baggage as accorded to members of diplomatic missions pursuant to
the Host Agreement and requested that the search warrant be suspended which
was supported by the SolGen. The respondent judge nevertheless summarily
denied the quashal of the search warrant. Hence a petition for certiorari and
prohibition was filed in which the WHO joined Verstuyft in asserting
diplomatic immunity.

Issue: W/N the personal effects of Verstuyft can be exempted from search and
seizure under the diplomatic immunity.

Held:
Yes. The executive branch of the Philippines has expressly recognized
that Verstuyft is entitled to diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the provisions of
the Host Agreement. The DFA formally advised respondent judge of the
Philippine Government's official position. The Solicitor General, as principal
law officer of the government, likewise expressly affirmed said petitioner's
right to diplomatic immunity and asked for the quashal of the search warrant.

It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of

separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political
question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the
executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic
immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the
government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the
claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of
the government, the Solicitor General in this case, or other officer acting under
his discretion.

The Court, therefore, holds the respondent judge acted without

jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in not ordering the quashal of
the search warrant issued by him in disregard of the diplomatic immunity of
petitioner Verstuyft.

The writs of certiorari and prohibition are hereby granted.

23. Jeffrey Liang (Hue Feng) vs People March 26, 2001

FACTS:
Petitioner is a Chinese national who was employed as an Economist by
the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Petitioner allegedly uttered defamatory
words to Joyce V. Cabal, a member of the clerical staff of ADB. As a result, a
case of grave oral defamation was filed against him in the MTC. MTC
dismissed the case due to DFA’s advice that petitioner enjoyed immunity from
legal processes. On a petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by the People,
RTC set aside the decision of the MTC. Thus, petitioner brought a petition for
review with this Court.

Petitioner contends that a determination of a person's diplomatic

immunity by the Department of Foreign Affairs is a political question. It is
further contended that the immunity conferred under the ADB Charter and the
Headquarters Agreement is absolute. Petitioner likewise urges that the
international organization's immunity from local jurisdiction empowers the
ADB alone to determine what constitutes "official acts" and the same cannot
be subject to different interpretations by the member states.

ISSUE: WON petitioner has immunity from suit as an employee of ADB.

RULING:
Petitioner has no immunity from suit. The immunity granted to officers
and staff of the ADB is not absolute; it is limited to acts performed in an official
capacity. Furthermore, the immunity cannot cover the commission of a crime
such as slander or oral defamation in the name of official duty.

The slander of a person, by any stretch, cannot be considered as falling

within the purview of the immunity granted to ADB officers and personnel.
Slander, in general, cannot be considered as an act performed in an official
capacity.

24. Holy See vs del Rosario December 1, 1994

FACTS:
This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of
6,000 square meters located in the Municipality of Paranaque. Said lot was
contiguous with two other lots. These lots were sold to Ramon Licup. In view
of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold, a dispute arose as to who
of the parties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of
squatters. Complicating the relations of the parties was the sale by petitioner
of the lot of concern to Tropicana.

ISSUE: Whether the Holy See is immune from suit insofar as its business
relations regarding selling a lot to a private entity

RULING:
As expressed in Section 2 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution, we have
adopted the generally accepted principles of International Law. Even without
this affirmation, such principles of International Law are deemed incorporated
as part of the law of the land as a condition and consequence of our admission
in the society of nations. In the present case, if petitioner has bought and sold
lands in the ordinary course of real estate business, surely the said transaction
can be categorized as an act jure gestionis.

However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent

disposal of the lot were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said
property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the
Philippines.

The Holy See is immune from suit for the act of selling the lot of concern
is non-proprietary in nature. The lot was acquired by petitioner as a donation
from the Archdiocese of Manila. The donation was made not for commercial
purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct thereon the official place of
residence of the Papal Nuncio. The decision to transfer the property and the
subsequent disposal thereof are likewise clothed with a governmental
character.

Petitioner did not sell the lot for profit or gain. It merely wanted to
dispose of the same because the squatters living thereon made it almost
impossible for petitioner to use it for the purpose of the donation.

25. Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary vs

Slovakia) ICJ Reports 1997
FACTS:

1977 Treaty and the Project

Hungary and Czechoslovakia entered into a treaty concerning the

construction and operation of the Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros System of Locks
(1977 Treaty). This treaty provided for the construction and operation of a
System of Locks by the parties as a “joint investment”. It was essentially aimed
at the production of hydroelectricity, the improvement of navigation on
relevant portions of the Danube River (Danube), and the protection of the
surrounding areas from flooding. The parties likewise undertook to ensure that
the quality of water in the Danube would not be impaired by the project, and
that the protection of nature would be observed in the construction and
operation of the Project.

The Project has taken the form of an integrated joint project, wherein the
two parties are on equal footing, as exemplified by the provision in the 1977
Treaty that provides that the construction, financing, and management of the
works would be shouldered by the parties in an equal measure. Hungary would
have control over the sluices at Dunakiliti and the works at Nagymaros,
whereas Czechoslovakia would have control over the works in Gabčíkovo,
both of which are within its respective territories. Its single and indivisible
nature was likewise realized in the Joint Contractual Plan, which
complemented the treaty.

The schedule of the works was likewise fixed upon by the parties in their
Agreement. The Project started in 1978; then, on Hungary’s initiative, the
parties agreed to (1) slow down the work, then (2) to postpone putting into
operation the power plants, and, then, (3) on 6 February 1989, to accelerate the
Project.

Suspension of Project

The government of Hungary received intense criticism due to the Project.

Due to this criticism, on 13 May 1989, the Hungarian Government decided to
suspend the works at Nagymaros, pending the completion of the studies it
procured in relation to the environmental impact of the project. Later on, the
government likewise suspended the works at Dunakiliti. Lastly, on 27 October
1989, Hungary decided to abandon the works at Nagymaros altogether, and
maintain the status quo at Dunakiliti.

Variant C

While negotiations were taking place between Hungary and

Czechoslovakia, the latter started investigating alternative solutions. One of
the solutions was known as “Variant C”, which entailed a unilateral diversion
of the Danube by Czechoslovakia on its territory and, on its final stage, a
construction at Cunovo of an overflow dam and a levee linking the dam to the
south bank of the bypass canal.

The Slovak government decided to begin in September 1991 the construction

to put the Gabčíkovo project into operation by the provisional solution, and
work on Variant C began in November 1991.

Alleged Termination of the Treaty

Discussions between the two parties continued but to no avail. On 19

May 1992, the Hungarian Government transmitted to the Czechoslovak
Government a Note Verbale terminating the 1977 Treaty, effective 25 May
1992.

On 15 October 1992, Czechoslovakia began to work to enable the

Danube to be closed and proceeded to the damming of the river.

The Slovak Republic, and Other Matters that Transpired

On 1 January 1993, The Slovak Republic became an independent State.

Likewise, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) observed that not only the
1977 Treaty, but also the “related instruments” are covered by the Preamble of
the Special Agreement.

RULING
(1) Suspension of Works – Whether Hungary was entitled to suspend and
subsequently abandon the Nagymaros and Gabčíkovo Projects

NO, it was not entitled to suspend the Projects.

Hungary’s argument is that, in suspending and subsequently abandoning

the works, it did not suspend the application of the 1977 Treaty itself or reject
the aforesaid treaty. The ICJ did not accept such argument, and held that the
conduct of Hungary can only be interpreted as an expression of its
unwillingness to comply with at least some of the provisions of the 1977 Treaty
and the subsequent Protocols, thereby rendering impossible the
accomplishment of the system of works, which the Treaty expressly described
as “single and indivisible”.

Regarding the State of Necessity invoked by Hungary: State of necessity

is a ground recognized by customary international law (CIL) for precluding the
wrongfulness of an act not in conformity with an international obligation.
However, it can only be accepted on an exceptional basis. In particular, the
following requisites must be met:
1. It must have been occasioned by an “essential interest” of the State;

2. The interest must have been threatened by a “grave an imminent

peril”;
3. The act must have been the only means of safeguarding that interest;
4. The act must not have seriously impaired an essential interest of the
State towards which the obligation existed; and
5. The State that is the author of the act must not have contributed to
the occurrence of the state of necessity

In this case, the perils invoked by Hungary (i.e., the criticism the
Hungarian Government received regarding the project) were not sufficiently
established in 1989, nor were they imminent. Likewise, Hungary had the
means of responding to these alleged perils other than the suspension and
abandonment of works. Furthermore, negotiations were on the way which
might have led to possible solutions, without need of abandoning the project.

Finally, even if there had been a state of necessity, Hungary would not
have been permitted to rely upon the same in order to justify its failure to
comply with its treaty obligations, as it had helped, by act or omission, to help
bring it about.

Therefore, Hungary was not entitled to suspend and subsequently

abandon the treaty.

(2) Variant C – Whether Czechoslovakia was entitled to proceed to the

“provisional solution” (Variant C) and to put it into operation
 While Czechoslovakia was entitled to proceed with Variant C, with
certain conditions, it was NOT entitled to put it into operation.

Czechoslovakia maintained that, in proceeding to Variant C, it did not

commit an internationally wrongful act, and asserted that Hungary’s actions in
suspending and abandoning the works made it impossible for it to carry out its
obligations in the treaty, which was to carry out the works initially
contemplated. Therefore, Czechoslovakia posits that it was entitled to proceed
with a solution which was as close to the original Project as possible, and
invoked the “principle of approximate application” to justify its actions.

The ICJ reiterated that the basic characteristic and objective of the 1977
Treaty was for the construction of the Project as a joint investment constituting
a single and indivisible operational system of works. Therefore, all this could
not be carried out by unilateral actions. Therefore, Variant C differed from the
characteristics envisioned by the 1977 Treaty. The ICJ ruled that
Czechoslovakia, in putting Variant C into operation, was not applying the 1977
Treaty but in fact violated express provisions of the treaty and, therefore,
committed an internationally wrongful act.

A wrongful act or offense is preceded by preparatory actions that should

not be confused with the wrongful act itself. The conduct prior to the
commission of the wrongful act does not qualify as a wrongful act. Therefore,
the ICJ found that while Czechoslovakia was entitled to proceed to Variant C
insofar as it then confined itself to undertaking works which did not
predetermine the final decision, it was not entitled to put that Variant into
operation in October 1992.

(3) Notifcation of Termination – What are the legal effects of the notification
of Hungary of the termination of the Treaty

Hungary presented five arguments in support of the lawfulness and

effectiveness of its notification, namely, (1) state of necessity, (2) impossibility
of performance, (3) fundamental change in circumstance, (3) material breach
of the Treaty by Czechoslovakia, and (5) development of new norms in
international environmental law.
The ICJ rejected all of these arguments by Hungary. In brief:

(1) State of necessity – Not a ground to terminate the treaty; can only be
invoked to exonerate the State from tits responsibility to implement the
treaty

(2) Impossiblity – The 1977 Treaty made available to parties necessary

means to proceed, at any time, to the required readjustments between
economic and ecological imperatives

(3) Rebus Sic Stantibus – The prevalent political conditions were not so
closely linked to the object and purpose of the Treaty that they constituted
an essential basis of the consent of the parties and, in changing, radically
altered the extent of the obligations still to be performed.

(4) Material Breach – No breach by Czechoslovakia has taken place yet

at that time

(5) New Norms – The Treaty contained “evolving provisions” that

recognized the potential necessity to adapt the Project. Consequently, the
Treaty is not static and is open to emerging norms of international law.

(4) Dissolution of Czechoslovakia - Whether Slovakia became a party to the

1977 Treaty as successor of Czechoslovakia

YES, Slovakia became a party to the 197 Treaty.

Article 12 of the 1978 Vienna Convention on the Succession of States

reflects the principle that treaties of a territorial character have been regarded
both in traditional doctrine and in modern opinion as unaffected by a
succession of State. This rule is reflects a rule of CIL.

Seeing as the content of the 1977 Treaty indicated that it must be

regarded as establishing a territorial regime within the meaning of Article 12
of the aforesaid convention, it created rights and obligations “attaching to” the
parts of the Danube which it relates. Therefore, the 1977 Treaty itself could
not be affected by such succession of States.

26.Judge Hubber in Island of Palmas Case, Netherlands vs US

Facts:
The Islands of Palmas (or Miangas) is a single, isolated island, not one
of several islands clustered together. It lies about halfway between Cape San
Augustin (Mindanao, Philippine Islands) and the most northerly island of the
Nanusa (Nanoesa) group (Netherlands East Indies).

The visit by General Leonard Wood led to the statement by the US that
the Island of Palmas (or Miangas), undoubtedly included in the "archipelago
known as the Philippine Islands", as delimited by Article III of the Treaty of
Paris, and ceded in virtue of the said article to the United States, was considered
by the Netherlands as forming part of the territory of their possessions in the
East Indies.

The United States, as successor to the rights of Spain over the

Philippines, bases its title in the first place on discovery. The existence of
sovereignty thus acquired is, in the American view, confirmed by treaty, in
particular by the Treaty of Miinster, of 1648, to which Spain and the
Netherlands are themselves Contracting Parlies. As, according to the same
argument, nothing has occurred of a nature, in international law, to cause the
acquired title to disappear, this latter title was intact at the moment when, Spain
ceded the Philippines to the United States. In these circumstances, it is, in the
American view, unnecessary to establish facts showing the actual display of
sovereignty. The United States Government finally maintains that Palmas (or
Miangas) forms a geographical part of the Philippine group and in virtue of the
principle of contiguity belongs to the Power having the sovereignty over the
Philippines.

According to the Netherlands Government, on the other hand, the fact of

discovery by Spain is not proved, nor yet any other form of acquisition, and
even if Spain had at any moment had a title, such title had been lost. The
principle of contiguity is contested.

The Netherlands Government's main argument endeavours to show that

the Netherlands, represented for this purpose in the first period of colonization
by the East India Company, have possessed and exercised rights of sovereignty
from 1677, or probably from a date prior even to 1648, to the present day. This
sovereignty arose out of conventions entered into with native princes of the
Island of Sangi (the main island of the Talautse (Sangi) Isles), establishing the
suzerainty of the Netherlands over the territories of these princes, including
Palmas (or Miangas). The state of affairs thus set up is claimed to be validated
by international treaties. The facts alleged in support of the Netherlands
arguments are, in the United States Government's view, not proved, and, even
if they were proved, they would not create a title of sovereignty, or would not
concern the Island of Palmas.

Issue: Whether the Island of Palmas (or Miangas) in its entirety forms a part
of territory belonging to the United States of America or of Netherlands
territory.

Held:
Island of Palmas belongs to the Netherlands.

If the claim to sovereignty is based on the continuous and peaceful

display of State authority, the fact of such display must be shown precisely in
relation to the disputed territory. It is not necessary that there should be a
special administration established in this territory; but it cannot suffice for the
territory to be attached to another by a legal relation which is not recognized
in international law as valid against a State contesting this claim to sovereignty;
what is essential in such a case is the continuous and peaceful display of actual
power in the contested region.

An inchoate title cannot prevail over a definite title founded on

continuous and peaceful display of sovereignty. The continuous and peaceful
display of territorial sovereignty is as good as title. Discovery alone, without
any subsequent act, cannot suffice to prove sovereignty over the island. There
is no positive rule of international law that islands situated outside territorial
waters should belong to a state whose territory forms the nearest continent or
large island. No one contested the exercise of territorial rights by the
Netherlands from 1700 to 1906. The title of discovery, at best an inchoate title,
does not prevail over the Netherlands, claim of sovereignty.

27. Austro-German Customs Union Case PCIJ 1931

Facts:
Germany and Austria had agreed, in virtue of a Protocol drawn up at
Vienna on March 19th, 1931, to conclude a treaty with a view to assimilating
the tariff and economic policies of the two countries on the basis of and
according to the principles laid down in the said Protocol, with the result that
a customs union régime would be established.
Doubts immediately arose as to whether the contemplated régime was
compatible with Article 88 of the Treaty of Peace of Saint-Germain and with
the Protocol for the Reconstruction of Austria.

ISSUE: Would a regime established between Germany and Austria be

compatible with Article 88 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain and with the
Protocol No. 1 signed at Geneva on October 4th, 1922?

HELD:
YES. the régime contemplated was incompatible not only with the
Protocol of Geneva that states that the signatory parties shall not violate
Austrian territorial or economic independence, but also with Article 88 of the
Treaty of Saint-Germain which prohibited the alienation of independence of
Austria without the consent of the League of Nations, since it would threaten
the independence of Austria in the economic sphere, and would thus be capable
of endangering the independence of that country.

28. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company (Belgium vs Spain)

1970 ICJ

Facts:
The Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, was
incorporated in 1911 in Toronto (Canada), where it has its head office. For the
purpose of creating and developing an electric power production and
distribution system in Catalonia (Spain) it formed a number of subsidiary
companies, of which some had their registered offices in Canada and the others
in Spain.

According to the Belgian Government, Barcelona Traction share capital

came to be very largely held by Belgian nationals, but the Spanish Government
contends that the Belgian nationality of the shareholders is not proven.
Barcelona Traction issued several series of bonds, principally in sterling. In
1936 the servicing of the Barcelona Traction bonds was suspended on account
of the Spanish civil war.

On February 12, 1948 a judgment was given declaring the company

bankrupt and ordering the seizure of the assets of Barcelona Traction and of
two of its subsidiary companies. In June 15, 1959, the Belgian Government
asked the International Court of Justice to decide that the behavior of the
organs of the Spanish State in declaring the Barcelona Traction Company in
bankruptcy and seizing then liquidated its assets was contrary to international
law, and that the Spanish

State was responsible for the resulting injury.

Issue: Whether or not International Law overrides Municipal Law.

Held:
NO. The Court found that Belgium lacked jus standi to exercise
diplomatic protection of shareholders in a Canadian company with respect to
measures taken against that company in Spain.

The Court observed that when a State admitted into its territory foreign
investments or foreign nationals it was bound to extend to them the protection
of the law and assumed obligations concerning the treatment to be afforded
them.

The court considers that in the field of diplomatic protection as in all

other fields and international law, it is necessary that the law be applied
reasonably. It has been suggested that if in a given case, it is not possible to
apply the general rule that the right of diplomatic protection of a company
belongs to its national state, considerations of equity might call for the
possibility of protection of the shareholders in question by their own national
state.

The Court has to decide the case in disregard of the relevant institutions
of municipal law; it would without justification, invite serious legal
difficulties. It is to rules generally accepted by municipal systems and not to
the municipal law of a particular State, that international law refers.

DOCTRINE: A state assumes an obligation concerning the treatment of

foreign investments based on general international law, once the state admits
foreign investments or foreign nationals into its territory.

FACTS:
The Belgium Government sought reparation for damage claimed to have
been caused to Belgian nationals, shareholders in the Canadian Barcelona
Traction Company, by the conduct of various organs of the Spanish State.

The Barcelona Traction was incorporated in Toronto. For the purpose of

creating and developing an electric power production and distribution system
in Catalonia (Spain) it formed a number of subsidiary companies, of which
some had their registered offices in Canada and the others in Spain. In 1936
the subsidiary companies supplied the major part of Catalonia's electricity
requirements. According to the Belgian Government, some years after the First
World War Barcelona Traction's share capital came to be very largely held by
Belgian nationals, but the Spanish Government contends that the Belgian
nationality of the shareholders is not proven.

Barcelona Traction issued several series d bonds, principally in sterling.

The sterling bonds were serviced out of transfers to Barcelona Traction
effected by the subsidiary companies operating in Spain. In 1936 the servicing
of the Barcelona sterling bonds was suspended on account of the Spanish civil
war. After that war the Spanish exchange control authorities refused to
authorize the transfer of the foreign currency necessary for the resumption of
the servicing of the sterling bonds. Subsequently, when the Belgian
Government complained of this, the Spanish Government stated that the
transfers could not be authorized unless it were shown that the foreign currency
was to be used to repay debts arising from the genuine importation of foreign
capital into Spain, and that this had not been established.

ISSUE: WON a state assumes an obligation concerning the treatment of

foreign investments based on general international law, once the state admits
foreign investments or foreign nationals into its territory.

RULING:
Yes. A state assumes an obligation concerning the treatment of foreign
investments based on general international law, once the state admits foreign
investments or foreign nationals into its territory. It is highly imperative to
draw a distinction between those obligations of a state toward the international
community as a whole and those arising from the field of diplomatic
protection. It is only the party to whom an international obligation is due can
bring a claim if a breach of an obligation that is the subject of diplomatic
protection occurs.

The Court observed that when a State admitted into its territory foreign
investments or foreign nationals it was bound to extend to them the protection
of the law and assumed obligations concerning the treatment to be afforded
them. But such obligations were not absolute. In order to bring a claim in
respect of the breach of such an obligation, a State must first establish its right
to do so.

International law had to refer to those rules generally accepted by

municipal legal systems. An injury to the shareholder’s interests resulting from
an injury to the rights of the company was insufficient to found a claim. Where
it was a question of an unlawful act committed against a company representing
foreign capital, the general rule of international law authorized the national
State of the company alone to exercise diplomatic protection for the purpose
of seeking redress. No rule of international law expressly conferred such right
on the shareholder’s national State.

The Court took cognizance of the great amount of documentary and other
evidence submitted by the Parties and fully appreciated the importance of the
legal problems raised by the allegation which was at the root of the Belgian
claim and which concerned denials of justice allegedly committed by organs
of the Spanish State.

However, the possession by the Belgian Government of a right of

protection was a prerequisite for the examination of such problems. Since no
jus standi before the Court had been established, it was not for the Court to
pronounce upon any other aspect of the case.

Accordingly, the Court rejected the Belgian Government’s claim by 15

votes to 1, 12 votes of the majority being based on the reasons set out above.