G.R. No.

196049 June 26, 2013

MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,

vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF
QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE
NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE,RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 107, Quezon
City, through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a pure
question of law. The petition assails the Order1 dated 31 January 2011 of the RTC in Civil Case
No. Q-11-68582 and its Resolution dated 2 March 2011 denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment
(or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of personality
of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.

The Facts

Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz
Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines2 on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well
with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides.
Eventually, they lost contact with each other.

In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage
being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City,
Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical
abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.3

Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010,
Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.4 On 14 January 2011,
Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree
of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be
recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab
initiounder Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines;5 and (3) for the RTC to
direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment
on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to
the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office
(NSO).6

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing the
petition and withdrawing the case from its active civil docket.7 The RTC cited the following
provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):

Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. –

(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed
solely by the husband or the wife.

xxxx

Sec. 4. Venue. – The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the
petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing,
or in the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at the
election of the petitioner. x x x

The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross violation" of the above
provisions. The trial court based its dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which
provides that "[f]ailure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for
immediate dismissal of the petition."8 Apparently, the RTC took the view that only "the husband
or the wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage
void, and not Fujiki.

Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
contemplated ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage. Thus,
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A petition for recognition of foreign judgment is a special
proceeding, which "seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact,"9 and not a civil action
which is "for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong."10 In other words, the petition in the RTC sought to establish (1) the status and
concomitant rights of Fujiki and Marinay as husband and wife and (2) the fact of the rendition of
the Japanese Family Court judgment declaring the marriage between Marinay and Maekara as
void on the ground of bigamy. The petitioner contended that the Japanese judgment was
consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines11 on bigamy and was
therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine courts.12

In any case, it was also Fujiki’s view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to void marriages
under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.13 Thus, Section
2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provides that "a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages may be filed solely by the husband or the wife." To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy
would be absurd because only the guilty parties would be permitted to sue. In the words of
Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of course, difficult to realize that the party interested in having a bigamous
marriage declared a nullity would be the husband in the prior, pre-existing marriage."14 Fujiki
had material interest and therefore the personality to nullify a bigamous marriage.

Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the
Rules of Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the "procedural implementation" of the Civil Register
Law (Act No. 3753)15 in relation to Article 413 of the Civil Code.16 The Civil Register Law
imposes a duty on the "successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to send a
copy of the final decree of the court to the local registrar of the municipality where the dissolved
or annulled marriage was solemnized."17 Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that entries in the civil
registry relating to "marriages," "judgments of annulments of marriage" and "judgments
declaring marriages void from the beginning" are subject to cancellation or correction.18 The
petition in the RTC sought (among others) to annotate the judgment of the Japanese Family
Court on the certificate of marriage between Marinay and Maekara.

Fujiki’s motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial court "gravely erred"
when, on its own, it dismissed the petition based on improper venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC
may be confusing the concept of venue with the concept of jurisdiction, because it is lack of
jurisdiction which allows a court to dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v.
Intermediate Appellate Court19 which held that the "trial court cannot pre-empt the defendant’s
prerogative to object to the improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the
case."20Moreover, petitioner alleged that the trial court should not have "immediately dismissed"
the petition under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC because he substantially complied with
the provision.

On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. In its
Resolution, the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the petitioner, in effect,
prays for a decree of absolute nullity of marriage.21 The trial court reiterated its two grounds for
dismissal, i.e. lack of personality to sue and improper venue under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC considered Fujiki as a "third person"22 in the proceeding because he
"is not the husband in the decree of divorce issued by the Japanese Family Court, which he
now seeks to be judicially recognized, x x x."23 On the other hand, the RTC did not explain its
ground of impropriety of venue. It only said that "[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x
as a ground for dismissal of this case[,] it should be taken together with the other ground cited
by the Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x x."24

The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based on Braza v. The City
Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental.25 The Court in Braza ruled that "[i]n a
special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries
in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages x x x." 26 Braza
emphasized that the "validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned
only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through a collateral attack
such as [a] petition [for correction of entry] x x x."27

The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of marriage between
Marinay and Maekara. The trial court held that this is a "jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the
petition.28 Moreover, the verification and certification against forum shopping of the petition was
not authenticated as required under Section 529 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence, this also
warranted the "immediate dismissal" of the petition under the same provision.

The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General and the Letters of
Marinay and Maekara

On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the petition for
review.30 The public respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Administrator
and Civil Registrar General of the NSO, participated through the Office of the Solicitor General.
Instead of a comment, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion.31

The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTC’s "pronouncement that
the petitioner failed to comply with x x x A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC x x x be set aside" and that the
case be reinstated in the trial court for further proceedings.32 The Solicitor General argued that
Fujiki, as the spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare the
bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor General cited Juliano-
Llave v. Republic33 which held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in
cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave, this Court explained:

[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only discovered
during the connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss
had already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous
marriage, it would not be expected that they would file an action to declare the marriage void
and thus, in such circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is the
one in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous
marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior
marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent
marriage will always be a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior
marriage which sanctity is protected by the Constitution.34

The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court
judgment may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding.35 In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas,36 this Court held
that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding
itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is
precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact."37 While Corpuzconcerned
a foreign divorce decree, in the present case the Japanese Family Court judgment also affected
the civil status of the parties, especially Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.

The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure to record
"[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons" in the civil registry as
required by Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other words, "[t]he law requires the entry in the civil
registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences upon a person’s legal capacity and
status x x x."38 The Japanese Family Court judgment directly bears on the civil status of a
Filipino citizen and should therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.

Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void
marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De Castro39 and Niñal v. Bayadog40 which
declared that "[t]he validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked."41

Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the directive for them
to comment on the petition.42 Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed from him the fact that she
was previously married to Fujiki.43Maekara also denied that he inflicted any form of violence on
Marinay.44 On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no reason to oppose the
petition.45 She would like to maintain her silence for fear that anything she say might cause
misunderstanding between her and Fujiki.46

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following legal issues:

(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
 (2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a
foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.

(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding
for cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court.

The Ruling of the Court

We grant the petition.

The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country.
Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic,47 this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not
apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy."48

I.

For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where
one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign
judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign
judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and
25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.49 Petitioner may prove the
Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy
attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a
foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of
office.50

To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment
would mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions, including the form
and contents of the petition,51 the service of summons,52 the investigation of the public
prosecutor,53 the setting of pre-trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of the trial court.56 This is
absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign
judgments, which is "to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues."57 The interpretation of the
RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v. Rañada,58 this Court
explained that "[i]f every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff
would be forced back on his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously
concluded litigation."59

A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition
and legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not
automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts
must determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and
other mandatory laws.60 Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws relating to
family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the rule
of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for
effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment
affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status,
condition and legal capacity of such citizen.

A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation
under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign
judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and
legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus,
Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of
evidence.

Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order
against a person creates a "presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court states
that "the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine courts
exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits of a
foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can
only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e. , "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited review embodies the
policy of efficiency and the protection of party expectations,61 as well as respecting the
jurisdiction of other states.62

Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts have recognized foreign
divorce decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are successfully proven
under the rules of evidence.64 Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the
recognition of a foreign divorce decree does not involve the extended procedure under
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a
divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry
when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad.65

There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family
Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy.
While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully
consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the
beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court
judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b)
of the Rules of Court.

II.

Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be
made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact."
Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a person’s life which are recorded by the State
pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence such
as birth, death or marriage,66 which the State has an interest in recording. As noted by the
Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that "[t]he recognition of the
foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special
proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status
or right of a party or a particular fact."67

Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil
register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating
thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is
located. (Emphasis supplied)

Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment
nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the
judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the
personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay
and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.

There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the
integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no
doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil
registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the
substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances68) his most
intimate human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law
the moment he contracts marriage.69 These property interests in marriage include the right to be
supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family"70 and preserving the property
regime of the marriage.71

Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, 72 but a
spouse’s right in a marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III
("Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code.73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC cannot "diminish, increase, or modify" the substantive right of the spouse to maintain the
integrity of his marriage.74 In any case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this
substantive right by limiting the personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the union
recognized by law.

Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to
question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when
Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife"75—it refers to the husband or the wife of the
subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from
the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife
under the law. The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the
personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a)
of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the beginning, is
the civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,76 which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a
public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an
interest in the prosecution and prevention of crimes.77 If anyone can file a criminal action
which leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage,78 there is more reason to confer
personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does
not only share in the public interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally
interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his marriage.

When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an injured
party and is therefore interested in the judgment of the suit.79 Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior
spouse "is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial
and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional
burden to the prior spouse."80 Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in
order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a court to
recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact
that such judgment is effective in the Philippines. Once established, there should be no more
impediment to cancel the entry of the bigamous marriage in the civil registry.

III.

In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this Court held that
a "trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.81 Thus, the "validity of marriage[] x x x
can be questioned only in a direct action" to nullify the marriage.82 The RTC relied on Braza in
dismissing the petition for recognition of foreign judgment as a collateral attack on the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara.

Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign judgment
nullifying a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.

To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot
substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent
circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code,
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of
proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage,83 support pendente lite of the
spouses and children,84 the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the
spouses,85 and the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion.86 A direct action
for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of
the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No.
8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the
Regional Trial Court "where the corresponding civil registry is located."87 In other words, a
Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of
marriage in the civil registry.

However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry
based on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is
a citizen of the foreign country. There is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural
safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A.
No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an
action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which
presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under foreign law. The
procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign court.

Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a
foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of
the dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides
that "[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." In Republic v.
Orbecido,88 this Court recognized the legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26
which is "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse"89 under the
laws of his or her country. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only
authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because
the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits
because it is tantamount to trying a case for divorce.

The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the anomaly that
results from a marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a foreign
citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse being tied to the
marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. The
correction is made by extending in the Philippines the effect of the foreign divorce decree, which
is already effective in the country where it was rendered. The second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code is based on this Court’s decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which declared that
the Filipino spouse "should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice
are to be served."91

The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a
foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy.
The Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the marriage void on the ground of
bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies because
the foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry
under the laws of his or her country. If the foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines,
the Filipino spouse will be discriminated—the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino
spouse cannot remarry.

Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are empowered
to correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage while the foreign
spouse is free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine
courts already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to
the extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. A critical
difference between the case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a
bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with
Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy
available to him or her. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.

In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their
judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family
rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a
party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to
extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide
whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in
Article 15 of the Civil Code.

For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is
inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging
party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither
inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts
should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section
48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the foreign judgment is already "presumptive
evidence of a right between the parties." Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this right
becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the correction or cancellation of
entry in the civil registry. The recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage
is a subsequent event that establishes a new status, right and fact92 that needs to be reflected in
the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency between the recognition of the
effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public records in the Philippines.1âwphi1

However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is without

prejudice to prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.93 The
recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for extinction of
criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91
of the Revised Penal Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not run
when the offender is absent from the Philippine archipelago."

Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need to address the
questions on venue and the contents and form of the petition under Sections 4 and 5,
respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and the Resolution
dated 2 March 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-
11-68582 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court
is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for further proceedings in accordance with this
Decision.

G.R. No. 215723

DOREEN GRACE PARILLA MEDINA, a.k.a. "DOREEN GRACE MEDINA KOIKE," Petitioner
vs.
MICHIYUKI KOIKE, THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, METRO MANILA,
and THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL
STATISTICS OFFICE, Respondents

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1are the Decision2 dated July 31, 2014 and the
Resolution3 dated November 28, 2014, of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 106
(RTC), in Sp. Proc. No. Q-13-72692, denying petitioner's petition for judicial recognition of
foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to Article 26 of the Family Code.

The Facts

Petitioner Doreen Grace Parilla (Doreen), a Filipino citizen, and respondent Michiyuki Koike
(Michiyuki), a Japanese national, were married on June 14, 2005 in Quezon City,
Philippines.4 Their union bore two children, Masato Koike, who was born on January 23, 2006,
and Fuka Koike who was born on April 4, 2007.5

On June 14, 2012, Doreen and Michiyuki, pursuant to the laws of Japan, filed for divorce6 before
the Mayor of Ichinomiya City, Aichi Prefecture, Japan. They were divorced on even date as
appearing in the Divorce Certificate7and the same was duly recorded in the Official Family
Register ofMichiyuki Koike.8

Seeking to have the said Divorce Certificate annotated on her Certificate of Marriage9 on file
with the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, Doreen filed on February 7, 2013 a petition10 for
judicial recognition of ioreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code11 before the RTC, docketed as Sp. Proc. No.
Q-13-72692.

At the hearing, no one appeared to oppose the petition.12 On the other hand, Doreen presented
several foreign documents, namely, "Certificate of Receiving/ Certificate of Acceptance of
Divorce"13 and "Family Register of Michiyuki Koike"14 both issued by the Mayor of Ichinomiya
City and duly authenticated by the Consul of the Republic of the Philippines for Osaka, Japan.
She also presented a certified machine copy of a document entitled "Divorce Certificate" issued
by the Consul for the Ambassador of Japan in Manila that was authenticated by the Department
of the Foreign Affairs, as well as a Certification15 issued by the City Civil Registry Office in
Manila that the original of said divorce certificate was filed and recorded in the said Office. In
addition, photocopies of the Civil Code of Japan and their corresponding English translation, as
well as two (2) books entitled "The Civil Code of Japan 2000" 16 and "The Civil Code of Japan
2009"17 were likewise submitted as proof of the existence of Japan's law on divorce.18

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision19 dated July 31, 2014, the RTC denied Doreen's petition, ruling that in an action
for recognition of foreign divorce decree pursuant to Article 26 of the Family Code, the foreign
divorce decree and the national law of the alien recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a
divorce must be proven in accordance with Sections 2420 and 2521 of Rule 132 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence. The RTC ruled that while the divorce documents presented by Doreen were
successfully proven to be public or official records of Japan, she nonetheless fell short of
proving the national law of her husband, particularly the existence of the law on divorce. The
RTC observed that the "The Civil Code of Japan 2000" and "The Civil Code of Japan 2009,"
presented were not duly authenticated by the Philippine Consul in Japan as required by
Sections 24 and 25 of the said Rules, adding too that the testimony of Doreen relative to the
applicable provisions found therein and its effect on the matrimonial relations was insufficient
since she was not presented as a qualified expert witness nor was shown to have, at the very
least, a working knowledge of the laws of Japan, particularly those on family relations and
divorce. It likewise did not consider the said books as learned treatises pursuant to Section
46,22 Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, since no expert witness on the subject matter
was presented and considering further that Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of
foreignjudgments and law.23

Doreen's motion for reconsideration24 was denied in a Resolution25 dated November 28, 2014;
hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the RTC erred in denying the petition
for judicial recognition of foreign divorce.1âwphi1

The Court's Ruling

At the outset, it bears stressing that Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence,
our courts cannot grant it. However, Article 26 of the Family Code - which addresses foreign
marriages or mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner - allows a Filipino spouse to
contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by an alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. The provision reads:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law. (Emphasis supplied)

Under the above-highlighted paragraph, the law confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to
extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to
determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.26

In Corpuz v. Sta. Tomas,27the Court had the occasion to rule that:

The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that
our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws.1âwphi1 Justice Herrera
explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment
rendered by a tribunal of another country." This means that the foreign judgment and its
authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the
alien's applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or
herself. The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in
another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or
defense.28 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citation omitted)

Thus, in Garcia v. Recio,29 it was pointed out that in order for a divorce obtained abroad by the
alien spouse to be recognized in our jurisdiction, it must be shown that the divorce decree is
valid according to the national law of the foreigner. Both the divorce decree and the governing
personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven.30 Since our courts
do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law on evidence requires that both
the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven like any other
fact.31

Considering that the validity of the divorce decree between Doreen and Michiyuki, as well as the
existence of pertinent laws of Japan on the matter are essentially factual that calls for a re-
evaluation of the evidence presented before the RTC, the issue raised in the instant appeal is
obviously a question of fact that is beyond the ambit of a Rule 45 petition for review.

Well entrenched is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts. The resolution of factual issues
is the function of the lower courts, whose findings on these matters are received with respect
and are in fact binding subject to certain exceptions.32 In this regard, it is settled that appeals
taken from judgments or final orders rendered by RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction
raising questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law should be brought to the Court of
Appeals (CA) in accordance with Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.33

Nonetheless, despite the procedural restrictions on Rule 45 appeals as above-adverted, the

Court may refer the case to the CA under paragraph 2, Section 6 of Rule 56 of the Rules of
Court, which provides:

SEC. 6. Disposition of improper appeal. -x x x

An appeal by certiorari taken to the Supreme Court from the Regional Trial Court submitting
issues of fact may be referred to the Court of Appeals for decision or appropriate action. The
determination of the Supreme Court on whether or not issues of fact are involved shall be final.

This, notwithstanding the express provision under Section 5 (f) thereof that an appeal likewise
"may" be dismissed when there is error irr the choice or mode of appeal.34

Since the said Rules denote discretion on the part of the Court to either dismiss the appeal or
refer the case to the CA, the question of fact involved in the instant appeal and substantial ends
of justice warrant that the case be referred to the CA for further appropriate proceedings. It
bears to stress that procedural rules were intended to ensure proper administration of law and
justice. The rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they
are adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice. A deviation from its rigid
enforcement may thus be allowed to attain its prime objective, for after all, the dispensation of
justice is the core reason for the existence of the courts.35

G.R. No. 165842 November 29, 2005

EDUARDO P. MANUEL, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
 DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR No. 26877, affirming the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio
City, Branch 3, convicting Eduardo P. Manuel of bigamy in Criminal Case No. 19562-R.

Eduardo was charged with bigamy in an Information filed on November 7, 2001, the accusatory
portion of which reads:

That on or about the 22nd day of April, 1996, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused EDUARDO P. MANUEL, being
then previously and legally married to RUBYLUS [GAÑA] and without the said marriage having
been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second
marriage with TINA GANDALERA-MANUEL, herein complainant, who does not know the
existence of the first marriage of said EDUARDO P. MANUEL to Rubylus [Gaña].

CONTRARY TO LAW. 3

The prosecution adduced evidence that on July 28, 1975, Eduardo was married to Rubylus
Gaña before Msgr. Feliciano Santos in Makati, which was then still a municipality of the
Province of Rizal.4 He met the private complainant Tina B. Gandalera in Dagupan City
sometime in January 1996. She stayed in Bonuan, Dagupan City for two days looking for a
friend. Tina was then 21 years old, a Computer Secretarial student, while Eduardo was 39.
Afterwards, Eduardo went to Baguio City to visit her. Eventually, as one thing led to another,
they went to a motel where, despite Tina’s resistance, Eduardo succeeded in having his way
with her. Eduardo proposed marriage on several occasions, assuring her that he was single.
Eduardo even brought his parents to Baguio City to meet Tina’s parents, and was assured by
them that their son was still single.

Tina finally agreed to marry Eduardo sometime in the first week of March 1996. They were
married on April 22, 1996 before Judge Antonio C. Reyes, the Presiding Judge of the RTC of
Baguio City, Branch 61.5 It appeared in their marriage contract that Eduardo was "single."

The couple was happy during the first three years of their married life. Through their joint efforts,
they were able to build their home in Cypress Point, Irisan, Baguio City. However, starting 1999,
Manuel started making himself scarce and went to their house only twice or thrice a year. Tina
was jobless, and whenever she asked money from Eduardo, he would slap her.6 Sometime in
January 2001, Eduardo took all his clothes, left, and did not return. Worse, he stopped giving
financial support.

Sometime in August 2001, Tina became curious and made inquiries from the National Statistics
Office (NSO) in Manila where she learned that Eduardo had been previously married. She
secured an NSO-certified copy of the marriage contract.7 She was so embarrassed and
humiliated when she learned that Eduardo was in fact already married when they exchanged
their own vows.8
For his part, Eduardo testified that he met Tina sometime in 1995 in a bar where she worked as
a Guest Relations Officer (GRO). He fell in love with her and married her. He informed Tina of
his previous marriage to Rubylus Gaña, but she nevertheless agreed to marry him. Their marital
relationship was in order until this one time when he noticed that she had a "love-bite" on her
neck. He then abandoned her. Eduardo further testified that he declared he was "single" in his
marriage contract with Tina because he believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid.
He did not know that he had to go to court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage before
marrying Tina.

Eduardo further claimed that he was only forced to marry his first wife because she threatened
to commit suicide unless he did so. Rubylus was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter
imprisoned. He visited her in jail after three months and never saw her again. He insisted that
he married Tina believing that his first marriage was no longer valid because he had not heard
from Rubylus for more than 20 years.

After trial, the court rendered judgment on July 2, 2002 finding Eduardo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of bigamy. He was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from six (6)
years and ten (10) months, as minimum, to ten (10) years, as maximum, and directed to
indemnify the private complainant Tina Gandalera the amount of ₱200,000.00 by way of moral
damages, plus costs of suit.9

The trial court ruled that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the
elements of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. It declared that Eduardo’s
belief, that his first marriage had been dissolved because of his first wife’s 20-year absence,
even if true, did not exculpate him from liability for bigamy. Citing the ruling of this Court
in People v. Bitdu,10 the trial court further ruled that even if the private complainant had known
that Eduardo had been previously married, the latter would still be criminally liable for bigamy.

Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA. He alleged that he was not criminally liable for
bigamy because when he married the private complainant, he did so in good faith and without
any malicious intent. He maintained that at the time that he married the private complainant, he
was of the honest belief that his first marriage no longer subsisted. He insisted that conformably
to Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, there must be malice for one to be criminally liable for a
felony. He was not motivated by malice in marrying the private complainant because he did so
only out of his overwhelming desire to have a fruitful marriage. He posited that the trial court
should have taken into account Article 390 of the New Civil Code. To support his view, the
appellant cited the rulings of this Court in United States v. Peñalosa11 and Manahan, Jr. v. Court
of Appeals.12

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) averred that Eduardo’s defense of good faith and
reliance on the Court’s ruling in United States v. Enriquez13 were misplaced; what is applicable
is Article 41 of the Family Code, which amended Article 390 of the Civil Code. Citing the ruling
of this Court in Republic v. Nolasco,14 the OSG further posited that as provided in Article 41 of
the Family Code, there is a need for a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absent
spouse to enable the present spouse to marry. Even assuming that the first marriage was void,
the parties thereto should not be permitted to judge for themselves the nullity of the marriage;
the matter should be submitted to the proper court for resolution. Moreover, the OSG
maintained, the private complainant’s knowledge of the first marriage would not afford any relief
since bigamy is an offense against the State and not just against the private complainant.
However, the OSG agreed with the appellant that the penalty imposed by the trial court was
erroneous and sought the affirmance of the decision appealed from with modification.

On June 18, 2004, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the RTC with
modification as to the penalty of the accused. It ruled that the prosecution was able to prove all
the elements of bigamy. Contrary to the contention of the appellant, Article 41 of the Family
Code should apply. Before Manuel could lawfully marry the private complainant, there should
have been a judicial declaration of Gaña’s presumptive death as the absent spouse. The
appellate court cited the rulings of this Court in Mercado v. Tan15 and Domingo v. Court of
Appeals16 to support its ruling. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Decision promulgated on July 31, 2002 is
hereby MODIFIED to reflect, as it hereby reflects, that accused-appellant is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional,
as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor as maximum. Said Decision is AFFIRMED in all
other respects.

SO ORDERED.17

Eduardo, now the petitioner, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, insisting that:

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT RULED

THAT PETITIONER’S FIRST WIFE CANNOT BE LEGALLY PRESUMED DEAD UNDER
ARTICLE 390 OF THE CIVIL CODE AS THERE WAS NO JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF
PRESUMPTIVE DEATH AS PROVIDED FOR UNDER ARTICLE 41 OF THE FAMILY CODE.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT

AFFIRMED THE AWARD OF PHP200,000.00 AS MORAL DAMAGES AS IT HAS NO BASIS IN
FACT AND IN LAW.18

The petitioner maintains that the prosecution failed to prove the second element of the
felony, i.e., that the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his/her spouse is absent,
the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead under the Civil Code. He avers that when
he married Gandalera in 1996, Gaña had been "absent" for 21 years since 1975; under Article
390 of the Civil Code, she was presumed dead as a matter of law. He points out that, under the
first paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code, one who has been absent for seven years,
whether or not he/she is still alive, shall be presumed dead for all purposes except for
succession, while the second paragraph refers to the rule on legal presumption of death with
respect to succession.

The petitioner asserts that the presumptive death of the absent spouse arises by operation of
law upon the satisfaction of two requirements: the
specified period and the present spouse’s reasonable belief that the absentee is dead. He
insists that he was able to prove that he had not heard from his first wife since 1975 and that he
had no knowledge of her whereabouts or whether she was still alive; hence, under Article 41 of
the Family Code, the presumptive death of Gaña had arisen by operation of law, as the two
requirements of Article 390 of the Civil Code are present. The petitioner concludes that he
should thus be acquitted of the crime of bigamy.

The petitioner insists that except for the period of absences provided for in Article 390 of the
Civil Code, the rule therein on legal presumptions remains valid and effective. Nowhere under
Article 390 of the Civil Code does it require that there must first be a judicial declaration of death
before the rule on presumptive death would apply. He further asserts that contrary to the rulings
of the trial and appellate courts, the requirement of a judicial declaration of presumptive death
under Article 41 of the Family Code is only a requirement for the validity of the subsequent or
second marriage.

The petitioner, likewise, avers that the trial court and the CA erred in awarding moral damages
in favor of the private complainant. The private complainant was a "GRO" before he married
her, and even knew that he was already married. He genuinely loved and took care of her and
gave her financial support. He also pointed out that she had an illicit relationship with a lover
whom she brought to their house.

In its comment on the petition, the OSG maintains that the decision of the CA affirming the
petitioner’s conviction is in accord with the law, jurisprudence and the evidence on record. To
bolster its claim, the OSG cited the ruling of this Court in Republic v. Nolasco.19

The petition is denied for lack of merit.

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines and penalizes bigamy, reads:

Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.

The provision was taken from Article 486 of the Spanish Penal Code, to wit:

El que contrajere Segundo o ulterior matrimonio sin hallarse legítimamente disuelto el anterior,
será castigado con la pena de prision mayor. xxx

The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to preserve and ensure the juridical tie of
marriage established by law.20 The phrase "or before the absent spouse had been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings" was
incorporated in the Revised Penal Code because the drafters of the law were of the impression
that "in consonance with the civil law which provides for the presumption of death after an
absence of a number of years, the judicial declaration of presumed death like annulment of
marriage should be a justification for bigamy."21

For the accused to be held guilty of bigamy, the prosecution is burdened to prove the felony: (a)
he/she has been legally married; and (b) he/she contracts a subsequent marriage without the
former marriage having been lawfully dissolved. The felony is consummated on the celebration
of the second marriage or subsequent marriage.22 It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy
that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be valid were it
not for the subsistence of the first marriage.23 Viada avers that a third element of the crime is
that the second marriage must be entered into with fraudulent intent (intencion fraudulente)
which is an essential element of a felony by dolo.24 On the other hand, Cuello Calon is of the
view that there are only two elements of bigamy: (1) the existence of a marriage that has not
been lawfully dissolved; and (2) the celebration of a second marriage. It does not matter
whether the first marriage is void or voidable because such marriages have juridical effects until
lawfully dissolved by a court of competent jurisdiction.25 As the Court ruled in Domingo v. Court
of Appeals26 and Mercado v. Tan,27 under the Family Code of the Philippines, the judicial
declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is a defense.

In his commentary on the Revised Penal Code, Albert is of the same view as Viada and
declared that there are three (3) elements of bigamy: (1) an undissolved marriage; (2) a new
marriage; and (3) fraudulent intention constituting the felony of the act.28 He explained that:

… This last element is not stated in Article 349, because it is undoubtedly incorporated in the
principle antedating all codes, and, constituting one of the landmarks of our Penal Code, that,
where there is no willfulness there is no crime. There is no willfulness if the subject
believes that the former marriage has been dissolved; and this must be supported by very
strong evidence, and if this be produced, the act shall be deemed not to constitute a crime.
Thus, a person who contracts a second marriage in the reasonable and well-founded belief that
his first wife is dead, because of the many years that have elapsed since he has had any news
of her whereabouts, in spite of his endeavors to find her, cannot be deemed guilty of the crime
of bigamy, because there is no fraudulent intent which is one of the essential elements of the
crime.29

As gleaned from the Information in the RTC, the petitioner is charged with bigamy, a felony
by dolo (deceit). Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is deceit
when the act is performed with deliberate intent. Indeed, a felony cannot exist without intent.
Since a felony by dolo is classified as an intentional felony, it is deemed voluntary.30 Although
the words "with malice" do not appear in Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, such phrase is
included in the word "voluntary."31

Malice is a mental state or condition prompting the doing of an overt act without legal excuse or
justification from which another suffers injury.32 When the act or omission defined by law as a
felony is proved to have been done or committed by the accused, the law presumes it to have
been intentional.33 Indeed, it is a legal presumption of law that every man intends the natural or
probable consequence of his voluntary act in the absence of proof to the contrary, and such
presumption must prevail unless a reasonable doubt exists from a consideration of the whole
evidence.34

For one to be criminally liable for a felony by dolo, there must be a confluence of both an evil act
and an evil intent. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.35

In the present case, the prosecution proved that the petitioner was married to Gaña in 1975,
and such marriage was not judicially declared a nullity; hence, the marriage is presumed to
subsist.36 The prosecution also proved that the petitioner married the private complainant in
1996, long after the effectivity of the Family Code.

The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he married the private
complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in
a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal intent. However,
ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know the
law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat.

It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when he married the private
complainant in 1996, he was of the well-grounded belief
that his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her for more than 20 years since
1975. He should have adduced in evidence a decision of a competent court declaring the
presumptive death of his first wife as required by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in
relation to Article 41 of the Family Code. Such judicial declaration also constitutes proof that the
petitioner acted in good faith, and would negate criminal intent on his part when he married the
private complainant and, as a consequence, he could not be held guilty of bigamy in such case.
The petitioner, however, failed to discharge his burden.

The phrase "or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered on the proceedings" in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code was not an
aggroupment of empty or useless words. The requirement for a judgment of the presumptive
death of the absent spouse is for the benefit of the spouse present, as protection from the pains
and the consequences of a second marriage, precisely because he/she could be charged and
convicted of bigamy if the defense of good faith based on mere testimony is found incredible.

The requirement of judicial declaration is also for the benefit of the State. Under Article II,
Section 12 of the Constitution, the "State shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution." Marriage is a social institution of the highest importance. Public
policy, good morals and the interest of society require that the marital relation should be
surrounded with every safeguard and its severance only in the manner prescribed and the
causes specified by law.37 The laws regulating civil marriages are necessary to serve the
interest, safety, good order, comfort or general welfare of the community and the parties can
waive nothing essential to the validity of the proceedings. A civil marriage anchors an ordered
society by encouraging stable relationships over transient ones; it enhances the welfare of the
community.

In a real sense, there are three parties to every civil marriage; two willing spouses and an
approving State. On marriage, the parties assume new relations to each other and the State
touching nearly on every aspect of life and death. The consequences of an invalid marriage to
the parties, to innocent parties and to society, are so serious that the law may well take means
calculated to ensure the procurement of the most positive evidence of death of the first spouse
or of the presumptive death of the absent spouse38 after the lapse of the period provided for
under the law. One such means is the requirement of the declaration by a competent court of
the presumptive death of an absent spouse as proof that the present spouse contracts a
subsequent marriage on a well-grounded belief of the death of the first spouse. Indeed, "men
readily believe what they wish to be true," is a maxim of the old jurists. To sustain a second
marriage and to vacate a first because one of the parties believed the other to be dead would
make the existence of the marital relation determinable, not by certain extrinsic facts, easily
capable of forensic ascertainment and proof, but by the subjective condition of
individuals.39 Only with such proof can marriage be treated as so dissolved as to permit second
marriages.40 Thus, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code has made the dissolution of marriage
dependent not only upon the personal belief of parties, but upon certain objective facts easily
capable of accurate judicial cognizance,41 namely, a judgment of the presumptive death of the
absent spouse.
The petitioner’s sole reliance on Article 390 of the Civil Code as basis for his acquittal for
bigamy is misplaced.

Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code provide –

Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not, the absentee still
lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.

The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an
absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five
years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened.

Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the
estate among the heirs:

(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who
has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;

(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for four
years;

(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has
not been known for four years.

The presumption of death of the spouse who had been absent for seven years, it being
unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, is created by law and arises without any
necessity of judicial declaration.42 However, Article 41 of the Family Code, which amended the
foregoing rules on presumptive death, reads:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage
shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded
belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is
danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil
Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the
spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Court for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse.43

With the effectivity of the Family Code,44 the period of seven years under the first paragraph of
Article 390 of the Civil Code was reduced to four consecutive years. Thus, before the spouse
present may contract a subsequent marriage, he or she must institute summary proceedings for
the declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee spouse,45 without prejudice to the
effect of the reappearance of the absentee spouse. As explained by this Court in Armas v.
Calisterio:46
In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent bigamous marriage may
exceptionally be considered valid, the following conditions must concur, viz.: (a) The prior
spouse of the contracting party must have been absent for four consecutive years, or two years
where there is danger of death under the circumstances stated in Article 391 of the Civil Code at
the time of disappearance; (b) the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse is already dead; and (c) there is, unlike the old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee for which purpose the spouse present can institute a summary
proceeding in court to ask for that declaration. The last condition is consistent and in
consonance with the requirement of judicial intervention in subsequent marriages as so
provided in Article 41, in relation to Article 40, of the Family Code.

The Court rejects petitioner’s contention that the requirement of instituting a petition for
declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is designed merely to
enable the spouse present to contract a valid second marriage and not for the acquittal of one
charged with bigamy. Such provision was designed to harmonize civil law and Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code, and put to rest the confusion spawned by the rulings of this Court and
comments of eminent authorities on Criminal Law.

As early as March 6, 1937, this Court ruled in Jones v. Hortiguela47 that, for purposes of the
marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee
before the spouse present may contract a subsequent marriage. It held that the declaration of
absence made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose the
taking of the necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For the
celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only requires that the former spouse had been
absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present
does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that such former spouse is generally
reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration of the
marriage.48 In In Re Szatraw,49 the Court declared that a judicial declaration that a person is
presumptively dead, because he or she had been unheard from in seven years, being a
presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or
become final; and that proof of actual death of the person presumed dead being unheard from
in seven years, would have to be made in another proceeding to have such particular fact finally
determined. The Court ruled that if a judicial decree declaring a person presumptively dead
because he or she had not been heard from in seven years cannot become final and executory
even after the lapse of the reglementary period within which an appeal may be taken, for such
presumption is still disputable and remains subject to contrary proof, then a petition for such a
declaration is useless, unnecessary, superfluous and of no benefit to the petitioner. The Court
stated that it should not waste its valuable time and be made to perform a superfluous and
meaningless act.50 The Court also took note that a petition for a declaration of the presumptive
death of an absent spouse may even be made in collusion with the other spouse.

In Lukban v. Republic of the Philippines,51 the Court declared that the words "proper
proceedings" in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code can only refer to those authorized by law
such as Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code which refer to the administration or settlement of
the estate of a deceased person. In Gue v. Republic of the Philippines,52 the Court rejected the
contention of the petitioner therein that, under Article 390 of the Civil Code, the courts are
authorized to declare the presumptive death of a person after an absence of seven years. The
Court reiterated its rulings in Szatraw, Lukban and Jones.
Former Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino was of the view that "the provision of Article 349 or
"before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
reached in the proper proceedings" is erroneous and should be considered as not written. He
opined that such provision presupposes that, if the prior marriage has not been legally dissolved
and the absent first spouse has not been declared presumptively dead in a proper court
proceedings, the subsequent marriage is bigamous. He maintains that the supposition is not
true.53 A second marriage is bigamous only when the circumstances in paragraphs 1 and 2 of
Article 83 of the Civil Code are not present.54 Former Senator Ambrosio Padilla was, likewise, of
the view that Article 349 seems to require judicial decree of dissolution or judicial declaration of
absence but even with such decree, a second marriage in good faith will not constitute bigamy.
He posits that a second marriage, if not illegal, even if it be annullable, should not give rise to
bigamy.55 Former Justice Luis B. Reyes, on the other hand, was of the view that in the case of
an absent spouse who could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code, the spouse
present cannot be charged and convicted of bigamy in case he/she contracts a second
marriage.56

The Committee tasked to prepare the Family Code proposed the amendments of Articles 390
and 391 of the Civil Code to conform to Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in that, in a case
where a spouse is absent for the requisite period, the present spouse may contract a
subsequent marriage only after securing a judgment declaring the presumptive death of the
absent spouse to avoid being charged and convicted of bigamy; the present spouse will have to
adduce evidence that he had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already
dead.57 Such judgment is proof of the good faith of the present spouse who contracted a
subsequent marriage; thus, even if the present spouse is later charged with bigamy if the
absentee spouse reappears, he cannot be convicted of the crime. As explained by former
Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy:

… Such rulings, however, conflict with Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code providing that the
present spouse must first ask for a declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse in
order not to be guilty of bigamy in case he or she marries again.

The above Article of the Family Code now clearly provides that for the purpose of the present
spouse contracting a second marriage, he or she must file a summary proceeding as provided
in the Code for the declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to
the latter’s reappearance. This provision is intended to protect the present spouse from a
criminal prosecution for bigamy under Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code because with the
judicial declaration that the missing spouses presumptively dead, the good faith of the present
spouse in contracting a second marriage is already established.58

Of the same view is former Dean Ernesto L. Pineda (now Undersecretary of Justice) who wrote
that things are now clarified. He says judicial declaration of presumptive death is now authorized
for purposes of
remarriage. The present spouse must institute a summary proceeding for declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, where the ordinary rules of procedure in trial will not be
followed. Affidavits will suffice, with possible clarificatory examinations of affiants if the Judge
finds it necessary for a full grasp of the facts. The judgment declaring an absentee as
presumptively dead is without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the said absentee.

Dean Pineda further states that before, the weight of authority is that the clause "before the
absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead x x x" should be disregarded because of
Article 83, paragraph 3 of the Civil Code. With the new law, there is a need to institute a
summary proceeding for the declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee, otherwise,
there is bigamy.59

According to Retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an eminent authority on

Criminal Law, in some cases where an absentee spouse is believed to be dead, there must be a
judicial declaration of presumptive death, which could then be made only in the proceedings for
the settlement of his estate.60 Before such declaration, it was held that the remarriage of the
other spouse is bigamous even if done in good faith.61 Justice Regalado opined that there were
contrary views because of the ruling in Jones and the provisions of Article 83(2) of the Civil
Code, which, however, appears to have been set to rest by Article 41 of the Family Code,
"which requires a summary hearing for the declaration of presumptive death of the absent
spouse before the other spouse can remarry."

Under Article 238 of the Family Code, a petition for a declaration of the presumptive death of an
absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code may be filed under Articles 239 to 247 of the
same Code.62

On the second issue, the petitioner, likewise, faults the trial court and the CA for awarding moral
damages in favor of the private complainant. The petitioner maintains that moral damages may
be awarded only in any of the cases provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, and bigamy is
not one of them. The petitioner asserts that the appellate court failed to apply its ruling in People
v. Bondoc,63 where an award of moral damages for bigamy was disallowed. In any case, the
petitioner maintains, the private complainant failed to adduce evidence to prove moral damages.

The appellate court awarded moral damages to the private complainant on its finding that she
adduced evidence to prove the same. The appellate court ruled that while bigamy is not
included in those cases enumerated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, it is not proscribed from
awarding moral damages against the petitioner. The appellate court ruled that it is not bound by
the following ruling in People v. Bondoc:

... Pero si en dichos asuntos se adjudicaron daños, ello se debió indedublamente porque el
articulo 2219 del Código Civil de Filipinas autoriza la adjudicación de daños morales en los
delitos de estupro, rapto, violación, adulterio o concubinato, y otros actos lascivos, sin incluir en
esta enumeración el delito de bigamia. No existe, por consiguiente, base legal para adjudicar
aquí los daños de ₱5,000.00 arriba mencionados.64

The OSG posits that the findings and ruling of the CA are based on the evidence and the law.
The OSG, likewise, avers that the CA was not bound by its ruling in People v. Rodeo.

The Court rules against the petitioner.

Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though
incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate
result of the defendant’s wrongful act or omission.65 An award for moral damages requires the
confluence of the following conditions: first, there must be an injury, whether physical, mental or
psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant; second, there must be culpable act or omission
factually established; third, the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause
of the injury sustained by the claimant; and fourth, the award of damages is predicated on any
of the cases stated in Article 2219 or Article 2220 of the Civil Code.66

Moral damages may be awarded in favor of the offended party only in criminal cases
enumerated in Article 2219, paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the Civil Code and analogous
cases, viz.:

Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases.

(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;

(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;

(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;

(4) Adultery or concubinage;

(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;

(6) Illegal search;

(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;

(8) Malicious prosecution;

(9) Acts mentioned in article 309;

(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.

The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this
article, may also recover moral damages.

The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the action
mentioned in No. 9 of this article in the order named.

Thus, the law does not intend that moral damages should be awarded in all cases where the
aggrieved party has suffered mental anguish, fright, moral anxieties, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury arising out of an act or
omission of another, otherwise, there would not have been any reason for the inclusion of
specific acts in Article 221967 and analogous cases (which refer to those cases bearing analogy
or resemblance, corresponds to some others or resembling, in other respects, as in form,
proportion, relation, etc.)68

Indeed, bigamy is not one of those specifically mentioned in Article 2219 of the Civil Code in
which the offender may be ordered to pay moral damages to the private complainant/offended
party. Nevertheless, the petitioner is liable to the private complainant for moral damages under
Article 2219 in relation to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code.
According to Article 19, "every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance
of his act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith." This
provision contains what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, and sets
certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the
performance of one’s duties. The standards are the following: act with justice; give everyone his
due; and observe honesty and good faith. The elements for abuse of rights are: (a) there is a
legal right or duty; (b) exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
another.69

Article 20 speaks of the general sanctions of all other provisions of law which do not especially
provide for its own sanction. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform to
the standards set forth in the said provision and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is
thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible.70 If the provision does not
provide a remedy for its violation, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 of
the Civil Code would be proper. Article 20 provides that "every person who, contrary to law,
willfully or negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the same." On the
other hand, Article 21 provides that "any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in
a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter
for damages." The latter provision
is adopted to remedy "the countless gaps in the statutes which leave so many victims of moral
wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury should
vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible
for human foresight to prove for specifically in the statutes." Whether or not the principle of
abuse of rights has been violated resulting in damages under Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil
Code or other applicable provisions of law depends upon the circumstances of each case.71

In the present case, the petitioner courted the private complainant and proposed to marry her.
He assured her that he was single. He even brought his parents to the house of the private
complainant where he and his parents made the same assurance – that he was single. Thus,
the private complainant agreed to marry the petitioner, who even stated in the certificate of
marriage that he was single. She lived with the petitioner and dutifully performed her duties as
his wife, believing all the while that he was her lawful husband. For two years or so until the
petitioner heartlessly abandoned her, the private complainant had no inkling that he was already
married to another before they were married.

Thus, the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioner’s chicanery and heartless
deception, the fraud consisting not of a single act alone, but a continuous series of acts. Day by
day, he maintained the appearance of being a lawful husband to the private complainant, who
changed her status from a single woman to a married woman, lost the consortium, attributes
and support of a single man she could have married lawfully and endured mental pain and
humiliation, being bound to a man who it turned out was not her lawful husband.72

The Court rules that the petitioner’s collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during and after
his marriage with the private complainant were willful, deliberate and with malice and caused
injury to the latter. That she did not sustain any physical injuries is not a bar to an award for
moral damages. Indeed, in Morris v. Macnab,73 the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled:

xxx The defendant cites authorities which indicate that, absent physical injuries, damages for
shame, humiliation, and mental anguish are not recoverable where the actor is simply negligent.
See Prosser, supra, at p. 180; 2 Harper & James, Torts, 1031 (1956). But the authorities all
recognize that where the wrong is willful rather than negligent, recovery may be had for the
ordinary, natural, and proximate consequences though they consist of shame, humiliation, and
mental anguish. See Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery Co., 117 NJL 90, 94, 186 A 585 (Sup. Ct.
1936); Kuzma v. Millinery Workers, etc., Local 24, 27 N.J. Super, 579, 591, 99 A.2d 833 (App.
Div. 1953); Prosser, supra, at p. 38. Here the defendant’s conduct was not merely negligent, but
was willfully and maliciously wrongful. It was bound to result in shame, humiliation, and mental
anguish for the plaintiff, and when such result did ensue the plaintiff became entitled not only to
compensatory but also to punitive damages. See Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery Co., supra;
Kuzma v Millinery Workers, etc., Local 24, supra. CF. Note, "Exemplary Damages in the Law of
Torts," 70 Harv. L. Rev. 517 (1957). The plaintiff testified that because of the defendant’s
bigamous marriage to her and the attendant publicity she not only was embarrassed and
"ashamed to go out" but "couldn’t sleep" but "couldn’t eat," had terrific headaches" and "lost
quite a lot of weight." No just basis appears for judicial interference with the jury’s reasonable
allowance of $1,000 punitive damages on the first count. See Cabakov v. Thatcher, 37 N.J.
Super 249, 117 A.2d 298 (App. Div.74 1955).

The Court thus declares that the petitioner’s acts are against public policy as they undermine
and subvert the family as a social institution, good morals and the interest and general welfare
of society.

Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioner’s perfidy, she is not
barred from claiming moral damages. Besides, even considerations of public policy would not
prevent her from recovery. As held in Jekshewitz v. Groswald:75

Where a person is induced by the fraudulent representation of another to do an act which, in

consequence of such misrepresentation, he believes to be neither illegal nor immoral, but which
is in fact a criminal offense, he has a right of action against the person so inducing him for
damages sustained by him in consequence of his having done such act. Burrows v. Rhodes,
[1899] 1 Q.B. 816. In Cooper v. Cooper, 147 Mass. 370, 17 N.E. 892, 9 Am. St. Rep. 721, the
court said that a false representation by the defendant that he was divorced from his former
wife, whereby the plaintiff was induced to marry him, gave her a remedy in tort for deceit. It
seems to have been assumed that the fact that she had unintentionally violated the law or
innocently committed a crime by cohabiting with him would be no bar to the action, but rather
that it might be a ground for enhancing her damages. The injury to the plaintiff was said to be in
her being led by the promise to give the fellowship and assistance of a wife to one who was not
her husband and to assume and act in a relation and condition that proved to be false and
ignominious. Damages for such an injury were held to be recoverable in Sherman v. Rawson,
102 Mass. 395 and Kelley v. Riley, 106 Mass. 339, 343, 8 Am. Rep. 336.

Furthermore, in the case at bar the plaintiff does not base her cause of action upon any
transgression of the law by herself but upon the defendant’s misrepresentation. The criminal
relations which followed, innocently on her part, were but one of the incidental results of the
defendant’s fraud for which damages may be assessed.

[7] Actions for deceit for fraudulently inducing a woman to enter into the marriage relation have
been maintained in other jurisdictions. Sears v. Wegner, 150 Mich. 388, 114 N.W. 224, 17 L.R.
A. (N.S.) 819; Larson v. McMillan, 99 Wash. 626, 170 P. 324; Blossom v. Barrett, 37 N.Y. 434,
97 Am. Dec. 747; Morril v. Palmer, 68 Vt. 1, 33 A. 829, 33 L.R.A. 411. Considerations of public
policy would not prevent recovery where the circumstances are such that the plaintiff was
conscious of no moral turpitude, that her illegal action was induced solely by the defendant’s
misrepresentation, and that she does not base her cause of action upon any transgression of
the law by herself. Such considerations
distinguish this case from cases in which the court has refused to lend its aid to the enforcement
of a contract illegal on its face or to one who has consciously and voluntarily become a party to
an illegal act upon which the cause of action is founded. Szadiwicz v. Cantor, 257 Mass. 518,
520, 154 N.E. 251, 49 A. L. R. 958.76

Considering the attendant circumstances of the case, the Court finds the award of ₱200,000.00
for moral damages to be just and reasonable.

G.R. No. 168328 February 28, 2007

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
LAILA TANYAG-SAN JOSE and MANOLITO SAN JOSE, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Respondents Laila Tanyag-San Jose (Laila) and Manolito San Jose (Manolito) were married on
June 12, 1988. Laila was 19 years and 4 months old, while Manolito was 20 years and 10
months old.1

The couple begot two children: Joana Marie who was born on January 3, 1989,2 and Norman
who was born on March 14, 1997.3

For nine years, the couple stayed with Manolito’s parents. Manolito was jobless and was
hooked to gambling and drugs. As for Laila, she sold fish at the wet market of Taguig.4

On August 20, 1998, Laila left Manolito and transferred to her parents’ house.5

On March 9, 1999, Laila filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage,6 under Article
367 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity, before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasig where it was docketed as JDRC Case No. 4862.

Testifying for Laila, Dr. Nedy Tayag, a clinical psychologist at the National Center for Mental
Health, declared that from the psychological test and clinical interview she conducted on Laila,
she found Manolito, whom she did not personally examine, to be psychologically incapacitated
to perform the duties of a husband.

Dr. Tayag’s May 28, 1999 Report on the Psychological Condition of LAILA T. SAN JOSE8 was
submitted in evidence. The pertinent portions of the Report read:

BACKGROUND DATA & BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY:

xxxx
. . . [Laila’s] association with [Manolito] started with the game of basketball. As a youngster,
petitioner often spent her free time seeking fun in the outdoors. She was then beginning to cast
her interests on basketball games and eventually became one of the avid spectators when a
minor league was staged at their place. Respondent happened to be one of the cagers who,
with his hardcourt skills, greatly impressed petitioner. The latter then became a fan of
respondent. Eventually acquiring the upper hand, respondent introduced himself personally to
his admirers and their initial encounter with petitioner proved to be a milestone for both of their
fates. Courtship followed and after a short period, they were already steadies.

Savoring the momentum, petitioner and respondent decided to formally seal their union. They
entered marriage on June 12, 1989 under religious ceremonies held in Taguig. After the
occasion, the newlyweds then went on to lead a life of their own making. However, contrary to
what was expected, their marriage turned out to be rocky right from the very start.

Claimed, respondent refused to get himself a job. Instead, he spent most of his available time
with his friends drinking intoxicating substances and gambling activities. Petitioner was left
without much choice but to flex her muscles and venture on several areas which could be a
source of income. She tried to endure the situation with the hope that respondent would change
for the better in no time. Their first child, Joana Marie, was born of January 3, 1989. Petitioner
was apparently happy with the birth of their first born, thinking that her presence would make a
difference in the family, particularly on the part of respondent.

Years had passed but no improvement was seen on respondent’s behavior. He turned out to be
worse instead and it was only later that petitioner discovered that he was into drugs. Said, he
prefers to be with his friends rather than his own family. He seemed oblivious to the efforts
rendered by petitioner just to make ends meet. She was the breadwinner of the family and
whenever an argument occurred between her and respondent, she often received the brunt of
her husband’s irrationality. On one of such incidents, she decided to separate from respondent.
The latter however pursued her and pleaded for another chance. He promised that he would
change his behavior if only petitioner would give him a son. Seeing his sincerity and unwilling to
give up the marriage, petitioner agreed to the compromise.

They reconciled and she did gave birth to a son, Norman, on March of 1997. Respondent was
happy but his show of good nature was superficial. Briefly after the birth of their second child,
respondent resumed his old ways and made them even worse.

Still, petitioner remained hopeful that something will turn out right in their union. However, with
respondent’s continuing irresponsibility, she realized that all her efforts proved nonsense to him.
On August 20, 1998, respondent went out of their dwelling for his usual late night stints but he
never came back the following morning. They never lived together since.

Respondent is MANOLITO SAN JOSE, 31 years old with last known address at 14-D Ibayo,
Tipas, Taguig, Metro Manila. He is unemployed and stayed in school only to finish his
secondary education. He was described to be a happy-go-lucky individual spending most of his
time hanging out with friends. Considered to be a bad influence, he was into gambling, drinking
sprees and prohibited drugs as well.

xxxx

REMARKS:
Through the evaluation of test data, correlated with clinical interviews and description of their
marital plight, it is the opinion of the undersigned that the disintegration of the marriage between
petitioner and respondent was caused primarily by the latter’s psychological incapacity to
perform the essential roles and obligations of a married man and a father.

His behavioral pattern characterized mainly by constant irresponsibility, lack of concern for the
welfare of others, self-centered orientation, absence of remorse, violent tendencies and his
involvement in activities defying social and moral ethics; suits under the classification of Anti-
Social Personality Disorder.

Such disorder is considered to be grave and is deeply [immersed] within the system. It
continues to influence the individual until the later stage of life.9 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Branch 70 of the RTC of Pasig, by Decision of July 17, 2001, citing Republic of the Philippines
v. Court of Appeals10and Leouel Santos v. CA, et al.11 denied Laila’s petition in this wise:

In the recent case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals and Roridel Olaviano
Molina (268 SCRA 198), the Supreme Court, reiterated its ruling [in] the earlier case of [Leouel]
Santos vs. Court of Appeals (240 SCRA 20), to the effect that "psychological incapacity should
refer to no less than a mental (not physical incapacity x x x) and that there is hardly any doubt
that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to
the most serious cases of personality disorder clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage and that such incapacity "must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."

Viewed in the light of the above guidelines, the present petition must necessarily be denied.

Petitioner’s portrayal of respondent as jobless and irresponsible is not enough. As the

Supreme Court said in the Molina case (supra), "(I)t is not enough to prove that the parties failed
to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be
shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness."

Petitioner’s case is not in any way enhanced by the psychological evaluation and assessment
done by psychologist Nedy Tayag as per her Psychological Report (Exhs. "C" to "C-1").
Although the body of the report mentions that the respondent is affected with "Anti-Social
Personality Disorder", the same cannot sway this Court from its above disposition. There is no
showing that [Dr.] Tayag was able to interview the respondent or any of his relatives in
order to arrive at the above conclusion. Obviously, the data upon which the finding or
conclusion was based is inadequate.12 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Laila’s motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s decision was, by Order of November 13,
2001,13 denied. Laila thus appealed to the Court of Appeals which docketed it as CA G.R. CV
No. 73286, faulting the trial court in holding that she failed to comply with the guidelines
enumerated in Molina.

By Decision dated February 15, 2005,14 the appellate court, finding Manolito psychologically
incapacitated after considering "the totality of the evidence," reversed the decision of the trial
court and declared the marriage between him and Laila void ab initio. Thus the appellate court
held:
. . . We perused the records of the present case and unearthed that the totality of the evidence
presented in the present case – including the testimony of the petitioner, were enough to sustain
a finding that Manolito San Jose is psychologically incapacitated within the contemplation of the
Family Code. We believe that his (respondent’s) defects were already present at the inception
of the marriage or that they are incurable. If being jobless (since the commencement of the
marriage up to the filing of the present petition) and worse, a gambler, can hardly qualify
as being mentally or physically ill – what then can We describe such acts? Are these
normal manners of a married man? We are not at all swayed that a union affirmed in church
rites and subsequently having children, are proofs that either of the spouses is mature and
responsible enough to assume marital responsibilities.1awphi1.net

Accordingly, We can safely conclude that said deficiency is so grave and so permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about
to assume. This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found
themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can
do no less but to declare the marriage between the herein petitioner and the respondent herein
dissolved. While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity ([A]rticle 68 of the Family Code), however, what is
there to preserve when the other spouse is an unwilling party to the cohesion and creation
of a family as an inviolable social institution. In fine, Laila Tanyag-San Jose must be allowed
to rise from the ashes and begin a new life—freed from a marriage which, to Us, was hopeless
from the beginning and where the bonding could not have been possible.

xxxx

While We may not have strictly adhered to the ruling in the Molina case in arriving at Our
present conclusion – We have reason to deviate from the same. In view of the peculiar
circumstances attendant in this case, We were constrained to take exception from the Molina
case. Note that the "(c) ommittee did not give any example of psychological incapacity for the
fear that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis. Rather, the Committee would like the judge to apply the provision on a
case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decision of Church tribunals which although not binding on the
civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law."
(page 37, Handbook of the Family Code of the Philippines, Sempio-Diy, 1991 reprinted). Hence,
whether or not psychological incapacity exists is for Us to establish, as there is no hard and fast
rule in the determination of what maybe considered indicia of psychological incapacity. To Our
mind there are sufficient grounds for Us to conclude that indeed psychological incapacity exists
so as to warrant declaration of the marriage void ab initio.15 (Italics and underscoring in the
original; emphasis supplied)

Petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, filed a Motion for Reconsideration16 of the appellate
court’s decision which was denied, by Resolution dated June 2, 2005,17 hence, its present
Petition for Review,18 positing that:

IT WAS NOT PROVEN THAT MANOLITO’S ALLEGED DEFECTS ARE CONSTITUTIVE OF

PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY AS CONTEMPLATED UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY
CODE AND THAT THE SAME HAS JURIDICAL ANTECEDENCE, IS GRAVE AND
INCURABLE[, AND]

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ADHERING TO THE

RULING OF THE MOLINA CASE AND THE DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS.19

Petitioner contends that Laila failed to prove that Manolito is psychologically incapacitated to
perform his marital obligations as she merely relied on the report of Dr. Tayag; and granted that
the psychological examination of Manolito is not a requirement for a declaration of his
psychological incapacity, the totality of the evidence presented does not show Manolito’s
psychological incapacity.

Petitioner further contends that the appellate court erred in believing that the "defects" of
Manolito already existed at the inception of the marriage or are incurable; and in any event,
"belief" cannot substitute for proof which the law and jurisprudence require.

Petitioner finally contends that a deviation from the Molina ruling is not proper in the present
case.

Laila, as petitioner, had the burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage.

Psychological incapacity, as a ground for nullity of marriage, has been succinctly expounded in
the recent case of Ma. Armida Perez-Ferraris v. Brix Ferraris (Ferraris),20 thus:

The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of the
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. As
all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics associated
with certain personality disorders, there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. It is for this reason that the Court relies heavily on
psychological experts for its understanding of the human personality. However, the root cause
must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature must be fully
explained[.] (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)

As the earlier-quoted Report of Dr. Tayag shows, her conclusion about Manolito’s psychological
incapacity was based on the information supplied by Laila which she found to be "factual." That
Laila supplied the basis of her conclusion, Dr. Tayag confirmed at the witness stand:

Q [Atty. Revilla, Jr.]: What was your conclusion, what w[ere] your findings with respect to the
respondent?

A [Dr. Tayag]: Base[d] on the narration made by [Laila], which I found the narration to be
factual, regarding her marital relationship with the petitioner (should have been respondent), I
came up with a conclusion that respondent is psychologically incapacitated. The one which I
found in him is his anti-social personality disorder because of the following overt manipulations:
the presence of drug, the absence of remourse [sic], the constant incapacity in terms of
maintaining the marital relationship, the lack of concern to his family, his self-centeredness, lack
of remourse, in addition to the womanizing, respondent which clearly connotes the defiant of
moral and personality disorder, he is tantamount to a person under the level, under our
diagnostic criteria labeled as anti-social personality disorder, sir.

Q: So you would like to impress this Court that your findings with respect to this case were only
base[d] on the information given to you by [Laila], is that correct?

A: Yes, wherein I found the narration made by [Laila] to be factual, sir.21 (Emphasis
supplied)

Undoubtedly, the doctor’s conclusion is hearsay. It is "unscientific and unreliable," so this Court
declared in Choa v. Choa22 where the assessment of the therein party sought to be declared
psychologically incapacitated was based merely on the information communicated to the doctor
by the therein respondent-spouse:

. . . [T]he assessment of petitioner by Dr. Gauzon was based merely on descriptions

communicated to him by respondent. The doctor never conducted any psychological
examination of her. Neither did he ever claim to have done so. In fact, his Professional Opinion
began with the statement "[I]f what Alfonso Choa said about his wife Leni is true, . . ."

xxxx

Obviously, Dr. Gauzon had no personal knowledge of the facts he testified to, as these had
merely been relayed to him by respondent. The former was working on pure
suppositions and secondhand information fed to him by one side. Consequently, his
testimony can be dismissed as unscientific and unreliable.23(Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Parenthetically, Dr. Tayag’s Psychological Report does not even show that the alleged anti-
social personality disorder of Manolito was already present at the inception of the marriage or
that it is incurable. Neither does it explain the incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder nor
identify its root cause. It merely states that "[s]uch disorder is considered to be grave and is
deeply [immersed] within the system [and] continues to influence the individual until the later
stage of life."

There is of course no requirement that the person sought to be declared psychologically

incapacitated should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine
qua non to arrive at such declaration.24 If it can be proven by independent means that one is
psychologically incapacitated, there is no reason why the same should not be credited.

In the present case, the only proof which bears on the claim that Manolito is psychologically
incapacitated is the following testimony of Laila, in answer to the clarificatory questions
propounded by the trial court:

Q [Court]: Now, so aside from what you said that your husband is a drug user and that he
is jobless and was not able to support your family, what other reasons do you have for saying
that your husband is psychologically incapacitated from performing his marital obligations?
A [Laila]: He cannot give us a brighter future because he is jobless, your honor.

Q: Apart from these two reasons which is for alleged use or possession of drugs and his inability
to get a job and support his family you have no other basis to show for the declaration of nullity
of your marriage?

A: Yes, your honor.25 (Underscoring supplied)

Manolito’s alleged psychological incapacity is thus premised on his being jobless and a drug
user, as well as his inability to support his family and his refusal or unwillingness to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Manolito’s state or condition or attitude has not been shown,
however, to be a malady or disorder rooted on some incapacitating or debilitating psychological
condition.

In Molina, where the therein respondent preferred to spend more time with his friends than with
his family, this Court found the same to be more of a "difficulty" if not outright "refusal" or
"neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations.

In Ferraris,26 this Court held:

We find respondent’s alleged mixed personality disorder, the "leaving-the- house" attitude
whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity,
the abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend more time with his band
mates than his family, are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere
refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage. (Underscoring
supplied)

Also in Ferraris, this Court held that habitual alcoholism, just like sexual infidelity or perversion
and abandonment, does not by itself constitute ground for declaring a marriage void based on
psychological incapacity.27 Neither is emotional immaturity and irresponsibility.28 Or failure or
refusal to meet duties and responsibilities of a married man if it is not shown to be due to some
psychological (not physical) illness.29

While Molina then is not set in stone,30 the facts and circumstances attendant to this case do not
warrant a deviation from it.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The February 15, 2005 Decision and June 2, 2005
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA- G.R. CV No. 73286 are REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE. The July 17, 2001 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City in JDRC Case No.
4862 is REINSTATED.

G.R. No. 204494

JO-ANN DIAZ-SALGADO and husband DR. GERARD C. SALGADO, Petitioners

vs.
LUIS G. ANSON, Respondent
 DECISION

REYES, J.:

Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari1under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Decision2dated August 6, 2012 and the Resolution3 dated November 26, 2012 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 92989. The CA affirmed the Decision4 dated July
23, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 155, in Civil Case No. 69611.

The Facts

On September 5, 2003, Luis Anson (Luis) filed a Complaint5 docketed as Civil Case No. 69611
against Jo-Ann Diaz-Salgado (Jo-Ann) and Gerard Salgado (Gerard) (Spouses Salgado) along
with Maria Luisa Anson-Maya (Maria Luisa) and Gaston Maya (Spouses Maya), seeking the
annulment of the three Unilateral Deeds of Sale6 dated January 23, 2002 and the Deed of
Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of the Deceased Severina De Asis dated October 25, 2002.7

Luis alleged in his complaint that he is the surv1vmg spouse of the late Severina de Asis-Anson
(Severina). They were married in a civil ceremony on December 28, 1966. Prior to the
celebration of their marriage, Severina gave birth to their daughter, Maria Luisa on December
30, 1965 while Jo-Ann is Severina's daughter from a previous relationship.8

During his marital union with Severina, they acquired several real properties located in San
Juan, Metro Manila, covered by the following Transfer Certificate of Title/s (TCT/s):

1. TCT No. 20618/T-104 (now TCT No. 11105-R),

2. TCTNo. 60069/T-301(nowTCTNo. 11106-R),

3. TCTNo. 5109/T-26 (nowTCTNo. 11107),

4. TCT No. 8478-R/T-43 (now TCT No. 11076-R),

5. TCT No. 44637/T-224-II (now TCT No. 11078-R), and

6. TCT No. 8003/T-41 (now TCT No. 11077-R).9

According to Luis, because there was no marriage settlement between him and Severina, the
above-listed properties pertain to their conjugal partnership. But without his knowledge and
consent, Severina executed three separate Unilateral Deeds of Sale on January 23, 2002
transferring the properties covered by TCT Nos. 20618, 60069 and 5109 in favor of Jo-Ann, who
secured new certificates of title over the said properties.10 When Severina died on September
21, 2002,11 Maria Luisa executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of Deceased
Severina de Asis on October 25, 2002, adjudicating herself as Severina's sole heir. She
secured new TCTs over the properties covered by TCT Nos. 8478-R, 44637 and 8003.12

Luis claimed that because of the preceding acts, he was divested of his lawful share in the
conjugal properties and of his inheritance as a compulsory heir of Severina.13
In Jo-Ann's Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim,14 which the trial court considered as the
Answer of her husband, Gerard,15 Jo-Ann countered that she was unaware of any marriage
contracted by her mother with Luis. She knew however that Luis and Severina had a common-
law relationship which they both acknowledged and formally terminated through a Partition
Agreement16 executed in November 1980. This was implemented through another Partition
Agreement17 executed in April 1981. Thus, Luis had already received the properties apportioned
to him by virtue of the said agreement while the properties subject of the Unilateral Deeds of
Sale were acquired exclusively by Severina. The TCTs covering Severina's properties were
under Severina's name only and she was described therein as single without reference to any
husband.18

Meanwhile, the Spouses Maya corroborated the Spouses Salgado's stance in their
Answer,19 stating that Maria Luisa is also not aware that Luis and Severina were married. She is
cognizant of the fact that Luis and Severina lived together as common-law husband and wife - a
relationship which was terminated upon execution of a Partition Agreement. In the Partition
Agreement, Luis and Severina were described as single and they acknowledged that they were
living together as common-law spouses. They also mutually agreed to the partition of the
properties they owned in common. Hence, Luis already received his share in the
properties20 and is estopped from denying the same.21 After the termination of their cohabitation
in 1980, Luis went to United States of America (USA), married one Teresita Anson and had a
son with her; while Maria Luisa was left under the guardianship and custody of Severina.22 It
was after the death of Severina that Maria Luisa executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement
of the Estate of the Deceased Severina de Asis on October 25, 2002. The Spouses Maya were
also able to obtain a Certificate of No Record of Marriage23 (between Luis and Severina) from
the Office the Civil Registrar General of the National Statistics Office.24

Trial ensued thereafter. After Luis gave his testimony and presented documentary evidence
which included a certified true copy of his marriage contract with Severina,25 the Spouses
Salgado and Spouses Maya filed their respective Demurrers to Evidence.26 The Spouses
Salgado disputed the validity of Luis and Severina's marriage on the ground of lack of marriage
license as borne out by the marriage contract. They further claimed that Luis himself disclosed
on cross-examination that he did not procure a marriage license prior to the alleged
marriage.27 Luis had also admitted the existence, due execution and authenticity of the Partition
Agreement.28 The logical conclusion therefore is that the properties disposed in favor of Jo-Ann
were owned by Severina as her own, separate and exclusive properties, which she had all the
right to dispose of, without the conformity of Luis.29

On February 16, 2006, the trial court denied both demurrers, explaining that the sufficiency of
evidence presented by Luis is evidentiary in nature and may only be controverted by evidence
to the contrary.30 The Spouses Salgado and Spouses Maya filed their separate motions for
reconsideration,31 which the trial court denied.32 Consequently, both the Spouses Salgado and
Spouses ·Maya filed their respective petitions for certiorari with the CA.33 Meanwhile, the
Spouses Salgado were deemed to have waived their presentation of evidence when they failed
to attend the scheduled hearings before the trial court.34

Resolving the petition for certiorari on the demurrer to evidence filed by the Spouses Salgado,
the CA Second Division directed the trial court "to properly resolve with deliberate dispatch the
demurrer to evidence in accordance with Section 3, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure by stating clearly and distinctly the reason therefor on the basis of [the Spouses
Salgado's] proffered evidence[,]"35 whereas the CA Ninth Division dismissed the petition of the
Spouses Maya and ordered the trial court to decide the case with deliberate dispatch.36

In an Order37 dated July 16, 2007, the RTC, in compliance with the order of the CA to resolve
the demurrer to evidence in more specific terms, denied the twin demurrers to evidence for lack
of merit and held that the totality of evidence presented by Luis has sufficiently established his
right to obtain the reliefs prayed for in his complaint.

Ruling of the RTC

On July 23, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision38 in favor of Luis, holding that the marriage
between Luis and Severina was valid. It noted that the marriage contract, being a public
document, enjoys the presumption of regularity in its execution and is conclusive as to the fact
of marriage.39 The trial court also based its ruling in Geronimo v. CA40where the validity of
marriage was upheld despite the absence of the marriage license number on the marriage
contract.41 The trial court thus declared that the properties covered by the Unilateral Deeds of
Sale were considered conjugal which cannot be disposed of by Severina without the consent of
her husband, Luis.42

The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of [Luis] and against
[the Spouses Salgado] ordering as follows:

1. ANNULMENT, VOIDING, SETTING ASIDE and DECLARING OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT

of the three (3) Unilateral Deeds of Sale, all dated January 23, 2002 executed by [Severina] in
favor of [Jo-Ann];

2. ANNULMENT, VOIDING, SETTING ASIDE and DECLARING OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT

of the three (3) [TCT] Nos. 11107-R, 11105-R and 11106-R covering the subject properties, all
issued in the name of [Jo-Ann] by the Registry of Deeds for San Juan, Metro Manila;

3. RESTITUTION of all properties covered by TCT Nos. 11107-R, 11105-R and 11106-R
(formerly TCT Nos. 5109, 20618 and 60069, respectively) to the conjugal community of
properties between [Luis] and [Severina].

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.43

On November 17, 2008, the RTC rendered another Decision44 which ordered the
"ANNULMENT, VOIDING, SETTING ASIDE and DECLARING OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT
the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of the Deceased Severina De Asis executed by
[Maria Luisa] dated October 25, 2002 x x x."45 The RTC also ordered the cancellation of new
TCTs issued by virtue of the said Deeds.46

The Spouses Salgado and the Spouses Maya filed their respective motions for reconsideration
on September 11, 200747 and August 28, 2007,48 respectively, which the RTC denied in the
Omnibus Order49 dated October 30, 2007 for lack of merit. This prompted the Spouses Salgado
and Spouses Maya to file their separate notices of appeal before the CA on December 13,
200750 and April 24, 2009,51 respectively.

Ruling of the CA

The Spouses Maya and Luis thereafter entered into a Compromise Agreement52 which was
approved by the CA in its Decision53 dated October 26, 2011. This resulted in the termination of
the Spouses Maya's appeal.54

On August 6, 2012, the CA rendered a Decision,55 dismissing the appeal of the Spouses
Salgado. The fallo reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the appeal interposed by [the Spouses Salgado] is DISMISSED. The Decision
dated July 23, 2007 of the [RTC] of Pasig is AFFIRMED IN TOTO.

SO ORDERED.56

The CA sustained the ruling of the RTC for the simple reason that the Spouses Salgado did not
present and formally offer any testimonial and documentary evidence to controvert the evidence
presented by Luis.57 The CA further explained that "the best evidence to establish the absence
of a marriage license is a certification from the Local Civil Registrar that the parties to the
Marriage Contract did not secure a marriage license or at the very least a certification from the
said office that despite diligent search, no record of application for or a marriage license was
issued on or before December 28, 1966 in favor of Luis and Severina. Again, Spouses Salgado
failed to prove the same by their failure to secure the said certification and present evidence
during the trial."58

The Spouses Salgado and Spouses Maya filed a motion for reconsideration59 which the CA
denied through its Resolution60 dated November 26, 2012.

The Spouses Salgado elevated the matter before the Court raising the core issue of whether the
CA committed reversible error in affirming the RTC decision which declared the marriage
between Luis and Severina valid and the subject lands as conjugal properties.

Ruling of the Court

The Spouses Salgado argue that the marriage between Luis and Severina is null and void for
want of marriage license based on the Marriage Contract61 presented by Luis which has
adequately established its absence.62

Luis, in his Comment,63 opposes the filing of the present petition on the ground that it raises a
question of fact, which cannot be raised in a petition for review on certiorari. He also countered
that the Spouses Salgado did not present any evidence to support their theory.64 If the existence
of the marriage license is in issue, it is incumbent upon the Spouses Salgado to show the lack
of marriage license by clear and convincing evidence.65

Before proceeding to the substantive issues brought in this petition, the Court shall first tackle
the procedural issue raised by Luis which pertains to the propriety of the filing of this petition for
review on certiorari.
Contrary to Luis' contention, the present petition raises a question of law, mainly, whether the
absence of a marriage license may be proven on the basis of a marriage contract which states
that no marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer on account of the marriage
being of an exceptional character.

In any event, while the jurisdiction of the Court in cases brought before it from the appellate
court is, as a general rule, limited to reviewing errors of law, there are exceptions66 recognized
by the Court, such as when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by
the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.67

Since the marriage between Luis and Severina was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code, the applicable law to determine its validity is the Civil Code, the law in effect at the
time of its celebration68 on December 28, 1966.

A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 5369 of the Civil Code, and the
absence thereof, save for marriages of exceptional character,70 renders the marriage void ab
initio pursuant to Article 80(3 ). It sets forth:

Art. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

xxxx

(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character;

x x x x. (Emphasis ours)

"Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title III,
comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at
the point of death during peace or war, (2) marriages in remote places, (3) consular marriages,
(4) ratification of marital cohabitation, (5) religious ratification of a civil marriage, (6)
Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and (7) mixed marriages."71 To reiterate, in any of the
aforementioned marriages of exceptional character, the requirement of a valid marriage license
is dispensed with.

The marriage is not of an

exceptional character

A cursory examination of the marriage contract of Luis and Severina reveals that no marriage
license number was indicated therein. It also appears therein that no marriage license was
exhibited to the solemnizing officer with Article 77 of Republic Act No. 386 (Civil Code) being
cited as the reason therefor. The pertinent portion of the marriage contract is quoted as follows:

[A]nd I further certify that Marriage License No. x x x issued at x x x on x x x, 19 x x x in favor of,
said parties, was exhibited to me or no marriage license was exhibited to me, this marriage
being of an exceptional character performed under Art. 77 of Rep. Act 386; x x x.72

The reference to Article 77 of the Civil Code in the marriage contract is not dismissible. Being a
public document, the marriage contract is not only a prima facie proof of marriage, but is also
a prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. This is pursuant to Section 44, Rule 130 of
the 1997 Rules of Court, which reads:

Sec. 44. Entries in official records. - Entries in official records made in the performance of his
duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially
enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.

Consequently, the entries made in Luis and Severina's marriage contract are prima facie proof
that at the time of their marriage, no marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer
for the reason that their marriage is of an exceptional character under Article 77 of the Civil
Code.

Article 77 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 77. In case two persons married in accordance with law desire to ratify their union in
conformity with the regulations, rites, or practices of any church, sect, or religion, it shall no
longer be necessary to comply with the requirements of Chapter 1 of this Title and any
ratification made shall merely be considered as a purely religious ceremony.

The foregoing provision pertains to a religious ceremony performed with the purpose of ratifying
a marriage which was solemnized civilly. In the eyes of the law, the marriage already exists; the
subsequent ceremony is undertaken merely to conform to religious practices. Thus, the parties
are exempted from complying with the required issuance of marriage license insofar as the
subsequent religious ceremony is concerned. For this exemption to be applicable, it is sine qua
non that: (1) the parties to the religious ceremony must already be married to each other in
accordance with law (civil marriage); and (2) the ratifying ceremony is purely religious in
nature.

Applied to the present case however, it is clear that Luis and Severina were not married to each
other prior to the civil ceremony officiated on December 28, 1966 - the only date of marriage
appearing on the records. This was also consistently affirmed by Luis in open court:

Atty. Francisco:

Q- You testified that you have a Marriage Contract marked as Exhibit A certifying that you were
married to the late [Severina].

A- Yes, sir.

Q- Do you recall when this marriage took place?

A- As far as I can recall it was sometime two (2) days before my daughter get (sic) one (1)
year old. That was 1966 December something like 28, because she was born December 30,
the death of Jose Rizal. I can remember 1965. So, before she turned one (1) year old two (2)
days before we got married here in San Juan.

Q- So, when was she born if you can recall?

A- Maria Luisa was born on December 30, 1965.

Q- If it is two (2) days before, it should be 1966?

A- Yes, sir.

Q- If you can recall who solemnized the marriage?

A- It was the late Mayor Ebona of San Juan.73

xxxx

[Atty. Valenton:] x x x You alleged during your direct examination that you were married to
[Severina]?

A: Yes sir.

Q: When do you say you marr[ied] her?

A: Two (2) days before our daughter turned one year old, so that is December 28,
1966.74(Emphasis ours)

Being that the ceremony held on December 28, 1966 was the only marriage ceremony between
the parties and this was not solemnized pursuant to any ratifying religious rite, practice or
regulation but a civil one officiated by the mayor, this marriage does not fall under the purview of
Article 77 of the Civil Code. It is evident that the twin requirements of the provision, which
are: prior civil marriage between the parties and a ratifying religious ceremony, were not
complied with. There is no prior ceremony to ratify. Thus, this marriage is not of an exceptional
character and a marriage license is required for Luis and Severina's marriage to be valid.

Absence of marriage license

The next issue to be resolved is: who has the burden of proving the existence or non-existence
of the marriage license?

Since there was an unequivocal declaration on the marriage contract itself that no marriage
license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer at the time of marriage owing to Article 77 of the
Civil Code, when in truth, the said exception does not obtain in their case, it is the burden of
Luis to prove that they secured the required marriage license.

However, instead of proving that a marriage license was indeed issued to them at the time of
their marriage, Luis relied mainly on the presumption of validity of marriage. This presumption
does not hold water vis-a-vis a prima facie evidence (marriage contract), which on its face has
established that no marriage license was presented to the solemnizing officer. If there was a
marriage license issued to Luis and Severina, its absence on the marriage contract was not
explained at all. Neither the original nor a copy of the marriage license was presented. No other
witness also testified to prove its existence, whereas Luis is not the best witness to testify
regarding its issuance. He admitted that he did not apply for one, and is uncertain about the
documents they purportedly submitted in the Municipal Hall. As he revealed in his testimony:

ATTY. VALENTON:
Q- How did you prepare for the alleged wedding that took place between you and
[Severina]?

A TTY. FRANCISCO: May I know the materiality, Your Honor?

ATTY. VALENTON: We are exploring as to whether there was really a wedding that took place,
Your Honor.

COURT: Answer.

What preparations were done?

A- There was no preparation because we were just visitors of the Mayor during that time
and the Mayor is a close friend of ours.1âwphi1 So, when he knew that we are traveling,
we are going to Thailand with the invitation of a friend to work with him in Thailand, he
told us you better get married first before you travel because your daughter will be
illegitimate.75

xxxx

ATTY. VALENTON:

Q- Do you remember having applied for a marriage license?

A- We did not.

Q- So, you are telling us that there is no marriage license?

A- No.

CLARIFICATORY QUESTIONS BY THE COURT TO THE WITNESS

[Q-] There was no marriage license?

A- Well, when you get married you have to get a marriage license.

COURT:

Not necessarily.

A- But, I don't know whether there was an application for the license because it was at the
house of the Mayor.

COURT:

But in this particular case before you went to the house of the Mayor for the
solemnization of your marriage, did you apply for a marriage license?

A- No. 76
x x xx

RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION OF

[LUIS]:

Q- Mr. Anson, a while ago during your cross-examination you were asked by counsel as
well as a question was raised by the Honorable Court whether or not you applied for a
marriage license when you got married on December 28, 1966 allegedly with [Severina].
Can you tell the Court what you meant by that?

COURT:

By what?

ATTY. FRANCISCO:

When he was asked, Your Honor, by the Honorable Court.

COURT:

Whether he applied?

ATTY. FRANCISCO:

Whether he applied for a marriage license prior to the solemnization of the marriage, you
answered No.

WITNESS:

I did not apply for such, all what I know is to sign something affidavit or application
before we went to the house of the Mayor to get marry (sic) but that was about - - I cannot
recall if that past (sic) a week or 2 days or 3 days ago.

ATTY. FRANCISCO:

Q- You mentioned, we signed an affidavit or application, when you used we, whom are you
referring to?

A- [Severina].

Q- And, yourself?

A- Yes.

Q- In your recollection, where did you file those affidavits with [Severina] before the
solemnization of the marriage?
A- It was in the Municipal Hall. I do not know whether that was the Registrar, Office of the
[M]ayor or Office of the Chief of Police.1awp++i1 I cannot recall. It is inside the Munisipyo
of San Juan.

Q- Who made you sign that Affidavit?

A- The Chief of Police whom we get (sic) to be (sic) witness for our marriage. They let us signed
(sic) an application or affidavit. I cannot recall what it is.77 (Emphasis ours)

In upholding the supposed validity of the marriage, the RTC and the CA failed to consider the
glaring statements in the marriage contract that no marriage license was exhibited to the
solemnizing officer and that the marriage is of an exceptional character under Article 77 of the
Civil Code, the latter statement being fallacious. Both the RTC and CA upheld the fact of
marriage based on the marriage contract but simply glossed over the part stating that the
marriage is of an exceptional character. It is inevitable to deduce that this is not a case of mere
non-recording of the marriage license number on the marriage contract, as was in Geronimo.78

The factual antecedents in Geronimo are not on all fours with the case under review, hence,
inapplicable. In Geronimo, despite the absence of the marriage license number on the marriage
contract presented by therein petitioner (brother of the deceased), there was no statement
therein that the marriage is of an exceptional character. Various witnesses also testified that the
deceased and her husband were indeed married. More importantly, the husband of the
deceased was able to produce a copy of the marriage contract on file with the National Archives
and Records Section where the marriage license number appears.

"[T]o be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that
the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at
the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage
license was issued to the parties."79 Considering that the absence of the marriage license is
apparent on the marriage contract itself, with a false statement therein that the marriage is of an
exceptional character, and no proof to the contrary was presented, there is no other plausible
conclusion other than that the marriage between Luis and Severina was celebrated without a
valid marriage license and is thus, void ab initio.

In Republic of the Philippines v. Dayot,80the Court similarly declared that a marriage solemnized
without a marriage license based on a fabricated claim of exceptional character, is void. In lieu
of a marriage license, therein parties to the marriage executed a false affidavit of marital
cohabitation. In declaring the marriage void, the Court rejected the notion that all the formal and
essential requisites of marriage were complied with. The Court held that to permit a false
affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to allow an abject circumvention of the law. It
was further explained:

We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in the parties'
affidavit will not affect the validity of marriage, since all the essential and formal requisites were
complied with. The argument deserves scant merit. Patently, it cannot be denied that the
marriage between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without the formal requisite of a marriage
license. Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal requirement in Article 76, that they
should have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted
from the requirement of a marriage license.
 xxxx

Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage under a
license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a
marriage not be invalidated by a fabricated statement that the parties have cohabited for at least
five years as required by law. The contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference to an
irregularity of the marriage license, and not to the absence of one. Here, there is no marriage
license at all. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period
of Jose and Felisa's cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to
the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a
quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties
under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of
paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all.81

The Court cannot turn a blind eye to the statements made in the marriage contract because
these refer to the absence of a formal requisite of marriage. "The parties should not be afforded
any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing element
as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from
securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the
exception."82 "The requirement and issuance of marriage license is the State's demonstration of
its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general
public is interested. This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the State
recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the family as a basic
'autonomous social institution."'83

Partition Agreement is Valid

Relative to the properties they amassed during the period of their cohabitation, Luis and
Severina executed a notarized Partition Agreement84 in November 1980, which divided their
properties between them without court intervention. Luis sought to annul such agreement on the
ground that "the separation of property is not effected by the mere execution of the contract or
agreement of the parties, but by the decree of the court approving the same. It, therefore,
becomes effective only upon judicial approval, without which it is void."85

The Court does not subscribe to Luis' posture.

In Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City,86the Court held that "[i]n a void
marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period
of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may
be, of the Family Code. Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of the Civil Code x x x."87 It
provides:

Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under
a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the
property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by
the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together
shall be presumed to have been obtained by their .ioint efforts, work or industry, and
shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not
participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have
contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care
and maintenance of the family and of the household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the
property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the
other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad
faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of
or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall
belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share
shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of
the cohabitation.88 (Emphasis ours)

As there is no showing that Luis and Severina were incapacitated to marry each other at the
time of their cohabitation and considering that their marriage is void from the beginning for lack
of a valid marriage license, Article 144 of the Civil Code,89 in relation to Article 147 of the Family
Code, are the pertinent provisions of law governing their property relations. Article 147 of the
Family Code "applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any
impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like
absence of a marriage license."90 "Under this property regime, property acquired by both
spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-
ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been
obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the
property shall still be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's 'efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household."'91

Accordingly, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code shall apply in the partition of
the properties co-owned by Luis and Severina. It is stated under Article 1079 of the Civil Code
that "partition, in general, is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common
among those to whom it may belong. The thing itself may be divided, or its value." As to how
partition may be validly done, Article 496 of the Civil Code is precise that "partition may be made
by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings x x x." The law does not impose
a judicial approval for the agreement to be valid. Hence, even without the same, the partition
was validly done by Luis and Severina through the execution of the Partition Agreement.

Moreover, Luis admitted the existence, due execution and authenticity of the Partition
Agreement.92 It also remains uncontroverted that he already received his share as stipulated in
the Partition Agreement. As such, the Court finds no reason to have the said agreement
declared null and void or annulled, in the absence of any circumstance which renders such
contract invalid or at least, voidable.

All things considered, the Court holds that although a certification of no record of marriage
license or certification of "due search and inability to find" a record or entry issued by the local
civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of the license,93 such certification is not
the only proof that could validate the absence of a marriage license.
In this case, the categorical statement on Luis and Severina's marriage contract that no
marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer, coupled with a contrived averment
therein that the marriage is of an exceptional character under Article 77 of the Civil Code, are
circumstances which cannot be disregarded. Incidentally, it may be well to note that Luis' failure
to assert his marriage to Severina during the latter's lifetime is suspect. Luis left for the USA in
1981, and until Severina' s death in 2002, he never saw, much less reconciled with her.94 All
those years, he never presented himself to be the husband of Severina. Not even their
daughter, Maria Luisa, knew of the marriage. During trial, he never presented any other witness
to the marriage. He contends that his marriage to Severina was valid and subsisting, yet he
knowingly contracted a subsequent marriage abroad. Verily, Luis failed to prove the validity of
their marriage based on the evidence he himself had presented.

"The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and would
lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary
parties, which was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by making a prior license a
prerequisite for a valid marriage. The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not
just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well."95

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 6, 2012 and the
Resolution dated November 26, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 92989 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 69611
is DISMISSED.

G.R. No. 159590 October 18, 2004

HONGKONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION LIMITED, petitioner,

vs.
CECILIA DIEZ CATALAN, respondent.

x----------------------------x

G.R. No. 159591 October 18, 2004

HSBC INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEE LIMITED, petitioner,

vs.
CECILIA DIEZ CATALAN, respondent.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before us are two petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
separately filed by the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited (HSBANK) and
HSBC International Trustee Limited (HSBC TRUSTEE). They seek the reversal of the
consolidated Decision,1 dated August 14, 2003, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
Nos. 75756 and 75757, which dismissed the petitions for certiorari of herein petitioners assailing
the Order, dated May 15, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, Bacolod City (RTC) in
Civil Case No. 01-11372 that denied their respective motions to dismiss the amended complaint
of respondent Cecilia Diez Catalan.

The factual antecedents are as follows:

On January 29, 2001, respondent filed before the RTC, a complaint for a sum of money
with damages against petitioner HSBANK, docketed as Civil Case No. 01-11372, due to
HSBANK’s alleged wanton refusal to pay her the value of five HSBANK checks issued
by Frederick Arthur Thomson (Thomson) amounting to HK$3,200,000.00.2

On February 7, 2001, summons was served on HSBANK at the Enterprise Center, Tower I,
Ayala Avenue corner Paseo de Roxas St., Makati City.3 HSBANK filed a Motion for Extension of
Time to File Answer or Motion to Dismiss dated February 21, 2001.4 Then, it filed a Motion to
Dismiss, dated March 8, 2001, on the grounds that (a) the RTC has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the complaint; (b) the RTC has not acquired jurisdiction for failure of the
plaintiff to pay the correct filing or docket fees; (c) the RTC has no jurisdiction over the person of
HSBANK; (d) the complaint does not state a cause of action against HSBANK; and (e) plaintiff
engages in forum-shopping.5

On September 10, 2001, Catalan filed an Amended Complaint impleading petitioner HSBC
TRUSTEE as co-defendant and invoking Article 19 of the Civil Code as basis for her cause of
action.6

The Amended Complaint alleges:

Defendants HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE, doing business in the Philippines, are
corporations duly organized under the laws of the British Virgin Islands with head office
at 1 Grenville Street, St. Helier Jersey, Channel Islands and with branch offices at Level
12, 1 Queen’s Road Central, Hongkong and may be served with summons and other
court processes through their main office in Manila with address at HSBC, the Enterprise
Center, Tower 1, Ayala Avenue corner Paseo de Roxas Street, Makati City.

Sometime in March 1997, Thomson issued five HSBANK checks payable to Catalan, to wit:

CHECK NO. DATE AMOUNT

807852 Mar. 15, 1997 $600,000.00
807853 Mar. 17, 1997 800,000.00
807854 Mar. 17, 1997 600,000.00
807855 Mar. 22, 1997 600,000.00
807856 Mar. 23, 1997 600,000.00

TOTAL $3,200,000.00

The checks when deposited were returned by HSBANK purportedly for reason of "payment
stopped" pending confirmation, despite the fact that the checks were duly funded. On March 18,
1997, Thomson wrote a letter to a certain Ricky Sousa7 of HSBANK confirming the checks he
issued to Catalan and requesting that all his checks be cleared. On March 20, 1997, Thomson
wrote another letter to Sousa of HSBANK requesting an advice in writing to be sent to the
Philippine National Bank, through the fastest means, that the checks he previously issued to
Catalan were already cleared. Thereafter, Catalan demanded that HSBANK make good the
checks issued by Thomson. On May 16, 1997, Marilou A. Lozada, personal secretary and
attorney-in-fact of Thomson, wrote a letter to Sousa of HSBANK informing him that HSBANK’s
failure to clear all the checks had saddened Thomson and requesting that the clearing of the
checks be facilitated. Subsequently, Thomson died and Catalan forwarded her demand to
HSBC TRUSTEE. Catalan sent photocopies of the returned checks to HSBC TRUSTEE. Not
satisfied, HSBC TRUSTEE through deceit and trickery, required Catalan, as a condition for the
acceptance of the checks, to submit the original copies of the returned checks, purportedly, to
hasten payment of her claim. HSBC TRUSTEE succeeded in its calculated deception because
on April 21, 1999, Catalan and her former counsel went to Hongkong at their own expense to
personally deliver the originals of the returned checks to the officers of HSBC TRUSTEE,
anxious of receiving the money value of the checks but HSBC TRUSTEE despite receipt of the
original checks, refused to pay Catalan’s claim. Having seen and received the original of the
checks, upon its request, HSBC TRUSTEE is deemed to have impliedly accepted the checks.
Moreover, the refusal of HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE to pay the checks is equivalent to
illegal freezing of one’s deposit. On the assurance of HSBC TRUSTEE that her claim will soon
be paid, as she was made to believe that payments of the checks shall be made by HSBC
TRUSTEE "upon sight," the unsuspecting Catalan left the originals of the checks with HSBC
TRUSTEE and was given only an acknowledgment receipt. Catalan made several demands and
after several more follow ups, on August 16, 1999, Phoenix Lam, Senior Vice President of
HSBC TRUSTEE, in obvious disregard of her valid claim, informed Catalan that her claim is
disapproved. No reason or explanation whatsoever was made why her claim was disapproved,
neither were the checks returned to her. Catalan appealed for fairness and understanding, in
the hope that HSBC TRUSTEE would act fairly and justly on her claim but these demands were
met by a stonewall of silence. On June 9, 2000, Catalan through counsel sent a last and final
demand to HSBC TRUSTEE to remit the amount covered by the checks but despite receipt of
said letter, no payment was made. Clearly, the act of the HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE in
refusing to honor and pay the checks validly issued by Thomson violates the abuse of rights
principle under Article 19 of the Civil Code which requires that everyone must act with justice,
give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith. The refusal of HSBANK and HSBC
TRUSTEE to pay the checks without any valid reason is intended solely to prejudice and injure
Catalan. When they declined payment of the checks despite instructions of the drawer,
Thomson, to honor them, coupled with the fact that the checks were duly funded, they acted in
bad faith, thus causing damage to Catalan. A person may not exercise his right unjustly or in a
manner that is not in keeping with honesty or good faith, otherwise he opens himself to liability
for abuse of right.8

Catalan prays that HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE be ordered to pay ₱20,864,000.00
representing the value of the five checks at the rate of ₱6.52 per HK$1 as of January 29, 2001
for the acts of HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE in refusing to pay the amount justly due her, in
addition to moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.9

On October 2, 2001, HSBANK filed a Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint on the grounds
that: (a) the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint since the action is
a money claim for a debt contracted by Thomson before his death which should have been filed
in the estate or intestate proceedings of Thomson; (b) Catalan engages in forum shopping by
filing the suit and at the same time filing a claim in the probate proceeding filed with another
branch of the RTC; (c) the amended complaint states no cause of action against HSBANK since
it has no obligation to pay the checks as it has not accepted the checks and Catalan did not re-
deposit the checks or make a formal protest; (d) the RTC has not acquired jurisdiction over the
person of HSBANK for improper service of summons; and, (e) it did not submit to the jurisdiction
of the RTC by filing a motion for extension of time to file a motion to dismiss. 10

Meanwhile, on October 17, 2001, summons for HSBC TRUSTEE was tendered to the In House
Counsel of HSBANK (Makati Branch) at the Enterprise Center, Tower 1, Ayala Avenue corner
Paseo de Roxas, Makati. Without submitting itself to the jurisdiction of the RTC, HSBC
TRUSTEE filed a Special Appearance for Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint, dated
October 29, 2001, questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC over it.11 HSBC TRUSTEE alleges
that tender of summons through HSBANK Makati did not confer upon the RTC jurisdiction over
it because: (a) it is a corporation separate and distinct from HSBANK; (b) it does not hold office
at the HSBANK Makati or in any other place in the Philippines; (c) it has not authorized
HSBANK Makati to receive summons for it; and, (d) it has no resident agent upon whom
summons may be served because it does not transact business in the Philippines.

Subsequently, HSBC TRUSTEE filed a Submission, dated November 15, 2001, attaching the
Affidavit executed in Hongkong by Phoenix Lam, Senior Vice-President of HSBC TRUSTEE,
attesting to the fact that: 1) HSBC TRUSTEE has not done nor is it doing business in the
Philippines; 2) it does not maintain any office in Makati or anywhere in the Philippines; 3) it has
not appointed any agent in Philippines; and 4) HSBANK Makati has no authority to receive any
summons or court processes for HSBC TRUSTEE.12

On May 15, 2002, the RTC issued an Order denying the two motions to dismiss.13 The RTC
held that it has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action because it is an action for
damages under Article 19 of the Civil Code for the acts of unjustly refusing to honor the checks
issued by Thomson and not a money claim against the estate of Thomson; that Catalan did not
engage in forum-shopping because the elements thereof are not attendant in the case; that the
question of cause of action should be threshed out or ventilated during the proceedings in the
main action and after the plaintiff and defendants have adduced evidence in their favor; that it
acquired jurisdiction over the person of defendants because the question of whether a foreign
corporation is doing business or not in the Philippines cannot be a subject of a Motion to
Dismiss but should be ventilated in the trial on the merits; and defendants voluntarily submitted
to the jurisdiction of the RTC setting up in their Motions to Dismiss other grounds aside from
lack of jurisdiction.

HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE filed separate motions for reconsideration14 but both proved
futile as they were denied by the RTC in an Order dated December 20, 2002.15

On February 21, 2003, Catalan moved to declare HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE in default for
failure to file their answer to the amended complaint.

On March 5, 2003, HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE filed separate petitions for certiorari and/or
prohibition with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP Nos. 7575616 and 75757,17 respectively.

Subsequently, HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE filed before the RTC separate Answers ad
cautelam, both dated March 18, 2003, as a "precaution against being declared in default and
without prejudice to the separate petitions for certiorari and/or prohibition then pending with the
CA."18
Meanwhile, the two petitions for certiorari before the CA were consolidated and after responsive
pleadings were filed, the cases were deemed submitted for decision.

In a consolidated Decision dated August 14, 2003, the CA dismissed the two petitions for
certiorari.19 The CA held that the filing of petitioners’ answers before the RTC rendered moot
and academic the issue of the RTC’s lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioners; that
the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter since it is one for damages under Article 19 of
the Civil Code for the alleged unjust acts of petitioners and not a money claim against the estate
of Thomson; and, that the amended complaint states a cause of action under Article 19 of the
Civil Code which could merit a favorable judgment if found to be true. The CA noted that
Catalan may have prayed for payment of the value of the checks but ratiocinated that she
merely used the value as basis for the computation of the damages.

Hence, the present petitions.

In G.R. No. 159590, HSBANK submits the following assigned errors:

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN HOLDING

THAT THE COURT A QUO, ACTING AS AN (SIC) REGULAR COURT, HAS
JURISDICTION OVER THE AMENDED COMPLAINT SEEKING TO ORDER
HSBC TRUSTEE, THE EXECUTOR OF THE DECEASED FREDERICK
ARTHUR THOMSON, TO PAY SUBJECT CHECKS ISSUED BY THE LATE
FREDERICK ARTHUR THOMSON, ADMITTEDLY IN PAYMENT OF HIS
INDEBTEDNESS TO CATALAN.

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN HOLDING

THAT THE AMENDED COMPLAINT DOES NOT SEEK TO ORDER HSBANK
AND HSBC INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEE LIMITED TO PAY THE OBLIGATION
OF THE (SIC) FREDERICK ARTHUR THOMSON AS EVIDENCED BY THE
CHECKS, BUT PRAYS FOR DAMAGES EQUIVALENT OR COMPUTED ON
THE BASIS OF THE VALUE OF THE CHECKS BECAUSE THE DEFENDANTS
FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE MANDATES OF ARTICLE 19 OF THE NEW
CIVIL CODE.

III.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN HOLDING

THAT ALLEGATIONS IN THE AMENDED COMPLAINT MAKE OUT A CAUSE
OF ACTION WHICH COULD MERIT A FAVORABLE JUDGMENT IF FOUND
TO BE TRUE, OR IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE AMENDED COMPLAINT
STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST HSBANK, AS DRAWEE BANK.

IV.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN

DISREGARDING THE FACT THAT CATALAN ENGAGED IN FORUM
 SHOPPING BY FILING THE AMENDED COMPLAINT WHILE HER PETITION
FOR THE PROBATE OF THE SUPPOSED WILL OF THE DECEASED
FREDERICK ARTHUR THOMSON IS PENDING WITH ANOTHER BRANCH OF
THE COURT A QUO.

V.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN HOLDING

THAT HSBANK HAD SUBMITTED TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT A
QUO BY SUBMITTING AN ANSWER TO THE AMENDED COMPLAINT.20

In G.R. No. 159591, HSBC TRUSTEE also assigns the foregoing first, second and fifth errors as
its own.21 In addition, it claims that:

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN NOT ORDERING THE

DISMISSAL OF THE AMENDED COMPLAINT AGAINST HSBC TRUSTEE DESPITE
THE FACT IT HAS NOT BEEN DULY SERVED WITH SUMMONS.22

HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE contend in common that Catalan has no cause of action for
abuse of rights under Article 19 of the Civil Code; that her complaint, under the guise of a claim
for damages, is actually a money claim against the estate of Thomson arising from checks
issued by the latter in her favor in payment of indebtedness.

HSBANK claims that the money claim should be dismissed on the ground of forum-shopping
since Catalan also filed a petition for probate of the alleged last will of Thomson before RTC,
Branch 48, Bacolod City, docketed as Spec. Proc No. 00-892. In addition, HSBANK imputes
error upon the CA in holding that by filing an answer to the amended complaint, petitioners are
estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC.

HSBC TRUSTEE maintains that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over it for improper service
of summons.

In her Comment, Catalan insists that her complaint is one for damages under Article 19 of the
Civil Code for the wanton refusal to honor and pay the value of five checks issued by the
Thomson amounting to HK$3,200,000.00. She argues that the issue of jurisdiction has been
rendered moot by petitioners’ participation in the proceedings before the RTC.

Succinctly, the issues boil down to the following:

1) Does the complaint state a cause of action?

2) Did Catalan engage in forum-shopping by filing the complaint for damages when she
also filed a petition for probate of the alleged last will of Thomson with another branch of
the RTC? and,

3) Did the RTC acquire jurisdiction over HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE? Corollary
thereto, did the filing of the answer before the RTC render the issue of lack of jurisdiction
moot and academic?
We shall resolve the issue in seriatim.

Does the complaint state a cause of action against HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE?

The elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the complaint alleges facts
which if true would justify the relief demanded. Stated otherwise, may the court render a valid
judgment upon the facts alleged therein?23 The inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity of
the material allegations.24 If the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis on which it
can be maintained, it should not be dismissed regardless of the defense that may be presented
by the defendants.25

Catalan anchors her complaint for damages on Article 19 of the Civil Code. It speaks of the
fundamental principle of law and human conduct that a person "must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give every one his due, and observe
honesty and good faith." It sets the standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of
one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties. When a right is exercised in a manner
which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to
another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held
responsible.26 But a right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such,
may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. A person should be protected only
when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is, when he acts with prudence and in
good faith; but not when he acts with negligence or abuse.27 There is an abuse of right when it
is exercised for the only purpose of prejudicing or injuring another. The exercise of a right must
be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established, and must not be excessive or
unduly harsh; there must be no intention to injure another.28

Thus, in order to be liable under the abuse of rights principle, three elements must concur, to
wit: (a) that there is a legal right or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole
intent of prejudicing or injuring another.29

In this instance, after carefully examining the amended complaint, we are convinced that the
allegations therein are in the nature of an action based on tort under Article 19 of the Civil Code.
It is evident that Catalan is suing HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE for unjustified and willful
refusal to pay the value of the checks.

HSBANK is being sued for unwarranted failure to pay the checks notwithstanding the repeated
assurance of the drawer Thomson as to the authenticity of the checks and frequent directives to
pay the value thereof to Catalan. Her allegations in the complaint that the gross inaction of
HSBANK on Thomson’s instructions, as well as its evident failure to inform Catalan of the
reason for its continued inaction and non-payment of the checks, smack of insouciance on its
part, are sufficient statements of clear abuse of right for which it may be held liable to Catalan
for any damages she incurred resulting therefrom. HSBANK’s actions, or lack thereof,
prevented Catalan from seeking further redress with Thomson for the recovery of her claim
while the latter was alive.

HSBANK claims that Catalan has no cause of action because under Section 189 of the
Negotiable Instruments Law, "a check of itself does not operate as an assignment of any part of
the funds to the credit of the drawer with the bank, and the bank is not liable to the holder unless
and until it accepts or certifies it." However, HSBANK is not being sued on the value of the
check itself but for how it acted in relation to Catalan’s claim for payment despite the repeated
directives of the drawer Thomson to recognize the check the latter issued. Catalan may have
prayed that she be paid the value of the checks but it is axiomatic that what determines the
nature of an action, as well as which court has jurisdiction over it, are the allegations of the
complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the
claims asserted therein.30

Anent HSBC TRUSTEE, it is being sued for the baseless rejection of Catalan’s claim. When
Catalan parted with the checks as a requirement for the processing of her claim, even going to
the extent of traveling to Hongkong to deliver personally the checks, HSBC TRUSTEE
summarily disapproved her claim with nary a reason. HSBC TRUSTEE gave no heed to
Catalan’s incessant appeals for an explanation. Her pleas fell on deaf and uncaring corporate
ears. Clearly, HSBC TRUSTEE’s acts are anathema to the prescription for human conduct
enshrined in Article 19 of the Civil Code.

Did Catalan engage in forum-shopping?

It has been held that forum-shopping exists where a litigant sues the same party against whom
another action or actions for the alleged violation of the same right and the enforcement of the
same relief is/are still pending, the defense of litis pendentia in one case is a bar to the others;
and, a final judgment in one would constitute res judicata and thus would cause the dismissal of
the rest.31

Thus, there is forum-shopping when there exist: a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as
represent the same interests in both actions, b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for,
the relief being founded on the same facts, and c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is
such that any judgment rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful
would amount to res judicata in the other.32

Applying the foregoing requisites to the case before us in relation to Spec. Proc No. 00-892, the
probate proceeding brought by Catalan before RTC, Branch 48, Bacolod City, it is obvious that
forum-shopping does not exist.

There is no identity of parties. HSBANK is not a party in the probate proceeding. HSBC
TRUSTEE is only a party in the probate proceeding because it is the executor and trustee
named in the Hongkong will of Thomson. HSBC TRUSTEE is representing the interest of the
estate of Thomson and not its own corporate interest.

With respect to the second and third requisites, a scrutiny of the entirety of the allegations of the
amended complaint in this case reveals that the rights asserted and reliefs prayed for therein
are different from those pleaded in the probate proceeding, such that a judgment in one case
would not bar the prosecution of the other case. Verily, there can be no forum-shopping where
in one proceeding a party raises a claim for damages based on tort and, in another proceeding
a party seeks the allowance of an alleged last will based on one’s claim as an heir. After all, the
merits of the action for damages is not to be determined in the probate proceeding and vice
versa. Undeniably, the facts or evidence as would support and establish the two causes of
action are not the same.33 Consequently, HSBANK’s reliance on the principle of forum-shopping
is clearly misplaced.

Did the RTC acquire jurisdiction over HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE?
The Rules of Court provides that a court generally acquires jurisdiction over a person through
either a valid service of summons in the manner required by law or the person’s voluntary
appearance in court.34

In holding that it acquired jurisdiction over HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE, the RTC held that
both voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court by setting up in their Motions to Dismiss
other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction. On the other hand, the CA ruled that HSBANK and
HSBC TRUSTEE are estopped from challenging the jurisdiction of the RTC because they filed
their respective answers before the RTC.

We find that both lower courts overlooked Section 20 of Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure which provides that "the inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary
appearance." Nonetheless, such omission does not aid HSBANK’s case.

It must be noted that HSBANK initially filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer or
Motion to Dismiss.35HSBANK already invoked the RTC’s jurisdiction over it by praying that its
motion for extension of time to file answer or a motion to dismiss be granted. The Court has
held that the filing of motions seeking affirmative relief, such as, to admit answer, for additional
time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with
motion for reconsideration, are considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the
court.36 Consequently, HSBANK’s expressed reservation in its Answer ad cautelam that it filed
the same "as a mere precaution against being declared in default, and without prejudice to the
Petition for Certiorari and/or Prohibition xxx now pending before the Court of Appeals"37 to assail
the jurisdiction of the RTC over it is of no moment. Having earlier invoked the jurisdiction of the
RTC to secure affirmative relief in its motion for additional time to file answer or motion to
dismiss, HSBANK, effectively submitted voluntarily to the jurisdiction of the RTC and is thereby
estopped from asserting otherwise, even before this Court.

In contrast, the filing by HSBC TRUSTEE of a motion to dismiss cannot be considered a

voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the RTC. It was a conditional appearance, entered
precisely to question the regularity of the service of summons. It is settled that a party who
makes a special appearance in court challenging the jurisdiction of said court, e.g., invalidity of
the service of summons, cannot be considered to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of
the court.38 HSBC TRUSTEE has been consistent in all its pleadings in assailing the service of
summons and the jurisdiction of the RTC over it. Thus, HSBC TRUSTEE cannot be declared in
estoppel when it filed an Answer ad cautelam before the RTC while its petition for certiorari was
pending before the CA. Such answer did not render the petition for certiorari before the CA moot
and academic. The Answer of HSBC TRUSTEE was only filed to prevent any declaration that it
had by its inaction waived the right to file responsive pleadings.

Admittedly, HSBC TRUSTEE is a foreign corporation, organized and existing under the laws of
the British Virgin Islands. For proper service of summons on foreign corporations, Section 12 of
Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 12. Service upon foreign private juridical entity. – When the defendant is a foreign
private juridical entity which has transacted business in the Philippines, service may be
made on its resident agent designated in accordance with law for that purpose, or if
there be no such agent, on the government official designated by law to that effect, or on
any of its officers or agents within the Philippines.
In French Oil Mill Machinery Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,39 we had occasion to rule that it is
not enough to merely allege in the complaint that a defendant foreign corporation is doing
business. For purposes of the rule on summons, the fact of doing business must first be
"established by appropriate allegations in the complaint" and the court in determining such fact
need not go beyond the allegations therein.40

The allegations in the amended complaint subject of the present cases did not sufficiently show
the fact of HSBC TRUSTEE’s doing business in the Philippines. It does not appear at all that
HSBC TRUSTEE had performed any act which would give the general public the impression
that it had been engaging, or intends to engage in its ordinary and usual business undertakings
in the country. Absent from the amended complaint is an allegation that HSBC TRUSTEE had
performed any act in the country that would place it within the sphere of the court’s jurisdiction.

We have held that a general allegation, standing alone, that a party is doing business in the
Philippines does not make it so; a conclusion of fact or law cannot be derived from the
unsubstantiated assertions of parties notwithstanding the demands of convenience or dispatch
in legal actions, otherwise, the Court would be guilty of sorcery; extracting substance out of
nothingness.41

Besides, there is no allegation in the amended complaint that HSBANK is the domestic agent of
HSBC TRUSTEE to warrant service of summons upon it. Thus, the summons tendered to the In
House Counsel of HSBANK (Makati Branch) for HSBC TRUSTEE was clearly improper.

There being no proper service of summons, the RTC cannot take cognizance of the case
against HSBC TRUSTEE for lack of jurisdiction over it. Any proceeding undertaken by the RTC
is therefore null and void.42 Accordingly, the complaint against HSBC TRUSTEE should have
been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over it.

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 159590 is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated August 14, 2003, in CA-G.R. SP No. 75757 dismissing the petition for certiorari
of the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited is AFFIRMED.

The petition in G.R. No. 159591 is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
August 14, 2003, in CA-G.R. SP No. 75756 dismissing the petition for certiorari of the HSBC
International Trustee Limited is REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court, Branch
44, Bacolod City is declared without jurisdiction to take cognizance of Civil Case No. 01-11372
against the HSBC International Trustee Limited, and all its orders and issuances with respect to
the latter are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The said Regional Trial Court is
hereby ORDERED to DESIST from maintaining further proceedings against the HSBC
International Trustee Limited in the case aforestated.

G.R. No. 151866 September 9, 2004

SOLEDAD CARPIO, petitioner,

vs.
LEONORA A. VALMONTE, respondent.

DECISION
TINGA, J.:

Assailed in the instant petition for review is the Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV
No. 69537,1promulgated on 17 January 2002.2 The appellate court reversed the trial court’s
decision denying respondent’s claim for damages against petitioner and ordered the latter to
pay moral damages to the former in the amount ofP100,000.00.

Respondent Leonora Valmonte is a wedding coordinator. Michelle del Rosario and Jon Sierra
engaged her services for their church wedding on 10 October 1996. At about 4:30 p.m. on that
day, Valmonte went to the Manila Hotel where the bride and her family were billeted. When she
arrived at Suite 326-A, several persons were already there including the bride, the bride’s
parents and relatives, the make-up artist and his assistant, the official photographers, and the
fashion designer. Among those present was petitioner Soledad Carpio, an aunt of the bride who
was preparing to dress up for the occasion.

After reporting to the bride, Valmonte went out of the suite carrying the items needed for the
wedding rites and the gifts from the principal sponsors. She proceeded to the Maynila
Restaurant where the reception was to be held. She paid the suppliers, gave the meal
allowance to the band, and went back to the suite. Upon entering the suite, Valmonte noticed
the people staring at her. It was at this juncture that petitioner allegedly uttered the following
words to Valmonte: "Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto, nasaan ang dala mong bag? Saan ka
pumunta? Ikaw lang and lumabas ng kwarto, ikaw ang kumuha." Petitioner then ordered one of
the ladies to search Valmonte’s bag. It turned out that after Valmonte left the room to attend to
her duties, petitioner discovered that the pieces of jewelry which she placed inside the comfort
room in a paper bag were lost. The jewelry pieces consist of two (2) diamond rings, one (1) set
of diamond earrings, bracelet and necklace with a total value of about one million pesos. The
hotel security was called in to help in the search. The bags and personal belongings of all the
people inside the room were searched. Valmonte was allegedly bodily searched, interrogated
and trailed by a security guard throughout the evening. Later, police officers arrived and
interviewed all persons who had access to the suite and fingerprinted them including Valmonte.
During all the time Valmonte was being interrogated by the police officers, petitioner kept on
saying the words "Siya lang ang lumabas ng kwarto." Valmonte’s car which was parked at the
hotel premises was also searched but the search yielded nothing.

A few days after the incident, petitioner received a letter from Valmonte demanding a formal
letter of apology which she wanted to be circulated to the newlyweds’ relatives and guests to
redeem her smeared reputation as a result of petitioner’s imputations against her. Petitioner did
not respond to the letter. Thus, on 20 February 1997, Valmonte filed a suit for damages against
her before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 268. In her complaint, Valmonte
prayed that petitioner be ordered to pay actual, moral and exemplary damages, as well as
attorney’s fees.

Responding to the complaint, petitioner denied having uttered words or done any act to confront
or single out Valmonte during the investigation and claimed that everything that transpired after
the theft incident was purely a police matter in which she had no participation. Petitioner prayed
for the dismissal of the complaint and for the court to adjudge Valmonte liable on her
counterclaim.

The trial court rendered its Decision on 21 August 2000, dismissing Valmonte’s complaint for
damages. It ruled that when petitioner sought investigation for the loss of her jewelry, she was
merely exercising her right and if damage results from a person exercising his legal right, it
is damnum absque injuria. It added that no proof was presented by Valmonte to show that
petitioner acted maliciously and in bad faith in pointing to her as the culprit. The court said that
Valmonte failed to show that she suffered serious anxiety, moral shock, social humiliation, or
that her reputation was besmirched due to petitioner’s wrongful act.

Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging that the trial court erred in finding that
petitioner did not slander her good name and reputation and in disregarding the evidence she
presented.

The Court of Appeals ruled differently. It opined that Valmonte has clearly established that she
was singled out by petitioner as the one responsible for the loss of her jewelry. It cited the
testimony of Serena Manding, corroborating Valmonte’s claim that petitioner confronted her and
uttered words to the effect that she was the only one who went out of the room and that she was
the one who took the jewelry. The appellate court held that Valmonte’s claim for damages is not
predicated on the fact that she was subjected to body search and interrogation by the police but
rather petitioner’s act of publicly accusing her of taking the missing jewelry. It categorized
petitioner’s utterance defamatory considering that it imputed upon Valmonte the crime of theft.
The court concluded that petitioner’s verbal assault upon Valmonte was done with malice and in
bad faith since it was made in the presence of many people without any solid proof except
petitioner’s suspicion. Such unfounded accusation entitles Valmonte to an award of moral
damages in the amount of ₱100,000.00 for she was publicly humiliated, deeply insulted, and
embarrassed. However, the court found no sufficient evidence to justify the award of actual
damages.

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner contends that the appellate court’s conclusion that she publicly humiliated respondent
does not conform to the evidence presented. She adds that even on the assumption that she
uttered the words complained of, it was not shown that she did so with malice and in bad faith.

In essence, petitioner would want this Court to review the factual conclusions reached by the
appellate court. The cardinal rule adhered to in this jurisdiction is that a petition for review must
raise only questions of law,3 and judicial review under Rule 45 does not extend to an evaluation
of the sufficiency of evidence unless there is a showing that the findings complained of are
totally devoid of support in the record or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute
serious abuse of discretion.4 This Court, while not a trier of facts, may review the evidence in
order to arrive at the correct factual conclusion based on the record especially so when the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are at variance with those of the trial court, or when the
inference drawn by the Court of Appeals from the facts is manifestly mistaken.5

Contrary to the trial court’s finding, we find sufficient evidence on record tending to prove that
petitioner’s imputations against respondent was made with malice and in bad faith.

Petitioner’s testimony was shorn of substance and consists mainly of denials. She claimed not
to have uttered the words imputing the crime of theft to respondent or to have mentioned the
latter’s name to the authorities as the one responsible for the loss of her jewelry. Well-settled is
the rule that denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-
serving which merit no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the
testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.6
Respondent, however, has successfully refuted petitioner’s testimony. Quite credibly, she has
narrated in great detail her distressing experience on that fateful day. She testified as to how
rudely she was treated by petitioner right after she returned to the room. Petitioner immediately
confronted her and uttered the words "Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto. Nasaan ang dala
mong bag? Saan ka pumunta? Ikaw ang kumuha." Thereafter, her body was searched including
her bag and her car. Worse, during the reception, she was once more asked by the hotel
security to go to the ladies room and she was again bodily searched.7

Sereña Manding, a make-up artist, corroborated respondent’s testimony. She testified that
petitioner confronted respondent in the presence of all the people inside the suite accusing her
of being the only one who went out of the comfort room before the loss of the jewelry. Manding
added that respondent was embarrassed because everybody else in the room thought she was
a thief.8 If only to debunk petitioner’s assertion that she did not utter the accusatory remarks in
question publicly and with malice, Manding’s testimony on the point deserves to be reproduced.
Thus,

Q After that what did she do?

A Then Leo came out from the other room she said, she is (sic) the one I only saw from
the comfort room.

Q Now, what exact word (sic) were said by Mrs. Carpio on that matter?

A She said "siya lang yung nakita kong galing sa C.R."

Q And who was Mrs. Carpio or the defendant referring to?

A Leo Valmonte.

Q Did she say anything else, the defendant?

A Her jewelry were lost and Leo was the only one she saw in the C.R. After that she get
(sic) the paper bag then the jewelry were already gone.

Q Did she confront the plaintiff Mrs. Valmonte regarding that fact?

A Yes.

Q What did the defendant Mrs. Carpio tell the plaintiff, Mrs. Valmonte?

A "Ikaw yung nakita ko sa C.R. nawawala yung alahas ko."

Q When the defendant Mrs. Carpio said that to plaintiff Mrs. Valmonte were there other
people inside the room?

A Yes, sir.

Q Were they able to hear what Mrs. Carpio said to Mrs. Valmonte?
 A Yes, sir.

Q What was your thinking at that time that Mrs. Carpio said that to Mrs. Valmonte?

A "Nakakahiya kasi akala ng iba doon na talagang magnanakaw siya. Kasi marami na
kaming nandodoon, dumating na yung couturier pati yung video man and we sir.

Q Who was the person you [were] alleging "na nakakahiya" whose (sic) being accused
or being somebody who stole those item of jewelry?

A "Nakakahiya para kay Leo kasi pinagbibintangan siya. Sa dami namin doon siya yung
napagbintangan."

Q And who is Leo, what is her full name?

A Leo Valmonte.

Q Did the defendant tell this matter to other people inside the room?

A Yes, the mother of the bride.

Q And who else did she talk to?

A The father of the bride also.

Q And what did the defendant tell the mother regarding this matter?

A "Nawawala yung alahas ko." Sabi naman nung mother baka naman hindi mo dala
tignan mo munang mabuti.

Q Who was that other person that she talked to?

A Father of the bride.9

Significantly, petitioner’s counsel elected not to pursue her cross-examination of the witness on
this point following her terse and firm declaration that she remembered petitioner’s exact
defamatory words in answer to the counsel’s question.10

Jaime Papio, Security Supervisor at Manila Hotel, likewise contradicted petitioner’s allegation
that she did not suspect or mention the name of respondent as her suspect in the loss of the
jewelry.11

To warrant recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action, for a wrong inflicted by
the defendant, and the damage resulting therefrom to the plaintiff. Wrong without damage, or
damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action.12

In the sphere of our law on human relations, the victim of a wrongful act or omission, whether
done willfully or negligently, is not left without any remedy or recourse to obtain relief for the
damage or injury he sustained. Incorporated into our civil law are not only principles of equity
but also universal moral precepts which are designed to indicate certain norms that spring from
the fountain of good conscience and which are meant to serve as guides for human
conduct.13 First of these fundamental precepts is the principle commonly known as "abuse of
rights" under Article 19 of the Civil Code. It provides that "Every person must, in the exercise of
his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due and
observe honesty and good faith." To find the existence of an abuse of right, the following
elements must be present: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith;
(3) for the sole intent or prejudicing or injuring another.14 When a right is exercised in a manner
which discards these norms resulting in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for
which the actor can be held accountable.15 One is not allowed to exercise his right in a manner
which would cause unnecessary prejudice to another or if he would thereby offend morals or
good customs. Thus, a person should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise
of his right, that is when he acts with prudence and good faith; but not when he acts with
negligence or abuse.16

Complementing the principle of abuse of rights are the provisions of Articles 20 and 21 of the
Civil Code which read, thus:

Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to
another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.

Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals or good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.

The foregoing rules provide the legal bedrock for the award of damages to a party who
suffers damage whenever one commits an act in violation of some legal provision, or an
act which though not constituting a transgression of positive law, nevertheless violates
certain rudimentary rights of the party aggrieved.

In the case at bar, petitioner’s verbal reproach against respondent was certainly uncalled for
considering that by her own account nobody knew that she brought such kind and amount of
jewelry inside the paper bag.17 This being the case, she had no right to attack respondent with
her innuendos which were not merely inquisitive but outrightly accusatory. By openly accusing
respondent as the only person who went out of the room before the loss of the jewelry in the
presence of all the guests therein, and ordering that she be immediately bodily searched,
petitioner virtually branded respondent as the thief. True, petitioner had the right to ascertain the
identity of the malefactor, but to malign respondent without an iota of proof that she was the one
who actually stole the jewelry is an act which, by any standard or principle of law is
impermissible. Petitioner had willfully caused injury to respondent in a manner which is contrary
to morals and good customs. Her firmness and resolve to find her missing jewelry cannot justify
her acts toward respondent. She did not act with justice and good faith for apparently, she had
no other purpose in mind but to prejudice respondent. Certainly, petitioner transgressed the
provisions of Article 19 in relation to Article 21 for which she should be held accountable.

Owing to the rule that great weight and even finality is given to factual conclusions of the Court
of Appeals which affirm those of the trial court,18 we sustain the findings of the trial court and the
appellate court that respondent’s claim for actual damages has not been substantiated with
satisfactory evidence during the trial and must therefore be denied. To be recoverable, actual
damages must be duly proved with reasonable degree of certainty and the courts cannot rely on
speculation, conjecture or guesswork.19

Respondent, however, is clearly entitled to an award of moral damages. Moral damages may be
awarded whenever the defendant’s wrongful act or omission is the proximate cause of the
plaintiff’s physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury20in the cases specified or
analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.21 Though no proof of pecuniary
loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be adjudicated, courts are mandated to take
into account all the circumstances obtaining in the case and assess damages according to their
discretion.22 Worthy of note is that moral damages are not awarded to penalize the
defendant,23 or to enrich a complainant, but to enable the latter to obtain means, diversions or
amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone, by reason of
defendant’s culpable action. In any case, award of moral damages must be proportionate to the
sufferings inflicted.24

Based on the foregoing jurisprudential pronouncements, we rule that the appellate court did not
err in awarding moral damages. Considering respondent’s social standing, and the fact that her
profession is based primarily on trust reposed in her by her clients, the seriousness of the
imputations made by petitioner has greatly tarnished her reputation and will in one way or the
other, affect her future dealings with her clients, the award of ₱100,000.00 as moral damages
appears to be a fair and reasonable assessment of respondent’s damages.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.

G.R. No. 156841 June 30, 2005

GF EQUITY, INC., petitioner,

vs.
ARTURO VALENZONA, respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO-MORALES, J.:

On challenge via Petition for Review on Certiorari is the Court of Appeals October 14, 2002
Decision1 reversing that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila dated June 28, 19972 which
dismissed the complaint of herein respondent Arturo Valenzona (Valenzona) for breach of
contract with damages against herein petitioner GF Equity, Inc. (GF Equity).

The factual antecedents of the case are as follows:

GF Equity, represented by its Chief Financial Officer W. Steven Uytengsu (Uytengsu), hired
Valenzona as Head Coach of the Alaska basketball team in the Philippine Basketball
Association (PBA) under a Contract of Employment.3

As head coach, the duties of Valenzona were described in the contract to include the following:
 xxx

1. . . . coaching at all practices and games scheduled for the CORPORATION’s TEAM
during the scheduled season of the ASSOCIATION . . ., coaching all exhibition
games scheduled by the corporation as approved by the PBA during and prior to the
scheduled season, coaching (if invited to participate) in the ASSOCIATION’s All Star
Game and attending every event conducted in association with the All Star
Game, and coaching the play-off games subsequent to the scheduled season based on
the athletic program of the PBA.

xxx

3. The COACH agrees to observe and comply with all requirements of the
CORPORATION respecting conduct of its TEAM and its players, at all times whether on
or off the playing floor. The CORPORATION may, from time to time during the
continuance of this contract, establish reasonable rules for the government of its players
"at home" and "on the road"; and such rules shall be part of this contract as fully is (sic) if
herein written and shall be the responsibility of the COACH to implement; x x x

4. The COACH agrees (a) to report at the time and place fixed by the CORPORATION
in good physical condition; (b) to keep himself throughout the entire season in good
physical condition; (c) to give his best services, as well as his loyalty to the
CORPORATION, and to serve as basketball coach for the CORPORATION and its
assignees; (d) to be neatly and fully attired in public and always to conduct himself on
and off the court according to the highest standards of honesty, morality, fair play and
sportsmanship; (e) not to do anything which is detrimental to the best interests of the
CORPORATION.

xxx

7. The COACH agrees that if so requested by the CORPORATION, he will endorse the
CORPORATION’s products in commercial advertising, promotions and the like. The
COACH further agrees to allow the CORPORATION or the ASSOCIATION to take
pictures of the COACH alone or together with others, for still photographs, motion
pictures or television, at such times as the CORPORATION or the ASSOCIATION may
designate, and no matter by whom taken may be used in any manner desired by either
of them for publicity or promotional purposes. (Underscoring supplied).

xxx

Even before the conclusion of the contract, Valenzona had already served GF Equity under a
verbal contract by coaching its team, Hills Brothers, in the 3rd PBA Conference of 1987 where
the team was runner-up.

Under the contract, GF Equity would pay Valenzona the sum of Thirty Five Thousand Pesos
(₱35,000.00) monthly, net of taxes, and provide him with a service vehicle and gasoline
allowance.
While the employment period agreed upon was for two years commencing on January 1, 1988
and ending on December 31, 1989, the last sentence of paragraph 3 of the contract carried the
following condition:

3. x x x If at any time during the contract, the COACH, in the sole opinion of the
CORPORATION, fails to exhibit sufficient skill or competitive ability to coach the team, the
CORPORATION may terminate this contract. (Emphasis supplied)

Before affixing his signature on the contract, Valenzona consulted his lawyer who pointed out
the one-sidedness of the above-quoted last sentence of paragraph 3 thereof.
The caveat notwithstanding, Valenzona still acceded to the terms of the contract because he
had trust and confidence in Uytengsu who had recommended him to the management of GF
Equity.

During his stint as Alaska’s head coach, the team placed third both in the Open and All-Filipino
PBA Conferences in 1988.

Valenzona was later advised by the management of GF Equity by letter of September 26, 1988
of the termination of his services in this wise:

We regret to inform you that under the contract of employment dated January 1, 1988 we
are invoking our rights specified in paragraph 3.

You will continue to be paid until your outstanding balance which, as of September 25, 1988, is
₱75,868.38 has been fully paid.

Please return the service vehicle to my office no later than September 30, 1988.4 (Emphasis
supplied)

Close to six years after the termination of his services, Valenzona’s counsel, by letter of July 30,
1994,5 demanded from GF Equity payment of compensation arising from the arbitrary and
unilateral termination of his employment. GF Equity, however, refused the claim.

Valenzona thus filed on September 26, 1994 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila a
complaint6 against GF Equity for breach of contract with damages, ascribing bad faith, malice
and "disregard to fairness and to the rights of the plaintiff" by unilaterally and arbitrarily pre-
terminating the contract without just cause and legal and factual basis. He prayed for the award
of actual damages in the amount of ₱560,000.00 representing his unpaid compensation from
September 26, 1988 up to December 31, 1989, at the rate of ₱35,000.00 a month; moral
damages in the amount of ₱100,000.00; exemplary damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00;
attorney’s fees in the amount of ₱100,000.00; and costs of suit.

Before the trial court, Valenzona challenged the condition in paragraph 3 of the contract as
lacking the element of mutuality of contract, a clear transgression of Article 1308 of the New
Civil Code, and reliance thereon, he contended, did not warrant his unjustified and arbitrary
dismissal.

GF Equity maintained, on the other hand, that it merely exercised its right under the contract to
pre-terminate Valenzona’s employment due to incompetence. And it posited that he was guilty
of laches and, in any event, his complaint should have been instituted before a labor arbiter.
The trial court, upholding the validity of the assailed provision of the contract, dismissed, by
decision of June 28, 1997,7 the complaint of Valenzona who, it held, was fully aware of entering
into a bad bargain.

The Court of Appeals, before which Valenzona appealed, reversed the trial court’s decision, by
decision of October 14, 2002,8 and accordingly ordered GF Equity to pay him damages.

In its decision, the appellate court held that the questioned provision in the contract "merely
confers upon GF Equity the right to fire its coach upon a finding of inefficiency, a valid reason
within the ambit of its management prerogatives, subject to limitations imposed by law, although
not expressly stated in the clause"; and
"the rightgranted in the contract can neither be said to be immoral, unlawful, or contrary to public
policy." It concluded, however, that while "the mutuality of the clause" is evident, GF Equity
"abused its right by arbitrarily terminating . . . Valenzona’s employment and opened itself to a
charge of bad faith." Hence, finding that Valenzona’s claim for damages is "obviously . . . based
on Art. 19 of the Civil Code" which provides:

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.,

the appellate court awarded Valenzona the following damages, furnishing the justification
therefor:

. . . a) Compensatory damages representing his unearned income for 15 months. Actual and
compensatory damages are those recoverable because of a pecuniary loss in business, trade,
property, profession, job or occupation. As testified, his employment contract provided a
monthly income of PhP35,000, which he lost from September 26, 1988 up to December 31,
1989 as a consequence of his arbitrary dismissal; b) Moral damages of PhP20,000. The act
caused wounded feelings on the part of the plaintiff. Moral damages is recoverable under Article
2220 and the chapter on Human Relations of the Civil Code (Articles 1936) when a contract is
breached in bad faith; c) Exemplary damages of PhP20,000, by way of example or correction
for the public good; and d) When exemplary damages are awarded, attorney’s fees can also be
given. We deem it just to grant 10% of the actual damages as attorney’s fees. (Underscoring
supplied)

Hence, this petition at bar, GF Equity faulting the appellate court in

. . . CONCLUD[ING] WRONGLY FROM ESTABLISHED FACTS IN A MANNER VIOLATIVE OF

APPLICABLE LAWS AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE.9

GF Equity argues that the appellate court committed a non-sequitur when it agreed with the
findings of fact of the lower court but reached an opposite conclusion. It avers that the appellate
court made itself a guardian of an otherwise intelligent individual well-versed in tactical
maneuvers; that the freedom to enter into contracts is protected by law, and the courts will not
interfere therewith unless the contract is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy or
public order; that there was absolutely no reason for the appellate court to have found bad faith
on its part; and that, at all events, Valenzona is guilty of laches for his unexplained inaction for
six years.
Central to the resolution of the instant controversy is the determination of whether the
questioned last sentence of paragraph 3 is violative of the principle of mutuality of contracts.

Mutuality is one of the characteristics of a contract, its validity or performance or compliance of

which cannot be left to the will of only one of the parties.10 This is enshrined in Article 1308 of
the New Civil Code, whose underlying principle is explained in Garcia v. Rita Legarda,
Inc.,11 viz:

Article 1308 of the New Civil Code reads as follows:

"The contract must bind both contracting parties; its validity or compliance cannot be left to the
will of one of them."

The above legal provision is a virtual reproduction of Article 1256 of the old Civil Code but it was
so phrased as to emphasize the principle that the contract must bind both parties. This, of
course is based firstly, on the principle that obligations arising from contracts have the force of
law between the contracting parties and secondly, that there must be mutuality between the
parties based on their essential equality to which is repugnant to have one party bound
by the contract leaving the other free therefrom (8 Manresa 556). Its ultimate purpose
is to render void a contract containing a condition which makes its fulfillment dependent
exclusively upon the uncontrolled will of one of the contracting parties.

x x x (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)

The ultimate purpose of the mutuality principle is thus to nullify a contract containing a
condition which makes its fulfillment or pre-termination
dependent exclusively upon the uncontrolled will of one of the contracting parties.

Not all contracts though which vest to one party their determination of validity or compliance or
the right to terminate the same are void for being violative of the mutuality principle.
Jurisprudence is replete with instances of cases12where this Court upheld the legality of
contracts which left their fulfillment or implementation to the will of either of the parties. In these
cases, however, there was a finding of the presence of essential equality of the parties to the
contracts, thus preventing the perpetration of injustice on the weaker party.

In the case at bar, the contract incorporates in paragraph 3 the right of GF Equity to pre-
terminate the contract — that "if the coach, in the sole opinion of the corporation, fails to exhibit
sufficient skill or competitive ability to coach the team, the corporation may terminate the
contract." The assailed condition clearly transgresses the principle of mutuality of contracts. It
leaves the determination of whether Valenzona failed to exhibit sufficient skill or competitive
ability to coach Alaska team solely to the opinion of GF Equity. Whether Valenzona indeed
failed to exhibit the required skill or competitive ability depended exclusively on the judgment of
GF Equity. In other words, GF Equity was given an unbridled prerogative to pre-terminate the
contract irrespective of the soundness, fairness or reasonableness, or even lack of basis of its
opinion.

To sustain the validity of the assailed paragraph would open the gate for arbitrary and illegal
dismissals, for void contractual stipulations would be used as justification therefor.
The assailed stipulation being violative of the mutuality principle underlying Article 1308 of the
Civil Code, it is null and void.

The nullity of the stipulation notwithstanding, GF Equity was not precluded from the right to pre-
terminate the contract. The pre-termination must have legal basis, however, if it is to be
declared justified.

GF Equity failed, however, to advance any ground to justify the pre-termination. It simply
invoked the assailed provision which is null and void.

While GF Equity’s act of pre-terminating Valenzona’s services cannot be considered willful as it

was based on a stipulation, albeit declared void, it, in doing so, failed to consider the abuse of
rights principle enshrined in Art. 19 of the Civil Code which provides:

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

This provision of law sets standards which must be observed in the exercise of one’s
rights as well as in the performance of its duties, to wit: to act with justice; give every one his
due; and observe honesty and good faith.

Since the pre-termination of the contract was anchored on an illegal ground, hence, contrary to
law, and GF Equity negligently failed to provide legal basis for such pre-termination, e.g. that
Valenzona breached the contract by failing to discharge his duties thereunder, GF Equity failed
to exercise in a legitimate manner its right to pre-terminate the contract, thereby abusing the
right of Valenzona to thus entitle him to damages under Art. 19 in relation to Article 20 of the
Civil Code the latter of which provides:

Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another,
shall indemnify the latter for the same.

In De Guzman v. NLRC,13 this Court quoted the following explanation of Tolentino why it is
impermissible to abuse our rights to prejudice others.

The exercise of a right ends when the right disappears, and it disappears when it is abused,
especially to the prejudice of others. The mask of a right without the spirit of justice which gives
it life is repugnant to the modern concept of social law. It cannot be said that a person exercises
a right when he unnecessarily prejudices another or offends morals or good customs. Over and
above the specific precepts of positive law are the supreme norms of justice which the law
develops and which are expressed in three principles: honeste vivere,14 alterum non
laedere15and jus suum quique tribuere;16 and he who violates them violates the law. For this
reason, it is not permissible to abuse our rights to prejudice others.

The disquisition in Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. Court of Appeals17 is just as
relevant as it is illuminating on the present case. In that case, this Court declared that even
granting that the therein petitioners might have had the right to dismiss the therein respondent
from work, the abusive manner in which that right was exercised amounted to a legal wrong for
which the petitioners must be held liable.
One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil Code is the codification of "some basic
principles that are to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the
stability of the social order." [REPORT ON THE CODE COMMISSION ON THE PROPOSED
CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, p. 39]. The framers of the Code, seeking to remedy the
defect of the old Code which merely stated the effects of the law, but failed to draw out its spirit,
incorporated certain fundamental precepts which were "designed to indicate certain norms that
spring from the fountain of good conscience" and which were also meant to serve as "guides for
human conduct [that] should run as golden threads through society, to the end that law may
approach its supreme ideal, which is the sway and dominance of justice" (Id.) Foremost among
these principles is that pronounced in Article 19 which provides:

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights,
sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also
in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give
everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a
primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in
Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted
by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is
exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19
and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the
government of human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a
remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21
would be proper.18 Emphasis and underscoring supplied).

As for GF Equity’s defense of laches on account of Valenzona’s invocation of his right under the
contract only after the lapse of six years, the same fails.

Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length
of time to do that which by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier,
thus giving rise to a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or
declined to assert it. It is not concerned with mere lapse of time; the fact of delay, standing
alone, is insufficient to constitute laches.19

Laches applies in equity, whereas prescription applies at law. Our courts are basically courts of
law, not courts of equity. Laches cannot thus be invoked to evade the enforcement of an
existing legal right. Equity, which has been aptly described as a "justice outside legality," is
applied only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law. Aequetas nunquam contravenit
legis. Thus, where the claim was filed within the statutory period of prescription, recovery
therefor cannot be barred by laches. The doctrine of laches should never be applied earlier than
the expiration of time limited for the commencement of actions at law,20 unless, as a general
rule, inexcusable delay in asserting a right and acquiescense in existing conditions are
proven.21 GF Equity has not proven, nay alleged, these.

Under Article 114422 of the New Civil Code, an action upon a written contract must be brought
within 10 years from the time the right of action accrues. Since the action filed by Valenzona is
an action for breach upon a written contract, his filing of the case 6 years from the date his
cause of action arose was well within the prescriptive period, hence, the defense of laches
would not, under the circumstances, lie.

Consequently, Valenzona is entitled to recover actual damages — his salary which he should
have received from the time his services were terminated up to the time the employment
contract expired.23

As for moral damages which the appellate court awarded, Article 2220 of the New Civil Code
allows such award to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad
faith. Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a
dishonest purpose or moral obliquity. It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with
furtive design or ill-will.24 Bad faith means a breach of a known duty through some motive of
interest or ill will. It must, however, be substantiated by evidence. Bad faith under the law cannot
be presumed, it must be established by clear and convincing evidence.

As earlier stated, however, the pre-termination of the contract was not willful as GF Equity
based it on a provision therein which is void. Malice or bad faith cannot thus be ascribed to GF
Equity.

The unbroken jurisprudence is that in breach of contract cases where a party is not shown to
have acted fraudulently or in bad faith, liability for damages is limited to the natural and probable
consequences of the breach of the obligation which the parties had foreseen or could
reasonably have foreseen. The damages, however, do not include moral damages.25

The award by the appellate court of moral damages must thus be set aside. And so must the
award of exemplary damages, absent a showing that GF Equity acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.26

The award to Valenzona of attorney’s fees must remain, however, GF Equity having refused to
pay the balance of Valenzona’s salaries to which he was, under the facts and circumstances of
the case, entitled under the contract, thus compelling him to litigate to protect his interest.27

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 14, 2002 is hereby SET
ASIDE and another rendered declaring the assailed provision of the contract NULL AND VOID
and ORDERING petitioner, GF Equity, to pay private respondent, Arturo Valenzona, actual
damages in the amount of ₱525,000.00 and attorney’s fees in the amount of ₱60,000.00.

G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the
Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?

Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite ruling on this
apparently novel question, presented as a pure question of law.

In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision1 dated May 15, 2002, of the
Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and its Resolution2 dated July
4, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration. The court a quo had declared that herein
respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry. The fallo of the impugned Decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code
and by reason of the divorce decree obtained against him by his American wife, the petitioner is
given the capacity to remarry under the Philippine Law.

IT IS SO ORDERED.3

The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.

On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church
of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and
a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.

In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years
later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.

Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree
and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at
5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.

Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph
2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the
court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.

In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY

CODE4

The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the
instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated
between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a
petition for annulment or for legal separation.5 Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that
governs respondent’s situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of
judicial determination.6
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but insists
that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry,
he is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution.7

At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court actually
constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court provides:

RULE 63

DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES

Section 1. Who may file petition—Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation,
ordinance, or other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an
action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or
validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.

...

The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy;
(2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party
seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial
determination.8

This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two
Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and
remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner
representing the State asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage while respondent, a
private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief,
has legal interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination
inasmuch as when respondent remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of
his second marriage.

Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code apply
to the case of respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this provision had come about in
the first place, and what was the intent of the legislators in its enactment?

Brief Historical Background

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209,
otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof
states:

All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227
was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second
paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:

ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force
in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce
is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)

On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation presented by the
case at hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the
time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife
was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her
capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U.S.A.

Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings9 on the Family Code, the Catholic Bishops’
Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to Paragraph 2 of
Article 26:

1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses are Filipinos who
divorce them abroad. These spouses who are divorced will not be able to re-marry, while the
spouses of foreigners who validly divorce them abroad can.

2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for Filipino citizens. For
those whose foreign spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be considered to be validly
divorced here and can re-marry. We propose that this be deleted and made into law only after
more widespread consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)

Legislative Intent

Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code
Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married
to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.

Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr.10 The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner.
The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the
Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine
law.

Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the marriage,
the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by
naturalization?
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals.11 In Quita,
the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became a
naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The Court therein
hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no
longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.

Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold
that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at
the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them
becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse
should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice.
Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to
mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed
according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A
statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as
they come within its spirit or intent.12

If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married
to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the
contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.

In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article
26 as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner;
and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry.

In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid
marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the
naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly,
the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case.
Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.

We are also unable to sustain the OSG’s theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino spouse is
to file either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation. Annulment would be a
long and tedious process, and in this particular case, not even feasible, considering that the
marriage of the parties appears to have all the badges of validity. On the other hand, legal
separation would not be a sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the
legally separated Filipino spouse would still remain married to the naturalized alien spouse.

However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by
respondent concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondent’s wife. It is
settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not
evidence.13

Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his wife
was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be
recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.14 Such foreign law must also be proved
as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be
alleged and proved.15 Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows
his former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no
evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.

Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino
citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and
remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the present petition there is no
sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are unable to declare, based on respondent’s
bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a
divorce decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry.
Such declaration could only be made properly upon respondent’s submission of the aforecited
evidence in his favor.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of
Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.

G.R. No. 221029

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner

vs
MARELYN TANEDO MANALO, Respondent

RESOLUTION

peralta, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules) seeks to
reverse and set aside the September 18, 2014 Decision1 and October 12, 2015 Resolution2 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 100076. The dispositive portion of the Decision
states:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 15 October 2012 of the
Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, First Judicial Region, Branch 43, in SPEC. PROC. NO.
2012-0005 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Let a copy of this Decision be served on the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila.
SO ORDERED.3

The facts are undisputed.

On January 10, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition for
cancellation of

Entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan , Metro Manila, by virtueof a judgment of
divorce Japanese court.

Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and in substance, Branch 43 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Dagupan City set the case for initial hearing on April 25, 2012. The petition and
the notice of initial hearing were published once a week for three consecutive weeks in
newspaper of general circulation. During the initial hearing, counsel for Manalo marked the
documentary evidence (consisting of the trial courts Order dated January 25, 2012, affidavit of
publication, and issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 -
March 5, 2012, and March 6-12, 2012) for purposes of compliance with the jurisdictional
requirements.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance for petitioner Republic of the
Philippines authorizing the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dagupan to appear on its behalf.
Likewise, a Manifestation and Motion was filed questioning the title and/or caption of the petition
considering that based on the allegations therein, the proper action should be a petition for
recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment.

As a result, Manalo moved to admit an Amended Petition, which the court granted. The
Amended Petition, which captioned that if it is also a petition for recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgment alleged:

2. That petitioner is previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese national named

YOSHINO MINORO as shown by their Marriage Contract xxx;

3. That recently, a case for divorce was filed by herein [petitioner] in Japan and after die
proceedings, a divorce decree dated December 6, 2011 was rendered by the Japanese Court x
x x;

4. That at present, by virtue of the said divorce decree, petitioner and her divorce Japanese
husband are no longer living together and in fact, petitioner and her daughter are living
separately from said Japanese former husband;

5. That there is an imperative need to have the entry of marriage in Civil Registry of San Juan,
Metro Manila cancelled, where the petitioner and the former Japanese husband's marriage was
previously registered, in order that it would not appear anymore that petitioner is still married to
the said Japanese national who is no longer her husband or is no longer married to her, she
shall not be bothered and disturbed by aid entry of marriage;

6. That this petition is filed principally for the purpose of causing the cancellation of entry of the
marriage between the petitioner and the said Japanese national, pursuant to Rule 108 of the
Revised Rules of Court, which marriage was already dissolved by virtue of the aforesaid divorce
decree; [and]
7. That petitioner prays, among others, that together with the cancellation of the said entry of
her marriage, that she be allowed to return and use her maiden surname, MANALO.4

Manalo was allowed to testify in advance as she was scheduled to leave for Japan for her
employment. Among the documents that were offered and admitted were:

1. Court Order dated January 25, 2012, finding the petition and its attachments to be sufficient
in form and in substance;

2. Affidavit of Publication;

3. Issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 - March 5, 2012,
and March 6-12, 2012;

4. Certificate of Marriage between Manalo and her former Japanese husband;

5. Divorce Decree of Japanese court;

6. Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of the

Notification of Divorce; and

7. Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce.5

The OSG did not present any controverting evidence to rebut the allegations of Manalo.

On October 15, 2012, the trial court denied the petition for lack of merit. In ruling that the divorce
obtained by Manalo in Japan should not be recognized, it opined that, based on Article 15 of the
New Civil Code, the Philippine law "does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce
whether they are in the country or living abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners,
or if they celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or in another country" and that unless
Filipinos "are naturalized as citizens of another country, Philippine laws shall have control over
issues related to Filipinos' family rights and duties, together with the determination of their
condition and legal capacity to enter into contracts and civil relations, inclusing marriages."6

On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the Family Code of the
Philippines (Family Code) is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce against her
Japanese husband because the decree may obtained makes the latter no longer married to the
former, capacitating him to remarry. Conformably with Navarro, et al. V. Exec. Secretary Ermita,
et al.7 ruling that the meaning of the law should be based on the intent of the lawmakers and in
view of the legislative intent behind Article 26, it would be height of injustice to consider Manalo
as still married to the Japanese national, who, in turn, is no longer married to her. For the
appellate court, the fact that it was Manalo who filed the divorce case is inconsequential. Cited
as similar to this case was Van Dorn v. Judge Romilo, Jr.8 where the mariage between a
foreigner an a Filipino was dissolved filed abroad by the latter.

The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied; hence, this petition.

We deny the petition and partially affirm the CA decision.

Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after the marriage, are of two
types: (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2)
limited divorce or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.9 In this
jurisdiction, the following rules exist:

1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant
it.10

2. Consistent with Articles 1511 and 1712 of the New Civil Code, the marital bond between
two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by an absolute divorce obtained abroad.13

3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who both aliens, may be

recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national
laws.14

4. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former is allowed to

contract a subsequent marriage in case the absolute divorce is validly obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.15

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law Executive Order (E.O.) No.
209, otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines, which took effect on August 3,
1988.16 Shortly thereafter , E.O. No. 227 was issued on July 17, 1987.17 Aside from amending
Articles 36 and 39 of the Family Code, a second paragraph was added to Article 26.18 This
provision was originally deleted by the Civil Code Revision Committee (Committee),but it was
presented and approved at a Cabinet meeting after Pres. Aquino signed E.O. No. 209.19 As
modified, Article 26 now states:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in
the where country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in
this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him her to remarry under
Philippine law.

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a

foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of
the dissolution of the marriage.20 It authorizes our courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce
decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce.21 Philippine courts cannot try
the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a divorce case.22Under the principles of
comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by the spouse of foreign nationality,
but the legal effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support of the children or property
relations of the spouses, must still be determined by our courts.23

According to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Committee, the idea of the amendment
is to avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino as still being married to his or her alien spouse,
although the latter is no longer married to the former because he or she had obtained a divorce
abroad that is recognized by his or national law.24 The aim was that it would solved the problem
of many Filipino women who, under the New Civil Code, are still considered married to their
alien husbands even after the latter have already validly divorced them under their (the
husbands') national laws and perhaps have already married again.25

In 2005, this Court concluded that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 applies to a case where, at the time
of the celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them
acquired foreign citizenship by naturalization, initiated a divorce proceeding, and obtained a
favorable decree. We held in Republic of the Phils. v. Orbecido III:26

The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals. In Quita, the
parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became
naturalized American citizen n 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The court therein
hinted, by the way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is
no longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.

Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold
that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at
the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them
becomes naturalized as foreign citizen and obtains divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should
likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. x
xx

If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who after obtaining a divorce is no longer married
to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the
contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.

In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article
26 as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner;
and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of
marriage, but their citizenship at the time valid divorced obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry.

Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same provision, a Filipino citizen has the
capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and
obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry.
Specifically, Manalo pleads for the recognition of enforcement of the divorced decree rendered
by the Japanese court and for the cancellation of the entry of marriage in the local civil registry "
in order that it would not appear anymore that she is still married to the said Japanese national
who is no longer her husband or is no longer married to her; [and], in the event that [she]
decides to be remarried, she shall not be bothered and disturbed by said entry of marriage," and
to use her maiden surname.

We rule in the affirmative.

Both Dacasin v. Dacasin28 and Van Dorn29 already recognized a foreign divorce decree that was
initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child
custody and property relation,respectively.

In Dacasin, post-divorce, the former spouses executed an Agreement for the joint custody of
their minor daughter. Later on, the husband who is a US citizen, sued his Filipino wife enforce
the Agreement, alleging that it was only the latter who exercised sole custody of their child. The
trial court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, on the ground, among others, that the
divorce decree is binding following the "nationality rule" prevailing in this jurisdiction. The
husband moved to reconsider, arguing that the divorce decree obtained by his former wife is
void, but it was denied. In ruling that the trial court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit bu not to
enforce the Agreement, which is void, this Court said:

Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree's alleged invalidity - not because the Illinois court
lacked jurisdiction or that the divorced decree violated Illinois law, but because the divorce was
obtained by his Filipino spouse - to support the Agreement's enforceability . The argument that
foreigners in this jurisdiction are not bound by foreign divorce decrees is hardly novel. Van Dron
v. Romillo settled the matter by holding that an alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce
decree obtained abroad. There, we dismissed the alien divorcee's Philippine suit for accounting
of alleged post-divorce conjugal property and rejected his submission that the foreign divorce
(obtained by the Filipino spouse) is not valid in this jurisdiction x x x.30

Van Dorn was decided before the Family Code took into effect. There, a complaint was filed by
the ex-husband , who is a US citizen, against his Filipino wife to render an accounting of a
business that was alleged to be a conjugal property and to be declared with right to manage the
same. Van Dorn moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action was barred
by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings that she initiated, but the trial court denied the
motion. On his part, her ex-husband averred that the divorce decree issued by the Nevada court
could not prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that
the acts and declaration of a foreign court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public
policy, divest Philippine courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction . In
dismissing the case filed by the alien spouse, the Court discussed the effect of the foreign
divorce on the parties and their conjugal property in the Philippines. Thus:

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the
United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For
instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union.
What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction,
the same being contrary to local law and public policy.

Is it true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorce
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage
from standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by
the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794,799:

"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of
competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and
wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as stone party,
ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the
law. When the law provides in the nature of penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again,
that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely feed from the bond of the former marriage."

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise
control over conjugal assets. As he is estopped by his own representation before said court
from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

To maintain, as private respondent does, that under our laws, petitioner has to be considered
still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et.
seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not
continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.31

In addition, the fact that a validity obtained foreign divorce initiated by the Filipino spouse can be
recognized and given legal effects in the Philippines is implied from Our rulings in Fujiki v.
Marinay, et al.32 and Medina v. Koike.33

In Fujiki, the Filipino wife, with the help of her husband, who is a Japanese national, was able to
obtain a judgment from Japan's family court. Which declared the marriage between her and her
second husband, who is a Japanese national, void on the ground of bigamy. In resolving the
issue of whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his her spouse and a foreign citizen on
the ground of bigamy, We ruled:

Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment
nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the
judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the
personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay
and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.

There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the
integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no
doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil
registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the
substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances) his most
intimate human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law
the moment he contracts marriage. These property interests in marriage included the right to be
supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family" and preserving the property
regime of the marriage.

Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, but a spouse's right
in a marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and
Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code. x x x34

On the other hand, in Medina, the Filipino wife and her Japanese husband jointly filed for
divorce, which was granted.1âwphi1 Subsequently, she filed a petition before the RTC for
judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to
Paragraph 2 of Article 26. The RTC denied the petition on the ground that the foreign divorce
decree and the national law of the alien spouse recognizing his capacity to obtain a divorce
must be proven in accordance with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence. This Court agreed and ruled that, consistent with Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, et
al.35 and Garcia v. Recio,36 the divorce decree and the national law of the alien spouse must be
proven. Instead of dismissing the case, We referred it to the CA for appropriate action including
the reception of evidence to determine and resolve the pertinent factual issues.

There is no compelling reason to deviate from the above-mentioned rulings. When this Court
recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and
extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and property relation, it should not stop
short in a likewise acknowledging that one of the usual and necessary consequences of
absolute divorce is the right to remarry. Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation to live
together and observe fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed and ceased to exist, the civil
status and the domestic relation of the former spouses change as both of them are freed from
the marital bond.

The dissent is of the view that, under the nationality principle, Manalo's personal status is
subject to Philippine law, which prohibits absolute divorce. Hence, the divorce decree which she
obtained under Japanese law cannot be given effect, as she is, without dispute, a national not of
Japan, bit of the Philippines. It is said that that a contrary ruling will subvert not only the intention
of the framers of the law, but also that of the Filipino peopl, as expressed in the Constitution.
The Court is, therefore, bound to respect the prohibition until the legislature deems it fit to lift the
same.

We beg to differ.

Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26 speaksof "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only
requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand
that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree
was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the
respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the statute;
neither can We put words in the mouth of lawmakers.37 The legislature is presumed to know the
meaning of the words to have used words advisely and to have expressed its intent by the use
of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words if
a statute there should be departure."38

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted to mean that
the divorce proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not
follow the letter of the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature
or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act.39 Law
have ends to achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out
such ends and purposes.40 As held in League of Cities of the Phils. et al. v. COMELEC et. al.:41

The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in which the resulting
law is couched. Thus, applying a verba legis or strictly literal interpretation of a statute may
render it meaningless and lead to inconvience, an absurd situation or injustice. To obviate this
aberration, and bearing in mind the principle that the intent or the spirit of the law is the law
itself, resort should be to the rule that the spirit of the law control its letter.
To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is
effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The
provision is a corrective measure is free to marry under the laws of his or her countr. 42 Whether
the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving
the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result:
the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign
divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstances as a Filipino who is at the
receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not make
a distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the
foreign divorce decree on a Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by
operations of their alien spouses are severed by operation on the latter's national law.

Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is erroneous. Such principle, found under Article
15 of the City Code, is not an absolute and unbending rule. In fact, the mer e existence of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is a testament that the State may provide for an exception thereto.
Moreover, blind adherence to the nationality principle must be disallowed if it would cause
unjust discrimination and oppression to certain classes of individuals whose rights are equally
protected by law. The courts have the duty to enforce the laws of divorce as written by the
Legislature only if they are constitutional.43

While the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification and that its
decision is accorded recognition and respect by the court of justice, such classification may be
subjected to judicial review.44 The deference stops where the classification violates a
fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded special protection by the
Constitution.45 When these violations arise, this Court must discharge its primary role as the
vanguard of constitutional guaranties, and require a stricter and more exacting adherence to
constitutional limitations.46 If a legislative classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise
of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class strict judicial
scrutiny is required since it is presumed unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the
government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest
and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest.47

"Fundamental rights" whose infringement leads to strict scrutiny under the equal protection
clause are those basic liberties explicitly or implicitly guaranteed in the Constitution.48 It includes
the right to free speech, political expression, press, assembly, and forth, the right to travel, and
the right to vote.49 On the other hand, what constitutes compelling state interest is measured by
the scale rights and powers arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by history.50 It is akin to
the paramount interest of the state for which some individual liberties must give way, such as
the promotion of public interest, public safety or the general welfare.51 It essentially involves a
public right or interest that, because of its primacy, overrides individual rights, and allows the
former to take precedence over the latter.52

Although the Family Code was not enacted by the Congress, the same principle applies with
respect to the acts of the President which have the force and effect of law unless declared
otherwise by the court. In this case, We find that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 violates one of the
essential requisites53 of the equal protection clause.54 Particularly, the limitation of the provision
only to a foreign divorce decree initiated by the alien spouse is unreasonable as it is based on
superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification.
A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly situated with a Filipino who is
married to a foreign citizen. There are real, material and substantial differences between
them. Ergo, they should not be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and liabilities imposed.
Without a doubt, there are political, economic cultural, and religious dissimilarities as well as
varying legal systems and procedures, all too unfamiliar, that a Filipino national who is married
to an alien spouse has to contend with. More importantly, while a divorce decree obtained
abroad by a Filipino against another Filipino is null and void, a divorce decree obtained by an
alien against his her Filipino spouse is recognized if made in accordance with the national law of
the foreigner.55

On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated a
foreign divorce proceedings a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or
her alien spouse . In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered as
Filipinos who have the same rights and obligations in a alien land. The circumstances
surrounding them are alike. Were it not for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married to
their foreigner spouses who are no longer their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction
between them based merely on the superficial difference of whether they initiated the divorce
proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives undue favor to one and unjustly
discriminate against the other.

Further, the differentiation in Paragraph 2 Article 26 is arbitrary. There is inequality in treatment

because a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by a Filipino citizen against his
or her alien spouse would not be recognized even if based on grounds similar to Articles 35, 36,
37 and 38 of the Family Code.56 In filing for divorce based on these grounds, the Filipino spouse
cannot be accused of invoking foreign law at whim, tantamount to insisting that he or she should
be governed with whatever law he or she chooses. The dissent's comment that Manalo should
be "reminded that all is not lost, for she may still pray for the severance of her martial ties before
the RTC in accordance with the mechanism now existing under the Family Code" is anything
but comforting. For the guidance of the bench and the bar, it would have been better if the
dissent discussed in detail what these "mechanism" are and how they specifically apply in
Manalo's case as well as those who are similarly situated. If the dissent refers to a petition for
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage, the reality is that there is no assurance that our
courts will automatically grant the same. Besides, such proceeding is duplicitous, costly, and
protracted. All to the prejudice of our kababayan.

It is argued that the Court's liberal interpretation of Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26 encourages

Filipinos to marry foreigners, opening the floodgate to the indiscriminate practice of Filipinos
marrying foreign nationals or initiating divorce proceedings against their alien spouses.

The supposition is speculative and unfounded.

First, the dissent falls into a hasty generalization as no data whatsoever was sworn to support
what he intends to prove. Second, We adhere to the presumption of good faith in this
jurisdiction. Under the rules on evidence, it is disputable presumed (i.e., satisfactory if
uncontradicted and overcome by other evidence) that a person is innocent of crime or
wrong,57 that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns,59 that acquiescence resulted from a
belief that the thing acquiesced in was conformable to the law and fact, 60 that a man and
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage,61 and that the law has been obeyed.62 It is whimsical to easily attribute any illegal,
irregular or immoral conduct on the part of a Filipino just because he or she opted to marry a
foreigner instead of a fellow Filipino. It is presumed that interracial unions are entered into out of
genuine love and affection, rather than prompted by pure lust or profit. Third, We take judicial
notice of the fact that Filipinos are relatively more forbearing and conservative in nature and that
they are more often the victims or losing end of mixed marriages. And Fourth, it is not for Us to
prejudge the motive behind Filipino's decision to marry an alien national. In one case, it was
said:

Motive for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot
dictated on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle
would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions.
The right marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in almost any way
they see it fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or
not, and so on. Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as
convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the
legal requisites, are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is
not the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly
support a marriage.63

The 1987 Constitution expresses that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.64 Nevertheless, it was not meant to
be a general prohibition on divorce because Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon, in
response to a question by Father Joaquin G. Bernas during the deliberations of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, was categorical about this point.65 Their exchange reveal as follows:

MR. RAMA. Mr. Presiding Officer, may I ask that Commissioner Bernas be recognized.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco). Commissioner Bernas is recognized.

FR. BERNAS. Just one question, and I am not sure if it has been categorically answered. I refer
specifically to the proposal of Commissioner Gascon. Is this be understood as a prohibition of a
general law on divorce? His intention is to make this a prohibition so that the legislature cannot
pass a divorce law.

MR. GASCON. Mr. Presding Officer, that was not primarily my intention. My intention was
primarily to encourage the social institution of marriage, but not necessarily discourage divorce.
But now that the mentioned the issue of divorce, my personal opinion is to discourage it. Mr.
Presiding Officer.

FR. BERNAS. No my question is more categorical. Does this carry the meaning of prohibiting a
divorce law?

MR. GASCON. No Mr. Presiding Officer.

FR. BERNAS. Thank you.66

Notably, a law on absolute divorce is not new in our country. Effectivity March 11, 1917,
Philippine courts could grant an absolute divorce in the grounds of adultery on the part of the
wife or concubinage on the part of the husband by virtue of Act No. 2710 of the Philippine
Legislature.67 On March 25, 1943, pursuant to the authority conferred upon him by the
Commander-in-Chief fo the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines and with the approval
of the latter, the Chairman of the Philippine Executive Commission promulgated an E.O. No.
141 ("New Divorce Law"), which repealed Act No. 2710 and provided eleven ground for
absolute divorce, such as intentional or unjustified desertion continuously for at least one year
prior to the filing of the action, slander by deed or gross insult by one spouse against the other
to such an extent as to make further living together impracticable, and a spouse's incurable
insanity.68 When the Philippines was liberated and the Commonwealth Government was
restored, it ceased to have force and effect and Act No. 2710 again prevailed.69 From August
30, 1950, upon the effectivity of Republic Act No. 836 or the New Civil Code, an absolute
divorce obatined by Filipino citizens, whether here or abroad, is no longer recognized.70

Through the years, there has been constant clamor from various sectors of the Philippine
society to re-institute absolute divorce. As a matte of fcat, in the currnet 17th Congress, House
Bill (H.B.) Nos. 11671 106272 238073 and 602774 were filed in the House of representatives. In
substitution of these bills, H.B. No. 7303 entitled "An Act Instituting Absolute Divorce and
Dissolution of Marriage in the Philippines" or the Absolute Divorce Act of 2018 was submitted by
the House Committee on Population

And Family Relations of February 8, 2018. It was approved on March 19, 2018 on Third
Reading - with 134 in favor, 57 against, and 2 absentations. Under the bill, the grounds for a
judicial decree of absolute divorce are as follows:

1. The grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code, modified or amended,
as follows:

a. Physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a

common child, or a child of the petitioner;

b. Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or

political affiliation;

c. Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of

a petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;

d. Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six (6) years,
even if pardoned;

e. Drug addiction or habitual alchoholism ro chronic gambling of respondent;

f. Homosexuality of the respondent;

g. Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the

Philippines or abroad;

h. Marital infidelity or perversion or having a child with another person other than one's
spouse during the marriage, except when upon the mutual agreement of the spouses, a
child is born to them by in vitro or a similar procedure or when the wife bears a child after
being a victim of rape;
 i. attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner, a common child or a child
of a petitioner; and

j. Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one
(1) year.

When the spouses are legally separated by judicial decree for more thath two (2) years, either
or both spouses can petition the proper court for an absolute divorce based on said judicial
decree of legal separation.

1. Grounds for annulment of marriage under Article 45 of the Family Code restated as follows:

a. The party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen
(18) years of age or over but below twety-one (21), and the marriage was solemnized
without the consent of the parents guradian or personl having substitute parental
authority over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one (21)
such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband and wife;

b. either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely
cohabited with the other as husband and wife;

c. The consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards with
full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other husband
and wife;

d. consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless
the same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the
other as husband and wife;

e. Either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other
and such incapacity continues or appears to be incurable; and

f. Either part was afflicted with the sexually transmissible infection found to be serious or
appears to be incurable.

Provided, That the ground mentioned in b, e and f existed either at the time of the marriage or
supervening after the marriage.

1. When the spouses have been separated in fact for at least five (5) years at the time the
petition for absolute divorce is filed, and the reconciliation is highly improbable;

2. Psychological incapacity of either spouse as provided for in Article 36 of the Family Code,
whether or not the incapacity was present at the time of the celebration of the marriage or later;

3. When one of the spouses undergoes a gender reassignment surgery or transition from one
sex to another, the other spouse is entitled to petition for absolute divorce with the transgender
or transsexual as respondent, or vice-versa;
4. Irreconcilable marital differences and conflicts which have resulted in the total breakdown of
the marriage beyond repair, despite earnest and repeated efforts at reconciliation.

To be sure, a good number of Filipinos led by the Roman Catholic Church react adversely to
any attempt to enact a law on absolute divorce, viewing it as contrary to our customs, morals,
and traditions that has looked upon marriage and family as an institution and their nature of
permanence,

In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with
religion, it also limits what religious sects can or cannot do. They can neither cause the
government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they cause the
government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to adhere
to a particular religion and, thus establish a state religion.76

The Roman Catholic Church can neither impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the
rest of the citizenry nor can it demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it is sincerely
believes that they are good for country.77While marriage is considered a sacrament, it has civil
and legal consequences which are governed by the Family Code.78 It is in this aspect, bereft of
any ecclesiastical overtone, that the State has a legitimate right and interest to regulate.

The declared State policy that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is a foundation of the
family and shall be protected by the State, should not be read in total isolation but must be
harmonized with other constitutional provision. Aside from strengthening the solidarity of the
Filipino family, the State is equally mandated to actively promote its total development. 79 It is
also obligated to defend, among others, the right of children to special protection from all forms
of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their
development.80 To Our mind, the State cannot effectively enforce these obligation s if We limit
the application of Paragraph 2 or Article 26 only those foreign divorce initiated by the alien
spouse. It is not amiss to point that the women and children are almost always the helpless
victims of all forms of domestic abuse and violence. In fact, among the notable legislation
passed in order to minimize, if not eradicate, the menace are R.A. No. 9262 ("Anti-Violence
Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004") R.A. No. 9710 ("The Magna Carta of
Women"), R.A. No 10354 ("The Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of
2012") and R.A. No 9208 ("Anti-Trafficking in Person Act of 2003"), as amended by R.A. No.
10364 ("ExpandedAnti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012").Moreover, in protecting and
strengthening the Filipino family as a basic autonomous social institution, the Court must not
lose sight of the constitutional mandate to value the dignity of every human person, guarantee
full respect for human rights, and ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and
men.81

A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm than good. If We disallow a
Filipino citizen who initiated and obtained a foreign divorce from the coverage of Paragraph 2
Article 26 and still require him or her to first avail of the existing "mechanisms" under the Family
Code, any subsequent relationship that he or she would enter in the meantime shall be
considered as illicit in the eyes of the Philippine law. Worse, any child born out such "extra-
marital" affair has to suffer the stigma of being branded as illegitimate. Surely, these are just but
a few of the adverse consequences, not only to the parent but also to the child, if We are to hold
a restrictive interpretation of the subject provision. The irony is that the principle of inviolability of
marriage under Section 2, Article XV of the Constitution is meant to be tilted in favor of marriage
and against unions not formalized by marriage, but without denying State protection and
assistance to live-in arrangements or to families formed according to indigenous customs.82

This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the present time. With the advancement
of communication and information technology, as well as the improvement of the transportation
system that almost instantly connect people from all over the world, mixed marriages have
become not too uncommon. Likewise, it is recognized that not all marriages are made in heaven
and that imperfect humans more often than not create imperfect unions.83 Living in a flawed
world, the unfortunate reality for some is that the attainment of the individual's full human
potential and self fulfillment is not found and achieved in the context of a marriage. Thus it is
hypocritical to safeguard the quantity of existing marriages and, at the same time, brush aside
the truth that some of them are rotten quality.

Going back, we hold that marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two
parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is considered
released from the marital bond while the other remains bound to it.84 In reiterating that the
Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his or her own country if the ends of
justice are to be served, San Luis v. San Luis85 quoted:

x x x In Alonzo v. Intermediate Applellate Court, the Court stated:

But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results: and likewise, we may add, by
its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the
judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law
should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the
legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives
of the legislature, is to render justice.

Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law
and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that,
while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because only of our
nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What
we do instead is find a balance between the sord and the will, that justice may be done even as
the law is obeyed.

As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it
worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and
consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of law," so we are
warned, by Justice Holmes agaian, "where these words import a policy that goes beyond them."

xxxx

More that twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to
render every one of his due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the
facts and the law in ever case brought to it for decisions. Justice is always an essential
ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrant, we interpret the law in a way that will
render justice, presuming that it was the intention if the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be
dispensed with justice.86
Indeed, where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead
to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed
according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law.87 A
statute may therefore, be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long
as they come within its spirit or intent.88

The foregoing notwithstanding, We cannot yet write finis to this controversy by granting
Manalo's petition to recognize and enforce the divorce decree rendered by the Japanese court
and to cancel the entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila.

Jurisprudence has set guidelines before the Philippine courts recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of foreign country.
Presentation solely of the divorce decree will not suffice.89 The fact of divorce must still first be
proven.90 Before a a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading
it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. 91

x x x Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first
be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce
decree itself. The decree purports to be written act or record of an act of an official body or
tribunal of foreign country.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven
as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy
thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in
the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b)authenticated by the seal of his office.92

In granting Manalo's petition, the CA noted:

In this case, Petitioner was able to submit before the court a quo the 1) Decision of the
Japanese Court allowing the divorce; 2) the Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippines
Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of the Decree of Divorce; and 3) Acceptance of Certificate
of Divorce byu the Petitioner and the Japanese national. Under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25,
in relation to Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of the Rules of Court, these documents sufficiently prove
the subject Divorce Decree as a fact. Thus, We are constrained to recognize the Japanese
Court's judgment decreeing the divorce.93

If the opposing party fails to properly object, as in this case, the divorce decree is rendered
admissible a a written act of the foreign court.94 As it appears, the existence of the divorce
decree was not denied by the OSG; neither was the jurisdiction of the divorce court impeached
nor the validity of its proceedings challenged on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake
of fact or law, albeit an opportunity to do so.95

Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.

x x x The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing
necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden
of proving the material defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their
answer when they introduce new matters. x x x
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like
any other facts, they must alleged and proved. x x x The power of judicial notice must be
exercise d with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the
negative.96

Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the pertinent Japanese law
validating it, as well as her former husband's capacity to remarry, fall squarely upon her.
Japanese laws on persons and family relations are not among those matters that Filipino judges
are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The September 18, 2014
Decision and October 12, 2015 Resolution if the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV. No. 100076,
are AFFIRMED IN PART. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for further proceedings
and reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.

G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010

GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner,

vs.
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag
City, Branch 11, elevated via a petition for review on certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court (present petition).

Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship
through naturalization on November 29, 2000.3 On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married
respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.4 Due to work and other
professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the
Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his
wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada
and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted
Gerbert’s petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month
later, on January 8, 2006.5

Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love.
Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiancée in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City
Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyn’s marriage
certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics
Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under
Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized
by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.6
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration
of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any
responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She
offered no opposition to Gerbert’s petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case
herself but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that
she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerbert’s.

In its October 30, 2008 decision,7 the RTC denied Gerbert’s petition. The RTC concluded that
Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign
divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can
avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,8 in order for
him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law.9 Article 26 of the Family Code reads:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce
is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the enactment of
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined by the Court in Republic
v. Orbecido III;10 the provision was enacted to "avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married
to the Filipino spouse."11

THE PETITION

From the RTC’s ruling,12 Gerbert filed the present petition.13

Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory relief, similar to
that filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of his rights under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into account the rationale behind the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, he contends that the provision applies as well to the
benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in
Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the petition only to the Filipino spouse – an interpretation
he claims to be contrary to the essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code. He considers himself as a proper party, vested with sufficient legal interest, to institute
the case, as there is a possibility that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his
Filipina fiancée in the Philippines since two marriage certificates, involving him, would be on file
with the Civil Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their respective
Comments,14 both support Gerbert’s position.

Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition
of a foreign divorce decree.

THE COURT’S RULING

The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse

The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent behind the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.

The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages – void15 and
voidable16 marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or
annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other
hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the marriage.17 Our
family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.18

Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino and an alien,
President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom
Constitution,19 enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code
to its present wording, as follows:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce
is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated
into the law this Court’s holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.20 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.21 In
both cases, the Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouse’s assertion of marital rights after
a foreign court’s divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized
that the foreign divorce had already severed the marital bond between the spouses. The Court
reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:

To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be considered still married to
[the alien spouse] and still subject to a wife's obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino
spouse] should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render
support to [the alien spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible
rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the
ends of justice are to be served.22

As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is
no longer married to the Filipino spouse."23 The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino
spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree.
Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse
a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved,
capacitating him or her to remarry.24 Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted
precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no
significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of
severing the marital bond;25 Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute
divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of
the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule
and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse
and his or her alien spouse.

Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not
limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree
capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is
likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can
make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already established by the
decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law.26

Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision
for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under
this provision.

The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal
interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction

We qualify our above conclusion – i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens – with the complementary statement that this
conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s petition before the RTC. In other words,
the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not
necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign
divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the
alien’s national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a
presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This Section states:

SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.—The effect of a judgment or final order of a
tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as
follows:

(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order
is conclusive upon the title of the thing; and

(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest
by a subsequent title.

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to
clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the
recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the
divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce
is valid according to his or her national law.27
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that
our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained
that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered
by a tribunal of another country."28 This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity
must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable
national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself.29 The recognition
may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a
party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.

In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien,
recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign
authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires
proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody
of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.

The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as
the required certificates proving its authenticity,30 but failed to include a copy of the Canadian
law on divorce.31 Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for
insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to
the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.

We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26 interests
that will be served and the Filipina wife’s (Daisylyn’s) obvious conformity with the petition. A
remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and
overcome a petitioner’s presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every
precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as
the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata32 between the
parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.33

In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal recognition
of foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce
serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien
spouse bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino
spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code provides.

Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree

As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has
already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate based on
the mere presentation of the decree.34 We consider the recording to be legally improper; hence,
the need to draw attention of the bench and the bar to what had been done.

Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil
status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register." The law requires the entry in the civil
registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences touching upon a person’s legal
capacity and status, i.e., those affecting "all his personal qualities and relations, more or less
permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or
illegitimate, or his being married or not."35

A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a person’s legal
capacity and status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil
Status specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in the civil registry:

Sec. 1. Civil Register. – A civil register is established for recording the civil status of persons, in
which shall be entered:

(a) births;

(b) deaths;

(c) marriages;

(d) annulments of marriages;

(e) divorces;

(f) legitimations;

(g) adoptions;

(h) acknowledgment of natural children;

(i) naturalization; and

(j) changes of name.

xxxx

Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. — The local registrars shall keep and preserve in their offices the
following books, in which they shall, respectively make the proper entries concerning the civil
status of persons:

(1) Birth and death register;

(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages solemnized but
also divorces and dissolved marriages.

(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and naturalization register.

But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the
submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decree’s registration.
The law should be read in relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign
judgment before it can be given res judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial
order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry
Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian
divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the
foreign decree presented by Gerbert.

Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a court
recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982,36 and Department of Justice Opinion
No. 181, series of 198237 – both of which required a final order from a competent Philippine
court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but
it, nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree. For being contrary to law, the registration
of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot
produce any legal effect.1avvphi1

Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may extend to the
Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil
registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding,
contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry.

Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be changed or
corrected, without judicial order." The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code
by specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry
may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the
jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment,
authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also requires,
among others, that the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located;38that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim
any interest must be made parties to the proceedings;39and that the time and place for hearing
must be published in a newspaper of general circulation.40 As these basic jurisdictional
requirements have not been met in the present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert
filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two
separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry – one for
recognition of the foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule
108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact.
Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial
proceeding41 by which the applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in
terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the October 30,
2008 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17,
2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case to the trial court for further proceedings in
accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar
General. No costs.

G.R. No. 145226 February 06, 2004

LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the decision1 dated October 21, 1999 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, which affirmed the judgment2 dated August 5,
1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol, Branch 4, in Criminal Case No. 8688. The trial
court found herein petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy
and sentenced him to a prison term of seven (7) months of prision correccionalas minimum to
six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. Also assailed in this petition is the
resolution3 of the appellate court, dated September 25, 2000, denying Morigo’s motion for
reconsideration.

The facts of this case, as found by the court a quo, are as follows:

Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina
Tortor at Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for a period of four (4) years (from 1974-
1978).

After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other.

In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from
Singapore. The former replied and after an exchange of letters, they became
sweethearts.

In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. While
in Canada, they maintained constant communication.

In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join
her in Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990
at the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.

On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant
Lucio behind.

On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a petition for
divorce against appellant which was granted by the court on January 17, 1992 and to
take effect on February 17, 1992.
 On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago4 at
the Virgen sa Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.

On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No. 6020. The
complaint seek (sic) among others, the declaration of nullity of accused’s marriage with
Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place.

On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an Information5 filed by the
City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran [City], with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.6

The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for
judicial nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case.
His motion was granted, but subsequently denied upon motion for reconsideration by the
prosecution. When arraigned in the bigamy case, which was docketed as Criminal Case No.
8688, herein petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial thereafter ensued.

On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed down its judgment in Criminal Case No. 8688, as
follows:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court finds accused Lucio Morigo y
Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy and sentences him to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from Seven (7) Months of Prision
Correccional as minimum to Six (6) Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayoras
maximum.

SO ORDERED.7

In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted petitioner’s claim that his first marriage
to Lucia was null and void ab initio. Following Domingo v. Court of Appeals,8 the trial court ruled
that want of a valid marriage ceremony is not a defense in a charge of bigamy. The parties to a
marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but
must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed
to marry again.

Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial court cited Ramirez v. Gmur,9 which
held that the court of a country in which neither of the spouses is domiciled and in which one or
both spouses may resort merely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce, has no jurisdiction to
determine the matrimonial status of the parties. As such, a divorce granted by said court is not
entitled to recognition anywhere. Debunking Lucio’s defense of good faith in contracting the
second marriage, the trial court stressed that following People v. Bitdu,10 everyone is presumed
to know the law, and the fact that one does not know that his act constitutes a violation of the
law does not exempt him from the consequences thereof.

Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No.
20700.

Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 was pending before the
appellate court, the trial court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6020 declaring the marriage
between Lucio and Lucia void ab initiosince no marriage ceremony actually took place. No
appeal was taken from this decision, which then became final and executory.

On October 21, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby

AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.11

In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the appellate court stressed that the
subsequent declaration of nullity of Lucio’s marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No. 6020 could not
acquit Lucio. The reason is that what is sought to be punished by Article 34912 of the Revised
Penal Code is the act of contracting a second marriage before the first marriage had been
dissolved. Hence, the CA held, the fact that the first marriage was void from the beginning is not
a valid defense in a bigamy case.

The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree obtained by Lucia from the
Canadian court could not be accorded validity in the Philippines, pursuant to Article 1513 of the
Civil Code and given the fact that it is contrary to public policy in this jurisdiction. Under Article
1714 of the Civil Code, a declaration of public policy cannot be rendered ineffectual by a
judgment promulgated in a foreign jurisdiction.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision, contending that the
doctrine in Mendiola v. People,15 allows mistake upon a difficult question of law (such as the
effect of a foreign divorce decree) to be a basis for good faith.

On September 25, 2000, the appellate court denied the motion for lack of merit.16 However, the
denial was by a split vote. The ponente of the appellate court’s original decision in CA-G.R. CR
No. 20700, Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, joined in the opinion prepared by Justice Bernardo P.
Abesamis. The dissent observed that as the first marriage was validly declared void ab initio,
then there was no first marriage to speak of. Since the date of the nullity retroacts to the date of
the first marriage and since herein petitioner was, in the eyes of the law, never married, he
cannot be convicted beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy.

The present petition raises the following issues for our resolution:

A.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE

RULE THAT IN CRIMES PENALIZED UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE,
CRIMINAL INTENT IS AN INDISPENSABLE REQUISITE. COROLLARILY, WHETHER
OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE [THE]
PETITIONER’S LACK OF CRIMINAL INTENT WHEN HE CONTRACTED THE
SECOND MARRIAGE.

B.
 WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
RULING IN PEOPLE VS. BITDU (58 PHIL. 817) IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT
BAR.

C.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE

RULE THAT EACH AND EVERY CIRCUMSTANCE FAVORING THE INNOCENCE OF
THE ACCUSED MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.17

To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or not petitioner committed bigamy and if
so, whether his defense of good faith is valid.

The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relying in good faith upon the divorce
decree of the Ontario court. He highlights the fact that he contracted the second marriage
openly and publicly, which a person intent upon bigamy would not be doing. The petitioner
further argues that his lack of criminal intent is material to a conviction or acquittal in the instant
case. The crime of bigamy, just like other felonies punished under the Revised Penal Code,
is mala in se, and hence, good faith and lack of criminal intent are allowed as a complete
defense. He stresses that there is a difference between the intent to commit the crime and the
intent to perpetrate the act. Hence, it does not necessarily follow that his intention to contract a
second marriage is tantamount to an intent to commit bigamy.

For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that good faith in the
instant case is a convenient but flimsy excuse. The Solicitor General relies upon our ruling
in Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,18 which held that bigamy can be successfully prosecuted provided all
the elements concur, stressing that under Article 4019 of the Family Code, a judicial declaration
of nullity is a must before a party may re-marry. Whether or not the petitioner was aware of said
Article 40 is of no account as everyone is presumed to know the law. The OSG counters that
petitioner’s contention that he was in good faith because he relied on the divorce decree of the
Ontario court is negated by his act of filing Civil Case No. 6020, seeking a judicial declaration of
nullity of his marriage to Lucia.

Before we delve into petitioner’s defense of good faith and lack of criminal intent, we must first
determine whether all the elements of bigamy are present in this case. In Marbella-Bobis v.
Bobis,20 we laid down the elements of bigamy thus:

(1) the offender has been legally married;

(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead;

(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and

(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of
the first.

Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that during the pendency of CA-G.R. CR
No. 20700, the RTC of Bohol Branch 1, handed down the following decision in Civil Case No.
6020, to wit:
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the
annulment of the marriage entered into by petitioner Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete on
August 23, 1990 in Pilar, Bohol and further directing the Local Civil Registrar of Pilar,
Bohol to effect the cancellation of the marriage contract.

SO ORDERED.21

The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and
Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage
contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that
the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 322 and 423 of the Family Code. As the
dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, "This simply means that there
was no marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the
first marriage. In other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the
declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the first
marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of the law, never married."24 The records show that
no appeal was taken from the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 6020, hence, the
decision had long become final and executory.

The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally
married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete.
Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage
being declared void ab initio, the two were never married "from the beginning." The contract of
marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal
purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria
Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the
crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where
there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant
charge.

The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v. Tan.25 In the latter
case, the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage was likewise obtained after the
second marriage was already celebrated. We held therein that:

A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent

one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first
obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the
earlier union is characterized by statutes as "void."26

It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually solemnized not just
once, but twice: first before a judge where a marriage certificate was duly issued and then again
six months later before a priest in religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage appeared
to have transpired, although later declared void ab initio.

In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized
solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their
own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid
marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot
be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for
bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent
marriage.

The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal statute in
favor of an accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to
ensure that justice is done. Under the circumstances of the present case, we held that petitioner
has not committed bigamy. Further, we also find that we need not tarry on the issue of the
validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and academic.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision, dated October 21,
1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, as well as the resolution of the
appellate court dated September 25, 2000, denying herein petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho is
ACQUITTED from the charge of BIGAMY on the ground that his guilt has not been proven with
moral certainty.

G.R. No. 210252 June 16, 2014

VILMA QUINTOS, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact FIDEL I. QUINTOS, JR.;

FLORENCIA I. DANCEL, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact FLOVY I. DANCEL; and
CATALINO L. IBARRA, Petitioners,
vs.
PELAGIA I. NICOLAS, NOLI L. IBARRA, SANTIAGO L. IBARRA, PEDRO L. IBARRA,
DAVID L. IBARRA, GILBERTO L. IBARRA, HEIRS OF AUGUSTO L. IBARRA, namely
CONCHITA R., IBARRA, APOLONIO IBARRA, and NARCISO IBARRA, and the spouses
RECTO CANDELARIO and ROSEMARIE CANDELARIO,Respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed under Rule 45 challenging the
Decision1 and Resolution2of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 98919 dated July 8,
2013 and November 22, 2013, respectively. The challenged rulings affirmed the May 7, 2012
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 68 in Camiling, Tarlac that petitioners and
respondents are co-owners of the subject property, which should be partitioned as per the
subdivision plan submitted by respondent spouses Recto and Rosemarie Candelario.

The Facts

As culled from the records, the facts of the case are as follows:

Petitioners Vilma Quintos, Florencia Dancel, and Catalino Ibarra, and respondents Pelagia
Nicolas, Noli Ibarra, Santiago Ibarra, Pedro Ibarra, David Ibarra, Gilberto Ibarra, and the late
Augusto Ibarra are siblings. Their parents, Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra, were the owners
of the subject property, a 281 sqm. parcel of land situated along Quezon Ave., Poblacion C,
Camiling, Tarlac, covered by Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) No. 318717.

By 1999, both Bienvenido and Escolastica had already passed away, leaving to their ten (10)
children ownership over the subject property. Subsequently, sometime in 2002, respondent
siblings brought an action for partition against petitioners. The case was docketed as Civil Case
No. 02-52 and was raffled to the RTC, Branch 68, Camiling, Tarlac. However, in an
Order4 dated March 22, 2004, the trial court dismissed the case disposing as follows:

For failure of the parties, as well as their counsels, to appear despite due notice, this case is
hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

As neither set of parties appealed, the ruling of the trial court became final, as evidenced by a
Certificate of Finality5it eventually issued on August 22, 2008.

Having failed to secure a favorable decision for partition, respondent siblings instead resorted to
executing a Deed of Adjudication6 on September 21, 2004 to transfer the property in favor of the
ten (10) siblings. As a result, TCT No. 318717 was canceled and in lieu thereof, TCT No.
390484 was issued in its place by the Registry of Deeds of Tarlac in the names of the ten (10)
heirs of the Ibarra spouses.

Subsequently, respondent siblings sold their 7/10 undivided share over the property in favor of
their co-respondents, the spouses Recto and Rosemarie Candelario. By virtue of a Deed of
Absolute Sale7 dated April 17, 2007 executed in favor of the spouses Candelario and an
Agreement of Subdivision8 purportedly executed by them and petitioners, TCT No. 390484 was
partially canceled and TCT No. 434304 was issued in the name of the Candelarios, covering the
7/10portion.

On June 1, 2009, petitioners filed a complaint for Quieting of Title and Damages against
respondents wherein they alleged that during their parents’ lifetime, the couple distributed their
real and personal properties in favor of their ten (10) children. Upon distribution, petitioners
alleged that they received the subject property and the house constructed thereon as their
share. They likewise averred that they have been in adverse, open, continuous, and
uninterrupted possession of the property for over four (4) decades and are, thus, entitled to
equitable title thereto. They also deny any participation in the execution of the aforementioned
Deed of Adjudication dated September 21, 2004 and the Agreement of Subdivision.
Respondents countered that petitioners’ cause of action was already barred by estoppel when
sometime in 2006, one of petitioners offered to buy the 7/10 undivided share of the respondent
siblings. They point out that this is an admission on the part of petitioners that the property is not
entirely theirs. In addition, they claimed that Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra mortgaged the
property but because of financial constraints, respondent spouses Candelario had to redeem
the property in their behalf. Not having been repaid by Bienvenido and Escolastica, the
Candelarios accepted from their co-respondents their share in the subject property as payment.
Lastly, respondents sought, by way of counterclaim, the partition of the property.

Docketed as Civil Case No. 09-15 of the RTC of Camiling, Tarlac, the quieting of title case was
eventually raffled to Branch 68 of the court, the same trial court that dismissed Civil Case No.
02-52. During pre-trial, respondents, or defendants a quo, admitted having filed an action for
partition, that petitioners did not participate in the Deed of Adjudication that served as the basis
for the issuance of TCT No. 390484, and that the Agreement of Subdivision that led to the
issuance of TCT No. 434304 in favor of respondent spouses Candelario was falsified.9 Despite
the admissions of respondents, however, the RTC, through its May 27, 2012 Decision,
dismissed petitioners’ complaint. The court did not find merit in petitioners’ asseverations that
they have acquired title over the property through acquisitive prescription and noted that there
was no document evidencing that their parents bequeathed to them the subject property.
Finding that respondent siblings were entitled to their respective shares in the property as
descendants of Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra and as co-heirs of petitioners, the
subsequent transfer of their interest in favor of respondent spouses Candelario was then upheld
by the trial court. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the above-entitled case is hereby Dismissed.

Also, defendants-spouses Rosemarie Candelario and Recto Candelario are hereby declared as
the absolute owners of the 7/10 portion of the subject lot.

Likewise, the court hereby orders the partition of the subject lots between the herein plaintiffs
and the defendants-spouses Candelarios.

SO ORDERED.

Aggrieved, petitioners appealed the trial court’s Decision to the CA, pleading the same
allegations they averred in their underlying complaint for quieting of title. However, they added
that the partition should no longer be allowed since it is already barred by res judicata,
respondent siblings having already filed a case for partition that was dismissed with finality, as
admitted by respondents themselves during pre-trial.

On July 8, 2013, the CA issued the assailed Decision denying the appeal. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated May 7, 2012 of the Regional Trial
Court of Camiling, Tarlac, Branch 68, in Civil Case No. 09-15, is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Similar to the trial court, the court a quo found no evidence on record to support petitioners’
claim that the subject property was specifically bequeathed by Bienvenido and Escolastica
Ibarra in their favor as their share in their parents’ estate. It also did not consider petitioners’
possession of the property as one that is in the concept of an owner. Ultimately, the appellate
court upheld the finding that petitioners and respondent spouses Candelario co-own the
property, 30-70 in favor of the respondent spouses.

As regards the issue of partition, the CA added:

x x x Since it was conceded that the subject lot is now co-owned by the plaintiffs-appellants,
(with 3/10 undivided interest) and defendants-appellees Spouses Candelarios (with 7/10
undivided interest) and considering that plaintiffs-appellants had already constructed a 3-storey
building at the back portion of the property, then partition, in accordance with the subdivision
plan (records, p. 378) undertaken by defendants-appellants [sic] spouses, is in order.10
On November 22, 2013, petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was denied. Hence, the instant
petition.

Issues

In the present petition, the following errors were raised:

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS MANIFESTLY OVERLOOKED RELEVANT AND

UNDISPUTED FACTS WHICH, IF PROPERLY CONSIDERED, WOULD JUSTIFY
PETITIONERS’ CLAIM OF EQUITABLE TITLE.

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE ORDER OF

PARTITION DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE COUNTERCLAIM FOR PARTITION,
BASED ON THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE EXECUTED IN 2007, IS BARRED BY
LACHES.

III. THE COURT OF APPEALS RENDERED A SUBSTANTIALLY FLAWED JUDGMENT

WHEN IT NEGLECTED TO RULE ON PETITIONERS’ CONTENTION THAT THE
COUNTERCLAIM FOR PARTITION IS ALSO BARRED BY PRIOR JUDGMENT,
DESPITE ITS HAVING BEEN SPECIFICALLY ASSIGNED AS ERROR AND
PROPERLY ARGUED IN THEIR BRIEF, AND WHICH, IF PROPERLY CONSIDERED,
WOULD JUSTIFY THE DISMISSAL OF THE COUNTERCLAIM.

IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT ORDERED PARTITION IN

ACCORDANCE WITH THE SUBDIVISION PLAN MENTIONED IN ITS DECISION, IN
CONTRAVENTION OF THE PROCEDURE ESTABLISHED IN RULE 69 OF THE
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.11

To simplify, the pertinent issues in this case are as follows:

1. Whether or not the petitioners were able to prove ownership over the property;

2. Whether or not the respondents’ counterclaim for partition is already barred by laches
or res judicata; and

3. Whether or not the CA was correct in approving the subdivision agreement as basis
for the partition of the property.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is meritorious in part.

Petitioners were not able to prove equitable title or ownership over the property

Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud, doubt, or uncertainty
affecting title to real property.12 For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable
requisites must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or equitable title to or
interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or
proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on the title must be shown to be in fact invalid or
inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or efficacy.13 In the case at bar, the CA
correctly observed that petitioners’ cause of action must necessarily fail mainly in view of the
absence of the first requisite.

At the outset, it must be emphasized that the determination of whether or not petitioners
sufficiently proved their claim of ownership or equitable title is substantially a factual issue that is
generally improper for Us to delve into. Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court explicitly states
that the petition for review on certiorari "shall raise only questions of law, which must be
distinctly set forth." In appeals by certiorari, therefore, only questions of law may be raised,
because this Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-examination of
the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial.14 Although there are
exceptions15 to this general rule as eloquently enunciated in jurisprudence, none of the
circumstances calling for their application obtains in the case at bar. Thus, We are constrained
to respect and uphold the findings of fact arrived at by both the RTC and the CA.

In any event, a perusal of the records would readily show that petitioners, as aptly observed by
the courts below, indeed, failed to substantiate their claim. Their alleged open, continuous,
exclusive, and uninterrupted possession of the subject property is belied by the fact that
respondent siblings, in 2005, entered into a Contract of Lease with the Avico Lending Investor
Co. over the subject lot without any objection from the petitioners.16 Petitioners’ inability to offer
evidence tending to prove that Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra transferred the ownership
over the property in favor of petitioners is likewise fatal to the latter’s claim. On the contrary, on
May 28, 1998, Escolastica Ibarra executed a Deed of Sale covering half of the subject property
in favor of all her 10 children, not in favor of petitioners alone.17

The cardinal rule is that bare allegation of title does not suffice. The burden of proof is on the
plaintiff to establish his or her case by preponderance of evidence.18 Regrettably, petitioners, as
such plaintiff, in this case failed to discharge the said burden imposed upon them in proving
legal or equitable title over the parcel of land in issue. As such, there is no reason to disturb the
finding of the RTC that all 10 siblings inherited the subject property from Bienvenido and
Escolastica Ibarra, and after the respondent siblings sold their aliquot share to the spouses
Candelario, petitioners and respondent spouses became co-owners of the same.

The counterclaim for partition is not barred by prior judgment

This brings us to the issue of partition as raised by respondents in their counterclaim. In their
answer to the counterclaim, petitioners countered that the action for partition has already been
barred by res judicata.

The doctrine of res judicata provides that the judgment in a first case is final as to the claim or
demand in controversy, between the parties and those privy with them, not only as to every
matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any
other admissible matter which must have been offered for that purpose and all matters that
could have been adjudged in that case.19 It precludes parties from relitigating issues actually
litigated and determined by a prior and final judgment.20 As held in Yusingco v. Ong Hing Lian:21

It is a rule pervading every well-regulated system of jurisprudence, and is put upon two grounds
embodied in various maxims of the common law; the one, public policy and necessity, which
makes it to the interest of the state that there should be an end to litigation — republicae ut sit
finis litium; the other, the hardship on the individual that he should be vexed twice for the same
cause — nemo debet bis vexari et eadem causa. A contrary doctrine would subject the public
peace and quiet to the will and neglect of individuals and prefer the gratitude identification of a
litigious disposition on the part of suitors to the preservation of the public tranquility and
happiness.22

The rationale for this principle is that a party should not be vexed twice concerning the same
cause. Indeed, res judicata is a fundamental concept in the organization of every jural society,
for not only does it ward off endless litigation, it ensures the stability of judgment and guards
against inconsistent decisions on the same set of facts.23

There is res judicata when the following requisites are present: (1) the formal judgment or order
must be final; (2) it must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was rendered after a
consideration of the evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial of the case; (3)
it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; and (4) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of
subject matter and of cause of action.24

In the case at bar, respondent siblings admit that they filed an action for partition docketed as
Civil Case No. 02-52, which the RTC dismissed through an Order dated March 22, 2004 for the
failure of the parties to attend the scheduled hearings. Respondents likewise admitted that since
they no longer appealed the dismissal, the ruling attained finality. Moreover, it cannot be
disputed that the subject property in Civil Case No. 02-52 and in the present controversy are
one and the same, and that in both cases, respondents raise the same action for partition. And
lastly, although respondent spouses Candelario were not party-litigants in the earlier case for
partition, there is identity of parties not only when the parties in the case are the same, but also
between those in privity with them, such as between their successors-in-interest.25

With all the other elements present, what is left to be determined now is whether or not the
dismissal of Civil case No. 02-52 operated as a dismissal on the merits that would complete the
requirements of res judicata.

In advancing their claim, petitioners cite Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

Section 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. — If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to
appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute
his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these Rules or any order of the
court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court’s own
motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same
or in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits,
unless otherwise declared by the court.

The afore-quoted provision enumerates the instances when a complaint may be dismissed due
to the plaintiff's fault: (1) if he fails to appear on the date for the presentation of his evidence in
chief on the complaint; (2) if he fails to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time;
or (3) if he fails to comply with the Rules or any order of the court. The dismissal of a case for
failure to prosecute has the effect of adjudication on the merits, and is necessarily understood to
be with prejudice to the filing of another action, unless otherwise provided in the order of
dismissal. Stated differently, the general rule is that dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute
is to be regarded as an adjudication on the merits and with prejudice to the filing of another
action, and the only exception is when the order of dismissal expressly contains a qualification
that the dismissal is without prejudice.26 In the case at bar, petitioners claim that the Order does
not in any language say that the dismissal is without prejudice and, thus, the requirement that
the dismissal be on the merits is present.

Truly, We have had the occasion to rule that dismissal with prejudice under the above-cited rule
amply satisfies one of the elements of res judicata.27 It is, thus, understandable why petitioners
would allege res judicata to bolster their claim. However, dismissal with prejudice under Rule
17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court cannot defeat the right of a co-owner to ask for partition at any
time, provided that there is no actual adjudication of ownership of shares yet. Pertinent hereto is
Article 494 of the Civil Code, which reads:

Article 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may
demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is
concerned.

Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain period of time, not
exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This term may be extended by a new agreement.

A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed twenty years.
Neither shall there be any partition when it is prohibited by law. No prescription shall run in favor
of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly
recognizes the co-ownership. (emphasis supplied)

From the above-quoted provision, it can be gleaned that the law generally does not favor the
retention of co-ownership as a property relation, and is interested instead in ascertaining the co-
owners’ specific shares so as to prevent the allocation of portions to remain perpetually in limbo.
Thus, the law provides that each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing
owned in common.

Between dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 and the right granted to co-owners
under Art. 494 of the Civil Code, the latter must prevail. To construe otherwise would diminish
the substantive right of a co-owner through the promulgation of procedural rules. Such a
construction is not sanctioned by the principle, which is too well settled to require citation, that a
substantive law cannot be amended by a procedural rule.28 This further finds support in Art. 496
of the New Civil Code, viz:

Article 496.Partition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial

proceedings.1âwphi1 Partition shall be governed by the Rules of Court insofar as they are
consistent with this Code.

Thus, for the Rules to be consistent with statutory provisions, We hold that Art. 494, as cited, is
an exception to Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court to the effect that even if the order of
dismissal for failure to prosecute is silent on whether or not it is with prejudice, it shall be
deemed to be without prejudice.

This is not to say, however, that the action for partition will never be barred by res judicata.
There can still be res judicata in partition cases concerning the same parties and the same
subject matter once the respective shares of the co-owners have been determined with finality
by a competent court with jurisdiction or if the court determines that partition is improper for co-
ownership does not or no longer exists.
So it was that in Rizal v. Naredo,29 We ruled in the following wise:

Article 484 of the New Civil Code provides that there is co-ownership whenever the ownership
of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. Thus, on the one hand, a co-owner of
an undivided parcel of land is an owner of the whole, and over the whole he exercises the right
of dominion, but he is at the same time the owner of a portion which is truly abstract. On the
other hand, there is no co-ownership when the different portions owned by different people are
already concretely determined and separately identifiable, even if not yet technically described.

Pursuant to Article 494 of the Civil Code, no co-owner is obliged to remain in the co-ownership,
and his proper remedy is an action for partition under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court, which he
may bring at anytime in so far as his share is concerned. Article 1079 of the Civil Code defines
partition as the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common among those to
whom it may belong. It has been held that the fact that the agreement of partition lacks the
technical description of the parties’ respective portions or that the subject property was then still
embraced by the same certificate of title could not legally prevent a partition, where the different
portions allotted to each were determined and became separately identifiable.

The partition of Lot No. 252 was the result of the approved Compromise Agreement in Civil
Case No. 36-C, which was immediately final and executory. Absent any showing that said
Compromise Agreement was vitiated by fraud, mistake or duress, the court cannot set aside a
judgment based on compromise. It is axiomatic that a compromise agreement once approved
by the court settles the rights of the parties and has the force of res judicata. It cannot be
disturbed except on the ground of vice of consent or forgery.

Of equal significance is the fact that the compromise judgment in Civil Case No. 36-C settled as
well the question of which specific portions of Lot No. 252 accrued to the parties separately as
their proportionate shares therein. Through their subdivision survey plan, marked as Annex "A"
of the Compromise Agreement and made an integral part thereof, the parties segregated and
separately assigned to themselves distinct portions of Lot No. 252. The partition was
immediately executory, having been accomplished and completed on December 1, 1971 when
judgment was rendered approving the same. The CA was correct when it stated that no co-
ownership exist when the different portions owned by different people are already concretely
determined and separately identifiable, even if not yet technically described. (emphasis
supplied)

In the quoted case, We have held that res judicata applied because after the parties executed a
compromise agreement that was duly approved by the court, the different portions of the owners
have already been ascertained. Thus, there was no longer a co-ownership and there was
nothing left to partition. This is in contrast with the case at bar wherein the co-ownership, as
determined by the trial court, is still subsisting 30-70 in favor of respondent spouses Candelario.
Consequently, there is no legal bar preventing herein respondents from praying for the partition
of the property through counterclaim.

The counterclaim for partition is not barred by laches

We now proceed to petitioners’ second line of attack. According to petitioners, the claim for
partition is already barred by laches since by 1999, both Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra had
already died and yet the respondent siblings only belatedly filed the action for partition, Civil
Case No. 02-52, in 2002. And since laches has allegedly already set in against respondent
siblings, so too should respondent spouses Candelario be barred from claiming the same for
they could not have acquired a better right than their predecessors-in-interest.

The argument fails to persuade.

Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which––by the exercise of due diligence––could or should have been done earlier. It is the
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable period, warranting the presumption
that the party entitled to assert it has either abandoned or declined to assert it.30 The principle is
a creation of equity which, as such, is applied not really to penalize neglect or sleeping upon
one’s right, but rather to avoid recognizing a right when to do so would result in a clearly
inequitable situation. As an equitable defense, laches does not concern itself with the character
of the petitioners’ title, but only with whether or not by reason of the respondents’ long inaction
or inexcusable neglect, they should be barred from asserting this claim at all, because to allow
them to do so would be inequitable and unjust to petitioners.31

As correctly appreciated by the lower courts, respondents cannot be said to have neglected to
assert their right over the subject property. They cannot be considered to have abandoned their
right given that they filed an action for partition sometime in 2002, even though it was later
dismissed. Furthermore, the fact that respondent siblings entered into a Contract of Lease with
Avico Lending Investor Co. over the subject property is evidence that they are exercising rights
of ownership over the same.

The CA erred in approving the Agreement for Subdivision

There is merit, however, in petitioners’ contention that the CA erred in approving the proposal
for partition submitted by respondent spouses. Art. 496, as earlier cited, provides that partition
shall either be by agreement of the parties or in accordance with the Rules of Court. In this
case, the Agreement of Subdivision allegedly executed by respondent spouses Candelario and
petitioners cannot serve as basis for partition, for, as stated in the pre-trial order, herein
respondents admitted that the agreement was a falsity and that petitioners never took part in
preparing the same. The "agreement" was crafted without any consultation whatsoever or any
attempt to arrive at mutually acceptable terms with petitioners. It, therefore, lacked the essential
requisite of consent. Thus, to approve the agreement in spite of this fact would be tantamount to
allowing respondent spouses to divide unilaterally the property among the co-owners based on
their own whims and caprices. Such a result could not be countenanced.

To rectify this with dispatch, the case must be remanded to the court of origin, which shall
proceed to partition the property in accordance with the procedure outlined in Rule 69 of the
Rules of Court.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 98919 dated July 8, 2013
and November 22, 2013, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The case
is hereby REMANDED to the RTC, Branch 68 in Camiling, Tarlac for purposes of partitioning
the subject property in accordance with Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.

G.R. No. 191090 October 13, 2014

EXTRAORDINARY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
HERMINIA F. SAMSON-BICO and ELY B. FLESTADO, Respondents.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

This treats of the petition for review filed by Extraordinary Development Corporation (EDC)
assailing the 31 July 2009 Decision1 and 22 January 2010 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals
10th Division in CAG.R. CV. No. 91358, which affirmed with modification the Decision3 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Binangonan, Rizal, Branch 68 in Civil Case No. 03-035, a
"Complaint for Annulment of Contract and Tax Declaration No. OO-BI-030-3512 and
Reconveyance of Possession with Damages."

As borne by the records, the facts are as follow:

Apolonio Ballesteros (Apolonio) and Maria Membrebe (Maria) were husband and wife. They
begot two (2) children, namely, Juan M. Ballesteros (Juan), who married Leonarda Tambongco
(Leonarda) and Irenea Ballesteros (Irenea), who married Santiago Samson (Santiago). Juan
and Leonarda begot six (6) children, namely, Leonardo T. Ballesteros (Leonardo), Marcelina T.
Ballesteros-Abad (Marcelina), Lydia T. Ballesteros-De Lara (Lydia), Cresencia T. Ballesteros-
Lirio (Cresencia), Lourdes T. Ballesteros-Tan (Lourdes), and Juan T. Ballesteros, Jr. (Juan Jr.),
while Irenea and Santiago begot two (2) children, namely, Herminia B. Samson-Bico (Herminia)
and Merlita Samson Flestado, who married Ely D. Flestado (Ely).

During his lifetime, Apolonio owned a parcel of land consisting of 29,748 square meters situated
at BarangayPantok, Binangonan, Rizal covered by Tax Declaration No. BI-030-1509. When
Apolonio and Maria died, the property was inherited by Juanand Irenea. When the latter died,
the heirs of Juan and Irenea became co-owners of the property.

On 16 April 2002, the heirs of Juan, without the consent of respondents, the heirs of Irenea
executed in favor of petitioner EDC a Deed of Absolute Sale4 covering the subject property for
₱2,974,800.00. Prior to the sale, respondents claimed that they learned that the property had
been the subject of a contract to sell between the heirs of Juan and EDC. On 7 March 2000,
respondents wrote to EDC informing it of the existence of coownership over the subject
property.5 EDC wrote back that it will look into the matter and asked respondents to further
establish the basis of their claims.6

EDC was able to cause the registration of the Deed of Absolute Sale with the Office of the
Provincial Assessor Rizal and transfer the tax declaration over the subject propertyin its name.
This prompted respondents to file the Complaint for Annulment of Contract and Tax Declaration
No. 00-BI-030-3512 and Reconveyance of Possession with Damages.7

In its Answer, EDC alleged thatit is a buyer in good faith and for value of the subject property
because it was of the honest belief that the heirs of Juan are the only heirs of the late Apolonio.
EDC counterclaimed for damages.8

On the other hand, the heirs of Juan asserted that respondents were aware of and were parties
to the contract to sell entered into by them and EDC. The heirs of Juan claimed that
respondents received their share in the downpayment made by EDC but they were both unpaid
of the balance on the cost of the land.9

After presentation of respondents’ testimonial and documentary evidence, the case was called
for hearing on 25 April 2007. The case for the presentation of defendants’ evidence was reset
by the trial court to 25 June 2007 for failure of their respective lawyers to appear without any
explanation.10 On 25 June 2007, the case was once again reset for the same reason.11 On 13
August 2007, Juan appeared and informed the court that his lawyer is sick while a certain
Reggie Angulo appeared before the court and manifested that EDC has not yet hired a lawyer.
The trial court reset the case to 3 October 2007 and required the parties to secure a new
lawyer. The trial court warned the defendants, petitioner here, and the heirs of Juan that if they
fail to do so, their right to present evidence would be waived.12 On 5 November 2007, the lawyer
of the heirs of Juan still failed to appear, while the counsel of the plaintiffs sent a representative
to move for the resetting of the case.13 Finally, on 5 December 2007, the counsel of the heirs of
Juan once again failed to appear so upon motion of respondent’s counsel, the case was
submitted for resolution.14

On 3 January 2008, the RTC ruled in favor of respondents. The dispositive portion of the
Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:

1. The Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 16, 2002 covering a property consisting of
29,748 square meters covered by Tax Declaration No. BI-030-1509 is hereby declared
null and void to the extent of one half of the property sold or 14,874 square meters.

2. That the Tax Declaration No. 00-BI-030-3512 in the name of [EDC] is hereby declared
null and void and the Provincial Assessor of Rizal or defendant Municipal Assessor of
Binangonan, Rizal is hereby ordered to cancel the same, and the Tax Declration
covering the subject parcel of land be reinstated in the name of the heirs of Apolonio
Ballesteros and Maria Membrebe.

3. That the [EDC] is hereby ordered to vacate, surrender or reconvey ownership and
possession of the parcel of land subject of the Deed of Absolute Sale to [respondents] or
the heirs of Apolonio Ballesteros or that they be reinstated to the lawful ownership of
one-half (1/2) of the property sold or 14,874 square meters.

4. The defendants are hereby ordered to pay the following damages to the [respondents]
jointly and severally:

a. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00

b. Exemplary damages – [P]100,000.00

c. Attorney’s fees – [P]100,000.00

5. The defendants are hereby ordered to pay the costs of suit.15

The trial court found that respondents and the heirs of Juan are coowners of the subject
property; that at the time of sale, the heirs of Juan did not have the right to sell the one half
share of the heirs of Irenea; that the sale did not bind the heirs of Irenea; that there was fraud in
the execution of the Deed of Absolute Salewhen the heirs of Juan failed to disclose to EDC that
one half of the property sold is owned by respondents; and that EDC was not a buyer in good
faith because itknew that respondents were coowners of the subject property because Herminia
informed EDC of such fact through a letter dated 9 March 2000.

EDC appealed to the Court of Appeals and assigned the following errors:

I.

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTEDGRAVE ERROR WHEN IT RENDERED A DECISION

HOLDING APPELLEES THE LAWFUL OWNER OF ONE-HALF OF THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY

II.

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTEDGRAVE ERROR WHEN IT ANNULLED THE 16 APRIL 2002
DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE AND INVALIDATED THE TITLE OF THE APPELLANT
CORPORATION TO THE SUBJECT PROPERTY DESPITE THE COMPLETE ABSENCE OF
ANY EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE APPELLEES’ CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP OVER ONE-
HALF OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.

III.

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTEDGRAVE ERROR WHEN IT AWARDED MORAL AND

EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S FEES AND LITIGATION EXPENSES IN FAVOR
OF THE APPELLEES DESPITE THE UTTER ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE WHICH CAN PROVE
THEY ARE ENTITLED TO THE SAME.

IV.

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR AND VIOLATED THE RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS OF THE DEFENDANT CORPORATION WHEN IT SUBMITTED THE CASE FOR

RESOLUTION WITHOUT PROVIDING THE APPELLANT THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT

EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF ITS CLAIMS AND DEFENSES.16

The heirs of Juan and respondents failed to file their brief so the Court of Appeals submitted the
case for resolution.

On 31 July 2009, the Court of Appeals partially granted the appeal. The dispositive portion of
the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated 03

January 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of Binangonan, Rizal, Branch 68 in Civil Case No. 03-
035 is AFFIRMEDwith the following MODIFICATIONS:
 1. Defendants-appellants Leonardo T. Ballesteros, Marcelina T. Ballesteros-Abad, Lydia
T. Ballesteros-De Lara, Cresencia T. Ballesteros-Lirio, Lourdes T. Ballesteros-Tan and
Juan T. Ballesteros, Jr. are hereby ORDERED to return to defendant-appellant
Extraordinary Development Corporation the amount of ₱1,487,400.00 or one-half of the
purchase price as stated in the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 16 April 2002;

2. The Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the [EDC] is valid only to the extent of one-half
of the subject property or 14,874 square meters, but not as to the other half of 14,874
square meters which is co-owned by [respondents];

3. The Provincial Assessor of Rizal is hereby ORDEREDto CANCELTax Declaration No.

00-BI-030-3512 in the name of [EDC] and to ISSUE a new one in the names of co-
owners [EDC] (one-half of the subject property) and [respondents] (the other half); and

4. The award of moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees in the amount
of ₱100,000.00 each is hereby DELETED.

No pronouncement as to costs.17

The Court of Appeals ruled that respondents were able to establish their co-ownership over
one-half of the subject property. The appellate court pointed out that the heirs of Juan
categorically admitted in their Answer, as well as during the hearing the existence of co-
ownership. The appellate court agreed with the trial court’s finding that the heirs of Juan, as co-
owners, could only alienate or convey to EDC their one-half portion of the subject property
which may be allotted to them in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. Thus,
the sale will affect only their share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to
the sale. The appellate court disputed the submissionof EDC that whatever admissions made by
the heirs of Juan regarding the ownership of the subject property is effective only insofar as they
are concerned but such do not bind or affect the defenses it raised. The appellate court
declared that the execution by the heirs of Juan of the Deed of Absolute Sale over the subject
property which they do not exclusively own but is admittedly co-owned bythem together with
respondents, was valid only to the extent of the former’s undivided onehalf share thereof, as
they had no title or interest to transfer the other one half portion which pertains to the appellees
without the latter’s consent. EDC’s invocation of it being a buyer in good faith was not
considered by the appellate court because the subject property is an unregistered land and the
defense of having purchased the property in good faith may be availed of only where registered
land is involved and the buyer had relied in good faith on the clear title of the registered owner.
The appellate court sustained the trial court’s finding that there was no denial of due process as
EDC was given the opportunity to advocate its cause and defend its interest.

However, the appellate court reversed the ruling of the trial court that the Deed of Absolute Sale
is null and void. According to the appellate court, the same is valid with respect to the transfer of
the rights of the co-owners sellers heirs of Juan over the one-half portion or 14,874 square
meters of the subject property, thereby making EDC a co-owner thereof. Consequently, the
appellate court ordered the heirs of Ballesteros to return to EDC the amount of ₱1,487,400.00
or one-half of the purchase price of ₱2,974,800.00. The award of moral and exemplary
damages,as well as attorney’s fees, were deleted for lack of legal and factual bases.

Aggrieved, EDC filed this present petition, ascribing the following errors to the Court of Appeals:
43.1 The Court of Appeals committed grave error in ruling that the Respondents are entitled to
½ of the Subject Property despite their utter failure to present evidence which can prove their
claim thereto.

43.2 The Court of Appeals gravely erred in failing to recognize that Petitioner is an innocent
party to the instant dispute and is a buyer in good faith and for value.18

Interestingly, it was EDC who pursued this petition and insist that respondents failed to prove
co-ownership presumably to validate in its entirety the Deed of Absolute Sale it entered into with
the heirs of Juan. EDC reiterates its argument that the testimony of Herminia is insufficient to
prove that respondents are entitled to inherit one-half of the subject property from Apolonio.
According to EDC, respondents should have established that Irenea is a legitimate child of
Apolonio; that Irenea and Juan are the only legitimate compulsory heirs of Apolonio; that
Apolonio predeceased Irenea and Juan; that Hermina and Merlita are the legitimate children of
Irenea; and that Irenea predeceased Herminia. EDC also maintains that it is a buyer in good
faith and that it was respondents who acted in bad faith, thus it prays for damages.

We deny the petition.

As borne by the records, respondents were able to convincingly establish their co-ownership
over one-half of the subject property.

Herminia has successfully established her successional rights over the subject property through
her clear testimony and admitted by the opposing counsel, viz:

DIRECT EXAMINATION BY ATTY. ROGELIO SILVESTRE, JR., ON WITNESS HERMINIA

BICO

Q: Mrs. Bico, are you the same Herminia Bico, one of the plaintiffs in this case?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Do you know the defendants Ballesteros in this case?

A: I know them, sir.

Q: Why do you know them?

A: Because they are my relatives, sir.

Q: Why did you say that they are your relatives?

A: [Their] father and my motherare brother and sister, sir.

Q: What is the name of your mother?

A: Irenea Ballesteros, sir.

Q: What is the name of the father of the defendants Ballesteros?

A: Juan Ballesteros, sir.

Q: So, you mean that they are brother and sister, what is the name of the mother of Irenea
Ballesteros and [Juan] Ballesteros?

A: Maria Membrebe, sir.

Q: What about the father of Irenea Ballesteros and Juan Ballesteros?

A: Apolonio Ballesteros, sir.

Q: So, you are saying that Irenea Ballesteros and Juan Ballesteros being brother and sister they
are the children of Maria Membrede and Apolonio Ballesteros?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Do you have proof that your mother is Irenea?

ATTY. CERVO

I admit the relationship.

ATTY. SILVESTRE

However, Your Honor, the defendant Extra-Ordinary is denying.

COURT

But they are not here.

ATTY. CERVO

As far as I am concerned…

COURT

As far as the Ballesteros…

ATTY. CERVO

As far as the Ballesteros are concerned they are admitting the relationship.

ATTY. SILVESTRE

But on the next hearing the counsel for the Extra-Ordinary will appear.

COURT
The admission is effective only insofar as the client of Atty. Cervo is concerned.

ATTY. SILVESTRE

That is the reason why I am asking these questions.

COURT

They are not here. So, if they will question it later on they are not here. I think the objection will
be too late. If they do not object right now the objection is waived.

ATTY. SILVESTRE

I went over the record of the case, the complainant and the Answer filed by the defendant now
when I read the Answer filed by defendant Ballesteros, defendant Ballesteros are practically
admitting everything except for a few allegations.

COURT

Are they disputing relationship?

ATTY. SILVESTRE

No, Your Honor.

COURT

So, if it is not disputed in the Answer, it is considered admitted.

ATTY. SILVESTRE

Okay, Your Honor.

Would counsel for the defendantstipulate that the parents, grandparents as well as the father
and the mother are already dead?

ATTY. CERVO

Yes admitted, Your Honor.

COURT

How can you deny that they are already dead?

ATTY. SILVESTRE

We would like to proceed to the markings, Your Honor of the exhibits.

COURT

Proceed.

ATTY. SILVESTRE

There being no objections, we would like to mark the Certificate of Baptism of Irenea
Ballesteros, child of Apolonio Ballesteros and Maria Membrebe as Exhibit "A".

COURT

Mark it.

ATTY. SILVESTRE

The name Apolonio Ballesteros and Maria Membrebebe bracketed and marked as Exhibit "A-1".

COURT

Mark it.

ATTY. SILVESTRE

The Death Certificate of Irenea Samson as Exhibit "B". The name of husband Santiago Samson
be bracketed and marked as Exhibit "B-1". The Certificate of Death of Santiago Samson be
marked as Exhibit "C".

COURT

Mark them.

ATTY. SILVESTRE

The name Herminia Bico followed by the word daughter be marked as our Exhibit "C-1".

COURT

Mark it.

ATTY. SILVESTRE

The certificate of Live Birth ofHerminia Samson be marked as Exhibit "D".

COURT

Mark it.

ATTY. SILVESTRE
The Certificate of Baptism of Merlita Samson as Exhibit "E".

COURT

Mark it.

ATTY. SILVESTRE

The name Santiago Samson and Herminia Ballesteros be bracketed and marked as Exhbit "E-
1".

COURT

Mark it.

ATTY. SILVESTRE

Will counsel for defendants Ballesteros stipulate that prior to the death of the sister of the
witness Merlita Samson she married the other co-plaintiff Ely Flestado?

ATTY. CERVO

Yes.

ATTY. SILVESTRE

We would like to mark, Your Honor, the Marriage Contract executed by and between
MerlitaSamson and Ely Flestado as Exhibit "F".

COURT

Mark it.

ATTY. SILVESTRE

The Certificate of Death of Merlita Flestado be marked as Exhbit "G".

COURT

Mark it.

ATTY. SILVESTRE

One of the entries in the Certificate of Death, Herminia Bico followed by the name sister be
bracketed and marked as Exhbit "G-1".

COURT
Mark it.19

We also took into consideration the admissions made by the heirs of Juan in their Answer to the
Complaint filed by respondents before the trial court. For ready reference, we shall reproduce
the pertinent portion of the Answer and the Complaint:

ANSWER

xxxx

2. The defendants BALLESTEROS admit the allegations in paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13
of the complaint;20

COMPLAINT

8. [Respondents] together with defendants-Ballesteros and defendant Juan T. Ballesteros, Jr.,

are co-owners ofa parcel ofland measuring TWENTYNINE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED
FORTY-EIGHT (29,748) SQUARE METERS situated at Barangay Pantok, Binangonan, Rizal
by virtue of succession;

9. [Herminia], defendants Ballesteros and defendant Juan T. Ballesteros are the Heirs of the
late Spouses Apolonio Ballesteros and Maria Membrebe who were the parents of the late Juan
M. Ballesteros and the late Irenea M. Ballesteros-Samson x x x;

10. During her lifetime, Irenea M. Ballesteros married Santiago Samson, now deceased, with
whom she had two (2) children, namely: [Herminia] and Merlita B. Samson x x x;

11. Merlita B. Samson married [respondent] Ely and later died childless and intestate x x x;

12. In his lifetime, Juan M. Ballesteros married Leonarda Tambongco, now deceased, with
whom she had six (6) children, namely: defendants Ballesteros and defendant Juan T.
Ballesteros, Jr.; 13. Likewise, during the lifetime of Apolonio Ballesteros, he was the owner of
the parcel of land mentioned in paragraph 8 hereof and the same was declared for taxation
purposes under his name x x x;21

Furthermore, Juan testified during the 12 March 2007 hearing that respondents are co-owners
of the subject property, to wit:

COURT Asan si Ballesteros?

ATTY. CERVO

He is in court, Your Honor.

COURT (to Ballesteros)

Q: Alam mo ba na ang may-ari ng lupa na binenta ninyo ay isa sa may-ari sya?

A: Opo.
Q: So, hindi lang kayo ang may-ari ng lupa? Ang ina nya kasama doon sa may-ari at kalahati
lang ang sa inyo?

A: Hindi pa naparti.

Q: Kahit hindi pa naparte narerecognize ninyo na ang nanay niya ay isa sa may-ari ng lupa
kasama ang tatay mo, hindi ba?

A: Opo.

Q: So, kalahati ang interest ninyo sa lupa, tama?

A: Opo.

Q: Why did you sell all?

A: Hindi pa po bayad lahat, ang hinahabol nila magkabayaran. Kulang pa po ng isang milyon.

Q: Ang tanong saiyo, kalahati ng lupa may karapatan ka, you have a right [to] only to one of the
property?

A: Opo.

Q: Bakit sa Deed of Sale ibinenta lahat? Wala silang pirma.

A: Nakalimutan ko.22

A party may make judicial admissions in (a) the pleadings, (b) during the trial, either by verbal or
written manifestations or stipulations, or (c) in other stages of the judicial proceeding.23 Sec. 4,
Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. – Anadmission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of
the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted
only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was
made.

The Answer submitted by the heirs ofJuan, as well as the testimony of Juan constitute judicial
admissions. Well-settled is the rule that a judicial admission conclusively binds the party making
it. He cannot thereafter take a position contradictory to, or inconsistent with his pleadings. Acts
or facts admitted do not require proof and cannot be contradicted unless it is shown that the
admission was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.24

EDC avers that said judicial admission should not bind it because it was an innocent purchaser
in good faith.1âwphi1 The Court of Appeals debunked this contention and correctly ruled, as
follow:

In a contract of sale, it is essential that the seller isthe owner of the property he is selling. Under
Article 1458 of the Civil Code, the principal obligation of a seller is to transfer the ownership of
the property sold. Also, Article 1459 of the Civil Code provides that the thing must be licit and
the vendor must have a right to transfer the ownership thereof at the time it is delivered. The
execution by appellants Ballesteros of the Deed of Absolute Sale over the subject property
which they do not exclusively own but is admittedly co-owned by them together with the
[respondents], was valid only to the extent of the former’s undivided one-half share thereof, as
they had no title or interest to transfer the other one-half portion which pertains to the
[respondents] without the latter’s consent. It is an established principle that no one cangive what
one does not have – nemo dat quod non habet. Accordingly, one can sell only what one owns
or is authorized to sell, and the buyer can acquire no more than what the seller can transfer
legally. Thus, since appellant EDC’s rights over the subject property originated from sellers-
appellants Ballesteros, said corporation merely stepped into the shoes of its sellers and cannot
have a better right than what its sellers have.Indeed, a spring cannot rise higher than its
source.25 (Emphasis ours) Moreover, EDC was given an ample opportunity to be heard through
counsel. The essence of due process is the right to be heard. Due process is satisfied when the
parties are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the
controversy. Thus, when the party seeking due process was in fact given several opportunities
to be heard and air his side, but it is by his own fault or choice he squanders these chances,
then his cry for due process must fail.26

It is apparent that despite numerous resetting of the case for EDC, it failed to appear because of
the absence of its counsel. On 3 October 2007, EDC was required by the court to securea new
lawyer for the next hearing but during the two hearings that followed, no counsel appeared for
EDC. It is of no moment that on some dates the resetting was on motion of the other parties to
the case. The fact remains that EDC’s counsel failed to appear on 25 April, 25 June, 13 August,
5 November and 5 December 2007. Therefore, EDC was not deprived of its day in court and he
cannot feign denial of due process.

Having established respondents’ co-ownership rights over the subject property, we find no error
in the appellate court’s ruling sustaining the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale but only with
respect to the rights of the heirs of Juan over one-half of the property.

Article 493 of the Civil Code recognizes the absolute right of a coowner to freely dispose of his
pro indivisoshare as well as the fruits and other benefits arising from that share, independently
of the other coowners,27 thus:

Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute
another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the
alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which
may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.

In Spouses Del Campo v. Court of Appeals,28 we had the occasion to expound the rights of a
co-owner vis-à-vis the vendee, thus:

x x x Would the sale by a co-owner of a physical portion of an undivided property held in

common be valid? x x x

On the first issue, it seems plain to us that the trial court concluded that petitioners could not
have acquired ownership of the subject land which originally formed part of Lot 162, on the
ground that their alleged right springs from a void sale transaction between Salome and
Soledad. The mere fact that Salome purportedly transferred a definite portion of the co-owned
lot by metes and bounds to Soledad, however, does not per serender the sale a nullity. This
much is evident under Article 493 of the Civil Code and pertinent jurisprudence on the matter.
More particularly in Lopez vs. Vda. De Cuaycong, et. al. which we find relevant, the Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Bocobo, held that:

…The fact that the agreement in question purported to sell a concrete portion of the hacienda
does not render the sale void, for it is a well-established principle that the binding force of a
contract must be recognized as far asit is legally possible to do so. "Quando res non valet ut
ago, valeat quantum valere potest." (When a thing is of no force as I do it, it shall have as much
force as it can have.)

Applying this principle to the instant case, there can be no doubt that the transaction entered
into by Salome and Soledad could be legally recognized in its entirety since the object of the
sale did not even exceed the ideal shares held by the former in the co-ownership. As a matter of
fact, the deed of sale executed between the parties expressly stipulated that the portion of Lot
162 sold to Soledad would be taken from Salome’s 4/16 undivided interest in said lot, which the
latter could validly transfer in whole or in part even without the consent of the other co-owners.
Salome’s right to sell part of her undivided interest in the co-owned property is absolute in
accordance with the well-settled doctrine that a coowner has full ownership of his pro-indiviso
share and has the right to alienate, assign or mortgage it, and substitute another person in its
enjoyment. Since Salome’s clear intention was to sell merely part of her aliquot share in Lot
162, in our view no valid objection can be made against it and the salecan be given effect to the
full extent.

We are not unaware of the principle that a co-owner cannot rightfully dispose of a particular
portion of a co-owned property prior to partition among all the co-owners. However, this should
not signify that the vendee does not acquire anything atall in case a physically segregated area
of the co-owned lot is in fact sold to him. Since the coowner/vendor’s undivided interest could
properly be the object of the contract of sale between the parties,what the vendee obtains by
virtue of such a sale are the same rights as the vendor had as co-owner, in an ideal share
equivalent to the consideration given under their transaction. In other words, the vendee steps
into the shoes of the vendor as co-owner and acquires a proportionate abstract share in the
property held in common.29

We are also in full accord with the appellate court’s order for the heirs of Juan to return one-half
of the purchase price to EDC. There is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a
benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains money or property of another against the
fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience.30 Therefore, it is correct for the
Court of Appeals to order the heirs of Juan to return the amount of ₱1,487,400.00, representing
one-half of the purchase price to prevent unjust enrichment at the expense of EDC. Lastly, and
likewise correctly, the prayer for moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees being
unsubstantiated had to be denied.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIEDand the assailed Decision dated 31 July 2009 and
Resolution dated 22 January 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 91358 is
AFFIRMED in toto.

G.R. No. 182438 July 2, 2014

RENE RONULO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Fr. Rene Ronulo
challenging the April 3, 2008 decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31028
which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, (RTC) Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos Norte.

The Factual Antecedents

The presented evidence showed that3 Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to
marry each other on March 29, 2003 at the Sta. Rosa Catholic Parish Church of San Nicolas,
Ilocos Norte. However, on the day of the wedding, the supposed officiating priest, Fr. Mario
Ragaza, refused to solemnize the marriage upon learning that the couple failed to secure a
marriage license. As a recourse, Joey, who was then dressed in barong tagalong,and Claire,
clad in a wedding gown, together with their parents, sponsors and guests, proceeded to the
Independent Church of Filipino Christians, also known as the Aglipayan Church. They
requested the petitioner, an Aglipayan priest, to perform a ceremony to which the latter agreed
despite having been informed by the couple that they had no marriage certificate.

The petitioner prepared his choir and scheduled a mass for the couple on the same date. He
conducted the ceremony in the presence of the groom, the bride, their parents, the principal and
secondary sponsors and the rest of their invited guests.4

An information for violation of Article 352 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, was
filed against the petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Batac, Ilocos Norte for
allegedly performing an illegal marriage ceremony.5

The petitioner entered the plea of "not guilty" to the crime charged on arraignment.

The prosecution’s witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne Yere, testified on the incidents of the
ceremony. Joseph was the veil sponsor while Mary Anne was the cord sponsor in the wedding.
Mary Anne testified that she saw the bride walk down the aisle. She also saw the couple
exchange their wedding rings, kiss each other, and sign a document.6She heard the petitioner
instructing the principal sponsors to sign the marriage contract. Thereafter, they went to the
reception, had lunch and took pictures. She saw the petitioner there. She also identified the
wedding invitation given to her by Joey.7

Florida Umadac, the mother of Joey, testified that she heard the couple declare during the
ceremony that they take each other as husband and wife.8 Days after the wedding, she went to
the municipal local civil registrar of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte with Atty. Mariano R. Nalupta Jr.
where she was given a certificate that no marriage license was issued to the couple.9

The petitioner, while admitting that he conducted a ceremony, denied that his act of blessing the
couple was tantamount to a solemnization of the marriage as contemplated by law.10
 The MTC Judgment

The MTC found the petitioner guilty of violation of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, and
imposed on him a ₱200.00 fine pursuant to Section 44 of Act No. 3613. It held that the
petitioner’s act of giving a blessing constitutes a marriage ceremony as he made an official
church recognition of the cohabitation of the couple as husband and wife.11 It further ruled that
in performing a marriage ceremony without the couple’s marriage license, the petitioner violated
Article 352 of the RPC which imposes the penalty provided under Act No. 3613 or the Marriage
Law. The MTC applied Section 44 of the Marriage Law which pertinently states that a violation
of any of its provisions that is not specifically penalized or of the regulations to be promulgated,
shall be punished by a fine of not more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment of not more
than one month, or both, in the discretion of the court.

The RPC is a law subsequent to the Marriage Law, and provides the penalty for violation of the
latter law. Applying these laws, the MTC imposed the penalty of a fine in the amount of
₱200.00.12

The RTC Ruling

The RTC affirmed the findings of the MTC and added that the circumstances surrounding the
act of the petitioner in "blessing" the couple unmistakably show that a marriage ceremony had
transpired. It further ruled that the positive declarations of the prosecution witnesses deserve
more credence than the petitioner’s negative statements.13 The RTC, however, ruled that the
basis of the fine should be Section 39, instead of Section 44, of the Marriage Law.

The CA Decision

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling. The CA observed that although there is no
prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of marriage, the law provides minimum
standards in determining whether a marriage ceremony has been conducted, viz.: (1) the
contracting parties must appear personally before the solemnizing officer; and (2) they should
declare that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of at least two witnesses
of legal age.14 According to the CA, the prosecution duly proved these requirements. It added
that the presence of a marriage certificate is not a requirement in a marriage ceremony. 15

The CA additionally ruled that the petitioner’s criminal liability under Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended, is not dependent on whether Joey or Claire were charged or found guilty under
Article 350 of the same Code.16

The CA agreed with the MTC that the legal basis for the imposition of the fine is Section 44 of
the Marriage Law since it covers violation of regulations to be promulgated by the proper
authorities such as the RPC.

The Petition

The petitioner argues that the CA erred on the following grounds: First, Article 352 of the RPC,
as amended, is vague and does not define what constitutes "an illegal marriage ceremony."
Assuming that a marriage ceremony principally constitutes those enunciated in Article 55 of the
Civil Code and Article 6 of the Family Code, these provisions require the verbal declaration that
the couple take each other as husband and wife, and a marriage certificate containing the
declaration in writing which is duly signed by the contracting parties and attested to by the
solemnizing officer.17 The petitioner likewise maintains that the prosecution failed to prove that
the contracting parties personally declared that they take each other as husband and
wife.18 Second, under the principle of separation of church and State, the State cannot interfere
in ecclesiastical affairs such as the administration of matrimony. Therefore, the State cannot
convert the "blessing" into a "marriage ceremony."19

Third, the petitioner had no criminal intent as he conducted the "blessing" in good faith for
purposes of giving moral guidance to the couple.20

Fourth, the non-filing of a criminal case against the couple in violating Article 350 of the RPC, as
amended, should preclude the filing of the present case against him.21

Finally, Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not provide for a penalty. The present case is
not covered by Section 44 of the Marriage Law as the petitioner was not found violating its
provisions nor a regulation promulgated thereafter.22

THE COURT’S RULING:

We find the petition unmeritorious.

The elements of the crime punishable under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, were proven
by the prosecution

Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who shall
perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony. The elements of this crime are as follows:
(1) authority of the solemnizing officer; and (2) his performance of an illegal marriage ceremony.
In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he has authority to solemnize a marriage.
Hence, the only issue to be resolved is whether the alleged "blessing" by the petitioner is
tantamount to the performance of an "illegal marriage ceremony" which is punishable under
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.

While Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not specifically define a "marriage ceremony"
and what constitutes its "illegal" performance, Articles 3(3) and 6 of the Family Code are clear
on these matters. These provisions were taken from Article 5523 of the New Civil Code which, in
turn, was copied from Section 324 of the Marriage Law with no substantial amendments. Article
625 of the Family Code provides that "[n]o prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization
of the marriage is required. It shall be necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear
personally before the solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not less than two
witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife."26 Pertinently, Article
3(3)27 mirrors Article 6 of the Family Code and particularly defines a marriage ceremony as that
which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer
and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of
not less than two witnesses of legal age.

Even prior to the date of the enactment of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, the rule was
clear that no prescribed form of religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required.
However, as correctly found by the CA, the law sets the minimum requirements constituting a
marriage ceremony: first, there should be the personal appearance of the contracting parties
before a solemnizing officer; and second, heir declaration in the presence of not less than two
witnesses that they take each other as husband and wife.

As to the first requirement, the petitioner admitted that the parties appeared before him and this
fact was testified to by witnesses. On the second requirement, we find that, contrary to the
petitioner’s allegation, the prosecution has proven, through the testimony of Florida, that the
contracting parties personally declared that they take each other as husband and wife.

The petitioner’s allegation that the court asked insinuating and leading questions to Florida fails
to persuadeus. A judge may examine or cross-examine a witness. He may propound
clarificatory questions to test the credibility of the witness and to extract the truth. He may seek
to draw out relevant and material testimony though that testimony may tend to support or rebut
the position taken by one or the other party. It cannot be taken against him if the clarificatory
questions he propounds happen to reveal certain truths that tend to destroy the theory of one
party.28

At any rate, if the defense found the line of questioning of the judge objectionable, its failure to
timely register this bars it from belatedly invoking any irregularity.

In addition, the testimonies of Joseph and Mary Anne, and even the petitioner’s admission
regarding the circumstances of the ceremony, support Florida’s testimony that there had indeed
been the declaration by the couple that they take each other as husband and wife. The
testimony of Joey disowning their declaration as husband and wife cannot overcome these clear
and convincing pieces of evidence. Notably, the defense failed to show that the prosecution
witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne, had any ill-motive to testify against the petitioner.

We also do not agree with the petitioner that the principle of separation of church and State
precludes the State from qualifying the church "blessing" into a marriage ceremony. Contrary to
the petitioner’s allegation, this principle has been duly preserved by Article 6 of the Family Code
when it provides that no prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of marriage is
required. This pronouncement gives any religion or sect the freedom or latitude in conducting its
respective marital rites, subject only to the requirement that the core requirements of law be
observed.

We emphasize at this point that Article 1529 of the Constitution recognizes marriage as an
inviolable social institution and that our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a
mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State has
paramount interest in the enforcement of its constitutional policies and the preservation of the
sanctity of marriage. To this end, it is within its power to enact laws and regulations, such as
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, which penalize the commission of acts resulting in the
disintegration and mockery of marriage.

From these perspectives, we find it clear that what the petitioner conducted was a marriage
ceremony, as the minimum requirements set by law were complied with. While the petitioner
may view this merely as a "blessing," the presence of the requirements of the law constitutive of
a marriage ceremony qualified this "blessing" into a "marriage ceremony" as contemplated by
Article 3(3) of the Family Code and Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.

We come now to the issue of whether the solemnization by the petitioner of this marriage
ceremony was illegal.
Under Article 3(3) of the Family Code, one of the essential requisites of marriage is the
presence of a valid marriage certificate. In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he
knew that the couple had no marriage license, yet he conducted the "blessing" of their
relationship.

Undoubtedly, the petitioner conducted the marriage ceremony despite knowledge that the
essential and formal requirements of marriage set by law were lacking. The marriage ceremony,
therefore, was illegal. The petitioner’s knowledge of the absence of these requirements negates
his defense of good faith.

We also do not agree with the petitioner that the lack of a marriage certificate negates his
criminal liability in the present case. For purposes of determining if a marriage ceremony has
been conducted, a marriage certificate is not included in the requirements provided by Article
3(3) of the Family Code, as discussed above.

Neither does the non-filing of a criminal complaint against the couple negate criminal liability of
the petitioner. Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not make this an element of the crime.
The penalty imposed is proper

On the issue on the penalty for violation of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, this provision
clearly provides that it shall be imposed in accordance with the provision of the Marriage Law.
The penalty provisions of the Marriage Law are Sections 39 and 44 which provide as follows:
Section 39 of the Marriage Law provides that:

Section 39. Illegal Solemnization of Marriage – Any priest or minister solemnizing marriage
without being authorized by the Director of the Philippine National Library or who, upon
solemnizing marriage, refuses to exhibit the authorization in force when called upon to do so by
the parties or parents, grandparents, guardians, or persons having charge and any bishop or
officer, priest, or minister of any church, religion or sect the regulations and practices whereof
require banns or publications previous to the solemnization of a marriage in accordance with
section ten, who authorized the immediate solemnization of a marriage that is subsequently
declared illegal; or any officer, priest or minister solemnizing marriage in violation of this act,
shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one month nor more than two years, or by a
fine of not less than two hundred pesos nor more than two thousand pesos. [emphasis ours]

On the other hand, Section 44 of the Marriage Law states that:

Section 44. General Penal Clause – Any violation of any provision of this Act not specifically
penalized, or of the regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities, shall be punished
by a fine of not more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for not more than one month,
or both, in the discretion of the court. [emphasis ours]

From a reading of the provisions cited above, we find merit in the ruling of the CA and the MTC
that the penalty imposable in the present case is that covered under Section 44, and not Section
39, of the Marriage Law.

The penalized acts under Section 39 of Act No. 3613 do not include the present
case.1âwphi1 As correctly found by the MTC, the petitioner was not found violating the
provisions of the Marriage Law but Article 352 of the RPC, as amended. It is only the imposition
of the penalty for the violation of this provision which is referred to the Marriage Law. On this
point, Article 352 falls squarely under the provision of Section 44 of Act No. 3613 which provides
for the penalty for any violation of the regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities;
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, which was enacted after the Marriage Law, is one of such
regulations.

Therefore, the CA did not err in imposing the penalty of fine of ₱200.00 pursuant to Section 44
of the Marriage Law.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals dated April
3, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31028.

G.R. No. 187013 April 22, 2015

SPOUSES MAGDALINO AND CLEOFE BADILLA, Petitioners,

vs.
FE BRAGAT, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
Decision dated October 9, 2008 and Resolution dated February 12, 2009 of the Court of
Appeals rendered in CA-G.R. CV No. 70423-MIN.

The case involves the issue of ownership of the subject real property.

The facts follow.

Azur Pastrano and his wife Profitiza Ebaning (Spouses Pastrano) were the original owners of
Lot No. 19986 (subject property), located at Tabion, Cagayan de Oro City. Its Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-2035, consisting of 1,015 sq. m. was issued on November 18,
1980.1 The OCT was in the name of Azur Pastrano.2

Before the issuance of the OCT, however, the Spouses Pastrano, on November 18, 1968, sold
the lot to Eustaquio P. Ledesma, Jr. (Ledesma), as evidenced by a Deed of Definite Sale of
Unregistered Coconut and Residential Land.3

The petitioners, the spouses Magdalino and Cleofe Badilla (Spouses Badilla) claimed that in
1970, Ledesma sold to them, "on installment" basis, a portion amounting to 200 sq. m. of Lot
No. 19986 (subject property). The sale was not reduced in writing, however, but possession of
the portion sold was transferred to the Badillas, which portion the Badillas claim was designated
as Lot No. 19986-B.4

On April 18, 1978, the spouses Florito Bragat and Fe Bragat (Spouses Bragat) bought 991 sq.
m. of the property from Ledesma and his wife, via a Deed of Absolute Sale of a Residential
Lot.5 Two (2) tax declarations were allegedly issued as a result of the sale: one designated a lot
as Lot No. 19986-A with an area of 642 sq. m.,6 while another designated the other lot as Lot
No. 19986-B withan area of 349 sq. m.7

On May 5, 1984, the Spouses Pastrano executed another Deed of Absolute Sale of Registered
Land in favor of herein petitioner Fe Bragat (Bragat), covered by OCT No. P-2035 and with an
area of 1,015 sq. m.8 On the same date, Azur Pastrano executed an Affidavit of Loss reporting
the loss of the owner's duplicate copy of OCT No. P-2035.9

It was Bragat, however, who petitioned the court for the issuance of a new owner's duplicate
copy of OCT No. P-2035. Thus, on July 24, 1987, the RTC ordered the issuance of a new
owner's copy of OCT No. P-2035.10

On October 2, 1987, the Spouses Pastrano executed yet another Deed of Sale of Registered
Land in favor of Bragat, which land is again covered by OCT No. P-2035 with an area of 1,015
sq. m.11 As a result, OCT No. P-2035 was canceled and TCT No. T-47759 was issued in the
name of Bragat.12

On March 7, 1991, Bragat, through her counsel, made a written demand to vacate against the
Spouses Badilla.1âwphi1 In response, the Spouses Badilla, also through their counsel's letter,
refused the demand and raised the earlier sale made by the Spouses Pastrano to Ledesma and
the subsequent sale by Ledesma to the Badillas.13

Hence, the parties filed their respective complaints within days of each other.

Bragat filed her Complaint for Recovery of Posession and Damages against the spouses
Magdalino and Cleofe Badilla on June 5, 1992, alleging therein that she is the absolute owner of
Lot No. 19986, covered by TCT No. T-47759. She claimed to have purchased the property, first,
from Eustaquio Ledesma, Jr., but later, when she found out that Ledesma was "unauthorized" to
sell, she again allegedly made another purchase of the same property from Azur Pastrano, on
May 5, 1984. This led to the cancellation of Pastrano's OCT No. P-2035 and the issuance of
Bragat's TCT No. T-47759. Thus, she prays for the Spouses Badilla to be ordered to vacate the
around 149-square-meter portion that they occupy in the property.14

Just six days later, on June 11, 1992, the Spouses Badilla filed their own Complaint for Quieting
of Title, Declaration of Nullity of TCT No. T-47759 and Damages against Bragat, claiming that
the Spouses Badilla are the lawful owners and possessors of Lot No. 19986-B (a portion of Lot
No. 19986), having acquired it in 1970 from Ledesma. The latter, on his part, allegedly bought
the bigger Lot No. 19986 from Pastrano earlier on November 18, 1968. The Spouses Badilla
alleged that they took possession of and built a house on the property upon their purchase
thereof from Ledesma and has since remained in possession. However, they claimed that
Pastrano was subsequently able to obtain a free patent and a title, OCT No. P-2035, over Lot
No. 19986. According to the Badillas, Pastrano made a sale to Bragat on October 2, 1987, but
such sale is not valid since Pastrano was no longer the owner of the property on that date.
Consequently, the Spouses Badilla prayed that TCT No. T-47759 issued to Bragat pursuant to
that sale be declared null and void.15

After Answers were filed for both complaints, the two cases were consolidated and heard by
one court, Branch 25 of the RTC of Cagayan de Oro City, as they involved exactly the same
parties and subject lot.
After trial, the RTC found for Bragat, noting that the sketch map shows the 152-square-meter
portion occupied by the Spouses Badilla is within the titled property of Bragat.16 It also found
Bragat's title as valid for what it saw as the result of a purchase in good faith and for value. 17 In
contrast, the trial court observed a lack of evidence of the Spouses Badilla. The latter allegedly
presented handwritten and typewritten receipts which were purportedly signed by Ledesma,
dated March 5, 1989, March 1, 1991 and March 23, 1991 acknowledging Ledesma's receipt of
certain amounts, but the court claimed that it found no evidence of (Ledesma's) absolute
ownership on these dates. The court noted that Ledesma had sold previously to the Spouses
Bragat via a Deed of Absolute Sale of Residential Land dated April 18, 1978. Hence, in the trial
court's view, on March 5, 1989, March 1, 1991 and March 23, 1991, Ledesma no longer owned
the land and transferred nothing to the Badillas.18 The dispositive portion of the RTC decision
states:

IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, by preponderance of evidence, judgment is hereby

rendered in favor of Spouses Fe Bragat and Florito Bragat and against Spouses Magdalino and
Cleofe Badilla and dismissing Civil Case No. 92-287 for failure of Spouses Magdalino and
Cleofe Badilla to substantiate their complaint and for lack of merit and ordering defendants
Cleofe Badilla and Magdalino Badilla in Civil Case No. 92-273:

a) to vacate immediately the 152-square-meter property they are occupying as shown in

Exh. N-2-A, P;

b) to pay Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00) by way of moral damages;

c) to pay a reasonable rental of One Hundred Pesos (₱100.00) a month from March 1,
1991 at 6% legal interest until they vacate the premises;

d) to reimburse Ten Thousand Pesos (₱10,000.00) attorney’s fees and Five Thousand
Pesos (₱5,000.00) as expenses for litigation as part of consequential damages; and

e) pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.19

Upon appeal to the CA, the appellate court affirmed the RTC's decision but modified the same
on a finding that Ledesma sold only 991 sq. m. of the property to Bragat in 1978; hence, it held
that the remaining 24 sq. m. of the 1,015-sq.-m. property was validly sold to the Badillas in 1991
and, therefore, must be reconveyed to the latter.20 It also removed the award of damages. The
dispositive portion of the CA's decision is as follows:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The January 14, 2001 Judgment
(of the RTC) is MODIFIED in that:

a) appellants are ordered to VACATE 128 square meters of the disputed lot and
appellee is ordered to RECONVEY 24 square meters of the disputed lot to appellants,
and

b) the reimbursement of attorney's fees and expenses of litigation and the payment of
costs are DELETED.
This case is REMANDED to the court of origin for the purpose of determining the 24-square-
meter lot to be reconveyed to appellants.

SO ORDERED.21

Hence, this petition.

Petitioners Spouses Badilla contend that ownership of the 200-sq.-m. portion was transferred to
them when they purchased the same and possession was delivered to them by Ledesma in
1970.22 They also contend that when OCT No. P-2035 was actually issued in 1980, it was first
delivered by Pastrano to Ledesma and the latter delivered the same to them (the
Badillas).23 Thus, Bragat allegedly falsely claimed the "loss" of the title when she petitioned the
court for a new duplicate original, because such title was not lost but had been with the Badillas
all along.24Another fraud that Bragat allegedly committed was the Deed of Sale dated October
2, 1987, in which Profitiza Pastrano signed (in marital consent) although she had been dead
since March 30, 1985.25

In her Comment, Bragat claims that the sale of October 2, 1987 was only a "re-execution" of the
sale of May 5, 1984, in order to avoid tax surcharges.26 Further, she alleges that the Badillas'
documentary evidence were all executed only after she had the property titled to her
name.27 The Court resolves to GRANT the petition.

The issue is one of ownership of the subject property.

This Court notes that the arguments raised call for a re-examination of the factual findings of the
trial court and the appellate court. It must be stressed that it is a time-honored rule that in a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, only questions of law may be raised. 28 Certainly,
it is equally observed that factual findings of the Court of Appeals, affirming those of the trial
court, are binding on this Court.29

However, these rules admit of certain exceptions, such as when the judgment of the Court of
Appeals is premised on a misapprehension of facts, or is belied by the evidence on record, or
fails to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different
conclusion.30 After a thorough examination of the findings of the trial court and Court of Appeals,
this Court concludes that the case falls under these exceptional situations. Such findings must
be reversed.

The error of the courts below is in misapprehending the fact that ownership passed to the
Spouses Badilla upon their purchase of the subject property from Eustaquio Ledesma.

It is not disputed that the spouses Azur and Profitiza Pastrano had previously sold on November
18, 1968,via a Deed of Definite Sale of Unregistered Coconut and Residential Land, the
property to Eustaquio Ledesma.31Therefore, as early as such date, it is established that the
Pastranos no longer had ownership over the property.

Then, as Ledesma subsequently sold, in 1970, a portion of the property to the petitioner
Spouses Badilla, who immediately took delivery and possession, ownership of this portion had
also been transferred to the said spouses. Although that sale appears to be merely verbal, and
payment therefor was to be made on installment, it is a partially consummated sale, with the
Badillas paying the initial purchase price and Ledesma surrendering possession.32 That the
parties intended for ownership to be transferred may be inferred from their lack of any
agreement stipulating that ownership of the property is reserved by the seller and shall not pass
to the buyer until the latter has fully paid the purchase price.33 The fact is, Ledesma even
delivered to the Badillas the owner's duplicate copy of OCT No. P-2035.34 The Civil Code states
that ownership of the thing sold is transferred to the vendee upon the actual or constructive
delivery of the same.35 And the thing is understood as delivered when it is placed in the control
and possession of the vendee.36 Payment of the purchase price is not essential to the transfer
of ownership as long as the property sold has been delivered; and such delivery (traditio)
operated to divest the vendor of title to the property which may not be regained or recovered
until and unless the contract is resolved or rescinded in accordance with law.37

The same is true even if the sale is a verbal one, because it is held that when a verbal contract
has been completed, executed or partially consummated, its enforceability will not be barred by
the Statute of Frauds, which applies only to an executory agreement.38 Thus, where a party has
performed his obligation, oral evidence will be admitted to prove the agreement. And, where it
was proven that one party had delivered the thing sold to another, then the contract was
partially executed and the Statute of Frauds does not apply.39

Therefore, with the Spouses Badilla owning and occupying the said 152-square-meter portion
since 1970, it may be concluded that TCT No. T-47759 (which canceled OCT No. P-2035)
covering the said portion has been wrongfully issued.40

In addition, TCT No. T-47759 was issued to Fe Bragat on the strength of a Deed of Sale of
Registered Land dated October 2, 1987.41 This deed of sale, however, is void for being
simulated, since both the vendor (Pastrano) and the vendee (Bragat) knew at the time of its
execution of the vendor's lack of ownership over Lot No. 19986, the property being sold. At that
time, it was not Pastrano but Ledesma who was absolute owner of the property by virtue of the
latter's earlier purchase of Lot No. 19986 from the Spouses Pastrano on November 18, 1968,
via a Deed of Definite Sale of Unregistered Coconut and Residential Land.42 Bragat herself
knew this, as she and her husband themselves first bought the property from Ledesma through
a Deed of Absolute Sale of Residential Land dated April 18, 1978.43

In fact, it is from this sale in 1978 that Fe Bragat derives title on the property and not from the
Deeds of Sale dated May 5, 1984 and October 2, 1987 executed between her as vendee and
Pastrano as vendor. Pastrano could no longer sell any part of the property to Bragaton such
later dates since he had already sold the same as early as November 18, 1968 to Ledesma.
Well-settled is the rule that no one can give what one does not have - nemodat quod non habet
–and, accordingly, one can sell only what one owns or is authorized to sell, and the buyer
acquires no better title than the seller.44 Thus, the sales made on the dates May 5, 1984 and
October 2, 1987 are void for being simulated and for lack of a subject matter. On these sales,
Bragat cannot claim good faith as she herself knew of Pastrano's lack of ownership.

It needs emphasis, however, that Bragat's property bought from Ledesma in 1978 does not
include the 152-sq.-m. portion that was already bought by the Badillas.1âwphi1

Therefore, Fe Bragat is entitled to a new transfer certificate of title issued in her name, but on
the basis of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 18, 1978, and excluding the 152 sq. m. in
area that the Spouses Badilla have already bought and have been occupying since 1970, but
which are currently covered by Bragat's existing title, TCT No. T-47759. Hence, Bragat's TCT
No. T-47759 (which canceled OCT No. P-2035), covering 1,015 sq. m., should be declared void
and cancelled and, in its place, two (2) new ones should be issued: (1) in the name of the
spouses Magdalino and Cleofe Badilla, covering the 152 sq. m. that they are occupying, and (2)
in the name of Fe Bragat, covering the remaining 863 sq. m. The metes and bounds of these
two lots are to be based on the survey plans already submitted by appointed commissioners to
the lower court during trial, which are: the Commissioner's Relocation Survey Report (Exhibit
"N")45 signed by Engr. Benigno B. Manlangit, et al., as well as the accompanying Relocation
Sketch Plan (Exhibit "N-2")46 prepared by the same commissioner.

This ruling is compelled by the involvement in this case of not just one instance of double sales
but a series of such sales made by two different vendors. First, it is admitted that Pastrano sold
the property to Ledesma in 1968; then, Pastrano sold it again to Bragat in 1984 and 1987. But
Ledesma, too, sold part of the property to the Spouses Badilla in 1970 and then the entire lot to
the Spouses Bragat in 1978. In such a situation of multiple sales, Article 1544 of the Civil Code
relates that ownership shall belong to the person acquiring the property who, in good faith, first
recorded such acquisition.47 Presently, however, it cannot be said that Bragat's recording of her
1987 purchase was in good faith because that sale was simulated and Bragat was aware of
other persons who have an interest on the property. That the 1987 sale is void is further
revealed by evidence to show that one of its signatories, Profitiza Pastrano was already dead
when it was executed.48 Bragat herself also admitted that she knew of the Spouses Badillas'
occupation prior to her purchase.49 In that case, the same Article 1544 of the Civil Code
provides that when neither buyer registered, in good faith, the sale of the properties with the
register of deeds, the one who took prior possession of the properties shall be the lawful owner
thereof.50 Such prior possessors, at least with respect to the 152-sq.-m. portion, are indisputably
the Spouses Badilla.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated
October 9, 2008 arid Resolution dated February 12, 2009. of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 70423-MIN.are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
47759 is DECLARED VOID, and, in its place, two (2) new transfer certificates of titles are
ORDERED ISSUED, namely: (1) in the name of the Spouses Magdalino and Cleofe Badilla,
covering the 152 sq. m. that they are occupying, and (2) in the name of Fe Bragat, covering the
remaining 863 sq. m. of the property, of which measurements are to be based on Exhibits
"N"51 and Exhibit "N-2".52

G.R. No. 176492 October 20, 2014

MARIETTA N. BARRIDO, Petitioner,

vs.
LEONARDO V. NONATO, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

For the Court's resolution is a Petition for Review filed by petitioner Marietta N. Barrido
questioning the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated November 16, 2006, and its
Resolution2 dated January 24, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 00235. The CA affirmed the
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ofBacolod City, Branch 53, dated July 21, 2004, in
Civil Case No. 03-12123, which ordered the partition of the subject property.

The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows: In the course of the marriage of
respondent Leonardo V. Nonato and petitioner Marietta N. Barrido,they were able to acquire a
property situated in Eroreco, Bacolod City, consisting ofa house and lot, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-140361. On March 15, 1996, their marriage was declared void
on the ground of psychological incapacity. Since there was no more reason to maintain their co-
ownership over the property, Nonato asked Barrido for partition, but the latter refused. Thus, on
January 29, 2003, Nonato filed a Complaint for partition before the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC) of Bacolod City, Branch 3.

Barrido claimed, by way of affirmative defense, that the subject property had already been sold
to their children, Joseph Raymund and Joseph Leo. She likewise moved for the dismissal of the
complaint because the MTCC lacked jurisdiction, the partition case being an action incapable of
pecuniary estimation.

The Bacolod MTCC rendered a Decision dated September 17, 2003, applying Article 129 of the
Family Code. It ruled in this wise:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering the conjugal

property of the former Spouses Leonardo and Marietta Nonato, a house and lot covered by TCT
No. T-140361 located at Eroreco, Bacolod City, which was their conjugal dwelling, adjudicated
to the defendant Marietta Nonato, the spouse with whom the majority of the common children
choose to remain.

Furthermore, defendant’s counterclaim is hereby granted, ordering plaintiff to pay defendant

₱10,000.00 as moral damages for the mental anguish and unnecessary inconvenience brought
about by this suit; and an additional ₱10,000.00 as exemplary damages to deter others from
following suit; and attorney’s fees of ₱2,000.00 and litigation expenses of ₱575.00.

SO ORDERED.4

Nonato appealed the MTCC Decision before the RTC. On July 21, 2004, the Bacolod RTC
reversed the ruling of the MTCC. It found that even though the MTCC aptly applied Article 129
of the Family Code, it nevertheless made a reversible error in adjudicating the subject property
to Barrido. Its dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated September 17, 2003 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new judgment is hereby rendered ordering the parties:

(1) to equitably partition the house and lot covered by TCT No. T-140361;

(2) to reimburse Joseph Raymund and Joseph Leo Nonato of the amount advanced by
them in payment of the debts and obligation of TCT No. T-140361 with Philippine
National Bank;

(3) to deliver the presumptive legitimes of Joseph Raymund and Joseph Leo Nonato
pursuant to Article 51 of the Family Code.
SO ORDERED.5

Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision on November 16, 2006. It held that since the
property’s assessed value was only ₱8,080.00, it clearly fell within the MTCC’s jurisdiction. Also,
although the RTC erred in relying on Article 129 of the FamilyCode, instead of Article 147, the
dispositive portion of its decision still correctly ordered the equitable partition of the property.
Barrido filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was, however, denied for lack of merit.

Hence, Barrido brought the case to the Court via a Petition for Review. She assigned the
following errors in the CA Decision:

I.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE MTCC HAD
JURISDICTION TO TRY THE PRESENT CASE.

II.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE LOT COVERED
BY TCT NO. T-140361 IS CONJUGAL AFTER BEING SOLD TO THE CHILDREN, JOSEPH
LEO NONATO AND JOSEPH RAYMUND NONATO.

III.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ARTICLE 129 OF THE
FAMILY CODE HAS NO APPLICATION IN THE PRESENT CASE, ON THE ASSUMPTION

THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE.6

The petition lacks merit.

Contrary to Barrido’s contention, the MTCC has jurisdiction to take cognizance of real actions or
those affecting title to real property, or for the recovery of possession, or for the partition or
condemnation of, or foreclosure of a mortgage on real property.7 Section 33 of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 1298 provides:

Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts in civil cases.– Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit

Trial Courts shall exercise:

xxxx

(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the propertyor interest therein
does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00)or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where
such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That value
of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots. (as amended
by R.A. No. 7691)9

Here, the subject property’s assessed value was merely ₱8,080.00, an amount which certainly
does not exceed the required limit of ₱20,000.00 for civil actions outside Metro Manila tofall
within the jurisdiction of the MTCC. Therefore, the lower court correctly took cognizance of the
instant case.

The records reveal that Nonatoand Barrido’s marriage had been declared void for psychological
incapacity under Article 3610 of the Family Code. During their marriage, however, the conjugal
partnership regime governed their property relations. Although Article 12911 provides for the

procedure in case of dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, Article 147 specifically
covers the effects of void marriages on the spouses’ property relations. Article 147 reads:

Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively
with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage,
their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by
both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed tohave been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall beowned by
them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the
acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the
acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and
of the household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property
acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after
the termination of their cohabitation.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad
faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of
or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall
belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share
shall belong to the innocent party.1âwphi1 In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon
termination of the cohabitation.

This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal
impedimentto marry each other, exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void
marriage or without the benefit of marriage.12 It is clear, therefore, that for Article 147 to operate,
the man and the woman: (1) must be capacitated to marry each other; (2) live exclusively with
each other as husband and wife; and (3) their union is without the benefit of marriage or their
marriage is void. Here, all these elements are present.13 The term "capacitated" inthe first
paragraph of the provision pertains to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage. 14 Any
impediment to marry has not been shown to have existed on the part of either Nonato or
Barrido. They lived exclusively with each other as husband and wife. However, their marriage
was found to be void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological
incapacity.15
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry
shall be governed by the rules on equal coownership. Any property acquired during the union is
prima faciepresumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not
participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed to the
same jointly if said party's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family
household.16 Efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household are regarded as
contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or income or work
or industry.17

In the analogous case of Valdez,18 it was likewise averred that the trial court failed to apply the
correct law that should govern the disposition of a family dwelling in a situation where a
marriage is declared void ab initiobecause of psychological incapacity on the part of either or
both parties in the contract of marriage.The Court held that the court a quodid not commit a
reversible error in utilizing Article 147 of the Family Code and in ruling that the former spouses
own the family home and all their common property in equal shares, as well as in concluding
that, in the liquidation and partition of the property that they owned in common, the provisions
on coownership under the Civil Code should aptly prevail.19 The rules which are set up to
govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the
property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages, are irrelevant to the liquidation of
the co-ownership that exists between common-law spousesor spouses of void marriages.20

Here, the former spouses both agree that they acquired the subject property during the
subsistence of their marriage. Thus, it shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint
efforts, work or industry, and shall be jointly owned by them in equal shares. Barrido, however,
claims that the ownership over the property in question is already vested on their children, by
virtue of a Deed of Sale. But aside from the title to the property still being registered in the
names of the former spouses, said document of safe does not bear a notarization of a notary
public. It must be noted that without the notarial seal, a document remains to be private and
cannot be converted into a public document,21 making it inadmissible in evidence unless
properly authenticated.22 Unfortunately, Barrido failed to prove its due execution and
authenticity. In fact, she merely annexed said Deed of Sale to her position paper. Therefore, the
subject property remains to be owned in common by Nonato and Barrido, which should be
divided in accordance with the rules on co-ownership.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated November 16, 2006, as well as its Resolution dated January 24, 2007 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 00235, are hereby AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 187987 November 26, 2014

VICENTE TORRES, JR., CARLOS VELEZ, AND THE HEIRS OF MARIANO VELEZ,
NAMELY: ANITA CHIONG VELEZ, ROBERT OSCAR CHIONG VELEZ, SARAH JEAN
CHIONG VELEZ AND TED CHIONG VELEZ,Petitioners,
vs.
LORENZO LAPINID AND JESUS VELEZ, Respondents.

DECISION
PEREZ, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the
petitioners assailing the 30 January 2009 Decision2 and 14 May 2009 Resolution3 of the
Twentieth Division of the Corni of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 02390, affirming the 15 October
2007 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (RTC Cebu City) which dismissed the
complaint for the declaration of nullity of deed of sale against respondent Lorenzo Lapinid
(Lapinid).

The facts as reviewed are the following:

On 4 February 2006, Vicente V. Torres, Jr. (Vicente), Mariano Velez (Mariano)5 and Carlos
Velez (petitioners) filed a Complaint6 before RTC Cebu City praying for the nullification of the
sale of real property by respondent Jesus Velez (Jesus) in favor of Lapinid; the recovery of
possession and ownership of the property; and the payment of damages.

Petitioners alleged in their complaint that they, including Jesus, are co-owners of several
parcels of land including the disputed Lot. No. 43897 located at Cogon, Carcar, Cebu. Sometime
in 1993, Jesus filed an action for partition of the parcels of land against the petitioners and other
co-owners before Branch 21 of RTC Cebu City. On 13 August 2001, a judgment was rendered
based on a compromise agreement signed by the parties wherein they agreed that Jesus,
Mariano and Vicente were jointly authorized to sell the said properties and receive the proceeds
thereof and distribute them to all the co-owners. However, the agreement was later amended to
exclude Jesus as an authorized seller. Pursuant totheir mandate, the petitioners inspected the
property and discovered that Lapinid was occupying a specific portion of the 3000 square
meters of Lot No. 4389 by virtue of a deed of sale executed by Jesus in favor of Lapinid. It was
pointed out by petitioner that as a consequence of what they discovered, a forcible entry case
was filed against Lapinid.

The petitioners prayed that the deed of sale be declared null and void arguing that the sale of a
definite portion of a co-owned property without notice to the other co-owners is without force
and effect. Further, the complainants prayed for payment of rental fees amounting to ₱1,000.00
per month from January 2004 or from the time of deprivation of property in addition to attorney’s
fees and litigation expenses.

Answering the allegations, Jesus admitted that there was a partition case between him and the
petitioners filed in 1993 involvingseveral parcels of land including the contested Lot No. 4389.
However, he insisted that as early as 6 November 1997, a motion 8 was signed by the co-
owners (including the petitioners) wherein Lot No. 4389 was agreed to be adjudicated to the co-
owners belonging to the group of Jesus and the other lots be divided to the other co-owners
belonging to the group of Torres. Jesus further alleged that even prior to the partition and
motion, several coowners in his group had already sold their shares to him in various dates of
1985, 1990 and 2004.9 Thus, when the motion was filed and signed by the parties on 6
November 1997, his rights asa majority co-owner (73%) of Lot No. 4389 became consolidated.
Jesus averred that it was unnecessary to give notice of the sale as the lot was already
adjudicated in his favor. He clarified that he only agreed with the 2001 Compromise Agreement
believing that it only pertained to the remaining parcels of land excluding Lot No. 4389.10

On his part, Lapinid admitted that a deed of sale was entered into between him and Jesus
pertaining to a parcel of land with an area of 3000 square meters. However, he insistedon the
validity of sale since Jesus showed him several deeds of sale making him a majority owner of
Lot No. 4389. He further denied that he acquired a specific and definite portion of the
questioned property, citing as evidence the deed of sale which does not mention any
boundaries or specific portion. He explained that Jesus permitted him to occupy a portion
notexceeding 3000 square meters conditioned on the result of the partition of the co-owners.11

Regarding the forcible entry case, Jesus and Lapinid admitted that such case was filed but the
same was already dismissed by the Municipal Trial Court of Carcar, Cebu. In that decision, it
was ruled that the buyers, including Lapinid, were buyers in good faith since a proof of
ownership was shown to them by Jesus before buying the property.12

On 15 October 2007, the trial court dismissed the complaint of petitioners in this wise:
Therefore, the Court DISMISSES the Complaint. At the same time, the Court NULLIFIES the
site assignment made by Jesus Velez in the Deed of Sale, dated November 9, 1997, of Lorenzo
Lapinid’s portion, the exact location of which still has to be determined either by agreement of
the co-owners or by the Court in proper proceedings.13

Aggrieved, petitioners filed their partial motion for reconsideration which was denied through a
26 November 2007 Order of the court.14 Thereafter, they filed a notice of appeal on 10
December 2007.15

On 30 January 2009, the Court of Appeals affirmed16 the decision of the trial court. It validated
the sale and ruled that the compromise agreement did not affect the validity of the sale
previously executed by Jesus and Lapinid. It likewise dismissed the claim for rental payments,
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses of the petitioners.

Upon appeal before this Court, the petitioners echo the same arguments posited before the
lower courts. They argue that Lapinid, as the successor-in-interest of Jesus, is also bound by
the 2001 judgment based on compromise stating that the parcels of land must be sold jointly by
Jesus, Mariano and Vicente and the proceeds of the sale be divided among the coowners. To
further strengthen their contention, they advance the argument that since the portion sold was a
definite and specific portion of a co-owned property, the entire deed of sale must be declared
null and void.

We deny the petition.

Admittedly, Jesus sold an area ofland to Lapinid on 9 November 1997. To simplify, the question
now iswhether Jesus, as a co-owner, can validly sell a portion of the property heco-owns in
favor of another person. We answer in the affirmative.

A co-owner has an absolute ownership of his undivided and proindiviso share in the co-owned
property.17 He has the right to alienate, assign and mortgage it, even to the extent of substituting
a third person in its enjoyment provided that no personal rightswill be affected. This is evident
from the provision of the Civil Code:

Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute
another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the
alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which
may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
A co-owner is an owner of the whole and over the whole he exercises the right of dominion, but
he is at the same time the owner of a portion which is truly abstract.18 Hence, his co-owners
have no right to enjoin a coowner who intends to alienate or substitute his abstract portion or
substitute a third person in its enjoyment.19

In this case, Jesus can validly alienate his co-owned property in favor of Lapinid, free from any
opposition from the co-owners. Lapinid, as a transferee, validly obtained the same rights of
Jesus from the date of the execution of a valid sale. Absent any proof that the sale was not
perfected, the validity of sale subsists. In essence, Lapinid steps into the shoes of Jesus as co-
owner of an ideal and proportionate share in the property held in common.20 Thus, from the
perfection of contract on 9 November 1997, Lapinid eventually became a co-owner of the
property.

Even assuming that the petitioners are correct in their allegation that the disposition in favor of
Lapinid before partition was a concrete or definite portion, the validity of sale still prevails.

In a catena of decisions,21 the Supreme Court had repeatedly held that no individual can claim
title to a definite or concrete portion before partition of co-owned property. Each co-owner only
possesses a right to sell or alienate his ideal share after partition. However, in case he disposes
his share before partition, such disposition does not make the sale or alienation null and void.
What will be affected on the sale is only his proportionate share, subject to the results of the
partition. The co-owners who did not give their consent to the sale stand to be unaffected by the
alienation.22

As explained in Spouses Del Campo v. Court of Appeals:23

We are not unaware of the principle that a co-owner cannot rightfully dispose of a particular
portion of a co-owned property prior to partition among all the co-owners. However, this should
not signify that the vendee does not acquire anything atall in case a physically segregated area
of the co-owned lot is in fact sold to him. Since the coowner/vendor’s undivided interest could
properly be the object of the contract of sale between the parties, what the vendee obtains by
virtue of such a sale are the same rights as the vendor had asco-owner, in an ideal share
equivalent to the consideration given under their transaction. In other words, the vendee steps
into the shoes of the vendor as co-owner and acquires a proportionate abstract share in the
property held in common.24

Also worth noting is the pronouncement in Lopez v. Vda. De Cuaycong:25

x x x The fact that the agreement in question purported to sell a concrete portionof the hacienda
does not render the sale void, for it is a wellestablished principle that the binding force of a
contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so. "Quando res non valet ut
ago, valeat quantumvalere potest." (When a thing is of no force as I do it, it shall have as much
force as it can have).26 (Italics theirs).

Consequently, whether the disposition involves an abstract or concrete portion of the co-owned
property, the sale remains validly executed.

The validity of sale being settled,it follows that the subsequent compromise agreement between
the other co-owners did not affect the rights of Lapinid as a co-owner.
Records show that on 13 August 2001, a judgment based on compromise agreement was
rendered with regard to the previous partition case involving the same parties pertaining to
several parcels of land, including the disputed lot. The words of the compromise state that:
COME NOW[,] the parties and to this Honorable Court, most respectfully state that instead of
partitioning the properties, subject matter of litigation, that they will just sell the properties
covered by TCT Nos. 25796, 25797 and 25798 of the Register of Deeds of the Province of
Cebu and divide the proceeds among themselves.

That Jesus Velez, Mariano Velez and Vicente Torres, Jr. are currently authorized to sell said
properties, receive the proceeds thereof and distribute them to the parties.27

Be that as it may, the compromise agreement failed to defeat the already accrued right of
ownership of Lapinid over the share sold by Jesus. As early as 9 November 1997, Lapinid
already became a co-owner of the property and thus, vested with all the rights enjoyed by the
other co-owners. The judgment based on the compromise agreement, which is to have the
covered properties sold, is valid and effectual provided as it does not affect the proportionate
share of the non-consenting party. Accordingly, when the compromise agreement was executed
without Lapinid’s consent, said agreement could not have affected his ideal and undivided
share. Petitioners cannot sell Lapinid’s share absent his consent. Nemo dat quod non habet –
"no one can give what he does not have."28

This Court has ruled in many cases that even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the
sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent
tothe sale. This is because the sale or other disposition of a co-owner affects only his undivided
share and the transferee gets only what would correspond to his grantor in the partition of the
thing owned in common.29

We find unacceptable the argument that Lapinid must pay rental payments to the other co-
owners.1âwphi1

As previously discussed, Lapinid,from the execution of sale, became a co-owner vested with
rights to enjoy the property held in common.

Clearly specified in the Civil Code are the following rights:

Art. 486. Each co-owner may use the thing owned in common, provided he does so in
accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in such a way as not to injure the
interest of the co-ownership or prevent the other co-owners from using it according to their
rights. The purpose of the co-ownership may be changed by agreement, express or implied.

Art. 493. Each co-owner shall havethe full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it and even substitute
another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rightsare involved. But the effect of the
alienation or mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may
be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.

Affirming these rights, the Court held in Aguilar v. Court of Appeals that:30

x x x Each co-owner of property heldpro indivisoexercises his rights over the whole property and
may use and enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of
his co-owners, the reason being that until a division is made, the respective share of each
cannot be determined and every co-ownerexercises, together with his coparticipants joint
ownership over the pro indiviso property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of the
same.31 From the foregoing, it is absurd to rule that Lapinid, who is already a co-owner, be
ordered to pay rental payments to his other co-owners. Lapinid’s right of enjoyment over the
property owned in common must be respected despite opposition and may notbe limited as long
he uses the property to the purpose for which it isintended and he does not injure the interest of
the co-ownership.

Finally, we find no error on denial of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.

Pursuant to Article 2208 of the New Civil Code, attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation, in the
absence of stipulation, are awarded only in the following instances:

xxxx

1. When exemplary damages are awarded;

2. When the defendant’s act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third
persons or to incur expenses to protect his interests;

3. In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;

4. In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff;

5. Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the
plaintiff’s plainly valid and demandable claim;

6. In actions for legal support;

7. In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled
workers;

8. In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and employer's liability laws;

9. In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a cnme;

10. When at least double judicial costs arc awarded;

11. In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees
and expenses oflitigation should be recovered.

In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.

Petitioners cite Jesus' act of selling a definite portion to Lapinid as the reason which forced them
to litigate and file their complaint. However, though the Court may not fault the complainants
when they filed a complaint based on their perceived cause of action, they should have also
considered thoroughly that it is well within the rights of a co-owner to validly sell his ideal share
pursuant to law and jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals dated 30 January 2009 and 14 May 2009 are hereby AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 161916 January 20, 2006

ARNELITO ADLAWAN, Petitioner,

vs.
EMETERIO M. ADLAWAN and NARCISA M. ADLAWAN, Respondents.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review is the September 23, 2003 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 74921 which set aside the September 13, 2002 Decision2 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 7, in Civil Case No. CEB-27806, and reinstated the
February 12, 2002 Judgment3 of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Minglanilla, Metro Cebu, in
Civil Case No. 392, dismissing petitioner Arnelito Adlawan’s unlawful detainer suit against
respondents Emeterio and Narcisa Adlawan. Likewise questioned is the January 8, 2004
Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals which denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

The instant ejectment suit stemmed from the parties’ dispute over Lot 7226 and the house built
thereon, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 8842,5 registered in the name of the late
Dominador Adlawan and located at Barrio Lipata, Municipality of Minglanilla, Cebu. In his
complaint, petitioner claimed that he is an acknowledged illegitimate child6 of Dominador who
died on May 28, 1987 without any other issue. Claiming to be the sole heir of Dominador, he
executed an affidavit adjudicating to himself Lot 7226 and the house built thereon.7 Out of
respect and generosity to respondents who are the siblings of his father, he granted their plea to
occupy the subject property provided they would vacate the same should his need for the
property arise. Sometime in January 1999, he verbally requested respondents to vacate the
house and lot, but they refused and filed instead an action for quieting of title8with the RTC.
Finally, upon respondents’ refusal to heed the last demand letter to vacate dated August 2,
2000, petitioner filed the instant case on August 9, 2000.9

On the other hand, respondents Narcisa and Emeterio, 70 and 59 years of age,
respectively,10 denied that they begged petitioner to allow them to stay on the questioned
property and stressed that they have been occupying Lot 7226 and the house standing thereon
since birth. They alleged that Lot 7226 was originally registered in the name of their deceased
father, Ramon Adlawan11 and the ancestral house standing thereon was owned by Ramon and
their mother, Oligia Mañacap Adlawan. The spouses had nine12 children including the late
Dominador and herein surviving respondents Emeterio and Narcisa. During the lifetime of their
parents and deceased siblings, all of them lived on the said property. Dominador and his wife,
Graciana Ramas Adlawan, who died without issue, also occupied the same.13 Petitioner, on the
other hand, is a stranger who never had possession of Lot 7226.
Sometime in 1961, spouses Ramon and Oligia needed money to finance the renovation of their
house. Since they were not qualified to obtain a loan, they transferred ownership of Lot 7226 in
the name of their son Dominador who was the only one in the family who had a college
education. By virtue of a January 31, 1962 simulated deed of sale,14 a title was issued to
Dominador which enabled him to secure a loan with Lot 7226 as collateral. Notwithstanding the
execution of the simulated deed, Dominador, then single, never disputed his parents’ ownership
of the lot. He and his wife, Graciana, did not disturb respondents’ possession of the property
until they died on May 28, 1987 and May 6, 1997, respectively.

Respondents also contended that Dominador’s signature at the back of petitioner’s birth
certificate was forged, hence, the latter is not an heir of Dominador and has no right to claim
ownership of Lot 7226.15 They argued that even if petitioner is indeed Dominador’s
acknowledged illegitimate son, his right to succeed is doubtful because Dominador was
survived by his wife, Graciana.16

On February 12, 2002, the MTC dismissed the complaint holding that the establishment of
petitioner’s filiation and the settlement of the estate of Dominador are conditions precedent to
the accrual of petitioner’s action for ejectment. It added that since Dominador was survived by
his wife, Graciana, who died 10 years thereafter, her legal heirs are also entitled to their share in
Lot 7226. The dispositive portion thereof, reads:

In View of the foregoing, for failure to prove by preponderance of evidence, the plaintiff’s cause
of action, the above-entitled case is hereby Ordered DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.17

On appeal by petitioner, the RTC reversed the decision of the MTC holding that the title of
Dominador over Lot 7226 cannot be collaterally attacked. It thus ordered respondents to turn
over possession of the controverted lot to petitioner and to pay compensation for the use and
occupation of the premises. The decretal portion thereof, provides:

Wherefore, the Judgment, dated February 12, 2002, of the Municipal Trial Court of Minglanilla,
Cebu, in Civil Case No. 392, is reversed. Defendants-appellees are directed to restore to
plaintiff-appellant possession of Lot 7226 and the house thereon, and to pay plaintiff-appellant,
beginning in August 2000, compensation for their use and occupation of the property in the
amount of P500.00 a month.

So ordered.18

Meanwhile, the RTC granted petitioner’s motion for execution pending appeal19 which was
opposed by the alleged nephew and nieces of Graciana in their motion for leave to intervene
and to file an answer in intervention.20 They contended that as heirs of Graciana, they have a
share in Lot 7226 and that intervention is necessary to protect their right over the property. In
addition, they declared that as co-owners of the property, they are allowing respondents to stay
in Lot 7226 until a formal partition of the property is made.

The RTC denied the motion for leave to intervene.21 It, however, recalled the order granting the
execution pending appeal having lost jurisdiction over the case in view of the petition filed by
respondents with the Court of Appeals.22
On September 23, 2003, the Court of Appeals set aside the decision of the RTC and reinstated
the judgment of the MTC. It ratiocinated that petitioner and the heirs of Graciana are co-owners
of Lot 7226. As such, petitioner cannot eject respondents from the property via an unlawful
detainer suit filed in his own name and as the sole owner of the property. Thus –

WHEEFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision dated September 13, 2002 of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 7, in Civil Case No. CEB-27806 is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE, and the Judgment dated February 12, 2002 of the Municipal Trial Court of
Minglanilla, Metro Cebu, in Civil Case No. 392 is REINSTATED. Costs against the respondent.

SO ORDERED.23

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the instant petition.

The decisive issue to be resolved is whether or not petitioner can validly maintain the instant
case for ejectment.

Petitioner averred that he is an acknowledged illegitimate son and the sole heir of Dominador.
He in fact executed an affidavit adjudicating to himself the controverted property. In ruling for the
petitioner, the RTC held that the questioned January 31, 1962 deed of sale validly transferred
title to Dominador and that petitioner is his acknowledged illegitimate son who inherited
ownership of the questioned lot. The Court notes, however, that the RTC lost sight of the fact
that the theory of succession invoked by petitioner would end up proving that he is not the sole
owner of Lot 7226. This is so because Dominador was survived not only by petitioner but also
by his legal wife, Graciana, who died 10 years after the demise of Dominador on May 28,
1987.24 By intestate succession, Graciana and petitioner became co-owners of Lot 7226.25 The
death of Graciana on May 6, 1997, did not make petitioner the absolute owner of Lot 7226
because the share of Graciana passed to her relatives by consanguinity and not to petitioner
with whom she had no blood relations. The Court of Appeals thus correctly held that petitioner
has no authority to institute the instant action as the sole owner of Lot 7226.

Petitioner contends that even granting that he has co-owners over Lot 7226, he can on his own
file the instant case pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code which provides:

ART. 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.

This article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession. Article 487 includes
forcible entry and unlawful detainer (accion interdictal), recovery of possession (accion
publiciana), and recovery of ownership (accion de reivindicacion).26 A co-owner may bring such
an action without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit
is presumed to have been filed to benefit his co-owners. It should be stressed, however, that
where the suit is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and entitled
to the possession of the litigated property, the action should be dismissed.27

The renowned civilist, Professor Arturo M. Tolentino, explained –

A co-owner may bring such an action, without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as
co-plaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. If the action is for
the benefit of the plaintiff alone, such that he claims possession for himself and not for
the co-ownership, the action will not prosper. (Emphasis added)28
In Baloloy v. Hular,29 respondent filed a complaint for quieting of title claiming exclusive
ownership of the property, but the evidence showed that respondent has co-owners over the
property. In dismissing the complaint for want of respondent’s authority to file the case, the
Court held that –

Under Article 487 of the New Civil Code, any of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.
This article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession, including an accion
publiciana and a reinvidicatory action. A co-owner may bring such an action without the
necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is deemed to be
instituted for the benefit of all. Any judgment of the court in favor of the co-owner will benefit the
others but if such judgment is adverse, the same cannot prejudice the rights of the unimpleaded
co-owners. If the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner
and entitled to the possession thereof, the action will not prosper unless he impleads the other
co-owners who are indispensable parties.

In this case, the respondent alone filed the complaint, claiming sole ownership over the subject
property and praying that he be declared the sole owner thereof. There is no proof that the other
co-owners had waived their rights over the subject property or conveyed the same to the
respondent or such co-owners were aware of the case in the trial court. The trial court rendered
judgment declaring the respondent as the sole owner of the property and entitled to its
possession, to the prejudice of the latter’s siblings. Patently then, the decision of the trial court is
erroneous.

Under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the respondent was mandated to implead his
siblings, being co-owners of the property, as parties. The respondent failed to comply with the
rule. It must, likewise, be stressed that the Republic of the Philippines is also an indispensable
party as defendant because the respondent sought the nullification of OCT No. P-16540 which
was issued based on Free Patent No. 384019. Unless the State is impleaded as party-
defendant, any decision of the Court would not be binding on it. It has been held that the
absence of an indispensable party in a case renders ineffective all the proceedings subsequent
to the filing of the complaint including the judgment. The absence of the respondent’s siblings,
as parties, rendered all proceedings subsequent to the filing thereof, including the judgment of
the court, ineffective for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to
those present.30

In the instant case, it is not disputed that petitioner brought the suit for unlawful detainer in his
name alone and for his own benefit to the exclusion of the heirs of Graciana as he even
executed an affidavit of self- adjudication over the disputed property. It is clear therefore that
petitioner cannot validly maintain the instant action considering that he does not recognize the
co-ownership that necessarily flows from his theory of succession to the property of his father,
Dominador.

In the same vein, there is no merit in petitioner’s claim that he has the legal personality to file
the present unlawful detainer suit because the ejectment of respondents would benefit not only
him but also his alleged co-owners. However, petitioner forgets that he filed the instant case to
acquire possession of the property and to recover damages. If granted, he alone will gain
possession of the lot and benefit from the proceeds of the award of damages to the exclusion of
the heirs of Graciana. Hence, petitioner cannot successfully capitalize on the alleged benefit to
his co-owners. Incidentally, it should be pointed out that in default of the said heirs of Graciana,
whom petitioner labeled as "fictitious heirs," the State will inherit her share31 and will thus be
petitioner’s co-owner entitled to possession and enjoyment of the property.

The present controversy should be differentiated from the cases where the Court upheld the
right of a co-owner to file a suit pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code. In Resuena v. Court of
Appeals,32 and Sering v. Plazo,33 the co-owners who filed the ejectment case did not represent
themselves as the exclusive owner of the property. In Celino v. Heirs of Alejo and Teresa
Santiago,34 the complaint for quieting of title was brought in behalf of the co-owners precisely to
recover lots owned in common.35 Similarly in Vencilao v. Camarenta,36 the amended complaint
specified that the plaintiff is one of the heirs who co-owns the controverted properties.

In the foregoing cases, the plaintiff never disputed the existence of a co-ownership nor claimed
to be the sole or exclusive owner of the litigated lot. A favorable decision therein would of
course inure to the benefit not only of the plaintiff but to his co-owners as well. The instant case,
however, presents an entirely different backdrop as petitioner vigorously asserted absolute and
sole ownership of the questioned lot. In his complaint, petitioner made the following allegations,
to wit:

3. The plaintiff was the only son (illegitimate) and sole heir of the late DOMINADOR ADLAWAN
who died intestate on 28 May 1987 without any other descendant nor ascendant x x x.

xxxx

5. Being the only child/descendant and, therefore, sole heir of the deceased Dominador
Adlawan, the plaintiff became the absolute owner, and automatically took POSSESSION, of
the aforementioned house and lot x x x. (Emphasis added)37

Clearly, the said cases find no application here because petitioner’s action operates as a
complete repudiation of the existence of co-ownership and not in representation or recognition
thereof. Dismissal of the complaint is therefore proper. As noted by Former Supreme Court
Associate Justice Edgrado L. Paras "[i]t is understood, of course, that the action [under Article
487 of the Civil Code] is being instituted for all. Hence, if the co-owner expressly states that he
is bringing the case only for himself, the action should not be allowed to prosper."38

Indeed, respondents’ not less than four decade actual physical possession of the questioned
ancestral house and lot deserves to be respected especially so that petitioner failed to show that
he has the requisite personality and authority as co-owner to file the instant case. Justice
dictates that respondents who are now in the twilight years of their life be granted possession of
their ancestral property where their parents and siblings lived during their lifetime, and where
they, will probably spend the remaining days of their life.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 23, 2003 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74921 which reinstated the February 12, 2002 Judgment of the
Municipal Trial Court of Minglanilla, Metro Cebu, dismissing petitioner’s complaint in Civil Case
No. 392, and its January 8, 2004 Resolution, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.