Fujiki, petitioner vs Marinay, Respondents

Facts: Fujiki is a Japanese National who married Marinay in the Philippines in 2004.
Fujiki was not able to bring Marinay to Japan and eventually lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay married Maekara another Japanese who was able to bring her to Japan. Marinay
left Maekara due to physical abuse and eventually had contact with Fujiki and reestablished their
relationship. In 2010, the marriage of Marinay and Maekara was declared null and void on the
ground of bigamy under the courts of Japan thru the help of Fujiki.

In 2011, Fujiki filed before the RTC to declare the subsequent marriage to Maekara null
and void based on Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines and prayed that
the Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the decision of the Japanese court on the marriage
certificate of Marinay and Maekara. The RTC dismissed the petition and cited that only "the
husband or the wife," may file a petition to declare their marriage void based on the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC). Fujiki sought to reconsider the decision but the RTC denied it and reiterated its
two grounds for dismissal, i.e. lack of personality to sue and improper venue under Sections 2(a)
and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC considered Fujiki as a "third person" in the proceeding
because he "is not the husband in the decree of divorce issued by the Japanese Family Court,
which he now seeks to be judicially recognized. Hence this petition.

Issue: Whether Fujiki has legal personality to seek the declaration of Nullity of Marriage by
Marinay and Maekara?

Held: Yes. Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court
judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because
the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the
personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and
Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.

Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the beginning, is
the civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a
public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an interest
in the prosecution and prevention of crimes. If anyone can file a criminal action which leads to the
declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage, there is more reason to confer personality to sue on
the husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the
public interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally interested in the purely
civil aspect of protecting his marriage.
Medina vs Koike

Facts: In 2005, Doreen Medina was married to Michiyuki Koike a Japanese national and bore
two children. In June 2012, the spouses filed for divorce pursuant to the laws of Japan and was
approved and registered on the same date. In 2013, Doreen filed a petition before the RTC of
Quezon City to have the Divorce recognized. The RTC denied the petition for failure to prove the
divorce in accordance with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.

Issue: Whether the RTC should grant the petition?

Held: Yes. At the outset, it bears stressing that Philippine law does not provide for absolute
divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. However, Article 26 of the Family Code - which
addresses foreign marriages or mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner - allows a
Filipino spouse to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad
by an alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. The provision reads:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be
valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37
and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

Under the above-highlighted paragraph, the law confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend
the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine
the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.

It bears to stress that procedural rules were intended to ensure proper administration of law and
justice. The rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they
are adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice. A deviation from its rigid enforcement
may thus be allowed to attain its prime objective, for after all, the dispensation of justice is the
core reason for the existence of the courts.
Manuel vs. People

Facts: In 1975, Eduardo was married to Rubylus Gana. Despite the previous marriage, Eduardo
contracted another one in 1996 with respondent Tina Gandalera. The second marriage turned
sour and Tina eventually learned of Eduardo’s subsisting marriage with Ruby. Eduardo was
charged for bigamy and raised the defense that he believed that his first marriage was already
dissolved because of Rubylus’ 20-year absence that it should exculpate him from liability for
bigamy. The RTC found him guilty and upon appeal he raised that he did so in good faith.
However, the CA affirmed the lower courts decision hence this petition.

Issue: Whether the defenses raised by Eduardo is tenable?

Held: No. It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when he married the
private complainant in 1996, he was of the well-grounded belief
that his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her for more than 20 years since
1975. He should have adduced in evidence a decision of a competent court declaring the
presumptive death of his first wife as required by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation
to Article 41 of the Family Code. Such judicial declaration also constitutes proof that the petitioner
acted in good faith, and would negate criminal intent on his part when he married the private
complainant and, as a consequence, he could not be held guilty of bigamy in such case. The
petitioner, however, failed to discharge his burden.
Republic vs. San Jose

Facts: In 1988, Laila and Manolito got married and bore two children. During nine years of
married life, Manolito was jobless and hooked to gambling and drugs while Laila worked her way
for the family. Laila petitioned to have the marriage declared null and void on the ground of
psychological incapacity at the same time employing a certain Dr. Nerdy Tayag who testified that
Manolito was incapacitated to perform the duties of a husband. The RTC denied the petition
alleging that the the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most
serious cases of personality disorder clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage and that such incapacity "must be characterized
by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."

Upon appeal, the decision was reversed finding that the totality of the evidence presented
in the present case – including the testimony of the petitioner, were enough to sustain a finding
that Manolito San Jose is psychologically incapacitated within the contemplation of the Family
Code. Hence this petition.

Issue: Whether the decision of the CA is correct?

Held: No. The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even
before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive
one of the awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to
assume.

Manolito’s alleged psychological incapacity is thus premised on his being jobless and a drug user,
as well as his inability to support his family and his refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Manolito’s state or condition or attitude has not been shown, however, to
be a malady or disorder rooted on some incapacitating or debilitating psychological condition.
Salgado vs Anson

Facts: The parties in this case are respondent Luis Anson, the complainant who alleges that he
was married to Severina De Asis and that he was deprived of his share when Severina sold
several properties to petitioners Jo-Ann Salgado and Maria Luisa Maya together with their
spouses. The spouses alleged that there was no marriage between Luis and Severina and their
common-law relationship was terminated when they executed a Partition Agreement. The RTC
and CA both ruled in favor of Luis holding that the marriage between Luis and Severina was valid.
Hence this petition

Issue: Whether the marriage of Luis and Severina is valid?

Held: No. In upholding the supposed validity of the marriage, the RTC and the CA failed to
consider the glaring statements in the marriage contract that no marriage license was exhibited
to the solemnizing officer and that the marriage is of an exceptional character under Article 77 of
the Civil Code, the latter statement being fallacious.

To be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the
absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very
least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was
issued to the parties. Considering that the absence of the marriage license is apparent on the
marriage contract itself, with a false statement therein that the marriage is of an exceptional
character, and no proof to the contrary was presented, there is no other plausible conclusion other
than that the marriage between Luis and Severina was celebrated without a valid marriage license
and is thus, void ab initio.

A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, and the
absence thereof, save for marriages of exceptional character, renders the marriage void ab
initio pursuant to Article 80(3 . It sets forth:

Art. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character;

"Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title III,
comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the
point of death during peace or war, (2) marriages in remote places, (3) consular marriages, (4)
ratification of marital cohabitation, (5) religious ratification of a civil marriage, (6) Mohammedan
or pagan marriages, and (7) mixed marriages." To reiterate, in any of the aforementioned
marriages of exceptional character, the requirement of a valid marriage license is dispensed with.
HSBC vs Catalan

Facts: Frederick Arthur Thomson drew 5 checks payable to Catalan in the total amount of HK$3.2
million. Cataalan presented these checks to HSBC [Bank]. The checks were dishonored for
having insufficient funds. Thomson demanded that the checks be made good because he, in fact,
had sufficient funds. Catalan knowing that Thomson had communicated with the Bank, asked
HSBCBank to clear the checks and pay her the said amount. HSBC did not heed her. Thomson
died but Catalan was not paid yet. The account was transferred to HSBC [Trustee]. Catalan then
requested Trustee to pay her. They still refused and even asked her to submit back to them the
original checks for verification. Catalan and her lawyer went to Hongkong on their own expense
to personally submit the checks. They still were not honored, leading Catalan to file a suit against
HSBC to collect her HK$3.2M.

Issue: Whether HSBC and Trustee are liable to pay damages to Catalan on the ground of abuse
under Article 19 of the Civil Code?

Held: Yes. Article 19 of the Civil Code speaks of the fundamental principle of law and human
conduct that a person "must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith." It sets the standards
which may be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of
one’s duties. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for
which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But a right, though by itself legal because
recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. A
person should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is, when
he acts with prudence and in good faith; but not when he acts with negligence or abuse.

There is an abuse of right when it is exercised for the only purpose of prejudicing or injuring
another. The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was
established, and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to injure
another. Thus, in order to be liable under the abuse of rights principle, three elements must
concur, to wit: (a) that there is a legal right or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for
the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.

HSBANK is being sued for unwarranted failure to pay the checks notwithstanding the repeated
assurance of the drawer Thomson as to the authenticity of the check sand frequent directives to
pay the value thereof to Catalan. Her allegations in the complaint that the gross inaction of
HSBANK on Thomson’s instructions, as well as its evident failure to inform Catalan of the reason
for its continued inaction and non-payment of the checks, smack of insouciance on its part, are
sufficient statements of clear abuse of right for which it may be held liable to Catalan for
any damages she incurred resulting therefore. HSBANK’s actions or lack thereof, prevented
Catalan from seeking further redress with Thomson for the recovery of her claim while the latter
was alive.
Carpio vs Valmonte

Facts: Valmonte is a wedding coordinator engaged by Michelle and Jon. During the wedding day,
jewelries were lost and Carpio singled out Valmonte as the culprit while uttering malicious words.
Searches were made and there was no evidence showing that Valmonte profited from the act.
Valmonte demanded for a public apology to redeem her smeared reputation but Carpio did not
respond to the letter, prompting Valmonte to file a suit for damages and prayed for actual, moral
and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees. The RTC denied the petition but the CA
reversed the same. Hence this petition.

Issue: Whether the decision of the CA is correct?

Held: Yes. The Court finds sufficient evidence on record tending to prove that petitioner’s
imputations against respondent was made with malice and in bad faith. To warrant recovery of
damages, there must be both a right of action, for a wrong inflicted by the defendant, and the
damage resulting therefrom to the plaintiff. Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong,
does not constitute a cause of action.

In the sphere of our law on human relations, the victim of a wrongful act or omission, whether
done willfully or negligently, is not left without any remedy or recourse to obtain relief for the
damage or injury he sustained. Incorporated into our civil law are not only principles of equity but
also universal moral precepts which are designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the
fountain of good conscience and which are meant to serve as guides for human conduct. First of
these fundamental precepts is the principle commonly known as "abuse of rights" under Article
19 of the Civil Code. It provides that "Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good
faith." To find the existence of an abuse of right, the following elements must be present: (1) there
is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent or prejudicing or
injuring another. Complementing the principle of abuse of rights are the provisions of Articles 20
and 21 of the Civil Code.

Respondent, however, is clearly entitled to an award of moral damages. Moral damages may be
awarded whenever the defendant’s wrongful act or omission is the proximate cause of the
plaintiff’s physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury in the cases specified or
analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Though no proof of pecuniary loss
is necessary in order that moral damages may be adjudicated, courts are mandated to take into
account all the circumstances obtaining in the case and assess damages according to their
discretion. Worthy of note is that moral damages are not awarded to penalize the defendant, or
to enrich a complainant, but to enable the latter to obtain means, diversions or amusements that
will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone, by reason of defendant’s culpable
action. In any case, award of moral damages must be proportionate to the sufferings inflicted.
GF Equity vs Valenzona

Facts: GF Equity, represented Uytengsu, hired Valenzona as Head Coach of the Alaska
basketball team in the PBA under a Contract of Employment. Even before the conclusion of the
contract, Valenzona had already served GF Equity under a verbal contract by coaching its team,
Hills Brothers, in the 3rd PBA Conference of 1987 where the team was runner-up. The
employment period agreed upon was for two years commencing on January 1, 1988 and ending
on December 31, 1989, the last sentence of paragraph 3 of the contract carried the following
condition:

3. x x x If at any time during the contract, the COACH, in the sole opinion of the CORPORATION,
fails to exhibit sufficient skill or competitive ability to coach the team, the CORPORATION may
terminate this contract.

During his stint as Alaska’s head coach, the team placed third both in the Open and All-Filipino
PBA Conferences in 1988.

Valenzona was later advised by the management of GF Equity by letter of September 26, 1988
of the termination of his services in this wise:

We regret to inform you that under the contract of employment dated January 1, 1988 we are
invoking our rights specified in paragraph 3.

Valenzona thus filed on September 26, 1994 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila a
complaint against GF Equity for breach of contract with damages, ascribing bad faith, malice and
"disregard to fairness and to the rights of the plaintiff" by unilaterally and arbitrarily pre-terminating
the contract without just cause and legal and factual basis. The RTC upheld the validity of said
provision but was reversed upon appeal.

Issue: a. Whether the last sentence of paragraph 3 is violative of the principle of mutuality of
contracts?

b. Whether GF Equity may be held liable for damages?

Held: a. Yes. Mutuality is one of the characteristics of a contract, its validity or performance or
compliance of which cannot be left to the will of only one of the parties. Article 1308 of the New
Civil Code reads as follows:

"The contract must bind both contracting parties; its validity or compliance cannot be left to the
will of one of them."

The ultimate purpose of the mutuality principle is thus to nullify a contract containing a condition
which makes its fulfillment or pre-termination dependent exclusively upon the uncontrolled will of
one of the contracting parties.

In the case at bar, the contract incorporates in paragraph 3 the right of GF Equity to pre-terminate
the contract — that "if the coach, in the sole opinion of the corporation, fails to exhibit sufficient
skill or competitive ability to coach the team, the corporation may terminate the contract." The
assailed condition clearly transgresses the principle of mutuality of contracts. It leaves the
determination of whether Valenzona failed to exhibit sufficient skill or competitive ability to coach
Alaska team solely to the opinion of GF Equity. Whether Valenzona indeed failed to exhibit the
required skill or competitive ability depended exclusively on the judgment of GF Equity. In other
words, GF Equity was given an unbridled prerogative to pre-terminate the contract irrespective of
the soundness, fairness or reasonableness, or even lack of basis of its opinion.

To sustain the validity of the assailed paragraph would open the gate for arbitrary and illegal
dismissals, for void contractual stipulations would be used as justification therefor.

The assailed stipulation being violative of the mutuality principle underlying Article 1308 of the
Civil Code, it is null and void.

b. Yes. While GF Equity’s act of pre-terminating Valenzona’s services cannot be

considered willful as it was based on a stipulation, albeit declared void, it, in doing so, failed to
consider the abuse of rights principle enshrined in Art. 19 of the Civil Code which provides:

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

This provision of law sets standards which must be observed in the exercise of one’s rights as
well as in the performance of its duties, to wit: to act with justice; give every one his due;
and observe honesty and good faith.

Since the pre-termination of the contract was anchored on an illegal ground, hence, contrary to
law, and GF Equity negligently failed to provide legal basis for such pre-termination, e.g. that
Valenzona breached the contract by failing to discharge his duties thereunder, GF Equity failed
to exercise in a legitimate manner its right to pre-terminate the contract, thereby abusing the right
of Valenzona to thus entitle him to damages under Art. 19 in relation to Article 20 of the Civil Code
the latter of which provides:
Republic vs Orbecido

Facts: Cipriano and Lady were married in 1981. After five years, Lady went to the US with their
son leaving behind Cipriano with their daughter. Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned that his wife
obtained a divorce decree and re-married. Cipriano thereafter filed with the RTC a petition to
remarry invoking Par. 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. Finding merit in the petition, the court
ganted the same. The Republic sought reconsideration but it was denied. Hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code?

Held: Yes. Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason,
we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties
who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them
becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should
likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice.
Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to
mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed
according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute
may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they
come within its spirit or intent.

If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married
to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation
of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.

In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article
26 as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner;
and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry.

In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid
marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the
naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly,
the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case.
Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
Republic vs Manalo

Facts: Manalo filed a petition for cancellation of entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San
Juan, by virtue of a judgment of divorce rendered by a Japanese court. The petition was later
amended and captioned as a petition for recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment.

The petition alleged, among others, that:

 Petitioner is previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese national named YOSHIDO

MINORO;
 Recently, a case for divorce was filed by petitioner in Japan and after due proceeding, a
divorce decree was rendered by the Japanese Court

The trial court denied the petition for lack of merit. In ruling that the divorce obtained by Manalo
in Japan should not be recognized, it opined that, based on Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the
Philippine law “does not afford Filipinos the right to file a divorce, whether they are in the country
or living abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their marriage
in the Philippines or in another country” and that unless Filipinos “are naturalized as citizens of
another country, Philippine laws shall have control over issues related to Filipino family rights and
duties, together with determination of their condition and legal capacity to enter into contracts and
civil relations, including marriages”.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the
Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code) is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for
divorce against her Japanese husband because the decree they obtained makes the latter no
longer married to the former, capacitating him to remarry.

Issue: Whether a Filipino citizen, who initiated a divorce proceeding abroad and obtained a
favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry, has the capacity
to remarry pursuant to Article 26 (2) of the Family Code?

Held: Yes. Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of “a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry”. Based on a clear and plain reading of the
provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law
does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein
the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the
petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding.

The purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the
country where it is rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a
corrective measure to address the anomaly where the Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while
the foreign spouse is free to remarry under the laws of his or her country. Whether the Filipino
spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage
bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino
spouse will effectively be without a husband or a wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce
proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end
of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not make a distinction. In
both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the foreign divorce
decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by operation of the
latter’s national law.
There is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce
proceeding and a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or her alien
spouse. In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered Filipinos who have
the same rights and obligations in an alien land. The circumstances surrounding them are alike.
Were it not for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married to their foreigner spouses who are
no longer their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between them are based merely on
superficial difference of whether they initiated the divorce proceedings or not is utterly unfair.
Indeed, the treatment gives undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate against the other.

Thus, a Filipino citizen, who initiated a divorce proceeding abroad and obtained a favorable
judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry, has the capacity to
remarry pursuant to Article 26 (2) of the Family Code.
Corpuz vs Sto Tomas

Facts: Corpuz is a naturalized Canadian citizen who married respondent Daisylyn Tirol Sto.
Tomas but subsequently left for Canada due to work and other professional commitments. When
he returned to the Philippines, he discovered that Sto. Tomas was already
romantically involved with another man. This brought about the filing of a petition for divorce by
Corpuz in Canada which was eventually granted by the Court Justice of Windsor, Ontario,
Canada. A month later, the divorce decree took effect. Two years later, Corpuz has fallen in
love with another Filipina and wished to marry her. He went to Civil Registry Office of Pasig City
to register the Canadian divorce decree on his marriage certificate with Sto. Tomas. However,
despite the registration, an official of National Statistics Office informed Corpuz that the former
marriage still subsists under the Philippine law until there has been a judicial recognition of the
Canadian divorce decree by a competent judicial court in view of NSO Circular No. 4, series of
1982. Consequently, he filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration
of dissolution of marriage with the RTC. However, the RTC denied the petition reasoning out that
Corpuz cannot institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree because
he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It was provided further that Sto. Tomas was the proper party
who can institute an action under the principle of Article 26 of the Family Code which capacitates
a Filipino citizen to remarry in case the alien spouse obtains a foreign divorce decree. Hence, this
petition.

Issue: Whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code grants aliens like Corpuz
the right to institute a petition for judicial recognition of a foreign divorce decree?

Held: Petition GRANTED. RTC Decision REVERSED. The Supreme Court qualifies the above
conclusion – i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in
favor of aliens -with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis
to dismiss Gerbert’s petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of
legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree.

The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien’s national law
have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of
right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for
the effect of foreign judgments. A remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to
oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioner’s presumptive evidence of aright by
proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before
a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res
judicata between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
Cacho vs People

Facts: Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of one Catalina Tortor
at Tagbilaran City, Bohol for four years. Their communication was broken after school year 1977-
1978. In 1984, Lucio received a letter from Lucia from Singapore. After an exchange of letters,
the two became sweethearts. Lucia later returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to
work there. Nonetheless, the sweethearts maintained a constant communication. Lucia, later
came back to the Philippines. The two agreed to get married, thus, they were married at Iglesia
de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol. Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving
Lucio behind. Barely a year, August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with Ontario Court a petition for divorce
which was granted and took effect in February of 1992. On October that year Lucio married Maria
Lumbago also in Tagbilaran City. September 21, 1993, Lucio filed a complaint for nullity of
marriage in Regional Trial Court of Bohol on the ground that there was no marriage ceremony
actually took place. He was later charge with Bigamy filed by City Prosecutor of the Regional Trial
Court of Bohol.

The petitioner moved for the suspension of the criminal case invoking prejudicial question.
The civil case is a prejudicial question to bigamy. The Court granted unfortunately denied by the
motion for reconsideration of the prosecution.

The Regional Trial Court of Bohol held Lucio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy.
He filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. While the case was pending in Court of Appeals, the
trial court granted the petition for nullty of marriage since no marriage ceremony took place. No
appeal was taken from this decision, thus, became final and executory. But the Court of Appeals
denied the petition for lack of merit. Hence, the petition was elevated to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner committed bigamy and if so, whether his defense of good faith
is valid.

Held: No. As laid down in the case of Bobis vs Bobis, the elements of bigamy are:

(1) the offender has been legally married;

(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead;
(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of
the first

The first element of Bigamy as laid down in above was not present.
No marriage ceremony. What transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two,
without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The mere signing of the same bears no semblance
to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. The Supreme Court need not
tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is
moot and academic.
Quintos vs Ibarra

Facts: Petitioners and respondents are siblings. In 1999, both their parents passed away, leaving
to their 10 children ownership over the subject property. An action for partition was subsequently
brought before the RTC. However, for failure of the parties and their counsels to appear despite
due notice, the case was dismissed.

Thereafter, the respondent siblings executed a Deed of Adjudication to transfer the property in
favor of the 10 siblings. As a result, the old TCT was cancelled and the Registry of Deeds issued
a new one. The respondents subsequently sold their 7/10 undivided share in favor of the spouses
Candelario.

The petitioners filed a complaint for Quieting of Title and Damages against the respondents.

Respondents countered that petitioners’ cause of action was already barred by estoppel when
sometime in 2006, one of petitioners offered to buy the 7/10 undivided share of the respondent
siblings. They point out that this is an admission on the part of petitioners that the property is not
entirely theirs. In addition, they claimed that Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra mortgaged the
property but because of financial constraints, respondent spouses Candelario had to redeem the
property in their behalf. Not having been repaid by Bienvenido and Escolastica, the Candelarios
accepted from their co-respondents their share in the subject property as payment. Lastly,
respondents sought, by way of counterclaim, the partition of the property.

The RTC dismissed the petitioner’s complaint, ruling that the respondent siblings were entitled to
their respective shares and that the subsequent transfer of interest in favor of the respondent
spouses Candelario was upheld. Likewise, the court ordered the partition of the subject lots
between the herein plaintiffs and the defendants-spouses Candelarios.

CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the petitioners were able to prove ownership over the property;
2. Whether or not the respondents’ counterclaim for partition is already barred by laches or res
judicata; and
3. Whether or not the CA was correct in approving the subdivision agreement as basis for the
partition of the property.

Held:
The petition is meritorious in part.
1. Petitioners were not able to prove equitable title or ownership over the property
For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the
plaintiff or complainant has a legal or equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of
the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on
the title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of
validity or efficacy. In the case at bar, the CA correctly observed that petitioners’ cause of action
must necessarily fail mainly in view of the absence of the first requisite.
Their alleged open, continuous, exclusive, and uninterrupted possession of the subject property
is belied by the fact that respondent siblings, in 2005, entered into a Contract of Lease with the
Avico Lending Investor Co. over the subject lot without any objection from the petitioners.

The cardinal rule is that bare allegation of title does not suffice. The burden of proof is on the
plaintiff to establish his or her case by preponderance of evidence

2. The counterclaim for partition is not barred by prior judgment

Dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court cannot defeat the right of a
co-owner to ask for partition at any time, provided that there is no actual adjudication of ownership
of shares yet. Pertinent hereto is Article 494 of the Civil Code.
Between dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 and the right granted to co-owners under
Art. 494 of the Civil Code, the latter must prevail. To construe otherwise would diminish the
substantive right of a co-owner through the promulgation of procedural rules. Substantive law
cannot be amended by a procedural rule. This further finds support in Art. 496 of the New Civil
Code.
Thus, for the Rules to be consistent with statutory provisions, We hold that Art. 494, as cited, is
an exception to Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court to the effect that even if the order of dismissal
for failure to prosecute is silent on whether or not it is with prejudice, it shall be deemed to be
without prejudice.
In the case at bar, the co-ownership, as determined by the trial court, is still subsisting 30-70 in
favor of respondent spouses Candelario. Consequently, there is no legal bar preventing herein
respondents from praying for the partition of the property through counterclaim.

3. The CA erred in approving the Agreement for Subdivision

Agreement of Subdivision allegedly executed by respondent spouses Candelario and petitioners

cannot serve as basis for partition, for, as stated in the pre-trial order, herein respondents admitted
that the agreement was a falsity and that petitioners never took part in preparing the same. It,
therefore, lacked the essential requisite of consent.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 98919 dated July 8, 2013
and November 22, 2013, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The case is
hereby REMANDED to the RTC, Branch 68 in Camiling, Tarlac for purposes of partitioning the
subject property in accordance with Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.
Extraordinary vs Samson-Bico

Facts: Apolonio Ballesteros and Maria Membrebe were husband and wife. They have two
children, Juan Irenea. Juan is married to Leonarda and they have six children. Irenea on the other
hand is married to Santiago Samson and they have two children, respondents Herminia Samson-
Bico and Merlita Samson-Flestado

Apolonio owned a 29,748 sq.m. parcel of land in Binangonan, Rizal that was later inherited
by his 2 children. Upon their death, the heirs of Juan and Irenea became co-owners.

In April of 2002, the heirs of Juan (Ballesteros), without the consent of respondents, the
heirs of Irenea executed in favor of petitioner Extra-ordinary Development Corp (EDC) a Deed of
Absolute Sale covering the subject property for P2,974,800.00. Prior to the sale, respondents
claimed that they learned that the property had been the subject of a contract to sell between the
heirs of Juan and EDC. On 7 March 2000, respondents wrote to EDC informing it of the existence
of co-ownership over the subject property. EDC wrote back that it will look into the matter and
asked respondents to further establish the basis of their claims.

EDC was able to cause the registration of the Deed of Absolute Sale with the Office of the
Provincial Assessor Rizal and transfer the tax declaration over the subject property in its name.
This prompted respondents to file the Complaint for Annulment of Contract and reconveyance of
property with damages. In defense, EDC alleged that it is a buyer in good faith and for value of
the subject property because it was of the honest belief that the heirs of Juan are the only heirs
of the late Apolonio. On the other hand, the heirs of Juan asserted that respondents were aware
of and were parties to the contract to sell entered into by them and EDC. The heirs of Juan claimed
that respondents received their share in the down payment made by EDC but they were both
unpaid of the balance on the cost of the land.

RTC: Ruled in favor of respondents. The decision stated that respondents and the heirs of Juan
are co-owners of the subject property; that at the time of sale, the heirs of Juan did not have the
right to sell the one-half share of the heirs of Irenea and thus the sale is null and void; that the
sale did not bind the heirs of Irenea; that there was fraud in the execution of the Deed of Absolute
Sale when the heirs of Juan failed to disclose to EDC that one-half of the property sold is owned
by respondents; and that EDC was not a buyer in good faith because it knew that respondents
were co-owners of the subject property because Herminia informed EDC of such fact through a
letter.

CA: Affirmed with modifications. It ruled that The Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of EDC is not
void, but valid, but only to the extent of one-half of the subject property or 14,874 square meters,
but not as to the other half of 14,874 square meters which is co-owned by the respondents. The
heirs of Juan were ordered to return to EDC half of the purchase price.

Issues:
1) WoN respondents are able to prove co-ownership.
2) WoN EDC was an innocent buyer in good faith.
3) WoN the contract of sale with EDC is valid.
Held:
1) YES, respondents are entitled to their share because they were able to prove co-ownership.
Herminia has successfully established her successional rights over the subject property through
her clear testimony (she was also able to show birth, baptism and marriage certificates).
Moreover, there was an admission of the co-ownership made by the heirs of Juan in their Answer
to the Complaint. During the hearing, it was admitted that the heirs of Juan was aware that half of
the property belongs to the respondents and that they forgot to ask for the latter’s signature in the
deed of sale.

The Answer submitted by the heirs of Juan, as well as the testimony of Juan constitute
judicial admissions. Well-settled is the rule that a judicial admission conclusively binds the party
making it.

2) NO, EDC was not an innocent purchaser in good faith. EDC was claiming that the judicial
admissions were not binding because they bought the property in good faith. In a contract of sale,
it is essential that the seller is the owner of the property he is selling. Under Article 1458 of the
Civil Code, the principal obligation of a seller is to transfer the ownership of the property sold. The
execution by appellants Ballesteros of the Deed of Absolute Sale over the subject property which
they do not exclusively own but is admittedly co-owned by them together with the respondents,
was valid only to the extent of the former’s undivided one­half share thereof, as they had no title
or interest to transfer the other one-half portion which pertains to the respondents without the
latter’s consent.

It is an established principle that no one can give what one does not have — nemo dat
quod non habet. Accordingly, one can sell only what one owns or is authorized to sell, and the
buyer can acquire no more than what the seller can transfer legally. Thus, since appellant EDC’s
rights over the subject property originated from sellers-appellants Ballesteros, said corporation
merely stepped into the shoes of its sellers and cannot have a better right than what its sellers
have.

3) YES, the Deed of Absolute Sale is VALID but only with respect to the rights of the heirs of Juan
over one­half of the property. This is in recognition of the heir’s rights to dispose of their own
share. Article 493 of the Civil Code recognizes the right of each co-owner “to have the full
ownership of his part of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate,
assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal
rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners,
shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of
the co- ownership.” The heirs are also ordered to return the ½ purchase price paid by EDC so as
not to constitute unjust enrichment.
Ronulo vs People

Facts: Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry on 29 March 2003 at the Sta.
Rosa Catholic Parish Church in Ilocos Norte. But on the day of the wedding, the church's
officiating priest refused to solemnize the marriage because of lack of a marriage license.

With the couple and the guests already dressed for the wedding, they headed to an Aglipayan
Church. The Aglipayan priest, herein petitioner Ronulo, conducted a ceremony on the same day
where the couple took each other as husband and wife in front of the guests. This was despite
Petitioner's knowledge of the couple's lack of marriage license.

Petitioner was eventually charged of violating Article 352 of the RPC for performing an illegal
marriage ceremony. The MTC did not believe Petitioner's defense that what he did was an act of
blessing and was not tantamount to solemnization of marriage and was found guilty. The decision
was affirmed by both the RTC and the CA.

Issue: Whether petitioner committed an illegal marriage?

Held: Yes. Article 352 of the RPC penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who shall perform
or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony. The elements of this crime are:

1. authority of the solemnizing officer; and

2. his performance of an illegal marriage ceremony.

The first element is present since Petitioner himself admitted that he has authority to solemnize a
marriage. The second element is present since the alleged "blessing" by Petitioner is tantamount
to the performance of an illegal marriage ceremony.

There is no prescribed form or rite for the solemnization of a marriage. However, Article 6 of the
Family Code provides that it shall be necessary:

1. for the contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer; and
2. declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take
each other as husband and wife.

The first requirement is present since petitioner admitted to it. The second requirement is likewise
present since the prosecution, through the testimony of its witnesses, proved that the contracting
parties personally declared that they take each other as husband and wife.

The penalty for violating Article 352 of the RPC is in accordance with the provision of the Marriage
Law, specifically Article 44, which states that:

Section 44. General Penal Clause – Any violation of any provision of this Act not specifically
penalized, or of the regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities, shall be punished by
a fine of not more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for not more than one month, or
both, in the discretion of the court.

As such, Petitioner was held guilty of violating Article 352 and was fined P200 as penalty.
Magdalino vs Bragat

Facts: Spouses Pastrano were the original owners of Lot No. 19986 (subject property) with OCT,
consisting of 1,015 sq. m. The OCT was in the name of Azur Pastrano. Before the issuance of
the OCT, however, the Spouses Pastrano, on November 18, 1968, sold the lot to Eustaquio P.
Ledesma, Jr. The petitioners, the Spouses Badilla claimed that in 1970, Ledesma sold to them,
"on installment" basis, a portion amounting to 200 sq. m. of Lot No. 19986 (subject property). The
sale was not reduced in writing, however, possession of the portion sold was transferred to the
Badillas, which portion the Badillas claim was designated as Lot No. 19986-B.

On April 18, 1978, the Spouses Bragat bought 991 sq. m. of the property from Ledesma and his
wife, via a Deed of Absolute Sale of a Residential Lot. On May 5, 1984, the Spouses Pastrano
executed another Deed of Absolute Sale of Registered Land in favor of herein petitioner Fe Bragat
(Bragat), covered by OCT No. P-2035 and with an area of 1,015 sq. m. On the same date, Azur
Pastrano executed an Affidavit of Loss reporting the loss of the owner's duplicate copy of OCT
No. P-2035. Bragat filed her Complaint for Recovery of Posession and Damages against the
Spouses Badilla alleging that she is the absolute owner of the subject property. She claimed to
have purchased the property, first, from Eustaquio Ledesma, Jr., but later, when she found out
that Ledesma was "unauthorized" to sell, she again allegedly made another purchase of the same
property from Azur Pastrano, on May 5, 1984.

RTC found for Bragat and the CA affirmed the lower court’s decision.

Issue: Whether or not Bragat is the owner of the subject property

Held: No. It is not disputed that the spouses Azur and Profitiza Pastrano had previously sold on
November 18, 1968, via a Deed of Definite Sale of Unregistered Coconut and Residential Land,
the property to Eustaquio Ledesma.Therefore, as early as such date, it is established that the
Pastranos no longer had ownership over the property. Then, as Ledesma subsequently sold, in
1970, a portion of the property to the petitioner Spouses Badilla, who immediately took delivery
and possession, ownership of this portion had also been transferred to the said spouses. Although
that sale appears to be merely verbal, and payment therefor was to be made on installment, it is
a partially consummated sale, with the Badillas paying the initial purchase price and Ledesma
surrendering possession.

The Civil Code states that ownership of the thing sold is transferred to the vendee upon the actual
or constructive delivery of the same. And the thing is understood as delivered when it is placed in
the control and possession of the vendee. Payment of the purchase price is not essential to the
transfer of ownership as long as the property sold has been delivered; and such delivery (traditio)
operated to divest the vendor of title to the property which may not be regained or recovered until
and unless the contract is resolved or rescinded in accordance with law.

The same is true even if the sale is a verbal one, because it is held that when a verbal contract
has been completed, executed or partially consummated, its enforceability will not be barred by
the Statute of Frauds, which applies only to an executory agreement. Thus, where a party has
performed his obligation, oral evidence will be admitted to prove the agreement.

Pastrano could no longer sell any part of the property to Bragat on such later dates since he had
already sold the same as early as November 18, 1968 to Ledesma. Well-settled is the rule that
no one can give what one does not have - nemodat quod non habet - and, accordingly, one can
sell only what one owns or is authorized to sell, and the buyer acquires no better title than the
seller. Thus, the sales made on the dates May 5, 1984 and October 2, 1987 are void for being
simulated and for lack of a subject matter. On these sales, Bragat cannot clajim good faith as she
herself knew of Pastrano's lack of ownership.

Pastrano sold it again to Bragat in 1984 and 1987. But Ledesma, too, sold part of the property to
the Spouses Badilla in 1970 and then the entire lot to the Spouses; Bragat in 1978. In such a
situation of multiple sales, Article 1544 of the Civil Code relates that ownership shall belong to the
person acquiring the property who, in good faith, first recorded such acquisition. Presently,
however, it cannot be said that Bragat's recording of her 1987 purchase was in good faith because
that sale was simulated and Bragat was aware of other persons who have an interest on the
property.
Barrido vs Nonato

Facts