Opposition to Summary Judgment

1 VALERIE LOPEZ (SPACE BELOW FOR FILE STAMP ONLY)
2328 Sunningdale Drive

2 Tustin California 92782
Telephone: (714)760-4117
3 2rms@sbcglobal.net
4
Defendant, In Pro Per
5
6
7 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
8
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ORANGE
9
CENTRAL JUSTICE CENTER
10
THE SUNNINGDALE TRUST #@#@*; ) [LIMITED JURISDICTION]
11 )
) Case No.: 30-2018-00983668-CL-UD-CJC
12 )
Plaintiff, ) Assigned for all purposes to:
13 ) Judge: Timothy J. Stafford
vs. )
14 )
) DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION TO
15 Valerie Lopez; ) PLAINTIFF’S NOTICE AND MOTION
) FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT;
16 ) MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
Defendant. ) AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION OF
17 ) VALERIE LOPEZ & [PROPOSED]
)
18 ) ORDER.
)
19 ) Date: June 21, 2018
) Dept/Time: X Dept. C66_at _ 1:30 p.m.
20 )  Dept. _____ at _____ a.m.
)
) [Specially Appearing, pursuant to Cal.
21
) Const., Art. 1, 6 & 7 and CCP §415.45]
22 )
) Date Action Filed: April 4, 2018
23 ) Trial Date: Not Set
)
24 )
)
25 )
TO EACH PARTY AND TO THE COUNSEL OF RECORD FOR EACH PARTY:
26
DEFENDANT LOPEZ herein submits its Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
27
Judgment.
28
1
DEFENDANT’S OPPOSTION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1 This Opposition to Motion for summary judgment is brought under the State Constitutional
2 authority of California Constitution Article 1, Section 1 & 7 and pursuant to the Statutory authority
3 of CCP § 437a on the following grounds:
4 1. This court is an improper venue when title is disputed. [California Benchguide

5 31.26(8)].
6 2. Plaintiff, THE SUNNINGDALE TRUST #2328, lacks legal standing to sue for
7 possession of Defendants property, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 1161a, as in
8 accordance with Civil Code §2924 et seq..
9 3. Where the property has been illegally sold based on a Fraud in accordance with
10 Section §2924 of the Civil Code, under an alleged power of sale contained in a deed of trust
11 executed by such person, or a person under whom such person claims, and the title under the
12 sale has not been duly perfected to maintain an action under CCP §1161a, the right to
13 possession does not exist.
14 4. This Limited Jurisdiction court lacks jurisdiction over Defendant and Defendant’s
15 property, pursuant to California Constitution Article 1, Section 7, and Civil Code §1161a for
16 deprivation of his constitutionally protected property without due process of law under ____.
17 5. NBS Default Services LLC illegally and fraudulently filed a Notice of Default and
18 Affinia Default Services LLC illegally and fraudulently Notice of Trustee Sale and conducted
19 an illegal trustee sale, as not in compliance with Civil Code §2924 et seq., in which the two
20 LLC’s never had lawful authority to do so, as the alleged trustee over Defendant’s property.
21 6. Plaintiff cannot meet his affirmative statutory burden by proving the pre-requisite
22 requirements necessary to prove that Affinia Default Services LLC had met its compliance
23 requirements with Civil Code §2924 et seq. as based on fact that the California Secretary of
24 State confirms as fact that the alleged lender presented on the DEED OF TRUST dated
25 November 1, 2005 never was registered for intra- commerce business as a foreign corporation
26 to be conducting banking business in California on day the Deed of Trust was created 11-1-
27 2005. Thus, making the Deed of Trust VOID and reason why Defendant and IRS are currently
28 investigating illegal transaction and why alleged beneficiary Wells Fargo illegally created an
2
1 account # on August 20, 2015 to make it appear the Fatal Void status of Deed of Trust was
2 now legal. An adverse claim s pending, as the Title to this property is encumbered with a
3 VOID deed of Trust by which duly perfect title has not been effectuated as a matter of law, as a
4 requirement under California Code of Civil Procedure §1161a. (See Seidell v. Anglo-
5 California Trust Co. (1942) 55 Cal.App.2d 913, 920.) and duly perfected title cannot be
6 initiated due to the VOID status of deed of trust.
7 7. Plaintiff cannot meet his affirmative statutory burden by proving the pre-requisite
8 requirements necessary to prove that Affinia Default Services LLC had met its compliance
9 with Civil Code section 2924 et seq. since an adverse claim is pending and Title to this
10 property is encumbered by a VOID Deed of Trust, as instrument No. 20005000893409 to
11 which duly perfect title has not been effectuated as a matter of law, as a requirement under
12 California Code of Civil Procedure §1161a. (See Seidell v. Anglo-California Trust Co. (1942)
13 55 Cal.App.2d 913, 920.)
14 8. Plaintiff, THE SUNNINGDALE TRUST #2328, is not a “Bona Fide Purchaser”
15 for value of Defendants property, pursuant to Civil Code § 2924, by any lawfully Recorded
16 Trustee’s Deed upon sale, as lawfully authorized by Affinia Default Services LLC due the fatal
17 issue with the Deed of Trust presenting a unregistered business as a lender.
18 9. Since Plaintiff, lacks standing to commence an unlawful detainer action against
19 Defendant, as he fails the “real party in interest” requirement, “the pleading does not state facts
20 sufficient to constitute a cause of action” on behalf of the proper specific plaintiff pursuant to
21 Code of Civil Procedure § 1161a.
22 10. Assuming arguendo that Plaintiff had legal standing to sue for possession of
23 Defendants property, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 1161a, Notice to Quit was not
24 served in strict compliance of Notice requirements, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §
25 415.45, for failure to properly serve in accordance with law including the requirements of the
26 granted NAIL AND MAIL from Comm. Carmen Luege. Plaintiff failed to mail certified mail
27 the complaint as required by Nail and Mail provision under Sect. 1161a.
28
3
2 Defendants property, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 1161a, Plaintiff failed to serve
3 Summons and Complaint within strict compliance of Service requirements, pursuant to Code
4 of Civil Procedure § 415.45, for failure to properly post and mail by certified Mail, in
5 accordance with law for the Nail and Mail provision.
7 Defendants property, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 1161a, that the three-day Notice
8 served on Defendant is Defective as it does not contain the information required by CCP
9 §1161(2).
10 13. Further that the Three Day notice was not issued to a bona fide tenant as described
11 as a matter of law and thus is fatally defective and will not support an unlawful detainer action.
12 This Opposition is based upon the memorandum of points of authorities, and upon such
13 oral and documentary evidence as may be presented by Defendant upon the hearing of this
14 opposition.
15 WHEREFORE, this moving defendant prays:
16 1. For an order denying the within motion;
17 2. For an order dismissing this action for lack of jurisdiction;
18 3. For all costs and attorney fees to defend this action.
19 4. For such other relief as the court deems proper.
20 Dated: June 18, 2018 Respectfully submitted,
21
22
_________________________________
23 Defendant, In Pro Per Valerie Lopez
24
25
26
27
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4
1 TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
2
I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1
3
4 II. STATEMENT OF FACTS ............................................................................................. 2
5 III. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ...................................................................................... 4
6 IV. LEGAL ARGUMENT.................................................................................................... 7

7 A. THE POLICY OF LAW IS TO HAVE EVERY CASE HEARD ON ITS
MERITS ................................................................................................................ 7
8
9 B. STANDARD FOR REVIEW OF A SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION ......... 7
10 C. STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH STATUTORY PROCEDURE IS

REQUIRED. .......................................................................................................... 8
11
D. ALL DOUBTS ARE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF DENYING THE
12 MOTION. .............................................................................................................. 9
13
E. PLAINTIFF FAILS TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR POSSESSION
14 OF SUBJECT PROPERTY. .................................................................................. 9
15 1. Proper Service of three-day Notice to Quit. .................................................... 10

16 2. Proper legal compliance with the foreclosure notice and recording
17 requirements of Cal. Civ. Code § 2924 et seq. and court’s order enjoining
the sale render the sale void for illegality. ...................................................... 10
18
3. Duly Perfected Title. ....................................................................................... 10
19
4. Tenant or former borrower is improperly holding over. ................................. 12
20
F. PLAINTIFF'S FACTUALLY DEVOID DISCOVERY RESPONSES
21
WARRANT A DENIAL OF THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION. ........ 12
22
G. A GENUINE ISSUES OF TRIABLE MATERIAL FACTS EXIST AS TO
23 TITLE WITH REGARDS TO UNLAWFUL DETAINER AFTER NON-
JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE REQUIREMENTS. ............................................. 13
24
a. California Code of Civil Procedure section 1161(a). ...................................... 13
25
26 1. A Genuine Issue Of Triable Material Fact Exists As To Whether Plaintiff Is
A Bona-Fide Purchaser Of Subject Property And Has Posessory Rights.
27 [U.C.C. §8-302. "Non Bona-Fide Purchaser"] ................................................ 15
28
i
1 2. A Genuine Issue Of Triable Material Fact Exists As To Whether The
Recorded “Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale” Is Void For Violation Of Civil Code
2 Sections 2924 Et. Seq.. .................................................................................... 15
3
3. Plaintiff's Contention That It Is A Bona Fide Purchaser Of The Real
4 Property For Value Is A Triable Issue Of Fact. .............................................. 16
5 H. A CALIFORNIA COURT HAS RULED THAT SUMMARY JUDGMENT

SHOULD NOT BE BASED ON ADMISSIONS THAT ARE
6 CONTRADICTED BY OTHER CREDIBLE EVIDENCE................................ 18
7
I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT CAN ONLY BE GRANTED WHEN NO
8 TRIABLE ISSUE EXISTS AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT........................... 19
9 J. PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO MEET ITS INITIAL BURDEN OF

PRODUCING EVIDENCE THAT MAKES A PRIMA FACIE SHOWING
10 OF THE NONEXISTENCE OF ANY GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL
11 FACT. .................................................................................................................. 20
12 1. QUESTIONS OF TITLE MAY BE ADJUDICATED IN AN EVICTION

BASED ON THE PURCHASE OF A PROPERTY AT A TRUSTEES
13 SALE. .............................................................................................................. 21
14 K. ONLY A TRUSTEE, MORTGAGEE, BENEFICIARY OR THEIR
15 AUTHORIZED AGENT MAY INITIATE A TRUSTEES SALE PURSUANT
TO SECTION 2924(A)(1). .................................................................................. 22
16
L. PLAINTIFF WAS NOT A TRUSTEE, MORTGAGEE, BENEFICIARY OR
17 AUTHORIZED AGENT WHEN IT RECORDED THE NOTICE OF
TRUSTEES SALE. ............................................................................................. 22
18
19 M. ANY DOUBTS REGARDING A SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION
MUST BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF THE OPPOSING PARTY. ................ 23
20
N. Constitutional PROTECTIONS AND ORDERS OF THE COURT DEMAND
21 DUE PROCESS................................................................................................... 25
22
O. DEFENDANT MAY CHALLENGE THE PROPRIETY OF THE TRUSTEES
23 SALE AND PLAINTIFF'S BENEFICIARY STATUS BECAUSE IT MADE
THE REQUISITE TENDER. .............................................................................. 26
24
V. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................ 27
25
26
27
28
ii
1 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
2 I. INTRODUCTION
3 This case before the court involves a Constitutional violation of DEFEDANT RIGHTS TO
4 DUE PROCESS based on a void lien and the purported Purchaser that brings this action appears
5 may have only bought a void and not voidable lien without duly perfected title. A Trustee’s Deed
6 upon Sale (TDUS) is a document that transfers one lien for another lien, but does not transfer title.
7 The owner in possession of the property is still the lawful owner of the property until such title
8 transfers.
9 The California Supreme Court ordered publication of an opinion issued by the Santa Clara
10 County Superior Court, Appellate Division, in an limited jurisdiction unlawful detainer case: Bank
11 of New York Mellon v. Preciado. The decision specified two errors in the unlawful detainer
12 proceedings: 1) the proofs of service of the 3-day notice failed to show that personal service was
13 attempted; 2) the post foreclosure plaintiff failed to prove its title was duly perfected. Each defect
14 required reversal of the judgment and a new and different judgment in favor of defendants.
15 Defendant adamantly denies that Plaintiff “acquired the property in accordance with Cal.
16 Civil Code (CCC) § 2924 and duly perfected title” as a matter of law while an adverse claim is
17 pending in this court. The sham and void “Trustee’s Deed upon Sale” as signed and illegally
18 recorded while it is a fact established by the California Secretary of State that the Deed of Trust has
19 been defective since its creation November 1, 2005 due to the alleged legal lender World Savings
20 Bank FSB a foreign corporation to California was never registered for intra-commerce business in
21 California. The defect of the Deed of Trust establishes that the property could not have been
22 lawfully sold due to the likelihood of Defendant prevailing on his adverse claim and notice of the
23 claim to purported Purchaser certainly does not establish him as a bona fide purchaser for value of
24 Defendant’s property and the trustee’s deed upon sale is clearly void and not voidable.
25 The courts have recognized that “A real property loan generally involves two documents, a
26 promissory note and a security instrument. The security instrument secures the promissory note.
27 This instrument ‘entitles the lender to reach some asset of the debtor if the note is not paid. In
28 California, the security instrument is most commonly a deed of trust (with the debtor and creditor
1
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION TO
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1 known as the trustor and beneficiary and a neutral third party known as trustee). ... [T]he creditor is
2 said to have a lien on the property given as security, which is also referred to as collateral.’
3 [Citation.]” (Alliance Mortgage Co. v. Rothwell (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1226, 1235; see also Nguyen v.
4 Calhoun (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 428, 438.)
5 Since there is a pending legal investigation by the Internal Revenue Service related to the
6 illegal lender presented on Defendant’s Deed of Trust and Wells Fargo’s illegal act of trying to
7 revive an illegal deed of trust by creating a loan number and attaching the loan number created 8-
8 20-15 to the Fatal Deed of Trust Recording # 2005000893409 with regards to subject Property, as
9 reflected by the public recordation. Plaintiff to this action has initiated a malicious prosecution
10 action for the ulterior purpose of using the court to illegally obtain possession of the subject
11 property under defendant’s ownership before a final adjudication of an existing Federal Case in
12 Santa Ana citing illegal actions of Debt Collectors pursuant to 15 USC 1692 addressing issues of
13 the title and cancellation of the VOID deed of trust ---upon the merits of the preceding action is
14 pending on some void lien papers illegally recorded. Plaintiff was given physical constructive
15 notice of the pending Federal Law Suit and chose to throw the law suit to the ground on day of
16 illegal auction of 3/22/2018.
17 II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
18 On April 4, 2018, Plaintiff, The Sunningdale Trust #2328 apparently filed his sham
19 complaint against the specially appearing Defendant, Valerie Lopez, (“Defendant”) without legal
20 authority to do so.
21 Further, an adverse action is pending in 8:18-cv-00452-DOC-KES to address the defective
22 Deed of Trust and cancellation of the Deed of Trust. California Secretary of State has et as fact
23 that the lender World Savings Bank FSB was a foreign corporation and was never registered with
24 the State of California to conduct intra commerce business in the State of California. Thus making
25 the Deed of Trust recorded as 205-000893409 Void. (See attached evidence of these facts
26 concurrently-filed Request for Judicial Notice as Exhibits A – E and Exhibits of Defendant’s
27 Declaration.
28
2
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1 It is important to note that the Unlawful Detainer Complaint was never served upon the
2 Defendant in accordance to 1161 Nail and Mail Provisions. While the Declaration of the process
3 server Childes claims that a Unlawful Detainer Complaint was posted upon Defendant door,
4 Defendant denies that such service was attempted or effected as required through the Mail – and
5 Certified Mail. It should also be noted that Plaintiffs and the US Postmaster haven't been able to
6 determine the nature and time of the mail service of the mailed certified complaint as was cited in
7 the DEMURRER of the Defendant that was illegally removed from the court calendar by the trial
8 court on 4/30/2018. Defendant has noticed the deposition June 8, 2018 of the Person Most
9 Knowledgeable concerning the facts surrounding the purported the service of the Unlawful
10 Detainer Complaint effective status for Nail and Mail. Defendant's counsel objected to the
11 Deposition claiming that his illegal act of setting up a trial for June 12, 2018 is reason why the
12 Plaintiff did not have to comply with the Deposition of June 8, 2018. To date, the Plaintiff has not
13 performed in discovery. The attorney for the Plaintiff has been answering the discovery which his
14 illegal. The attorney for plaintiff has been attaching a pre-signed Verification to the discovery
15 which is illegal. One cannot white out a standing signed verification when needed for varied case
16 documents and declarations and verifications. The attorney for Plaintiff should know that the
17 Plaintiff must complete the Discovery and not the attorney and ordering the trial in the middle of
18 discovery is not appropriate. To date, Plaintiff has not complied with Discovery which commenced
19 on May 7, 2018.
20 The Court would have to deny Plaintiffs Motion For Summary Judgment simply because a
21 triable issue of fact remains concerning the actual service of the Unlawful Detainer Complaint non-
22 compliance of certified mailing of the complaint and whether the unlawful detainer itself was filed
23 prematurely.
24 Another reason why the Court must deny Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is because
25 triable issues of fact remain concerning the trustees sale itself. This matter is being aggressively
26 litigated in Federal Dsitrict Jurisdiction Court as of 3/21/2018. While the Court in an unlawful
27 detainer matter does not normally litigate issues concerning title, the Plaintiff has the burden of
28
3
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1 proving a trustees sale was conducted in accordance with Section 2924 of the Civil Code in order
2 to evict an owner with superior title pursuant to CCP Section 1162.
3 III. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
4 The fundamental material issue before this court is whether a trustee’s deed upon sale is
5 void due the condition of the existing deed of trust on record which presents an foreign business
6 not registered in California at any time – posing as a lender on subject Deed of Trust. The court
7 lack of jurisdiction founded on whether the court has lawful jurisdiction over Defendant based on a
8 void and defective sale of Defendants property for failure to satisfy that Unlawful Detainer
9 prerequisites under CCP 1161a, as to perfection of Title, as in accordance with California
10 Foreclosure law, under Section 2924 of the Civil Code.
11 In Malkoskie v. Option One Mortgage Corporation (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 968. the Court
12 of Appeal determined that if an issue concerning the propriety of a trustee’s sale has actually been
13 litigated in the unlawful detainer court, the findings in the unlawful detainer court are res judicata
14 in any Superior Court action challenging the propriety of the trustee’s sale. The Unlawful Detainer
15 Court must now take into account and give deference the litigation concerning title in the Superior
16 Court given the Malkoskie decision. Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the trustee’s
17 sale was conducted in accordance with Section 2924, the unlawful detainer court should abstain
18 from making any factual determination that the trustee’s sale was conducted properly simply by
19 taking judicial notice of recorded documents when those documents themselves may be suspect.
20 In this unlawful detainer action, Defendant has challenged the propriety if the trustee’s sale
21 in his answer and the Plaintiff is arguing that the trustee’s sale was conducted properly in its
22 Motion For Judgment. Plaintiff contends that Defendant cannot challenge the propriety of a
23 trustee’s sale. Defendant does not need to tender Dimock v. Emerald Properties (2000) 81 Cal
24 App.4th 868 [97 Cal Rptr 2d255] which was followed by Lona v. Citibank N.A.(2011) 202 Cal.
25 App. 4th 89 in finding that tender is not required when the sale is based on legal issues (fraud,
26 illegal trustee) rather than equitable issues. The Court should acknowledge that Defendant is not
27 required tender.
28
4
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1 Once again, the Notice of Deposition of the Person Most Knowledgeable seeks to depose
2 the person most knowledgeable concerning Plaintiff's contention that trustee’s sale was conducted
3 in accordance with Section 2924. Defendant set up a deposition for June 13, 2018 based on fact
4 that Plaintiff to date has not complied with discovery since May 7, 2018. Plaintiff’s attorney has
5 ordered a trial knowing Plaintiff’s non-compliance with discovery. The attorney cannot complete
6 the discovery questions for the Plaintiff. Both the Plaintiff and the Attorney were a no show at the
7 set Deposition for June 13, 2018. When defendant called the Plaintiff’s attorney on June 13, 2018,
8 he stated he was not coming and hung up on Plaintiff. Again, to date the Plaintiff has not complied
9 with discovery and for this reason the trial should not have been ordered and discovery completed
10 prior to a trial.
11 The Court is urged to deny Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment because triable
12 issues of fact remain, Specifically, disputed facts exist concerning whether a Nail and Mail
13 complaint was served by required certified mail, whether the trustee’s sale was conducted in
14 accordance with Section 2924. Lastly, the Court is urged to continue the hearing on the Motion for
15 Summary Judgment until the completion of discovery by Plaintiff and deposition of the Plaintiff
16 can be completed.
17 Without a proper foreclosure sale, the purported purchaser does not hold valid title to the
18 property and cannot satisfy that UD prerequisite of “Duly perfected title” under CCP 1161a, as
19 based on the recordation of a lien instrument known as a Trustee’s Deed upon sale.
20 The complaint fails to establish any cause of action for possession of subject property for
21 which the court has jurisdiction over Defendant based on a defective “Notice to quit” that can
22 begin an Unlawful Detainer action.
23 A deed of trust is not valid without a note. Transfer the note, and the deed of trust follows,
24 not vice versa. “[A] deed of trust is a mere incident of the debt it secures and ... an assignment of
25 the debt ‘carries with it the security.’ [Citations.]” (Domarad v. Fisher & Burke, Inc. (1969) 270
26 Cal.App.2d 543, 553; see also Lewis v. Booth (1935) 3 Cal.2d 345, 349 [“A lien is but an incident
27 of the debt secured, and cannot be transferred apart therefrom. A transfer of the debt carries with it
28
5
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1 the lien”].) The latter is not applicable since the alleged lender was not a legal business at the time
2 subject deed of trust was created.
3 Plaintiff cannot claim that he was a “bona fide purchaser” without knowledge of the public
4 Notice of the defective Deed of Trust presenting a lender World Savings Bank FSB which was
5 never registered in California to transact upon the subject property. A bona fide purchaser is one
6 who takes a property in good faith, on payment of value, and without constructive notice of
7 another’s rights. Gates Rubber Co. v. Ulman (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 356, 364. Plaintiff certainly
8 had constructive notice of the wrongful foreclosure documents filed on the home on day of illegal
9 auction and statutory violations of the California Homeowner Bill of Rights Act (CCP 2920 Et
10 seq.) based on a VOID deed of trust recorded in the Orange county Recorder’s office on
11 November 7, 2005 and elected to enter into an illegal auction of the property to his peril that was
12 enjoined by a Federal District Law Suit for cancellation of a VOID deed of trust.
13 In his UD Complaint, Plaintiff explicitly holds himself as a bona fide purchaser of a lien
14 without dully perfected title seeming to be qualified to commence this Unlawful Detainer action
15 against Defendant. Plaintiff’s Declaration ¶3. However, it appears on the face of the UD
16 Complaint, which is judicially-noticeable by this Court, that:
17 (1) Plaintiff is not a real party in interest based on a void lien;
18 (2) Title has not been perfected in Plaintiff since the title to the Property was not conveyed
19 to Plaintiff under the power of sale contained in the Deed of Trust and/or was not
20 conveyed in compliance with Civil Code § 2924;
21 (3) Plaintiff lacks capacity and standing to sue as not being a Bona fide Purchaser of
22 subject property; and,
23 (4) Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute cause of action on behalf
24 of the proper specific plaintiff, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure 1 §§ 430.10(b) and
25 430.10(e).
26 Therefore, Defendants’ motion must be sustained and Plaintiff’s Complaint dismissed with
27 prejudice.
28
6
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1 IV. LEGAL ARGUMENT
2
A. THE POLICY OF LAW IS TO HAVE EVERY CASE HEARD ON ITS
3 MERITS
4 The California Supreme Court has stated that, “It is the policy of law to favor,
5 whenever possible, a hearing on the merits”.Shamblin v. Brattain (1988) 44 Cal.3d 474, 478.
6 PLAINTIFF seems to think that its Motion is a “slam dunk” purely because of his own
7 submitted Declaration and un-authentication and non-certified exhibits. As this opposition has
8 shown, that is not the case. DEFENDANT LOPEZ has shown the existence of evidence that
9 discloses the existence of several triable issues of material fact which preclude Summary
10 Judgment being granted.
11 PLAINTIFF The Sunningdale Trust #2328 should not be allowed to “hit the jackpot”
12 just because a party to a illegal foreclosure action. NBS Default Services LLC illegally
13 recorded a Notice of default to DEFENDANT LOPEZ’s property then conducted an illegal
14 trustee sale in direct violation of Civil Code section 2924 Et Seq. and is proceeding on a void
15 sale to illegally take possession of DEFENDANT LOPEZ’s constitutionally protected property
16 without proper due process of law, which amounts to irreparable harm and damages to
17 DEFENDANT. That would not only result in PLAINTFF receiving an undeserved windfall by
18 not having to meet his burden at a trial, upon the merits of his claims, it would also subvert the
19 policy favoring the resolution of lawsuits on the merits, as discussed by the California Supreme
20 Court in Shamblin v. Brattain.
21
B. STANDARD FOR REVIEW OF A SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION
22
23 The trial court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment is subject to de novo review.
24 (Ruoff v. Harbor Creek Community Assn. (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1624, 1627 [13 Cal.Rptr.2d 755].) In
25 conducting this review, the "motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted
26 show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
27 judgment as a matter of law." (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) To be entitled to judgment as a
28
matter of law, the moving party must show by admissible evidence that the "action has no merit or that
7
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1 there is no defense." (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (a).) A party moving for summary judgment meets
2 this burden by showing that one or more elements of all causes of action cannot be established or that
3 there is a complete defense to the action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (o)(2).) [81 Cal.App.4th 733]
4 As recently stated in Bahl v. Bank of America (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 389, 394-395:
5
“‘Though often said, it appears necessary to again reiterate that a summary judgment is a
6 drastic measure which deprives the losing party of trial on the merits.’ [Citations.] The
right to a jury trial, embodied in article I, section 16 of the California Constitution, is at
7 stake. (See Troutman, The Jury Trial (1977) 51 Fla. B.J. 331, 332 [cautioning against too
liberal summary judgment as an ‘abandonment of the hard-fought principles of our
8 forefathers who believed that no amount of economy and efficiency is adequate
consideration for a fair and impartial jury’ trial].) Some cases refer to the constitutional
9 rights argument as being a creature of ‘older decisions,’ because the summary judgment
statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c) has been held constitutional. [Citation.] We agree there
10 is ‘nothing in the summary judgment procedure [that] is inherently unconstitutional.
11 [Citations.]’ [Citation.] But technical compliance with the procedures of Code of Civil
Procedure section 437c is required to ensure there is no infringement of a litigant’s
12 hallowed right to have a dispute settled by a jury of his or her peers.”
13 C. STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH STATUTORY PROCEDURE IS

REQUIRED.
14
The summary nature of unlawful detainer proceedings mandate strict compliance with
15
the governing statutory provisions. De La Vera v. Municipal Court, (1979) 98 Cal. App.3d 638,
16
640, 159 Cal. Rptr. 648.
17
Where written notice to quit the premises, or to pay rent or quit, is a condition
18
19 precedent to maintaining a proceeding for unlawful detainer, the giving of notice must be
20 alleged in the Complaint. Delta Imports, Inc. v. Municipal Court, (1983) 146 Cal. App.3d
21 1033, 1036. On motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff must produce competent evidence
22 of such service. Plaintiff's inconsistent declarations and discovery responses and
23 Defendants' counter-declarations denying such service creates a triable issue of fact.
24 Both of the Declarations filed by Stephen A. Raheb are contradicted by the
25 Declaration of David Carrozza, which states that Stephen A. Raheb never attempted service of
26 the required notices under Code of Civil Procedure Section 1161 or 1161a, or of any other
27 documents and process on the dates and times that Mr. Raheb claims. The Motion should be
28 denied.
8
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1 Further, foreclosure sales are governed by a 'comprehensive' statutory scheme. This
2 scheme, which is found in Civil Code sections 2924 through 2924k, evidences a legislative
3 intent that a sale which is properly conducted 'constitutes a final adjudication of the rights of
4 the borrower and lender.'" 6 Angels, Inc. v. Stuart-Wright Mortgage. Inc. (2001) 85 Cal.
5 App.4th 1279, 1283-1284. Plaintiff must therefore demonstrate that it complied that the sale
6 was conducted in accordance with Section 2924 in order to prevail on a Motion For Summary
7 Judgment. In this case, it remains a triable issue of fact as to whether this Plaintiff had the
8 power, right, and authority to commence foreclosure proceedings against the Property in the
9 first place.
10
D. ALL DOUBTS ARE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF DENYING THE MOTION.
11
Where there is a doubt as to whether a motion for summary judgment should be granted,
12
the motion should be denied. Gibson v. De La Salle Institute, (1944) 66 Cal. App.2d 609, 152
13
P.2d 774; Empire West Side Irrigation District v. Lovelace, (1970) 5 Cal. App.3d 911, 85 Cal.
14
Rptr. 552.
15
16 In the case at bar, all doubts as to proper efforts and acts to effectuate service of notices and
17 dulty perfect title and process should be resolved in favor of denying the Motion. All doubts as
18 to whether Plaintiff conducted the sale in accordance with Section 2924 should also be
19 resolved in favor of denying the motion.
20
E. PLAINTIFF FAILS TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR POSSESSION OF
21 SUBJECT PROPERTY.
22 Evicting Plaintiffs in California Unlawful Detainer courts bear the burden of establishing
23 four essential elements, as follows:
24 (1) Proper service of a valid 3 day notice to quit; (2) Proper legal compliance with the
foreclosure notice and recording requirements of Cal. Civ. Code § 2924 et seq. (Cal. Civ.
25 Code § 2924(a)(1)-(5) for requirements) (3) Plaintiff “duly perfected title” (which should
26 incorporate the California Homeowner Bill of Rights (CHBOR) “authority to foreclose”
requirements discussed above). See California Civil Code § 2924(a)(6) added section to
27 California non judicial foreclosure laws (holder of beneficial interest in note/deed of trust).
and, (4) Show that the tenant or former borrower is improperly holding over. (See Aurora
28
9
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1 Loan Servs., LLC v. Brown, 2012 WL 6213737 for an unpublished case discussing the basic
requirements.)
2
1. Proper Service of three-day Notice to Quit.
3
In order for a Plaintiff to serve notice of a 3-day Notice to quit. Plaintiff must be the title
4
owner of the property. Since the purported foreclosure sale is void based on illegality, and since a
5
Affinia Default Services did not have lawful authority to conduct a sale of subject property for
6
failure of compliance with California Code of Civil procedure sec. 2924 et seq. and Nationwide
7
Posting and Publication Inc. and Affinia Default Services LLC were not legally authorized by law
8
from selling subject property, any service of the Notice was void and assuming arguendo the sale
9
was valid the service was defective for the reason stated herein and by Defendants Declaration in
10
support and herevidentiary objections.
11
2. Proper legal compliance with the foreclosure notice and recording
12 requirements of Cal. Civ. Code § 2924 et seq. and court’s order enjoining the
sale render the sale void for illegality.
13
14 The foreclosure sale is void based on illegality, since a Affinia Default Services. did not
15 have lawful authority to conduct a sale of subject property for failure of compliance with
16 California Code of Civil procedure sec. 2924 et seq.. Moreover, the foreclosure sale is void for
17 acting on a VOID deed of trust reflecting World Savings Bank FSB a foreign corporation never
approved to conduct intra-commerce in the State of California as set as fact by Secretary of State.
18
Plaintiff to this action is not the Bona fide purchaser of subject proper as the sale is void
19
for illegality and could not be in compliance with CC 2924.
20
The purported purchaser does not hold valid title to the property and cannot satisfy that UD
21
prerequisite under CCP 1161a with a defective and VOID deed of Trust reflecting a non legal
22
entity presented as a lender.
23
3. Duly Perfected Title.
24
25 In General; Words and Phrases.
26 Term "duly" implies that all of those elements necessary to valid sale exist, else there would
not be a sale at all. Kessler v. Bridge (1958, Cal App Dep't Super Ct) 161 Cal App 2d Supp
27 837, 327 P2d 241, 1958 Cal App LEXIS 1814.
28
10
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1 Title that is "duly perfected" includes good record title, but is not limited to good record title.
Kessler v. Bridge (1958, Cal App Dep't Super Ct) 161 Cal App 2d Supp 837, 327 P2d 241,
2 1958 Cal App LEXIS 1814.
3 Title is "duly perfected" when all steps have been taken to make it perfect, that is, to convey to
purchaser that which he has purchased, valid and good beyond all reasonable doubt. Kessler v.
4 Bridge (1958, Cal App Dep't Super Ct) 161 Cal App 2d Supp 837, 327 P2d 241, 1958 Cal App
LEXIS 1814.
5
An eviction after a foreclosure (or other) sale under California Civil Procedure §1161a requires
6 the purchaser seeking eviction to have "duly perfected title" Vella v. Hudgins (1977) 20 C3d
251, 255, 142 CR 414, 416, Evans v. Super Ct. (Robbins) (1977) 67 CA3d 162, 169, 136 CR
7 596, 600-6011
8 After a lawful non-judicial foreclosure sale under CCP §1161a. A qualified exception to the
9 rule that title cannot be tried in an unlawful detainer proceeding [see Evid Code § 624; 5.45[1][c]]
10 is contained in CCP § 1161a. By extending the summary eviction remedy beyond the conventional
11 landlord-tenant relationship to include purchasers of the occupied property, the statute provides for
12 a narrow and sharply focused examination of title. A purchaser of the property as described in the
13 statute, who starts an unlawful detainer proceeding to evict an occupant in possession, must show
14 that he or she acquired the property at a regularly conducted sale and thereafter "duly perfected" the
15 title [CCP § 1161a; Vella v. Hudgins (1977) 20 C3d 251, 255, 142 CR 414, 572P2d 28.
16
In Hocking v. Title Ins. & Trust Co. (1951), 37 Cal.2d 644) the California court of appeals
17
discussed:
18
The word title has a variety of meanings. It sometimes connotes the means by which
19 property in land is established, as in the expression ‘chain of title.’ It sometimes means
‘property’ or ‘ownership’ in the sense of the interest one has in land. A common meaning is
20
complete ownership, in the sense of all the rights, privileges, powers and immunities an owner
21 may have with respect to land……A perfect title must be one that is good and valid beyond
all reasonable doubt’; and in that case it was conceded by counsel upon both sides that a title,
22 to be good, ‘should be free from litigation, palpable defects, and grave doubts, should
consist of both legal and equitable titles, and should be fairly deducible of record.’ It would
23 seem, in fairness to the vendee, that the foregoing requirements should be held absolutely
necessary, in order to fully satisfy the covenant of perfect title. Certainly such a condition of
24
title must exist before it can be said to be good and valid beyond reasonable doubt……which
25 includes good record title (Gwin v. Calegaris (1903), 139 Cal. 384), but is not limited to good
record title, as between the parties to the transaction. (Emphasis Added) The term “record
26 title” means a title officially of record. (Bone v. Dwyer, 89 Cal. App. 535).
27 This UD case is not based on duly perfected title since it is not free from litigation, has
28 palpable defects and there is grave doubts as to the record title based on the current litigation.
11
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1 4. Tenant or former borrower is improperly holding over.
2 Defendant is still the owner of her property and has not improperly held over on her own
3 property. Plaintiff assertion by his complaint is absolutely absurd.
4 Therefore, Defendant requests the court to review the Declaration of VALERIE LOPEZ
5 attesting to these facts and Defendant’s request for judicial notice.
6 As discussed above, Plaintiff has failed to establish these material elements in the
7 Complaint, due to the serious defects with the possessory interest in the premises and service of the
8 nail and mail mandatory statutory notice requirements – complaint must be mailed certified mail to
9 defendant after posting complaint on house.
10
F. PLAINTIFF'S FACTUALLY DEVOID DISCOVERY RESPONSES
11 WARRANT A DENIAL OF THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION.
12
Plaintiff's discovery responses are factually devoid because the Plaintiff never
13
answered the Form Interoggatories and Requests for Admissions. His attorney answered
14
the discovery which is illegal. Plaintiff has refused and continues to refuse to respond to
15
Defendant’s propoubded discovery requests, and the Plaintiff’s most knowledgeable
16
person sit for its deposition. The taking of the deposition set for June 13, 2018, the
17
Plaintiff has refused to attend.
18
Plaintiff's factually devoid discovery responses can satisfy the Defendants' initial
19
burden of producing evidence in support of Defendants' Opposition to the motion for
20
summary judgment. Union Bank v. Superior Court. (1995) 31 Cal. App.4th 573, 590.
21
592-593, 37 Cal. Rptr.2d 653:
22
"Now, a ... defendant may rely on factually devoid responses to shift his burden of
23
proof pursuant to [Code of Civil Procedure] section 437c, subdivision (o)(2). Once the
24
burden shifts as a result of the factually devoid discovery responses, plaintiff must set
25
forth the specific facts which prove the existence of a triable issue of material fact." [31
26
Cal. App.4th at 590.]
27
28
12
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1 In the present case, a motion for summary judgment is premature where discovery
2 is incomplete to establish the true facts in this case, as particularly if duly perfected title
3 has really been perfected and should be denied where the moving party has refused to
4 comply with its discovery obligations or where the moving party has failed to cooperate
5 in discovery. In the case at bar, Plaintiff has refused to sit for its deposition. The motion
6 should be denied.
7 In the case at bar, Plaintiff's failure to sit for its duly noticed deposition shifts the
8 burden to the Plaintiff to provide more specific information. In this case, the only
9 declaration provided by Plaintiff to support its claim that the trustee’s sale was conducted
10 in accordance with Section 2924 is the declaration of Plaintiff's counsele for the initial
11 complaint. Plaintiff's counsel did not conduct the trustee’s sale or supervise the trustee’s
12 sale. At least, there is nothing in Plaintiff's declaration that contends it did. Since Gary
13 Vecchio trustee for The Sunningdale Trust #2328 has no personal knowledge concerning
14 any matter that occurred prior to the trustee’s sale, his testimony is inadmissible, as
15 evidence that the trustee’s sale was ever conducted in accordance with Section 2924. The
16 Motion should be denied on this point of argument alone.
17
G. A GENUINE ISSUES OF TRIABLE MATERIAL FACTS EXIST AS TO
18
TITLE WITH REGARDS TO UNLAWFUL DETAINER AFTER NON-
19 JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE REQUIREMENTS.
20 The elements of an unlawful detainer action based upon the sale of real property at a trustee’s
21 sale are set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 1161a which states:
22 a. California Code of Civil Procedure section 1161(a).
23 “(b) In any of the following cases, a person who holds over and continues in possession
of a manufactured home, mobile home, floating home, or real property after a three-day
24 written notice to quit the property has been served upon the person, or if there is a
25 subtenant in actual occupation of the premises, also upon such subtenant, as prescribed
in Section 1162, may be removed therefrom as prescribed in this chapter:
26 (3) Where the property has been sold in accordance with Section 2924 of the Civil Code,
under a power of sale contained in a deed of trust executed by such person, or a person
27 under whom such person claims, and the title under the sale has been duly perfected.”
28
13
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1 As this section points out, the Plaintiff bringing the wrongful holdover (unlawful detainer
2 action) bears the burden to prove the sale was in accordance with Section 2924 of the Civil Code
3 (which are California’s non-judicial foreclosure statute).
4 Under California Evidence Code Section 500, the purchaser at the trustee sale who brings
the UD should be required to prove the elements necessary to evict. This section states:
5 “Except as otherwise provided by law, a party has the burden of proof as to each fact the
existence or nonexistence of which is essential to the claim for relief or defense that he is
6 asserting.”
7
A qualified exception to the rule that title cannot be tried in an unlawful detainer
8 proceeding [see Evid Code § 624; 5.45[1][c]] is contained in CCP §1161a. By extending
the summary eviction remedy beyond the conventional landlord-tenant relationship to
9 include purchasers of the occupied property, the statute provides for a narrow and sharply
focused examination of title. A purchaser of the property as described in the statute, who
10 starts an unlawful detainer proceeding to evict an occupant in possession, must show that
11 he or she acquired the property at a regularly conducted sale and thereafter "duly
perfected" the title [CCP § 1161a; Vella v. Hudgins (1977) 20 C3d 251, 255, 142 CR
12 414, 572 P2d 28 ]. To this limited extent, as provided by the statute, title may be litigated
in the unlawful detainer proceeding [Cheney v. Trauzettel (1937) 9 C2d 158, 159, 69 P2d
13 832 ].
14
Plaintiff must "prove a sale in compliance with the statute and deed of trust, followed by
15
purchase at such sale and the defendant may raise objections" on that phase of the issue of title.
16
[Cheney v. Trauzettel (1937) 9 Cal.2d 158, 159-160]
17
In an action for unlawful detainer, section 1161a requires proof that the property was "duly
18
sold in accordance with Section 2924 of the Civil Code.” Title, to the extent required by section
19
1161a, "not only may, but must, be tried in such actions." [Kartheiser v. Superior Court (1959) 174
20
Cal.App.2d 617, 620]
21
The defendant is entitled to dispute the validity of the trustee’s sale and place the purchaser's
22
title in issue. The burden of proof is on the purchaser to show the trust property had been duly sold
23
to him and that his title was duly perfected. [Crummer v. Whitehead (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 264,
24
268]
25
The property was not sold in accordance with section 2924 of the California Civil Code. So
26
from the outset the court’s analysis should consist at this pleading stage as to whether the complaint
27
satisfies the prerequisite of section 1161a of California Code of Civil Procedure.
28
14
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1 1. A Genuine Issue Of Triable Material Fact Exists As To Whether Plaintiff Is A
Bona-Fide Purchaser Of Subject Property And Has Posessory Rights. [U.C.C.
2 §8-302. "Non Bona-Fide Purchaser"]
3
U.C.C. - ARTICLE 8 - INVESTMENT SECURITIES, PART 3. TRANSFER § 8-302. "Bona
4 Fide Purchaser"; "Adverse Claim"; Title Acquired by Bona Fide Purchaser.
5 (1) A "bona fide purchaser" is a purchaser for value in good faith and without notice of any
adverse claim:
6
7 (a) who takes delivery of a certificated security in bearer form or in registered form,
issued or indorsed to him or in blank;
8
(b) to whom the transfer, pledge, or release of an uncertificated security is registered on
9 the books of the issuer; or
10
(c) to whom a security is transferred under the provisions of paragraph (c), (d) (i), or (g)
11 of Section 8- 313(1).
12 (2) "Adverse claim" includes a claim that a transfer was or would be wrongful or that a
particular adverse person is the owner of or has an interest in the security.
13
14 An adverse claim and Notice of the adverse claim has been recorded, filed and pending in
15 the Orange County Court as of ________________________, against adverse artificial persons
16 VALLEY BANK AND TRUST CORPORATION, DOVENMUHELLE MORTGAGE
17 CORPORATION AND NORTHWEST TRUSTEE SERVICES, INC. (Case No. 30-2015-
18 00782798) that have made a claim of interest in the purported security to Defendant’s real
19 property. (U.C.C. 8-302)
20 Public Notice of this adverse claim filed with the Federal District Court and which enjoins
21 the adverse parties to this action is referenced as Case 8:18-cv-00452-DOC whereby Plaintiff
22 cannot establish himself as a bona fide purchaser for value in good faith and without notice of any
23 adverse claim, as a matter of law.
24 Consequently, Plaintiff cannot be a Bona fide Purchaser of Defendant’s property. This
25 material fact renders a triable issue of material fact as to the validity of the purchase.
26
2. A Genuine Issue Of Triable Material Fact Exists As To Whether The
27 Recorded “Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale” Is Void For Violation Of Civil Code
Sections 2924 Et. Seq..
28
15
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1 See the Declaration and Exhibits of Defendant.
2
See Judicial notice of the filed and recorded documents.
3
4 3. Plaintiff's Contention That It Is A Bona Fide Purchaser Of The Real Property
For Value Is A Triable Issue Of Fact.
5
The conclusive presumption that Plaintiff is the owner of the property upon the
6
timely recordation of the deed of trust only applies if Plaintiff is a bona fide purchaser of
7
the property for value. See: Wolfe v. Lipsy, (1985) 163 Cal. App.3d 633, 640.
8
Plaintiff contends that Trustees Sales are presumed valid. They cite Royal Thrift
9
10 anci Loan Co. v County Escrow, Inc. (2004) 123 Cal. App. 4th 24 for this proposition. In
11 Royal Thrift, Royal Thrift paid $139,000.00 for the Property. The Trustees Deed Upon Sale
12 attached as Exhibit A to Plaintiff's Motion which does not prove duly perfected title or how
13 did allege trustee become duly perfected trustee.
14 The Court in Royal Thrift also stated that the presumption only applies to
15 bonafide purchasers who pay value.
16
Civil Code section 2924 contains a statutory presumption 'aris[ing] from the
17 recital in the trustee's deed that all statutory requirements for notice of
default and sale have been satisfied. This presumption is prima facie
18 evidence of compliance and conclusive evidence of compliance in favor of a
bona fide purchaser or encumbrancer.' [Citations.] Thus, once a deed
19 reciting that all legal requirements have been satisfied has been transferred
to a buyer at a foreclosure sale, the sale can be successfully attacked on the
20 grounds of procedural irregularity only if the buyer is not a bona fide
purchaser." Royal Thrift & Loan citing 6 Angels, Inc. v. Stuart-Wright
21 Mortgage, Inc., supra, 85 Cal. App.4th at p. 1286, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 711.
22 The next case cited by the Plaintiff in support of this proposition is Beck v. Reinholtz
23 (1956) 138 Cal. App. 2d 719. In that case, the Defendant filed a Motion For Summary
24 Judgment in a quiet title action. The Defendant filed the following affidavit:
25 "In her affidavit in support of the motion defendant Reinholtz set forth that
the complaint does not state a good cause of action against the defendants;
26 that plaintiffs were the owners of the real property involved until October 7,
1954; that the said trust deed was executed and delivered on December 4,
27 1946; that, as alleged in plaintiffs' complaint, plaintiffs made no payments
on the promissory note after May 5, 1947; that notice of default under the
28 terms of said trust deed was recorded May 18, 1954; that pursuant to said
16
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1 notice of default, a notice of trustee's sale was executed and the property was
sold at public auction to affiant; that a trustee's deed was executed and
2 recorded; that notices of the trustee's sale were posted in three public places
in San Clemente and publication was had in accordance with all of the
3 provisions of said trust deed; that pursuant to said sale and the purchase of
the property by affiant, she entered into possession of the property and is
4 now the owner thereof; that said sale was legally made and fairly conducted;
that by reason of the default of plaintiffs under said note and by reason of
5 the sale of the property to affiant by the trustee on October 7, 1954,
plaintiffs' title and interest in the property ceased and was terminated" Beck
6 at 721.
7 The Court in Beck granted Defendants Motion For Summary Judgment because
8 the Plaintiff failed to file a counter-affidavit alledging an irregularity Citing Security
9 First Nat. Bank of Los Angeles v. Cryer, 39 Cal.App.2d 757, 762 , the Court held that
10 while recitals contained in a trustee's deed are not conclusive as between the parties to
11 the trust deed, nevertheless, it was incumbent upon the defendants in that case in order
12 to defeat a motion for summary judgment to present evidentiary facts to controvert the
13 recitals in the trust deed to the effect that the sale was legally held, thereby raising an
14 issue, the merits of which would be determined upon a trial. Beck at 723.
15
16 In this case, the Plaintiff has not filed any affidavits based on its personal knowledge
17 that the trustee’s sale was conducted properly. Defendant has filed his own declaration asserting
18 that he had paid all amounts due as will a Subpoena of all Wells Fargo documents will show
19 and subpoena of IRS 8549 from Wells Fargo to show Wells Fargo was never the beneficiaty
20 and owed on the Promissory Note to Wells Fargo. Defendant was not in default to Wells Fargo
21 as the accounting and IRS records will confirm. Defendant has also provided evidence, which is
22 even apparent to the layman's eye that the Substitution of Trustee is fraud by Eric Kinsley Lee
23 Jr. who is a level 2 processor Wells Fargo and misrepresented being a Vice President for Wells
24 Fargo. The Notice of Trustee Sale is forged as verified by Russell Bradford – State of California
25 Handwriting Expert for Los Angeles Courts. The auction company Nationwide Posting and
26 Publication Inc. (NPP) is a defunct dummy company which was dissolved in 2013 according to
27 CA Secretary of State. NPP ordered the publication, posted on the door of Defendant,
28 administered the illegal auction without required bond due to its non existence as a business in
17
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1 California. Plaintiff ‘s have offered no evidence or affidavits that rebut the contentions of
2 Defendant's experts. For the purpose of Summary Judgment, the findings of Defendant's expert
3 must be accepted as true.
4
Defendant has challenged the trustee’s sale on multiple grounds which are being
5
adjudicated by the Federal District Case opened 3-21.2018. Wells Fargo without providing
6
any evidentiary or factual support for its claim alleges that it is was a "beneficiary" of a deed
7
of trust for the purpose of conducting a trustee’s sale. It should be noted that Wells Fargo was
8
not the original beneficiary of the deed of trust or promissory note. Defendant never entered
9
into an agreement with the Wells Fargo. Plaintiff contends that it received an asset from a
10
merger. This is also a falsehood as verified by SEC certified records showing only purchase
11
from Wachovia of Stock Options. No assignment exists from the original beneficiary to the
12
Wells Fargo. A void Deed of Trust is not marketable.While Defendant argues that it has
13
conclusively proven that Wells Fargo was never a beneficiary under the deed of trust. Wells
14
Fargo’s beneficiary status remains a triable issue of fact as is Affinia Default Services as a
15
duly substituted trustee based on a VOID deed of trust – the lender never existed in
16
California. The Motion must be denied.
17
18 H. A CALIFORNIA COURT HAS RULED THAT SUMMARY JUDGMENT
SHOULD NOT BE BASED ON ADMISSIONS THAT ARE
19 CONTRADICTED BY OTHER CREDIBLE EVIDENCE.
20
The main thrust of PLAINTIFF’S Motion is the contention that because a party to a
21
wrongful foreclosure action conducted a purported and alleged sale of subject property of the
22
against DEFENDANT ‘s challenge of duly perfected title has no merit. This is not true
23
because non-existent lender on the Deed of Trust has shown credible evidence disclosing the
24
existence of triable issues of material fact that directly contradict the matters contained in the
25
deemed admitted requests for admission. And a California Court of Appeal has ruled that
26
admissions that are contradicted by other credible evidence should not be used as a basis for a
27
Summary Judgment motion.
28
18
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1 As DEFENDANT has shown on its Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts,
2 and the Declaration of VALERIE LOPEZ, credible evidence that directly contradicts the
3 matters contained in the Declaration of Gary Vecchio, the Court should deny the Summary
4 Judgment Motion and allow this matter to proceed to trial.
5 Absent proper circumstances for a motion for summary judgment or partial summary
6 judgment, parties to a lawsuit are entitled to a trial, either by the court or by jury. IFS
7 Industries, Inc. v. Stephens (1984) 159 Cal. App. 3d 740, 756.
8 Issue finding, rather than issue determination, is pivot upon which summary judgment law
9 turns. Northrop Corp. v. Stinson Sales Corp., (1984) 151 Cal. App. 3d 653, 657.
10
I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT CAN ONLY BE GRANTED WHEN NO TRIABLE
11 ISSUE EXISTS AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT.
12 Case law is clear that Summary Judgment can only be granted when no triable issues of
13
material fact exist.
14
Summary judgment may only be granted when no triable issue exists as to any material
15
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Villa v. McFerren (1995)
16
35 Cal. App.4th 733, 741. See also Thatcher v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (2000) 79 Cal.App. 4th 1081,
17
1086.
18
Summary judgment is proper if, and only if, affidavits in support of motion, strictly
19
construed, contain facts sufficient to entitle moving party to judgment, and those of opposing
20
party, liberally construed, fail to show there is material issue of fact. Eott Energy Corp. v.
21
Storebrand Internat. Ins. Co. (1996) 45 Cal. App.4th 565, review denied.
22
Summary judgment is appropriate only if facts upon which motion is based are
23
sufficient to sustain judgment in favor of moving party and if party opposing motion does not,
24
by affidavit, show facts sufficient to raise a triable issue. Blair v. Pitchess (1971) 5 Cal.3d 258.
25
DEFENDANT has shown facts that are more than sufficient to raise triable issues of
26
material fact.
27
28
19
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1 Thus triable issues of material fact exist as to who breached the contract, whether
2 Plaintiff’s and Wells Fargo and Affinia Default Services LLC committed fraud, and whether
3 Federal District case is entitled to declaratory relief and cancellation of Deed of Trust; And
4 those issues can only be resolved at trial.
5 The moving party must demonstrate that under no hypothesis is there a material factual
6 issue requiring a trial. Flowmaster, Inc. v. Superior Court (1993) 16 Cal. App.4th 1019, 1026.
7 See also Ostayan v. Serrano Reconveyance Co., (2000) 77 Cal.App. 4th 1411, 1418.
8 DEFENDANT has shown that there are several hypotheses that are very credible which
9 lead to material factual issues requiring a trial. PLAINTIFF has not met their burden.
10 Plaintiff’s complaint fails to states a cause of action for possession of subject property and
11 lacks standing to bring a unlawful detainer action since the Trustee lacked authority to conduct the
12 purported sale, and this evidence demonstrates that Plaintiff is not a “Bona fide Purchaser” for
13 value, as a matter of law.
14
J. PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO MEET ITS INITIAL BURDEN OF
15 PRODUCING EVIDENCE THAT MAKES A PRIMA FACIE SHOWING OF
THE NONEXISTENCE OF ANY GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT.
16
17 The burden of producing evidence that a genuine triable issue of fact does not exist is
18 initially on the moving party. Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Oil Company, (2001) 25 Ca1.4th
19 826, 857 fn. 4.
20 Only if the moving party first demonstrates that its declarations, considered in light of
21 the issues raised by the pleading, would standing alone, support the summary judgment motion
22 does the court look to counter-affidavits and counter-declarations. Bro v. Glasser, (1994) 22
23 Cal. App.4th 1398, 1405, 1406.
24 The moving party's papers are strictly construed, accepting as fact only those
25 portions that are not contradicted by opposing papers. Salazar v. Southern California Gas
26 Company, (1997) 54 Cal. App.4th 1370, 1376, 63 Cal. Rptr.2d 522.
27 The opposing party's papers are liberally construed. All facts stated therein are
28 accepted as true. Salazar v. Southern California Gas Company, (id).
20
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1 In the case at bar, Plaintiffs supporting Declarations are insufficient to justify the granting
2 of summary judgment. Gary Veccho has filed inconsistent declarations failed to address Fatal
3 non compliance to service of law suit certified mail mandatory for his approve nail and mail
4 authorization. Plaintiffs failure to respond to the form interrogatories and Requests for
5 Admissions should further stand as reason to deny the Motion for Summary Judgment. Further,
6 no declaration has been filed the Plaintiff itself or the trustee who conducted the trustees sale
7 attesting to the fact that the trustees sale was conducted in accordance with Section 2924. The
8 only declaration concerning the propriety of the trustees sale is the Declaration filed by
9 Plaintiff's counsel, Steven Silverstein and Gary Vecchio who appears to have no knowledge
10 and confused; and does not state what corporation he is verifying for; whose testimony is not
11 based on personal knowledge but on documents he received from illegal trustee. While the
12 Court may take judicial notice of the fact that documents were "recorded" with the County
13 Recorder, the contents of the documents themselves are hearsay and require supporting evidence
14 that the contentions made in the documents are actually true. The testimony of Steven Silverstein
15 and Gary Vecchio concerning the trustees sale is incompetent, unreliable and based on hearsay. It
16 doesn't even warrant shifting the burden to respond to the Defendant.
17 1. QUESTIONS OF TITLE MAY BE ADJUDICATED IN AN EVICTION

BASED ON THE PURCHASE OF A PROPERTY AT A TRUSTEES SALE.
18
"A qualified exception to the rule that title cannot be tried in an unlawful detainer
19
proceeding [see Evid Code § 624; 5.45[1][c]] is contained in CCP § 1161a. By extending the
20
summary eviction remedy beyond the conventional landlord-tenant relationship to include
21
purchasers of the occupied property, the statute provides for a narrow and sharply focused
22
examination of title. A purchaser of the property as described in the statute, who starts an
23
unlawful detainer proceeding to evict an occupant in possession, must show that he or she
24
acquired the property at a regularly conducted sale and thereafter "duly perfected" the title CCP
25
§ 1161a; Vella v. Hudgins (1977) 20 C3d 251, 255,. To this limited extent, as provided by the
26
statute, titlemay be litigated in the unlawful detainer proceeding Cheney v. Trauzettel (1937) 9
27
C2d 158, 159.
28
21
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1 K. ONLY A TRUSTEE, MORTGAGEE, BENEFICIARY OR THEIR
AUTHORIZED AGENT MAY INITIATE A TRUSTEES SALE PURSUANT
2 TO SECTION 2924(A)(1).
3
"The trustee, mortgagee, or beneficiary, or any of their authorized agents shall first file
4
for record, in the office of the recorder of each county wherein the mortgaged or trust property
5
or some part or parcel thereof is situated, a notice of default. That notice of default shall
6
include all of the following:
7
(A) A statement identifying the mortgage or deed of trust by stating the
8 name or names of the trustor or trustors and giving the book and page, or
instrument number, if applicable, where the mortgage or deed of trust is
9 recorded or a description of the mortgaged or trust property.
(B) A statement that a breach of the obligation for which the mortgage or
10 transfer in trust is security has occurred.
(C) A statement setting forth the nature of each breach actually known to
11 the beneficiary and of his or her election to sell or cause to be sold the
property to satisfy that obligation and any other obligation secured by the
12 deed of trust or mortgage that is in default.
(D) If the default is curable pursuant to Section 2924c, the statement
13 specified in paragraph (1) of subdivision (b) of Section 2924c.
(2) Not less than three months shall elapse from the filing of the notice of default.
14 (3) After the lapse of the three months described in paragraph (2), the
mortgagee, trustee or other person authorized to take the sale shall give
15 notice of sale, stating the time and place thereof, in the manner and for a time
not less than that set forth in Section 2924f. C.C.P. Section 2924(a)(1)
16
L. PLAINTIFF WAS NOT A TRUSTEE, MORTGAGEE, BENEFICIARY OR
17 AUTHORIZED AGENT WHEN IT RECORDED THE NOTICE OF
TRUSTEES SALE.
18
19 No one disputes the fact that Wells Fargo is not the original lender or original
20 beneficiary under the Deed of Trust. Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 identifies the original lender and
21 original beneficiary under Note and Deed of Trust as World Savings Bank, F.S.B. – a
22 company never registered to conduct intra – commerce in the State of California.
23 In order for Plaintiff to have any rights in the Property, the Court must find that
24 World Savings Bank FSB was a legal business in the State of California at the time the
25 Deed of Trust was created on November 1, 2018.
26 The authenticity of Exhibit 1 is immediately called into question because the
27 lender was not a legal business on November 1, 2005 in California according to
28 Secretary of State and California Business Oversight . Refer to Defendant’s
22
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1 Declaration related to Forged Notice of Trustee Sale document and fraud
2 substitution of trustee.
3 Deed of Trust Recording No. 2005000893409 is void due to non-existent lender.
4 In Carpenter v. Longan (1872) ,83 U.S. 271, 274, 21 L.Ed. 313 (1872), the U.S.
5 Supreme Court stated "The note and mortgage are inseparable; the former as essential, the
6 latter as an incident.
7
The Defendant has offered credible evidence that the trustee deed upon sale is sham and
8
Affinia Default never had a legal right to initiate a non-judicial trustee’s sale in the first place
9
and its action remains a triable issue of fact.
10
11 M. ANY DOUBTS REGARDING A SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION MUST
BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF THE OPPOSING PARTY.
12
13 Case law is well settled that any doubts or uncertainty regarding a Summary Judgment
14 Motion must be resolved in favor of the opposing party. Further, the declarations of the moving
15 party are strictly construed, those of the opposing party are liberally construed, and the Court
16 should focus on issue finding, not resolving issues of fact.
17 Declarations of the moving party are strictly construed, those of the opposing party are
18 liberally construed, and doubts as to whether a summary judgment should be granted must be
19 resolved in favor of the opposing party; the court focuses on issue finding, and it does not
20 resolve issues of fact. Colores v. Board of Trustees (2003) 105 Cal. App. 4th 1293, 1305.
21 And if the evidence presented is equally conflicting the motion should be denied.
22 Typically, in summary judgment litigation, equally conflicting evidence requires a trial
23 to resolve the dispute. Kids' Universe v. In2labs, (2002) 95 Cal.App. 4th 870, 881.
24 As the evidence shown by DEFENDANT LOPEZ is at least as credible and conflicts
25 with the evidence alleged by PLAINTIFF the Court should deny the Motion.
26 The facts alleged in the evidence of the party opposing summary judgment and the
27 reasonable inferences therefrom must be accepted as true. Grant-Burton v. Covenant Care,
28 Inc., (2002) 99 Cal. App. 4th 1361, 1369.
23
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1 The facts alleged by PLAINTIFF show that an illegal fraudulent and void sale occurred
2 and that’s it.
3 And the declarations in opposition to a motion for summary judgment need only
4 disclose the existence of a triable issue.
5 Counter-affidavits and declarations in opposition to motion for summary judgment
6 need not prove the opposition's case; they suffice if they disclose the existence of a triable
7 issue. McManis v. San Diego Postal Credit Union, (1998) 61 Cal. App. 4th 547, 555, 71 Cal
8 .Rptr.2d 617.
9 The Declaration of VALERIE LOPEZ more than discloses the existence of triable
10 issues of fact, it proves that PLAINTIFF and his attorney knew they had no justification for
11 filing this unlawful detainer action based on a void sale, and it also discloses very credible
12 evidence from which a reasonable inference can be drawn that the alleged and purported
13 Trustee had no authority to conduct and auction for the sale of DEFENDANT’S property
14 which amounts to an unlawful conversion based on an issue pending for a wrongful
15 foreclosure.
16 Even if only a doubt exists as to whether summary judgment motion should be granted,
17 the motion should be denied. Hoover v. City of Fresno (1969) 272 Cal.App.2d 7.
18 In this case, one of the main issues is whether purported Affinia Default Services LLC
19 had lawful authority to conduct a trustee sale and title was duly perfected as a matter of law
20 pursuant to California civil code 2924 et. Seq. Plaintiff has failed to meet its burden to satisfy
21 that there is no triable issue of material fact when a pending Federal District Case is pending to
22 cancel the Deed of Trust and Defendant has the likelihood of success in that action and the
23 recorded Trustee’s Deed upon Sale is void due to VOID Deed of Trust See- Defendant’s
24 Declaration Exhibit 13 and Exhibit 1, and Judicial Notice Exhibit 1.
25 Thus, the Court should allow this matter to proceed to trial so that the parties do have a
26 full opportunity to produce evidence of the facts, circumstances and conditions surrounding the
27 compliance issues to California Civil code 2924 et seq. and duly perfected title matter and the
28 conduct of the relative parties.
24
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1 In fact, the gravamen of Plaintiffs complaint is that duly perfected title has been
2 perfected as in accordance with California Civil code 2924 et seq. and ignores the material
3 facts that a illegal foreclosure was initiated and Federal Dsitrict Case to cancel VOID deed of
4 trust. Affinia Default Services LLC is not a duly perfected substituted trustee in non-
5 compliance with the California Civil code 2924 et seq. statutes.
6
N. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS AND ORDERS OF THE COURT
7 DEMAND DUE PROCESS.
8 U.S. Constitution and California State Constitution Article 1, states, in pertinent part:
9 SECTION 1. All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights.
Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and
10
protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.
11
SECTION. 7. (a) A person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
12 process of law or denied equal protection of the laws; …
13
DEFENDANT LOPEZ’s likeliness of succeeding on the merits of that action based on non-
14
compliance with the California non-judicial foreclosure laws (Civil code sections 2924 et. Seq. is likely.
15
She won recently her Appeal against Silverstein for an illegal eviction based in same elements – the
16
Deed of Trust was VOID and BofA had open investigation related to fraud deed of trust. See Request
17
for Judicial Notice Exhibit 1.
18
PLAINTIFF has allegedly purchased a void lien for violation of this order and would be
19
subjected to damages for a fraud upon the court in a conspiracy with Affinia Default Services LLC,
20
Wells Fargo, Black Knight Financial and other unknown parties..
21
This Unlawful Detainer action presents itself as a “fraud upon the court” based on clear and
22
unequivical evidence of a violation and contempt for the laws of this State and orders of this court, in
23
that PLAINTIFF VALERIE LOPEZ as based her entire claim on a void recordation of a lien based on
24
an adverse pending cause of action within the Federal District Court Case # 8:18-cv-00452-DOC.
25
PLAINTIFF is attempting to abuse of the process of this court for purposes of committing a GRAND
26
THEFT of DEFEDANT LOPEZ’S property in direct violation of her constitutional rights to due
27
process and deprivation of his property based on wrongful foreclosure action. position of a residence
28
25
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1 worth in excess of $500,000 which amounts to a crime of grand theft being aided and abetted by the
2 abuse of process using the court for purposes of depriving Defendant of her constitutional rights
3 without due protect of the supreme law of the land.
4 Uncertainty as to the void “Trustee’s Deed upon Sale” as to compliance under California civil
5 code section 2924 et. Seq. raises a triable issue of fact and the court should find that certain defects in
6 procedural compliance warrant a trial upon the merits, as provided for under law, and as supported by a
7 host of authorities cited, herein.
8 A judgment may not be rendered in violation of constitutional protections. The validity of a

judgment may be affected by a failure to give the constitutionally required due process
9 notice and an opportunity to be heard. Earle v. McVeigh, 91 US 503, 23 L Ed 398. See also
Restatements, Judgments ' 4(b). Prather v Loyd, 86 Idaho 45, 382 P2d 910. The limitations
10 inherent in the requirements of due process and equal protection of the law extend to
judicial as well as political branches of government, so that a judgment may not be rendered
11 in violation of those constitutional limitations and guarantees. Hanson v Denckla, 357 US
12 235, 2 L Ed 2d 1283, 78 S Ct 1228.
13 Granting a summary judgment on a void lien in direct contempt of the court order of
14 preliminary injunction enjoining the sale of subject property and depriving DEFENDANT of due
15 process of law, where a genuine issue of material fact exists amounts to a constitutional violation as
16 based on a fraud upon the court is a constitutional violation. Thus for this reason alone the motion
17 should be denied.
18
If this fraud being perpetuated on the court results in granting this motion based on all legal
19
authorities and case precedence in favor of Defendant. Defendant LOPEZ has an independent an
20
private right to sue for damages in the Unlimited jurisdiction of this court for civil rights violations
21
and extrinsic fraud upon the court based on Plaintiff’s fabricated evidence and perjury in
22 declarations to commit a grant theft of Defendant homesteaded property without a jury trial on the
23 merits.
24
25 O. DEFENDANT MAY CHALLENGE THE PROPRIETY OF THE TRUSTEES
SALE AND PLAINTIFF'S BENEFICIARY STATUS BECAUSE IT MADE
26 THE REQUISITE TENDER.
27
28
26
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1 At the outset, it must be pointed out that until the Plaintiff satisfies its requisite burden of
2 proof, the Defendant doesn't have an obligation to prove anything during a Motion For Summary
3 Judgment. Defendant acknowledges that if it were the Plaintiff in a proceeding challenging a
4 trustees sale, it is required to plead and prove tender. No such requirement exists for a Defendant in
5 thean action for unlawful detainer. While Plaintiff argues that Defendant has not satisfied the
6 tender requirement in its points and authorities, it has offered no evidence to support its claim that
7 no tender occurred in its Motion for Summary Judgment which the Defendant must rebut through
8 counter-affidavits. Nonetheless, the Defendant has declared that he made the requisite tender.
9 Plaintiff's contention that there was no tender remains a triable issue of fact. The Motion For
10 Summary Judgment must be denied.
11 V. CONCLUSION
12 Defendant has demonstrated that there are significant triable issues of material fact
13 WHEREFORE, based on the above, Plaintiff cannot come to Court with clean hands based on an
14 illegal and fraudulent instrument recorded to commit a crime of grand theft and steal ones property
15 in violation of his constitutional protections. At this time it is impossible for PLAINTIFF to state a
cause of action for possession upon a void and fraudulent instruments recorded by Affinia Default
16
Services LLC and company and any party who try to prove it has standing with fabricated
17
evidence. Defendant is not aware of any California law that allows fraudulent documents to
18
facilitate theft of property, followed by an unlawful detainer proceeding.
19
For the foregoing reasons Defendant, Lopez should be entitled to an order denying this
20
Motion.
21
Dated: June 18, 2018 Respectfully submitted,
22
23 _________________________________
VALERIE LOPEZ, Defendant, In Pro per
24
25
26
27
28
27
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1 DECLARATION OF VALERIE LOPEZ
2 I, VALERIE LOPEZ, am the named Defendant in this matter, and I declare the following in
3 support of my Opposition to motion for summary judgment and dismiss this case. The
4 following facts are matters of my own personal knowledge and, if sworn, I could testify
5 competently to them in court:
6 1. I have been named the Defendant in this action, pending before this Superior Court for
7 the Orange County Judicial District based on a sham filing and illegal and defective service.
8 2. On March 30, 2018, I had recorded a Proof of Publication of Public Notice to action (Lis
9 give constructive notice to the public and potential buyers that an adverse claim for a illegal
10 foreclosure is pending and consequently duly perfected title cannot be perfected upon an
11 adverse claim as recorded prior to the purported sale by defunct business Nationwide Posting
12 and Publication pursuant to CCP Section 48a. Exhibit 5
13 3. I was never served the Unlawful Detainer complaint in accordance to 1161 Nail and Mail
14 Statutory Notice strict compliance of having the complaint sent Certified Mail to my home.
15 4. To this day I have not received any service of process of Unlawful Detainer complaint by
16 Certified Mail a fatal error in Statutory Notice Requirements for CCP 1161a.
17 5. I am the lawful owner of the subject property known 2328 Sunningdale Drive Tustin
18 California 92782.
19 6. Exhibit “1” is a true and correct copy of the Deed of Trust with non-existent lender World
20 Savings Bank FSB.
21 7. Exhibit “13” is a true and correct copy of the California Secretary of State’s Certificate
22 verifying that World Savings Bank FSB a foreign corporation was never registered to conduct
23 intra – commerce business in the State of California.
24 8. I am not in default with Wells Fargo the alleged holder of the note and deed of trust under
25 a loan created by Wells Fargo on 8-20-2015.
26 9. I have provided all constructive notices against the subject property that an adverse claim
27 for a illegal foreclosure and other causes with the Federal District Court on 3/21/2018.
28
1
DECLARATION OF Valerie Lopez
1 10. I am not required as a matter of law to tender any sum of money to The Sunningdale Trust
2 #2328 for a void purported sale, as a trespasser.
3 11. I have done a short form appraisal of my property and found the fair market value is
4 estimated to be in excess of $500,000.
5 12. On March 3, 2018, I have filed a Federal lawsuit against Gary Vecchio trustee for The
6 Sunningdale Trust #2328 for an abuse of the Judicial Process and other claims for seeking to steal
7 my property on an illegal and void purported sale of my property and intend to report him the
8 State and Federal authorities for crimes committed against me and my property and violation of
9 FDCPA with other debt collectors.
10
11 13. The sale of my property and any document recorded on or after March 22, 2018, was illegal
12 and void as a matter of law, as based on constructive notice to the published in the Mission
13 Viejo News Paper Exhibit 5 of declaration.
14
15 14. Exhibit 2 is Report from Russell Bradford establishing that the Trustee Deed Upon Sale is
16 Forged.
17
18 15. Exhibit 3 is from authenticated web site Facebook for Eric Kinsley Lee Jr and Wells Fargo
19 Corporate Center of Raleigh North Carolina verifying the signer of the Substitution
20 misrepresented that he was a Board Approved Vice President for Wells Fargo Bank N.A.
21 when in fact he is a lower level 2 processor.
22
23 16. Declaration from Rene Powers Secretary of Nationwide Posting and Publication Inc. stating
24 that the Nationwide Posting and Publication Inc. used as the auctioneer in the illegal auction,
25 posting and publication was not a legal business in California as Secretary of State records will
26 show. Exhibit 4
27 \\\
28
2
1 STANDING UNDER CCP 1161a
2 17. I am not in default of any mortgage with Wells Fargo to the related illegal foreclosure
3 based on the California Homeowner Bill of rights act.
4
5 18. I have made public all necessary Notices of the adverse claims associated with this
6 property for which Plaintiff to this action should have known that he does not have duly perfected
7 title to Declarant’s property, which exemplifies this action is based on a sham pleading and filing.
8 SERVICE OF FORECLOSURE NOTICE TO QUIT
9 19. I have reviewed the court file, and there is not a valid Proof of Service of Summons filed
10 in this case.
11 20. I was never personally served the foreclosure Notice to quit at my place of residence.
12 21. I never received by certified mail method the purported foreclosure Notice to quit at my
13 place of residence.
14 \
15 SERVICE OF SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT
16 22. I was never personally served the summons and complaint at my place of residence.
17 23. I never received by certified mail the summons and complaint at my place of residence.
18 24. As to the service of the Summons:
19  I contest the manner of service. I was illegally served as described in the Order for
20 posting.
21  Although the Order for posting claims that I am required to be served by certified
22 mail, I was not served by mailing.
23  XXXI did not receive by certified mailing of the complaint as required by CCP
1161a. The posted copy of the complaint was posted at my door, and video
24
recorded.
25
 I contend that Service of the Summons was invalid because I was required to be
26
served in accordance with my rights under law and due diligence was never made to
27
28
3
1 obtain posting and mailing order by the court, as based on a false application which
2 constitutes defective service and therefore the summons should be quashed.
3 25. The following facts support my contentions in the preceding paragraphs above: The
4 court has been deceived into believing that this court has jurisdiction and that Defendant has
5 been legally served by a false declaration of an alleged non-registered California process
6 server named Childes giving illusion that he complied to Nail and Mail order = The complaint
7 was not sent to defendant certified mail MANDATORY of Strict Statutory Notice.
8 26. Plaintiff’s lawsuit has no merit as I own the property until any final adjudication of
9 Declarant’s action has been determined under the Federal Law Suit to cancel VOID deed of
10 Trust.
11 27. On or about latter part of April 2015, I became aware of the Summons and complaint, by
12 finding the Plaintiff’s Summons and complaint posted at my property’s front door.
13 28. I respectfully request that the Court quash the service of summons and dismiss the
14 complaint for the grounds set forth in this motion and upon Declarant’s Federal lawsuit
15 against the Plaintiff and other debt collectors.
16 29. Grant Deed to Valerie Lopez on 7-31-2002 Exhibit 6.
17
18 I declare under penalty of perjury of the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is
19 true and correct.
20 Executed on this 20 June 1981 Tustin California.
21
_____________________________
22 VALERIE LOPEZ
23
24
25
26
27
28
4
1 VALERIE LOPEZ (SPACE BELOW FOR FILE STAMP ONLY)
2328 Sunningdale Drive

2 Tustin California 92782
Telephone: (714)760-4117
3 2rms@sbcglobal.net
4
Defendant, In Pro Per
5
6
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
7
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ORANGE
8
CENTRAL JUSTICE CENTER
9
The Sunningdale Trust #2328; ) [LIMITED JURISDICTION]
10 )
) Case No.: 30-2018-00983668-CL-UD-CJC
11 )
Plaintiff,
) Assigned for all purposes to:
12 ) Judge: Timothy Stafford
vs. )
13 )
) [PROPOSED] ORDER DENYING
14 ) MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
Valerie Lopez, an Individual;
)
15 ) Date: June 21 ___, 2018
Defendant.
16
) Dept/Time: XX Dept. C66_at _1:30 p.m.
)  Dept. _____ at ____ a.m.
)
17 ) [Specially Appearing, pursuant to Cal.
) Const., Art. 1, 6 & 7 and CCP §415.45]
18 )
) Date Action Filed: April 4, 2018
19 )
) Trial Date: Not Set
20 )
21 The motion of PLAINTIFF KEVIN E. VALERIE LOPEZ for ORDER granting
22 summary judgment motion on Plaintiff’s motion dated June 21, 2018, came on hearing by the
23 court on the following date June 21, 2018. Plaintiff, The Sunningdale Trust #2328 appeared;
24 Defendant, Valerie Lopez, appeared in Pro Per.
25 After full consideration of the evidence submitted by the parties, it appears and the
26 court determines that a triable controversy exists as to the following material facts and finds the
27 following:
28
1
[PROPOSED] ORDER
1 1. On the first and only cause of action for right to possession, a triable issue of material fact
2 exists as to whether the purported Trustee’s Deed upon sale is void for illegality and non-
3 compliance with California Homeowner Bill of Rights Act, as codified in Civil code section 2924
4 Et Seq., and as shown by the Declaration of VALERIE LOPEZ and Exhibits attached thereto, and
5 the Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts.
7 exists as to whether “Duly perfected title” had been duly perfected in-compliance with California
8 Homeowner Bill of Rights Act, as codified in Civil code section 2924 Et Seq., and as shown by the
9 Declaration of VALERIE LOPEZ and Exhibits attached thereto, and the Separate Statement of
10 Undisputed Material Facts.
12 exists as to whether Plaintiff is actually a “Bona fide Purchaser for value,” as in-compliance with
13 California Homeowner Bill of Rights Act, as codified in Civil code section 2924 Et Seq., and as
14 shown by the Declaration of VALERIE LOPEZ and Exhibits attached thereto, and the Separate
15 Statement of Undisputed Material Facts.
17 exists as to whether the purported “Trustee’s Deed upon sale” as shown by the Declaration of
18 VALERIE LOPEZ and Exhibits attached thereto, and the Separate Statement of Undisputed
19 Material Facts.
21 exists as to the controversy regarding the validity purported Trustee’s Deed upon sale, regarding
22 the parties differing opinions as to whether the sale specified is in controversial of DEFENDANTS
23 rights to due process under the State Constitution Article 1, Section 1, and 7, as shown by the
24 Declaration of VALERIE LOPEZ and Exhibits attached thereto, and the Separate Statement of
25 Undisputed Material Facts.
26 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED.

27 DATED: _______________, 2018
___________________________________________
28 PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
2
[PROPOSED] ORDER
1 PROOF OF SERVICE
2 STATE OF CALIFORNIA )
)ss.
3 COUNTY OF ORANGE )
4
I am a citizen of the United States and a resident of the County of Orange, State of California. I am
5 over the age of eighteen (18) years and not a party to the within action; my business address 2328
Sunningdale Drive Tustin California 92782.
6
On October 28, 2015, I caused to be served the following document(s): DEFENDANT’S
7 OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S NOTICE AND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT;
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION OF VALERIE
8
LOPEZ & [PROPOSED] ORDER.
9
Steven Silverstein
10 14351 Redhill Avenue #G
Tustin California 92780
11
12 (X) (MAIL) I caused such document, in a sealed addressed envelope, with postage thereon fully
prepaid, to be placed in the United States mail.
13
( ) (BY PERSONAL DELIVERY) I personally delivered a copy of the document, in a sealed
14 addressed envelope, by hand to the offices of the addressee.
( ) (BY FAX) I served such document by facsimile transmission from 16458 Bolsa Chica St.,
15 Huntington Beach, California 92649 on ______________to the above listed individuals.
16 ( ) (EXPRESS DELIVERY) I caused such document, in a sealed addressed envelope, with postage
thereon fully prepaid, to be delivered by overnight delivery by __________________, at Fountain
17 Valley, California.
18
I am "readily familiar” with the firm's practice of collection and processing correspondence for
19 mailing. It is deposited with the United States Postal Service on that same day in the ordinary course
of business. I am aware that on motion of a party served, service is presumed invalid if postal
20 cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one (1) day after date of deposit for mailing in
21 affidavit.
22 I declare under penalty of perjury of the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and
correct and that their declaration was executed on June 20, 2018 at Tustin, California.
23
24 _______________________________
25
26
27
28
1
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1 VALERIE LOPEZ (SPACE BELOW FOR FILE STAMP ONLY)

2328 Sunningdale Drive

3 of CCP § 437a on the following grounds:

4 1. This court is an improper venue when title is disputed. [California Benchguide

5 III. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ...................................................................................... 4

6 IV. LEGAL ARGUMENT.................................................................................................... 7

10 C. STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH STATUTORY PROCEDURE IS

15 1. Proper Service of three-day Notice to Quit. .................................................... 10

5 H. A CALIFORNIA COURT HAS RULED THAT SUMMARY JUDGMENT

9 J. PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO MEET ITS INITIAL BURDEN OF

12 1. QUESTIONS OF TITLE MAY BE ADJUDICATED IN AN EVICTION

4 Calhoun (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 428, 438.)

16 illegal auction of 3/22/2018.

17 II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

21 Further, an adverse action is pending in 8:18-cv-00452-DOC-KES to address the defective

26 concurrently-filed Request for Judicial Notice as Exhibits A – E and Exhibits of Defendant’s

2 to evict an owner with superior title pursuant to CCP Section 1162.

3 III. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

9 prerequisites under CCP 1161a, as to perfection of Title, as in accordance with California

10 Foreclosure law, under Section 2924 of the Civil Code.

22 begin an Unlawful Detainer action.

2 subject deed of trust was created.

16 Complaint, which is judicially-noticeable by this Court, that:

17 (1) Plaintiff is not a real party in interest based on a void lien;

20 conveyed in compliance with Civil Code § 2924;

22 subject property; and,

13 C. STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH STATUTORY PROCEDURE IS

22 of such service. Plaintiff's inconsistent declarations and discovery responses and

23 Defendants' counter-declarations denying such service creates a triable issue of fact.

24 Both of the Declarations filed by Stephen A. Raheb are contradicted by the

22 a. California Code of Civil Procedure section 1161(a).

3 (which are California’s non-judicial foreclosure statute).

15 the Orange County Court as of ________________________, against adverse artificial persons

16 VALLEY BANK AND TRUST CORPORATION, DOVENMUHELLE MORTGAGE

17 CORPORATION AND NORTHWEST TRUSTEE SERVICES, INC. (Case No. 30-2015-

19 property. (U.C.C. 8-302)

23 adverse claim, as a matter of law.

24 Consequently, Plaintiff cannot be a Bona fide Purchaser of Defendant’s property. This

13 did allege trustee become duly perfected trustee.

15 bonafide purchasers who pay value.

13 value, as a matter of law.

19 826, 857 fn. 4.

23 Cal. App.4th 1398, 1405, 1406.

26 Company, (1997) 54 Cal. App.4th 1370, 1376, 63 Cal. Rptr.2d 522.

16 doesn't even warrant shifting the burden to respond to the Defendant.

17 1. QUESTIONS OF TITLE MAY BE ADJUDICATED IN AN EVICTION

22 company never registered to conduct intra – commerce in the State of California.

25 Deed of Trust was created on November 1, 2018.

26 The authenticity of Exhibit 1 is immediately called into question because the

27 lender was not a legal business on November 1, 2005 in California according to

28 Secretary of State and California Business Oversight . Refer to Defendant’s

3 Deed of Trust Recording No. 2005000893409 is void due to non-existent lender.

16 should focus on issue finding, not resolving issues of fact.

22 Typically, in summary judgment litigation, equally conflicting evidence requires a trial

24 As the evidence shown by DEFENDANT LOPEZ is at least as credible and conflicts

27 reasonable inferences therefrom must be accepted as true. Grant-Burton v. Covenant Care,

28 Inc., (2002) 99 Cal. App. 4th 1361, 1369.

3 without due protect of the supreme law of the land.

7 host of authorities cited, herein.

8 A judgment may not be rendered in violation of constitutional protections. The validity of a

3 Judgment. Defendant acknowledges that if it were the Plaintiff in a proceeding challenging a

10 Summary Judgment must be denied.