CRIM LAW 2 – SLANDER
From the cited PH cases in the ponencia, it can be inferred that
VICTORIO V. CA
G.R. No. 32836-37 | May 31, 1989 | Bidin
PETITIONERS: Daniel and Exequiel Victorio
RESPONDENTS: CA and People of the Philippines
SUMMARY OF THE CASE
Right after the hearing of an administrative case the petitioners filed against certain
Judge Guiang. a policeman named Emiliano Manuzon overheard their conversation
wherein they uttered defamatory wards such as “tunaw naman ang utak”,
“suwapang”, and “estapador” against Atty. Ruiz who serves as the counsel for Judge
Guiang. From these acts, they were convicted with serious oral defamation by the
RTC. Upon appeal to the CA, the respondent court affirmed the TC decision but
modified the penalty to the indeterminate sentence of 1 month and 1 day of arresto
mayor as minimum to 1 year and 1 day of prison correccional as maximum. With this
ruling, the petitioner filed the current petition wherein he argued that he shall be
charged with slight oral defamation only instead of grave oral defamation.
The SC affirmed the CA decision and held that the petitioner shall be convicted of
serious oral defamation because he imputed the crime of estafa against Atty. Ruiz
which is a serious and insulting imputation. Moreover, since the respondent is a
lawyer, his statements against Atty. Ruiz with regard to his performance of his
profession are libelous and actionable per se. Finally, the court rejected the
petitioner’s contention that he shall be only convicted of slight oral defamation
because he uttered the statements out of anger since the CA already found that there
was no lawful cause for Victorio to be angry because Atty. Ruiz did not provoke him
at all.
PROVISIONS APPLICABLE
Article 358 – Slander : Oral defamation shall be punished by arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period if it is of a serious and
insulting nature; otherwise the penalty shall be arresto menor or a fine not exceeding
200 pesos.
[FROM REYES]: Factors that determine gravity of the offense: 1) Expressions used ;
2) Personal relations of the accused and the offended party; 3) Circumstances
surrounding the case; 4) Social standing and position of the offended party are also
taken into account
DOCTRINES OF THE CASE
1) Defamatory words will fall under serious or slight oral defamation, not depending
upon their sense and grammatical meaning judging them separately, but also upon
the special circumstance of the case, antecedents or relationship between the
offended party and the offender, which might tend to prove the intention of the
offender at the time.
there is grave oral defamation if there is an imputation of a crime or vice, or
immorality.
● IN THE CASE AT BAR: Victorio admitted calling Atty. Ruiz as “estapador”
which attributes to the latter the crime of estafa, a serious and insulting
imputation against a prominent lawyer
2) No special circumstance need be shown for the defamatory words uttered to be
considered grave oral defamation.
● IN THE CASE AT BAR: As the imputation of estafa strikes deep into Atty.
Ruiz’s character, no special circumstance need be shown for the defamatory
words uttered to be considered grave oral defamation.
3) Defamatory words uttered specifically against a lawyer when touching on his
profession are libelous per se.
● IN THE CASE AT BAR: The fact that the offended party is a lawyer, the words
such as “kayabang”, “tunaw ang utak”, “swapang at estapador”, imputed
against him has the import of charging him with dishonesty or improper
practice of his duties, hence are actionable per se.
4) When an anger was not lawfully caused, the argument that defamatory words
uttered in the heat of anger could only give rise to slight oral defamation is rejected.
● IN THE CASE AT BAR: The defamatory words were uttered by the petitioner
without provocation by the private respondent, hence the anger was unlawful
and cannot give rise to slight oral defamation.
FACTS
1) Atty. Vivencio Ruiz has been the attorney of petitioner Exequiel Victorio in civil
cases from 1953 to 1963, when the petitioner decided to hire the services of
another lawyer, Atty. L. Castillo, to replace Atty Ruiz and his collaborator Judge
Alfredo Guiang, then Muncipal Judge of Guimba, Nueva Ecija.
2) Exequiel and his wife then filed an administrative charge against Judge Guiang,
which was assigned to the sala of Judge Ramon Avancena, Presiding Judge of CFI of
Nueva Ecija.
3) January 6, 1964: During the hearing of the administrative case, Atty. Castillo, the
counsel for Victorios, presented an urgent motion to disqualify Judge Avancena to
hear the administrative case.
● Judge Avancena called down Atty. Castillo and gave him a lecture
● Atty. Ruiz, as counsel for Judge Guiang, moved that Atty. Castillo be citedfor
contempt of court.
4) After the hearing and while Exequiel and his son Daniel were walking down the
corridor leading to the stairs from the sala of Judge Avancena, petitioners were
overheard by Emiliano Manuzon (a policeman of Cabanatuan and one of the
witnesses for the prosecution), to have uttered the following defamatory words:
DANIEL: “Kayabang ng putang-inang abogadong Ruiz na iyan, tunaw naman ang
utak, suwapang, at estapador.”
EXEQUIEL: “Lastog ta ukinnanata abogado Ruiz, suwapang, estapador, paltogak ta
ukinana ta abogado Ruiz, suwapang ken estapador” (In Tagalog: Mayabang yang
putang-inang abogado Ruiz na iyan, babarilin ko ang putang inang iyan,
suwapang at estapador)
5) February 8, 1964: Daniel and Exequiel were separately charged with the crime of
Serious Oral Defamation. Both of them pleaded not guilty upon arraignment and
the cases were tried jointly.
6) April 10, 1968: The trial court convicted of Grave Oral Defamation and was
sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of 6 months and 1 day.
● The petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the TC decision was denied
by the trial court so they appealed to the CA.
7) October 9, 1968: the CA affirmed the TC decision but modified the penalty to
the indeterminate sentence of 1 month and 1 day of arresto mayor as minimum to 1
year and 1 day of prison correccional as maximum.
● The petitioners’ motion for reconsideration filed on the CA was denied by the
court. Hence this petition for review on certiorari of the CA decision..
8) February 11, 1971: the SC resolved to deny the petition for insufficient showing
that the findings of facts are unsupported by substantial evidence and for lack of
merit. However, on April 15, 1971 resolution of SC, the Court resolved to give
due course to the petition for review on certiorari by the petitioners.
9) October 15, 1974: Counsel for petitioners-appellants filed a motion to dismiss G.R.
No. L-32836 manifesting that Exequiel Victorio died on April 14, 1974.
● December 18, 1974: There being no objection, the Court dismissed the
charges against Exequiel Victorio.
10) In the petitioner’s brief for this petition, he abandoned all assignment of errors in
CA decision. He practically admitted that crime charged but to a lesser degree:
slight oral defamation only instead of grave oral defamation.
ISSUES, HELD, AND RATIO
W/N the defamatory words by Daniel constitute serious oral defamation or simply
slight oral defamation? – SERIOUS ORAL DEFAMATION
● Oral defamation or slander is defined as speaking of base and defamatory
words which tend to prejudice another in his reputation, office, trade,
business or means of livelihood.
● Art. 358 of RPC demarcates serious and slight oral defamation
o Punished by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prison
correccional in its minimum period if it is of a serious and
insulting nature
o Otherwise, the penalty shall be arresto mayor or a fine not
exceeding 200 pesos
● To determine if the offense is serious or slight oral defamation, the
Court adopted the following guidelines:
o : “x x x defamatory words will fall under one or the other, not
depending upon their sense and grammatical meaning judging
them separately, but also upon the special circumstance of the
case, antecedents or relationship between the offended party
and the offender, which might tend to prove the intention of the
offender at the time.”
● The court also cited several jurisprudence involving oral defamation:
⮚ Citing PH cases:
o Balite v. People: Imputing the crime of estafa is serious and
insulting, thus constitutes grave oral defamation
o U.S. v. Tolosa: A woman of violent temper imputing unchastity
against a respectable married lady committed grave slander
because imputing vice or immorality to another would gravely
prejudice the reputation of the person insulted.
o People v. Arcand: A priest who called the offended party a gangster
is convicted of slight slander because there was no imputation of
a crime nor a vice or immorality.
▪ FROM THESE CASES, it can be inferred that there is
grave oral defamation if there is an imputation of a
crime or vice, or immorality.
⮚ Citing US cases:
o Kleeberg v. Sipser: statements concerning plaintiff in his
professional capacity as an attorney are libelous per se
and the complaint, even in the absence of allegation of special
damage, states a cause of action
o Kraushaar v LaVin: “Oral Statements that a certain lawyer is
‘unethical’ or a false charge dealing with office, trade,
occupation, business or profession of a person charged
are slanderous per se”.
o Pollard v. Lyon: Oral Slander as a cause of action can be
divided into several classes, which among others include: (3)
Defamatory words falsely spoken of a person which impute to
the party unfitness to perform the duties of an office or
employment xxx”; (4) “Defamatory words falsely spoken of a
party which prejudice such party in his profession or trade”
▪ FROM THESE CASES, it can be inferred that
defamatory words uttered specifically against a
lawyer when touching on his profession are
libelous per se and are thus actionable
● IN THE CASE AT BAR:
On imputing the crime of estafa
 o Victorio admitted calling Atty. Ruiz as “estapador” which attributes
to the latter the crime of estafa, a serious and insulting
imputation against a prominent lawyer
▪ One time Justice of the Peace and member of the
Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija.
▪ For sometime, Atty. Ruiz was also the president of the
Nueva Ecija Bar Association
o As the imputation strikes deep into Atty. Ruiz’s character, no
special circumstance need be shown for the defamatory words
uttered to be considered grave oral defamation.

On the offended party who is a lawyer

o The fact that the offended party is a lawyer, the words such as
“kayabang”, “tunaw ang utak”, “swapang at estapador”, imputed
against him has the import of charging him with dishonesty or
improper practice of his duties, hence are actionable per se.

On petitioner’s contention that defamatory words uttered in the heat of anger

could only give rise to slight oral defamation

o The court disagrees to the petitioner’s reliance upon the cases of

People v. Doronila and People v. Modesto because these cases
are decided by the CA and not by the SC, hence not binding to
the SC
▪ Nevertheless, these cases would still not help him in his
cause because the petitioner’s anger was not lawfully
caused.
● There was no reason for the Victorio to be angry
at Atty. Ruiz who was merely performing his
duties as a lawyer in the defense of his client.
● The defamatory words were uttered by the
petitioner without provocation by the private
respondent.
o As a matter of fact, as found by the CA,
the scurrilous remarks were found to
have been uttered in a loud voice, in
the presence of at least 10 persons¸
taken seriously by the offended party
and without provocation on his part.

RULING

The petition is denied for lack of merit and the appealed decision is affirmed in
toto.