THE ESTATE OF THE LATE JUAN B GUTIERREZ VS.

HEIRS OF SPOUSES JOSE AND GRACITA

CABANGON
760 SCRA 197; June 22, 2015

FACTS:

Spouses Jose and Gracita Cabangon bought three (3) lots from Juan B. Guttierez for a total of P 45,223.53 to be paid
in several installments. Juan allegedly promised to transfer the title upon full payment. Having almost paid the
property in full, Juan stopped collecting payment and told the spouses that he would no longer proceed with the sale,
unless they would be willing to take only one of the original 3 lots.

The spouses did not agree with the new condition and thus, were compelled to consign with the remaining amount
with the Clerk of Court and filed a suit for Specific Performance and Damages before the Regional Trial Court,
Cotabato Branch 13 praying that Juan accepts the payment and transfer the ownership of the said properties.

The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision on August 26, 2005 ordering the transfer of ownership, possession,
and control of the subject lots to the spouses and granted the Motion for Execution of Judgment, it also directed the
issuance of a Writ of Execution.

Petitioners filed a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus before the Court of Appeals, contending that
the decision and subsequent orders are null and void for lack of jurisdiction, power and authority over the case for
Judge Ibrahim was already the presiding judge of the court at the time of their issuances, therefore, Judge Indar had
no authority to decide over the case dues to the latter being assigned to RTC, Branch 14.

The appellate court denied the petition and sustained the ruling of the Regional Trial Court. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellate court erred in affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court for lack of jurisdiction,
power, and authority.

HELD:

The appellate court did not err in affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations of the complaint
which comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action. The nature of an
action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it is determined based on the allegations of the complaint
of the plaintiff, regardless of whether or not he is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.
The averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted. In this case, the
action which the spouses Cabangon filed was one for specific performance, well within the jurisdiction of RTC,
Cotabato.

As for the authority of Judge Indar, to issue the assailed decision, it is settled that cases have been submitted for
decision or those past the trial stage, such as when all the parties have finished presenting their evidence, prior to the
transfer or promotion, shall be esolved or disposed by the judge to which these are raffled or assigned.
 HEIRS OF FRANCISCO BIHAG VS. HEIRS OF NICASIO BATHAN
723 SCRA 499; 23 April 2014

FACTS:

Petitioners alleged that sometime in the 1960’s, respondent Primitiva approached her brother, Francisco, to borrow
money. Since he did not have money at that time, she asked him to mortgage his unregistered land in Mandaue City,
to the Rural Bank of Mandaue so that she could get a loan. Respondent promised to pay the obligation to the bank
and that she would return to him the documents, which were submitted to the bank in support of the loan
application. Francisco agreed on the condition that respondent would pay the real property tax of the subject land
while it was mortgaged.

Francisco died on December 13, 1976 and petitioners found out that the mortgage had long been cancelled;
respondents did not return the documents, and petitioners later discovered that respondents took possession of the
land and were hauling materials and limestones from it to the prejudice of petitioners. Petitioners prayed that a
Temporary Restraining Order be issued against the latter to enjoin them from entering the land and from hauling
materials therefrom. On the same day, RTC issued a TRO against respondents for a period of 20 days, pending the
resolution of petitioners’ application for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.

Respondents, in their Answer, denied the material allegations of the Complaint and interposed the defenses of lack
of cause of action and laches. Claiming that respondent spouses already owned the land when it was mortgaged to
the Rural Bank of Mandaue in the 1960’s, they alleged that in 1956, Francisco borrowed money from Primitiva
using the tax declarations of the land as collateral; that he failed to pay the loan; thus, in 1959, he verbally sold the
land to respondent spouses. Respondents insisted that petitioners knew about the sale, as evidenced by the Extra-
Judicial Declaration of Heirs with Deed of Sale, which was signed by some of the petitioners in 1984.

Petitioners countered that the signatures of those who signed the declaration of Heirs with Deed of Sale were
obtained through fraud, barely knowing how to read and were in their twilight years when they signed the
documents. RTC issued an Order granting petitioners’ application for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction. Trial then ensued.

On March 20, 2006, RTC issued a Decision in favor of respondents. It gave credence to their version that Francisco
sold the land to respondent Primitiva in 1959. In addition, RTC ruled that petitioners are estopped from claiming
ownership over the said land by reason of laches, that respondents have been in possession of the land for more than
30 years and Francisco, during his lifetime, never disputed their public and peaceful possession of the land.

Petitioners moved for a reconsideration but the RTC denied the same in its August 11, 2006 Order. Unfazed,
petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal on October 2, 2006.

RTC issued an Order denying the Notice of Appeal, declaring that the Notice of Appeal showed that petitioners
received a copy of the Decision on April 20, 2006 but filed the Motion for Reconsideration on April 28, 2006 after
the lapse of eight days. Furthermore, they received a copy of the Order denying their motion on September 22, 2006
but filed the Notice of Appeal on October 2, 2006 after the lapse of ten days. Thus, the Notice of Appeal was filed
after the lapse of the fifteen days reglementary period or to be exact after the lapse of eighteen days.

Based on the case cited above, they only had seven days from the date of receipt of the Order denying the Motion
for Reconsideration to file the Notice of Appeal.

Respondents filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution, which petitioners did not oppose. RTC issued
an Order granting the Motion and on May 2, 2007, it issued a Writ of Execution.

On October 10, 2007, petitioners filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a TRO
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which the CA dismissed, being
insufficient in form and substance.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration attaching a copy of the RTC’s August 24, 2007 Order and
explaining that no motion for reconsideration was filed since they never received a copy of the RTC’s January 5,
2007 Order, denying their Notice of Appeal.

CA issued a Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners for lack of merit.

ISSUE:

Whether the disapproval of the Notice of Appeal undertaken by petitioners from the judgment of the RTC was in
accordance with law.

HELD:

Petitioners’ Notice of Appeal was timely filed as they had a fresh 15-day period from the time they received the
Order denying their Motion for Reconsideration within which to file their Notice of Appeal.

While petitioners’ Notice of Appeal was erroneously denied by the RTC, SC is constrained to deny the instant
Petition as the January 5, 2007 Order, denying petitioners’ Notice of Appeal, has attained finality. It is a settled rule
that a decision or order becomes final and executory if the aggrieved party fails to appeal or move for a
reconsideration within 15 days from his receipt of the court’s decision or order disposing of the action or
proceeding. Once it becomes final and executory, the decision or order may no longer be amended or modified, not
even by an appellate court.

In the given case, petitioners, through their counsel, received a copy of the assailed January 5, 2007 Order, as
evidenced by the Certification of the assistant postmaster. As such, petitioners should have filed their motion for
reconsideration within 15 days, or on or before February 6, 2007, but they did not.

Instead, they filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals on October 10, 2007. At this time, the RTC’s
January 5, 2007 Order denying the Notice to Appeal had long become final and executory. Petitioners’ mere denial
of the receipt of the assailed Order cannot prevail over the Certification issued by the assistant postmaster as SC
have consistently declared that “the best evidence to prove that notice was sent would be a certification from the
postmaster, who should certify not only that the notice was issued or sent but also as to how, when and to whom the
delivery and receipt was made.”

Considering that the January 5, 2007 Order has attained finality, it may no longer be modified, altered, or disturbed,
even if the modification seeks to correct an erroneous conclusion by the court that rendered it.
 ERNESTO OPPEN, INC., VS. ALBERTO COMPAS
753 SCRA 546; October 21, 2015

FACTS:

The subject matter of the present case involves two (2) parcels of land, located in Las Piñas City, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. S-100612 and TCT No. S-100613, previously registered in the name of
Philippine Merchant Marine School, Inc. (PMMSI).

On May 21, 1984, the said properties were levied upon pursuant to the decision rendered, and the writ of execution
issued, by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 7, Manila. The MeTC-Branch 7 decision approved the compromise
agreement between Manufacturers Building, Inc. (MBI) and PMMSI. Thereafter, the Notice of Levy in favor of MBI
was annotated. Pursuant to the writ of execution issued by the MeTC, Branch 16, Manila (MeTC-Branch 16),
Ernesto Oppen Inc. (EOI), annotated its lien on TCT No. S-100162..

A certificate of sale was issued in its favor on and entered on TCT No. S-100612. The said property was later sold
in a public auction, EOI was the highest bidder and the Final Deed of Sale, dated September 28, 1990, was issued
after the lapse of the redemption period. Subsequently, EOI filed for the cancellation of PMMSI’s title and the
issuance of a new one under EOI’s name. Pursuant to a writ of execution, dated December 9, 2003, TCT No. 95712
in the name of EOI, was issued cancelling on March 18, 2004 TCT No. S-100612.
Meanwhile, on September 2, 2002, an alias writ of execution was issued by MeTC-Branch 7 in connection with
the case between PMMSI and MBI. On November 8, 2002, the properties covered by TCT Nos. S-100612 and S-
100613 were sold in a public auction in which respondent Alberto Compas (Compas) was the winning bidder and
had the sale annotated on both titles on November 11, 2002. The Final Deed of Sale was issued to Compas after
PMMSI failed to redeem the said properties during the redemption period which expired on November 11, 2003.

On September 28, 2005, Compas filed a petition for the cancellation of TCT Nos. S-100612 and S-100613 and for
the issuance of new titles in his name before RTC-Las Piñas. Upon learning that TCT No. S-100162 had been
cancelled and TCT No. T-95712 had been issued in its place under EOI’s name, Compas filed his Motion to Admit
Amended Petition.

EOI filed two motions to dismiss the Amended Petition of Compas. The first motion to dismiss was filed on the
ground of failure to state a cause of action. It was denied by RTC-Las Piñas on the ground that Compas could
rightfully enforce its lien on the property under EOI’s name.

Thereafter, EOI filed a second motion to dismiss arguing that under Section 108 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1529, the court with jurisdiction was the court where the original registration was filed and docketed. Hence, the
case should have been filed with the courtwhich heard the proceedings for original registration

RTC-Las Piñas issued an order denying EOI’s second motion to dismiss on the ground that Section 108 of P.D. No.
1529 was inapplicable and that it was vested with jurisdiction under Section 2 thereof.

EOI sought for reconsideration but said court denied the motion. Aggrieved, EOI filed a petition for certiorari with
the CA alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of RTC-Las Piñas for denying its second motion to dismiss and
its motion for reconsideration filed in relation thereto.

CA rendered the questioned decision sustaining the jurisdiction of RTC-Las Piñas over the amended petition. The
CA stated that Section 2 of P.D. No. 1529 was the applicable provision in determining whether the RTC had
jurisdiction. Whereas Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529 was inapplicable for the proceedings contemplated therein were
summary in nature and relief under the said provision could be granted only when there was unanimity among the
parties

EOI moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the RTC has jurisdiction to hear the amended petition of EOI.

HELD:

The jurisdiction of regional trial courts in land registration cases is conferred by Section 2 of P.D. No. 1529. It
expressly provides:

Section 2. Nature of registration proceedings; jurisdiction of courts.—Judicial proceedings for the

registration of lands throughout the Philippines shall be in rem and shall be based on the generally accepted
principles underlying the Torrens system.

Courts of First Instance shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications for original registration of
title to lands, including improvements and interests therein, and over all petitions filed after original
registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or
petitions. The court through its clerk of court shall furnish the Land Registration Commission with two
certified copies of all pleadings, exhibits, orders, and decisions filed or issued in applications or petitions for
land registration, with the exception of stenographic notes, within five days from the filing or issuance
thereof.

The CA was correct in stating that EOI’s reliance on Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529 was misplaced. The
appellate court aptly cited Philippine Veterans Bank v. Valenzuela where the Court held that the prevailing rule was
that proceedings under Section 108 were summary in nature, contemplating corrections or insertions of mistakes,
which were only clerical, but certainly not controversial issues. Section 108 states that:

Sec. 108. Amendment and alterations of certificates.—No erasure, alteration, or amendment shall be made
upon the registration book after the entry of a certificate of title or of a memorandum thereon and the
attestation of the same by the Register of Deeds, except by order of the proper Court of First Instance. x x x
All petitions or motions filed under this Section as well as any other provision of this Decree after original
registration shall be filed and entitled in the original case in which the decree or registration was entered.

Even granting that Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529 was applicable, EOI’s second motion to dismiss should still be
denied. The second paragraph of Section 108 provides that all petitions or motions, as well as under any other
provision of P.D. No. 1529 after original registration, shall be filed in the original case in which the decree or
registration was made.
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO. VS. LAMB CONSTRUCTION CONSORTIUM CORPORATION
606 SCRA 159; November 27, 2009

.
FACTS:

Respondent Lamb Construction Consortium Corporation obtained a P5.5 million loan from petitioner Metropolitan
Bank & Trust Co., subject to 18% interest per annum. To secure the loan, respondent executed a Real Estate
Mortgage in favor of petitioner involving six parcels of land.

Respondent failed to pay the loan upon maturity hence petitioner filed a petition for the extra-judicial foreclosure of
the said properties. During the auction sale, petitioner emerged as the highest bidder and was accordingly issued a
Certificate of Sale.

During the period of redemption, petitioner filed a verified petition for issuance of a writ of possession. Petitioner
alleged that notwithstanding its demands, respondent refused and failed to turn over actual possession of the
foreclosed properties. The case was docketed and raffled to Branch 257 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Parañaque City. While the petition was pending with the trial court, respondent redeemed the property.

Afterwards, RTC rendered a Decision denying petitioner’s application for the issuance of a writ of possession
because it failed to deposit the surplus proceeds from the foreclosure sale.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was denied.

On appeal, CA ruled that petitioner is entitled to a writ of possession, the issuance of which is ministerial upon the
court. At the same time, the appellate court ruled that petitioner is obliged to return the excess of the bid price over
the outstanding obligation, since the application of the proceeds from the sale of the mortgaged property to the
mortgagor’s obligation is an act of payment, not payment by dation. It then found imperative that an assessment of
the total outstanding debt be made in order to resolve whether there was any surplus proceeds, which must be
returned to respondent. Thus, based on its computation, the appellate court held that petitioner must deliver to
respondent the surplus proceeds of P488,289.35 with legal interest from 27 January 2000 until it is paid, which
amount represents the balance of the obligation as well as interest and penalty charges at the time of foreclosure
sale.

Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, which was denied by the CA.

ISSUE:

Whether the court can rule upon the surplus or excess of the purchase price upon issuing a writ of possession

HELD:

No. The petition is meritorious.

In Sulit v. Court of Appeals, SC withheld the issuance of a writ of possession for the mortgagee failed to deliver the
surplus from the proceeds of the foreclosure sale, which is equivalent to approximately 40% of the total mortgage
debt. Sulit was considered as an exception to the general rule that it is ministerial upon the court to issue a writ of
possession even during the period of redemption. We explained that equitable considerations prevailing in said case
demand that a writ of possession should not issue.

In the subsequent case of Saguan v. Philippine Bank of Communications, however, SC clarified that the exception
made in Sulit does not apply when the period to redeem has already expired or when ownership over the property
has already been consolidated in favor of the mortgagee-purchaser. In other words, even if the mortgagee-purchaser
fails to return the surplus, a writ of possession must still be issued. In the instant case, the period to redeem has
already lapsed. Thus, following the ruling in Saguan, the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the petitioner is
in order.
The failure of the mortgagee to deliver the surplus proceeds does not affect the validity of the foreclosure sale. It
gives rise to a cause of action for the mortgagee to file an action to collect the surplus proceeds.

Relatedly, we held in Sulit that if the mortgagee is retaining more of the proceeds of the sale than he is entitled to,
this fact alone will not affect the validity of the sale but simply gives the mortgagor a cause of action to recover
such surplus.

In the instant case, the cadastral court is without jurisdiction to order petitioner to deliver to respondent the surplus
or excess of the purchase price. The only issue in a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession is the purchaser’s
entitlement to possession. No documentary or testimonial evidence is even required for the issuance of the writ as
long as the verified petition states the facts sufficient to entitle the purchaser to the relief requested. As held
in Saguan, when the mortgagee-purchaser fails to return the surplus, the remedy of a mortgagor “lies in a separate
civil action for collection of a sum of money,” thus:

“However, petitioners’ remedy lies in a separate civil action for collection of a sum of money. We have
previously held that where the mortgagee retains more of the proceeds of the sale than he is entitled to, this
fact alone will not affect the validity of the sale but simply gives the mortgagor a cause of action to recover
such surplus. In the same case, both parties can establish their respective rights and obligations to one
another, after a proper liquidation of the expenses of the foreclosure sale, and other interests and claims
chargeable to the purchase price of the foreclosed property. The court can then determine the proper
application of compensation with respect to respondent’s claim on petitioners’ remaining unsecured
obligations. In this regard, respondent is not precluded from itself filing a case to collect on petitioners’
remaining debt.

An action to collect the surplus proceeds is improper where there is a pending action for the nullification of the
foreclosure proceedings.

Unlike in the case of Saguan where the mortgagors did not challenge the validity of the foreclosure but only
demanded the return of the surplus, respondent in this case sought to set aside the foreclosure sale. In fact, a
Complaint for Nullification of Foreclosure Proceedings and Damages was filed before the RTC of Parañaque
docketed and raffled to Branch 194. The filing of a separate case for the collection of surplus by respondent would
therefore be improper while the annulment case is still pending.

It bears stressing that the collection of surplus is inconsistent with the annulment of foreclosure because in suing for
the return of the surplus proceeds, the mortgagor is deemed to have affirmed the validity of the sale since nothing is
due if no valid sale has been made. It is only after the dismissal of complaint for annulment or when the foreclosure
sale is declared valid that the mortgagor may recover the surplus in an action specifically brought for that purpose.
However, to avoid multiplicity of suits, the better recourse is for the mortgagor to file a case for annulment of
foreclosure with an alternative cause of action for the return of the surplus, if any.

Respondent did a similar recourse. In its complaint for nullification of foreclosure proceedings and damages pending
before Branch 194 of the RTC of Parañaque City, it alleged, among others, that “the payments made by
the respondent on the interest and principal were misapplied and therefore a re-computation is necessary to
determine the amount of the obligation.” Consequently, there is no need for respondent to file a separate case for
collection of surplus in case the court affirms the validity of the foreclosure sale. Once the foreclosure is declared
valid and a re-computation of the total amount of obligation is made, the court in the same case may order petitioner
to return the surplus, if any, pursuant to the legal maxim, Nemo cum alterius detrimento locupletari potest—no
person shall be allowed to enrich himself unjustly at the expense of others.
 SPOUSES WILLIAM GENATO and REBECCA GENATO VS. RITA VIOLA
611 SCRA 677; February 5, 2010

FACTS:

Thirty-four individuals including Rita Viola, filed a complaint titled “VILLA REBECCA HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION, INC. versus MR. WILLIAM GENATO and spouse REBECCA GENATO” was filed with the
HLURB.

Prior to the filing of the complaint, a cease and desist order (CDO) was issued by HLUR enjoining them for the
collection of amortization payments. When HLURB lifted the CDO, complainants wanted to resume their
amortization payments but Spouses Genato refused and demanded a lump sum payment instead.

Complainants are praying that Spouses Genato accept the complainants’ monthly amortization payments
corresponding to the period of effectivity of the subsequently lifted CDO, without any penalty; and at 3% interest for
those with delinquent payments. They also prayed for correction of deficiencies in the construction of commercial
wells , water pump facilities and proper drainage in the subdivision.

HLURB granted the reliefs prayed for. This decision was revised and then reinstated; and subsequently became final
and executor. The HLURB Arbiter Torres issued a Writ of Execution. The sheriff seized Rita Viola’s two delivery
trucks and 315 sacks of rice.

Respondent Viola filed an Urgent Motion to Quash Execution. The two trucks were ordered released but the 315
sacks were sold at public auction to the highest bidder petitioner Rebecca Genato.

On December 15, 2000, Arbiter Torres issued an Order denying respondent Viola’s motion to quash the writ of
execution and directed her to pay the Sps. Genato.

Viola appealed the said Order and on January 10, 2003, the HLURB First Division rendered another decision
granting the motion to quash and ordering the payment of 315 sacks of rice.

The Sps. Genato appealed to the Office of the President, which affirmed the HLURB decision. The motion for
reconsideration was denied. They appealed to the Court of Appeals, the latter, affirming the decision of the Office of
the President. Hence this petition.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the honorable court of appeals erred in ruling that the HLURB has not acquired jurisdiction over
the person of respondent Rita Viola.
2. Whether after the decision has become final and executory the HLURB could still rule on the lack of
jurisdiction over the person of Rita Viola.

HELD:

1. Yes. It is not the caption of the pleading but the allegations therein that are controlling. The inclusion of names of
all the parties in the tile of the complaint is a formal requirement under Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.

However, the rules of pleadings require courts to pierce the form and go into the substance. The non-inclusion of one
or some of the names of all the complainants in the title of a complaint, is not fatal to the case, provided there is a
statement in the body of the complaint indicating that such complainant/s was/were made party to such action. This
is specially true before the HLURB where the proceedings are summary in nature without regard to legal
technicalities obtaining in the courts of law and where the pertinent concern is to promote public interest and to
assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action, application or other
proceedings.
Having been set forth in the body of the complaint as a complainant, Viola was a party to the case.

Moreover, it was only when the final and executory judgment of the HLURB was already being executed against
Viola that she, for the first time, reversed her position; and claimed that she was not a party to the case and that the
HLURB did not acquire jurisdiction over her. Viola is estopped from taking such inconsistent positions.

2. No. The April 27, 1999 HLURB Resolution has long been final and executory. Nothing is more settled in the law
than that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in
any respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it was
made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land.

The only recognized exceptions to the general rule are the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro
tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire after the
finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable. None of the exceptions is present in this case.
The HLURB decision cannot be considered a void judgment, as the tribunal tribunal rendered it with jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the complaint and, as discussed above, with jurisdiction over the parties. Hence, the same
can no longer be modified.