G.R. No.

100113 September 3, 1991

RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner, vs. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON.

JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and HON.
GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and
Management, respondents.

PARAS, J.:

We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While

ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the Court's decision in this case
would indubitably have a profound effect on the political aspect of our
national existence.

The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:

There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six

Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at
the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a
college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position
in the immediately preceding -elections. However, a majority thereof,
including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis
supplied)

The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the
1973 Constitution which similarly provides:

There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a

Chairman and eight Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the
Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of
age and holders of a college degree. However, a majority thereof, including
the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)

Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what

constitutes practice of law as a legal qualification to an appointive office.

Black defines "practice of law" as:

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal
principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It
is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct
of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers
incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of
legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It
embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters
connected with the law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by
maintaining an office where he is held out to be-an attorney, using a
letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal
matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and
fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his associate. (Black's Law
Dictionary, 3rd ed.)

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title
Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is
also considered to be in the practice of law when he:

... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person,

firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or
appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending
or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body,
committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle
controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs any act or
acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients
under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity,
engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law,
or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of
court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel.
Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)

This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil.
173,176-177) stated:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court;
it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions
and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings
on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In
general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body,
the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained
legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
(Emphasis supplied)

Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work

performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to
proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on
a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and
other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection
with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in
litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult
and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or
counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by
the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in
the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which
involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and
drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the
public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons
possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and
acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests
upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953
ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313,
quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A.
139,144). (Emphasis ours)

The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation

briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of
law in even broader terms as advocacy, counselling and public service.

One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the

profession. If what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind
usual for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he
follows some one or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing
attorney at law within the meaning of the statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW
312)

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To
engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice
or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any
degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)

The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has
adopted a liberal interpretation of the term "practice of law."

MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I
forgot to do during our review of the provisions on the Commission on Audit.
May I be allowed to make a very brief statement?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).

The Commissioner will please proceed.

MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the
Commission on Audit. Among others, the qualifications provided for by
Section I is that "They must be Members of the Philippine Bar" — I am
quoting from the provision — "who have been engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten years".

To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of

the Bar who are now employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would
like to make the clarification that this provision on qualifications regarding
members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of
law outside the COA We have to interpret this to mean that as long as the
lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or
legal talent in their respective work within COA, then they are qualified to be
considered for appointment as members or commissioners, even chairman,
of the Commission on Audit.

This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions

and Agencies and we deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this
interpretation may be made available whenever this provision on the
qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the
practice of law for at least ten years is taken up.

MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is
equivalent to the requirement of a law practice that is set forth in the Article
on the Commission on Audit?

MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although it is
auditing, will necessarily involve legal work; it will involve legal work. And,
therefore, lawyers who are employed in COA now would have the necessary
qualifications in accordance with the Provision on qualifications under our
provisions on the Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the answer is yes.

MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent
to the practice of law.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Thank you.

... ( Emphasis supplied)

Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others,
that the Chairman and two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA)
should either be certified public accountants with not less than ten years of
auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied)

Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways
synonymous with the word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not
engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the majority of lawyers are
private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM
Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).

At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as

commonly understood, means "an individual or organization engaged in the
business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are
often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The
firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some
firms may be organized as professional corporations and the members called
shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are the experienced
attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried
attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).

The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law
practice is essentially tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as
that which lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West
Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law is defined as
the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to
be the practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145
Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne,
128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform almost
every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a
definition would obviously be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).

The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the

most publicly familiar role for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the
average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in courtrooms, and a large
percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p.
593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating
lawyer's role colors much of both the public image and the self perception of
the legal profession. (Ibid.).

In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects
history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander
SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the importance of a lawyer as
a business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed
laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases
before the courts. The members of the bench and bar and the informed
laymen such as businessmen, know that in most developed societies today,
substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the
courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-
litigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending
more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as business counseling than in
trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the planner, the
diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed]
that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal
medicine can be effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11,
1989, p. 4).

In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage
in a number of legal tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal
skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested parties.
Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually
perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within
a narrow specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task
or role such as advice-giving to an importantly different one such as
representing a client before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p.
687).

By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one
of the relatively rare types — a litigator who specializes in this work to the
exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have
mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling,
advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers
find that the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective for
many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).

Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that
is constrained in very important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove
from it some of the salient features of adversarial litigation. Of these special
roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the
constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in
which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work. The
most common of these roles are those of corporate practice and government
legal service. (Ibid.).

In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted
are emerging trends in corporate law practice, a departure from the
traditional concept of practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary
transformation in corporate law practice. Lawyers and other professional
groups, in particular those members participating in various legal-policy
decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the major emerging
trends in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.

Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an

accurate understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law
research function accompanied by an accelerating rate of information
accumulation. The recognition of the need for such improved corporate legal
policy formulation, particularly "model-making" and "contingency planning,"
has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in many
decisional contexts.

In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the

sorting and weighing of significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major
trends, the necessity of estimating the consequences of given courses of
action, and the need for fast decision and response in situations of acute
danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow
theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic
computing equipment. Understandably, an improved decisional structure
must stress the predictive component of the policy-making process, wherein
a "model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is developed to
test projected alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects
flowing therefrom.

Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in

predicting and projecting the trends of the law, the subject of corporate
finance law has received relatively little organized and formalized attention
in the philosophy of advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a
cross-disciplinary approach to legal research has become a vital necessity.

Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those

trained primarily in the law can be improved through an early introduction to
multi-variable decisional context and the various approaches for handling
such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a master's or doctorate
degree in business administration or management, functioning at the legal
policy level of decision-making now have some appreciation for the concepts
and analytical techniques of other professions which are currently engaged
in similar types of complex decision-making.

Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would

require the services of an astute attorney because of the complex legal
implications that arise from each and every necessary step in securing and
maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance
Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to
as the "abogado de campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big
money and with a clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of
business and industry.

Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not
explain what it is that a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of
attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary with the size and type
of the corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations farm out all
their legal problems to private law firms. Many others have in-house counsel
only for certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to
handle most legal problems in-house.

A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the
legal affairs of a corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include,
inter alia: corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting out as
corporate secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both courts and
other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and Exchange
Commission), and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the
law.

At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the
legal affairs of the business of the corporation he is representing. These
include such matters as determining policy and becoming involved in
management. ( Emphasis supplied.)

In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated
from the action, or not understanding how one's work actually fits into the
work of the orgarnization. This can be frustrating to someone who needs to
see the results of his work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is
sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the running of
the business.

Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a

multinational corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few
opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the international law
field. After all, international law is practiced in a relatively small number of
companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign country is perceived
by many as glamorous, tills is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most
cases, however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the
younger attorneys do their "international practice" in law libraries. (Business
Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May 25,1990, p. 4).

This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of
finance. To borrow the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to
wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one
who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts
them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm,"
so to speak. No longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching method
of confining the subject study to the Corporation Code and the Securities
Code but an incursion as well into the intertwining modern management
issues.

Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types
of learning: (1) acquisition of insights into current advances which are of
particular significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable
disciplinary skins applicable to a corporate counsel's management
responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and management of
the legal function itself.

These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a

shared area linking them. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial
jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the corporate counsel's total
learning.

Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's
role. For that matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process,
including the resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he provides
counsel for are required to make, and the need to think about a
corporation's; strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state is
being reduced as firms deal both with global multinational entities and
simultaneously with sub-national governmental units. Firms increasingly
collaborate not only with public entities but with each other — often with
those who are competitors in other arenas.

Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the

corporation is rapidly changing. The modem corporate lawyer has gained a
new role as a stakeholder — in some cases participating in the organization
and operations of governance through participation on boards and other
decision-making roles. Often these new patterns develop alongside existing
legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are
complicated as corporations organize for global operations. ( Emphasis
supplied)

The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies

toward the promotion and management of technology. New collaborative
arrangements for promoting specific technologies or competitiveness more
generally require approaches from industry that differ from older, more
adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence
governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other
countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative
efforts between governmental and business Japan's MITI is world famous.
(Emphasis supplied)

Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate

Counsel comprises a distinct group within the managerial structure of all
kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary groups
within organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable factors in
the group-context interaction such as the groups actively revising their
knowledge of the environment coordinating work with outsiders, promoting
team achievements within the organization. In general, such external
activities are better predictors of team performance than internal group
processes.

In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer

vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. Current
research is seeking ways both to anticipate effective managerial procedures
and to understand relationships of financial liability and insurance
considerations. (Emphasis supplied)

Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are
apropos:

First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an
effective tool for new managerial thinking regarding both planning and
pressing immediate problems. An understanding of the role of feedback
loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of
systematic problems — physical, economic, managerial, social, and
psychological. New programming techniques now make the system dynamics
principles more accessible to managers — including corporate counsels.
(Emphasis supplied)

Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions

involving complexity and uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it
can be used to appraise the settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation
settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio
of cases. (Emphasis supplied)

Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be

used directly by parties and mediators in all lands of negotiations. All
integrated set of such tools provide coherent and effective negotiation
support, including hands-on on instruction in these techniques. A simulation
case of an international joint venture may be used to illustrate the point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function,
concern three pointed areas of consideration, thus:

Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that

comprise a major part of the general counsel's responsibilities. They differ
from those of remedial law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with
minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such
legal entities at that time when transactional or similar facts are being
considered and made.

Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken

those activities of the firm to which legal consequences attach. It needs to be
directly supportive of this nation's evolving economic and organizational
fabric as firms change to stay competitive in a global, interdependent
environment. The practice and theory of "law" is not adequate today to
facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a global economy work.

Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general

counsel has emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets
of the legal profession. The corporate counsel hear responsibility for key
aspects of the firm's strategic issues, including structuring its global
operations, managing improved relationships with an increasingly diversified
body of employees, managing expanded liability exposure, creating new and
varied interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally with more
complex make or by decisions.

This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not
enough to make one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full
sense of how the legal system shapes corporate activities. And even if the
corporate lawyer's aim is not the understand all of the law's effects on
corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also gain a working
knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the
basic legal "constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation. "Business
Star", "The Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).

The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more
than a passing knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their
work. Yet, many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law
territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the
lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding
and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p.
4).

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino

to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the
Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner
opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the
required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years.

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination

of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath
of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.

Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on

Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer,
filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said
confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections be declared null and void.

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the
bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues
paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in
1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for
more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)

After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar,
Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in the
World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for
about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting
acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and
coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning
to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief
executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business
conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies
as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former
Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL.
Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared
for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of
advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of
the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has worked
with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups,
in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian
reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his
legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quast judicial
body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the
Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of
the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments
to reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and public
accountability and the party-list system for the House of Representative. (pp.
128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used
to be a member.

In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and

which is adequately constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise
during a negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there
are the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and an
operations officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the contracts)
who comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan
Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2,
Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)

After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays

down the law as far as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of
any Loan Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental
parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3) conditions of
closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).

In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring
program. For aside from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal
advising, they score national development policies as key factors in
maintaining their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper,
entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted
by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for
International Development, during the Session on Law for the Development
of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the
World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis
supplied)

Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely

renegotiation policies, demand expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation
and agreement drafting and in renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer
may work with an international business specialist or an economist in the
formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring contract
agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they should
be carefully drafted and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in
conjunction with the guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See
International Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts, an unpublished
dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321). ( Emphasis
supplied)

A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the

set of terms and conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a
failure to perform one or more elements of the contract. A good agreement
must not only define the responsibilities of both parties, but must also state
the recourse open to either party when the other fails to discharge an
obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring represents a devotion to that
principle which in the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan
agreements-an adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international
affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
once said: "They carry no banners, they beat no drums; but where they are,
men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and serene
mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign
Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4,
Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law".
particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into
consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the
Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a
lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of
contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more
than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years.

Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA
327, the Court said:

Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by

the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition
being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If
he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there
are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political
question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing
authority can decide. (emphasis supplied)

No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service
Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where it stated:

It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all
the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative
but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law.
The Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground
that another person is more qualified for a particular position. It also has no
authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do so
would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing
authority. An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of
whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that the appointee
should possess the qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis supplied)
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar,
consists of four (4) stages: (1) nomination; (2) confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the
Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its
certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment;
and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v.
Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p.
200)

The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the

nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections is
mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the Constitution which
provides:

The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President

with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven
years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall
hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last
Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any
vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case
shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity.

Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his
definition of the practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law
practice, as distinguished from the modern concept of the practice of law,
which modern connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent
framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition would
require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practised two or three
times a week and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten
consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent.

Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that
in my written opinion, I made use of a definition of law practice which really
means nothing because the definition says that law practice " . . . is what
people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited the definition but
only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition of
law practice by "traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous"
or defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined.

Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all
situations, most individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others
on what the law means, are actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps,
but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a
member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over ten
years. This is different from the acts of persons practising law, without first
becoming lawyers.

Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected
President of the Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more
qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an action
or petition be brought against the President? And even assuming that he is
indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the
incumbent President?

We now proceed:

The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public

hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed
the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by
the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond
judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1
Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly
shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the
instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective
power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would
amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of
the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.

Additionally, consider the following:

(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the

President, may the Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and thus in
effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the negative.

(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the
Commission has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.

(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S.
Congress) decides to confirm a Presidential nominee, it would be incredible
that the U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.

Finally, one significant legal maxim is:

We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth
life.

Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of
Judea asked Delilah (who was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing
Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that —
No blade shall touch his skin;

No blood shall flow from his veins.

When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator
placed an iron rod burning white-hot two or three inches away from in front
of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had happened
to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and fuming with
righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The
procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow
from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the
spirit of the agreement.

In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-12426 February 16, 1959

PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION, petitioner, vs. CELEDONIO

AGRAVA, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office,
respondent.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

This is the petition filed by the Philippine Lawyer's Association for prohibition
and injunction against Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity as Director of the
Philippines Patent Office.

On may 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he

had scheduled for June 27, 1957 an examination for the purpose of
determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the
Philippines Patent Office, the said examination to cover patent law and
jurisprudence and the rules of practice before said office. According to the
circular, members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons with
sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified to take the said
examination. It would appear that heretofore, respondent Director has been
holding similar examinations.

It is the contention of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer's Association that one

who has passed the bar examinations and is licensed by the Supreme Court
to practice law in the Philippines and who is in good standing, is duly
qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office, and that
consequently, the cat of the respondent Director requiring members of the
Philippine Bar in good standing to take and pass an examination given by the
Patent Office as a condition precedent to their being allowed to practice
before said office, such as representing applicants in the preparation and
prosecution of applications for patent, is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in
violation of the law.

In his answer, respondent Director, through the Solicitor General, maintains

that the prosecution of patent cases "does not involve entirely or purely the
practice of law but includes the application of scientific and technical
knowledge and training, so much so that, as a matter of actual practice, the
prosecution of patent cases may be handled not only by lawyers, but also
engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training
who pass the prescribed examinations as given by the Patent Office; . . . that
the Rules of Court do not prohibit the Patent Office, or any other quasi-
judicial body from requiring further condition or qualification from those who
would wish to handle cases before the Patent Office which, as stated in the
preceding paragraph, requires more of an application of scientific and
technical knowledge than the mere application of provisions of law; . . . that
the action taken by the respondent is in accordance with Republic Act No.
165, otherwise known as the Patent Law of the Philippines, which similar to
the United States Patent Law, in accordance with which the United States
Patent Office has also prescribed a similar examination as that prescribed by
respondent. . . .

Respondent further contends that just as the Patent law of the United States
of America authorizes the Commissioner of Patents to prescribe
examinations to determine as to who practice before the United States
Patent Office, the respondent, is similarly authorized to do so by our Patent
Law, Republic Act No. 165.

Although as already stated, the Director of Patents, in the past, would appear
to have been holding tests or examinations the passing of which was
imposed as a required qualification to practice before the Patent Office, to
our knowledge, this is the first time that the right of the Director of Patents to
do so, specially as regards members of the bar, has been questioned
formally, or otherwise put in issue. And we have given it careful thought and
consideration.

The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect
to admission to the practice of law in the Philippines1 and to any member of
the Philippine Bar in good standing may practice law anywhere and before
any entity, whether judicial or quasi-judicial or administrative, in the
Philippines. Naturally, the question arises as to whether or not appearance
before the patent Office and the preparation and the prosecution of patent
applications, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of law.

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court;
it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions
and social proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on
behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In
general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law corporation services, assessment and condemnation
services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure
of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in
matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice
as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done
involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of
facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work
performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to
proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on
a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and
other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection
with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in
litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult
and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or
counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by
the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in
the order, can be drawn between that part which involves advice and
drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the
public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons
possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and
acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests
upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 (1953
ed.), p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices (Mass.), 194 N.E. 313,
quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. vs. Automobile Service Assoc. (R. I. ) 179 A.
139, 144). (Emphasis ours).

In our opinion, the practice of law includes such appearance before the
Patent Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other
persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their
oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. In the
first place, although the transaction of business in the Patent Office involves
the use and application of technical and scientific knowledge and training,
still, all such business has to be rendered in accordance with the Patent Law,
as well as other laws, including the Rules and Regulations promulgated by
the Patent Office in accordance with law. Not only this, but practice before
the Patent Office involves the interpretation and application of other laws
and legal principles, as well as the existence of facts to be established in
accordance with the law of evidence and procedure. For instance: Section 8
of our Patent Law provides that an invention shall not be patentable if it is
contrary to public order or morals, or to public health or welfare. Section 9
says that an invention shall not be considered new or patentable if it was
known or used by others in the Philippines before the invention thereof by
the inventor named in any printed publication in the Philippines or any
foreign country more than one year before the application for a patent
therefor, or if it had been in public use or on sale in the Philippines for more
than one year before the application for the patent therefor. Section 10
provides that the right to patent belongs to the true and actual inventor, his
heirs, legal representatives or assigns. Section 25 and 26 refer to connection
of any mistake in a patent. Section 28 enumerates the grounds for
cancellation of a patent; that although any person may apply for such
cancellation, under Section 29, the Solicitor General is authorized to petition
for the cancellation of a patent. Section 30 mentions the requirements of a
petition for cancellation. Section 31 and 32 provide for a notice of hearing of
the petition for cancellation of the patent by the Director of Patents in case
the said cancellation is warranted. Under Section 34, at any time after the
expiration of three years from the day the patent was granted, any person
patent on several grounds, such as, if the patented invention is not being
worked in the Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the demand for the
patented article in the Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the demand
for the patented article in the Philippines is not being met to an adequate
extent and reasonable terms, or if by reason of the patentee's refusal to
grant a license on reasonable terms or by reason of the condition attached
by him to the license, purchase or use of the patented article or working of
the patented process or machine of production, the establishment of a new
trade or industry in the Philippines is prevented; or if the patent or invention
relates to food or medicine or is necessary to public health or public safety.
All these things involve the applications of laws, legal principles, practice and
procedure. They call for legal knowledge, training and experience for which a
member of the bar has been prepared.

In support of the proposition that much of the business and many of the act,
orders and decisions of the Patent Director involve questions of law or a
reasonable and correct evaluation of facts, the very Patent Law, Republic Act
No. 165, Section 61, provides that:

. . . . The applicant for a patent or for the registration of a design, any party
to a proceeding to cancel a patent or to obtain a compulsory license, and any
party to any other proceeding in the Office may appeal to the Supreme Court
from any final order or decision of the director.

In other words, the appeal is taken to this Tribunal. If the transaction of

business in the Patent Office and the acts, orders and decisions of the Patent
Director involved exclusively or mostly technical and scientific knowledge
and training, then logically, the appeal should be taken not to a court or
judicial body, but rather to a board of scientists, engineers or technical men,
which is not the case.

Another aspect of the question involves the consideration of the nature of

the functions and acts of the Head of the Patent Office.

. . . . The Commissioner, in issuing or withholding patents, in reissues,

interferences, and extensions, exercises quasi-judicial functions. Patents are
public records, and it is the duty of the Commissioner to give authenticated
copies to any person, on payment of the legal fees. (40 Am. Jur. 537).
(Emphasis supplied).
. . . . The Commissioner has the only original initiatory jurisdiction that exists
up to the granting and delivering of a patent, and it is his duty to decide
whether the patent is new and whether it is the proper subject of a patent;
and his action in awarding or refusing a patent is a judicial function. In
passing on an application the commissioner should decide not only questions
of law, but also questions of fact, as whether there has been a prior public
use or sale of the article invented. . . . (60 C.J.S. 460). (Emphasis supplied).

The Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasi-judicial

functions, it is reasonable to hold that a member of the bar, because of his
legal knowledge and training, should be allowed to practice before the Patent
Office, without further examination or other qualification. Of course, the
Director of Patents, if he deems it advisable or necessary, may require that
members of the bar practising before him enlist the assistance of technical
men and scientist in the preparation of papers and documents, such as, the
drawing or technical description of an invention or machine sought to be
patented, in the same way that a lawyer filing an application for the
registration of a parcel of land on behalf of his clients, is required to submit a
plan and technical description of said land, prepared by a licensed surveyor.

But respondent Director claims that he is expressly authorized by the law to

require persons desiring to practice or to do business before him to submit
an examination, even if they are already members of the bar. He contends
that our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, is patterned after the United
States Patent Law; and of the United States Patent Office in Patent Cases
prescribes an examination similar to that which he (respondent) has
prescribed and scheduled. He invites our attention to the following provisions
of said Rules of Practice:

Registration of attorneys and agents. — A register of an attorneys and a

register agents are kept in the Patent Office on which are entered the names
of all persons recognized as entitled to represent applicants before the
Patent Office in the preparation and prosecution of applicants for patent.
Registration in the Patent Office under the provisions of these rules shall only
entitle the person registered to practice before the Patent Office.

(a) Attorney at law. — Any attorney at law in good standing admitted to

practice before any United States Court or the highest court of any State or
Territory of the United States who fulfills the requirements and complied with
the provisions of these rules may be admitted to practice before the Patent
Office and have his name entered on the register of attorneys.

xxx xxx xxx

(c) Requirement for registration. — No person will be admitted to practice

and register unless he shall apply to the Commissioner of Patents in writing
on a prescribed form supplied by the Commissioner and furnish all requested
information and material; and shall establish to the satisfaction of the
Commissioner that he is of good moral character and of good repute and
possessed of the legal and scientific and technical qualifications necessary to
enable him to render applicants for patent valuable service, and is otherwise
competent to advise and assist him in the presentation and prosecution of
their application before the Patent Office. In order that the Commissioner
may determine whether a person seeking to have his name placed upon
either of the registers has the qualifications specified, satisfactory proof of
good moral character and repute, and of sufficient basic training in scientific
and technical matters must be submitted and an examination which is held
from time to time must be taken and passed. The taking of an examination
may be waived in the case of any person who has served for three years in
the examining corps of the Patent Office.

Respondent states that the promulgation of the Rules of Practice of the

United States Patent Office in Patent Cases is authorized by the United States
Patent Law itself, which reads as follows:

The Commissioner of Patents, subject to the approval of the Secretary of

Commerce may prescribe rules and regulations governing the recognition of
agents, attorneys, or other persons representing applicants or other parties
before his office, and may require of such persons, agents, or attorneys,
before being recognized as representatives of applicants or other persons,
that they shall show they are of good moral character and in good repute,
are possessed of the necessary qualifications to enable them to render to
applicants or other persons valuable service, and are likewise to competent
to advise and assist applicants or other persons in the presentation or
prosecution of their applications or other business before the Office. The
Commissioner of Patents may, after notice and opportunity for a hearing,
suspend or exclude, either generally or in any particular case from further
practice before his office any person, agent or attorney shown to be
incompetent or disreputable, or guilty of gross misconduct, or who refuses to
comply with the said rules and regulations, or who shall, with intent to
defraud in any matter, deceive, mislead, or threaten any applicant or
prospective applicant, or other person having immediate or prospective
applicant, or other person having immediate or prospective business before
the office, by word, circular, letter, or by advertising. The reasons for any
such suspension or exclusion shall be duly recorded. The action of the
Commissioner may be reviewed upon the petition of the person so refused
recognition or so suspended by the district court of the United States for the
District of Columbia under such conditions and upon such proceedings as the
said court may by its rules determine. (Emphasis supplied)

Respondent Director concludes that Section 78 of Republic Act No. 165 being
similar to the provisions of law just reproduced, then he is authorized to
prescribe the rules and regulations requiring that persons desiring to practice
before him should submit to and pass an examination. We reproduce said
Section 78, Republic Act No. 165, for purposes of comparison:

SEC. 78. Rules and regulations. — The Director subject to the approval of the
Secretary of Justice, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations,
not inconsistent with law, for the conduct of all business in the Patent Office.

The above provisions of Section 78 certainly and by far, are different from
the provisions of the United States Patent Law as regards authority to hold
examinations to determine the qualifications of those allowed to practice
before the Patent Office. While the U.S. Patent Law authorizes the
Commissioner of Patents to require attorneys to show that they possess the
necessary qualifications and competence to render valuable service to and
advise and assist their clients in patent cases, which showing may take the
form of a test or examination to be held by the Commissioner, our Patent
Law, Section 78, is silent on this important point. Our attention has not been
called to any express provision of our Patent Law, giving such authority to
determine the qualifications of persons allowed to practice before the Patent
Office.

Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes every chief of

bureau to prescribe forms and make regulations or general orders not
inconsistent with law, to secure the harmonious and efficient administration
of his branch of the service and to carry into full effect the laws relating to
matters within the jurisdiction of his bureau. Section 608 of Republic Act
1937, known as the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, provides that
the Commissioner of Customs shall, subject to the approval of the
Department Head, makes all rules and regulations necessary to enforce the
provisions of said code. Section 338 of the National Internal Revenue Code,
Commonwealth Act No. 466 as amended, states that the Secretary of
Finance, upon recommendation of the Collector of Internal Revenue, shall
promulgate all needful rules and regulations for the effective enforcement of
the provisions of the code. We understand that rules and regulations have
been promulgated not only for the Bureau of Customs and Internal Revenue,
but also for other bureaus of the Government, to govern the transaction of
business in and to enforce the law for said bureaus.

Were we to allow the Patent Office, in the absence of an express and clear
provision of law giving the necessary sanction, to require lawyers to submit
to and pass on examination prescribed by it before they are allowed to
practice before said Patent Office, then there would be no reason why other
bureaus specially the Bureau of Internal Revenue and Customs, where the
business in the same area are more or less complicated, such as the
presentation of books of accounts, balance sheets, etc., assessments
exemptions, depreciation, these as regards the Bureau of Internal Revenue,
and the classification of goods, imposition of customs duties, seizures,
confiscation, etc., as regards the Bureau of Customs, may not also require
that any lawyer practising before them or otherwise transacting business
with them on behalf of clients, shall first pass an examination to qualify.

In conclusion, we hold that under the present law, members of the Philippine
Bar authorized by this Tribunal to practice law, and in good standing, may
practice their profession before the Patent Office, for the reason that much of
the business in said office involves the interpretation and determination of
the scope and application of the Patent Law and other laws applicable, as
well as the presentation of evidence to establish facts involved; that part of
the functions of the Patent director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so
that appeals from his orders and decisions are, under the law, taken to the
Supreme Court.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for prohibition is granted and the
respondent Director is hereby prohibited from requiring members of the
Philippine Bar to submit to an examination or tests and pass the same before
being permitted to appear and practice before the Patent Office. No costs.

[A.M. SDC-97-2-P. February 24, 1997]

SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant, vs. ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court

VI, Shari'a District Court, Marawi City, respondent.

DECISION

NARVASA, C.J.:

Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or
coordinator) of E. B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate
and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of
court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City. They were classmates,
and used to be friends.

It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the
purchase on installments by Alauya of one of the housing units belonging to
the above mentioned firm (hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.); and in
connection therewith, a housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the
National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya
addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the
termination of his contract with the company. He wrote:

" ** I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying you of my

intent to terminate the Contract/Agreement entered into between me and
your company, as represented by your Sales Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA
ALAWI, of your company's branch office here in Cagayan de Oro City, on the
grounds that my consent was vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit,
fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the aforesaid sales agent
which made said contract void ab initio. Said sales agent acting in bad faith
perpetrated such illegal and unauthorized acts which made said contract an
Onerous Contract prejudicial to my rights and interests."

He then proceeded to expound in considerable detail and quite acerbic

language on the "grounds which could evidence the bad faith, deceit, fraud,
misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the unscrupulous
sales agent ** ;" and closed with the plea that Villarosa & Co. "agree for the
mutual rescission of our contract, even as I inform you that I categorically
state on record that I am terminating the contract **. I hope I do not have to
resort to any legal action before said onerous and manipulated contract
against my interest be annulled. I was actually fooled by your sales agent,
hence the need to annul the controversial contract."

Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa & Co. at San
Pedro, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. The envelope containing it, and which
actually went through the post, bore no stamps. Instead at the right hand
corner above the description of the addressee, the words, "Free Postage PD
26," had been typed.

On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr. Fermin T.
Arzaga, Vice-President, Credit & Collection Group of the National Home
Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) at Salcedo Village, Makati City,
repudiating as fraudulent and void his contract with Villarosa & Co.; and
asking for cancellation of his housing loan in connection therewith, which
was payable from salary deductions at the rate of P4,338.00 a month.
Among other things, he said:

" ** (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as I hereby annul, cancel,

rescind and voided, the 'manipulated contract' entered into between me and
the E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd., as represented by its sales
agent/coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, who maliciously and fraudulently
manipulated said contract and unlawfully secured and pursued the housing
loan without my authority and against my will. Thus, the contract itself is
deemed to be void ab initio in view of the attending circumstances, that my
consent was vitiated by misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, dishonesty, and
abuse of confidence; and that there was no meeting of the minds between
me and the swindling sales agent who concealed the real facts from me."

And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some detail what he
took to be the anomalous actuations of Sophia Alawi.

Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated February
21, 1996, April 15, 1996, and May 3, 1996, in all of which, for the same
reasons already cited, he insisted on the cancellation of his housing loan and
discontinuance of deductions from his salary on account thereof.a He also
wrote on January 18, 1996 to Ms. Corazon M. Ordoez, Head of the Fiscal
Management & Budget Office, and to the Chief, Finance Division, both of this
Court, to stop deductions from his salary in relation to the loan in question,
again asserting the anomalous manner by which he was allegedly duped into
entering into the contracts by "the scheming sales agent."b

The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the Supreme Court
requesting it to stop deductions on Alauya's UHLP loan "effective May 1996,"
and began negotiating with Villarosa & Co. "for the buy-back of ** (Alauya's)
mortgage, and ** the refund of ** (his) payments."c

On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995,

Sophia Alawi filed with this Court a verified complaint dated January 25, 1996
-- to which she appended a copy of the letter, and of the above mentioned
envelope bearing the typewritten words, "Free Postage PD 26."[1] In that
complaint, she accused Alauya of:

1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds

through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith;"

2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and established
reputation;"

3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage **;" and

4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the

Philippine Bar may properly use.

She deplored Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous, swindler, forger,

manipulator, etc." without "even a bit of evidence to cloth (sic) his
allegations with the essence of truth," denouncing his imputations as
irresponsible, "all concoctions, lies, baseless and coupled with manifest
ignorance and evident bad faith," and asserting that all her dealings with
Alauya had been regular and completely transparent. She closed with the
plea that Alauya "be dismissed from the service, or be appropriately
disciplined (sic) ** "
The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint.
Conformably with established usage that notices of resolutions emanate from
the corresponding Office of the Clerk of Court, the notice of resolution in this
case was signed by Atty. Alfredo P. Marasigan, Assistant Division Clerk of
Court.[2]

Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment"[3] in which he questioned

the authority of Atty. Marasigan to require an explanation of him, this power
pertaining, according to him, not to "a mere Asst. Div. Clerk of Court
investigating an Executive Clerk of Court." but only to the District Judge, the
Court Administrator or the Chief Justice, and voiced the suspicion that the
Resolution was the result of a "strong link" between Ms. Alawi and Atty.
Marasigan's office. He also averred that the complaint had no factual basis;
Alawi was envious of him for being not only "the Executive Clerk of court and
ex-officio Provincial Sheriff and District Registrar," but also "a scion of a Royal
Family **."[4]

In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much less

aggressive, even obsequious tones,[5] Alauya requested the former to give
him a copy of the complaint in order that he might comment thereon.[6] He
stated that his acts as clerk of court were done in good faith and within the
confines of the law; and that Sophia Alawi as sales agent of Villarosa & Co.
had, by falsifying his signature, fraudulently bound him to a housing loan
contract entailing monthly deductions of P4,333.10 from his salary.

And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5, 1996, Alauya
contended that it was he who had suffered "undue injury, mental anguish,
sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering,"
considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted
from his salary.[7] He declared that there was no basis for the complaint; in
communicating with Villarosa & Co. he had merely acted in defense of his
rights. He denied any abuse of the franking privilege, saying that he gave
P20.00 plus transportation fare to a subordinate whom he entrusted with the
mailing of certain letters; that the words: "Free Postage PD 26," were
typewritten on the envelope by some other person, an averment
corroborated by the affidavit of Absamen C. Domocao, Clerk IV (subscribed
and sworn to before respondent himself, and attached to the comment as
Annex J);[8] and as far as he knew, his subordinate mailed the letters with
the use of the money he had given for postage, and if those letters were
indeed mixed with the official mail of the court, this had occurred
inadvertently and because of an honest mistake.[9]

Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is
"lexically synonymous" with "Counsellors-at-law," a title to which Shari'a
lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of "attorney"
because "counsellor" is often mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal or the
Maranao term "consial," connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor.
Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.

He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what he did "is expected
of any man unduly prejudiced and injured."[10] He claims he was
manipulated into reposing his trust in Alawi, a classmate and friend.[11] He
was induced to sign a blank contract on Alawi's assurance that she would
show the completed document to him later for correction, but she had since
avoided him; despite "numerous letters and follow-ups" he still does not
know where the property -- subject of his supposed agreement with Alawi's
principal, Villarosa & Co. -- is situated;[12] He says Alawi somehow got his
GSIS policy from his wife, and although she promised to return it the next
day, she did not do so until after several months. He also claims that in
connection with his contract with Villarosa & Co., Alawi forged his signature
on such pertinent documents as those regarding the down payment,
clearance, lay-out, receipt of the key of the house, salary deduction, none of
which he ever saw.[13]

Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without malice, Alauya
prays for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit, it consisting of
"fallacious, malicious and baseless allegations," and complainant Alawi
having come to the Court with unclean hands, her complicity in the
fraudulent housing loan being apparent and demonstrable.

It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to Assistant Clerk
of Court Marasigan (dated April 19, 1996 and April 22, 1996), and his two (2)
earlier letters both dated December 15, 1996 -- all of which he signed as
"Atty. Ashary M. Alauya" -- in his Comment of June 5, 1996, he does not use
the title but refers to himself as "DATU ASHARY M. ALAUYA."

The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for
evaluation, report and recommendation.[14]

The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters, he made
"malicious and libelous charges (against Alawi) with no solid grounds through
manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," resulting in "undue injury to (her)
and blemishing her honor and established reputation." In those letters,
Alauya had written inter alia that:

1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by gross

misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;"

2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated ** illegal and unauthorized acts
** ** prejudicial to ** (his) rights and interests;"
3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent" who had fooled
him by "deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of
confidence;" and

4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the contract with

Villarosa & Co., and unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan without
** (his) authority and against ** (his) will," and "concealed the real facts **."

Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these statements, he was

merely acting in defense of his rights, and doing only what "is expected of
any man unduly prejudiced and injured," who had suffered "mental anguish,
sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering,"
considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted
from his salary.[15]

The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees (RA 6713) inter alia enunciates the State policy of promoting a
high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service.[16]
Section 4 of the Code commands that "(p)ublic officials and employees ** at
all times respect the rights of others, and ** refrain from doing acts contrary
to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety
and public interest."[17] More than once has this Court emphasized that "the
conduct and behavior of every official and employee of an agency involved in
the administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the most junior
clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their
conduct must at all times be characterized by, among others, strict propriety
and decorum so as to earn and keep the respect of the public for the
judiciary."[18]

Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good
customs or public policy, or respect for the rights of others, to couch
denunciations of acts believed -- however sincerely -- to be deceitful,
fraudulent or malicious, in excessively intemperate. insulting or virulent
language. Alauya is evidently convinced that he has a right of action against
Sophia Alawi. The law requires that he exercise that right with propriety,
without malice or vindictiveness, or undue harm to anyone; in a manner
consistent with good morals, good customs, public policy, public order,
supra; or otherwise stated, that he "act with justice, give everyone his due,
and observe honesty and good faith."[19] Righteous indignation, or
vindication of right cannot justify resort to vituperative language, or
downright name-calling. As a member of the Shari'a Bar and an officer of a
Court, Alawi is subject to a standard of conduct more stringent than for most
other government workers. As a man of the law, he may not use language
which is abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing, or otherwise improper.
[20] As a judicial employee, it is expected that he accord respect for the
person and the rights of others at all times, and that his every act and word
should be characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical
deviation from these salutary norms might perhaps be mitigated, but cannot
be excused, by his strongly held conviction that he had been grievously
wronged.

As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had
occasion to declare that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged
members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a
courts.[21] While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one
who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered
"counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional
capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to
those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and
successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good
standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this
jurisdiction.

Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-
law," because in his region, there are pejorative connotations to the term, or
it is confusingly similar to that given to local legislators. The ratiocination,
valid or not, is of no moment. His disinclination to use the title of "counsellor"
does not warrant his use of the title of attorney.

Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking

privilege, the record contains no evidence adequately establishing the
accusation.

WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the

use of excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e., language
unbecoming a judicial officer, and for usurping the title of attorney; and he is
warned that any similar or other impropriety or misconduct in the future will
be dealt with more severely. SO ORDERED.
[B. M. No. 1036. June 10, 2003]

DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, complainant, vs. EDWIN L. RANA,

respondent.

D E C I S I O N: CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess the requisite
moral integrity for membership in the legal profession. Possession of moral
integrity is of greater importance than possession of legal learning. The
practice of law is a privilege bestowed only on the morally fit. A bar
candidate who is morally unfit cannot practice law even if he passes the bar
examinations.

The Facts

Respondent Edwin L. Rana (respondent) was among those who passed the
2000 Bar Examinations.

On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of

successful bar examinees as members of the Philippine Bar, complainant
Donna Marie Aguirre (complainant) filed against respondent a Petition for
Denial of Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with
unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave
misrepresentation.

The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar during
the scheduled oath-taking on 22 May 2001 at the Philippine International
Convention Center. However, the Court ruled that respondent could not sign
the Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge against him. Thus,
respondent took the lawyers oath on the scheduled date but has not signed
the Roll of Attorneys up to now.

Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and grave

misconduct. Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer,
appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections before the
Municipal Board of Election Canvassers (MBEC) of Mandaon, Masbate.
Complainant further alleges that respondent filed with the MBEC a pleading
dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the
Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In this
pleading, respondent represented himself as counsel for and in behalf of Vice
Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan, and signed the pleading as counsel for
George Bunan (Bunan).

On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a

municipal government employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is not allowed by law to
act as counsel for a client in any court or administrative body.

On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant

accuses respondent of acting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate
George Bunan (Bunan) without the latter engaging respondents services.
Complainant claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent
the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.

On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing respondent to take

the lawyers oath but disallowed him from signing the Roll of Attorneys until
he is cleared of the charges against him. In the same resolution, the Court
required respondent to comment on the complaint against him.

In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his specific assistance
to represent him before the MBEC. Respondent claims that he decided to
assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who knows the law.
Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that objected to the
inclusion of certain votes in the canvassing. He explains, however, that he
did not sign the pleading as a lawyer or represented himself as an attorney
in the pleading.

On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent

claims that he submitted his resignation on 11 May 2001 which was allegedly
accepted on the same date. He submitted a copy of the Certification of
Receipt of Revocable Resignation dated 28 May 2001 signed by Vice-Mayor
Napoleon Relox. Respondent further claims that the complaint is politically
motivated considering that complainant is the daughter of Silvestre Aguirre,
the losing candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. Respondent prays that
the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and that he be allowed to sign
the Roll of Attorneys.

On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to respondents Comment and

refuted the claim of respondent that his appearance before the MBEC was
only to extend specific assistance to Bunan. Complainant alleges that on 19
May 2001 Emily Estipona-Hao (Estipona-Hao) filed a petition for proclamation
as the winning candidate for mayor. Respondent signed as counsel for
Estipona-Hao in this petition. When respondent appeared as counsel before
the MBEC, complainant questioned his appearance on two grounds: (1)
respondent had not taken his oath as a lawyer; and (2) he was an employee
of the government.

Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondents Comment) reiterating his

claim that the instant administrative case is motivated mainly by political
vendetta.

On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and recommendation.

OBCs Report and Recommendation

The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as counsel
for Bunan in the May 2001 elections. The minutes of the MBEC proceedings
show that respondent actively participated in the proceedings. The OBC
likewise found that respondent appeared in the MBEC proceedings even
before he took the lawyers oath on 22 May 2001. The OBC believes that
respondents misconduct casts a serious doubt on his moral fitness to be a
member of the Bar. The OBC also believes that respondents unauthorized
practice of law is a ground to deny his admission to the practice of law. The
OBC therefore recommends that respondent be denied admission to the
Philippine Bar.

On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to cite a law which
respondent allegedly violated when he appeared as counsel for Bunan while
he was a government employee. Respondent resigned as secretary and his
resignation was accepted. Likewise, respondent was authorized by Bunan to
represent him before the MBEC.

The Courts Ruling

We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that respondent
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus does not deserve
admission to the Philippine Bar.

Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the records
show that respondent appeared as counsel for Bunan prior to 22 May 2001,
before respondent took the lawyers oath. In the pleading entitled Formal
Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for
the Office of Vice-Mayor dated 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel
for George Bunan. In the first paragraph of the same pleading respondent
stated that he was the (U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in behalf of Vice
Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T. BUNAN. Bunan himself wrote the MBEC on
14 May 2001 that he had authorized Atty. Edwin L. Rana as his counsel to
represent him before the MBEC and similar bodies.

On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also retained

respondent as her counsel. On the same date, 14 May 2001, Erly D. Hao
informed the MBEC that Atty. Edwin L. Rana has been authorized by
REFORMA LM-PPC as the legal counsel of the party and the candidate of the
said party. Respondent himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he was
entering his appearance as counsel for Mayoralty Candidate Emily Estipona-
Hao and for the REFORMA LM-PPC. On 19 May 2001, respondent signed as
counsel for Estipona-Hao in the petition filed before the MBEC praying for the
proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning candidate for mayor of
Mandaon, Masbate.

All these happened even before respondent took the lawyers oath. Clearly,
respondent engaged in the practice of law without being a member of the
Philippine Bar.

In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,[1] the Court elucidated that:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court;
it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions
and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings
on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveyancing.
In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law, incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body,
the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained
legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263).
(Italics supplied) x x x

In Cayetano v. Monsod,[2] the Court held that practice of law means any
activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of
law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal
profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service which
requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.

Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in

the proceedings before the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without license
to do so. Evidence clearly supports the charge of unauthorized practice of
law. Respondent called himself counsel knowing fully well that he was not a
member of the Bar. Having held himself out as counsel knowing that he had
no authority to practice law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a
member of the Philippine Bar.[3]

The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a

privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral character with special
qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege
presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational
attainment, and even public trust[4] since a lawyer is an officer of the court.
A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing
the bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld
even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking
admission had practiced law without a license.[5]

The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. In Beltran, Jr. v.

Abad,[6] a candidate passed the bar examinations but had not taken his oath
and signed the Roll of Attorneys. He was held in contempt of court for
practicing law even before his admission to the Bar. Under Section 3 (e) of
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who engages in the unauthorized
practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court.[7]
True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the
lawyers oath. However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally
makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar
examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to
become an attorney-at-law.[8] Respondent should know that two essential
requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his
lawyers oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of
Attorneys.[9]

On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that the law does
not allow respondent to act as counsel for a private client in any court or
administrative body since respondent is the secretary of the Sangguniang
Bayan.

Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan

prior to the acts complained of as constituting unauthorized practice of law.
In his letter dated 11 May 2001 addressed to Napoleon Relox, vice- mayor
and presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent stated that he
was resigning effective upon your acceptance.[10] Vice-Mayor Relox
accepted respondents resignation effective 11 May 2001.[11] Thus, the
evidence does not support the charge that respondent acted as counsel for a
client while serving as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.

On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence shows

that Bunan indeed authorized respondent to represent him as his counsel
before the MBEC and similar bodies. While there was no misrepresentation,
respondent nonetheless had no authority to practice law.

WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the

Philippine Bar.

SO ORDERED.
B.M. No. 2540, September 24, 2013

IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS MICHAEL A.

MEDADO, Petitioner.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, C.J.:

We resolve the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys filed by

petitioner Michael A. Medado (Medado).
Medado graduated from the University of the Philippines with the degree of
Bachelor of Laws in 19791 and passed the same year’s bar examinations
with a general weighted average of 82.7.2

On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorney’s Oath at the Philippine International

Convention Center (PICC) together with the successful bar examinees.3 He
was scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on 13 May 1980,4 but he failed
to do so on his scheduled date, allegedly because he had misplaced the
Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys5 given by the Bar Office when he went
home to his province for a vacation.

Several years later, while rummaging through his old college files, Medado
found the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys. It was then that he realized
that he had not signed in the roll, and that what he had signed at the
entrance of the PICC was probably just an attendance record.

By the time Medado found the notice, he was already working. He stated that
he was mainly doing corporate and taxation work, and that he was not
actively involved in litigation practice. Thus, he operated “under the
mistaken belief [that] since he ha[d] already taken the oath, the signing of
the Roll of Attorneys was not as urgent, nor as crucial to his status as a
lawyer”;8 and “the matter of signing in the Roll of Attorneys lost its urgency
and compulsion, and was subsequently forgotten.”

In 2005, when Medado attended Mandatory Continuing Legal Education

(MCLE) seminars, he was required to provide his roll number in order for his
MCLE compliances to be credited.10 Not having signed in the Roll of
Attorneys, he was unable to provide his roll number.

About seven years later, or on 6 February 2012, Medado filed the instant
Petition, praying that he be allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys.

The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) conducted a clarificatory conference on

the matter on 21 September 201212 and submitted a Report and
Recommendation to this Court on 4 February 2013.13 The OBC
recommended that the instant petition be denied for petitioner’s gross
negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of merit.14 It explained that,
based on his answers during the clarificatory conference, petitioner could
offer no valid justification for his negligence in signing in the Roll of
Attorneys.
After a judicious review of the records, we grant Medado’s prayer in the
instant petition, subject to the payment of a fine and the imposition of a
penalty equivalent to suspension from the practice of law.

At the outset, we note that not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of
Attorneys would be akin to imposing upon him the ultimate penalty of
disbarment, a penalty that we have reserved for the most serious ethical
transgressions of members of the Bar.

In this case, the records do not show that this action is warranted.

For one, petitioner demonstrated good faith and good moral character when
he finally filed the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys. We note
that it was not a third party who called this Court’s attention to petitioner’s
omission; rather, it was Medado himself who acknowledged his own lapse,
albeit after the passage of more than 30 years. When asked by the Bar
Confidant why it took him this long to file the instant petition, Medado very
candidly replied: Mahirap hong i-explain yan pero, yun bang at the time,
what can you say? Takot ka kung anong mangyayari sa ‘yo, you don’t know
what’s gonna happen. At the same time, it’s a combination of apprehension
and anxiety of what’s gonna happen. And, finally it’s the right thing to do. I
have to come here … sign the roll and take the oath as necessary.

For another, petitioner has not been subject to any action for disqualification
from the practice of law,17 which is more than what we can say of other
individuals who were successfully admitted as members of the Philippine Bar.
For this Court, this fact demonstrates that petitioner strove to adhere to the
strict requirements of the ethics of the profession, and that he has prima
facie shown that he possesses the character required to be a member of the
Philippine Bar.

Finally, Medado appears to have been a competent and able legal

practitioner, having held various positions at the Laurel Law Office,18 Petron,
Petrophil Corporation, the Philippine National Oil Company, and the Energy
Development Corporation.

All these demonstrate Medado’s worth to become a full-fledged member of

the Philippine Bar. While the practice of law is not a right but a privilege,20
this Court will not unwarrantedly withhold this privilege from individuals who
have shown mental fitness and moral fiber to withstand the rigors of the
profession.

That said, however, we cannot fully exculpate petitioner Medado from all
liability for his years of inaction.

Petitioner has been engaged in the practice of law since 1980, a period
spanning more than 30 years, without having signed in the Roll of
Attorneys.21 He justifies this behavior by characterizing his acts as “neither
willful nor intentional but based on a mistaken belief and an honest error of
judgment.”

We disagree.
While an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the
legal consequences of his acts23 as it negates malice or evil motive,24 a
mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone
is presumed to know the law and its consequences.25 Ignorantia facti
excusat; ignorantia legis neminem excusat.

Applying these principles to the case at bar, Medado may have at first
operated under an honest mistake of fact when he thought that what he had
signed at the PICC entrance before the oath-taking was already the Roll of
Attorneys. However, the moment he realized that what he had signed was
merely an attendance record, he could no longer claim an honest mistake of
fact as a valid justification. At that point, Medado should have known that he
was not a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar because of his failure to
sign in the Roll of Attorneys, as it was the act of signing therein that would
have made him so.26 When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose to continue
practicing law without taking the necessary steps to complete all the
requirements for admission to the Bar, he willfully engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law.

Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice of law by one’s assuming
to be an attorney or officer of the court, and acting as such without authority,
may constitute indirect contempt of court,27 which is punishable by fine or
imprisonment or both.28 Such a finding, however, is in the nature of criminal
contempt29 and must be reached after the filing of charges and the conduct
of hearings.30 In this case, while it appears quite clearly that petitioner
committed indirect contempt of court by knowingly engaging in unauthorized
practice of law, we refrain from making any finding of liability for indirect
contempt, as no formal charge pertaining thereto has been filed against him.

Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses

Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:

CANON 9 – A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized

practice of law.
While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely prohibit lawyers from assisting
in the unauthorized practice of law, the unauthorized practice of law by the
lawyer himself is subsumed under this provision, because at the heart of
Canon 9 is the lawyer’s duty to prevent the unauthorized practice of law. This
duty likewise applies to law students and Bar candidates. As aspiring
members of the Bar, they are bound to comport themselves in accordance
with the ethical standards of the legal profession.

Turning now to the applicable penalty, previous violations of Canon 9 have

warranted the penalty of suspension from the practice of law.31 As Medado
is not yet a full-fledged lawyer, we cannot suspend him from the practice of
law. However, we see it fit to impose upon him a penalty akin to suspension
by allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one (1) year after receipt of
this Resolution. For his transgression of the prohibition against the
unauthorized practice of law, we likewise see it fit to fine him in the amount
of P32,000. During the one year period, petitioner is warned that he is not
allowed to engage in the practice of law, and is sternly warned that doing
any act that constitutes practice of law before he has signed in the Roll of
Attorneys will be dealt with severely by this Court.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys is hereby

GRANTED. Petitioner Michael A. Medado is ALLOWED to sign in the Roll of
Attorneys ONE (1) YEAR after receipt of this Resolution. Petitioner is likewise
ORDERED to pay a FINE of P32,000 for his unauthorized practice of law.
During the one year period, petitioner is NOT ALLOWED to practice law, and
is STERNLY WARNED that doing any act that constitutes practice of law
before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt with severely by
this Court.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator
for circulation to all courts in the.

SO ORDERED.
B.M. No. 1678 December 17, 2007

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,

BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay for
leave to resume the practice of law.

Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law
until he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for
his ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of
Canada’s free medical aid program. His application was approved and he
became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.

On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention
and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine
citizenship.1 On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen
before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he
returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice. There
is a question, however, whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his
membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine citizenship
in May 2004. Thus, this petition.

In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar Confidant cites
Section 2, Rule 138 (Attorneys and Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court:
SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. – Every
applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the
Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and a
resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court
satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against
him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in
the Philippines.

Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue
of his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has again met
all the qualifications and has none of the disqualifications for membership in
the bar. It recommends that he be allowed to resume the practice of law in
the Philippines, conditioned on his retaking the lawyer’s oath to remind him
of his duties and responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar.

We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant with

certain modifications.

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.2 It is so delicately

affected with public interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State
(through this Court) to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote
the public welfare.3

Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest

degree of morality, faithful observance of the rules of the legal profession,
compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement and
payment of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
are the conditions required for membership in good standing in the bar and
for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of
these conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence which the
courts and clients repose in him for the continued exercise of his professional
privilege.4

Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Who may practice law. – Any person heretofore duly admitted as
a member of the bar, or thereafter admitted as such in accordance with the
provisions of this Rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to
practice law.

Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the Philippine bar in

accordance with the statutory requirements and who is in good and regular
standing is entitled to practice law.
Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of Court
mandates that an applicant for admission to the bar be a citizen of the
Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character and a
resident of the Philippines.5 He must also produce before this Court
satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no charges against
him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in
the Philippines.6

Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as furnishing

satisfactory proof of educational, moral and other qualifications;7 passing the
bar examinations;8 taking the lawyer’s oath9 and signing the roll of
attorneys and receiving from the clerk of court of this Court a certificate of
the license to practice.10

The second requisite for the practice of law ― membership in good standing
― is a continuing requirement. This means continued membership and,
concomitantly, payment of annual membership dues in the IBP;11 payment
of the annual professional tax;12 compliance with the mandatory continuing
legal education requirement;13 faithful observance of the rules and ethics of
the legal profession and being continually subject to judicial disciplinary
control.14

Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship still
practice law in the Philippines? No.

The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the

Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by
law.15 Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar,
loss thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently,
the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other words, the loss of
Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the
Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners.16

The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization

as a citizen of another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA
9225. This is because "all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another
country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under
the conditions of [RA 9225]."17 Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a
citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine
citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also
deemed never to have terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no
automatic right to resume law practice accrues.

Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the

Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions
"(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage
in such practice."18 Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino
citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law practice, he must first
secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:

(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the
IBP;

(b) the payment of professional tax;

(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal

education; this is specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s
knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal developments and

(d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind him of his
duties and responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also
renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.

Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member
of the Philippine bar.

WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby

GRANTED, subject to compliance with the conditions stated above and
submission of proof of such compliance to the Bar Confidant, after which he
may retake his oath as a member of the Philippine bar.

SO ORDERED.

B.M. No. 2112 July 24, 2012

IN RE: PETITION RE-ACQUIRE THE PRIVILEGE TO PRACTICE LAW IN
THE PHILIPPINES, EPIFANIO B. MUNESES, Petitioner,

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

On June 8, 2009, a petition was filed by Epifanio B. Muneses (petitioner) with

the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) praying that he be granted the
privilege to practice law in the Philippines.

The petitioner alleged that he became a member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) on March 21, 1966; that he lost his privilege to practice law
when he became a citizen of the United States of America (USA) on August
28, 1981; that on September 15, 2006, he re-acquired his Philippine
citizenship pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the "Citizenship
Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003" by taking his oath of allegiance as
a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Washington, D.C.,
USA; that he intends to retire in the Philippines and if granted, to resume the
practice of law. Attached to the petition were several documents in support
of his petition, albeit mere photocopies thereof, to wit:

1. Oath of Allegiance dated September 15, 2006 before Consul General

Domingo P. Nolasco;

2. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship of same date;

3. Order for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship also of same date;

4. Letter dated March 13, 2008 evidencing payment of membership dues

with the IBP;

5. Attendance Forms from the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE).

In Bar Matter No. 1678, dated December 17, 2007, the Court was confronted
with a similar petition filed by Benjamin M. Dacanay (Dacanay) who
requested leave to resume his practice of law after availing the benefits of
R.A. No. 9225. Dacanay was admitted to the Philippine Bar in March 1960. In
December 1998, he migrated to Canada to seek medical attention for his
ailments and eventually became a Canadian citizen in May 2004. On July 14,
2006, Dacanay re-acquired his Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. No.
9225 after taking his oath of allegiance before the Philippine Consulate
General in Toronto, Canada. He returned to the Philippines and intended to
resume his practice of law.
The Court reiterates that Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to
the bar and is, in fact, a continuing requirement for the practice of law. The
loss thereof means termination of the petitioner’s membership in the bar;
ipso jure the privilege to engage in the practice of law. Under R.A. No. 9225,
natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of
their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are deemed to have re-
acquired their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the
Republic.1 Thus, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country
and later re-acquires his Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, remains
to be a member of the Philippine Bar. However, as stated in Dacanay, the
right to resume the practice of law is not automatic.2 R.A. No. 9225 provides
that a person who intends to practice his profession in the Philippines must
apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such
practice.3

It can not be overstressed that:

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.1âwphi1 It is so

delicately affected with public interest that it is both the power and duty of
the State (through this Court) to control and regulate it in order to protect
and promote the public welfare.

Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest

degree of morality, faithful observance of the legal profession, compliance
with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement and payment of
membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the
conditions required for membership in good standing in the bar and for
enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these
conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence which the courts
and clients repose in him for the continued exercise of his professional
privilege.4

Thus, in pursuance to the qualifications laid down by the Court for the
practice of law, the OBC required the herein petitioner to submit the original
or certified true copies of the following documents in relation to his petition:

1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;

2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);

3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;

4. Identification Certificate (IC) issued by the Bureau of Immigration;

5. Certificate of Good Standing issued by the IBP;

6. Certification from the IBP indicating updated payments of annual
membership dues;

7. Proof of payment of professional tax; and

8. Certificate of compliance issued by the MCLE Office.

In compliance thereof, the petitioner submitted the following:

1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;

2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);

3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;

4. Certificate of Re-Acquisition/Retention of Philippine Citizenship issued by

the Bureau of Immigration, in lieu of the IC;

5. Certification dated May 19, 2010 of the IBP-Surigao City Chapter attesting
to his good moral character as well as his updated payment of annual
membership dues;

6. Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) for the year 2010;

7. Certificate of Compliance with the MCLE for the 2nd compliance period;
and

8. Certification dated December 5, 2008 of Atty. Gloria Estenzo-Ramos,

Coordinator, UC-MCLE Program, University of Cebu, College of Law attesting
to his compliance with the MCLE.

The OBC further required the petitioner to update his compliance,

particularly with the MCLE. After all the requirements were satisfactorily
complied with and finding that the petitioner has met all the qualifications
and none of the disqualifications for membership in the bar, the OBC
recommended that the petitioner be allowed to resume his practice of law.

Upon this favorable recommendation of the OBC, the Court adopts the same
and sees no bar to the petitioner's resumption to the practice of law in the
Philippines.

WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Epifanio B. Muneses is hereby

GRANTED, subject to the condition that he shall re-take the Lawyer's Oath on
a date to be set by the Court and subject to the payment of appropriate fees.
Furthermore, the Office of the Bar Confidant is directed to draft the
necessary guidelines for the re-acquisition of the privilege to resume the
practice of law for the guidance of the Bench and Bar.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 102549 August 10, 1992

EDWIN B. JAVELLANA, petitioner,

vs.
DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND LUIS T. SANTOS,
SECRETARY, respondents..

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari involves the right of a public official to engage
in the practice of his profession while employed in the Government.

Attorney Erwin B. Javellana was an elected City Councilor of Bago City, Negros
Occidental. On October 5, 1989, City Engineer Ernesto C. Divinagracia filed
Administrative Case No. C-10-90 against Javellana for: (1) violation of Department of
Local Government (DLG) Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 dated June 10, 1980 in
relation to DLG Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 and of Section 7, paragraph b, No.
2 of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the "Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees," and (2) for oppression, misconduct
and abuse of authority.

Divinagracia's complaint alleged that Javellana, an incumbent member of the City

Council or Sanggunian Panglungsod of Bago City, and a lawyer by profession, has
continuously engaged in the practice of law without securing authority for that
purpose from the Regional Director, Department of Local Government, as required
by DLG Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 in relation to DLG Memorandum Circular
No. 74-58 of the same department; that on July 8, 1989, Javellana, as counsel for
Antonio Javiero and Rolando Catapang, filed a case against City Engineer Ernesto C.
Divinagracia of Bago City for "Illegal Dismissal and Reinstatement with Damages"
putting him in public ridicule; that Javellana also appeared as counsel in several
criminal and civil cases in the city, without prior authority of the DLG Regional
Director, in violation of DLG Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 which provides:

MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 80-38

TO ALL: PROVINCIAL GOVERNORS, CITY AND MUNICIPALITY

MAYORS, KLGCD REGIONAL DIRECTORS AND ALL CONCERNED

SUBJECT: AMENDING MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 80-18 ON

SANGGUNIAN SESSIONS, PER DIEMS, ALLOWANCES, STAFFING
AND OTHER RELATED MATTERS

In view of the issuance or Circular No. 5-A by the Joint Commission on

Local Government Personnel Administration which affects certain
provisions of MC 80-18, there is a need to amend said Memorandum
Circular to substantially conform to the pertinent provisions of Circular
No. 9-A.

xxx xxx xxx

C. Practice of Profession

The Secretary (now Minister) of Justice in an Opinion No. 46 Series of

1973 stated inter alia that "members of local legislative bodies, other
than the provincial governors or the mayors, do not keep regular office
hours." "They merely attend meetings or sessions of the provincial
board or the city or municipal council" and that provincial board
members are not even required "to have an office in the provincial
building." Consequently, they are not therefore to required to report
daily as other regular government employees do, except when they are
delegated to perform certain administrative functions in the interest of
public service by the Governor or Mayor as the case may be. For this
reason, they may, therefore, be allowed to practice their professions
provided that in so doing an authority . . . first be secured from the
Regional Directors pursuant to Memorandum Circular No. 74-58,
provided, however, that no government personnel, property,
equipment or supplies shall be utilized in the practice of their
professions. While being authorized to practice their professions, they
should as much as possible attend regularly any and all sessions,
which are not very often, of their Sanggunians for which they were
elected as members by their constituents except in very extreme
cases, e.g., doctors who are called upon to save a life. For this purpose
 it is desired that they always keep a calendar of the dates of the
sessions, regular or special of their Sanggunians so that conflicts of
attending court cases in the case of lawyers and Sanggunian sessions
can be avoided.

As to members of the bar the authority given for them to practice their
profession shall always be subject to the restrictions provided for in
Section 6 of Republic Act 5185. In all cases, the practice of any
profession should be favorably recommended by the Sanggunian
concerned as a body and by the provincial governors, city or municipal
mayors, as the case may be. (Emphasis ours, pp. 28-30, Rollo.)

On August 13, 1990, a formal hearing of the complaint was held in Iloilo City in
which the complainant, Engineer Divinagracia, and the respondent, Councilor
Javellana, presented their respective evidence.

Meanwhile, on September 10, 1990, Javellana requested the DLG for a permit to
continue his practice of law for the reasons stated in his letter-request. On the same
date, Secretary Santos replied as follows:

1st Indorsement
September 10, 1990

Respectfully returned to Councilor Erwin B. Javellana, Bago City, his

within letter dated September 10, 1990, requesting for a permit to
continue his practice of law for reasons therein stated, with this
information that, as represented and consistent with law, we interpose
no objection thereto, provided that such practice will not conflict or
tend to conflict with his official functions.

LUIS T. SANTOS
Secretary.

(p. 60, Rollo.)

On September 21, 1991, Secretary Luis T. Santos issued Memorandum Circular No.
90-81 setting forth guidelines for the practice of professions by local elective
officials as follows:

TO: All Provincial Governors, City and Municipal Mayors,

Regional Directors and All Concerned.

SUBJECT: Practice of Profession and Private Employment

of Local Elective Officials

Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical

Standards for Public Officials and Employees), states, in part, that "In
addition to acts and omission of public officials . . . now prescribed in
the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute
prohibited acts and transactions of any public officials . . . and are
hereby declared to be unlawful: . . . (b) Public Officials . . . during their
incumbency shall not: (1) . . . accept employment as officer, employee,
consultant, counsel, broker, agent, trustee or nominee in any private
enterprise regulated, supervised or licensed by their office unless
expressly allowed by law; (2) Engage in the private practice of their
profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that
such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official
functions: . . .

xxx xxx xxx

Under Memorandum Circular No. 17 of the Office of the President dated

September 4, 1986, the authority to grant any permission, to accept
private employment in any capacity and to exercise profession, to any
government official shall be granted by the head of the Ministry
(Department) or agency in accordance with Section 12, Rule XVIII of
the Revised Civil Service Rules, which provides, in part, that:

No officer shall engage directly in any . . . vocation or

profession . . . without a written permission from the head
of the Department: Provided, that this prohibition will be
absolute in the case of those officers . . . whose duties
and responsibilities require that their entire time be at the
disposal of the Government: Provided, further, That if an
employee is granted permission to engage in outside
activities, the time so devoted outside of office should be
fixed by the Chief of the agency to the end that it will not
impair in anyway the efficiency of the officer or
employee . . . subject to any additional conditions which
the head of the office deems necessary in each particular
case in the interest of the service, as expressed in the
various issuances of the Civil Service Commission.

Conformably with the foregoing, the following guidelines are to be

observed in the grant of permission to the practice of profession and to
the acceptance of private employment of local elective officials, to wit:

1) The permission shall be granted by the Secretary of

Local Government;

2) Provincial Governors, City and Municipal Mayors whose

duties and responsibilities require that their entire time be
at the disposal of the government in conformity with
Sections 141, 171 and 203 of the Local Government Code
(BP 337), are prohibited to engage in the practice of their
profession and to accept private employment during their
incumbency:
 3) Other local elective officials may be allowed to practice
their profession or engage in private employment on a
limited basis at the discretion of the Secretary of Local
Government, subject to existing laws and to the following
conditions:

a) That the time so devoted outside of office

hours should be fixed by the local chief
executive concerned to the end that it will
not impair in any way the efficiency of the
officials concerned;

b) That no government time, personnel,

funds or supplies shall be utilized in the
pursuit of one's profession or private
employment;

c) That no conflict of interests between the

practice of profession or engagement in
private employment and the official duties of
the concerned official shall arise thereby;

d) Such other conditions that the Secretary

deems necessary to impose on each
particular case, in the interest of public
service. (Emphasis supplied, pp. 31-
32, Rollo.)

On March 25, 1991, Javellana filed a Motion to Dismiss the administrative case
against him on the ground mainly that DLG Memorandum Circulars Nos. 80-38 and
90-81 are unconstitutional because the Supreme Court has the sole and exclusive
authority to regulate the practice of law.

In an order dated May 2, 1991, Javellana's motion to dismiss was denied by the
public respondents. His motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on June 20,
1991.

Five months later or on October 10, 1991, the Local Government Code of 1991 (RA
7160) was signed into law, Section 90 of which provides:

Sec. 90. Practice of Profession. — (a) All governors, city and municipal
mayors are prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in
any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief
executives.

(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in

any occupation, or teach in schools except during session
hours: Provided, That sanggunian members who are members of the
Bar shall not:
 (1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case
wherein a local government unit or any office, agency, or
instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;

(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an

officer or employee of the national or local government is
accused of an offense committed in relation to his office;

(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative

proceedings involving the local government unit of which
he is an official; and

(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except

when the sanggunian member concerned is defending the
interest of the Government.

(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during

official hours of work only on occasions of emergency: Provided, That
the officials concerned do not derive monetary compensation
therefrom. (Emphasis ours.)

Administrative Case No. C-10-90 was again set for hearing on November 26, 1991.
Javellana thereupon filed this petition for certiorari praying that DLG Memorandum
Circulars Nos. 80-38 and 90-81 and Section 90 of the new Local Government Code
(RA 7160) be declared unconstitutional and null void because:

(1) they violate Article VIII, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of

constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified
and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special
courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court.

(2) They constitute class legislation, being discriminatory against the legal and
medical professions for only sanggunian members who are lawyers and doctors are
restricted in the exercise of their profession while dentists, engineers, architects,
teachers, opticians, morticians and others are not so restricted (RA 7160, Sec. 90 [b-
1]).
In due time, the Solicitor General filed his Comment on the petition and the
petitioner submitted a Reply. After deliberating on the pleadings of the parties, the
Court resolved to dismiss the petition for lack of merit.

As a matter of policy, this Court accords great respect to the decisions and/or
actions of administrative authorities not only because of the doctrine of separation
of powers but also for their presumed knowledgeability and expertise in the
enforcement of laws and regulations entrusted to their jurisdiction (Santiago vs.
Deputy Executive Secretary, 192 SCRA 199, citing Cuerdo vs. COA, 166 SCRA 657).
With respect to the present case, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the respondent, Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), in issuing the
questioned DLG Circulars Nos. 80-30 and 90-81 and in denying petitioner's motion
to dismiss the administrative charge against him.

In the first place, complaints against public officers and employees relating or
incidental to the performance of their duties are necessarily impressed with public
interest for by express constitutional mandate, a public office is a public trust. The
complaint for illegal dismissal filed by Javiero and Catapang against City Engineer
Divinagracia is in effect a complaint against the City Government of Bago City, their
real employer, of which petitioner Javellana is a councilman. Hence, judgment
against City Engineer Divinagracia would actually be a judgment against the City
Government. By serving as counsel for the complaining employees and assisting
them to prosecute their claims against City Engineer Divinagracia, the petitioner
violated Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 (in relation to Section 7[b-2] of RA 6713)
prohibiting a government official from engaging in the private practice of his
profession, if such practice would represent interests adverse to the government.

Petitioner's contention that Section 90 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and
DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 violate Article VIII, Section 5 of the
Constitution is completely off tangent. Neither the statute nor the circular trenches
upon the Supreme Court's power and authority to prescribe rules on the practice of
law. The Local Government Code and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 simply
prescribe rules of conduct for public officials to avoid conflicts of interest between
the discharge of their public duties and the private practice of their profession, in
those instances where the law allows it.

Section 90 of the Local Government Code does not discriminate against lawyers and
doctors. It applies to all provincial and municipal officials in the professions or
engaged in any occupation. Section 90 explicitly provides that sanggunian members
"may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools
expect during session hours." If there are some prohibitions that apply particularly
to lawyers, it is because of all the professions, the practice of law is more likely than
others to relate to, or affect, the area of public service.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
WILFREDO M. CATU, A.C. No. 5738

Complainant,

Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,

- v e r s u s - CORONA,

AZCUNA and

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.

ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA,

Respondent. Promulgated:

February 19, 2008

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot[1] and the building erected

thereon located at 959 San Andres Street, Malate, Manila. His mother and brother,
Regina Catu and Antonio Catu, contested the possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-
Catu[2] and Antonio Pastor[3] of one of the units in the building. The latter ignored
demands for them to vacate the premises. Thus, a complaint was initiated against
them in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5th District of
Manila[4] where the parties reside.

Respondent, as punong barangay of Barangay 723, summoned the parties to

conciliation meetings.[5] When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable
settlement, respondent issued a certification for the filing of the appropriate action
in court.

Thereafter, Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth
and Pastor in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 11. Respondent entered
his appearance as counsel for the defendants in that case. Because of this,
complainant filed the instant administrative complaint,[6] claiming that respondent
committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he stood
as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation
proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay.

In his defense, respondent claimed that one of his duties as punong barangay was
to hear complaints referred to the barangays Lupong Tagapamayapa. As such, he
heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. As head of
the Lupon, he performed his task with utmost objectivity, without bias or partiality
towards any of the parties. The parties, however, were not able to amicably settle
their dispute and Regina and Antonio filed the ejectment case. It was then that
Elizabeth sought his legal assistance. He acceded to her request. He handled her
case for free because she was financially distressed and he wanted to prevent the
commission of a patent injustice against her.

The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation. As there was no factual issue to thresh
out, the IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) required the parties to submit
their respective position papers. After evaluating the contentions of the parties, the
IBP-CBD found sufficient ground to discipline respondent.[7]
According to the IBP-CBD, respondent admitted that, as punong barangay, he
presided over the conciliation proceedings and heard the complaint of Regina and
Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. Subsequently, however, he represented
Elizabeth and Pastor in the ejectment case filed against them by Regina and
Antonio. In the course thereof, he prepared and signed pleadings including the
answer with counterclaim, pre-trial brief, position paper and notice of appeal. By so
doing, respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 6.03 A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement
or employment in connection with any matter in which he intervened while in said
service.

Furthermore, as an elective official, respondent contravened the prohibition under

Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713:[8]

SEC. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In addition to acts and omissions of public
officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the
following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official ands
employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. Public officials and
employees during their incumbency shall not:

(2) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the

Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict
with their official functions; xxx (emphasis supplied)

According to the IBP-CBD, respondents violation of this prohibition constituted a

breach of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND, PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. (emphasis supplied)

For these infractions, the IBP-CBD recommended the respondents suspension from
the practice of law for one month with a stern warning that the commission of the
same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.[9] This was adopted and
approved by the IBP Board of Governors.[10]

We modify the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of respondent as well

as the recommendation on the imposable penalty.

RULE 6.03 OF THE CODE

OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY APPLIES ONLY TO FORMER GOVERNMENT

LAWYERS

Respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. As worded, that Rule applies only to a lawyer who has
left government service and in connection with any matter in which he intervened
while in said service. In PCGG v. Sandiganbayan,[11] we ruled that Rule 6.03
prohibits former government lawyers from accepting engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which [they] had intervened while in said service.

Respondent was an incumbent punong barangay at the time he committed the act
complained of. Therefore, he was not covered by that provision.

SECTION 90 OF RA 7160, NOT SECTION 7(B)(2) OF RA 6713, GOVERNS THE

PRACTICE OF PROFESSION OF ELECTIVE LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 prohibits public officials and employees, during their
incumbency, from engaging in the private practice of their profession unless
authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or
tend to conflict with their official functions. This is the general law which applies to
all public officials and employees.

For elective local government officials, Section 90 of RA 7160[12] governs:

SEC. 90. Practice of Profession. (a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are
prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than
the exercise of their functions as local chief executives.

(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation,
or teach in schools except during session hours: Provided, That sanggunian
members who are members of the Bar shall not:

(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government
unit or any office, agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse
party;

(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the
national or local government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his
office;

(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the
local government unit of which he is an official; and

(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when the sanggunian
member concerned is defending the interest of the Government.

(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours of
work only on occasions of emergency: Provided, That the officials concerned do not
derive monetary compensation therefrom.

This is a special provision that applies specifically to the practice of profession by

elective local officials. As a special law with a definite scope (that is, the practice of
profession by elective local officials), it constitutes an exception to Section 7(b)(2) of
RA 6713, the general law on engaging in the private practice of profession by public
officials and employees. Lex specialibus derogat generalibus.[13]
Under RA 7160, elective local officials of provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays are the following: the governor, the vice governor and members of the
sangguniang panlalawigan for provinces; the city mayor, the city vice mayor and
the members of the sangguniang panlungsod for cities; the municipal mayor, the
municipal vice mayor and the members of the sangguniang bayan for municipalities
and the punong barangay, the members of the sangguniang barangay and the
members of the sangguniang kabataan for barangays.

Of these elective local officials, governors, city mayors and municipal mayors are
prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than
the exercise of their functions as local chief executives. This is because they are
required to render full time service. They should therefore devote all their time and
attention to the performance of their official duties.

On the other hand, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang

panlungsod or sangguniang bayan may practice their professions, engage in any
occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours. In other words, they
may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools
outside their session hours. Unlike governors, city mayors and municipal mayors,
members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod or
sangguniang bayan are required to hold regular sessions only at least once a week.
[14] Since the law itself grants them the authority to practice their professions,
engage in any occupation or teach in schools outside session hours, there is no
longer any need for them to secure prior permission or authorization from any other
person or office for any of these purposes.

While, as already discussed, certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors,
provincial board members and councilors) are expressly subjected to a total or
partial proscription to practice their profession or engage in any occupation, no such
interdiction is made on the punong barangay and the members of the sangguniang
barangay. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.[15] Since they are excluded from
any prohibition, the presumption is that they are allowed to practice their
profession. And this stands to reason because they are not mandated to serve full
time. In fact, the sangguniang barangay is supposed to hold regular sessions only
twice a month.[16]

Accordingly, as punong barangay, respondent was not forbidden to practice his

profession. However, he should have procured prior permission or authorization
from the head of his Department, as required by civil service regulations.

A LAWYER IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE WHO IS NOT PROHIBITED TO PRACTICE LAW

MUST SECURE PRIOR AUTHORITY FROM THE HEAD OF HIS DEPARTMENT

A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to
be fully at the disposal of the government can engage in the private practice of law
only with the written permission of the head of the department concerned.[17]
Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules provides:
Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business,
vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or
industrial undertaking without a written permission from the head of the
Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those
officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire
time be at the disposal of the Government; Provided, further, That if an employee is
granted permission to engage in outside activities, time so devoted outside of office
hours should be fixed by the agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the
efficiency of the officer or employee: And provided, finally, that no permission is
necessary in the case of investments, made by an officer or employee, which do not
involve real or apparent conflict between his private interests and public duties, or
in any way influence him in the discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in
the management of the enterprise or become an officer of the board of directors.
(emphasis supplied)

As punong barangay, respondent should have therefore obtained the prior written
permission of the Secretary of Interior and Local Government before he entered his
appearance as counsel for Elizabeth and Pastor. This he failed to do.

The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil
Service Rules constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer: to obey the laws.
Lawyers are servants of the law, vires legis, men of the law. Their paramount duty
to society is to obey the law and promote respect for it. To underscore the primacy
and importance of this duty, it is enshrined as the first canon of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required written
permission, respondent not only engaged in the unauthorized practice of law but
also violated civil service rules which is a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:

Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. (emphasis supplied)

For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical
standards of the legal profession, respondent failed to comply with Canon 7 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility:

CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE
DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR. (emphasis supplied)

Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards
legal ethics and disgraces the dignity of the legal profession.

Public confidence in the law and in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and
improper conduct of a member of the bar.[18] Every lawyer should act and comport
himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal
profession.[19]
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney
for violation of the lawyers oath[20] and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal
profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of

professional misconduct for violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is therefore SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for a period of six months effective from his receipt of this
resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any repetition of similar acts shall be dealt
with more severely.

Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the
word delicadeza.

Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and entered
into the records of respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa. The Office of the Court
Administrator shall furnish copies to all the courts of the land for their information
and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

ATTY. EVELYN J. MAGNO, A.C. No. 6296

Complainant,
Present:

PANGANIBAN, J., Chairman

- versus - SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,

CORONA,

CARPIO MORALES and

GARCIA, JJ.

ATTY. OLIVIA VELASCO-JACOBA, Promulgated:

Respondent. November 22, 2005

x----------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

GARCIA, J.:
 In her sworn complaint, as endorsed by the President of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Nueva Ecija Chapter, Atty. Evelyn J. Magno
charged Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba, a member of the same IBP provincial
chapter, with willful violation of (a) Section 415 of the Local Government
Code (LGC) of 1991 and (b) Canon 4 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

This disciplinary case arose out of a disagreement that complainant had

with her uncle, Lorenzo Inos, over a landscaping contract they had entered
into. In a bid to have the stand-off between them settled, complainant
addressed a letter, styled Sumbong,[1] to Bonifacio Alcantara, barangay
captain of Brgy. San Pascual, Talavera, Nueva Ecija. At the barangay
conciliation/confrontation proceedings conducted on January 5, 2003,
respondent, on the strength of a Special Power of Attorney signed by Lorenzo
Inos, appeared for the latter, accompanied by his son, Lorenzito.
Complainants objection to respondents appearance elicited the response
that Lorenzo Inos is entitled to be represented by a lawyer inasmuch as
complainant is herself a lawyer. And as to complainants retort that her being
a lawyer is merely coincidental, respondent countered that she is appearing
as an attorney-in-fact, not as counsel, of Lorenzo Inos.

Complainant enumerated specific instances, with supporting

documentation, tending to prove that respondent had, in the course of the
conciliation proceedings before the Punong Barangay, acted as Inos Lorenzos
counsel instead of as his attorney-in-fact. This is what complainant said in
her complaint: [2]

5. xxx Atty. Olivia Jacoba asked for an ocular inspection of the subject
matter of the complaint. A heated argument took place because Lorencito
Inos said that [complainants brother] Melencio Magno, Jr. made alterations in
the lagoon . Afterwards Atty. Olivia Jacoba . . . returned to the barangay hall
to have the incident recorded in the barangay blotter.... attached as Annex A

6. That on January 12, 2003, Lorenzo Inos appeared before the

hearing also with the assistance of [respondent]. When the minutes of the
proceeding (sic) was read, [respondent] averred that the minutes is partial in
favor of the complainant because only her statements were recorded for
which reason, marginal insertions were made to include what [respondent]
wanted to be put on record. She also signed as saksi in the minutes .

7. xxx In a letter (answer to the "sumbong) sent to the Punong

Barangay dated December 22, 2002, she signed representing herself as
Family Legal Counsel of Inos Family, a copy of the letter is attached as Annex
C . . . . (Words in bracket added.)
 In an Order dated February 17, 2003, Atty. Victor C. Fernandez, IBP
Director for Bar Discipline, directed the respondent to submit, within fifteen
(15) days from notice, her answer to the complaint, otherwise she will be
considered as in default.[3]

The case, docketed as CBD No. 03-1061, was assigned to Commissioner

Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, who admitted respondents answer
notwithstanding her earlier order of July 15, 2003, declaring respondent in
default for failure to file an answer in due time.[4]

In her Answer, respondent alleged that the administrative complaint

was filed with the Office of the Punong Barangay, instead of before the
Lupong Tagapamayapa, and heard by Punong Barangay Bonifacio Alcantara
alone, instead of the collegial Lupon or a conciliation panel known as
pangkat. Prescinding from this premise, respondent submits that the
prohibition against a lawyer appearing to assist a client in katarungan
pambarangay proceedings does not apply. Further, she argued that her
appearance was not as a lawyer, but only as an attorney-in-fact.

In her report dated October 6, 2003,[5] Commissioner Maala stated

that the charge of complainant has been established by clear preponderance
of evidence and, on that basis, recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of her profession for a period of six (6) months.
On the other hand, the Board of Governors, IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline, while agreeing with the inculpatory finding of the investigating
commissioner, recommended in its Resolution No. XVI-2003-235,[6] a lighter
penalty, to wit:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and

APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with
modification, and considering respondent's actuations was in violation of
Section 415 which expressly prohibits the presence and representation by
lawyers in the Katarungan Pambarangay, Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba is
hereby ADMONISHED.

This resolution is now before us for confirmation.

 Section 415 of the LGC of 1991[7], on the subject Katarungang
Pambarangay, provides:

Section 415. Appearance of Parties in Person. - In all katarungang

pambarangay proceedings, the parties must appear in person without the
assistance of the counsel or representative, except for minors and
incompetents who may be assisted by their next of kin who are not lawyers.

The above-quoted provision clearly requires the personal appearance

of the parties in katarungan pambarangay conciliation proceedings,
unassisted by counsel or representative. The rationale behind the personal
appearance requirement is to enable the lupon to secure first hand and
direct information about the facts and issues,[8] the exception being in cases
where minors or incompetents are parties. There can be no quibbling that
laymen of goodwill can easily agree to conciliate and settle their disputes
between themselves without what sometimes is the unsettling assistance of
lawyers whose presence could sometimes obfuscate and confuse issues.[9]
Worse still, the participation of lawyers with their penchant to use their
analytical skills and legal knowledge tend to prolong instead of expedite
settlement of the case.

The prohibition against the presence of a lawyer in a barangay

conciliation proceedings was not, to be sure, lost on respondent. Her defense
that the aforequoted Section 415 of the LGC does not apply since
complainant addressed her Sumbong to the barangay captain of Brgy. San
Pascual who thereafter proceeded to hear the same is specious at best. In
this regard, suffice it to state that complainant wrote her Sumbong with the
end in view of availing herself of the benefits of barangay justice. That she
addressed her Sumbong to the barangay captain is really of little moment
since the latter chairs the Lupong Tagapamayapa.[10]

Lest it be overlooked, the prohibition in question applies to all

katarungan barangay proceedings. Section 412(a)[11] the LGC of 1991
clearly provides that, as a precondition to filing a complaint in court, the
parties shall go through the conciliation process either before the lupon
chairman or the lupon or pangkat. As what happened in this case, the
punong barangay, as chairman of the Lupon Tagapamayapa, conducted the
conciliation proceedings to resolve the disputes between the two parties.

Given the above perspective, we join the IBP Commission on Bar

Discipline in its determination that respondent transgressed the prohibition
prescribed in Section 415 of the LGC. However, its recommended penalty of
mere admonition must have to be modified. Doubtless, respondents conduct
tended to undermine the laudable purpose of the katarungan pambarangay
system. What compounded matters was when respondent repeatedly
ignored complainants protestation against her continued appearance in the
barangay conciliation proceedings.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba is hereby FINED in the amount

of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) for willful violation of Section 415 of the
Local Government Code of 1991 with WARNING that commission of similar
acts of impropriety on her part in the future will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.