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PUBLIC MONEY AND MICKEY MOUSE Evaluating performance and

accountability in the Hong Kong Disneyland joint venture public- private
partnership

Article  in  Public Management Review · February 2014

DOI: 10.1080/14719037.2014.881533

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 Public Money and Mickey Mouse: Evaluating Performance and
Accountability in the Hong Kong Disneyland Joint Venture Public-Private
Partnership

Christopher D. Higgins*
Ph.D. Candidate
McMaster Centre for Spatial Analysis
Burke Science Building, Room 342
McMaster University
1280 Main Street West
Hamilton, ON, Canada
Phone: (905) 525-9140 ext. 24960
Email: higgicd@mcmaster.ca

Ahmed Shafiqul Huque

Professor and Chair
Department of Political Science
Kenneth Taylor Hall, Room 527
McMaster University
1280 Main Street West
Hamilton, ON, Canada
Phone: (905) 525-9140 ext. 23124
Email: huqueas@mcmaster.ca

*Corresponding Author
Word Count: 8,862
Tables: 1
Figures: 2

******This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis Group

in Public Management Review on 12/02/2014, available online at:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14719037.2014.881533
PUBLIC  MANAGEMENT  REVIEW   2  

ABSTRACT
Joint venture public-private partnerships [PPPs] allow partners to share in the risks and rewards
of joint production. But the literature offers little theoretical guidance on assessing performance
and accountability in this type of PPP. The present paper fills this gap by examining joint
ventures as PPPs and formulates a comprehensive performance evaluation framework. It’s
application to the case of Hong Kong’s Disneyland Resort reveals a project that has endured
several challenges related to achieving objectives, ensuring cooperation among partners, and
upholding principles of democratic accountability. Outcomes from this study offer new insight
into an under-explored aspect of PPP research.
INTRODUCTION

One of the more peculiar aspects of public-private partnerships [PPPs] is what Willems and Van

Dooren (2011) call the ‘paradox of accountability’. PPPs have been heavily criticized on the

grounds that they entail an erosion of traditional forms of democratic accountability. Yet some

stakeholders involved in PPPs have argued that accountability has never been stronger. The key

difference lies in in the type of accountability, where on the one hand there are notions of

controlling how government functions, and secondly, how government performs. The first deals

with democratic accountability – the desire to shape government through rules and procedures

and to hold final say as the authority and ownership of the state ultimately rests with its citizens.

The second considers what government actually accomplishes – accountability for performance

and results. There is an inherent tension between each type of accountability, and conflicts

between them are magnified in a PPP. However, the type of PPP arrangement also matters, with

different organizational structures offering interesting implications for accountability. Such

concerns are exemplified in the case of the Hong Kong Disneyland Resort [HKDL].

The year 2006 was a particularly turbulent one for Hong Kong’s Disneyland. After

opening in September of 2005 to much fanfare, the park suffered a series of damaging

government and public relations setbacks, detrimental media coverage, and lower than

anticipated attendance and revenue. In the same year, an admission from the Disney Company

that it was already looking beyond Hong Kong in pursuit of a much larger park in Shanghai

confirmed widely held suspicions and pushed tensions to new heights. Certainly Disney is no

stranger to the teething issues that can appear in such large-scale projects, maintaining a more

than 50-year history operating theme parks around the world. But it quickly became apparent

that Disney’s first theme park in the important Chinese market was off to a difficult start.
PUBLIC  MANAGEMENT  REVIEW   2  

What makes Hong Kong’s Disneyland particularly interesting from a public management

and policy perspective is that it is the result of a joint venture PPP in which the Hong Kong

Government provided a majority of the financial resources and maintains a controlling interest.

Given the considerable outlay of public capital and substantial amounts of risk involved in such a

venture, the project brings with it significant economic and social implications for the public

partner, Disney, and the broader community. As such, there is a clear need to assess whether the

HKDL joint venture is meeting expectations.

But what exactly are the expectations of a joint venture PPP and the implications of this

type of organizational structure on accountability? And how can they be measured? Research

on joint venture PPPs in particular remains neglected, with little understanding of their place

within the larger family of PPP approaches. Furthermore, although there is a considerable body

of literature dedicated to evaluating PPPs, most previous work is focused on specific programs or

policy areas and it is only recently that a general approach to theorizing overall PPP performance

more broadly has been developed. Here overall performance includes both outcomes related to

the accomplishment of objectives and democratic accountability.

In order to address these inadequacies in the literature, the present paper sets out to

achieve several goals: first, to develop and clarify the theory surrounding public-private joint

ventures as PPPs; second, to formulate a method for evaluating the project performance and

democratic accountability of this type of PPP; third, to apply this evaluative framework to the

case of HKDL, where a number of significant performance issues have negatively affected the

project to date; and finally, to utilize this information to offer some preliminary conclusions on

the implications of joint ventures as PPPs.

HIGGINS  &  HUQUE   3  

JOINT VENTURE PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS

What precisely is a joint venture PPP, and how does it fit within the broader PPP concept? The

answer to the first question is relatively straightforward. Grimsey and Lewis (2004) offer a

concise definition of joint venture PPPs, describing them as a partnership in which the public and

private sectors come together to jointly finance, own, develop, and operate a facility or

infrastructure asset. Regarding the second question of the place of these partnerships within the

PPP literature however, the answer is surprisingly complex.

Despite decades of research, no one seems to know for sure what PPPs are, owing to the

fact that they are best described as a ‘phenomenon’ as opposed to one technique (Hodge &

Greve, 2009). One characterization often cited in the literature is that by van Ham and

Koppenjan (2001, p. 598) who define PPPs as “cooperation of some sort of durability between

public and private actors in which they jointly develop products and services and share risks,

costs and resources which are connected with these products.” However, Weihe (2008) argues

that such a definition cannot accommodate all of the possible types of PPPs seen in the literature

and instead delineates four approaches to PPPs: a) the urban regeneration approach for urban

economic renewal and development; b) the policy approach which considers the institutional

setup of public-private cooperation; c) the infrastructure approach based on long-term

infrastructure contract [LTIC] PPPs; and d) the development approach, which consists of

creating the conditions for PPPs in developing countries. But while useful for conceptualizing

PPPs in general, there are a few characteristics of joint venture PPPs that defy their placement

within one of the four groups in this typology.

Grimsey and Lewis’ (2004) definition cited above hints at viewing joint venture PPPs as

infrastructure partnerships. Yet due to their focus on risk transfer and a heavily contractual
PUBLIC  MANAGEMENT  REVIEW   4  

principal-agent relationship, infrastructure PPPs tend to lack any meaningful collaboration, risk

sharing, and co-production between the public and private sectors. In fact, some have been

critical of whether infrastructure PPPs should actually be considered ‘partnerships’ at all (Klijn

& Teisman, 2005; Wettenhall, 2005). In contrast, the structure of a joint venture PPP is

fundamentally different from long-term infrastructure contracting. Located at the nexus of tight

financial and organizational relationships between the public and private sectors in Hodge and

Greve’s (2007) typology of PPPs, a joint venture PPP sees both the public and private sectors

maintaining control and equity in a project, essentially acting as ‘parents’ to a ‘child’. Rather

than risk transfer, both partners accept the idea of shared risk and shared reward, and each must

be willing to make quantifiable contributions to the project over its duration.

To better understand the difference between joint venture and infrastructure PPPs, it is

useful to turn to a dichotomy of the management and organizational structures that inform them.

Klijn and Teisman (2005) make a distinction between ‘project-oriented’ contractual PPPs

associated with infrastructure contracting where the goal is to manage exchange in a principal-

agent relationship, and more process-oriented ‘alliance’ partnerships designed to facilitate long-

term organizational cooperation in a principal-principal relationship. This latter type of

management and organizational structure is employed in the urban redevelopment PPP approach

(Edelenbos & Teisman, 2008; Klijn & Teisman, 2005; Weihe, 2008), though it also informs

partnerships between government and the not-for-profit and private sectors (Osborne & Murray,

2000). It is within this second family of alliance partnerships that joint venture PPPs exist, a

family that has much more in common with van Ham and Koppenjan’s (2001) characterization

of partnership in a PPP than long-term infrastructure contracting. Thus, joint venture PPPs are

best understood in the PPP literature as a derivative of both the infrastructure and urban
HIGGINS  &  HUQUE   5  

development approaches of Weihe (2008), focused on the production of some infrastructure

asset, not necessarily one for urban renewal, through a true long-term cooperative partnership

between the public and private sectors.

Despite its apparent exemplification of partnership in the PPP concept, research on joint

venture PPPs remains underdeveloped, though this is likely an outcome of limited opportunities

for study when compared with other types of PPP. The literature does highlight several cases,

such as the redevelopment of specific property assets in central cities in the United States

(Grimsey & Lewis, 2004) and the European Union (Nijkamp et al., 2002; Saz-Carranza &

Longo, 2012), as well as the development of water and energy infrastructure in developing

countries (UNDP, 2000). Perhaps the most extensive application of joint venture PPPs has been

the Japanese ‘third sector’ approach to development in the 1980s wherein the public, or ‘first

sector’ engages in partnerships with the private, or ‘second sector’ to develop specific projects

through the creation of third sector joint venture companies. By 1995, the Japanese public sector

held shares of at least 25 percent in over 7,850 third sector entities engaged in a range of

activities, though many struggled to become profitable with ninety-nine entering bankruptcy

between 1996 and 2000 alone (Kagami, 2002).

Such experiences elicit several questions regarding joint venture PPPs. Are they

achieving their performance goals? What risks and rewards are involved? How is accountability

affected? And are they an effective management and organizational structure? The case of

HKDL is one pertinent example of such a PPP, and its analysis provides some insight into

answering these questions.

PUBLIC  MANAGEMENT  REVIEW   6  

PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN JOINT VENTURE PPPs

The task of evaluating performance and accountability in a joint venture PPP and ensuring that

the evaluation is theoretically comprehensive, appropriate, and effective remains a considerable

challenge. There are two important issues to overcome. The first is related to the lack of a

consistent and suitable evaluation methodology. Many ‘toolkits’ exist to evaluate PPPs, though

each differs in design, application, and underlying theory, and no single method appears to be

suitable for evaluating a joint venture PPP where performance is heavily dependent on the

complexities of the cooperative relationship between partners. This underlines the need for

developing a new approach.

The second issue is that of context. The evaluation is likely to be contested based on

different expectations of performance from a range of stakeholders. Therefore, the researcher

must consider a number of perspectives and ask the questions that elicit a complete account of

performance in accordance with guiding theories. A recent contribution that has helped to

clarify and simplify both problems is the work of Jeffares et al. (2009), who review the existing

PPP evaluation literature and attempt to define a common theoretical foundation for future

evaluation methodologies in this area. They begin by explaining that evaluations can adhere to

either a narrow or wide conceptualization of PPP performance: narrow consists of measuring the

achievement of particular goals as set out in the official partnership agreement, while the wide

conceptualization considers the longer-term relationship beyond the delivery of a specified

product and the wider benefits to individuals, partners, citizens, and service users.

Based on the two types of conceptualization, Jeffares and associates identify six primary

performance domains in a PPP: policy (goal achievement); democracy (democratic principles);

transformation (the production of new public sector behaviours); connectivity (the stimulation of
HIGGINS  &  HUQUE   7  

innovation); coordination (production of synergies); and coalition (sustainability of the

partnership). As different types of partnership entail different expectations of performance, new

evaluation toolkits need to be developed that cater to the various types of PPP. Utilizing the six

domains as a base, the evaluator can ask a range of questions from the perspectives of different

stakeholders and begin to realize a more comprehensive and balanced account of PPP

performance. However, even with such a comprehensive theoretical basis, Jeffares et al. (2009)

note that formulating a truly definitive account of performance in a PPP is likely unfeasible

given the inherently political context in which they exist.

Nevertheless, this work is useful for establishing a theoretical foundation on which to

build. Any approach to the evaluation of joint venture PPPs must consider the venture from both

a narrow view of contractual performance and broader performance ‘beyond the contract’. As

well, the evaluation must analyze the partnership according to its performance within the six

performance domains. Populating this framework requires asking the right questions. For that

we propose an evaluation methodology that considers joint venture PPPs across two primary

dimensions: as a joint venture business and as a partnership between public and private actors.

Joint Venture PPPs as a Business

Regarding the first dimension, the literature dedicated to analyzing the performance of joint

ventures among private sector actors is well developed. Business management studies have long

taken a wide perspective in examining the inter-partner factors contributing to the performance

of international joint ventures [IJVs] between firms from different countries and cultures, and

research in this area can extend to evaluations of joint venture PPPs.

While a number of papers have sought to illuminate the inner-workings of IJVs, Ren et

al. (2009) offer a review of over thirty years of research on their performance indicators and
PUBLIC  MANAGEMENT  REVIEW   8  

identify ten important performance drivers that directly or indirectly affect the relationship

between partners and five measures for gauging overall performance. Both the performance

measures and performance drivers combine to form a conceptual model (Figure 1).

 
Figure 1 A Conceptual Model of International Joint Venture Performance

The strength of this approach as applied to the context of joint venture PPPs is that it is focused

on the process management factors that are required to facilitate the long-term relationship of an

alliance model of PPP. Furthermore, its performance measures and drivers consider a number of

the PPP performance domains identified by Jeffares et al. (2009). For example, the achievement

of objectives examines issues related to the policy domain, connectivity and coordination are

examined through inter-partner performance drivers, the transformative power of a PPP for each

partner is accounted for in learning and its reciprocal effects, and both the performance measures
HIGGINS  &  HUQUE   9  

and drivers affect the strength and sustainability of the coalition. But in keeping with the

challenge of complexity in evaluating PPPs, additional analysis is required for a holistic

evaluation of joint venture PPP performance.

 
Joint Ventures as a PPP: Democratic Accountability

One obvious shortcoming in the application of the IJV framework to joint venture PPPs is that it

offers no assessment of the democracy performance domain, which centres on principles of

democratic accountability. Issues related to this domain have long been an acknowledged

challenge in LTIC PPPs due to mixing of public and private lines of accountability. However, it

is also becoming clear that the vacuum of democratic accountability in a PPP is to some extent

being supplemented by a focus on technical evaluations of output or results as the main

benchmark of accountability (Forrer et al., 2010). Nevertheless, questions remain over the

degree to which output legitimacy corresponds to or replaces democratic legitimacy and critics

continue to point to a serious deficit of democratic accountability in the governance of PPPs

(Willems & Van Dooren, 2011). In this sense, like LTIC PPPs, some loss of democratic

accountability should be expected in a joint venture PPP. Thus the question in evaluating this

performance domain is not one of whether democratic principles are affected, but by how much.

Compared to LTIC PPPs, maintaining principles of democratic accountability in a public-

private joint venture is even more complex as it entails greater mixing of what have traditionally

been two very different standards of accountability for the public and private sectors. As Mulgan

(2000) explains, in general, the actions of managers in large proprietary firms are typically

accountable to shareholders with little if any accountability to the general public. By extension,

the overall approach to a joint venture from a private partner is contingent on its value to the firm
PUBLIC  MANAGEMENT  REVIEW   10  

based on its objectives for the project, which may extend beyond basic profitability to other

strategic considerations.

In contrast, while the public partner might also be acting in pursuit of similar

entrepreneurial goals, public sector accountability is generally much more stringent and the

actions of public actors are subject to continuous public scrutiny. A joint venture PPP combines

the structures of public and private accountability together into one project, blurring the

traditional lines between each and creating an additional layer of density in the relationship when

compared to a private-private venture. What results is a web of different accountability

standards that present a unique challenge for public managers who, in addition to their

accountability to the public, also need to consider not only how they will hold their private

partners to account, but also how they themselves will be accountable to their private partner

(Forrer et al., 2010).

The mixing of accountability can be a natural source of tension and conflict between

partners. Both sectors have historically different ‘institutional logics’, and integrating them into

a single organizational entity poses a number of challenges (Saz-Carranza & Longo, 2012).

Externally, the venture may come to be seen as a quasi-public enterprise and evaluated according

to its contribution to the public or common good. Yet public demands for openness run counter

to private principles of confidentiality. Such accountability issues can have a direct effect on a

partner’s approach to the venture and if not properly managed, can degrade performance in terms

of accountability and the achievement of objectives. The case of HKDL is useful for expanding

on these issues in greater detail.

Subsequently, the issue of accountability is measured in a joint venture PPP in two ways.

Internal accountability relates to how actors from both sectors must work together for common
HIGGINS  &  HUQUE   11  

goals and performance along this dimension is measured by inter-partner performance drivers in

the IJV framework. In some ways the different standards of accountability for each partner

could be reflected in the IJV evaluation framework in measures of culture distance. But in

general, both democratic and market accountability can be understood as external to the IJV

framework and act as the overall ‘lens’ through which each partner approaches and interacts with

the project. In this way, each performance measure and driver has both a public and private

dimension.

The second area in which accountability affects a joint venture PPP is externally, where

the actions of partners are held to account by the broader public. Measuring external

accountability necessitates collecting and analyzing information on how the PPP is performing

with regards to public inclusiveness and support, collaborative planning, and issues related to

secrecy and transparency. It is this dimension that forms the basis of evaluating democratic

accountability in joint venture PPPs.

METHODOLOGY

Operationalizing the evaluative framework requires a significant amount of information. The

case study of HKDL primarily utilizes publicly available quantitative and qualitative data from

the Government and Legislative Secretariats of the Hong Kong Government, such as planning

documents, briefing papers, and economic assessments. This information is supplemented by

periodical articles collected over a number of years to expand on the evolution of the project in

the local context as well as academic research from business and cultural studies. While the

venture does feature one public partner, its nature as a commercial enterprise means that

information for measures of justice, details of the cooperative relationship, and conflict

resolution mechanisms from the evaluation framework are not available. Nevertheless, the
PUBLIC  MANAGEMENT  REVIEW   12  

extent of public information does allow for an interesting and reasonably comprehensive

assessment of the performance of HKDL to date.

PERFORMANCE OF THE HKDL JOINT VENTURE PPP

Utilizing the framework outlined above, the analysis will first consider inter-partner project

performance drivers and performance measures followed by an examination of democratic

accountability. To avoid duplication, the analysis of some performance drivers and performance

measures from Figure 1 have been combined due to overlap in their respective conceptual areas

when applied to the case of HKDL.

Project Performance Drivers

Goal Compatibility

Compatibility in goals among partner firms in general is not likely an issue as both parties

considered the park mutually beneficial. In the late 1990s, Disney began to consider options for

opening its next theme park in the Asia-Pacific region. After returning from a trip to China in

1998, Disney Chairman and Chief Executive Michael Eisner noted a strong potential market for

their products, stating that “The Chinese people love Mickey no less than Big Mac” (Iritani,

1999) and began negotiations with the Hong Kong Government. Several months later, final

contracts were signed and the public-private joint venture company Hong Kong International

Theme Parks Limited [HKITP] was created to develop HKDL.

Eager to learn from its experiences at the wildly successful Tokyo Disneyland Resort

where it had negotiated only a simple royalty fee, Disney would contribute HK$2.45 billion and

take an ownership stake of 43 percent in HKDL to better capitalize on its expected profitability.

Additionally, Disney seemed determined to avoid the mistakes of Disneyland Paris by promoting
HIGGINS  &  HUQUE   13  

a plan for a gradual expansion of attractions rather than take on the risk of constructing a sizable

park all at once (Reckard, 1999).

For its contribution of HK$3.25 billion for the remaining 57 percent of shares, the Hong

Kong Government anticipated economic development benefits totaling HK$168 billion after 40

years (Government Secretariat, 1999b). Assuming all went according to plan, the payback

period for the Government’s contribution was to be a mere five years, after which it would

consider selling its stake to private investors (Government Secretariat, 1999a). These projections

came to be known as ‘Base Case Scenario A’ and formed the overall framework on which the

economic feasibility of the HKDL project was grounded, though the Government prepared its

own set of derivative Base Case Scenarios B to F based on slower growth assumptions.

Nevertheless, Scenario A was considered by Disney and the Government as a “prudent view of

what is likely to happen” and “certainly not the most optimistic assessment”, noting that “an

economic assessment carried out by Walt Disney’s consultants suggests that considerably higher

return might accrue to the Hong Kong economy.” (Government Secretariat, 1999a, p. 2)

Culture Distance

Differences in culture between Disney and the Government, both in terms of their international

backgrounds and their public and private nature, may affect joint venture performance, though

no information is publicly available that details the nature of the internal working relationship.

The public-private dimension has come to create some tension in the public sphere, and this will

be explored further below. Furthermore, interviews of HKDL employees conducted by Choi

(2012) give some indication of a difference in culture related to employment practices. Other

issues associated with cultural sensitivity are included in the section dedicated to learning.
PUBLIC  MANAGEMENT  REVIEW   14  

Control and Bargaining Power

Satisfactory performance in a joint venture is to some extent a function of bargaining power and

the relative control held by each partner. But the case of HKDL illustrates several issues related

to each. Structurally, the Hong Kong Government maintains strategic and operational control

over the joint venture through its ability to appoint a majority of directors to the HKITP board.

However, both the share and control structure of HKITP do not reflect an even distribution of

control relative to risk capital contributions. While the Government contributed HK$3.25 billion

for a 57 percent stake in the project alongside Disney’s HK$2.45 billion for 43 percent, the true

costs of constructing HKDL were far greater for the public sector than reflected in the contracted

share ratio.

Government documents reveal that when accounting for the costs of a HK$6.1 billion

below-market rate loan and HK$13.6 billion land for reclamation, infrastructure works,

environmental cleanup, and other related development, the Hong Kong Government contributed

an additional HK$21.3 billion to the venture. Approximately HK$4 billion of this was to be paid

by HKITP to the Hong Kong Government for the purchase of reclaimed lands used for the

construction of the park, but this was later waived upon petition by Disney that the project would

be unfeasible with the added debt load (Legislative Council Secretariat, 2006). Considering

these contributions alongside its initial equity stake, the public sector has contributed a total of

HK$24.55 billion, or 84 percent of the total dollars spent. In terms of raw capital, clearly the

Hong Kong Government has much more at risk than its partner.

Disney also maintains resource-based bargaining power over its control of the end

product through its sole ownership of Hong Kong Disneyland Management Limited, with the

Government exercising no influence on day-to-day operations other than through its oversight of
HIGGINS  &  HUQUE   15  

the venture as a whole. Taken together, such a split of ownership relative to capital and control

over operations is likely to play a large role in defining the bargaining power dynamics between

the partners, and this issue will continue to inform the assessment of further indicators below.

Conflict and Commitment

Unequal power and control relationships between partners are likely to result in increased

conflict and transaction costs as well as questions of each partner’s commitment to the

partnership. Despite the unequal share to capital ratio, the sunk costs by both parties and long

time horizon mean that they are unlikely to terminate the project. However, there have already

been several instances in which tensions between the partners have become publicly apparent.

Early Issues: Immediately after opening, the operation of HKDL was subject to a number of

issues that eroded confidence in the venture. In one example, government health inspectors

dispatched to the park to investigate reports of food poisoning were asked to remove their

uniforms before entering, drawing the ire of legislators who commented that “Disneyland does

not stand above the law” and referred to these actions as “unacceptable” and “out of line” (Choi,

2012). HKDL’s most visible early public relations setback came during the Lunar New Year

celebrations of 2006, wherein overbooking related to a lack of restrictions on the use of tickets

for the holiday week caused thousands of patrons holding valid tickets to be barred from entering

the park on February 1st and 2nd, with some going so far as to climb or hand children over the

gates. Disney’s failure to issue an apology or to enact appropriate measures to prevent a similar

incident on the second day led the media to label the park “Hong Kong’s Shame” and prompted

the Government to draft a press release calling on Disney to “make improvements” (Choi, 2012).
PUBLIC  MANAGEMENT  REVIEW   16  

Expansion Negotiations: The closest the relationship has come to outright conflict in the public

sphere came during negotiations to expand the park. In an effort to increase attendance, the

Hong Kong Government and Disney sought to expand the number of theme areas from four to

seven. But during the negotiation process, the Government expressed its frustrations by making

public its refusal to inject any new capital into the project. In response, Disney prepared a press

release in March of 2009 stating that a suitable arrangement for expansion could not be reached

with its partner and as such, it was withdrawing from negotiations and terminating the jobs of 30

Hong Kong-based ‘Imagineers’ in charge of designing the new areas (Balfour & Einhorn, 2009).

This prompted the Government to announce that Disney’s decision left it “puzzled” and

expressing “grave concern”, noting that such a move will not be conducive to continued

discussions (Lau, 2009).

By June of 2009 both parties were eventually able to reach a deal, with Disney funding

the entire expansion through approximately HK$3.5 billion in new capital, increasing its

ownership stake to 48 percent while the Government will convert part of its outstanding HK$6.1

billion loan into equity to maintain a controlling interest. The Government also secured a period

of exclusivity for the new attractions and negotiated a change in the management fee to

incentivize performance, a change that would have resulted in Disney earning 90 percent less of

its fees since the park opened had it not agreed to waive them for 2007 and 2008 (Legislative

Council Secretariat, 2009b).

Shanghai Disneyland Resort: Expansion negotiations also revealed another facet of the unequal

power relationships between the partners and raised questions regarding Disney’s psychological

and behavioural commitment to Hong Kong. One position alluded to for many years was the

possibility of Disney opening a second Disneyland in Mainland China. While Disney first
HIGGINS  &  HUQUE   17  

openly admitted it was at least looking to Shanghai in 2006 (Leung, 2006), some observers

speculated during expansion negotiations that Disney was disinterested in funding a serious

expansion of HKDL due to an impending deal with Mainland authorities. Rumours of the deal

proved to be true in November of 2009 when Disney announced plans for Shanghai Disneyland

Resort, a park that would be approximately ten times the size of Hong Kong’s at opening

(Balfour, 2009). With Mainland tourists a major market for HKDL, the easier access to a larger

theme park in Shanghai was seen by some as a major blow to the park’s long-term prospects,

though Disney executives reassured the Government that Hong Kong will maintain its

competitive edge and continue to attract visitors from Southern China (Shen & Zeidler, 2009).

Measures of Project Performance

Learning

Outside of Disney’s eagerness to learn from its lack of ‘skin in the game’ in Tokyo Disney and

its over-exposure to risk in the case of Disneyland Paris, several initiatives were undertaken to

increase the appeal of HKDL to the local and Mainland Chinese population. Matusitz (2011)

explains that Disney has made changes to the non-core elements of the Disneyland experience

along four dimensions: (1) a reduction in prices relative to other Disney parks; (2) an adaptation

to local visitors’ customs, such as tighter integration with tour operators, multilingual attractions,

local food items, and a redesign of Mickey and Minnie Mouse to sport traditional Chinese attire;

(3) a change in decor and settings including designing the physical infrastructure of the park to

promote feng shui; and (4) an acclimatization to local labour practices. Nevertheless, other

researchers have argued that the core of the product remains fundamentally, and even arrogantly

unchanged in pursuit of an ‘authentic’ Disney experience, reiterating that Disney did not
PUBLIC  MANAGEMENT  REVIEW   18  

conceive of the project as Hong Kong Disneyland, but rather as Disneyland in Hong Kong (Choi,

2012; Fung & Lee, 2009).

Disney has also attempted to overcome what Fung and Lee (2009) described as a general

lack of knowledge of Disney characters and the values associated with them by increasing its

television presence in Mainland China, where nearly 24 hours of daily programming now reach

more than 300 million viewers (Yung, 2012). For their part, Disney executives have been

forthcoming with regards to the challenges HKDL has faced to date, with Walt Disney Parks and

Resorts chairman Jay Rasulo commenting “Have we made some mistakes? Absolutely. We are

in a brand-new market. We have to keep listening and keep learning.” (Schuman, 2006) But

perhaps the most valuable knowledge Disney has gained from HKDL will be applied outside of

the joint venture as it works to ensure that Shanghai Disneyland Resort becomes a success in the

Mainland market.

Beyond Disney, information related to learning on the part of the Hong Kong

Government has proven difficult to obtain, though crucially, it continues to seek to allow more

Mainland Chinese tourists to visit the territory through the expansion of the Individual Visitor

Scheme to more cities in concert with Mainland authorities. This has resulted in a more than

1,000 percent increase in tourists from Mainland China since the handover in 1997 according to

data from the Hong Kong Tourism Board.

Financial Output, Goal Achievement, and Overall Satisfaction

The strongest indicator of the performance of the HKDL joint venture is the park’s financial

performance since opening in 2005. The initial goal in the early stages of planning was to

achieve attendance of 5.2 million visitors in the first year, growing to nearly 10 million by the

year 2024. However, Disney informed the Government in 2002 that it considered the attendance
HIGGINS  &  HUQUE   19  

projections of Base Case Scenario A from 1999 too conservative and revised its figures upward

to 5.6 million visitors in the first year (Legislative Council Secretariat, 2012). Yet as Figure 2

reveals, initial attendance results at the park have been disappointing.

FIGURE 2 Projected and Actual Attendance, 2005-2025

 10    
 9    
 8    
A"endance  (Millions)  

 7    
 6    
 5    
 4     Actual  A3endance  
Scenario  A  
 3     Scenario  B  
 2     Scenario  C  
Scenarios  D,  E,  F  
 1     Revised  ProjecFon  
 -­‐    

While HKITP refused to release official attendance numbers for the first two years of

operations, Government reports show that first-year attendance was shy of Disney’s revised

projections and that by 2006, visitor numbers had dropped to 4 million (Legislative Council

Secretariat, 2012). Official results since then show attendance gradually improving to Scenario

B and Scenario A levels over the last two years. But considering the Government itself noted

that “the success of the project lies in its ability to attract adequate patronage both within and

outside Hong Kong” (Government Secretariat, 1999c), the early performance of Hong Kong

Disneyland Resort has fallen short of expectations.

PUBLIC  MANAGEMENT  REVIEW   20  

As a result, HKDL’s early financial output has been below what were considered worst-

case projections along several indicators. Calculations by the authors based on an analysis

conducted by the Legislative Council Secretariat (2009a) utilizing the methodology presented by

the Government Secretariat (1999b) reveal that while the additional length of stay of visitors

exceeded expectations, total spending and value added to the local economy was below the most

conservative estimations of Scenario F (Table 1).

TABLE 1 Summary of Initial Results since Opening, Projection Years 2005-2007 and
Fiscal Years 2006-2008
Actual,
Projection Scenarios 2005-2007*
FY2006-
A B C D E F 2008*
Attendance
15.9 15.1 14.3 11.9 11.9 11.0 13.8
(Millions)
Additional length of stay of base
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.7
tourists (nights)
Additional spending of all
29.6 28.3 24.9 23.0 20.2 18.7 17.0
visitors to HKDL (HK$ billions)
Value added to Hong Kong
19.3 18.5 16.0 15.1 13.2 12.0 10.0
economy (HK$ billions)
*The Hong Kong Government of Hong Kong uses Fiscal Years to calculate its assessment, which run from
April 1 to March 31. However, original attendance projections were made for the year September to August.
Therefore, the comparison of fiscal to projection years serves to provide an approximate assessment.

The park’s low attendance has been blamed on a number of factors, such as the damaging

cultural and public relations missteps and lack of product knowledge cited earlier. Hong Kong

Disneyland also faces competition from Ocean Park, a local theme park that coincidentally has

posted its best attendance numbers since HKDL opened, as well as regional attractions such as

Singapore’s Universal Studios theme park (Balfour, 2009). The size of HKDL is another

frequently cited reason as it opened with only 16 attractions compared to 52 for Disneyland Paris

(Schuman, 2006) and its area of 130 hectares makes it by far the smallest Disneyland in the

world (Ewing, 2006).

HIGGINS  &  HUQUE   21  

Like attendance, it has been difficult to ascertain the true financial viability of HKDL

since opening. The independent group Euromonitor estimated operating losses of HK$357

million for the year ending June 2006, rising to HK$1.3 billion the following year (Balfour &

Einhorn, 2009). The first official admission of financial difficulties from within the joint venture

came in 2007 when, similar to Paris, Disney agreed to waive its management and royalty fees.

After HKDL began issuing official results in 2009, the park has recorded respective net losses of

HK$ 1.6 billion, HK$1.3 billion, HK$718 million, and HK$237 million from 2008 to 2011.

Attendance and revenues are improving, and efforts to overcome initial issues by both Disney

and the Hong Kong Government are reflected in HKDL’s most recent figures for 2012, which

show that it has turned its first profit of HK$109 million. The park’s improved performance

appears to largely be a product of attracting more Mainland visitors, whose numbers have

doubled from 1.5 million to 3 million between 2008 and 2012, driving their proportion up from

34 to 45 percent of total attendees according to HKDL financial statements.

Democratic Accountability in the HKDL PPP

Secrecy, Transparency, and Community Engagement

Hong Kong Disneyland was justified by the Government as a major economic stimulus, but

assessing whether the project was meeting these goals was initially difficult if not impossible.

The fist sign of a lack of community engagement and secrecy on the part of the Hong Kong

Government came with the announcement of the HKDL project itself. Hayllar (2010) notes that

like many recent large economic development partnerships in the territory, the partnership with

Disney was abruptly revealed by the government executive without any prior consultation with

the legislature or broader community. This appears to have set the tone for the project as a
PUBLIC  MANAGEMENT  REVIEW   22  

whole, as public accountability issues related to secrecy and transparency have long affected the

performance of the project as a PPP.

Because the HKDL project features the Hong Kong Government as its majority

shareholder, it is largely viewed as a quasi-public business by legislators, the press, and the

broader community (Choi, 2012), and many have argued they have a right to know the details of

the joint venture. But as HKITP is a private company, it is under no obligation to disclose

anything it views as sensitive information and both Disney and the Government are bound by a

confidentiality agreement due to the commercial nature of the project. As such, a lack of

transparency in park operations has been a constant area of public discontent since the very

beginning, though criticism intensified after opening.

For example, in September of 2005, two members of the Legislative Council raised

concerns over the amount of secrecy in the financial aspects of the deal between the Government

and Disney (Crets, 2005). In October of the same year, the Disney took the step of sealing

blueprints for the park from public view, leading one Legislative Council member to remark that

“[Disney] is not a transparent organization and it’s not very accountable to the public even

though at least half of the whole [HKDL] project is being funded by taxpayer’s money” (Ma,

2005). But rather than cede to demands for transparency, the Government reaffirmed its support

of this arrangement in December of 2005, arguing that it has no desire to undermine the

commercial sensitivity of the deal despite the large public stake in the project (Hong Kong

Government, 2005).

Subsequently, attendance and financial figures were consistently withheld for several

years of operations. The first attempt to gauge attendance by other means came when the Asia

Times dispatched two reporters to count visitors and estimated the numbers were falling short of
HIGGINS  &  HUQUE   23  

the daily totals needed to reach projections (Ewing, 2006). Problems with a lack of transparency

in the arrangement are best reflected in the Government’s own attempts to assess the park’s

performance between 2006 and 2008, where it resorted to surveys conducted by the Hong Kong

Tourism Board to establish that HKDL was not meeting its preliminary goals (Legislative

Council Secretariat, 2009a).

Some progress has been made since opening. In an effort to counter criticism over the

lack of transparency and accountability within HKITP, the Government announced in 2006 that

it had exercised its right to appoint two non-executive directors from the private sector to the

board (Young & Liu, 2007). Several of the venture’s more pressing democratic accountability

issues were resolved during the negotiation of expansion plans for the park, with the Government

requiring annual disclosure of key operating and financial results from HKDL starting with the

2008-2009 operational year. Nevertheless, some Legislative Council members continue to

request more detail and seek a mechanism to ensure a public audit of park expenditures

(Legislative Council Secretariat, 2012).

Broader PPP Context in Hong Kong

To some extent, the problems noted above are reflective of broader issues related to governance

in Hong Kong and their effect on PPP projects. The Hong Kong Government maintains an

extensive history of public, private, and non-governmental cooperation for the provision of

economic infrastructure and social services. But the use of PPPs in Hong Kong has not been

without issue.

While the territory has long been regarded as one of the least corrupt places in which to

conduct business, Hayllar (2010, p. S112) argues that “standards of governance, procedural

fairness and transparency, as well as the development of mutual trust between the government
PUBLIC  MANAGEMENT  REVIEW   24  

and public are, in many respects, lacking.” As a result, transparency and accountability in PPPs

suffers. In Hayllar’s (2010, p. S112) words, “the official secrecy that frequently shrouds such

projects goes well beyond the possibly justifiable demands of commercial confidentiality and

tends to reflect the arrogance of decision-makers who capitalize on the fact that they cannot be

held directly accountable to any electorate.” Common (2000, p. 138) raised similar concerns,

noting that the heavily centralized control structures of semi-authoritarian political systems such

as Hong Kong’s results in a local context for PPPs that “appears unpromising”. Such sentiment

leads Hayllar (2010, p. S110) to conclude that this style of government “poses the biggest

challenge and barrier to PPP development in Hong Kong” and as such, PPPs in the territory

would be better understood as ‘Government-Private’ rather than ‘Public-Private’.

PPP Performance Appraisal

Utilizing information collected according to this evaluation structure, we can now begin to

populate the six primary PPP performance domains and consider the overall performance of the

HKDL joint venture PPP to date:

Policy: Is the HKDL project achieving its stated goals? Levels of attendance, revenue, and value

added to the local economy have not achieved original projections. However, recent results

show the project may yet achieve its objectives, although the impact of future developments such

as the opening of Disneyland in Shanghai remains to be seen.

Transformation: The HKDL project has not produced any publicly visible transformation in the

behaviour of the public sector. But in this case, the Hong Kong Government has a history of

acting entrepreneurially through its promotion of public-private cooperation in a number of

areas. Transformation has occurred with regards to learning. Disney has adjusted its strategy in
HIGGINS  &  HUQUE   25  

the Asia-Pacific region and the Hong Kong Government has increased transparency by securing

the release of official results.

Connectivity: Has the partnership produced innovation and value for the partners? The HKDL

project is not likely to have otherwise been achievable had each party acted alone. The bulk of

the Government’s added value to the project came early on through its access to low-cost capital

and a reduction in policy and construction risk attributable to its local knowledge. Disney’s

management expertise is required over the long term. Such a scenario may see the partnership

evolve as the Government reduces its equity in the project over time after a reasonable return as

per its original objectives.

Coordination: How well have the partners been able to coordinate? Both brought compatible

goals and a common purpose to the project and constructed the park on time and within budget,

though issues related to public accountability and conflict during expansion negotiations have

negatively affected coordinative performance.

Coalition: Is the partnership sustainable? The inability to achieve policy goals, the considerable

public capital at risk, and questions of Disney’s commitment created observable tension between

partners. The fact that both were able to work together to overcome many of these issues is a

testament to the facilitation of a functional inter-partner relationship. The sustainability of the

coalition appears promising should the project’s policy goals continue to be met, but information

on the internal cooperative relationship is not publicly available.

Democracy: Outside of policy goals, the biggest issue affecting the performance of HKDL is that

of democratic accountability as evidenced in the project’s high levels of secrecy and a lack of
PUBLIC  MANAGEMENT  REVIEW   26  

transparency and community engagement. Transparency has improved, although much of this

issue is related to the territory’s system of representative government and its effect on the

broader PPP context in Hong Kong.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

The case of Hong Kong Disneyland Resort is significant for bringing together the local public

sector and a transnational private corporation as equity partners in a long-term joint venture PPP.

However, a number of issues have resulted in negative impacts on the performance of the

project. Of the six performance domains, major challenges are limited to the areas of policy,

coordination, coalition, and particularly democracy, although steps have been and continue to be

taken to improve each. This analysis suggests that after facing considerable initial difficulties,

the project at present appears to be performing reasonably well. Still, as a long-term venture, it

is too early to render a final judgment on absolute performance.

What does this case tell us about joint venture PPPs more broadly? Though HKDL is but

one example and the case of a theme park is rare, its analysis nonetheless provides important

preliminary insight into a previously under-explored area of PPP research. In terms of deriving

accountability from results and the achievement of objectives, a first conclusion is that in

contrast to LTIC PPPs, a joint venture PPP is not associated with risk transfer but entails

significant risk exposure for both parties. Despite the best intentions of partners, there is

considerable risk of achieving less than desirable results and furthermore, uneven capital

contributions from partners can skew incentives to increase performance.

The second and most important facet of ensuring output performance in a joint venture

PPP is in the management of the ‘process’ more so than management of a contract. Although

initial contracts are important, facilitating a strong principal-principal working relationship

HIGGINS  &  HUQUE   27  

between parties is fundamental for ensuring organizational collaboration and a partnership that

can navigate the ups and downs involved in a long-term joint venture with considerable amounts

of public and private capital at stake.

Within process management, a specific issue for joint venture PPPs in particular is the

natural tension between the boundaries of public and private accountability, requiring both

partners to walk a tightrope between public scrutiny and commercial sensitivity. Making a joint

venture PPP work requires a private partner willing to accept the potential of its actions being

held to account by the general public and an entrepreneurial public sector that can act quickly to

protect and produce a return on the investment of each partner, something that may stretch the

mandate and expertise of many public sector bodies. In both cases, the friction inherent in such a

complex web of accountability has the potential to strain the principal-principal relationship,

increase risks and transaction costs, and negatively affect performance.

This leads to important conclusions regarding democratic accountability in joint venture

PPPs. As in any PPP, a loss of democratic accountability is to be expected when mixing public

and private notions of accountability in one project. But in practice the impact of a joint venture

on democratic accountability will likely be mixed. By being a true partner in a process as

opposed to a holder of a contract, public actors should in theory exhibit more direct influence

over and within the partnership, striking a greater balance between democratic and results-

oriented performance compared to LTIC PPPs.

On the other hand, the potential for greater public accountability is confounded by the

stringent controls on public information that result from the imposition of commercial sensitivity

on the public partner. Experience with PPPs in general suggests such confidentiality concerns

will continue to take precedence, and this is a main reason for the shift in focus to output
PUBLIC  MANAGEMENT  REVIEW   28  

performance as accountability in PPPs. Nevertheless, the extent to which output legitimacy can

substitute or succeed democratic legitimacy in practice is unresolved. Furthermore, as the

HKDL case illustrates, democratic accountability is also a function of the particular governance

context in which the PPP operates, as wider deficits in democratic accountability will

undoubtedly be magnified within any PPP.

Beyond these initial conclusions, fully understanding the effectiveness, applicability, and

implications of joint ventures as an organizational structure for PPPs requires further study. To

that end, the evaluation framework builds on the theoretical foundations of PPP performance to

effectively capture the six performance domains and is broadly applicable to all joint venture

PPPs. Given the conflict between market and democratic accountability, data for other cases

may be difficult to obtain, particularly for information relating to the internal cooperative

relationship. Nevertheless, the extension of this method to additional cases will help planners

and practitioners to undertake a balanced, structured, and comprehensive evaluation of the

contractual and beyond the contract performance of this interesting, risky, potentially lucrative,

and under-explored type of partnership.

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